bs_bs_banner

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab

Spring: A Comparative Study of
Popular Uprisings in Indonesia
and Tunisia
Ahmad Najib Burhani*

By comparing popular uprisings in Indonesia and Tunisia, this article intends to answer
the questions: What kind of condition made the Islamists successfully take over the state
in Tunisia, while they failed to do so in Indonesia? What are the similarities and differences between the uprisings in these two countries? This article argues that the historical
and sociopolitical position of Islamists during the authoritarian regimes determined the
fate of Islamist parties after the uprisings. The role of Ennahda party as a symbol of
opposition has contributed to its rise after the Tunisian Spring, while the involvement of
Islamists in the regime during the last years of Suhartos rule contributed to the decline
of Islamist parties in Indonesia. However, the strongest argument for the decline of
Islamist parties in Indonesia is the fading away of political streams. Furthermore, the role
of Muslim scholars in desacralizing Islamist parties in Indonesia has significantly challenged and undermined the identification of Islam with Islamist parties.
Key words: Ennahda party, political Islam, politik aliran, Rachid Ghannouchi, secularism

Introduction

ne of the most significant features of politics in Tunisia, and also in Egypt,

after the Arab Spring, is the rise of Islamist parties to power. Some surveys predicted that Ennahda party would emerge as the winner in the Tunisian
elections on October 23, 2011, but the results of the election still surprised many
people. Ennahda did not only come out as the victor in the elections, it obtained
89 out of 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly. This means Ennahda won the
elections with a significant margin, gaining 41.7% of the vote, far above other
parties. The victory of Ennahda Party brought analysts and observers to the

*Ahmad Najib Burhani is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI),

Jakarta. He received his PhD in Religious Studies from the University of California-Santa
Barbara, USA. His academic interests include minority religions in Islam, Islamic
movements in Southeast Asia, and cosmopolitan sufism.
Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Number 2Pages 199215
2014 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

200

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

conclusion that the Islamists successfully hijacked the Arab Spring that they
consider to be a secular revolution (Al-Anani, 2012, pp. 466467; Bradley, 2012;
Schwedler, 2013, p. 1; Zguric, 2012, pp. 419, 431). Not stopping at accusing the
Islamists of hijacking the revolution, some observers such as John Bradley (2012)
even boldly came to rash judgment, typical of Huntingtonian clash of civilizations
argument, that whenever and wherever democracy, however tentatively, was
introduced, it was the Islamists who benefited (p. 14).
This article intends to problematize the above view by doing a comparative
study between the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Indonesia, and the political
constellations that emerged after these two countries were freed from dictatorship. Although the uprisings in these two countries have a number of similarities (an economic crisis preceding the uprising, secular revolution, emphasis on
economic development during the authoritarian regimes, corruption in the
family of dictators, and so on), the political conditions after the uprising were
quite different. In Indonesia, instead of Islamist parties coming to power after
democracy was introduced in 1998, it was the secular-nationalist parties that
won in free elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009.1 The questions dealt with in this
article are the following: What kind of conditions made the Islamists successfully take over the state in Tunisia, while they failed to do so in Indonesia?
What are the similarities and differences between the uprisings in these two
countries?
To answer the above questions, this article is divided into three parts: first,
prelude to the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the Reformasi 1998 in Indonesia; second, Islamist parties after the popular uprisingsthe triumph of
Ennahda party in Tunisia and the failure of Islamist parties in Indonesia; and
third, analysis of factors that contributed to the rise of Ennahda party in Tunisia
and the decline of Islamist parties in Indonesia. This third part mainly discusses
the role of Muslim activists like Nurcholish Madjid in desacralizing Islamist
parties in Indonesia and Rachid Ghannouchi in moderating Islamist parties in
Tunisia.
This article argues that, first, it is not Islamist parties that benefited from the
introduction of democracy in Muslim countries. The rise of Ennahda party in
Tunisia was strongly related to the suppression of this party and political Islam
during the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali. The rise of secular-nationalist parties
in Indonesia, particularly the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP),
after the Reformasi is strongly related to the fact that this party was the only
symbol of opposition during the last years of Suharto regime, while political
Islam was already part of the regime since a few years before the collapse of the
authoritarian government of Suharto. Second, the decline of Islamist parties as
was the case in Indonesia does not necessarily show the decline of political
Islam. Since politik aliran (political stream)2 has been fading away, political Islam
is no longer exclusively promoted by Islamist parties. This is different from
Tunisia where political alignment is still strong. In this context, political Islam
is identical to or only promoted by Islamist parties. Third, secularism in politics
is not something incompatible with Islam. As demonstrated by Rachid
Ghannouchi, Ennahdas leader, and Nurcholish Madjid of Indonesia, it is the
secular State rather than an Islamic one that would grant more benefits to
Muslims.

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

201

Prelude to the Uprisings

There are some similarities between Tunisias Jasmine revolution and Indonesians Reformasi. The similarities are not only during the moment of the downfall
of the dictators, but also the way they controlled the governments. Both Ben
Ali and Suharto had emphasized economic development to the point where
French president Jacques Chirac referred to a Tunisian miracle, while Indonesia
during Suharto was known as one of Asias economic tigers (Haughblle &
Cavatorta, 2012, p. 22; Hicks, 2012, p. 39; Hill, 1998; Zeghal, 2013, p. 256). Both also
controlled political parties so that democracy continued to symbolically exist.
During his rule, Suharto only allowed three political parties: his own Golkar party
and two other parties that were tightly controlled and interfered withthe
Development Unity Party (PPP) and Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The
Tunisian government under Ben Ali recognized a number of political parties such
as the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and the Democratic Forum for Labor
and Liberties (FDTL or Ettakatol). However, democracy in Tunisia was often seen
as fake democracy because these other parties were under the control or even
loyal offshoots of Ben Alis own party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RDC).
Another similarity of Ben Ali and Suharto is that their popularity were significantly undermined by corruption practiced by members of their families or by
cronies. Finally, the uprisings that forced them to step down from their presidencies were initiated by economic crisis. In what follows, this article elaborates
briefly the conditions in Tunisia and Indonesia before the uprisings, and the
position of political Islam and Islamist parties under the two regimes.

