Annual Corrosion Survey Report 2013-14

Annual Corrosion Survey Report 2013-14
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INDEX
SL. NO.
DESCRIPTION
PAGE NO.
1.0
GUWAHATI REFINERY
10
1.1
DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU)
10
1.1.1
INTERNAL CORROSION OF TANK SHELL, ROOF &

STRUCTURE UNDER CG SERVICE
10
1.2
OFFSITE
13
1.2.1
FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT OF RISER TUBE IN

BOILER#07
13
2.0
BARAUNI REFINERY
18
2.1
CATALYTIC REFORMER UNIT (CRU)
18
2.1.1
FAILURE OF AIR FIN COOLER 03-EA-001A/B/C
18
2.2
ATMOSHPERIC VACUUM UNIT-1 (AVU-1)
22
2.2.1
CORROSION IN OVERHEAD AIR FIN COOLER OF

ATMOSPHERIC & PRE-TOPPING COLUMN)
22
2.3
OFFSITE
25
2.3.1
CORROSION OF FIXED ROOF IN TK-221
25
2.4
SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT (SRU)
26
2.4.1
FAILURE REPORT ON STEAM COIL IN TRAIN-I
26
3.0
GUJARAT REFINERY
31
3.1
VACUUM GAS OIL HYDROTREATING UNIT (VGOHDT)
31
3.1.1
TUBE FAILURE OF FRACTIONATOR BOTTOM MP

STEAM GENERATOR
31
3.2
VACUUM DISTILLATION UNIT (VDU)
33
3.2.1
LEAKAGE OF CONVECTION ZONE TUBE IN HEATER

(721-F1)
33
3.3
ATMOSPHERIC UNIT-I (AU-I)
35
3.3.1
FURNACE F1K2 PASS-2 (NORTH WALL) TUBE FAILURE
35
4.0
HALDIA REFINERY
39
4.1
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-II (CDU-II)
39
4.1.1
REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION TUBES

OF MAIN FURNACE (16-F-01)
39
4.2
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-I (CDU-I)
40
4.2.1
4.2.2
FAILURE OF DEPROPANIZER REBOILER (12-E-08)

INTERNAL CORROSION OF DIA. 8 LINE FROM
OVERHEAD CONDENSER TO ACCUMULATOR
40
42
4.3
43
4.3.1
INTERNAL CORROSION IN RGC CONNECTED PIPING
43
4.4
DIESEL HYDRO DE-SULPHURISATION (DHDS)
46
4.4.1
INTERNAL CORROSION AT STRIPPER GAS AMINE

ABSORBER COLUMN (25-C-03)
46
4.5
SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT-IV (SRU-IV)
49
4.5.1
4.5.2
CORROSION OF BANK TUBES OF INCINERATOR WHB

FAILURE OF REFRACTORY AT THE SHELL OF MCC
49
50
4.6
VACUUM DISTILLATION UNIT-II (VDU-II)
52
Page 6 of 140
SL. NO.
DESCRIPTION
4.6.1
SHELL FAILURE OF TERTIARY EJECTOR AFTER
CONDENSER (U-82)
PAGE NO.
52
4.7
MOTOR SPIRIT QUALITY UP-GRADATION (MSQU)
55
4.7.1
OFF-GAS LINE FAILURE TO 86-C-02 (SCRUBBER

COLUMN)
55
4.8
RESIDUE FLUIDIZED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT

(RFCCU)
57
4.8.1
TUBE BUNDLE FAILURE OF HP SEPARATOR

CONDENSER (18-E-25A/B)
SEVERE DAMAGE OF VIBROCAST LINING OF COLD
WALL RISER
57
4.9
THERMAL POWER STATION

MINERALIZED (DM) PLANT
DE-
60
4.9.1
FREQUENT LEAKAGES AT DIA 2 MB # 6 & 7 ACID

CHARGING LINE
60
4.10
OFFSITE
62
4.10.1
SEVERE CORROSION UNDER INSULATION OF SHELL

OF TANK NO. 713
SEVERE CORROSION UNDER INSULATION OF DIA 4
HO LINE TO 750 TANK FARM
62
5.0
MATHURA REFINERY
66
5.1
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT (CDU)
66
5.1.1
66
5.1.2
CRACKING OF CONVECTION ZONE HEATER TUBESHEETS

FAILURE OF CAST APH MODULES
5.2
DIESEL HYDRO DESULPHURIZATION (DHDS)
71
5.2.1
71
5.2.2
SEVERE TUBE END THINNING AND CORROSION OF

FRACTIONATOR OVERHEAD TRIM COOLER (02-AC-2)
SEVERE CORROSION OF STRIPPER COLUMN TRAYS
5.3
SOUR WATER STRIPPER UNIT (SWSU)
75
5.3.1
FAILURE OF RE-BOILER TUBE BUNDLE (303-E-01)
75
5.4
HYDROGEN GENERATION UNIT (HGU)
79
5.4.1
HYDROGEN BLISTERING IN STORAGE TANK BOTTOM

PLATE
79
5.5
OFFSITE
81
5.5.1
CORROSION UNDER INSULATION IN VGO TANK
81
6.0
PANIPAT REFINERY
84
6.1
HYDRO CRACKER UNIT (HCU)
84
6.1.1
CORROSION & PERFORATION IN THE TUBE OF HOT

SEPARATOR VAPOUR CONDENSER (75-EA-001 E)
84
6.2
MOTOR
SPIRIT
QUALITY
HYDROTREATER (MSQ NHT)
NAPHTHA
87
6.2.1
CORROSION & PERFORATION IN THE TUBES OF

COMBINED FEED EXCHANGER (301-E-101 B)
87
6.3
DIESEL HYDRO DE-SULPHURIZATION (DHDS) UNIT
90
6.3.1
TUBE LEAKAGE OF 52-EE-101C (1ST REACTOR FEED/
90
4.8.2
4.10.2
Page 7 of 140
(TPS)
&
58
63
69
73
SL. NO.
DESCRIPTION
EFFLUENT EXCHANGER)
6.4
DIESEL HYDROTREATING (DHDT) UNIT
93
6.4.1
TUBE LEAKAGE IN HP REAC (72-EA-1C)
93
6.5
PURIFIED TEREPHTHALIC ACID (PTA)
96
6.5.1
SHELL FAILURE OF DISSOLVER REACTOR (21-R11301)

INTERNAL SHELL CORROSION OF 1ST CRYSTALLIZER
(21-CR1-1401)
96
6.5.2
PAGE NO.
101
6.6
RESID FLUIDIZED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT

(RFCCU)
104
6.6.1
LEAKAGE IN INLET ECONOMISER HEADER IN COBOILER (07-LW-201)
104
6.7
CONTINUOUS
(CCRU)
UNIT
109
6.7.1
LEAKAGE IN BFW COIL OF 08-FF-205 DUE TO CAUSTIC

EMBRITTLEMENT
109
6.8
THERMAL POWER STATION (TPS)
115
6.8.1
FAILURE OF PLATEN SUPERHEATER COIL IN VHP

BOILER-2
115
6.9
OFFSITE
118
6.9.1
CORROSION
LOCATIONS
7.0
PANIPAT NAPHTHA CRACKER
120
7.1
UNIT
120
7.1.1
TRANSFER LINE EXCHANGERS FAILURES (H#700 SRTVI)
120
8.0
BONGAIGAON REFINERY
128
8.1
128
8.1.1
CORROSION OF REACTOR EFFLUENT FIN FAN

COOLER (22-ME-002) TUBES
DEW POINT CORROSION OF APH TUBES OF HOT OIL
FURNACE
128
8.2
133
8.2.1
HIGH TEMPERATURE OXIDATION

BURNER CASING PLATES
8.3
OFFSITE
135
8.3.1
PERFORATION OF TANK ROOF AND BOTTOM PLATE

CORROSION OF COKER RESIDUE TANK
TANK BOTTOM PLATE CORROSION/FAILURE OF
CRUDE TANK T-501
135
8.4
DELAYED COKER UNIT-I (DCU-I)
139
8.4.1
FAILURE OF 14-C-008 STAND PIPE
139
8.1.2
8.3.2
CATALYTIC
REFORMING
OF OFFSITE LINES AT SUPPORT
Page 8 of 140
OF
REFORMER
118
131
133
137
Page 9 of 140
1.0
GUWAHATI REFINERY
1.1
DELAYED COKER UNIT (DCU)
1.1.1 INTERNAL CORROSION OF TANK SHELL, ROOF & STRUCTURE UNDER

CG SERVICE
Introduction:
Tank no.95 and 96 were taken for M&I, due to severe perforation in fixed roof
plate and severe thinning of shell courses. The tanks were commissioned in
February 2003 and March 2003 respectively. Tk-95 was also taken for M&I in
October 2006, due to sinking of roof deck caused by Dip Hatch pipe stuck up.
The same was rectified & put back in operation by providing a sleeve pipe in
Dip Hatch. The tanks were internally painted with High Build Epoxy coating
paint system since commissioning.
Tank Details:
Service
Capacity
Roof type
Shell Courses
Diameter
Height
Plate Thickness
:
:
:
:
:
:
Density of Product
Coker Gasoline (CG) containing high sulphur

(~1200ppm) & Wild Naphtha routed from HDT Unit
having H2S (About 5-10ppm).
1, 300 M
Fixed cum Floating roof
08 nos.
12 Meter
11.5 Meter
Fixed roof-5.0mm, Shell courses - 8.0 / 6.0mm,
Deck - 6.0mm, Bottom - 8.0mm
0.730 gm / cc
Observations:
Entire fixed roof plate found to have severely corroded and paper thinned, due
to internal corrosion. UT thickness survey on shell courses revealed severe
thinning (Min. thickness - 2.0mm) from 3rd to 8th shell (top shell) courses.
Blackish deposit was noticed on the holes of perforated roof. Subsequent
upon roof plate cutting & access to tank internal, severe deep / dense
grooving with 1- 4 mm depth was observed on internal surface of shell
courses and Deck was found to have heavy deposits of scales & oil
accumulation.
Floating roof sealing system was found completely damaged making through
release of hydrocarbon on the space above the deck level.
One of the 8 Dip hatch pipe and 2 instrument pipe was found to have
deformed and bowed restricting upward movement of deck. Decks of both the
tanks appeared to be sunk, due to this restriction.
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Entire top trusses, rafters, angles were found severely corroded, thinned
down and perforated. Vertical / inclined angle supports holding top trusses
and rafters, were also found severely corroded and thinned down.
Page 11 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
Severe corrosion of internal surface of fixed roof, shell courses & roof
structures attributed to H2S vapour in the form of cloud from H2S present in
Coker Gasoline. The damage further accelerated, due to product reaching on
top of the deck that sunk and making evaporation of H2S rich Gasoline at
increased rate.
Repairs Carried Out:
Replacement of top six shell courses, roof along with structures and
deformed dip hatch pipe.
Renewal of internal coating.
Remedial Measures:
Rollers have been added for free movement of the deck along the dip
hatch pipe.
Up-gradation of existing internal painting system for Coker Gasoline and
HSD service from conventional epoxy system to improved system of
Solvent free epoxy coating by Air less spray.
Keeping Nitrogen blanketing system operational.
Page 12 of 140
1.2
OFFSITE
1.2.1 FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT OF RISER TUBE IN BOILER#07

Introduction:
Boiler-7 was brought down on 9th Mar.14, due to suspected tube leakage
inside the fire box. On opening, one riser tube (Tube # 20 from burner side) in
the roof portion was found leaking. Leak was from a 40 mm long split opening
in the tube. When the tube was longitudinally cut for internal inspection and
subsequent replacement, approx. 5 mm thick uniform and hard white deposit
was observed along the entire circumference. After detailed visual inspection,
thickness survey and Remote Visual Inspection (RVI), tube # 20 and the
adjacent tube (tube # 19) were replaced.
Observation and Jobs Carried Out:
The leaky Riser tube in the roof segment of the fire box was found opened
up over approx. 40 mm length. The failure was found to be a thick lip type
and followed minor localized bulging.
No thickness loss noticed in the leaky tube. However, overheating mark
was noticed on tubes near burner area including the failed tube.
Flaky pieces of hard white internal deposit were visible from the
longitudinal opening of the failed tube. After cutting the failed tube, about
5-6 mm thick hard and adherent white scale like deposit was noticed on
the entire circumference of internal surface. Deposit was found over the
80% length of the roof tube & the bend upstream as highlighted.
Page 13 of 140
To identify presence of such deposit in other roof tubes, RVI was carried
out from the steam drum end and the adjacent tube (Tube # 19) was found
to have similar kind of deposit. Mild and insignificant scaling was observed
on the bend of few more tubes. Remaining roof tubes were found free from
any such deposit. Due to construction of the boiler, RVI could be carried
out up to 1 Meter beyond the 900 bend only.
Internal visual condition of mud drum and steam drum was found
satisfactory. No significant deposition was observed and condition of
internals and pre-heater coils in mud drum was also satisfactory.
In view of the deposition noticed in tube no. 19, this tube was also cut
along with leaky tube number 20 up to the first bend. Due to non
availability of extra long radius bend, these were reused after manual
cleaning. The straight lengths of the tubes were however replaced in both
the cases.
White hard scale on internal surface of tube was collected and found to be
insoluble in water as well as acid. The sample was further analyzed with
the help of XRD & XRF testing carried out R&D centre, Faridabad. The
Page 14 of 140
finding indicated presence of silica in amorphous phase as primary

constituent. Detail of test result in described in Table 1& 2.
TABLE : 1
Result of XRF Analysis
1 Major
elements
Si
2
3
Minor
elements
Trace
Fe, Cu, Zn
Table 2
Result of XRD Analysis
SiO2 (quartz mainly with
small amount of Cristobalite)
with significant amorphous
phases. (Amorphous phases
cannot be identified using
powder XRD).
Very small amount of Iron
Oxide (Fe3O4 & FeO)
S, K, P, Ti,
Mg, Zr, Al,
Ca
Silica values of feed water for the past few months since Dec2013 was
analyzed and the same was found mostly in the range 0.2-0.6 ppm - much
above the allowable limit of 0.02 ppm.
Discussion on Causes of Failure:
The lip of the 40 mm split opening is thick and has not suffered any
thickness loss. The tube has 5 mm thick hard deposits along the inner
circumferential length and overheating marks on the tube external surface.
Considering above observations, cause of tube failure is due to long term
overheating rather than short term overheating as the same is
accompanied by thin lipped longitudinal rupture.
Present failure is characteristic of a long term creep damage which occurs

with little or no detectable changes in the tube wall thickness.
Silica in boiler feed water is present in the form of reactive and un-reactive
(colloidal) silica. In boiler drum, colloidal silica is converted into reactive
silica, due to high temperature and pressure conditions. Presence of silica
beyond allowable range in boiler feed water is harmful, as silica tends to
volatilize along with steam and gets deposited as glassy and hard scales.
Silica forms a dense porcelain-like scaling which is insoluble in acid and
has very low thermal conductivity. Build-up of silica on the walls of tube
can significantly reduce thermal transfer leading to overheating and
eventual rupturing of the tube.
Configuration of the riser tube is D type, connecting mud drum and

steam drum, as seen in figure-1. Two tubes, the leaky tube no. 20 and the
adjacent tube no. 19 has a different configuration with two additional 180
deg curves to accommodate peep hole openings at two different
elevations. This resulted in restriction of flow through these two tubes and
local drop in pressure resulting into steam blanketing.
Page 15 of 140
In present case of failure, insufficient circulation on account of the unusual

profile of the riser tube would have resulted in steam blanketing. Thus,
causing salts / impurities to concentrate on the wall of boiler tube. Under
such condition, Silica gets deposited and forms thick hard and dense scale
over a period of time. Thereby, decreasing heat transfer significantly and
increasing the tube temperature locally. Finally the tube ruptured, due to
long term overheating.
Conclusion / Actions required:
Level of silica in the drum shall be monitored and build-up of silica be

controlled by effective blow down at regular intervals.
Flame impingement shall be avoided and peep holes to be accordingly

modified for condition monitoring of fire box.
Feed water quality shall be strictly monitored w.r.t. silica content at out let
of Strong Acid Cation (SAC), Strong Base Anion (SBA) and Mixed Bed
(MB). Accordingly, change of resin shall be carried out.
Page 16 of 140
Page 17 of 140
2.0
BARAUNI REFINERY
2.1
2.1.1 FAILURE OF AIR FIN COOLER 03-EA-001A/B/C

Introduction:
CRU unit was taken under shutdown for reformer reactor catalyst
regeneration. Along with re-generation S/D, some other jobs were also
planned in the unit. The air fin coolers 03-EA-001 A/B/C (Reactor Effluent
Cooler) were opened for cleaning as per PN requirements. During this
occasion severe fouling of the coolers with Ammonium Chloride (NH4Cl)
deposit was observed at the inlet portion of tube sheet. On visual
inspection, tube end corrosion was noticed in all the coolers. Tubes with
corroded end were plugged followed by seal welding. Seal welding was
also done at corroded existing tube seal weld locations. Coolers were
taken in line after hydrotest @ 17kg/cm2 pressure.
During re-generation leakage was observed near the branch joint of 1 dia.
caustic line to 6 dia. inlet line. Thorough inspection of I/L & O/L lines by
ultrasonic thickness survey and visual inspection was carried out. After
replacement of thinned portion of lines as observed in UT survey, fin
coolers were taken in operation for re-generation activities.
During second stage regeneration and post oxy-chlorination, leakage was

again observed in all the three coolers. Subsequently while water filling
inside the tubes, a number of tubes started leaking.
In view of the poor reliability, air fin coolers 03-EA-001 A & C were
replaced with new air fin cooler meant for NSU service after seal welding
of all tubes and hydro testing at 17 kg/cm2 g pressure.
03-EA-001B was re-used after plugging and seal welding of 14 nos. of

tubes as identified in individual pneumatic tube testing.
Specification of AFC 03-EA-001 A/B/C

Parameter
Fluid
Operating Temp (deg C)
Operating Pr (kg/cm2g)
Material of Construction
Tube size
Tube Side
Reactor Effluent
Inlet-115-1200C/
Outlet- 55-600C
14 kg/cm2
SA 179 annealed; Al finned
Tube size: OD 25 mm x thk 3 mm x 276 no. each
Observations:
The unit was commissioned in 1997.
Page 18 of 140
AFC leakage observed for the first time since commissioning.

