Of counsel:
Adam Giangreco, Esq.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The question before the Court is this: Are Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Gibson) and
DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian (D&D) entitled to an amount of compensation over 40
times greater than that previously awarded by this Court for prosecution of a nearly identical
action against the County. The answer is no. The Court should deny plaintiffs unprecedented
request, either in whole or in part, for four reasons.
First, the over seven million dollar fee request deviates so significantly from what the
Judges of this Court have deemed reasonable for a civil trial that plaintiffs request should be
deemed on its face outrageously unreasonable. The burden rests with plaintiffs to document a
reasonable attorneys fee and not saddle the County, and ultimately this Court, with the burden
of sifting through nearly a thousand-page application to ferret out properly documented time
entries and set a reasonable fee. In such a situation as this, the Court can and should consider
the fee request so outrageously unreasonable that outright denial of the request would be
appropriate. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Second, Gibson is not entitled to exorbitant NYC rates (at an average rate of $1,174 per
hour) for lead attorney Mitchell Karlan because it failed to show (1) that local counsel D&D and
its lead attorney, Paul DerOhannesian II lacked the experience necessary to prosecute this action
and (2) that plaintiffs exclusive retention of D&D would have produced a substantially inferior
result. Osterweil v. Bartlett, 2015 WL 1066404, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2015). Nor can
grotesque fees serve as punishment - the award of counsel fees is not intended to punish the
defendant in any way, Milwe v. Cabuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981), and the Court noted
that the County has made laudable progress to address racial disparities in the County, Pope v.
County of Albany, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).
Third, the Second Circuits factors for analyzing a request for attorneys fees - including
D&Ds familiarity with the substance of this dispute, D&Ds expertise in redistricting matters,
Plaintiffs scorched earth tactics, and the reputational, training, and other collateral benefits that
Gibson acquired from this matter--establish that the requested rates are unreasonable. See Arbor
Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008).
Fourth, Gibsons and D&Ds time records reflect numerous unsupportable billing
practices that justify a 90 plus percent across-the-board reduction in hours billed. For example,
Vague descriptions for work that make it impossible to determine what was done
and whether it was reasonable.
Full attorneys fees for work that should have been performed by clerical staff.
Thousands of dollars for nothing more than meeting with other firm members.
Multiple unjustified charges for duplicative work (e.g., overstaffing almost every
conference and deposition).
Travel time billed at full rate with no indication that work was performed.
Block billing that obscures the time spent on specific tasks they performed making it impossible to evaluate the reasonableness of their time.
In sum, even if this Court excused plaintiffs false and inaccurate records, a reasonable
fee should be measured only by the fees properly requested and supported in their bills.
POINT I
THE APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED
AS PATENTLY EXCESSIVE IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS
For the Courts convenience and if the Court desires, the County offers the services of the County
Comptroller or District Attorney to assist with a forensic audit of the submitted bill.
Federal courts have discretion to deny attorneys' fees applications where the application
is obviously inflated to an intolerable degree. Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir.
1980). Plaintiffs multi-million dollar fee application is intolerably inflated. Plaintiffs billed
hundreds of thousands of dollars for training young litigation associates, excessive charges for
overstaffing and duplicative work, intra-office conferences, travel time, and routine
administrative tasks, and by careless block billing for hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees.
See Point II. Plaintiffs requested fee is grossly disproportionate to the fee awards in this Court.
See Appendix 1 to this Memorandum of Law.2
Additionally, the fee application bears several indicia of bad faith. Plaintiffs knew and
were told last litigation they were not entitled to out-of-district rates. Nevertheless, plaintiffs
argue that the County should be saddled with an inflated legal bill as a form of punishment. See
Pls. Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs understands this argument to be impermissible -- the award of counsel
fees is not intended to punish the defendant in any way. Milwe, 653 F.2d at 84.3 A naked bad
faith demand for an out-of-district rate does not become a good faith demand by veiling it in a
frivolous argument. Second, plaintiffs submitted a 900 page bill that contains entries that are the
result of either unprofessional sloppiness or an effort to conceal improper and illegal billing
practices. Secreted within the massive document are charges for thousands of dollars in
unrelated cases and charges for travel time at the full hourly rate in violation of the law of this
Appendix 1 represents a diligent search of fee awards in the Northern District for civil rights cases.