Political Islam During Suharto Regime

Indonesia experienced its first free elections in 1955 or 10 years after the
independence of this country in 1945. These first elections were held to choose
the members of the Constituent Assembly or Konstituante, whose main role was
to replace the interim constitution of 1950. The election was won by four parties:
the Indonesian Nationalist Party, Masyumi party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). They represented four main political and ideological streams in Indonesia at that time; aristocracy, modernist
Muslims, traditionalist Muslims, and abangan (religiously syncretic) workers. The
number of the votes gained by the two Islamist partiesMasyumi and NUin
the 1955 elections was almost equal to those of the two othersecular and
communistparties (Hefner, 2000, p. 43; Liddle & Mujani, 2007, p. 835).3 In 1959,
President Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly, arguing that it failed
to find consensus on the form of the state, that is, Islamic state or secular state,
after three and a half years in office. This unfortunate event occurred just nine
months before it was scheduled to conclude its deliberations with whatever
consensus that they could achieve (Barton, 2005, p. 87). In Sukarnos view, the
Assembly was in a deadlock position and would never reach a consensus. Therefore, he declared that Indonesia return to the Constitution of 1945 and be run
under Guided Democracy.
After the failure of the attempted coup of the Communist party in 1965, Sukarno
was forced to step down from the presidency and Suharto rose to power. In 1973,
to stabilize the economic development that became his priority and with backing

202

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

from the military, Suharto started to curtail political freedom by forcing all Islamist
parties to merge into a newly created party of the PPP. He also forced all secularnationalist parties to merge into the PDI and he completely banned the PKI. He
used his party, the Functional Party (Golkar) as the machinery to control government, allowing the existence of the PPP and PDI only as a democratic mechanism
to legitimize his power. In the 1980s, Suharto further controlled all political parties,
and also all mass organizations, by forcing them to adopt the state ideology of
Pancasila as their sole ideological basis (asas tunggal). He suppressed any
dissident movements during his reign by labeling them bahaya laten kiri (Communism) and bahaya laten kanan (Islamism).
Before economic crisis hit Asia in 1997, known in Indonesia as krismon or krisis
moneter (monetary crisis), Suhartos developmentalism had often been perceived
as quite successful. Indonesia was considered as an Asian economic tiger or
an East Asian economic miracle (Bresnan, 2005, p. 191; Haughblle & Cavatorta,
2012, p. 22; Hicks, 2012, p. 39). Elaborating this phenomenon, Bresnan (2005) says,
Indonesia was part of the economic boom that swept East Asia in the years
before the crisis broke out in 1997 . . . The GDP of Indonesia grew 7.7 times from
$26 billion in 1965 to $202 billion in 1995 (pp. 190191). Unfortunately, the
foundation of Suhartos economic development was undermined by corruption
among the members of his families and cronies. Therefore, during the economic
crisis that began in 1997, the national economy that he helped develop readily
collapsed and during the uprising in 1998, he could not sustain his rule anymore.
In terms of political Islam, the rise of Suharto in 1966 gave new hope to the
Islamist groups that they could reestablish and revive Masyumi Party, which
had been banned by Sukarno in 1959. This hope soon disappeared since Suharto
was not willing to allow the rise of political Islam and Islamist parties. In the 1970s
and 1980s, Suharto was even known for anti-Islam policies such as prohibiting
Muslim girls from wearing the veil in public schools, allowing prostitution
districts (lokalisasi) and gambling, and attempting to recognize aliran kepercayaan
(indigenous mysticism) as a legal religion in Indonesia (Effendy, 2003, p. 50).
Suhartos anti-Islam policies changed in the 1990s. Previously, he had relied on
the backing of the military to sustain his regime. However, some military generals became disgruntled with corruption as Suhartos family members asked for
an even greater share of the pie. Suharto then tried to find different backers and
turned this time to Islamist groups that he had suppressed for decades. To show
his Islamic sensitivity and inclinations, Suharto went on a pilgrimage to Mecca
with his family, supported the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, that is, Bank Muamalat, and endorsed the establishment of the Association of
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals in December 1990. Suhartos new inclination
toward Islam, borrowing a statement from Robert Hefner (2000), shattered in
one fell swoop one of the most enduring stereotypes of New Order politics. Here,
after all, was a man long regarded as a staunch defender of Javanese mysticism
and Pancasila pluralism giving his blessing to an elite Muslim organization
openly dedicated to the Islamization of Indonesian society (p. 128).
The era of the 1990s was known as the era of regimist Islam or hijaunisasi
(greenization)4 of the military, government apparatus, parliament, and so on.
These terms are used to show the significant changes in the regime from being
anti-Islam to pro-Islam. Political Islam had moved from a peripheral into a

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

203

central position in the government. The only symbol of opposition and the only
group still oppressed in the last years of the Suharto regime was the secularnationalist party of PDI led by Megawati Sukarno Putri, a daughter of the first
president of Indonesia, Sukarno. As will be elaborated in the next part of this
article, the fact that the PDI was the only symbol of opposition during the last
years of Suharto contributed to the triumph of this secular party in the first
genuinely democratic elections held after the downfall of Suharto.

Political Islam Under Ben Alis Regime

Ben Ali came to power in November 1987 by means of a constitutional coup
against 84-year-old Habib Bourguiba. Like Suharto who became the second
president of Indonesia after its independence in 1945, Ben Ali was also the second
president of Tunisia since it gained independence from France in 1956. After his
rise to power, Ben Ali gave new hope for the al-Ittija al-Islami or Islamic Tendency
Movement (MTI; Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique) to participate in politics,
after it had been curtailed and suppressed by Bourguiba.
The MTI was formally established by Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdel Fattah
Moro in 1981. Soon after its establishment, the government perceived it as
a serious threat and, therefore, arrested its prominent leaders and activists.
Ghannouchi was even sentenced to death by the State Security Court in 1987.
After the coup, Ghannouchi was released from jail and members of Ennahda party
were allowed to participate in the 1989 parliamentary elections. The name of
Ennahda itself was used to comply with the 1988 government regulation that
prohibits the use of party names that have reference to religion, such as the MTI.
Breaking his own promise after coming to power, however, Ben Ali revoked the
legal status of Ennahda and denied the results of the democratic elections in which
Ennahda won 15% of the national vote. Ben Ali did not only deny the results of the
elections, he also imprisoned Ennahda leaders and activists, and forced some of
them into exile, including Ghannouchi (Arieff, 2011, pp. 17, 22; Esposito & Voll,
2001, p. 91).
After banning Ennahda Party, Ben Alis party, the RDC, won five consecutive
elections with around 90% of the vote in each election, and Ben Ali was elected as
president of Tunisia for five times (Arieff, 2011, p. 23; Schraeder & Redissi, 2011,
p. 8).5 According to the constitution of Tunisia, the position of president was legally
limited to three terms. However, to remove this limitation and to make himself
Tunisian president for life, Ben Ali arranged for a constitutional referendum in
2002 (Schraeder & Redissi, 2011, p. 8). This was possible because there was no
significant opposition party during his rule. There were a number of political
parties legally recognized by the Ben Ali regime, but most of them were under his
control and they functioned mainly as a rubber-stamp of Tunisias fake democracy. The few genuine opposition parties such as the PDP, Ettajdid, and the FDTL,
had never gained significant votes (Arieff, 2011, pp. 1516).
Ben Alis policy against political Islam did not stop with banning Ennahda
party; he also tried to portray political Islam as identical with chaos, backwardness, and anti-modernity. He used the argument of better us than Islamic chaos
to justify his authoritarian rule and to repress political Islam (Al-Anani, 2012,
p. 469; Zguric, 2012, p. 422). As summarized by Filiu (2011), The extraordinary