Heavy deposit of NH4Cl
was observed on the inlet
tube sheet of the coolers.
(refer Photo below).
Severe under deposit
corrosion was observed in
the inlet lines, tube end &
seal weld locations.
On ultrasonic thickness
survey, severe thinning
was observed in 6 dia.
inlet line of air fin cooler
adjacent
to
caustic
injection point.
Location of tube leakage
was within approx. 1 mtr
length from the tube sheet at the inlet end.
Jobs Carried Out:

The following jobs were carried out:
Thinned section of piping between inlet headers to air fin coolers was
replaced. Portion replaced were:
All 06 no. inlet line (Horizontal section); 6 dia.; SCH 40; A 106 Gr. B
material.
04 no. bends after horizontal portion (03-EA-001A&C); 6 dia.; SCH
40; A234 Gr. WPB
The air fin coolers 03-EA-001 A & C were replaced with available new
coolers meant for 01-EA-01 series.
Specification of 01-EA-001 A/B/C:

-
To suit to the new requirement following modifications were carried out in

retrofitted 03-EA-001 A&C:
Tube size: OD 25 mm x Thk 3 mm x 252 no.

Tube material: A 179 (annealed) CS
100% seal welding of the tubes was carried out by TIG process using
ER-70 S2 filler wire.
Dia. 3 O/L nozzles were replaced by 6 dia. SCH 80 nozzles to meet
the process requirement.
Old 03-EA-001B was re-used after
Individual pneumatic testing of the tubes to identify the leakage.

Page 19 of 140
Plugging of total 14 nos. of identified leaky tubes followed by seal

welding & DP test.
Provision of Isolation valves in both the inlet & outlet lines of 03-EA001B.
Hydrotest @ 17 kg/cm2 was carried out and found satisfactory.
After completion of hot jobs Hydrotest of the piping circuit from 03-EE-001
(Packinox) inlet header 03-EA-001 A/B/C Outlet header 03-EE004 was carried out at 17 kg/cm2 and found satisfactory. Hydrotest of the
new coolers 03-EA-001 A & C were also carried out along with the piping
circuit and no leakage was observed.
Reasons of Failure:
Under deposit corrosion due to deposition of abnormally high amount of

NH4Cl because of higher content of N in the feed.
Inadequate neutralization of HCl formed during re-generation
Recommendations:
The elements of air fin coolers 03-EA-001 A/B/C shall be replaced at the
earliest with present specification.
To improve the plant availability factor and to ensure uninterrupted unit
operation, metallurgy of all the three air fin coolers to be upgraded to
Super Duplex SS 2507 as a long term measure.
Caustic injection point shall be shifted to new location as advised by
Licensor M/s Axens.
Injection quill shall be provided for caustic injection to ensure proper
mixing & better dispersion.
Steps to be taken to control N content in the feed within the design limit.
Figure-1: Flow Diagram of CRU Unit
Page 20 of 140
Page 21 of 140
2.2
ATMOSHPERIC VACUUM UNIT-1 (AVU-1)
2.2.1 CORROSION IN OVERHEAD AIR FIN COOLER OF ATMOSPHERIC &

PRE-TOPPING COLUMN)
Introduction:
Atmospheric & Vacuum unit-1 (AVU-1) was taken on shutdown for M&I on
23.04.2013. Last M&I of the unit was carried out in Feb 2008. During this
shutdown, overhead air fin coolers of Atmospheric & Pre-topping column were
opened for inspection. IRIS (Internal Rotary Inspection System) of the tubes
was carried out. In Pre-topping overhead air fin cooler 601-AC-101A/B/C/D
where 30% to 50 % tube wall thickness loss observed in 117 tubes & in
Atmospheric overhead air fin cooler 601-AC-102 A/B/C/D 30% to 50 % wall
thickness loss observed in 91 tubes. These tubes were plugged & the fin
coolers were hydrotested.
Brief Flow Description of Air fin Cooler Circuit:
The overhead of Atmospheric column 601-K-2 (1180C-1250C) is cooled in air
fin coolers 601-AC-102A/B/C/D. Further cooling of O/H product is done in
condensers 601-T-18A/B/C by cooling water. Then water & gasoline is
separated in Reflux vessel 601-E-102.
Similarly pre-topping column (601-K-1) O/H product is cooled in air fin coolers
601-AC-101A/B/C/D. The further cooling of O/H product is done in
condensers 601-T-17A/B/C by cooling water. Then water & gasoline is
separated in Reflux vessel 601-E-1.
Specification of the Air Fin Coolers:
Sl.
No
1
2
3
5
6
7
4
Description
Dimension
Metallurgy
No of tubes
(each unit)
Design pressure
Design temp.
Operating temp.(in/out)
Hydrotest pressure
601-AC-102A/B/C/D
601-AC-101A/B/C/D
OD 25.4 x 2.77 mm
thk (min) x 9150 mm
Length
SA179
230
OD 25.4 x 2.77 mm
thk (min) x 9150 mm
Length
SA179
368
2.0kg/Cm2
163.50C
113.50C/ 650C
3.0 kg/cm2
3.2kg/cm2
172.10C (max.)
122.10C/ 650C
4.8 kg/cm2
Observations:
Internal Rotary Inspection System (IRIS) was carried out on Carbon Steel
SA179 tubes of AC-101A,B,C,D & AC-102 A,B,C,D to find out the wall loss &
remaining wall thickness present in the tubes
Page 22 of 140
Following are the major observations;

Sl.
No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AC-101A
AC-101B
AC-101C
AC101D
AC102A
AC-102B
AC102C
Wall loss
(10% to20%)
341
255
190
209
8
157
179
Wall loss
(20% to30%)
20
103
124
113
117
59
47
Wall loss
(30% to40%)
7
10
50
43
49
14
4
Wall loss
(40% to50%)
0
0
4
3
10
0
0
Tubes
plugged
7
10
54
46
59
14
04
AC102D
143
73
14
14
Equpt.
Tube plugging was carried out above 30% of the wall thickness loss as
recommended by IRIS agency.
Jobs Carried Out:

The tubes having appreciable thinning were plugged using CS plugs based on
IRIS report.
Reasons of Failure:
Corrosion in air fin cooler is primarily due to acid attack (aqueous HCL) at
the initial water condensation point (ICP), resulting in low pH conditions
and the associated aggressive corrosion of the systems metal surfaces.
Water condensation zone forms a small part of a cooler length where
damage is expected to be maximum.
This is attributed to slippage of chloride in the overhead stream and
ineffective corrosion inhibition.
This could be confirmed by observance of low pH and high Fe content in
the boot water.
The root cause of the failure is also attributed to poor desalter
performance. The salt content was observed high against limit of 1 ptb.
Page 23 of 140
Recommendations:
Optimum injection of neutralizer & corrosion inhibitor solution shall be

monitored & ensured to reduce overhead corrosion.
Steps shall be taken to improve desalter performance.
Action shall be taken for replacement of air fin coolers due to thinning of
tubes.
Page 24 of 140
2.3
OFFSITE
2.3.1 CORROSION OF FIXED ROOF IN TK-221

Introduction:
During ongoing pre-monsoon Inspection of storage tanks, severe corrosion
was been observed on the roof of Tank-221 (Service-HSD, Capacity-10000
M3, Type- Fixed Cone Roof Tank). The thickness of the roof plate is found to
have severely thinned down & cannot bear any load. It was advised to
barricade / cordon off the entrance to the roof of the tank.
History & Observation:
During pre-monsoon inspection, thinning as well as perforation of roof was

observed at peripheral locations i.e. from curb angle location.
M&I of the tank was carried out in Nov2007. Entire roof of the tank was
replaced with 5mm thick CS plate.
Internal painting of the top shell course and the roof underside was
recommended
during the M&I of the
tank.
External Thickness
based
inspection
was carried out as
per
schedule
in
Nov2010
which
revealed moderate
thickness loss of
1.5-2 mm.
Page 25 of 140
Jobs Carried Out:
Access to the roof has been blocked for safety.

The tank has been isolated for replacement of the roof.
Reasons of Failure:
HSD being lighter in nature generates VOC. The vapour thus generated is
accumulated in the space above the liquid level. Presence of abundant
amount of H2S moisture and vapour condense as droplets on the surface
of the tank causing severe pitting of the metal
The top shell course and the roof plate are susceptible to vapour space
corrosion in fixed roof tanks. Internal epoxy painting is usually carried out
to prevent such corrosion.
In this case, the reason of failure may be attributed to damage of internal
painting. Initiation of corrosion seems to be from intersection of shell and
roof where painting is difficult.
Recommendations:
Complete replacement of the fixed roof plate shall be carried out.

Internal epoxy painting of the roof and the top shell course shall be carried
out. Care shall be taken to ensure painting of the curb angle to roof
junction.
Page 26 of 140
2.4
SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT (SRU)
2.4.1 FAILURE REPORT ON STEAM COIL IN TRAIN-I

Introduction
A newly fabricated Steam Coil of Austenitic SS metallurgy was placed inside
the Sulphur Pit after satisfactory hydro test. However, due to unavoidable
circumstances, it was not commissioned & remained idle for 15 days. As a
result, during this idle period due to water seepage into the pit, it got
submerged in water. Subsequently, on hydro test prior to commissioning,
leakage was observed from many locations on steam coil header pipe close
to tube stub connection welding. Failed sections of header containing the
steam coil stubs were analyzed at R&D Centre, Faridabad for failure
investigation. Different tests on failed header were conducted at R&D Centre
and observations & findings are as mentioned below.
Observations:
General:
Steam coil of the sulphur pit comprised of dia. 6 inlet / outlet SS header
inter- connected with dia. 2 SS pipe.
Water accumulation inside the pit covering the whole of steam coil due to
seepage was reported to have very low Ph On laboratory analysis,
different constituents present in water were indicated as below:
Sample
Water inside Sulphur Pit
Water Ex SWS
F
43.4
-
pH of solution was highly acidic : 2 3.

Observation:
Multiple
cracks
were
observed on the dia. 6 coil
header in the Heat Affected
Zone (HAZ) and nearby
parent metal of stub weld
connection. However, no
cracks have been noted on
dia. 2 steam coil pipe.
Material Identification:
Material identification of failed
header sample was done
Page 27 of 140
Noted values in ppm.*

Cl
PO4
SO4 Phenol
16.2 30.5 7410
6
11.1 3.0
175
189
NH4
33.6
46.9
with the help of Spark Spectrometer & PMI machine. The header metallurgy
was found resembling with 201 Grade Austenitic SS.
Composition using PMI machine:
Cr-16.99, Mn 7.67, Ni 3.98,
Cu- 1.04,
Fe 69.86
Composition using Spark spectrometer:
Metallography:
Metallography was carried out on sample from cross section of the cracked
header portion & viewed under optical microscope. Multiple branched cracks
of transgranular as well as intergranular morphology was observed at both
HAZ and parent metal of the header. The cracks were seen to be propagating
from the external surface towards the header internal surface, indicating
failure mode as Cl-SCC.
Discussion:
As such, 200 series Austenitic grades SS are used to replace SS 304 &
SS 301 materials predominantly for low corrosion applications at room
temperature like furniture, cookware, serving Bowls, Railway rolling stock
etc. With the available literature it is inferred that, SS 201 material
behavior resembles with other Austenitic grade materials in general.
SS 201 grade material contains higher carbon content (0.15 max.)

compared to SS 304 / SS 316 and thus it can be said that, this is liable to
more sensitization during weld fabrication and thus more prone to
Page 28 of 140
Intergranular attack as well as Polythionic Acid SCC preferentially in the

HAZ when exposed to respective corrosive environment.
SCC can occur in this material in chloride environments at temperature

excess of 600C and as such, it is not recommended to use in chloride
environment.
Based on analysis of water in which the system remained immersed

during idle period, it can be inferred that the SS 201 header of the steam
coil was exposed to chloride and other acidic constituents in water at a pH:
23. The morphology of crack (Intergranular & transgranular) noted
suggests the failure of the tube by Cl-SCC ambient conditions. This is
further strengthened by the fact that the SS 316 branch which was also
exposed to the similar environment didnt show any cracks.
Conclusion
The failure of the steam coil tube header is attributed to the followings:
Use of improper material of composition i.e. SS 201 in place of SS 316.

Suspected chloride stress corrosion cracks at HAZ region of the header to
tube welds resulting from inadvertent exposure to acidic water/ chloride
environment.
Jobs Carried Out:
All five steam coils were replaced with new steam coils of metallurgy SS
316. PMI was done to
confirm the metallurgy of
the coils and header.
All the steam coils were
hydrotested outside sulphur
pit and found satisfactory
without any leakage.
After assembling all the
steam coils inside sulphur
pit, all the five steam coils
were hydrotested and found
satisfactory.
Recommendations:
SS 316L steam coils shall be used both for Train-I & II.
Action shall be taken to prevent water seepage into the sulphur pit.
Page 29 of 140
Page 30 of 140
3.0
GUJARAT REFINERY
3.1
VACUUM GAS OIL HYDROTREATING UNIT (VGO-HDT)
3.1.1 TUBE FAILURE OF FRACTIONATOR BOTTOM MP STEAM GENERATOR

Introduction:
From 10th March 2014, traces of HC were observed from MP steam TD traps
and the traces were mostly VGO. This raised suspicion on MP Steam
Generator (2093-E-13) and the unit was planned to be taken under shutdown
for attending the tube leak. Hence the unit was brought down and on
02/04/2014 exchanger channel cover was opened. Exchanger hydro testing
was carried out, during shell test 24 tube leakages observed, leaky tubes
were plugged and again shell test was taken, and it was found satisfactory.
After channel cover closing final test was taken which was also found
satisfactory.
Design Details:
Tube Side
Service
Operating temperature (In/Out), 0C
Operating pressure, kg/cm2
Design temperature (In/Out), 0C
Design pressure, kg/cm2
Tube size
Tube (nos.)
MOC
VGO
293.00/216.00
14.533
325.00/293.00
26/FV
19.05 OD X 2.769
THK X 4500 L
1116 U tubes
SA 210 Gr. A-1
Shell Side
BFW
187.00/197.68
15.333
230.00/120
20/FV
Observations:
After channel cover opening, tube ends were found satisfactory and no
traces of corrosion observed at the tube ends.
During water filling and pressurizing for shell test, at around 10kg/cm2
pressure only 24 tube leakages observed.
Analysis:
It was observed that all failed tubes were from top pass. On further
investigation it was observed that level troll, for the shell side liquid level
measurement, was having its top level (100% level) at same level as that
of the tube bundle top.
On measurement of the heights of the top of LT and top of tube bundle
from the ground level, it was observed that the both the heights are same
2.37 meters from ground level.
Page 31 of 140
Hence for tube bundle to remain dipped inside the water LT level shall
always be maintained above 100%, but in normal operation it was
maintained at 50% only.
Reasons of Failure:
Faulty installation of LT at construction stage.

Actual liquid level remained low leading to dry run of top tubes
As per design, tube bundle shall always remain submerged & liq. Level
shall be at least 50mm above from the bundle top.
Steam impingement over dry top pass tubes lead to erosion and
subsequent of the tubes.

These leaky U tubes were plugged at both the ends (shown in photograph
below) and exchanger was hydro tested successfully.
Remedial Measures / Recommendations:
Following were the recommendations given for insuring the reliability of the
fractionator bottom MP steam generator (2093-E-13);
Procurement action for new tube bundle.

Level is being maintained > 100%.
Review of the design of the level trolls by TS.
Page 32 of 140
3.2
VACUUM DISTILLATION UNIT (VDU)
3.2.1 LEAKAGE OF CONVECTION ZONE TUBE IN HEATER (721-F1)

Introduction:
On 27th Aug13, at approx. 20-00 hrs a minor flame was noticed in the south
side shock tubes of the convection section of VDU fired heater (721-F-01).
Suspecting leakage of tube, emergency steam was introduced inside the
furnace coils immediately. Box purging steam was introduced inside the fire
box and the burners were put off. The flame seen at convection got put off by
itself. The unit was shut down safely.
Construction Details:
The hydrocarbon coil of the heater has two passes:
Convection Section:
No. of studded tube
Size
Material
No. of Plain tube
Size
Material
:
:
:
:
:
:
20 nos.
4.5 OD x 237 AW
ASTM A106 Gr. B
08 nos.
4.5 OD x 237 AW
ASTM A335 Gr.P5 (5Cr Mo) as shock tubes
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
4 nos.
8.625 OD x 0.322 AW
ASTM A 335Gr. P9 (9Cr-1Mo)
6 nos.
6.625 OD x 0.28 AW
16 nos.
4.5 OD x 0.237 AW
34 nos.
4.5 OD x 0.237 AW
ASTM A 335Gr. P5 (5Cr-Mo)
Radiation Section:
No. of tube
Size
Material
No. of tube
Size
Material
No. of tube
Size
Material
No. of tube
Size
Material
Observations:
After shutdown, spalling of heater tubes carried out. Visual inspection of

radiation and convection tubes was done. After water filling, drop wise
leakage was noticed at one location from the bottom row shock tube in
pass # 1 of convection section. The leak was from a circumferential fine
crack developed at the bulged location. OD growth was noticed in all the
eight nos. of shock tubes. Severe bowing, thick & hard scaling due to
oxidation was noticed in all the eight nos. shock tubes. OD gauging
Page 33 of 140
revealed at least 2% growth in OD of all the eight shock tubes and more
than 3 % at the leaked
location. Sagging of about
1D was observed in all the
shock tubes. Thickness was
carried out on shock and the
radiation tubes including the
failed tube but no significant
loss in thickness was
observed. Approximate 2
mm thick layer of coke was
noticed inside the failed
tube.
Severe sagging of more than

1.5 D was noticed in all four
tubes the bottom row of
studded tubes.
Analysis:
On 6/4/2013, power dip led to tripping of feed pump 721-P-01A/B, The

burners of Heater were cut-off.
Since the above incident the coil inlet pressure for the same throughput
was increased by around 2 Kg/cm.
Occasionally flame impingement / minor skin temperature excursion for
short duration was also observed. However, corrective actions were taken
by the operation group to bring the skin temperature within limit of 586 0C.
Prior to failure, maximum skin temperature of convection zone tube was
5740C (reading of one thermocouple on unfailed shock tube) against
design of 5860C. In radiation zone maximum skin was against design of
5860C.
Reasons of Failure:
Form the nature of failure (bowing/ bulging/ scaling & cracking), probable
reason of failure seems to be cracking from bulged area caused due to
localized overheating of internally coked up convection tube.
Jobs Carried Out:
The bottom two rows of shock tubes (8 nos.- P5 metallurgy) of both the
passes & 4nos. sagged studded tubes (bottom row) in both the passes were
replaced due to excessive bowing/ bulging/ scaling.
Page 34 of 140
3.3
ATMOSPHERIC UNIT-I (AU-I)
3.3.1 FURNACE F1K2 PASS-2 (NORTH WALL) TUBE FAILURE

Introduction:
A leak occurred on 24/10/2013 at ~ 11.00 PM inside fire box of AU-1 F1K2
(North wall) due to leakage from radiation tube. The leakage was very minor
and unit was breakdown safely. Prior to failure, all the skin thermocouple
readings were found to be well within the limit.
Design parameters:
Technical specifications of furnace F1K2 is as mentioned below:
Parameter
Fluid
Design Temperature (0C)
Operating temperature (0C)
Design Pressure (Kg/cm2)
Operating Pressure (Kg/cm2)
Inlet conditions
Outlet conditions
Crude
265
380
245
360
21
7.0
15.2
4.5
Tube Metallurgy:
Heater
No.
F1K2
F1K2
F1K2
F1K2
F1K2
F1K2
FIKI
FIKI
Pass No.
Pass#1
Pass#1
Pass#2
Pass # 2
Pass # 1
Pass-1 & 2
Pass1 & 2
Pass1 & 2
Wall
Tube No.
South wall
South wall
North wall
North wall
North wall
Roof tubes
North & South wall
North & South wall
No 1-12
No 13 &19
No 1-12
No 24
25 - 29
30-34 & 35-39
1-7
Tube 8 -33
Tube
Metallurgy
SS316L
P5
SS316L
P5
P5
P5
SS 316L
P5
(Tube-1 counting from bottom)

Observations:
Highly scattered and isolated deep pitting/ grooving and corrosion marks
observed on all replaced radiation tubes in F1K2.
Severe grooving along circumferential weld joints was also observed.
Corrosion detected in all radiation tubes by thickness survey.
Severely corroded tubes (based on thickness survey) were replaced (4
nos. tubes in F1K2 pass#1 and 11 nos. tubes in pass#2).
In F1K2 section also severe corrosion was observed in radiation zone
tubes. Minimum thickness observed is in the range of 4.5mm to 4.7mm
against the original thickness of 6.5mm.
Page 35 of 140
No definite pattern in thickness loss i.e. low to high temperature region.