Normal fee requests seldom rise above $250,000 to take a case from pleading to summary judgment to
trial (including an occasional interlocutory appeal) in the Northern District of New York. The average
award is much smaller. A reasonable plaintiff would expect to pay at the most no more than $240,000 for
the legal services rendered in this case.
This Court noted that the County has made laudable progress to address racial disparities in the
County, Pope v. County of Albany, -- F. Supp. 3d --, at *1. Moreover, fee awards should not serve as a
vehicle to charge exorbitant fees and such excessive fees should not act to chill good faith defenses to
claims brought under the Civil Rights Act. Jaquette v. Hawk County, 710 F. 2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1983).
Court that has been established for nearly two decades. Delancett v. Village of Saranac, 986
F.Supp. 126, ) (NDNY 1997); Ferran v. Town of Grafton, No. 90-CV-155 (FJS), 1998 WL
295674, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
Striking the entire fee or a fee of an individual attorney is an appropriate remedy within
the Courts arsenal to combat the misuse of fee applications. See Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under these circumstances, courts have
rejected inflated fee applications. Stackler, 612 F.2d at 1059.
What the County seeks may seem harsh and it is certainly done with grave caution and
reticence. However, in the rare case, such as this, where the misuse of billing practices deviates
beyond all known precedent, to treat and examine with solemnity such an extreme request would
encourage a claimant to make unreasonable demands -- knowing that the only unfavorable
consequence of such conduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked for
in the first place. To discourage such greed, especially by sophisticated counsel, a severe reaction
unfortunately is needed and indeed justified.4 See Lewis, 944 F.2d at 958 (noting that
Appellants counsel submitted a claim which was so intolerably inflated that the District Court
was warranted in departing from the usual practice and reacting vigorously to prevent such abuse
of the courts authority to award reasonable compensation to counsel).
POINT II
HOURLY RATES ARE UNREASONABLE AND SHOULD BE REDUCED
As the moving party, Plaintiffs bear[] the burden of documenting . . . [their] reasonable
hourly rates. Hines NYLJ 1202659661779 at *8. Plaintiffs have not met this burden: D&Ds
4
No reply is allowed under the rules nor should one be granted in this case. Local Rule 7.1(b)(2). Plaintiff
had a full and fair opportunity to present a reasonable fee for the purpose of a good faith discussion they
chose not to. They should not be able to employ an inflated fee as a diversionary tactic to get a second
bite of the apple their request is their request.
hourly rates exceed those customarily awarded in this district for civil rights actions, while
Gibsons rates (ranging from $416 to $1,174 per hour) are unprecedented. Plaintiffs requested
hourly rates must be reduced to no more than $275 for Karlan and DerOhannesian; $210 for
other partners; $150 for senior associates; $120 for junior associates; and $80 for paralegals.
Osterweil, 2015 WL 1066404, at *7 (awarding $300 per hour to the 43rd Solicitor General of the
United States in a civil rights matter); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v.
County of Albany, 419 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir.
2008) (awarding $210 per hour for experienced attorneys, $150 for senior associates, $120 for
junior associates, and $80 for paralegals in a nearly identical VRA matter against the County).
A.
The Forum Rule Bars Gibson from Collecting Its Usual NYC Rate.
The Second Circuit has held that when faced with a request for an award of higher outof-district rates, a district court must first apply a presumption in favor of application of the
forum rule - that is, the principle that courts should generally use the hourly rates employed in
the district in which the reviewing court sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee.
Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174, 175 (2d Cir. 2009).
To rebut this presumption, a litigant must persuasively establish that a reasonable client
would have selected out-of-district counsel because doing so would likely (not just possibly)
produce a substantially better result. In determining whether a litigant has established such a
likelihood, the district court must consider experience-based, objective factors, including
counsels expertise in litigating the particular type of case. Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added);
see Osterweil, 2015 WL 1066404, at *5 (To receive out-of-district rates, a party must make a
particularized showing, not only that the selection of out-of-district counsel was predicated on
experience-based, objective factors, but also of the likelihood that use of in-district counsel
would produce a substantially inferior result.). Plaintiffs failed to make this showing.