204

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

resilience of the Arab regimes over the past three decades stems partly from their
ability to portray themselves as the only alternative to chaos (p. 73). The image of
the Taliban in Afghanistan had often been contrasted with gender equality
and modernity in Tunisia. In contrast to the Taliban or any Islamist movements,
Ben Ali had tried to inculcate the message that his regime was a proponent of
democracy, plurality, and liberty (Chomiak, 2011, p. 71). In short, using the fear
factor under the pretext of Islamic extremism, the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali
prolonged its rule and justified the oppression of any dissident movements. To
further emphasize its modernity and secularization, Ben Ali regime also prohibited Muslim girls from wearing the veil in public and legalized red-light districts
and abortion (Bradley, 2012, pp. 5, 11; Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, p. 23).
To compensate for the restrictions on political freedom, Ben Ali tried to give the
Tunisian people stability and economic development. Economic development in
Tunisia under Ben Ali can be seen as one of the most successful cases of economic development in African countries, also referred to in several reports as a
miracle (Hanafi, 2012, p. 200; Zeghal, 2013, pp. 256257). As illustrated by
Cavatorta and Haugblle (2012), Poverty rates declined from 7.7% in 1984, three
years before Ben Ali came to power, to 3.8% in 2005. Literacy rates went up from
a low 48% in 1984 to 78% in 2008 and women were included in this literacy drive.
Infrastructural projects such as access to water and sanitation also drastically
improved (p. 183). Other reports mentioned that the Tunisian economy grew an
average of 5% a year. Per capita GDP more than tripled, from $1,201 in 1986 to
$3,786 in 2008. The Davos Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report
ranked Tunisia first in Africa as recently as the 2010 (Bradley, 2012, p. 38; cf.
Zeghal, 2013, pp. 256257).
However, the abovementioned development was undermined by Ben Alis
extended family. Tunisian people loathed the attitude of his wife, Leila Trabelsi
and members of her family, who showed unlimited greed. This became exacerbated by the global economic crisis that struck Tunisia in 2008. Finally, the
revolution broke after street vendor Mohammed Bouazizis self-immolation on
December 17, 2010, that emboldened the Tunisian people to show their frustration at inequality in economic development and the lack of job opportunities
(Bradley, 2012, p. 40; Schraeder & Redissi, 2011, p. 9).

Islamist Parties After the Revolutions

Ennahda party was legalized only in March 2011, after more than two decades
when its leaders were brutally oppressed, imprisoned, and tortured by the
Ben Ali regime. The triumph of Ennahda party in Tunisia, and also the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring, surprised many analysts and led
some of them to accuse the Islamists of hijacking the revolution (Al-Anani, 2012,
pp. 466467; Atul, 2011; Bradley, 2012; Schwedler, 2013, p. 1; The Economist, 2011;
Zakheim, 2011; Zaman, 2011; Zguric, 2012, pp. 419, 431). This party, they said,
only played little part, if any, during the popular uprising, but they were the
ones who took the most benefit from the revolution (Bradley, 2012, pp. 2, 12, 14).
Bradley (2012) even predicted that the Islamists would bring the revolution to a
different direction, away from the objectives of revolution itself. In his view, the
Islamists would change Tunisia into an Islamic state and would impose sharia in

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

205

this country which had previously been known as the most secular country in the
Middle East (Bradley, 2012, pp. 5462). Bradley (2012) further concludes prematurely that whenever and wherever democracy was introduced in the Arab
countries, it would be the Islamists who would benefit. He says, In the Arab
world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring
out of the box (Bradley, 2012, p. 12).6
In this section, this article challenges Bradleys conclusion by showing the case
of Indonesia, where Islamist parties did not win the elections after the popular
uprising in 1998, known as Reformasi 98. In fact, Islamist parties have never won
any elections in this country, not only after the Reformasi, but also since independence from the Netherlands in 1945. Second, this part also intends to show that
contrary to Bradleys accusation, Islamist parties are not monolithic. Ennahda
party and also some Islamist parties in Indonesia have supported a secular state,
rather than seeking to impose sharia and to change the state into an Islamic one.

The Rise of Ennahda Party in Tunisia

There are some Islamist parties in Tunisia, but it is Ennahda party that has
become a phenomenon.7 Considering that Tunisia is often touted as the most
secular country in the Middle East, known for its well-educated population and
effective social services, it surprised many that Ennahda could win with such a
significant margin, obtaining 41.7% of the vote and winning 89 seats out of 217
seats in the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly has two roles: drafting a new
constitution and governing the country (Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, p. 20).
Ennahda won far more seats than the two other major parties that won seats in
the Assembly; Congress for Republic (Congrs pour la Rpublique), the second
winner, gained 29 seats, while Ettakatol won 21 seats. The former is a center-left
nationalist party that was also banned during Ben Ali regime, while Ettakatol is a
social democratic party that was among the few dissident parties then
(Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, pp. 2021; Moghadam, 2013, p. 400; Zeghal, 2013,
p. 258).
Rachid Ghannouchi, the founder and leader of Ennahda, was forced to live
in London as a political exile since 1988. After spending more than two decades
in London, he returned to Tunisia for the first time on January 30, 2011. After his
return and after the release of Ennahda activists from jail by the transition
government, this party was then legalized as a political party in March 2011
(Chomiak, 2011, p. 80).
Haughblle and Cavatorta (2012) give several arguments on why the Ennahda
party could win the elections after the Arab Spring. They include the ability of
this party to rebuild and reorganize its structures across the country in a short
time after the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011, the reputation of this party as a
consistent and resilient opponent of Ben Alis dictatorship, the ability of Ennahda
to go door to door to reach Tunisian voters while other parties only relied on
advertising, the acceptance by Ennahda of democratic principles and its promotion for national consensus, and lastly its promise to give jobs and to develop the
economy (Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, p. 21).8 From the above mentioned
arguments, it seems the strongest one for the rise of Ennahda comes from Ben
Alis own policy to portray Islam in a binary opposition from modernity, secu-