Tubes near the radiation inlet was also having low thickness to the extent
of 3.5mm (tube no. 23 in F1K2 Pass#2).
Considering the thickness loss pattern in F1K1 & F1K2 heater tubes,
corrosion severity was more in F1K2 heater. Average corrosion rate in
F1K1 is around 0.5mm/ year whereas in F1K2 is around 2mm/ year.
Reasons of Failure:
Failure has occurred due to highly localized naphthenic acid corrosion of P5
metallurgy tube nearer to the weld joint.
Page 36 of 140
Jobs Carried Out:
Visual inspection and NDTs (thickness survey, OD gauging, hardness

measurement, metallography) of radiation and convection tubes were
carried out to assess the health of the remaining tubes and found
satisfactory.
Severely corroded tubes (based on thickness survey) were replaced (4
nos. tubes in F1K2 pass#1 and 11 nos. tubes in pass#2).
Floor and side wall casing plate repair carried out after removal of
complete damaged brick lining / CF blanket lining.
Remedial Measures and recommendations:
Limit the TAN value of the mix crude below 0.5 till upgradation of
metallurgy to SS 316L for all tubes in radiation is completed.
Daily analysis of TAN value of NG crude carried out.
Installation of online corrosion monitoring instruments at inlet of radiation
to be explored.
Replacement of all radiation tubes with upgraded SS 316 metallurgy at the
earliest.
Page 37 of 140
Page 38 of 140
4.0
HALDIA REFINERY
4.1
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-II (CDU-II)
4.1.1 REMAINING LIFE ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION TUBES OF MAIN

FURNACE (16-F-01)
Introduction:
The Remaining Life Assessment (RLA) of radiation tubes of CDU-II Main
Furnace (16-F-01) was carried out through Applied Metallurgy Department,
R&D Centre Faridabad. Laboratory study consisting of Visual Inspection,
Tensile Tests at room and high temperature, Impact tests, Micro structural
studies, Accelerated Stress rupture testing (ASRT) tests etc. were carried out
as per program of the study.
Observations:
Mechanical property and microstructural evaluations had indicated sufficient
mechanical strength and toughness in the material. However, on completion
of creep testing, degradation in creep rupture curve was observed. Cross
sectional microstructure perpendicular to longitudinal axis of the tube fire side
revealed precipitation of carbides along bainitic regions. No grain coarsening
or creep voids were observed. Bulk Brinell hardness measurements on the
metallographic samples were in the range of 174-180 BHN which were within
acceptable range.
Recommendations:
Based on laboratory investigation of presumably the representative tube
sample from CDU-II furnace 16-F-01, the remanant life has been estimated as
four years corresponding to operation at tube skin temperature of 440 deg C
at the design hoop stress values. However, further operation at the desired
skin temperature of 500 deg C is likely to result in failures within three years.
In view of the creep damage seen to have set in the tubes, it was
recommended to limit the tube skin temperature within 440 deg. C in order to
realize more useful life from the material. Further, accumulated
microstructural damages are imminent with continued exposure to high
temperature; a reassessment is suggested at the next available opportunity.
Page 39 of 140
4.2
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-I (CDU-I)
4.2.1 FAILURE OF DEPROPANIZER REBOILER (12-E-08)

Introduction:
The Depropanizer Reboiler of CDU-I (12E-08) was suspected for leakage in
service. The tube bundle was pulled out for check-III inspection on
02.12.2013. The equipment was taken back in operation after check-III
maintenance on 03.12.2013.
Observations:
During visual inspection cracks were observed on 3 nos. of tubes at the U

bend location (as shown in Figure-1).
Severe localized external pitting was observed on external tube surface
(as shown in Figure-2).
The visible portion of the tube internal surface was found to be
satisfactory. No tube end thinning was noticed.
Minor pitting was observed on tube-sheet, however, overall condition of
the tube-sheet was found to be satisfactory. Minor rusting/ roughening
were observed on baffles. Condition of baffle was found to be satisfactory.
Channel box condition was found to be satisfactory. Gasket faces were
found to be satisfactory.
Blackish oily deposits were found on shell side and external tube surface.
The deposits were analyzed to be as follows:
pH = 10.5
Total sulphur = 0.34%
Caustic content = 3.24 % (w/w)
The drain line of the LPG caustic wash vessel (13B-01) had been choked
and the level gauge had been malfunctioning for some days before the
incident.
Analysis:
The depropanizer reboiler is a BHU type exchanger.
Page 40 of 140
As could be observed during inspection of the failed tubes, cracks were

found at the U bend locations which are vulnerable from stress corrosion
cracking view point (as cold-working/ hot bending performed on tubes
during manufacturing of U tubes rendering them zone of stress
concentration).
The diagram shows the Depropanizer Reboiler connected circuit with
section of the LPG caustic wash.
Depropanizer Reboiler Connected Circuit
In case of any caustic carryover from the L.P.G. caustic wash section the
subsequent equipments (Depropanizer, Depropanizer Reboiler and
connected piping etc.) would get exposed to caustic environment.
Caustic concentrations of 50 to 100 ppm are sufficient to cause cracking
and stresses promote cracking in caustic environment (source: API 571).
Reasons of Failure:
In view of the above facts and obtained data of the QC Lab analysis report of
the obtained sample, it was opined that the subject failure of the Depropanizer
Re-boiler tubes was a case of stress corrosion cracking of the U tubes in
caustic environment.
Jobs Carried Out:
Hydro-test of the equipment was arranged and during shell test total 6 nos.
of tubes leaked.
After plugging the leaky tubes suitably hydro test was carried out
successfully at a pressure of 31.6 kg/cm 2(g) for shell side and at 23.7
kg/cm2(g) for tube side.
As the Depropanizer Column (12C-07) and connected circuit also got
exposed to caustic environment the same was inspected after scaffolding
erection and insulation removal.
However, no significant deterioration was observed.
Page 41 of 140
Remedial Measures:
Based on the observation taken during check-III of the subject exchanger

it was opined that the tube bundle of Depropanizer Reboiler was not
reliable for continuous operation on sustained basis and replacement of
the deteriorated tube bundle was recommended.
Process was requested to study suitable measures to eliminate
possibilities of caustic carryover from LPG caustic wash section to
subsequent circuits of the Depropanizer to avoid recurrence of same type
of failure in future.
4.2.2 INTERNAL CORROSION OF DIA.

CONDENSER TO ACCUMULATOR
LINE
FROM
OVERHEAD
Introduction:
Severe localized internal corrosion was observed at dia. 8 line from CDU-I
overhead condensers 11-E-22A/B to overhead accumulator 11-B-01. The
corrosion was predominantly observed at the bottom portion of the piping at
elbows.
Observations:
Ultrasonic thickness survey revealed localized thinning at bottom portion of

the piping.
No appreciable corrosion could be
observed at the external surface of
the pipe.
Loose layer of scales/ deposits
was observed at the internal pipe
surface.
Reasons of Failure:
The average pH of overhead boot
water had been 7.5 from the period
July to Oct 2013 against desired range of 6.2 to 6.8. This had led to
deposition of loose scales/ salts leading to under deposit corrosion at the
bottom portion of the piping.
Remedial Measures:
It was recommended to monitor the iron content of the overhead boot water.
The monitoring frequency of overhead pH was increased.
Page 42 of 140
4.3
4.3.1 INTERNAL CORROSION IN RGC CONNECTED PIPING

Introduction:
Severe internal corrosion and leakages were observed in the RGC connected
piping during regeneration of CRU catalyst during September 2013. After
commencement of the carbon burn step, leakage was observed in the tubeside outlet line (10) upstream of Na2CO3 dosing of feed vs effluent
exchanger 22-E-01A/B (Sketch attached as Figure-5). Thereafter, repeated
leakages were observed at downstream of the dosing point and also at 3
tapping of RGC 22-K-01A/B suction line (8).
Na2CO3
dosing
Leakages at Dia. 10 Tube Side Outlet Line of 22-E-01A/B

Observations:
Visual observation of failed pipe samples revealed severe localized

thinning and perforations (Figures 6 & 7).
Sludgy deposits were also observed in the pipe internal. The deposits
were collected and sent to QC lab for chemical analysis. 2% aqueous
sample of the deposits on chemical analysis yielded following results:
pH-3.8
Fe content-15%
Chloride content- 21%
No appreciable corrosion could be observed at the external surface of the

pipe.
Preferential internal corrosion at weld joints was observed.
Page 43 of 140
The 3 tapping of RGC 22-K-01A/B suction line (8) connected to

service air line was split into two halves. The half containing the leak
revealed severe localized corrosion, while the other half did not have any
signs of thickness loss or corrosion.
Due to repeated failure of various pipings, it was decided to carryout

thorough thickness survey of all the cold piping in the regeneration circuit
to detect corrosion.
The survey revealed severe corrosion of the entire RGC suction circuit
from HP separator top to 22-K-01A/B. However, the nature of corrosion
was highly localized which was evident from large variations in reading
during thickness survey.
Reasons of Failure:
The repeated failure of 10 tube-side outlet line of 22-E-01A/B, the

leakage of 3 tapping of RGC suction line during coke burning stage
were attributed to severe acidic corrosion.
The deterioration was found predominantly localized, indicating generation
of strong acid medium which corroded at the location where it condensed
to form strong acid solution.
Page 44 of 140
Remedial Measures:
It was recommended that the neutralizer dosing system, rate and injection
location needs to be reviewed by PN/TS to avoid repetition of failures in
future.
Page 45 of 140
4.4
DIESEL HYDRO DE-SULPHURISATION (DHDS)
4.4.1 INTERNAL CORROSION AT STRIPPER GAS

COLUMN (25-C-03)
AMINE
ABSORBER
Introduction:
DHDS unit (U-25) was scheduled for catalyst replacement shutdown in
June2013. During the shutdown, the Stripper Gas Amine Absorber Column
(25-C-03) was opened for internal inspection. Severe internal corrosion was
observed predominantly at the liquid level of the column.
Observations:
Severe general thinning and internal grooving was observed during

inspection of the column.
Thickness loss to the extent up to 75% was observed at the down comer
locations.
Internal inspection of the Column revealed severe grooving at the down
comer area (Figure 10) along with general thinning. The extent of general
thinning can be adjudged from the down comer bolting bars.
The operational data of the stripper gas amine absorber column were
analyzed for the period of Jan12 to Apr13.
It was found that the Lean amine strength was maintained at 28 - 30 wt%
against design of 25 wt% during the period of Jan12 to Apr12.
Subsequently, the lean amine strength started to decrease gradually to
average strength of 14 - 17 wt%.
The strength of lean amine was particularly low in the period of June12
Oct12 and was as low as 7 - 8 wt% on some occasions.
The trend of Lean amine strength for the period of Jan12 to Apr13 is as
given below.
Page 46 of 140
28-04-2013
07-04-2013
17-03-2013
24-02-2013
03-02-2013
13-01-2013
23-12-2012
02-12-2012
11-11-2012
21-10-2012
30-09-2012
09-09-2012
19-08-2012
29-07-2012
08-07-2012
17-06-2012
27-05-2012
06-05-2012
15-04-2012
25-03-2012
04-03-2012
12-02-2012
22-01-2012
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
01-01-2012
Lean Amine strength
Trend of Lean Amine Strength
The lean amine circulation rate was observed to be maintained at a lower

flow of 6 m3/hr against design rate of 16.9 m3/hr.
The trend of lean amine flow rate for the period of Jan12 to Apr13 is given
below.
Amine circulation flowrate

20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
Trend of Lean Amine Flow Rate

Reasons of Failure:
The severe general thinning and internal grooving in the Stripper Gas Amine
Absorber Column is attributed to lower lean amine strength, lower lean amine
circulation rate and higher Rich amine loading.
Remedial Measures:
It was recommended to maintain the following attributes for proper amine
scrubbing to take place in the Amine absorber column:
Lean amine strength to be maintained at design value of 25 wt%.
Page 47 of 140
Stripper off gas temperature is to be always maintained 5 - 10C lower

than the lean amine temperature.
Lean amine circulation rate to be maintained at the design rate of 17 m 3/hr.
Page 48 of 140
4.5
SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT-IV (SRU-IV)
4.5.1 CORROSION OF BANK TUBES OF INCINERATOR WHB

Introduction:
Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU-IV) (U-95) was taken under shutdown on
01.09.2013 on account of severe leakage in incinerator waste heat boiler.
After shutdown, the incinerator was opened and on water filling, leakages
were observed at the bank tubes and at the expansion joint of D-Panel tubes
with the mud drum.
After repair of the leakages, the waste heat boiler was hydro tested at 58
Kg/cm2g pressure and found leak free. The unit was started up on
09.09.2013.
Observations:
Heavy sulfurous deposits were observed near the tail gas entry to the
incinerator.
Green colored water accumulation at the bank tubes bottom was
observed.
The casing drain was found choked.
The pH of the accumulated water was found highly acidic.
Thick greenish sludge accumulation observed at the stack bottom which
was suitably cleaned.
The sludge pH as tested by litmus paper was also found acidic in nature.
Severe corrosion was observed at the tube bottom location near mud
drum especially at the refractory embedded portion.
Reasons of Failure:
The severe thinning of bank tubes at the bottom location near to the mud
drum is attributed to severe acidic corrosion due to accumulation of water and
operation of the boiler at lower temperatures especially during the start-up.
Page 49 of 140
Remedial Measures:
To mitigate the problem of operation of the waste heat boiler at temperatures
lower that its dew point especially during the start-ups, a steam Spurger was
introduced. All the corroded bank tubes were replaced with new tubes.
4.5.2 FAILURE OF REFRACTORY AT THE SHELL OF MCC
Introduction:
SRU-II (U-28) was brought down due to leak at shell of MCC (28-F-02) and
was opened on 22.05.2013. Localized hot spot was observed at the manhole
neck area in thermography (Figure 16).
Observations:
On 22/05/2013, the MCC was opened and internal inspection was carried
out. Holes and gaps between refractory bricks were observed. On removal
of damaged refractory from the affected area, a hole of approx dimensions
60 mm long and 15 mm width was observed at the manhole nozzle
welding location. Adjacent area found oxidized. The MCC burner tip was
found severely damaged. The refractory layout was found not as per the
drawing.
Page 50 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
The refractory failure at the manhole neck location is attributed to localized
overheating due to damaged burner and the improper application of the
refractory during installation.
Remedial Measures & Jobs Carried Out:
The shell was repaired and the refractory was applied as per drawing. The
dry-out of the refractory was carried out. The refractory application was
carried out under supervision of refractory expert.
The damaged burner tip was replaced.
The MCC temperature indication was rectified.
Page 51 of 140
4.6
VACUUM DISTILLATION UNIT-II (VDU-II)
4.6.1 SHELL FAILURE OF TERTIARY EJECTOR AFTER CONDENSER (U-82)

Introduction:
Leakage was observed at the shell of Tertiary Ejector after Condenser 82-E25 in VDU-II. The leakage from the shell was found in the form of a big hole
and one smaller hole at the periphery of RF pad welding of one of the three
dia. 4 inlet lines from ejector. One tube was also found perforated adjacent to
the impingement plate of the nozzle. The leaky portion of the shell was
repaired in position and finally the shell side hydrotest of the condenser was
carried out successfully at pressure of 5.3 Kg/cm2. One leaky tube was
plugged during the shell test
Design Data:
Fluid
Inlet Temp (0C)
Outlet Temp (0C)
Design Temp (0C)
Design Press (Kg/Cm2)
Hyd. Test Press (Kg/Cm2)
MOC
No of tubes
Shell Side
Gas + steam
184
46
320
3.5 / F.V.
5.3
SA 516 Gr. 60 (NACE)
-
Tube Side
Cooling Water
40
44
65
7.0
12.0
Admiralty Brass
479
Observations:
The shell adjacent to the middle inlet nozzle was found perforated and
thinned down. One tube just below the middle inlet nozzle was found
perforated. The ultrasonic thickness survey of shell and nozzles away from
the middle inlet nozzle found satisfactory. No appreciable loss of wall
thickness could be detected. The localized loss of wall thickness around
the middle inlet nozzle appeared to be due to erosion.
Page 52 of 140
Jobs Carried Out:

Leaky shell body was repaired at position with patch welding followed by
reinforcement pad as shown below.
Root Cause Analysis:
From the ultrasonic thickness survey data it is evident that deterioration

had taken place only at the middle out of the three dia. 4 inlet nozzles of
the shell of 82-E-25.
The nozzle areas of other two inlet nozzles were found satisfactory.
Since no appreciable loss of wall thickness could be detected at other
locations apart from the deteriorated area, it can be concluded that
aqueous corrosion has not played a significant part in the deterioration
process.
From the visual observations of the deteriorated area, it was evident that
the deterioration has been caused due to impingement of high velocity
inlet vapor and steam.
Page 53 of 140
The perforation of the tube adjacent to the impingement plate also

corroborates the statement.
After putting in operation, thermography of the three shell inlet pipes of 82E-25 was carried out.
The surface temperature of the middle pipe was found to be about 50-60
0
C higher than the other two pipes.
On physical verification, one of the inlet valves was found throttled.
Reasons of Failure:
The reason of failure is attributed to improper distribution of the inlet fluid
leading to accelerated erosion of the shell due to high inlet velocity.
Reason of Localized Erosion at Middle Nozzle