5
First, objective factors establish that local counsel D&Ds expertise in litigating VRA
cases actually surpasses that of Gibson. For example,
Election law is a cornerstone of D&Ds business, and D&D holds itself out to be a
specialist in such matters. Marcelle Decl., Exh. 1 (At DerOhannesian &
DerOhannesian, we work hard to uphold New York State voters rights and ensure
adherence to local and state election administration process. When rights and process are
violated, we staunchly defend them. Our firm also works with clients to challenge
redistricting initiatives . . . and other elements of election law.); see also Pls. Mot. at 10
(D&Ds legal services were integral to [sic] success of this case . . . .).
DerOhannesian has litigated at least three other VRA actions, including a prior
redistricting suit against the County (DerOhannesian Decl. 8), while Karlan has
litigated just two prior VRA cases - only one involving redistricting (Karlan Decl. 24).
DerOhannesian is more senior than Karlan. Cf. DerOhannesian Decl. Exh. A (graduated
law school in 1978), with Karlan Decl., Exh. 2 (graduated law school in 1979).
Second, courts exercise particular caution in VRA matters to ensure that the attorney
does not recoup fees that the market would not otherwise bear because a plaintiff bringing suit
under the [VRA] has little incentive to negotiate a rate structure with his attorney prior to
litigation. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184.
Indeed, when deciding a prior suit involving the same law firms, the same substantive
issues, the same experts, and the same defendants, the Second Circuit affirmed this Courts
decision slashing Gibsons and D&Ds requested compensation by 66% because it believe[d]
that a reasonable, paying resident of Albany would have made a greater effort to retain an
attorney practicing in the Northern District of New York . The rates charged by attorneys
practicing in the Southern District of New York would simply have been too high for a thrifty,
hypothetical clientat least in comparison to the rates charged by local attorneys, with which he
would have been familiar. Id. at 185. See also Osterweil, 2015 WL 1066404, at *6, *7
(reducing the former Solicitor General of the United States requested hourly rate from $1,100 to
$300 for his work in a civil rights matter where plaintiff failed to identify what specific
6
expertise or skills his attorneys possessed that attorneys within the Northern District of New
York do not possess). Gibsons attorneys have failed to demonstrate why their rates should
exceed those customarily charged in this District.
Moreover, as a result of DerOhannesians experience in VRA matters - which has only
increased since this Courts decision in Arbor Hill (see DerOhannesian Decl. 8) - the Court
should deny Karlans request to be paid at more than three times DerOhannesians rate. See,
e.g., Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *11 ([I]t would be unreasonable to expect a client to pay
Mr. Marcelle at a higher rate than Mr. Steck, an attorney with more years of experience.).
B.
A reasonable hourly rate is what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay,
given that such a party wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.
Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *5; Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184 ([T]he reasonable, paying
client . . . wishes to pay the least amount necessary to litigate the case effectively.) (emphasis
added). In determining what a reasonable client would be willing to pay, courts in this circuit
consider the following factors: (1) complexity and difficulty of the case; (2) available expertise
and capacity of the clients other counsel; (3) resources required to prosecute the case effectively
(taking account of resources being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth
tactics); (4) timing demands of the case; (5) whether an attorney might have an interest
(independent of that of his client) in achieving the ends of the litigation or might initiate the
representation himself; (6) whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a
client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration); and (7) other
returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an attorney might expect from the representation. Arbor
Hill, 522 F.3d at 184. These factors weigh in favor of reducing plaintiffs requested fees.
1.
The underlying dispute was factually and legally a straightforward matter. As explained
above, Karlan and DerOhnannesian previously litigated an essentially identical case in 2003.
See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v. County of Albany, No. 1:0-3cv-00502
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). Arbor Hill involved the exact same issues (allegations that the County had
violated the VRA by adopting a redistricting plan following a census), the same defendants, the
same lead counsel, and the same experts. Marcelle Decl. 4. In that matter - decided in 2005
and affirmed in 2008 - this Court awarded $210 per hour to experienced attorneys, $150 per hour
to senior associates, $120 per hour for junior associates, and $80 per hour for paralegals. Arbor
Hill, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 211. The passing of several years does not justify Karlans request to be
paid $1,174 per hour - a rate more than five times that found reasonable in Arbor Hill.