206

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

larism, and also his authoritarianism. As elaborated earlier, Ben Ali also used fear
of political Islam as a factor to prolong his regime and justify the imprisonment,
torture, and oppression of Islamist activists in Tunisia.
With the fall of Ben Ali, Ennahda becomes a symbol of the coming of a new
hope and a symbol of the binary opposition to authoritarianism, dictatorship,
economic inequality, and secularism. As stated by Pickard (2011), Ennahda
derives its support from the many Tunisians who look to Islam as a rejection of
the French secularism and Ben Alis authoritarianism. Inserting Islam in Tunisian
politics has little to do with sharia and more to do with identity and agency (pp.
644645). Ennahda provided an opportunity for Tunisians to get a fresh start in
living with political freedom, true democracy, and freedom from corruption.
The new identity model was a rejection of both Bourguibas, which excluded
Islam from public life, whether policymaking or regular communal prayer, and
the Ben Ali regimes, which seemed to celebrate conspicuous consumption and
corruption in the name of progress (Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, p. 22).
Before the Arab Spring, as elaborated by Wittes (2008, p. 11), joining an Islamist
movement and voting individuals from an Islamist group during the elections
was a symbol of protest to the regime. After the Arab Spring, this symbol became
stronger, although the Arab Spring itself is considered a secular revolution.
Voting for an Islamist party or candidate is the clearest way for an Arab today to
cast a protest vote. That Islamists continue to bear the brunt of regime repression,
and that their views and platforms remain unchallenged by any other viable
movement, only solidifies their reputation as the most authentic opposition
(Wittes, 2008, p. 11). Besides becoming a symbol of opposition to the old regimes,
as stated by Malika Zeghal (2013), the ability of Islamist parties to compete in the
elections under a single banner of Ennahda party was also an important factor
why this party could win in the elections. Other parties were unable to secure a
comparable position in the elections of October 23, 2011, in part because they
were unable to unite under a single banner, and in part because al-Nahdha
benefited from its legitimacy as a movement that was particularly victimized
by the authoritarian regime and could unite around the leadership of Rached
Ghannouchi (Zeghal, 2013, p. 259).

The Decline of Islamist Parties and the Rise of Political Islam

in Indonesia
In contrast to Tunisia where Ennahda Islamist party came to power after
democratic elections were introduced, Islamist parties in Indonesia failed to come
to power after the fall of the 32-year Suharto regime in 1998. In fact, Islamist
parties have never won in any free elections held in Indonesia since its independence in 1945. Is it because Indonesian Muslims are not really Muslims, as
commonly perceived by some observers such as Clifford Geertz (1960)? Or, is it
because religion does not have any significant role in this country? To answer
these questions, this article intends to elaborate the relationship between Islamist
parties and political Islam in Indonesia. In doing so, this article hopes to explain
why Islamist parties continuously decline in Indonesia.
After more than three decades of fake democracy, Indonesia finally held the
first free elections after the Reformasi, or the second independence from the

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

207

Netherlands, in 1999. Forty-eight parties participated in those elections, including

five major Islamist parties, namely, the PPP, the National Awakening Party (PKB),
the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), and the Justice
Party. The total national vote of these parties combined together is less than the
number of votes of two major secular-nationalist parties of the PDIP and Golkar
Party, namely, 37% for all Islamist parties, 33.7% for the PDIP, and 22.4% for
Golkar Party (Baswedan, 2004, p. 685). Similar results occurred in the national
elections in 2004 and 2009, in which Islamist parties gained 38% of the total
national vote in 2004 and 29% in 2009 (Barton, 2006, pp. 237238; Hicks, 2012,
p. 40; Tanuwidjaja, 2010, pp. 30, 34). The number of votes of Islamists parties are
even smaller if the PAN and the PKB are excluded from the category of Islamist
parties. Although the main constituents of these two parties came from two
largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, that is, the Muhammadiyah and the
NU, these two parties (PAN and PKB) declared as pluralist parties and did not
use Islam as the ideology or platform of the parties. They adopted Pancasila,
national ideology of Indonesia, as their basis. In the Indonesian context, the
difference between an Islamist and a non-Islamist party is usually deduced from
their basis, that is, Islam or Pancasila. The party that adopts Pancasila as its
ideological basis is considered a secular party (Mujani & Liddle, 2009, pp. 577
578).
Except for the PPP, all Islamist parties that participated in the elections in 1999,
2004, and 2009 are new and fresh start parties, even though the PBB claims to be
the successor of Masyumi party, the second winner in the first democratic elections in Indonesia in 1955. The PPP was established in 1973 after the Suharto
regime forced all Islamist parties to merge into a single party. It had been used by
Suharto to show that Indonesia had a multiparty system, while in fact all parties
were always under government control.
In contrast to Tunisia where political Islam had been suppressed, political
Islam in Indonesia enjoyed a good relationship with the Suharto regime during
its last years in the 1990s. The shift of Suhartos attitude toward political Islam
contributed to the removal of political Islam as a symbol of opposition to his
regime. And in the elections held after the fall of Suharto, Islamist parties could
not pose themselves as a symbol of opposition to the dictatorship and suppression by the old regime. The only symbol of opposition at that time was the
secular-nationalist party PDIP that was still being suppressed even in 1996.9
It was this party that won the 1999 elections, gaining 33.7% of the national
vote.
The decline of Islamist parties in Indonesia after the Reformasi, however, does
not mean that political Islam has suffered the same fate. Instead of declining,
political Islam has in fact been on the rise since 1998. In contrast to the 1955
elections, political Islam was not carried or introduced exclusively by Islamist
parties. All parties in Indonesia, including the secular ones like the PDIP, Democrat Party, and Golkar, have also articulated and promoted political Islam. As
brilliantly summarized by Tanuwidjaja (2010), The decline of Islamic parties
electoral clout should be interpreted not as the decline of political Islam
but instead the reverse: Islam has penetrated the dominant nationalist, secular and Pancasila-based political parties and has made them stronger in their
contest against Islamic parties, which are no longer the lone channel for Islamic