Remedial Measures:
The valve was made fully opened to avoid mal-distribution of flow at the three
inlet nozzles.
Page 54 of 140
4.7
MOTOR SPIRIT QUALITY UP-GRADATION (MSQU)
4.7.1 OFF-GAS LINE FAILURE TO 86-C-02 (SCRUBBER COLUMN)

Introduction:
A pinhole leakage was reported in the 4 off gas line ex-86B11 (LPG
separator drum) to 86C02 (caustic scrubber) line. The leaky location was
subsequently inspected. Following are the observations, analysis and
recommendation.
Observation:
Visual inspection of the piping revealed pinhole leakage from weld joint
between flange and the
pipe at 4O clock position.
PMI was carried out; the
pipe was found to be of
monel metallurgy while the
flange was of carbon steel
(internally
lined
with
monel).
Analysis:
The off gas coming from

the LPG separator drum
86B11 overhead contains
HCl.
In order to avoid internal
corrosion
due
to
condensation of aqueous
HCL, the temperature of
the line required to be
maintained at set point of
550C by electrical tracing.
The temperature of the
line at the entry of 86C02
could be monitored by
86TI1202 as indicated.
The average trend of 86TI1202 for the past one year has been showing
that the off gas line inlet temperature remains well below the desired limit
of 550C.
In the last one month, the temperature was around 300C.
The HCl in the gas phase condensed at the lower temperatures in to
aqueous phase before entering the scrubber forming a corrosive medium
inside the pipe and resulting in leakage from the weld joint.
Page 55 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
The failure is attributed to acidic corrosion due to condensation of aqueous
HCl as the electrical tracing is not functional.
Remedial Measures:
In order to prevent condensation of HCl from gas phase into aqueous

phase, electrical tracing system for the line is to be revived and the tracing
set temperature should be 550C as per licensor recommendation.
The leaky portion of the welding shall be repaired at the earliest available
opportunity.
The balance portion of the line is to be offered for inspection after removal
of insulation and scaffolding.
Page 56 of 140
4.8
RESIDUE FLUIDIZED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT (RFCCU)
4.8.1 TUBE BUNDLE FAILURE OF HP SEPARATOR CONDENSER (18-E-25A/B)

Introduction:
Leakage was suspected in the HP separator condensers 18-E-25A/B during
operation. Accordingly, check-II activity of the condensers was taken up.
Design Data:
Fluid
Inlet Temp (0C)
Outlet Temp (0C)
Design Temp (0C)
Design Press (Kg/Cm2)
Hyd. Test Press (Kg/Cm2)
MOC
No of tubes
Shell side
Hydrocarbon
70.1
37.8
150
21
31.5
SA516 Gr.60, 16thk.
-
Tube side
Cooling Water
33
45
65
14
21
SB163 N04400
1136 EACH
Observations:
Blackish deposits were observed inside shell cover at 6O clock position.

Chokage due to CW muck
observed
inside
tubes,
especially in 18-E-25A. Black
slimy
mass
underneath
deposits observed.
Isolated pitting observed inside
tubes underneath scaling.
No tube end thinning was
observed at both the bundles.
Visible portion of tube external
side found satisfactory.

The observations indicate that the
failure mode is predominantly
cooling water side microbial corrosion which may be attributed to low cooling
water flow inside the tubes of 18-E-25A/B which are located at the second
technological platform level.
Remedial Measures:
The problem of low flow of cooling water needs to be addressed. Localized
chemical dosing is being thought of as a temporary measure.
Page 57 of 140
4.8.2 SEVERE DAMAGE OF VIBROCAST LINING OF COLD WALL RISER

Introduction:
Severe channeling was observed at the vibrocast lining especially at the feed
nozzle area of cold wall Riser of RFCCU during May-June 2013 shutdown.
Observations:
Vertical channeling was observed at the vibrocast refractory of the cold

wall Riser at the feed nozzles, HCO nozzles and the slurry nozzles area.
At all the locations where vertical channeling of the lining was observed,
the exposed anchor length was about 30-50 mm and also some of the
anchors tips were found in eroded condition.
The vibrocast refractory lining was found impregnated with coke.
Page 58 of 140
Jobs Carried Out:
The refractory at the severe channeling locations at the feed nozzles area
was removed and in-situ repair with full refractory thickness by new
casting was carried out followed by dry-out.
The refractory job was carried out under the supervision of refractory
specialist.
The in-situ casting was carried out using Resco cast Sure flow material
with the help of metallic/wooden form for casting.

The severe damage of the vibro cast refractory of the cold wall Riser is
attributed to severe erosion due to catalyst and coke impregnation which was
accelerated due to damaged tips of feed and HCO nozzles.
Remedial Measures:
The cold wall Riser along with the Feed nozzles has been planned for
replacement at the next available opportunity.
Page 59 of 140
4.9
THERMAL POWER STATION (TPS) & DE-MINERALIZED (DM)

PLANT
4.9.1 FREQUENT LEAKAGES AT DIA 2 MB # 6 & 7 ACID CHARGING LINE

Introduction:
Frequent leakages were observed at the welding of flange at dia. 2 acid
charging line of MB # 6 & 7 in DM plant. At present, the lines are of SS 304
material. However, metallurgy mix-up was observed in the flanges.
Observations:
The metallurgy of pipe was observed as SS 304, however, the SORF

flange was found to be of SS410 as confirmed by PMI checking.
Appreciable loss of metal thickness was observed at SS304 pipe also, at
the vicinity of the flange.
The inner surface of the flange as well as weld joint was found to be
corroded.
A portion of the weld joint was magnetic in nature.
Copper deposition was observed after application of Copper sulphate
solution.
The frequent leakages are attributed to improper mixing leading to dilution

of sulphuric acid at the mixing location.
The use of SS410 flange in place of SS304 has aggravated the problem.
Also, the welding carried out during maintenance was carried out using
carbon steel electrode which had resulted in severe corrosion.
Page 60 of 140
Remedial Measures:
As a long term solution, the complete acid charging circuits including the
mixing points are to be upgraded to a PTFE (Teflon) lined piping to improve
the run length and reliability of lines.
Page 61 of 140
4.10 OFFSITE
4.10.1 SEVERE CORROSION UNDER INSULATION OF SHELL OF TANK NO.
713
Introduction:
Tank-713 (Ser: HFU Feed, cap. 2000m3) was decommissioned & taken for
periodic M&I. Mechanical cleaning and complete insulation removal of shell
and roof was carried out. Severe corrosion under insulation (CUI) was
observed at tank shell.
Observations:
Severe external under insulation corrosion and thickness loss were

observed at the 1st to 6th shell courses.
CUI was severe mostly at the side of the tank facing the process cooling
tower and at stairway location.
Also bulging of bottom shell course was observed at some locations.
Reason of Failure:
The severe CUI at the tank shell courses is attributed to ingress of water mist
from adjacent cooling tower in to the insulation.
Remedial Measures
All the shell courses of the tank were replaced and external insulation of the
tank was not provided after consultation with Production and Process Dept.
External blasting and painting with PU paint system was carried out to
increase the life of external painting of the tank shell.
Page 62 of 140
4.10.2 SEVERE CORROSION UNDER INSULATION OF DIA 4 HO LINE TO 750

TANK FARM
Introduction:
The dia. 4 HO Ex VDU-II to 750 Tank Farm was found to be leaking north
side of process cooling tower and TPS cooling tower which was subsequently
clamped to arrest the leak. Severe corrosion of 1 no. of HPV and LPD near
leaky location was also observed.
Observations:
After insulation removal, visual examination of the affected portion of the

line revealed severe external corrosion under insulation (CUI) near the
leaky location.
No moisture barrier (foil) was observed at the affected location and
painting on the line was found severely damaged.
Jobs Carried Out:
The affected portion of the subject line was replaced with material
specification A 106 Gr. B Sch-40, length 6M and the severely corroded
HPV and LPD were also replaced.
External painting was carried out and aluminum foil was provided as
moisture barrier before application of insulation.
Reasons of Failure:
As the subject line lie in the vicinity of the TPS and Process Cooling
Tower, it is subjected to continuous drift from the same.
Thus, in absence of moisture barrier, damaged aluminum cladding and
improper sealing of the insulation cladding, continuous water ingress into
the insulation resulted in severe CUI.
Page 63 of 140
Remedial Measures:
The application of paint followed by moisture barrier (Aluminum foil) is being
enforced in all insulated piping prone to CUI.
Page 64 of 140
Page 65 of 140
5.0
MATHURA REFINERY
5.1
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT (CDU)
5.1.1 CRACKING OF CONVECTION ZONE HEATER TUBE-SHEETS

Introduction:
Mathura Refinery Crude distillation Unit is consisting of four parallel fired
heaters. All four furnaces were commissioned in the year 1983. In pre-2013
shutdown scenario, Convection tubes of these four furnaces were supported
by seven nos. intermediate tube sheets in each furnace. These total 28 nos.
and 50mm thick cast tube sheets conformed to specification IN 657 (ASTM A
560 50Cr-50Ni-Nb) and Russian design. Out of these, three furnaces
(11F1/2/3) were having heat duty of 43.2 MM Kcal/Hr and Fourth furnace
(11F4) was having heat duty of 27.7 MM Kcal/Hr.
Observation:
During shutdown heater inspection, it was observed that these high alloy
tube sheets of convection section in all four heaters have developed
through thickness cracking after around 30 years of service life.
Page 66 of 140
Tube sheet supporting channel members were also seen bent.

Tube sheet supporting channels were also seen severely bent from the
supporting locations.
Some repair and strengthening jobs were carried in tube-sheets and
supporting channels during 2009 and 2011 shutdowns.
Analysis:
The cracking phenomenon after almost 30 years of service life is largely
attributed to the following factors:
Sidewise shifting of I-Beam which is supporting the convection tube-sheet

through Gusset type construction.
This led to stress concentration in corners of tube-sheet and led to
cracking.
Page 67 of 140
General aging of high Alloy Cast 50Cr-50Ni-Nb type tube sheets over the
years.
Thermal cycling during start-up and shutdowns.
Higher thermal gradient across the Cast Tubes sheets, around 350 0C in
place of maximum allowable 2220C, as per API 560. To reduce this
thermal gradient, nowadays, split type tube-sheet design is used in place
of single piece, as was used earlier in the past.
Recommendation and Jobs Carried Out:

All 28 nos. tube sheets were recommended for replacement. Additionally,
there was a process requirement to examine the design adequacy of heaters
in view of future capacity augmentation of 11 MMTPA. Accordingly
replacement of convection tube sheets and tubes was done in consultation
with M/s. EIL during 2013 shutdown. Following major design changes were
made:
Replacement of high alloy (50 Cr 50 Ni-Nb) tube sheet castings with new
25 Cr 20 Ni and 20 Cr 12 Ni tube-sheets.
In place of seven intermediate tube-sheets, in new design 5 intermediate
Tube-sheets and two end tube-sheets were considered.
New thickness was 25 mm in place of 50 mm earlier. Design was split type
i.e. one tube-sheet consisted of three pieces so as to avoid excessive
thermal gradient across one tube-sheet.
In addition, old convection tubes (64 nos.; 152mm OD; 8mm thickness)
were also replaced with new tubes (80 nos.; 141.3mm OD; 6.55mm
thickness).
Benefits:
Reliability improvement of convection section with respect to tube sheet

life due to new Design.
Capacity augmentation with respect to new tubes: designed for 11
MMTPA + 120 preheat loss
Page 68 of 140
Convection shell temp went below 1000C against earlier 200-2500C

resulting in overall reduction in Refinery F&L.
5.1.2 FAILURE OF CAST APH MODULES

Introduction:
Mathura Refinery CDU consisting of four parallel Air Pre-heaters (APH). Each
APH is having four nos. Cast Modules. APH were installed in the year 1988.
The bottom most modules of all four APH were replaced during 2007 Shutdown.
Observation:
In year 2012, during APH efficiency survey, it was observed that flue gas
temperature ex-APH was on the lower side (minimum up to 1600C).
Accordingly, oxygen survey of flue gas at every module outlet was
conducted to detect any possible air ingress in the flue gas.
During the survey, it was observed that oxygen content was very high (up
to 15%) at 3rd and 4th module flue gas outlet of APH 1 and 2. It confirmed
air ingress inside flue gas thru these cast modules. Accordingly these
modules were recommended for replacement.
During 2013 M&I shutdown, APH were taken under maintenance for
inspection and replacement. In line with findings during online oxygen
survey, 3rd and 4th modules (2 nos. bottom most modules) of APH 1 and 2
were found severely perforated.
Modules were also found severely chocked with castable material on top
of them. Perforations were also observed in the insulated part between
two modules.
Flue gas ID fan suction and discharge duct were also inspected during
Shut-down. At some locations, castable refractory was found badly
damaged. Perforations were also seen at many locations.
Page 69 of 140
Analysis:
Due to leakage in flue gas duct, the air kept on coming inside the APH
bottom modules, which resulted in decrease of the flue gas temperature
below the dew point.
This eventually corroded the bottom modules due to dew point corrosion.
Recommendation and Jobs Done:
3rd and 4th bottom modules of APH 1 and 2 were completely replaced
during Shutdown as per inspection recommendation.
ID fan suction and discharge duct were also partially replaced along with
internal castable refractory.
Flue gas temperature at ID discharge was recommended to maintain
minimum 150C above the calculated dew point.
Steam coil air pre-heater (SCAP) was also recommended to use whenever
the atmospheric air temperature goes down. The same is in practice.
Benefits:
Improvement in overall reliability of APH and flue gas duct.

Maintaining flue gas temperature ex-APH above dew point temperature.
Increase in temperature of hot air ex-APH with respect to lower APH inlet
temperature thus reducing overall refinery F&L.
Page 70 of 140
5.2
DIESEL HYDRO DESULPHURIZATION (DHDS)
5.2.1 SEVERE TUBE END THINNING AND CORROSION OF FRACTIONATOR

OVERHEAD TRIM COOLER (02-AC-2)
Introduction:
DHDS fractionator overhead trim cooler (02-AC-2) is in service since
commissioning of unit in 1999. Since commissioning up to year 2007, no
corrosion problem was observed. In 2007, process modification was carried
out and a hot separator (02-V-32) was put in operation. Since then, the
corrosion problem has been observed. In 2009 shutdown, minor tube end
thinning was observed and sulphide scale deposit was observed inside the
tube and header box. In the 2013 shutdown severe tube end thinning and
heavy sulphide scale deposit was also observed inside the header box.
Design and Operating Parameters:
Sl. No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Parameter
No of tube
Tube size
Tube spec
Fluid Circulated
Design Pressure
Design Temperature
Operating Pressure
Operating Temperature
Value
336
24.94 ODX2.25 thk. X3154 L
SA 334 Gr. 6
HC+H2S+NH3+H2O
7.7 Kg/Cm2g
202 0C
5.7 Kg/Cm2g
1850C
Observations:
The end covers of the air fin cooler were opened during the shutdown for
periodic inspection, cleaning & testing.
On opening the cover, header box was found filled with heaps of sulphide
scale.
Page 71 of 140
Deposit sample was collected and send to MR laboratory for chemical

analysis, 1900 ppm chloride was found in the collected sample.
Heaps of scale was removed.
Inspection of the channel box, tubes was carried out.
Blackish deposit was also observed inside the tubes before cleaning.
Tubes were cleaned by hydro jetting.
After hydro jet cleaning of the tubes, detailed visual inspection of the tubes
was carried out.
Severe tube end thinning in top 03 nos. of rows was observed specially
around the inlet nozzles.
Approx 70 nos. of tubes around the inlet nozzles were found paper
thinned.
RFET of all the tubes were carried out, result of RFET are mentioned
below.
Visual observation shows severe tube end thinning and paper thinned tube
end in approx 50-60 nos. of tubes. Tube end thinning was observed
preferentially around both the inlet nozzles. RFET result confirm the same
observation i.e.40 to 50 % wall loss in approx 40% of the tubes.
Reasons of Failure:
Presence of high chloride in the collected sample shows severe acidic

corrosion has taken place. Corrosion product (Sulphide scale) from Upstream piping of the Air cooler got accumulated at inlet side of air cooler
and restricted flow in the major portion of the air cooler. Preferential flow
from remaining tube caused erosion-corrosion of the tubes due to high
velocity.
Partial Re-tubing of the Air cooler was carried out.
Page 72 of 140
5.2.2 SEVERE CORROSION OF STRIPPER COLUMN TRAYS

Introduction:
The top eight (08) nos. of trays above feed inlet nozzle of DHDS Stripper
Column (302-C-02) was found paper thinned during internal inspection of the
Column on 2013 Shutdown.
Design and Operating Parameters:
Sl. No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Parameter
No of trays
Tray Spec
Fluid handled
Design Pressure
Design Temperature
Operating Pressure
Operating Temperature
Value
28
1-8 SS 410, 9-28 CS
Amine
8
6
3100C
2700C
Observations:
Corrosion was observed in the upper portion of Stripper Column (02-C-2)

of DHDS. Top 08 nos. of trays and down-comers up to the feed distributor
nozzle was found severely corroded.
Most of the tray segments were paper thinned.
Severity of damage was more in tray near feed distributor (8 th tray from
top) and went on reducing as we go up and 1st tray was good among the
top 8 trays.
Yellowish sulfurous deposit was observed on the trays as well as on the
top portion of the shell.
Reasons of Failure:
Corrosion is observed in this column post 2007, process modification was

carried out in 2007 and a hot separator 02-V-32 was put in operation.
Since then, the corrosion problem has been observed.
Page 73 of 140
The problem is related to process modification and accordingly, the matter

has been discussed with our process group.
The matter has been referred to process licensor for their necessary inputs
in this regard.