2.
DerOhannesian was fully capable of performing the required legal service properly
without the assistance of out-of-district counsel. DerOhannesian advertises himself as a
specialist in election law on his own website and, as explained above, possesses prior litigation
experience against the exact same defendants for the exact same cause of action. Marcelle Decl.,
Exh. 2 (At DerOhannesian & DerOhannesian, we work hard to uphold New York State voters
rights and ensure adherence to local and state election administration process. When rights and
process are violated, we staunchly defend them. Our firm also works with clients to challenge
redistricting initiatives, campaign financing, and other elements of election law.).
3.
Due to their role in the 2003 litigation, Gibson and D&D were already positioned to
litigate this case efficiently. Instead, they pursued a scorched earth strategy that repeatedly
racked up unnecessary charges and burdened the County.
8
For example, the underlying litigation featured more than 30 depositions, almost all of
which Gibson overstaffed with an inordinate number of associates. Marcelle Decl. 5. For the
deposition of Aaron Mair, which lasted seven hoursincluding breaksfour Gibson attorneys
billed 77.55 hours, racking up a bill of $39,792.25. Even more absurd, five Gibson attorneys
billed an astonishing 63.55 hours for the deposition of Frank Commisso, even though Mr.
Commisso had opposed the Countys redistricting plan and the deposition itself lasted for less
than two hours. Id. 6. As a result of this extraordinary overstaffing, Gibson Dunn now seeks
$38,253.25 in fees. And six Gibson attorneys billed 59.95 hours at a cost of $32,791.75 for the
three-hour deposition of Vicente Alfonso. Id. 7.
This kind of overstaffing and overbilling is seen repeatedly in Gibsons bills for all
depositions, see Marcelle Decl. Exh. 3 (deposition excerpts), including those depositions (P)
where Gibson was representing the deponent:
Deponent
No. of
Gibson
Attys.
Deposition
Length
Block
Billed Costs
Block
Billed
Hours
Certain
Costs
Certain
Hours
Total
Costs
Liu (P)
8 hrs 10 mins
$88,937.40
160.14
$27,190.50
52.35
$116,127.90
Gaddie
Scarff
6
6
7 hrs 49 mins
4 hrs 16 mins
$93,462.00
$56,883.50
165.95
112.7
$13,424.50
$6,948.50
24.2
12.9
$106,886.50
$63,832.00
Pope (P)
2 hrs 22 mins
$57,146.00
85.3
__
__
$57,146.00
Morse
Perrin
6
4
3 hrs 30 mins
5 hrs 15 mins
$54,475.50
$26,979.00
97.1
52.1
__
$18,310.00
__
30
$54,475.50
$45,289.00
Bell (P)
1 hr 50 mins
$42,234.00
71.1
__
__
$42,234.00
Merrill
Mair (P)
Commisso
7
4
5
__
7 hrs 15 mins
1 hr 45 mins
$25,512.75
$39,112.00
$38,253.25
48.55
77.55
63.55
$16,585.00
$680.25
__
26.75
1.35
__
$42,097.75
$39,792.25
$38,253.25
It is impossible to determine the amount plaintiffs billed on depositions or on any other discrete task
because they used improper block billing that makes it impossible to determine the amount of time spent
on each task or whether the time was reasonable. See Point III(G), infra.