208

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

aspirations (p. 29). He further stated that, the decline of Islamic parties is not
due to the irrelevance of religion in politics but due to the increasing accommodation of Islamic aspirations by the bigger and more well established nationalist
political parties (Tanuwidjaja, 2010, p. 38).
The inclination of secular parties to political Islam can be seen, for instance, in
the 2006 establishment of Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusithe House of
Indonesian Muslims) in the secular-nationalist party of PDIP; this institution
has recruited a number of prominent Muslim activists to join this party. Golkar
has since 1998 even been dominated by alumni from the most important association of Muslim students, the Islamic Student Organization (HMI) (Baswedan,
2004, p. 676). Besides the number of devout Muslims in secular parties, the
PDIP and Golkar also supported Islamic agenda or aspirations such as the
implementation of sharia by-law (perda shariah) and regulations or decrees
against heretical groups like the Ahmadiyya in many districts in Indonesia.
Tanuwidjaja (2010) says, Despite lacking formal political representation through
Islamic political parties, Islamic agendas are still able to penetrate the legal
public sphere (p. 31). In fact, the ideological differences among parties has been
fading away since the Reformasi. Some scholars call this phenomenon as the
dealignment of political parties or the decline of politik aliran (political stream).
With all parties promoting Islam, voting for a secular party is no different from
voting an Islamist party; consequently political Islam is no longer identical with
Islamic parties.

Islamism, Democracy, and Secularism

There are several religio-sociological factors that influence the course of
Islamist parties in Indonesia and Tunisia, such as governments policy on Islam
during the authoritarian regimes, the response of Muslim scholars and activists
to the regimes, and the ability of Islamist parties to attract voters (Buehler, 2009;
Mujani & Liddle, 2004, 2009; Ufen, 2008, 2009). This article, however, focuses on
elaborating three factors that have not been sufficiently elaborated in the academic literature, to wit: First, the role of civil society organizations, particularly
the Muhammadiyah and the NU, in stabilizing democracy in Indonesia and the
lack of comparable strong Islamic-based civil society organizations able to challenge Islamist parties in Tunisia. Second, the success of Muslim scholars, particularly Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, in desacralizing Islamist
parties in Indonesia and the use of political party as the main vehicle to channel
political Islam in Tunisia. Third, the ability of Rachid Ghannouchi and Ennahda
Party to promote and emphasize substantial Islam in Tunisia and the failure of
Islamist parties in Indonesia to do the same thing. These three factors will be
discussed in turn.

The role of the Muhammadiyah and the NU

The Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 and has been known as the largest
modernist movement in Indonesia with approximately 20 million followers,
whereas the NU was established in 1926 and has represented the largest traditionalist movement with approximately 40 million members. These two organizations

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

209

have deep roots in Indonesian history and culture, having been present long before
this country gained independence from the Netherlands in 1945. They also have
pervasive networks among Indonesian Muslims. As stated by Ahmad Syafii
Maarif, former chairman of the Muhammadiyah, this organization has over 10,000
schools (from elementary to high school), 172 colleges and universities, over 400
hospitals and polyclinics. The number of students at Muhammadiyah universities
is around 450,000 people or 10% of the total number of college students in
Indonesia (Maarif, 2012a, 2012b). If the Muhammadiyah has thousands of modern
schools, the NU has thousands of pesantren (traditional Islamic school with boarding system). The data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1997 show that there
were over 9,000 pesantren in Indonesia with the total number of students around
1,770,000 (Howell, 2001, p. 708).
With their dense, vast, and pervasive network, the Muhammadiyah and the
NU have been able to structure the discourse on Islam in Indonesia. These two
organizations have shared authority in determining acceptable and unacceptable religious practices and they represent two different kinds of orthodoxy
of Sunni Islam in Indonesia.10 Although in the last decades the religious authority of the Muhammadiyah and the NU has been challenged by transnational
organizations like the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (the Indonesian branch of
Hizb-ut-Tahrir), the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired party of the PKS, and radical
movements like the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Council of Indonesian
Warrior) and the Front Pembela Islam (the Front of the Defenders of Islam), in
general, as indicated by several surveys (Mujani & Liddle, 2004), they are still
dominating and representing the face and voice of Islam in Indonesia (van
Bruinessen, 2011).
After the Reformasi in 1998, the Muhammadiyah and the NU, indirectly for
the former and directly for the latter, established their political parties, the PAN
and the PKB. Interestingly, these two parties do not adopt Islam as their ideological basis. Instead, they use Pancasila as their political ideology. During the
constitutional debate in 2002, the PAN and the PKB joined secular-nationalist
parties to oppose the reinsertion of the seven controversial words of Piagam
Jakarta (Jakarta Charter), dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam kepada
kepada pemeluknya (with the obligation for Muslims to carry out sharia), into
the preamble of the Constitution. The initiative to Islamize Indonesia from
above by reinserting the seven words into the Constitution came from Islamist
parties such as the PPP and the PBB (Mujani & Liddle, 2009, p. 578). Partly
because of the opposition of the PKB and the PAN, the attempt to reinsert the
seven controversial words failed.
The opposition of the Muhammadiyah to Islamist parties, particularly the PKS,
was very strong even to the point of issuing two surat keputusan (decree); decree
no. 149/2006 and decree no. 101/2007. These decrees were intended to shield the
Muhammadiyah from the infiltration and influence of Islamist parties by disciplining the members of this organization who have commitments to other
political parties, particularly the PKS (Burhani, 2013, pp. 120121). In short, it can
be said that the existence of the Muhammadiyah and the NU in Indonesia has
become the main obstacle for Islamists and Islamist parties to win in elections
and to take over the government. It is this kind of Muslim civil society organizations that was lacking in Tunisia.