The total tray assembly/ internal up to top 08th tray level was replaced with SS
410 material.
Remedial Measures:
The matter was taken up with Process Licensor for possible bypassing of
Hot separator (2-V-32)
Following metallurgy up-gradation in the Column may prevent the problem;
however, the corrosion problem will get shifted downstream.
The total tray assembly/internal up to top 08 tray level shall be replaced
with SS 410 material, coated with Hastelloy C by HVOF/HVAF process.
The Column shell up to 08th tray level including top dome shall be coated
with Hastelloy C with HVOF/HVAF coating process.
Page 74 of 140
5.3
SOUR WATER STRIPPER UNIT (SWSU)
5.3.1 FAILURE OF RE-BOILER TUBE BUNDLE (303-E-01)

Introduction:
New SWS unit was commissioned in year 2005. During inspection in M&I
2013 shutdown of Unit-303, tube bundle of subject exchanger were pulled out
for carrying out inspection. After pulling out of tube bundle, severe cracks on
tubes of stripper re-boiler were observed.
Brief Process Description:
Single stage sour water stripper configuration has been adopted for Sour
Water Stripper Unit (SWSU). H2S, ammonia and other light components
present in the raw sour water are stripped off as overhead product from
the sour water stripper column.
Treated water recovered as part of the bottom product of sour water
stripper is sent to the battery limit.
Unit is not designed for processing chloride in sour water.
The acid gases are stripped off from the column bottom by re-boiling in the
re-boiler (303-E-01), a kettle re-boiler operating on LP steam.
Process Flow Diagram of New Sour Water Stripper unit.
Page 75 of 140
Design and Operating Parameters of Sour water Stripper Reboier, 303-E-01:

Sl.
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6
7
8
9
Parameters
Service
Design pressure, Kg/Cm2 (g)
Operating pressure Kg/cm2(g)
Temp. Inlet (0C)
Temp. outlet (0C )
Nos of Tubes
Tube Size( ODxThk x length )
Tube Specification
Shell Specification
Details
Shell Side
Tube Side
Sour water
LP steam
4.0
5.0/FV
2.47
3.63
125.9
148.5
125.9
138.92
-331( U Tubes)
-25x2.5x6056(In mm)
-SA 213TP 316L
SA 516 GR 60 --
History:
The subject exchanger was in Service since 2011.

The same observations were noticed in exchanger during M&I shutdown
of 2009.
During hydro test in 2009, 210 tubes out of 331 tubes were found leaking
and same were plugged.
Based on observations of 2009 shutdown, complete tube bundle was
recommended for replacement.
Tube bundle of subject exchanger was replaced in 2011 shutdown.
But within a period of 2 years i.e. during 2013 M&I shutdown, condition of
tube bundle of (303-E-01) was found unsatisfactory.
Observations:
Fine pits and multiple numerous branching type cracks were observed in
tubes of stripper re-boiler,(303-E-01) (Pic-1,2,3,4).The cracks were found
on external surface of tubes. Very thin isolated deposits inside the pits/
cracks were also observed on the tube OD surface.
In order to establish the root cause of failure, Eddy current testing of the
tubes were also carried out which indicated 50% loss in thickness in tubes
due to cracks in around 223 tubes out of 662 (U tube bundle; Total tubes
331 X 2).
Failed tube sample was also sent to IOCL R&D center, Faridabad for
carrying out failure analysis. Tube metallurgy & deposits inside the cracks/
pits on the tube OD surface were analyzed using EDAX system of SEM at
IOCL R&D center.
EDAX Analysis of localized deposit under the cracks/ pits revealed

presence of Chloride (6000 ppm).
Page 76 of 140
Micro structural evaluation of failed tube cross section reveals multiple

branched Trans granular cracks which is a characteristic of Stress
corrosion cracking phenomenon in SS 316 material.
Page 77 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
As per API 581,Cl-SCC susceptibility for SS 316 is considered high in the
temperature range of 93-149 0C & Cl level from 11 ppm to more than 1000
ppm at pH <10. The failure took place due to Chloride carryover in the sour
Water.
Remedial Measures:
The Tube Bundle was plugged as a Short term measure and continued in
service.
Replacement of tube bundle with duplex SS metallurgy has been
recommended.
Page 78 of 140
5.4
5.4.1 HYDROGEN BLISTERING IN STORAGE TANK BOTTOM PLATE

Introduction:
The Tank no (370-TK-109) is in the HGU Feed Service (Naphtha) since
Commissioning in 2005. Material used in construction of the tank is IS 2062
Gr B. The tank was decommissioned for its first M&I in Jul-2013. After
opening of the tank, huge amount of scaling was observed to be present on
the tank bottom. The entire portion from the bottom to first shell man hole was
full with scale. After removal of scaling material hydrogen blistering was
observed on the tank bottom sketch plates at various locations.
After complete removal of scales, it was observed that pitting/ grooving was
also present on the tank bottom plate. Entire bottom plate and bottom shell
course were blast cleaned to find the extent of damage on tank bottom plate
and the shell.
After blast cleaning of the bottom plates, visual inspection, ultra sonic
thickness survey and scanning using Low Frequency Electromagnetic
Technique (LFET) were carried out to find out the extent of damage. Also
Coupon cutting was done to verify the results.
Observations:
Blistering was observed in 21 nos. plates out of 79 nos. sketch plates.

No blistering was observed in Annular Plate/ Shell plate.
Pitting was observed on Product side of bottom plate up to 3.6mm depth
against original thickness of 8mm.
After Coupon cutting and subsequent blast cleaning, no Corrosion activity
was observed on the Soil side.
No Paint was observed on the either Product/Soil side of the bottom
plates.
Page 79 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
The tank is operated at ambient temperature.

Presence of high H2S content in the product and absence of paint on the
tank bottom/ shell has caused severe scaling which has eventually
blocked the siphon drains.
Blockage of siphon drain had caused build up of water content inside the
tank. Presence of water and high H2S content in the product has led to
hydrogen blistering.
Remedial Measures:
The corroded and blistered portion of the tank bottom plate was replaced.
The complete tank bottom, bottom shell course and floating Roof
underside were blast cleaned to Sa 2 and painted with solvent less
epoxy paint system to prevent scale formation.
Page 80 of 140
5.5
OFFSITE
5.5.1 CORROSION UNDER INSULATION IN VGO TANK

Introduction:
The Tank no (199-TK-503) is an insulated dome roof tank of dia. 45.6M in
VGO service commissioned in 1981. The tank is having two wind girders at
06th and 07th shell courses from the bottom. The tank was decommissioned
for its M&I. Ultrasonic thickness survey was carried out from inside the tank.
During thickness survey thickness loss was observed near to the top wind
girder in east direction. The shell insulation was opened and sweep blast
cleaning was carried out.
Observations:
The water draining holes on the wind girders was found clogged and
blocked with muck deposits.
After removal of insulation in east side, severe scaling and corrosion was
observed along the top wind girder and the shell plate.
The complete insulation of the shell above the wind girders was opened
and sweep blast cleaning was carried out.
After sweep blast cleaning, perforation was observed on the Shell plate in
east direction.
Photographs showing corrosion and perforation due to CUI in shell external

side (Left) and perforation observed from product side of the Shell plate
(Right)
Reasons of Failure:
The Tank is in VGO-Service and completely insulated on the roof as well

as the shell. The riser pipe of the tank cooling connected in the east side
on the roof top got corroded and leaked causing the water to pass through
Page 81 of 140
the insulation from the roof to the shell. Also, the water draining holes of
the wind girders were found blocked by foreign materials leading to water
stagnation in this zone which have caused CUI (Corrosion Under
Insulation).
Remedial Measures:
The perforated and corroded shell plates in east direction were replaced
with 8mm Thk. IS 206P2 Gr B plates.
The complete portion of the shell above the wind girders was blast cleaned
and painted with one coat Self Priing Epoxy and two coats HR aluminum.
The water draining holes on the wind girders were made wider to prevent
blocking and allow water draining.
The leaky cooling water line of the tank in the east side was replaced.
Page 82 of 140
Page 83 of 140
6.0
PANIPAT REFINERY
6.1
HYDRO CRACKER UNIT (HCU)
6.1.1 CORROSION & PERFORATION IN THE TUBE OF HOT SEPARATOR

VAPOUR CONDENSER (75-EA-001 E)
Introduction:
On 06-02-14, a leak was reported in one of the Hot Separator Vapor
Condenser AFCs (75-EA-001E) in PRE Hydrocracker unit. The leak was from
top row tube (20th tube from north side). Due to non- feasibility of the isolation
facility of the air-fin cooler, the unit had to be brought down for attending the
repair & testing jobs. After plugging of the leaky tube and adjacent tube,
hydro-test was carried out at 215 kg/cm 2g, condition found satisfactory and
was taken back in line.
Process Description:
There are total 8 nos. of AFCs (75-EA-001 A to H) & leakage was observed in
element E. Schematic diagram is attached. Details of air fin cooler bundle
are as below:
Total installed Qty

Installation date
Tube Dimension
No of tubes / bundle
Metallurgy
Operating Temp.
Operating Pressure
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
08nos. (75-EA-001 A to H)
Nov2008.
25.0mm ODX3.0 mm thick X 12500mm L
228
KCS (SA179)
1460C
156 kg/cm2
Page 84 of 140
Observations:
Only one tube (20th tube from North, inlet tube) of top most rows was found
leaky.
Leak was localized and was from (4-5) O clock position of tube around 5m
away from the tube-sheet.
No fouling observed in the inlet & outlet nozzles when opened. However,
severe fouling (Blackish color deposits) was observed in both the cut
tubes.
No other tube leaked during hydro-testing.
External surface of the tube found satisfactory after fins removal with no
sign of corrosion/ damage.
Upon splitting of tubes, severe fouling (blackish color) was observed inside
the tubes. The tube fouling had channeling like characteristic.
After the deposits were cleaned, the area of leak revealed channeling/
grooving (with loss of metal) like appearance.
The adjacent tube when split and cleaned did not significant sign of
corrosion.
Page 85 of 140
pH of deposits collected from the tubes was checked and was found to
5.5. The deposits were not completely water soluble.
Sample was sent to IOCL lab for detailed analysis. The results are given
below:
pH
: 5.5
Ammonium bisulphide
: 1653 ppm,
Ammonium chloride
: 1303 ppm
Iron content
: 33.28%
Coke
: 7%
The remaining 65% may be catalyst fines.
Reasons of Failure:
Under deposit corrosion due to severe fouling inside the tubes may be one
of the reasons for tube failure as depicted from the appearance of leaky
tube surface.
Severe fouling inside the tubes indicates inadequate water washing in the
air fin coolers.
Use of DM water as make-up in wash water might also be one of the
reasons for mild uniformly distributed pitting on the tube internal surface. It
is also supported by the fact that thickness loss and pitting has been
observed in wash water line in the past and replacement of piping has
been done twice.
Inferior quality HCGO in the feed from DCU, might also have contributed in
fouling of the tubes. Possibility of coke carryover from inferior quality
HCGO or catalyst and fouling the tubes leading to under deposit
corrosion also cannot be ruled out.
The leaky air-fin cooler was lowered to ground level and kept on stand.
One tube found leaky during water filling.
02 nos. of tubes (01 no. leaky tube and 01 no. adjacent tube) were cut for
detailed inspection.
Both tubes were plugged with CS plugs and hydro-testing of bundle was
carried out at 215 kg/cm2g. No other tube detected leaky.
The air-fin cooler was installed back at position and unit was started.
Recommendations:
In view of low reliability of these air-fin coolers with history of 02 nos. failures
(different coolers) in past two years, it is recommended to replace all the airfin coolers (A-H) with the metallurgy as suggested by the Licensor.
Page 86 of 140
6.2
MOTOR SPIRIT QUALITY - NAPHTHA HYDROTREATER (MSQ NHT)
6.2.1 CORROSION & PERFORATION IN THE TUBES OF COMBINED FEED

EXCHANGER (301-E-101 B)
Introduction:
NHT unit design throughput 80.2 m3/hr was commissioned in Oct.2009. High
sulphur in NHT product was observed by PN since July 2013 at 301E-101A/B
exchanger outlet. To determine whether high sulphur slippage was attributed
to catalyst deactivation or leakage in pre-heat train (NHT combined feed
exchangers 301E-101A~H) tests were undertaken by PN. Results indicated
probable leak from the CFE (A/B) is the cause of high sulphur slippage.
Subsequently, NHT unit was brought down on 12-11-2013 to identify the leaky
exchanger among the (301-E-101 A-H).
CFE Exchanger Details:
Shell Side
:
Tube Side
:
Feed
Effluent
MOC:
Tube
Shell
Effluent inlet temperature at H

Effluent outlet temperature at A
Feed inlet temperature at A
Feed outlet temperature at H
Nos. of tubes in each bundle
:
:
:
:
:
A,B,C,D, E & F (CS),

G&H (SS321)
A,B,C,D, E, F & G (CS),
H (P11)
3430C
940C
450C
2950C
237 U tubes
Wash water injection: Upstream of B- intermittently (weekly) an continuous (6

days) at upstream of product Air fin coolers at the rate of 2.4m3/hr (approx).
Page 87 of 140
Observations:
Dark brownish color deposit was observed in the channel box & no significant
deposits observed in the shell. Lots of adherent & thick deposit of brown
blackish color was observed inside the tubes. Post cleaning inspection, no
significant corrosion on the tube external surface was observed. Severe tube
end thinning was observed in all the tubes and severe corrosion was seen
inside the tubes. The deposits collected were sent for analysis to the external
Lab.
Chemical analysis results:
pH: 5.82, Chloride:1 2.7% wt/wt, Ammonia: 5.8%wt/wt, Iron:77.4%wt/wt,

sulphides: Not detectable.
Chemical analysis indicates presence of corrosion products of iron.
Corrosion resulted due to chloride & Ammonia.
Hydro-testing was carried out and out of total 237 U tubes, 49 tubes
leaked during shell side hydro-testing at 53 kg/cm2g. All these leaky tubes
were plugged.
Samples of leaky tubes were taken out of tube bundle and cut & split for
detailed analysis. Following are the observations:
Heavy deposition observed inside the tube and almost 60-80% fouling
was noticed, severity was more at U-bends.
After cleaning of the deposit, severe pitting & perforations in the tubes
was observed. Phenomenon of localized corrosion mainly due to under
deposit corrosion.
No uniform thickness loss was observed. Other than the areas of
localized corrosion under deposit, thickness was satisfactory as
indicated in the below pictures.
Reasons of Failure:
Corrosion in the tubes was not uniform and it was more at bend locations.
Page 88 of 140
Severe Pitting corrosion & perforations of tubes was taken place under
deposits due to deposition of NH4Cl and formation of HCl in the tube
bundle of 301-E-101B.
49 nos. leaky tubes were plugged.

Considering the large number of plugged tubes and reduced reliability of
the bundle owing to severe corrosion, 301-E-101B was completely
bypassed by modifying the piping in both shell and tube sides.
Exchanger 301-E-101A was taken in line after start-up.
Recommendations:
Procurement of new tube bundles (301 -E-101 A &B) for both the
exchangers with existing MOC at the earliest.
The licensor recommended to inject wash water upstream of 301-E-101B
tube side I/L only on requirement basis such as increase in pressure drop
or temperature increase instead of doing it weekly once for 24 hrs.
Page 89 of 140
6.3
DIESEL HYDRO DE-SULPHURIZATION (DHDS) UNIT
6.3.1 TUBE LEAKAGE OF 52-EE-101C (1ST REACTOR FEED/ EFFLUENT

EXCHANGER)
Introduction:
High sulphur was reported in the product diesel ex DHDS unit. After analysis
of the samples, it was decided that leak is suspected from the Reactor feed/
effluent exchangers (52-EE-101 B &C).Subsequently, DHDS unit was brought
down on 21/09/2013 (Evening shift) for identification of leaky exchangers &
rectification of the leaks.
There are total 5 nos. of tubular exchangers (52-EE-101 A to E) & leakage
was observed in element C from tube side. Schematic diagram is attached.
Leaked Exchanger is Highlighted in the Schematic Sketch showing the

Configuration
Details of Exchangers (52-EE-101 A-E)
Year of commissioning
Types of Bundle
Nos. of Tubes
MOC of Tubes
:
:
:
:
MOC of Shell
Fluid
Operating Pressure
:
:
1999
U Tubes
234 (U-tube)
A&B - SA 179, C- SA 199 Gr T11,
D&E- SA 213 GR321
A,B &C- SA 516 Gr 60,
D&E- SA 387 GR 11 CL2
Shell Feed, Tube Effluent
Shell - 70 Kg/cm2; Tube- 54.3 Kg/cm2
Page 90 of 140
Inspection History:
Inspection & Testing of the Exchangers was carried out during last M&I
S/D in May2011. Condition of Tube bundles of A, B, D & E exchangers
was found satisfactory. No significant deterioration/corrosion was
observed.
Exchanger 52-EE-101 C: During hydro testing, two nos. U tubes were
found leaking in element C. Bundle was taken out, localized damage in
external surface of both the tubes was observed. The leaky tubes were
plugged and one additional tube was cut to examine the internal condition
of tube. The internal surface of the cut tube was found free from corrosion
any other type of damage. All three tubes were plugged and the
exchanger was hydro tested.
Observations:
After opening of the channel covers of both the exchangers (B&C),

exchangers were pressurized after providing ring & water filling to check
the leaky tubes.
A leak from one tube of 52-EE-101 C was observed. No leak was noticed
in B exchanger.
Reasons of Failure:
Due to time constraints and Production requirement, bundle was not pulled
out for detailed analysis.
However, Minor whitish deposits were observed inside the tubes after
opening of channel covers.
Whitish deposits may indicate deposition ammonium chlorides in the tubes
due to inadequate wash water injection in to the system.
Leaky tube was plugged and exchanger was hydro tested at a pressure of
30 Kg/cm2 to check condition of other tubes. No leak was observed.
Seal welding of plugged tube was done with necessary heat treatment,
condition found satisfactory.
Hydro testing of Exchanger was done at maximum differential pressure
across tube sheet of 31.5 kg/cm2 (Shell side pressure -121.8 kg/cm2, Tube
side pressure - 94.5 kg/cm2). No abnormality observed condition found
satisfactory.
Recommendations:
It was recommended to replace the existing bundle with new one of same
metallurgy in the forth coming shutdown May2014.
Presently, wash water injection is around 4.5% of fresh feed rate is being
done. PS to study if the present wash water injection rate is sufficient to
wash out all the deposits in the circuit.
Page 91 of 140
It was recommended to provide temperature indicators and pressure

indicators across combined feed exchangers to understand any salt
deposition during the service which may result in increasing of pressure
across exchangers.
Page 92 of 140
6.4
DIESEL HYDROTREATING (DHDT) UNIT
6.4.1 TUBE LEAKAGE IN HP REAC (72-EA-1C)