Evers
__
$22,312.00
31.65
$14,707.00
24.6
$37,019.00
Willingham (P)
5 hrs 40 mins
$30,851.00
58.7
$3,100.00
$33,951.00
McCoy
6 hrs 40 mins
$33,751.25
64.1
__
__
$33,751.25
Alfonso (P)
2 hrs 51 mins
$25,554.00
49
$7,237.75
10.95
$32,791.75
Gonzalez (P)
2 hrs 34 mins
$22,714.00
44.35
$1,442.00
2.8
$24,156.00
Benedict
2 hrs 30 mins
$21,835.75
44.75
__
__
$21,835.75
Pinckney (P)
1 hr 10 mins
$21,562.00
36.2
__
__
$21,562.00
Breslin
6 hrs 55 mins
$21,047.25
40.65
__
__
$21,047.25
Coleman (P)
1 hr 35 mins
$18,832.50
33
__
__
$18,832.50
Wilkerson
6 hrs 5 mins
$17,715.75
36.05
__
__
$17,715.75
Frazier (P)
3 hrs 26 mins
$11,924.25
17.55
$4,387.50
6.5
$16,311.75
Alomar (P)
2 hrs 52 mins
$14,512.50
21.5
$1,406.50
2.9
$15,919.00
Conway
Gomez (P)
McKnight (P)
Condon
McLaughlin
3
2
4
4
1
3 hrs 51 mins
1 hr 15 mins
2 hrs 5 mins
3 hrs 15 mins
2 hrs 10 mins
$15,274.25
$14,533.75
$13,282.50
$13,203.25
$2,626.50
29.95
29.25
27.5
26.55
5.1
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
$15,274.25
$14,533.75
$13,282.50
$13,203.25
$2,626.50
$844,527.90
1529.89
200.3
$959,947.40
Totals
$155,419.50
Further, many depositions were only required because plaintiffs amended their complaint
after summary judgment, while the County prevailed on every single discovery dispute. Id. 8.
Moreover, plaintiffs sole cause of action in the complaint was a coalition claim- i.e., claiming
that the Countys plan diluted the combined voting strength of blacks and Hispanics. Most of the
depositions and arguments were aimed at this coalition claim (id. 9), yet the court never
reached this issue. Pope, -- F. Supp. 3d --, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that [t]his
conclusion renders it unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of plaintiffs coalition claim).
10
As an international firm with over 1,000 lawyers dispersed across four continents
(Marcelle Decl., Exh. 2), Gibson possesses a war chest far deeper than the County. The Court
should not reward Gibsons extravagant and unnecessary billing.
4.
The undisputed facts belie any assertion that timing demands required plaintiffs to retain
Gibson instead of seeking less expensive local counsel. D&D learned of the matter before
Gibson and actively recruited Gibson as co-counsel. Karlan Decl. 7. Accordingly, plaintiffs
reliance on Trudeau v. Bockstein, 2008 WL 3413903 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008) is misplaced.
Pls. Mot. at 10. This is not a case where it was reasonable to retain [ ] longtime counsel . . .
rather than searching out a cheaper alternative or where plaintiffs were required to retain
counsel on an expedited basis due to [their] perception that harm was imminent. Trudeau, 2008
WL 3413903, at *6. And this is not a case where the client[] actually assented to the rates. Id.
5.
Plaintiffs overstaffed nearly every aspect of this litigation to train their junior associates.
Marcelle Decl. 5. However, a fee-shifting statute is designed to ensure effective access to the
judicial process ... not to serve as a full employment or continuing education programs for
lawyers and paralegals. Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
For example, Gibson and D&D staffed an inordinate number of associates at every
deposition. See Point II(B)(3), supra. Indeed, Gibson acknowledges that one reason it pursues
pro bono opportunities is to train its associates. Marcelle Decl., Exh. 4 ([Gibson] . . . believe[s]
that community involvement adds an important dimension to the growth and development of our
attorneys, as both lawyers and citizens of those communities.). Gibson would have reaped a
benefit even if it had been unsuccessful in the underlying dispute.
11
6.
Gibson and D&D knew that they were unlikely to receive their usual rates. As explained
above, this Court previously awarded Gibson and D&D rates no greater than $210 for
experienced attorneys for their work prosecuting a nearly identical action against the County.
Arbor Hill, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 211. Accordingly, Karlans request for $1,174 per hourcoupled
with his conspicuous silence regarding the rate he received in Arbor Hillborders on bad faith, a
transparent attempt to anchor the Court at an insupportably high number.
7.