210

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

Desacralization of Islamist party

Besides this role by the Muhammadiyah and the NU, the failure of Islamist
parties after Reformasi was also influenced by the role of Muslim scholars, particularly, Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, in desacralizing and
secularizing Islamist parties. In the early 1970s, Nurcholish Madjid promoted a
well-known slogan Islam Yes, Islamic Party No (Madjid, 2008, p. 226).11 Previously, a Muslim would not be considered a true Muslim if he did not vote for an
Islamic party. Before the 1970s, Islamist parties were seen as identical with Islam
and must be equally perceived as sacred. With that slogan, however, Madjid tried
to deconstruct this understanding. Although there was huge opposition to
him, even to the point of asking him to repent and apologize to the Muslim
community (Madjid, 1985, p. 384), many Indonesian Muslims finally accepted
this view.
The impact of Madjids initiative has been tremendous. Some Muslim activists,
particularly from the alumni of the HMI such as Akbar Tandjung, moved to
secular parties such as Golkar and struggled to promote substantive Islam in
those parties. One of the effects of Madjids innovation can be seen after the
Reformasi. Devout and pious Muslims can be found in almost all parties and
political Islam permeated in those parties. As stated by Baswedan (2004), Today,
legislators from Golkar are 83% Muslim, largely with Santri [pious Muslims]
backgrounds, and almost half have had experience in the HMI or ICMI [Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals] (p. 676). Although Islamic symbols
are still carried by Islamist parties, secular parties like Golkar also promoted
Islamic agenda or aspirations.
Unlike Madjid, the contribution of Abdurrahman Wahid in desacralizing
Islamist party, as stated by Mujani and Liddle (2009, p. 586), was more in the
political arena, not in the context of ideology or concept. In 1983, Wahid led the
NU to accept Pancasila as the asas tunggal or the sole ideological foundation for
all political and social organizations, including religious ones, in Indonesia.
Before Wahid came up with that initiative, the NU was reluctant to accept the asas
tunggal, which had been introduced and enforced by the New Order government.
Accepting Pancasila as the sole foundation of Islamic organization was even
seen as antithetical to Islam and also seen as an indication of accepting Pancasila
as having the status of religion. Wahid successfully changed this view and convinced people, particularly within the NU, that adopting Pancasila as the
organizational foundation of the NU is not contradictory to Islam. For Wahid,
Pancasila is the best manifestation of Islamic universal teaching in the Indonesian
context (Wahid, 1986, 1994).
Besides accepting the asas tunggal, Wahid also led the NU to return to the
khittah (the original mission) of this organization, which meant withdrawing
from political parties, that is, the PPP, and focusing on education and organizational development. At that time, Wahid believed that an Islamist party was not
the best place for Indonesian Muslims, particularly the members of the NU. The
NU must free itself from being trapped in the opposition between Islam and the
State by allowing its members to work and collaborate with secular government
and parties. Therefore, it was for the betterment of the NU to withdraw itself from
the PPP and to let its members vote for any party that they like. This initiative had

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

211

tremendous impact on the PPP, the only Islamist party from 1973 until 1998. The
number of votes for this party dramatically declined from 27% in 1982 to 15%
in 1987.

Tunisias Democracy and Substantive Islam

The situation in Tunisia is quite different from Indonesia. With respect to
Islamist parties, Tunisia nowadays is quite similar to Indonesia in 1955 when
politik aliran was still very strong. Certain parties can be identified with certain
ideologies and the sole carrier of political Islam is the Islamist party. This is
among the reasons why Islamist parties are on the rise in Tunisia, while in
Indonesia they have declined. However, Ennahda party is not similar to Islamist
parties as commonly understood by some foreign observers as those that try to
impose sharia and change the state into an Islamic one. This party is also different
from the PKS, the PPP, and the PBB in Indonesia that have the agenda to Islamize
the state. Rachid Ghannouchi is an admirer of the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) in Turkey and has tried to make his party follow the footsteps of the
AKP. He says, Why do people want to compare me to [Osama] Bin Laden or
Khomeini, when I am closer to [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan? (Bradley, 2012, p. 56).12
Ghannouchi is also against imposing sharia and Islamic state. As quoted
by Zeghal, Ghannouchi says: we do not need to impose Islam because it is
the peoples religion and not the elites, and Islam has not endured for so long
because of states influence, but rather due to the large acceptance it enjoys
among its adherents, in fact the state has often been a burden on religion
(Zeghal, 2013, p. 262). This commitment was also strengthened by leaders of
Ennahda, including Tirad Labbane of Riadh Ennasr. He says, Our commitment
to Islam does not mean that we want to impose what we do on others. In that
sense, you could say that we are anti-salafi, because we do not approve of
imposing behavior. If you want to wear a mini-skirt, it is not my problem; if you
do not want to wear the veil, it is also not my problem. Choices have to be left to
individuals; the state cannot impose behavior. From the state authorities we ask
only that they let us do our work in peace (Haughblle & Cavatorta, 2012, p. 24).
Compared with Islamist parties in different Muslim countries, many observers
still do not believe in the religious position of Ennahda. Bradley (2012), for
instance, continuously questions the sincerity of Ennahdas acceptance of democracy; for him, this party only accepts democracy in order to crush it. Borrowing a
statement from Schwedler (2013), Bradleys view seems to point Ennahda of
Acting as a wolf in sheeps clothing, a group might present itself as committed
to the democratic process only to abandon that stance once it has gained enough
power democratically to overturn the democratic system entirely (p. 4).
However, if Ghannouchi and Ennahda are sincere in their statements, then
Ghannouchi is quite similar to Madjid who promoted secularization of state,
but not society. This secular state, but religious society, is brilliantly elaborated by
An-Naim (2008) as follows:
In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only way
one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state. By a secular state I mean one that is
neutral regarding religious doctrine, one that does not claim or pretend to enforce
Shariathe religious law of Islamsimply because compliance with Sharia

212

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

cannot be coerced by fear of the state institutions or faked to appease their officials.
This is what I mean by secularism in this book, namely, a secular state that facilitates the possibility of religious piety out of honest conviction. My call for the state,
and not society, to be secular is intended to enhance and promote genuine religious observance, to affirm, nurture, and regulate the role of Islam in the public life
of the community. (p. 1)

In short, Ghannouchi seems to have a similar view with An-Naim that the
State must be secular in treating religions, but society must have freedom to be
pious and faithful to their religions. Ghannouchi accepts secularism as a mechanism for the state to guarantee religious freedom and to be neutral in treating
all religions (Zeghal, 2013, p. 265). With these observations, it can be said that
Ennahda party can become an excellent example of the compatibility between
Islam and democracy. This is also the main difference between Ennahda and
Islamist parties in Indonesia that still focus on symbolic Islam rather than substantial Islam. The PPP, PKS, and PBB, for instance, have been preoccupied with
Islamic jargons and symbols, while their politicians could not avoid corruption
and money politics.