Introduction:
DHDT unit was commissioning in Dec-2005. Shutdown of the DHDT unit was
taken on 05-02-2014 due to leakage in high pressure reactor effluent air
cooler (REAC, 72-EA-1C) while in operation. As there was no individual
isolation facility, the unit had to be brought down to isolate leaky cooler by
putting blinds at inlet / outlet nozzles. After 05 years of service a tube leak in
REAC (72-EA-01D) was reported in Dec-2010 due to internal corrosion in inlet
tubes. Considering similar damage due to identical service of other coolers, all
16 nos. coolers were replaced in October 2012 (supplied by M/s BGR with
same MOC).
There are 16 nos. reactor effluent air cooler (72-EA-01 A-P) of DHDT which
cool the reactor effluent vapor stream coming from high pressure hot
separator (72-V-02) and the condensed stream goes to high pressure cold
separator (72-V-03). To avoid salt deposition & fouling in tubes, wash water is
injected in the common 30 inlet line through a quill arrangement into the
system upstream of the air coolers.
Page 93 of 140
Operating Condition & MOC of Air Cooler Tubes

:
I/L 1380 C, O/L 550C
Operating temperature
(Design)
Operating pressure
Tubes
:
:
Inlet / Outlet piping

Fluid Handled
:
:
I/L 109.1 kg/cm2g, O/L 108.3 kg/cm2g

SA -179(CS, NACE+HIC), 25mm OD, 3 mm
thick
Carbon steel (NACE+ HIC)
HC + H2 + H2S + H2O + Ammonium salts
Observation & Jobs Carried Out:
During visual inspection after isolation of cooler, perforation was noticed

very near to the tube sheet at 10 clock position (Tube # 16th from North
of EA-01C top row).
To investigate the reason and pattern of tube failure, plugs of few tubes
were opened.
Huge black deposits were observed inside the stationary header box at the
inlet side (as shown below).
Header box was found choked with deposits.
Tube samples were cut from 2 nos. top row tubes (one leaky tube & other
from the side S-end) to check
internal condition of the tubes.
After cutting, tubes were inspected
and minor deposit was noticed
inside the tubes.
Tube were cut in two halves and
inspected.
No appreciable pitting/ corrosion/
wall thinning was noticed in the
internal surface of the tubes.
Tube end near failed location was
also inspected and no corrosion from internal surface of tube was
observed.
External corrosion/ metal loss at external surface of tube were noticed.
Page 94 of 140
Thickness of top row tubes of 72-EA-01C was checked at un-finned

location. Minimum tube wall thickness was 3.0 mm against design
thickness of 3.0 mm.
Sample thickness of I/L lines of air fin coolers was done. No appreciable
thickness loss in I/L lines was observed.
Visual inspection of other AFCs top row tubes was also carried out and no
abnormality was observed.
At present, unit operates at Tput 500-510 T/Hr against design Tput 437.5
T/hr. REACs I/L temperature remains in the range of approx. 160-1700C
against design operating temperature of 1380C.
Wash water quantity injected to REAC remains in the range of 19-22 T/hr
against required quantity of 29 T/Hr.
Reasons of Failure:
Inadequacy of wash water injection at current throughput & operating inlet

temperature of HP Air Fin coolers.
Localized tube to tube sheet weld joint defects which were further
aggravated by under deposit corrosion.
Recommendations:
Considering the heavy deposit inside header box, Process study to be

carried out to identify the cause of deposit and adequacy of wash water
being added to REAC at current throughput levels of DHDT unit &
operating conditions (Temp & pressure) of the REAC.
Wash water analysis for pH, sulfides, ammonia and chlorides shall be
carried on regular basis.
As per operating instructions of the licensor, sour water ex-cold separator
72-V-03 shall be analyzed once in a day for pH, sulfides, ammonia and
chlorides.
Page 95 of 140
6.5
PURIFIED TEREPHTHALIC ACID (PTA)
6.5.1 SHELL FAILURE OF DISSOLVER REACTOR (21-R1-1301)

Introduction:
On 11/03/2014 at around 02:00 hrs a leak was reported from the shell of
Dissolver Reactor (21-R1-1301) in PTA unit of PR. The leak is from the shell
above the 2nd manhole from bottom. Unit was brought down to attend the
leak.
After opening of manholes & removal of reactor catalyst, internal inspection
was carried out to check the nature & location of leak. Since the leaky location
was behind the dissolver tank and not accessible for visual inspection, exact
location / extent of damage could not be ascertained. For assessment of the
leaky area and type of damage, M/s L&T was contacted. M/s L&T suggested
cutting and lifting of the dissolver tank to assess the nature of defect &
location. After cutting & lifting of the tank, reactor shell damage was assessed.
Seeing the criticality of the job, M/s L&T was engaged in repair of the reactor.
The reactor shell damage was repaired by weld build up. After successful
testing, NDT and hydro-test at 168 kg/cm, catalyst loading was done. On
completion of all the maintenance activities, unit was started up on 21.04.14.
MOC/ Design/ Operating parameters of Dissolver Reactor
MOC:
Shell
Supporting ring
Shell thickness
:
:
:
A 387 Gr. 11 CL2 + SS 304L cladding

Inconel 625
Nom. (136+4) mm
Design/Operating parameters of Dissolver Reactor:
Operating/ Design temp.

Operating/ Design Press.
Hydro test pressures
:
:
:
286/3500C
83.64/122.4 Kg/cm2
167.9 Kg/cm2
Process Description
Crude Terephthalic Acid (CTA) product (99.7% pure) from the oxidation plant
contains a small quantity of impurities (0.25 to 0.3%). The main impurities are
intermediates from the oxidation of Paraxylene and include 4
carboxybenzaldehyde, paratoluic acid and coloured substances which must
be removed before the material can be used in the manufacture of polyester
products.
The function of the Purification Plant is to reduce the levels of intermediates
and by-products. This is achieved by dissolving the CTA in water at high
pressure/ temperature and reaction of impurities with Hydrogen in the
presence of a catalyst. This reaction effectively converts the impurities into
more soluble or non-coloured forms, which stay dissolved in the water phase
Page 96 of 140
in the subsequent crystallization stage. Both CTA and 4CBA are very
insoluble but p-TA is soluble. The p-TA and other non-coloured forms are
purged from the plant in the mother liquor from the primary solid/ liquid
separation stage.
The main reactions that take place are:
4-CBA + Hydrogen = p-TA + water (or to 4-carboxy benzyl alcohol). Both

products are soluble in water.
Coloured impurities + Hydrogen = Non coloured impurities or to soluble
coloured impurities.
Observations:
On preliminary inspection during leak, slurry was found coming out from
the shell above the middle manhole of the shell.
On removal of the shell insulation, the leak in the shell was noted adjacent
to the shell longitudinal weld joint just above the second manhole.
Ultrasonic thickness gauging of shell from external side was carried out
around the leak location and localized thickness loss in approx. 6 X 8
area around the leak was noted.
After unloading of catalyst and opening of manholes, internal inspection

was carried out to assess the type and extent of damage from inside.
However, assessment could not be carried out as internal dissolver tank
was resting over support ring and the damage was behind the dissolver
tank.
Page 97 of 140
Hydrojet cleaning of annular space between reactor shell and dissolver

tank was carried out to see the inaccessible area behind the dissolver tank
using Video-scope. However, only deposits over the support ring could
have been seen. Deposits could not be cleaned through hydro-jetting as
there was no opening in the bottom side of the annular space for the
deposits to come out.
Finally, the tank was cut and lifted to expose the damage location from
inside. On lifting of the tank, heap of deposits over the support ring was
observed.
After cleaning of deposits, leak was found to have initiated from top side
weld joint of support ring to shell cladding. After cleaning, corrosion and
pitting of the support ring top side weld joint was observed all around the
circumference.
No significant corrosion of Support ring and nearby cladding was observed

except cladding to support ring top weld joint.
No corrosion / deterioration in bottom side weld joint of support ring,

SS304L clad of reactor, down comer plates, inner tank & its bottom plates
(SS304L), and in Inconel support ring, distributor assembly (Hastelloy),
drain nozzle i.e. internals of tanks in dissolver section except top weld joint
of support ring. Support ring was cut circumferentially in the damaged
area. Thereafter, PMI of support ring and cladding surface was carried out
and confirmed to Inco-625 & SS 304 respectively.
Page 98 of 140
UT of 1200 m circumferential band (i.e. 600mm above & below the leaky
area) was carried out by to check the condition of cladding & base metal.
Condition was found satisfactory except the failed location.
Thickness survey around the failure location from external side before
lifting of dissolver tank was carried out. No appreciable thickness loss was
noted except near failed location.
Thickness survey of other shell plate was also carried out and no
appreciable thickness loss was noted. All nozzles weld joints and shell
internal side welding joints was also DP tested and found satisfactory.
PAUT of circumferential and longitudinal weld joints of reactor shell was

carried out by external agency. No rejectable indications were observed.
TOFD inspection in 600mm top & bottom of defect area was also carried
out by M/s L&T. No rejectable indications were observed except for the
area around the leak.
Page 99 of 140
Sample Analysis:
Sample of deposits was collected from the dissolver tank support ring for
chemical analysis. Sample has been submitted to Process, QC lab PR and
R&D, IOCL for further detailed analysis. The results obtained from QC lad
PR as follows:
Fe (3.11%), Cl & Br (ND), Cobalt (10 ppm), Manganese (10 ppm) and 4CBA (65 ppm)
Repair job of failed location was carried out by M/s L&T as per procedure
submitted by M/s L&T. Major steps followed were as below:
Initially PT & UT, TOFD, PMI, Ferrite check, Hardness test on surface
500mm either side of support ring was carried out.
Disbonded portion of clad was removed. Also clad from defect area was
removed.
Dehydrogenation treatment for repair area was carried out at soaking

temperature of 600-620 OC for 02 hours.
Welding of ground locations was carried out using E-8018-B2 followed by

post heating at 300-350 OC for min. 03 hrs.
SS weld overlay welded with E-309L + E-308L followed by Inconel

buttering at marked areas.
After NDTs, PWHT of repaired shell was carried out at soaking

temperature of 630-650 OC for min 05 hrs 15 mins.
Inconel ring welding was carried out followed by DP testing. Then Internal
dissolver tank was welded & DP tested.
Page 100 of 140
After completion of all repair jobs & associated NDTs, hydrotesting of

reactor was carried out at 168 Kg/cm2g & found satisfactory.
Reasons of Failure:
Failure occurred at the top side welding of dissolver tank support ring
where heap of deposits were accumulated.
Corrosion and pitting on the top side weld joint of support ring where the
weld joint is under tensile stress due to load of the dissolver tank might
have caused stress corrosion cracking in the SS cladding leading to
exposure of P11 shell to corrosive fluid and subsequent leak.
Recommendations:
As it is not feasible during every turnaround to cut & lift the inner dissolver
tank, necessary changes in the design of internal dissolver tank is required
after due consultation from the process licensor/ manufacturer.
6.5.2 INTERNAL SHELL CORROSION OF 1ST CRYSTALLIZER (21-CR1-1401)
Introduction:
PTA plant was commissioned in June2006. An emergency shutdown of PTA
unit was taken due to dissolver reactor shell failure which was subsequently
declared as M&I SD 2014 of PTA unit considering the repair time for dissolver
reactor. During this opportunity, 1st PTA crystallizer internal inspection was
also carried out.
MOC/ Design/ Operating Parameters of Dissolver Reactor:
MOC:
Page 101 of 140
Shell
Inlet nozzle shroud
Shell thickness
:
:
:
A 516 Gr 70 + SS 304L cladding

Inconel 625, 15mm thk.
Nom. (76+3) mm
Design/ Operating parameters of Dissolver Reactor:
Operating/ Design temperature

Operating/ Design Pressure
:
:
246/2800C
36.7/51Kg/cm2
This crystallizer is in just downstream of dissolver reactor. Process description
for this circuit has been detailed in 6.1.
Observations & Jobs Carried Out:
Internal visual inspection of shell and connected nozzles was carried out.
Condition of shell and nozzles was found satisfactory except the shell
around inlet nozzle.
Erosion marks on cladding surface of shell near the inlet nozzle was
observed.
Vent holes in the pad plates for inlet nozzle shroud left were observed
unsealed during vessel fabrication stage.
These 2 nos. pads are welded to the shell base plate.
Reactor shell material just below these pads is carbon steel.
Since vent hole were left open, CS shell base plate was in contact with the
corrosive process fluid.
Deep groove observed in the shell plate at the vent hole from inside. Insitu repair of corroded shell carried out followed by NDT. One certain
failure of the equipment could be averted by this inspection.
Both vent holes were ground to smooth finish.
Page 102 of 140
After Hydrogen bake out, welding was carried out using E-7018-1 for base
metal and ER 308L+ER 309L for cladding surfaces followed by NDTs.
Page 103 of 140
6.6
RESID FLUIDIZED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT (RFCCU)
6.6.1 LEAKAGE IN INLET ECONOMISER HEADER IN CO- BOILER (07-LW-201)

Introduction:
Leakages were observed in the inlet economizer header/ stub joints within a
year of the replacement. The root cause for the leakage was identified using
the data available from inspection history records, NDT observations, site
parameters, laboratory analysis and RTDBMS/ DCS. The following report
details about the observations and findings.
CO-Boiler is used for recovering the waste heat of the flue gas ex-Orifice
Chamber-1/ 2. This boiler was commissioned in the year 1998. The
manufacturer of this boiler is M/s. Themax India Ltd, Pune.
Brief Process Description of the section
The condensate generated in WGC/MAB and make up DM water are

treated in the de-aerator to remove dissolved oxygen and CO2 gases. The
BFW ex deaerator is further preheated in E-212 (LCO pump around) to
1420C, E213A/B/C (HCO pump around) and then E217A/B to 1900C
before sending to CO-boiler economizer section.
Flue gas path is ex-RG-1 (5980C) to CO-Incinerator. Ex RG-2 (6750C) to
ExCO incinerator (5830C). The flue gas ex- Co-incinerator passes
through Co-boiler and then to stack (1960C).
Material of construction (MOC) and process details of inlet economizer header

and coils:
Construction code
Operating/ Design Pressure

BFW inlet temperature
Design metal temperature
(Header/ coil)
Inlet economizer header
dimension
Coil dimension
:
:
:
IBR Class-II & ASME Sec-Viii Div-1(Ed

2010,add 2011)
40/ 50 kg/cm2 (g)
180-2000C
2110C (header) / 2220C (coil)
OD 168.3 x 14.27thk, SA 106 Gr. B
OD 38.1 x 3.66thk, SA 210 GrA1-HFS
Inspection History of Economizer Coil/ Header:
The sketch of header assembly with stubs is shown in sketch-1.
Sketch-2 shows the side view of the assembly.
Photographs show the leakages in the header/ stub coil.
Page 104 of 140
In 2001, leakages were noticed in

the tubes of coil no-12, 13, 14 (of
module-1), which was attributed
to weld joint defect. Subsequent
hydrotest revealed leakages from
the bends of coils 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7
(module-2). 266 nos. of externally
pitted bends and 176 nos.
straight portions of pipe at the
bottom section (module-2) were
replaced.
In 2008, Severe corrosion (pits

depth 1.5-2 mm) noticed in bottom bends and adjacent straight portion of
economizer module-2. All 50 nos. coils of this module were replaced with
new set of coils.
In June 2011, first leakage was noticed from tube to Header stub joint
(HAZ). Leaky location was clamped online.
Page 105 of 140
IN Aug2011, leakage from 2 more tubes was observed and pinhole leak
was arrested by providing online clamp.
In Sept.2012, the complete inlet economizer header (with stub) was

replaced with new header supplied
by M/s. Indcon Projects and
Equipments Ltd, Faridabad. The
replaced
leaky
header
was
inspected. Leakage was noticed
from economizer coils (10, 11, 13)
towards the coil portion adjacent
to the stub/ coil welding joint. The
leak was in the form of pin hole.
Internal inspection of replaced

Header & Stubs (Tubes) was done
after splitting. No corrosion/ pitting
were seen. Thickness of the tube & Header was satisfactory. Pinhole was
seen at all the leaky locations (see photograph-1, 2, 3).
In May 2013, 2 nos. of coils leaked from the weld joint between stub to
pipe in the newly replaced inlet economizer header.
In Aug.2013, one more leak noticed in the coil portion adjacent to the
stub/ coil welding joint.
In Oct.2013, 4 more leakages were noticed in the coil portion adjacent

to the stub/ coil welding joint.
In Nov13, one more leakage took place, leading to a total leakage of 8

nos. coils.
Analysis and Discussion:
The BFW parameters are operating out of range. pH is hovering in the

range 8.2 to 9.7 (against recommended 8.8 to 9.2), Conductivity is
Page 106 of 140
hovering in the range 6 to 35 (against recommended < 3 mMHO/cm.