The Court should reduce Gibsons and D&Ds usual hourly rates because a reasonable,
paying client might consider whether a lawyer is willing to offer his services in whole or in part
pro bono, or to promote the lawyers own reputational or societal goals. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at
192. Gibson regularly provides pro bono services and advertises its pro bono accomplishments
to attract new associates and clients. Marcelle Decl., Exh. 5 (listing the awards and accolades
Gibson has achieved for its commitment to pro bono). Indeed, Gibson seeks $242.50 for time
billed [e]diting a submission on VRA case for the Global Pro Bono Newsletter. Id. at Exh. 1.
And D&D might have been willing to offer a reasonable client a reduced fee to reap the
reputational benefits for its participation in such a high-profile dispute, particularly because
election law is one of D&Ds primary practice areas. Marcelle Decl., Exh. 1 (Our firm also
works with clients to challenge redistricting initiatives . . . and other elements of election law.).
For all of the above reasons, defendants respectfully request that the Court award
plaintiffs counsel fees in accordance with the following hourly rates:
$150 to Gibson senior associates Molly Claflin, Lindsey Schmidt, Brendon Fleming, Jon
Fortney, Teresa Kung, Christopher Muller, Sapnai Pandya, Jeana Maute, Kristin Carlson,
Kyle Kolb, Brittany Garmyn, Gabriel Gillett, Amy Mayer, and Rena Kates Stern.
$120 for Gibson junior associates Peter Wade, Masha Bresner, Alyssa Kuhn, and Chelsea
Kelly.
$80 for D&D paralegal Kristin Bruno and D&D law student Alyssa Bombard. Osterweil,
2015 WL 1066404, at *8 (awarding $80 for paralegal work in a civil rights matter);
Arbor Hill, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (awarding $80 for paralegal work in a VRA matter).
$0 for D&D secretaries Stacey Civello and Alicia Segura. Menghi v. Hart, 745 F. Supp.
2d 89, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), affd, 478 F. Appx 716 (2d Cir. 2012) (Typically, in this
Circuit, clerical and secretarial services are part of overhead and are not generally
charged to clients.) (quotation omitted).
These rates are consistent with those awarded by this Court in the prior Arbor Hill case
and affirmed by the Second Circuit in 2008. Arbor Hill, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 211 ($210 for
experienced attorneys, $150 for associates with more than four years experience, $120 for junior
associates, and $80 for paralegals). See Hines, 2015 WL 3479820, at *2 (Determination of a
reasonable hourly rate . . . may include judicial notice of the rates awarded in prior cases and the
courts own familiarity with the rates prevailing in the district.).
Moreover, defendants propose awarding Karlan and DerOhannesian $275 per hour. This
reasonable rate - nearly 31% greater than the $210 hourly rate awarded in Arbor Hill - should
serve to sufficiently compensate Karlan and DerOhannesian for their expertise in VRA matters.
POINT III
BILLABLE HOURS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED
BECAUSE TIME RECORDS CONTAIN UNJUSTIFIABLE CHARGES
The time records contain excessive charges for routine activities that had little to no
impact on the course of the litigation, including time for work in unrelated cases. They bill
hundreds of thousands of dollars for doing little more than meeting with members of their own
13
team. They record hundreds of hours for redundant and unnecessary work. Gibson even charges
its full rates for travel time without any indication its attorneys performed work and even seeks
payment for bills completely unrelated to this litigation. And compounding all the above
problems, they block bill their time. Thus, the requested hours should be substantially reduced.
As with reasonable hourly rates, plaintiffs bear[] the burden of documenting the hours
reasonably expended . To prove that a fee request is reasonable, a party must support that
request with contemporaneous time records that show, for each attorney, the date, the hours
expended, and the nature of the work done. Hines v, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *8, affd 2015
WL 3479820 (2d Cir. June 3, 2015) (quotation and citations omitted). Gibsons and D&Ds bills
do not meet this basic standard.
A.
Gibsons time records are littered with erroneous time entries that clearly have nothing to
do with this litigation and that even a cursory examination of the records would have uncovered.