Conclusion
Arguing against the view that Islamists benefit most from the introduction of
democracy in Muslim countries, this article finds that the rise of Islamist parties
in the Middle East, particularly Tunisia, is strongly influenced by the history of
opposition and sociopolitical factors. Unlike Tunisia where Ennahda Islamist
party won the elections after democracy was introduced, Indonesian Islamist
parties did not win the elections held after the Reformasi in 1998. Instead of an
Islamist party, it was the secular and left-leaning party of PDIP that won the
elections in 1999. In fact, Islamist parties never won in any free national election
in this most populous Muslim country in the world.
From a historical perspective, the rise of Islamist parties in Tunisia was helped
by the fact that they were oppressed and became a symbol of opposition before
the Arab Spring. Political Islam in Indonesia, on the other hand, enjoyed a good
relationship with the Suharto regime during its last years in power. Had they
still been oppressed like during the first two decades of the Suharto regime, they
might probably benefit from the introduction of democracy after the Reformasi in
terms of enlarging their power. Because only the secular-nationalist party of PDIP
that was oppressed before the fall of Suharto, this party became the only symbol
of opposition and could win the elections held immediately after the downfall of
Suharto. The sociopolitical factor that contributed to the rise of Islamist parties
in Tunisia and the failure of their counterparts in Indonesia is the phenomenon
of politik aliran (political stream or political alignment). The political context of
the elections in Tunisia in 2011 was still determined by politik aliran or political
stream. Political Islam was introduced by and identical with Islamist parties like
Ennahda. Other parties have their ideologies such as secularism and communism. In Indonesia, political streams have been fading away. Although each party
officially has different political orientations and streams, most of them also
promote political Islam. Islamist parties were not the only representations of
Islam or Muslim constituents and voting non-Islamist parties was not seen as
acting against or jeopardizing political Islam.

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

213

The blurring division between Islamist parties and non-Islamist parties in

Indonesia was strongly influenced by, first, the role of Muslim civil society organizations, particularly the NU and the Muhammadiyah, that opposed Islamist
agenda, and second, the struggle of Muslim scholars, particularly Nurcholish
Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, to secularize politics during 32 years of
Suharto regime. Realizing that Muslims constitute almost 90% of the Indonesian
population and the fact that political parties only fragmented the Muslim community, Madjid then promoted secularization of political Islam known with his
slogan, Islam Yes, Partai Islam No. Following his struggle, Muslim activists no
longer saw Islamist parties as something sacred like Islam as religion and they no
longer confined their political activities to those aligned with Islamist parties.
With this desacralization, being a devout Muslim but active in secular parties is
no longer seen as a taboo. Wahid, as a leader of the largest Muslim organization,
the NU, also promoted substantial Islam by accepting the national-secular ideology of Pancasila. This strategy has changed the discourse of the opposition
between Islam on the one hand and democracy and nationalism on the other
hand. With his effort, Islam is no longer seen as an adversary of democracy,
nationalism, and even secularism.

Acknowledgments
A draft of this article was first presented at the IIIT Summer Institute for Scholars 2013 on Islamic
Reform Movements after the Arab Spring, Herndon, VA, June 24July 3, 2013. I wish to thank Ermin
Sinanovic, Usaama al-Azami, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Notes
1

The use of the term secular to identify Indonesian political parties refers to their ideology. If they
state that they use the state ideology of Pancasila instead of Islam, then they are commonly called
secular party (Mujani & Liddle, 2009, p. 577).
2
The term Politik Aliran or stream politics was introduced by Clifford Geertz (1960, 1963) to
illustrate party affiliation with certain ideologies in the 1955 elections in Indonesia.
3
The total percentage for all Islamist parties, including Masyumi and NU, was around 44%, while
secular and nationalist parties gained around 55% of the vote.
4
Islam in Indonesia is identified with the color green. The terms hijaunisasi and regimist
Muslims were used in Robert Hefners Civil Islam (2000).
5
This is similar to Suharto, whose party Golkar also won six consecutive elections since his ascent
to power until his downfall in 1998.
6
Expressing quite similar views with Bradley but with more positive expectations, The Economist
(2011) reported, Political Islam comes in many shapes and guises. So far, the version emerging as
predominant seems relatively benevolent. Grit your teeth and cautiously welcome itin the hope that
the Arabs turn away from the more malignant variety.
7
Hizb-ut-Tahrir was denied by the transition government the status of a legal party, and it was not
allowed to participate in the elections on October 23, 2011 (Filiu, 2011, p. 103).
8
The Economist also had quite similar analysis. The main reason for Islamists popularity is their
hatred of corruption, the scourge of secular dictatorships throughout the region, and their promotion
of justice and dignity, words that have resonated in the Arab spring even more than democracy (The
Economist, 2011). Zeghal (2013, p. 259) emphasizes two reasons, namely, the ability of Islamist parties
to run under a single banner during the elections in October 2011 and the fact that Ennahda was a
victim during the administration of Ben Ali.
9
During the incident of July 27, 1996, known as Peristiwa 27 Juli or Kudatuli (Kerusuhan 27 Juli) or
Sabtu Kelabu, supporters of the puppet leader of PDI, Soerjadi, helped by Indonesian army, took over
the office of PDIP.
10
The NU is orthodox because of their consistency in holding the transmitted beliefs that they
received from the preceding generations, while the Muhammadiyah is orthodox because of their
principle of returning to the Quran and the Sunna (Saleh, 2001, pp. 9697).

214

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 22014

11
The English version of Madjids phenomenal speech entitled Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran
Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Umat [The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem
of the Integration of the Islamic Community] is available in Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A
Sourcebook, pp. 284289 (Kurzman, 1998).
12
Bradleys reference is Tunisian Islamist Leader: Im No Khomeini, The Associated Press, January
31, 2011.