There is no data on dissolved oxygen, Fe. With such fluctuations in pH
and conductivity likelihood of corrosion inside the tubes is increased.
Internal inspection of replaced economizer did not reveal any corrosion/
pitting indications. The leakage was in the form of pinhole, indicating very
localized phenomenon near the pinhole. No thickness loss was noticed
around the pin hole leak portion.
The operating temperatures of BFW (1900C) and pressure 40 kg/cm2(g)

rules out steaming condition in the economizer. The same is corroborated
with the visual inspection findings wherein no sign of erosion/ corrosion is
noticed.
The skin temperatures measured for the header and coil is (145 0C and
1600C respectively using thermohunter instrument. These values are well
below the design limits of 2110C and 2220C respectively.
The supports of the BFW line ex-E-217A/B to inlet economizer header was
visually checked, no abnormality was noticed.
The new header was fabricated by M/s. Indcon Projects and Equipments
Ltd, Faridabad. This header design is very similar to the one fabricated by
OEM M/s Thermax limited. The weld joint quality of the existing header
needs further assessment.
The existing stub to header joint in inlet economizer header is a stub out
design with the opening smaller than the tube ID, whereas in the
intermediate/ outlet header the opening ID is full bore. M/s Thermax limited
was contacted to comment on the design of the existing inlet economizer
header. M/s Thermax replied that the inlet header having lesser ID bore at
header is to maintain proper water circulation through each coil. Hence
you cannot make full bore at inlet header. Since both intermediate & outlet
header are having full bore, if you make inlet header also full bore then it
will cause circulation disturbance & hence overheating/ steaming in
economizer. Accordingly, the design is not the root cause of failure.
Moreover, the same design header served since 1998 till Nov 2012.
Revamp of the RFCCU was done to increase the through put of the unit
from 0.7 MMTA to 0.85 MMMTA in 2008.No changes/modifications were
done in the Co-boiler section hardware.
During Sept.12 the inlet economizer header and 3 nos. coils (10, 11, 13)
were replaced. In April 2013 short shutdown, major repairs in casing plate
was undertaken to arrest flue gas leakage. In the economizer section also
top casing plates were cut to identify leakages of flue. After completing
necessary repairs the casing plate was fixed back and welded. The coil
inlet section was also seal welded to plug flue gas leakage. But as per the
drawing of casing plate, the coils should not be welded with casing,
instead they should pass through a sleeve to provide expansion of the
coil/header during operation. This welding might have contributed to
Page 107 of 140
stresses in the weld joint causing leakages. It is worth mentioning here

that in 2008, 50 nos. economizer coils were replaced. After the
replacement of coils the header started leaking in 2011. In the recent
shutdown during May14 the casing plate was cut for replacement of the
inlet economizer header, the tubes were found seal welded with casing
plate.
To mitigate the problem, sleeves were provided around the coils for
accommodating free expansion during operation in all coils of inlet,
intermediate and final economizer header during the May14 shutdown.
The same is being monitored on daily basis; so far no problems have been
noticed.
Conclusion and Probable Reasons of Failure:
Though the BFW parameters are not within the limits, physical evidence of
the failed header sample shows that there is no apparent corrosion,
erosion signs, thereby ruling out failure due to corrosion or steaming of
economizer.
Neither is the design of header a issue as was confirmed by the OEM M/s
Thermax and also based on our past data.
The quality of the fabrication carried out by M/s Indcon Projects and
Equipments Ltd, Faridabad could be a reason.
The most probable reason appears to be hindrance/ restriction in thermal
expansion of the inlet economizer header/ coil assembly due to the seal
welding carried out between coil and casing plate at top causing
development of stress and subsequent failure.
Page 108 of 140
6.7
CONTINUOUS CATALYTIC REFORMING UNIT (CCRU)
6.7.1 LEAKAGE IN BFW

EMBRITTLEMENT
COIL
OF
08-FF-205
DUE
TO
CAUSTIC
Introduction:
CCRU furnace 08-FF-205 is provided with BFW coil in the convection zone for
generation of steam. This coil has been suffering from repeated failure of
BFW inlet tube predominantly due to cracking phenomenon. The recent
failure in BFW coil was noted in Jan 2013 at 6 O clock position however,
continuation of furnace operation using restricted orifice (to avoid dry run in
the coil) resulted in erosion corrosion failure of neighboring HC tube in
Sept2013.
Design/ Operating Conditions of BFW Coil:
Process details:
BFW coil operating temperature

BFW coil Design TMT
BFW coil operating Pressure
BFW coil design Pressure (Elastic rupture)
Flue temperature around the BFW coils
:
:
:
:
:
Around 1380C
3500C
57- 61 kg/cm2(g)
76 kg/cm2(g)
5040C
Material of Construction (MOC):
BFW Coil: MOC: Studded A210 Gr.A1, Size: 88.9 O/D x 7.62 (12 nos.)
Steam Coil: MOC: Studded A210 Gr.A1, Size: 88.9 O/D x 7.62
Steam Super Heater: A213 Gr.T11,
Size: 88.9 O/D x 7.62
FF-201
FF-205
FF-203
FF-202
RB-201
RB-202
RB-203
EE-201
08-EA-LP-201
Convection of FF-201,202 & 203

K-202
LEGENDS
Line MOC
.5Mo
Line size-24"
1.25Cr-
Corrosion control chemical injection / monitoring parameters for BFW feed.
Page 109 of 140
BFW in this unit is supplied from HGU (06) & RFCCU

Hydrazine and Morpholine injections are made in deaerator for oxygen
removal & pH control respectively.
TSP dosing is done in steam drum.
Corrosion monitoring parameters limits & status.
BFW Parameter
PH
COND.(mMHO/CM)
Hydrazine, PPM
Silica (PPM)
Limit
8.1-9.0
<3
.01- .02
<.02
Observed Range
8.8-8.9
4.0 - 48
0.04 - 0.10
0.05 - 0.07
Leakage History of BFW Inlet Tubes:
Predominant cause for leakage in BFW coil was reported as

circumferential cracks in the vicinity of studs & ligament.
Subsequent to the commissioning of the Furnace, BFW coil leaked at
three occasions as below:
BFW Parameter
Leakage in BFW Coil
1st leakage
2nd leakage
3rd leakage
Limit
Replacement Month
/Year
Nov2009
Dec2011
Sept2013 (Leaked in
Jan2013)
Observed Range
Total no. of tube
replaced
07 Nos.
03 Nos.
12 Nos.
Repair / replacement methodology for BFW coil leakage:
The furnace was not opened immediately after the leakage in BFW coil for
repair/ replacement jobs and operation was continued by reducing BFW
flow inside the coil using restricted orifice.
Leakage in BFW coil occurred in Jan2013 & replacement was taken up in
Sept2013.
Observations:
Visual Observation:
The internal surface of the tube was found fairly clean with adherent
magnetite layer and as such no appreciable corrosion marks except minor
roughening on the ID surface was observed.
However, in the vicinity of leak, severe localized corrosion to tube OD

surface as well as studs was noted. At the same time, yellowish deposit on
the tube OD surface was also observed at some locations.
Wide, through & through crack like opening was observed on the failed
tube sample at the location of leak without any evidence of appreciable
Page 110 of 140
tube bulging. In addition, a few circumferential cracks were also observed

on tube OD & ID surface around stud locations as well as in the ligament
space.
On close observation of crack morphology, it could be ascertained that

crack propagation has taken path from Tube ID to Tube OD surface.
Slight bowing in the failed tube was also observed during replacement,
however, that may be due to continuation of BFW coil operation after
failure using restricted orifice to reduce flow rate.
Failed tube sample was sent to M/s R&D, Faridabad. The observations
and investigation results are given below:
Laboratory Investigation:
Metallographic Examination:
Microstructure Indicated normal Ferritic & pearlitic microstructure having

network of cracks with predominantly
intergranular morphology.
Cracks were found initiated from tube
ID surface.
Some of the cracks were also found
initiated in the middle of tube cross
section & that may be due to
penetration of affecting media in the
through & through crack.
Observation under SEM:
The deposit inside the crack tip was analyzed using EDAX system of SEM.
This revealed presence of Na to the extent of 1.9 % apart from other
constituents present.
Page 111 of 140
Deposits on tube ID surface using EDAX system indicated presence of Na

up to 0.6 %.
Deposits on tube OD surface using EDAX system indicated presence of
sulfur to the extent of 2.9 %.
Chemical Analysis of BFW Tube Sample:
Chemical analysis of failed tube sample received was carried out using
Angstrom V-950 Spark Spectrometer and composition of the tube was
found in line with design metallurgy ASTM A-210 Gr A1.
Analysis and Discussion:

The observation noted on localized corrosion & cracks in the vicinity of leak
apparently indicated the failure due to either of the two mechanisms of
material degradation below:
Severe external corrosion of tube external surface at the failure location.

Environmental Cracking of tube in the vicinity of studs & its ligament.
Severe Localized External Corrosion at the Location of Leak:
As we are aware, that liquid/ gaseous hydrocarbon fuel used for furnace
firing, invariably contain sulfur bearing compounds and that was also
indicated by EDAX analysis of deposit on the tube OD surface to the
extent of 2.9%. On burning such fuel in the oxidizing atmosphere, can
result in formation of acidic gases/ acid components like SO 2, H2SO3,
H2SO4 etc. in the flue gas. These on direct condensation or dissolution in
water after steam condensation can form acids, which, on coming in
contact with BFW tubes (CS), can result in external corrosion / immature
failure of BFW tube. However, looking at flue gas temperature of 550
6000C in the vicinity of leaky tube, chances of above mentioned
condensation is not possible. Thus, presence of acidic gases in the flue
gas resulting in localized corrosion / leakage of BFW tube in operation as
a primary reason of failure can be ruled out.
However, such localized external corrosion is possible after BFW tube
leaks in service & water coming out of it dissolves acidic gases in flue gas
creates acidic environment and continue corrosion of tube OD surface in
the leaky region. Such acidic water coming out from leak in jet form, can
also be expected to cause erosion corrosion of nearby Hydro Carbon
convection tube when it comes in contact with it and result in leakage of
the same.
Circumferential Cracking of BFW Tube in the Vicinity of Studs & Ligament:

As established in the observation part, initiation of crack has taken place from
the tube internal surface, indicates that BFW ID environment has played a
lead role in the material degradation by cracking phenomenon leading to
immature failure of tube in operation.
Page 112 of 140
Literature suggests that
The combined action of tensile stress and presence of sodium hydroxide

in contact with CS component at elevated temperature, result in caustic
cracking (embrittlement) of the component. This embrittlement results in
network of cracks having predominantly inter granular cracking
morphology at the contact surface.
Cracking probability is significantly lower in caustic solutions < 5%

however, presence of high temperature (approaching boiling) can cause
locally higher concentration, which would increase cracking susceptibility.
With regard to temperature, the key consideration is the actual metal

temperature, and not just the normal process temperature.
As weld or as bent carbon & low alloy Ferritic steel assemblies are
susceptible to caustic cracking because of high level of residual stress
remaining after fabrication by these methods.
As a matter of fact, the present failure observations was found matching with
caustic embrittlement criterion indicated above as:
High amount of residual tensile stresses are expected in the stud region
due to involvement of resistance welding for joining studs.
From the analysis of deposit on the tube inside surface, indication for
presence of Na in appreciable amount and analysis of deposit at crack tip
showing Na to the extent of 1.9 % on EDAX analysis indicates the
possibility of caustic deposition inside the failed BFW tube & its further
concentration.
Network of cracks observed on tube cross section & tube internal surface
showing inter-granular morphology also resembles with caustic
embrittlement (Caustic Stress Corrosion Cracking) phenomenon.
On looking at the configuration of BFW coil, it is noted that BFW inlet tube
is placed in the high flue gas temperature zone of 550-600 oC than BFW
outlet tube at comparatively lower flue gas temperature zone in the
downstream of flue gas. Therefore, water to tube interface temperature
can be expected high enough particularly at 6 O Clock position with BFW
inlet temperature of 850C to result in deposition of phosphate & release of
free caustic from Tri-Sodium Phosphate. Further concentration of caustic
under the deposit, to the extent to cause caustic embrittlement can also be
expected. Variation in Solubility of Tri-Sodium Phosphate at different
temperature can be seen from Fig 8.
Also, wide variation in conductivity of BFW in the range of 4.0 48

mMHO/cm against the limit of <3 mMHO/cm suggest improper control on
salts in BFW system, can contribute to caustic concentration in the BFW
system.
Page 113 of 140
Conclusion:
From the observation & discussion, it can be concluded that,

Present failure of economizer tube is suspected due to Caustic
Embrittlement phenomenon.
Operation & Engg. Services may analyze presence of caustic and
possibility of its concentration with respect to
Upsets in BFW conductivity.
Any impact of BFW inlet coil placement at higher flue gas temperature
zone in release / concentration of caustic in the BFW inlet tubes.
Page 114 of 140
6.8
THERMAL POWER STATION (TPS)
6.8.1 FAILURE OF PLATEN SUPERHEATER COIL IN VHP BOILER-2

Introduction:
Subsequent to commissioning of VHP boiler -2 in 1997, failure in super heater
tube was noted for the first time in June, 2013. The tube cracked open from
SS 347 weld joint.
Design parameters of the Boiler / Superheater:
Design Load
Steam Pressure at Superheater outlet
Steam temperature at Super heater outlet
Super heater Tube
Feed water inlet temperature
No. of PSH coil
:
:
:
:
:
:
160 Tons / hr
105 kg/cm2
5100C
NB 51.0 mm SS 347
2000C
14
Failed tube sample was sent to R&D center, the results of investigation are as
follows:
Visual Inspection:
The failed sample tube was found free from any deposit on tube ID / OD
surface. However, minor oxidation on tube OD surface was observed.
Failure of the super heater tube took place from HAZ of weld towards
small spool piece of lower thickness side (used during original fabrication).
At the same time multiple circumferential cracks were also observed at the
internal surface of the above failed spool piece.
Thickness Survey:
Thickness variation was noted between the failed SS 347 spool piece &
other tube sections either side of the failed spool piece.
Page 115 of 140
Thickness recorded for failed spool piece was noted 3.45 4.22 mm
compared to thickness values recorded close to 6.0 mm for tube sections
on either side of the failed spool piece (Refer Fig-1).
As per main steam & furnace draft trend graph forwarded by PR, SH outlet
STM temp is noted as 580.330C). Therefore actual tube skin temperature
at failure site may be even higher than 6000C. Considering tube skin
temperature of 6210C the retiring thickness of the tube were calculated to
be 6.2 & 3.62 mm respectively for SS 347 & SS347H Grade tube material.
Micro structural Evaluation:
In the failed region of the tube, microstructure revealed multiple cracks of

both Intergranular & transgranular morphology.
Sensitization of super heater tube was observed in both the above
mentioned locations
Hardness Measurement:
Hardness measurement on service exposed SS tube was carried out and
values noted were found within acceptable limit.
Sample
Specification
Tube
Hardness ( BHN)
135/136/135
Hardness Max (BHN) As per A213

194
Chemical Analysis:
Chemical analysis of the failed tube & weld joint was carried out using
Angstrom V-950 Spark Spectrometer & found conforming to SS 347
metallurgy.
Analysis and Discussions:
From the observation, sensitization has been noticed in SS 347 tubes both
in the failed region & beyond and can be expected in the tubes exposed to
sensitization temperature zone of 423 815C. As such, sensitization may
not be expected to impact high temperature properties of the tube material
however, reduction of corrosion resistance and thereby possibility of inter
granular corrosion / cracking in specific environment cannot be ruled out.
At the same time sensitized grain boundary can be expected to have lower
ductility compared to bulk material & thus any failure in such a condition
can have higher tendency to take grain boundary path. Therefore failed
region has shown both Intergranular & transgranular mode of failure.
From the available data, it is noted that, there is fast reduction in allowable
stress values for SS 347 material above 537 oC and thus to withstand the
same amount of pressure much higher thickness will be required at higher
operating temperature .From the observation, it is also noted that failed
spool piece has lower thickness (3.45 4.22) compared to nearby SS 347
Page 116 of 140
tube spool piece having close to 6.0 mm thk. On estimation of retiring

thickness considering of tube skin temperature 6210C in the present upset
condition, the retiring thickness of the tube were calculated to be 6.2 &
3.62 mm respectively for SS 347 & SS347H Grade of tube material.
Therefore, the spool piece having thickness in the range 3.45 4.22 mm
may not be expected to withstand the present upset in operating
conditions and result in failure in case of both SS 347 & 347 H metallurgy.
Conclusion:
The failure of the super heater tube is suspected due to fabrication fault
that is the use of lower thickness spool piece being inadequate to
withstand the temperature & pressure conditions of Boiler.
Sensitization in SS 347 tube material of the Boiler was observed that may
be prone to Polythionic Acid SCC in the environment of flue gas containing
S bearing compounds (can be expected due to the use of S containing
fuel for burner firing.)
Page 117 of 140
6.9
OFFSITE
6.9.1 CORROSION OF OFFSITE LINES AT SUPPORT LOCATIONS

Introduction:
Piping in offsite area is susceptible to external corrosion at support locations,
as this area is difficult to clean and paint. Moreover, the support locations are
also submerged in soil, water, debris etc. Several off-site piping failures have
occurred at Panipat Refinery due to external corrosion at pipe resting support
locations. Since, hot job is not possible in all these lines at support locations
to provide pads; a novel technique was used at Panipat Refinery for the first
time to prevent such failures.
In order to mitigate the above issue corrosion protection pads were provided
at support contact points by cold patching using Ferro Silicone based epoxy
resin material. Corrosion protection pads were provided at around 3000
support contact points of LPG, MS, Naphtha, Hydrogen pipelines and piping
under culverts locations.
Page 118 of 140
Page 119 of 140
7.0
PANIPAT NAPHTHA CRACKER
7.1
UNIT
7.1.1 TRANSFER LINE EXCHANGERS FAILURES (H#700 SRT-VI)

Background:
Heater taken in cracking mode for the first time during commissioning on
12.03.2010. After run length of 21 days heater was brought under decoking
mode. Due to high DP in Coil-C choking was suspected and heater was
brought under shutdown for cutting and dechoking jobs. Hot corrosion was
observed after investigation in radiant coil tubes due to Na carry over from
DSG circuit. Heater was under shut-down since the first decoking cycles. It
was commissioned after complete radiant coil replacement in March 2013.
Idle time wet preservation was done in H#700 according to OEM. . Being the
lowest point all the deposits in the system were collected in the TLE oval
header. As per the operation practice no IBD blow down valve in TLEs are
being operated to remove the deposits from the oval header.
Introduction:
Heater#700 was brought under shut-down on 20.12.13 after 2 decoking
cycles. 11-E-701D TLE (Transfer Line Exchanger) bath tub was opened on
28.12.13 for suspected tube leak which was identified due to the increased
pressure in the process side of radiant coil O/L. Visual inspection after bath
tub opening revealed failures in 3 nos. Oval headers and erosion in tubes
ends. TLE was Hydrotested for leak identification in tubes and T/s.
Subsequently leak was also observed in other TLEs (TLE-A & F) during the
hydrotest of TLE-D. Depending on the observation in the opened TLE bathtubs all other TLEs (3 nos) were also opened for thorough inspection.
Equipment Tag no: 11-E-701 A~F (SRT-VI Transfer Line Exchangers)
Description about TLEs:
Transfer Line exchangers The TLES for SRT-VI type cracking heaters are
vertical exchangers incorporating and annular tube in tube type design. The
hot cracked gas enters the inner tubes at the bottom of the exchangers and
flows upward. Super high pressure BFW enters the annulus between the
inner tube and outer tube via distribution sub-headers at the bottom and the
steam water mixture flows upward, co-current with the process gas. The
steam generation system is designed to circulate by thermosyphon from
steam drums located above the TLEs.
Designed Conditions:
Stream
Operating pressure
Operating temp
Inner tube
Cracked gas
70.6 kPa
829/3770C
Page 120 of 140
Outer tube
Water/Steam
12778 kPa
3290C
Designed Pressure
Designed Temperature
Inner tube
448 kPa
5250C
Page 121 of 140
Outer tube
14100 kPa
3700C
Page 122 of 140
TLE Details:
No. of TLEs per Heater (SRT-VI): 06 nos.
Material Specifications:
Inner tube
Outer Tube
Oval Header
:
:
:
SA 209 T1A, Size 63.5 x 8 mm thk.