References
Al-Anani, Khalil. (2012). Islamist parties post-Arab Spring. Mediterranean Politics, 17(3), 466
472.
An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed. (2008). Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of Sharia.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Arieff, Alexis. (2011, April 15). Political transition in Tunisia. Congressional Research Service, 129.
Atul, Aneja. (2011, October 28). Dont let extremists hijack Arab Spring. The Hindu. Retrieved from
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2574359.ece?css=print.
Barton, Greg. (2005). Islam, Islamism and politics in Indonesia. In Damien Kingsbury (Ed.), Violence
in between: Conflict and security in archipelagic Southeast Asia (pp. 75103). Clayton: Monash
University Press.
Barton, Greg. (2006). Islam and democratic transition in Indonesia. In Tun-Jen Cheng & Deborah A.
Brown (Eds.), Religious organizations and democratization: Case studies from contemporary Asia
(pp. 221241). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Baswedan, Anies Rasyid. (2004). Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and future trajectory. Asian
Survey, 44(5), 669690.
Bradley, John R. (2012). After the Arab spring: How the Islamists hijacked the Middle East revolts. New York
City: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bresnan, John. (2005). Economic recovery and reform. In John Bresnan (Ed.), Indonesia: The great
transition (pp. 189237). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
van Bruinessen, Martin. (2011, September 30October 2). Indonesian Muslims and their place in the larger
world of Islam. Paper presented at the 29th Indonesia Update conference, Australian National
University, Canberra.
Buehler, Michael. (2009). Islam and democracy in Indonesia. Insight Turkey, 11(4), 5163.
Burhani, Ahmad Najib. (2013). Liberal and conservative discourses in the Muhammadiyah: The
struggle for the face of reformist Islam in Indonesia. In Martin van Bruinessen (Ed.), Contemporary
developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the conservative turn (pp. 105144), Singapore:
ISEAS.
Cavatorta, Francesco, & Haugblle, Rikke Hostrup. (2012). The end of authoritarian rule and the
mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali. Mediterranean Politics, 17(2), 179195.
Chomiak, Laryssa. (2011). The making of a revolution in Tunisia. Middle East Law and Governance, 3,
6883.
Effendy, Bahtiar. (2003). Islam and the state in Indonesia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
Esposito, John L., & Voll, John O. (2001). Makers of contemporary Islam. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Filiu, Jean-Pierre. (2011). The Arab Revolution: Ten lessons from the democratic uprising. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Geertz, Clifford. (1960). The religion of Java. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Geertz, Clifford. (1963). Peddlers and princes. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Hanafi, Sari. (2012). The Arab revolutions; the emergence of a new political subjectivity. Contemporary
Arab Affairs, 5(2), 198213.
Haughblle, Rikke Hostrup, & Cavatorta, Francesco. (2012). Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and social
change in Tunisia. Middle East Report, 262(Spring), 2025.
Hefner, Robert W. (2000). Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Hicks, Jacqueline. (2012). The missing link: Explaining the political mobilization of Islam in Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42(1), 3966.
Hill, Hal. (1998). The Indonesian economy: The strange and sudden death of a tiger. In Geoff Forrester
& R. J. May (Eds.), The fall of Soeharto (pp. 93103). Bathurst, NSW: Crawford House.
Howell, Julia Day. (2001). Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival. The Journal of Asian Studies, 60(3),
701729.
Kurzman, Charles (Ed.). (1998). Liberal Islam: A sourcebook. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Liddle, R. William, & Mujani, Saiful. (2007). Leadership, party, and religion: Explaining voting
behavior in Indonesia. Comparative Political Studies, 40(7), 832857.

The Reformasi 98 and the Arab Spring

215

Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. (2012a, November 13). 100 tahun Muhammadiyah (I). Republika.
Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. (2012b, November 20). 100 tahun Muhammadiyah (II). Republika.
Madjid, Nurcholish. (1985). The issue of modernization among Muslims in Indonesia: From a participants point of view. In Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, & Yasmin Hussain (Eds.), Readings
on Islam in Southeast Asia (pp. 379387). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Madjid, Nurcholish. (2008). Islam, Kemodernan, dan Keindonesiaan. Bandung, Indonesia: Mizan.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (2013). What is democracy? Promises and perils of the Arab Spring. Current
Sociology, 61(4), 393408.
Mujani, Saiful, & Liddle, R. William. (2004). Politics, Islam, and public opinion. Journal of Democracy,
15(1), 109123.
Mujani, Saiful, & Liddle, R. William. (2009). Muslim Indonesias secular democracy. Asian Survey,
49(4), 575590.
Pickard, Duncan. (2011). Challenges to legitimate governance in post-revolution Tunisia. The Journal
of North African Studies, 16(4), 637652.
Saleh, Fauzan. (2001). Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in 20th century Indonesia: A critical
study. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill.
Schraeder, Peter J., & Redissi, Hamadi. (2011). Ben Alis fall. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 519.
Schwedler, Jillian. (2013). Islamists in power? Inclusion, moderation, and the Arab uprisings. Middle
East Development Journal, 5(1), 118.
Tanuwidjaja, Sunny. (2010). Political Islam and Islamic parties in Indonesia: Critically assessing the
evidence of Islams political decline. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 32(1), 2949.
The Economist. (2011, December 10). Islamists, elections and the Arab spring: And the winner is. . . .
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21541404.
Ufen, Andreas. (2008). From aliran to dealignment: Political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. South
East Asia Research, 16(1), 541.
Ufen, Andreas. (2009). Mobilising political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia compared. Commonwealth
& Comparative Politics, 47(3), 308333.
Wahid, Abdurrahman. (1986). The Nahdlatul Ulama and Islam in present day Indonesia. In Taufik
Abdullah & Sharon Siddique (Eds.), Islam and society in Southeast Asia (pp. 175185). Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Wahid, Abdurrahman. (1994). Universalisme Islam dan Kosmopolitanisme Peradaban Islam. In
Budhy Munawar Rachman (Ed.), Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah (pp. 545552).
Jakarta, Indonesia: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina.
Wittes, Tamara Cofman. (2008). Three kinds of movements. Journal of Democracy, 19(3), 712.
Zakheim, Dov. (2011, December 15). Whither the Arab Spring? Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://
shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/15/whither_the_arab_spring?wp_login_redirect=0.
Zaman, Mohammad. (2011, December 16). The role of religion in the Arab spring. Retrieved from
http://www.e-ir.info/2011/12/16/the-role-of-islam-in-the-arab-spring/.
Zeghal, Malika. (2013). Competing ways of life: Islamism, secularism, and public order in the
Tunisian tradition. Constellations (Oxford, England), 20(2), 254274.
Zguric, Borna. (2012). Challenges for democracy in countries affected by the Arab spring. Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, 23(4), 417434.