SA 106 Gr B, Size 88.9 x 7.1 mm thk.
SA 209 T1A, Size 147 x 80 x 12.5 mm thk.
Observations:
All the TLEs were inspected, observation of thickness loss due to severe
corrosion, cracks in tube sheets and tube leaks were observed in bottom
oval header location.
Severe under deposit corrosion (UDC) was observed in boiler feed water
side in oval header and inner tube OD at the inspected locations of the
replaced inner tubes.
Steam drum was also opened for internal inspection.
Loose black deposits were observed near both dish ends @ bottom 6
OClock location with corrosion marks in shell throughout the length in
bottom most portions.
Non-uniform magnetite later was observed in drum shell, risers baffles

and bottom 6 OClock location.
White deposits of salts were observed @ 10 and 2 Oclock location which

signifies foaming inside the drum during operation.
Heater was operated with high conductivity indicating excessive dissolved

salts present in the system.
Page 123 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
BFW Side Corrosion:
The tubes extracted from the TLE revealed diminished wall thickness of
the inner tube, with degradation mechanism clearly starting from the Outer
side i.e. BFW/steam side. Huge amount of black deposits were observed
in the oval header when the tubes were extracted. The damage was only
present at the bottom, very detrimental in the oval header location (100mm
from the bottom end). Oxides in BFW occur due to insufficient preservation
during shut-down and inadequate treatment. These oxides agglomerate in
the areas of high heat flux, building porous salt layers. These layers stick
to the tube wall and difficult to remove even by mechanical cleaning.
The increased concentrations cause localized decreased pH value, which

result in strong corrosion and recurrent scale spalling. The high heat flux
on the tube side and low boiler water circulation rates may result in
phosphate hide-out. As a result these TLE tube designs are more
susceptible to Acidic Phosphate attack resulting in severe localized
corrosion on the boiler water tube that is shell side of the TLEs as per the
following reaction:
Page 124 of 140
In Phosphate based treatments, the presence of iron oxides above the

320C and particularly when phosphate hide-out is observed increases the
possibility of phosphate salt precipitation (which was also observed
visually in the collected deposits), these deposits increases the potential of
Under Deposit Corrosion (UDC). Therefore the more the deposits present
the more the amount of corrosion will be observed.
Mentioned below is the localized corrosion cell forming cathodic and

anodic areas.
Evidence:
Black deposits along with traces of white phosphate salts were observed
in oval headers when tubes were extracted in TLE-D. Also videoscopy
done in TLE-E revealed black deposits in the oval header.
Parameter control: Drum water parameters (high conductivity and Low
PO4) in H#700 were not maintained within desired limits even after shock
blow-downs and Phosphate based treatments.
Page 125 of 140
Overheating: Lack of heat transfer in oval header, excessive heat flux/

poor circulation, localized bulging and surface opening cracks signifies
deposits in the oval header.
Corrosion in the oval header bottom portion and tubes had severe
thickness loss (Oval header thickness loss from 12.5 mm to 2-3 mm) when
inspected after cutting and UT.
Jobs Carried Out:
UT gauging was carried out in oval headers and weld built-up was done at
thickness loss locations.
Surface grinding & DP was done at all oval header bulge locations.
Cracks in oval header were removed by grinding and weld built-up was
done. Root and final DP were carried out.
Leaky corroded inner tubes were replaced.
Ring welding jobs were carried out in 1 no TLE with severe thickness loss
in oval Header.
Manual cleaning of boiler drum was done for removal of deposits.
Alkali Boil-out and passivation of the steam and water circuit is
recommended as a long term and sustainable remedial measure.
Page 126 of 140
Page 127 of 140
8.0
BONGAIGAON REFINERY
8.1
8.1.1 CORROSION OF REACTOR EFFLUENT FIN FAN COOLER (22-ME-002)

TUBES
Introduction:
CRU was taken shutdown for catalyst regeneration in May-2013. During the
time of last stage of catalyst regeneration, heavy leakage from the tubes of
Reactor Effluent Fin Fan cooler (22-E-002) of CRU was detected.
Brief Process Description of the Reformer Unit:
Hydro-treated naphtha ex- Pretreater unit (NHT) is fed to the Catalytic
Reformer Unit (CRU) and is mixed with recycle hydrogen gas from reformer
recycle gas compressor (22-K-001A/B). The mixture of naphtha feed and
recycle hydrogen is preheated in the feed/effluent vertical helical exchanger
(22-E-001) and then condensed in the reactor effluent air cooler (22-E-002)
(where leakage was found during catalyst regeneration) and reactor effluent
cooler (22-E-003) before being collected in the separator (22-V-001). The
feed naphtha and the recycle hydrogen recover heat from the fourth reactor
effluent stream and are further heated to the required reactor inlet
temperature (22-R-001,002,003,004) in the respective heaters.
The liquid outlet from separator vessel is fed to stabilizer column (22-C001).The separated vapor phase hydrogen rich gas is recycled to the
compressor (22-K-001 A/B) suction, via RG compressor KO drum (22-V-021).
The hydrogen rich gas is partly mixed with the hydro treated naphtha and is
recycle back to the reaction loop. The remaining hydrogen rich gas from
compressor discharge is distributed to Naphtha pretreater unit (Unit-21) as
hydrogen make up gas, Isomerisation unit as hydrogen make up gas, Fuel
gas network, Hydrogen bullets while filling and will be fed to DHDT MUG
compressor. A simplified process flow diagram of CRU is given below:
Page 128 of 140
Process Condition:
22-E-002
Pressure(Kg/cm2g)
Tube side
12.9
Temperature in 0C
In
Out
136
55
Fluid Handled
H2 + HC
Exchanger (22-ME-002) Detail:

Tube OD
(mm)
25.4(Fin tubes)
Thickness
(mm)
2.77
Length
(mm)
8500
No. of
Tubes
276
MOC
SA 179
History of failure, if any

The FFC was last inspected on the following dates:
Tag No
Year of Last Inspection
22-E-002
Jan09
Sept11
Year of
Installment
1984
Year of Tube
Replacement
Nil
Observations:
During regeneration of reactor catalyst, profuse leakage was developed

from the Fin fan cooler tube.
Regenration was stopped and
the FFC was dropped.
Brownish/ black type corrosive
deposits were observed towards
both ends of the Fin Fan Cooler.
Tube ends towards Southside
were found to be thinned down.
Tube ends towards north side
(I/L & O/L) were found to be
slightly better condition in
comparison with Southside.
Leaky tubes were found to be paper thinned down and fins are found to be
damaged near the leaky area.
Reasons of Failure:
Under deposit corrosion by Ammonium Chloride Salt:
High nitrogen in feed has contributed to formation of ammonium chloride

deposits in the low temperature regions of FFC. High Nitrogen was found
in the RFN feed (0.1 to 4.41 ppm) during Jul.12 to May13 as compared to
design max of 0.5 ppmw.
Page 129 of 140
Ammonium chloride deposits contribute to gradual under deposit corrosion

in the reactor operating conditions of very low moisture (20 -30 ppmv in
recycle gas). Ammonium chloride salt was found in the air cooler inlet side
tubes, which confirms that during normal operation, salts are deposited in
air cooler. This can lead to corrosion during normal operation as the
normal operating environment is moist and these salts can release HCl
responsible for corrosion.
Poor Mixing of Neutralizing Agent in the Air cooler:

It has been observed that there is uneven distribution of wash water and
caustic injection due to orientation of injection point. Injection point is only on
one side of the bank (towards east side). Due to the uneven distribution of
flow, one side of the tubes is not properly neutralized during regeneration
time. This has resulted to heavy corrosion of the tubes and led to failure of the
tubes.
Ageing:
Ageing is also one of the factors leading to failure of tubes during the current
catalyst regeneration process. These air coolers are old and seen several
regeneration (even during normal operation, risk of HCl corrosion in
CRU/CCR is common). In each regeneration, some corrosion to happen
thereby reducing the life expectancy.
Recommendation:
To replace complete tube bundle.

Injection point of the neutralizer should be located as far upstream of the
effluent cooler as possible and secondary injection point just ahead of the
cooler to enhance the mixing of the injected neutralizer with the acid
vapour.
Nitrogen in the CRU feed and Chloride content of CRU off gas to be
monitored regularly.
Action Taken:
Complete tube bundle was replaced with new one.

Injection point of wash water and caustic injection point made uniform.
Earlier it was from one side of the bank only. Now it was made from both
side of the Bank.
Nitrogen in the CRU feed and Chloride content of CRU off gas is
monitored regularly.
Page 130 of 140
8.1.2 DEW POINT CORROSION OF APH TUBES OF HOT OIL FURNACE

Introduction:
The APH of Hot Oil Furnace is of tube type. During the time of M&I in
November-2013, the cold end section of the APH tubes were found to be
severely corroded and many tubes were found to be perforated near the tube
sheet. Material of the APH tubes is of A-106 Gr. B and of size 2 X 40 sch. x
6054mm length. Total nos. of tube is 153.
History:
In CRU-MSQ unit there are two nos. of hot oil furnace (26-F-001 A & B) for
heating of hot oil which is used as a heating medium in the heat
exchangers.
After decommissioning of Isomerisation & Parex unit of erstwhile Xylene,

DMT & RMCR units in 2006, only one of the furnaces was operated
alternately below the design capacity for meeting the requirement of CRU
only.
Presently after expansion and commissioning of MSQ unit, one furnace is

operated alternately at the design capacity.
Both the furnaces are fuel oil / gas fired vertical heater.
The APH of the furnaces use heat from flue gas (at around 335 0C) from
radiant section to heat combustion air up to a temperature of around
1300C.
Observations:
During internal inspection of APH of Hot oil Furnace 26-F-001/B of CRU &
MSQ Unit in Nov.13 shutdown, following observations were made:
Severe corrosion & perforation of tubes was observed on cold end side
just near to the tube sheet.
Perforation of tubes on the hot
end side and other portion of
the tubes were not observed.
Thick yellowish deposit was
observed on the top external
side of the tubes.
Deposits of reddish oily layer
were observed on APH tube
surfaces.
External
corrosion
was
observed
on
the
tube
surfaces.
Page 131 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
The fuel used in the Furnace contains sulphur. When sulfur (S) containing fuels, including heavy oil are burnt, sulfur oxides (SOx) are
produced, part of which is turned to SO3.
When flue gas temperature drops to below a dew point or when the gas is
in contact with a low temperature wall (at the cold end of APH), SO 3 and
H2O, contained in the gas, are combined to form highly-concentrated
sulfuric acid that corrodes steel.
This is sulfuric acid dew corrosion, which severely corrodes not only
carbon steel but also stainless steel unlike normal atmospheric corrosion.
The severe corrosion and perforation of the APH tubes may be attributed
to sulfuric acid dew point corrosion caused due to running of the furnace
below the design capacity and idling of the furnace for long time.
Recommendation:
Complete replacement of all the APH tubes.

To monitor the flue gas outlet temperature and avoid idling of the furnaces
for a long period.
Actions Taken:
Complete APH tubes (153 nos.) of the furnace were replaced in January
2014.
Page 132 of 140
8.2
8.2.1 HIGH TEMPERATURE OXIDATION OF REFORMER BURNER CASING

PLATES
Introduction:
During TPSD in June-2013, Primary blocks of total 5 nos. of burners of HGU
reformer had to be replaced due to burning of primary block casing plate &
damage of its internal refractory material.
Burners of HGU reformer are Low Nox, Dual Gas, down firing type which uses
a mix of PSA Purge Gas & Vaporized SRN as fuel. Details of the burners are
as follows:
Description of the Burner:
HGU Reformer burners are having two types of refractory blocks Muffle
Blocks & Primary
Blocks.
The
muffle
block
assembly (consisting
of 4 segments) is
installed/ supported in
the burner windbox.
The muffle block also
houses four tertiary air
ports which effectively
reduces production of
Nitrogen Oxides.
The primary block
(adjustable block) is
housed within the
muffle
block.
It
consists of a profiled
castable
refractory
encased in a metal
container
(casing
plate), supported from
a mounting plate.
The combustion air to
the
burner
is
controlled by the inlet
throat to the primary
block, the air-ports in
the muffle block and the annular gap between the primary block and muffle
block assembly.
The burner windbox is internally lined with removable slabs of pre-cut
mineral wool faced with SS plate to provide thermal as well as acoustic
insulation.
Page 133 of 140
Observations:
Primary block casing plates of Burner # 1, 7, 15, 30, 31, 34, 35 which were
opened for suspected damage, were found to be burnt out.
Scaling of primary block casing plates (in left out portions) of damaged
burners was also observed.
Higher than normal gaps were also observed in-between muffle block
segments of the above mentioned burners.
Igniter Pipe tips of a few burners was also observed to be burnt out.
Gas gun tips of all burners were found OK.
MOC: Gas Gun Tip- SS-310, Primary Block Casing Plate- SS-304, Igniter
Pipe- SS-304
Reasons of Failure:
Improper gap between Primary block assembly and muffler blocks. If the
gap is not maintained, then the flame heat may directly come to the casing
plate which occurred a number of times during operating period as noted
during onstream inspection.
Due to lopsided flame in the burner (due to blocked nozzle jets/ partially
blocked air-way within wind box) plates of primary blocks may also come
under intense Abnormal increase of gaps in-between muffle block
segments also exposes the primary block casing plates to the radiant box
heat (in the range of 980-11700C) which is higher than the threshold limit
of SS-304 (8710C) for sustained operation against High temperature
oxidation.
Sometimes, due to leakage/ puncture in gas gun pipe, combustible mixture
may form inside the burner windbox and reaches its auto-ignition
temperature, burning takes place inside the windbox.
Exposure of casing plates to higher than design heat level seems to have
caused high temperature oxidation of the same in the form of scaling and
ultimately burning-off the plate. Traces of sulfur present in hot flue gas
might have increased the scaling rate.
Recommendations:
To maintain the clearance in between muffle block & primary block as per
the design drawings during re-installation.
Page 134 of 140
SS-310 plate material is to be used for primary block casing plates.
Action Taken:
Gas gun tips of the burners were cleaned.

Primary blocks of Burner# 30, 34, 35 were completely replaced. Casing
plates of Burner # 15, 31 were fabricated at site and fitted back.
Considering the degree of damage, Burner #1 & 7 are planned to be
replaced in next opportunity.
Clearance in between muffle block and primary block were checked in
each burner and adjustments were made to achieve the design value.
Page 135 of 140
8.3
OFFSITE
8.3.1 PERFORATION OF TANK ROOF AND BOTTOM PLATE CORROSION OF

COKER RESIDUE TANK
Introduction:
The Coker Residue tank was taken for M&I. Bottom plate thinning and roof
perforation was noticed during visual inspection and thickness gauging.
Equipment No.
Service
Type
Capacity
Dia
Height
:
:
:
:
:
:
T-1704
Coker Residue
Fixed Cone roof
500 KL
10.0 M
7.5 M
Observations:
Bottom Plate:
The thickness reduction was observed at the tank bottom plate while
carrying
out
thickness
gauging.
The plate material is of IS
226 and thickness is 6mm
only.
Suspecting some defects in
bottom plates adjacent to the
shell
plate,
thickness
scanning was carried out of
all the bottom plates near the
shell and bottom plate joints.
It
was
observed
that
thickness reduction recorded
in almost all the plates
adjacent to the shell towards North East to South East direction.
No corrosion was observed on the internal side of the tank.
The plates were cut and the corrosion was observed on the soil side of the
bottom plate.
Roof Plate:
The perforation was observed on the roof plate after removal of insulation
pockets.
After opening the manhole, the roof condition was accessed from inside.
The perforation was observed throughout the complete roof plate and
thinning down of the structure was observed at few locations.
Page 136 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
Roof:
Coker residue stored in this tank has sulphur compounds in it.

Air intake during night or winter season formed suphurous acid vapor
which again condensed on underside of the roof.
The condensed vapors, at its dew point become highly corrosive causing
dew point corrosion from underside of the roof.
Tank Bottom:
It was clear indication that the water ingress into the soil side of the bottom
plates.
This ingress of the water has caused the corrosion and thinning of the soil
side of the bottom plates.
Action Taken:
The roof plate and corroded structures were replaced. Underside of the
roof plate including its structure and top course plate were painted from
inside.
The foundation was repaired after cutting the thinned down bottom plate.
The corroded plates were replaced after the repair of the foundation.
8.3.2 TANK BOTTOM PLATE CORROSION/FAILURE OF CRUDE TANK T-501

Introduction:
The crude tank T-501was taken for M&I. Bottom plate thinning was noticed
during visual inspection and thickness gauging. Capacity of the tank is 20,000
KL.
Observations:
The tank was taken for M&I in financial year 2013-14.

Internal inspection was carried
out and several pits were
observed at scattered locations
on the bottom plate.
Severe pitting and corrosion was
also observed at tank bottom
plate.
MOC of the plate material is IS
2062 Gr. A and thickness is 14
mm.
Plates were cut to access the
condition
of
the
bottom
foundation.
Page 137 of 140
The crude passed through the holes of bottom plate and had led to the
damage of the bitumen layer below the plates at few locations.
Reason of Failure:
The reason of corrosion and pitting was attributed to SRB attack which led
to the tank bottom plate failure.
The absence of protective painting/Coating at tank bottom plate since
commissioning.
The complete bottom plate was recommended to be replaced.
The plates fabricated for replacement were painted from soil side before
replacement and internal side to be painted after the completion
replacement job.
The foundation was recommended for repair by filling the bitumen sand
layer at the damage location.
Page 138 of 140
8.4
DELAYED COKER UNIT-I (DCU-I)
8.4.1 FAILURE OF 14-C-008 STAND PIPE

Introduction:
On 01/10/2013, a leakage has taken place from stand pipe of 14-C008(Rectified Absorber column).The stand pipe is located at the bottom of the
column. Size of the stand pipe: 2 X 40 Sch. MOC: Carbon steel. The stand
pipe is insulated.
Observations:
After removal of the insulation, thickness gauging was carried out and it was
observed that
A pin hole had developed in the pipe portion near the bottom flange of the
stand pipe.
LPG was coming out through the hole.
On closer look another smaller leakage point was observed very close to
the pin hole.
The holes were adjacent to each other in a localized area.
In the localized portion close to pin hole minimum thickness was observed
2 mm. In other area thickness was found in order.
However, in one elbow slight thickness reduction was observed.
Pipe portion where leakage had taken place was observed with multiple
depressions/ denting in the entire length.
This led to undulation/ unevenness in surface area of the pipe.
Page 139 of 140
Reasons of Failure:
This appears to be a case of localized corrosion. The condition might have

aggravated due to following reason.
It is probable that some time in the past the bottom portion of the stand
pipe got choked and hammering had been done in the pipe portion to
dechoke the same. This led to denting/depression in the pipe portion and
weakening the area.
It is worth mentioning here that the bottom most elbow (just near the pin
hole in the drawing) was cut in June 2008 for dechoking the stand pipe
while it was found choked. That time thickness was found OK in all other
area. The elbow was re-welded after dechoking.
Recommendation:
The replace the stand pipe with 80 schedule pipe.
Status of Jobs Carried Out:
The line has been replaced with new piping and pipe fittings of 80 schedules
and hydro tested successfully
Page 140 of 140

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