For example, Gibson submitted the following improper entries from associate Peter M. Wade:
$204 for [c]all with J. Chin-Fong; [p]rint materials for use in revising civil complaint;
[e]lectronic communications with Library regarding background research on J. Conti and
B. White on March 13, 2013.
$2,244 for [e]mail with A. Wollin regarding authorization forms; [f]ill out forms for
each provider for J. Chin-Fongs signature; [m]eet with J. Chin-Fong to review forms and
sign and notarize forms; [s]end authorization forms to the comptrollers office; [e]dit
complaint and claims research on June 5, 2013.
$204 for [c]all with J. Chin-Fong; [c]all with N. Biancanello at UMC on June 20, 2013.
$153 for [c]onfer with D. Feinstein regarding the 1983 plan and upcoming case
deadlines on December 12, 2013.
$1,062.50 for [c]all with J. Chin-Fong; draft position paper in advance of mediation
session on March 24, 2014.
14
$3,000 for [d]raft talking points for mediation session; prepare materials for mediation
session; research damages awards in personal injury cases; draft summary of cases for
mediation session on March 29, 2014.
$375 for [c]all with D. Feinstein regarding depositions; draft email to D. Olds regarding
discovery issues and deposition dates; call with office of Dr. Nadkarni regarding potential
expert testimony on July 14, 2014.
Karlan Decl., Exh. 1. Moreover, on October 8, 2014, Chelsea Kelly billed $242.50 for [e]diting
a submission on VRA case for the Global Pro Bono Newsletter. Id.
Plaintiffs have entirely failed to carry their burden of documenting the hours reasonably
expended with respect to these entries. Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *8. Accordingly, the
requested fees should be substantially discounted.
B.
Plaintiffs counsel inflated their time records by overstaffing this matter and by spending
an inordinate amount of time handling various aspects of the litigation. See Guardians Assn of
Police Dep't of New York v. City of New York, 133 F. Appx 785, 786 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that
302 billable hours can be facially excessive for a simple case that goes to trial). Counsels
time records are particularly egregious in light of their prior involvement in the substantially
similar Arbor Hill matter and their reassertion of many of the same arguments. Osterweil, 2015
WL 1066404, at *14 (As counsel has provided no justification for why nearly ninety hours of
work was necessary to reassert arguments Plaintiff had already developed . . . the Court will
reduce the time counsel spent preparing its briefs to the Court of Appeals by two-thirds.).
For example, Gibson and D&D billed up to 238.99 hours at a cost of $121,111.40 to file
and amend their 17-page complaint in this action. This is plainly excessive. Hines, NYLJ
1202659661779, at *13 (finding 52.5 hours for the research, drafting and editing of the
complaint to be excessive); Hofler v. Family of Woodstock, Inc., 2012 WL 527668, at *5
15
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2012) (9 hours drafting and 4.2 hours editing an 11-page complaint was an
example of sheer excessiveness).
Similarly, Gibson alone billed at least 265.7 hours at a cost of $207,797.75 to complete
its summary judgment papers. This is also excessive. Id. at *13 (finding 52.5 hours for the
research, drafting and editing of a cross-motion for summary judgment to be excessive); Hofler,
2012 WL 527668, at *5 (101.1 hours spent preparing opposition to Defendants motion for
summary judgment and drafting their cross-motion was an example of sheer excessiveness).
Further, Gibson and D&D attorneys repeatedly billed for the same work. For example,
on July 22, 2011, DerOhannesian and five Gibson attorneys billed 8.7 hours at a cost of
$5,280.50 for work related to a conference before Judge Homer. Similarly, on July 26, 2012,
Karlan and Gibson associates Sapna Desai Pandya, Brendon S. Fleming, and Kyle J. Kolb block
billed $9,380.50 to prepare and attend (some via telephone) a discovery conference before Judge
Homer. Gibson associate Brittany Garmyn billed an additional $1,781.25 to prepare for the
conference, though she did not attend. DerOhannesian block billed 2.5 hours at a cost of more
than $700 for the same conference. And on May 15, 2014, DerOhannesian, his associate, and
two Gibson attorneys billed $12,676.25 to attend another conference before Judge Hummel.
Counsel should not be rewarded for their redundant work. Jimico Enterprises, Inc. v.
Lehigh Gas Corp., 2011 WL 4594141, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011), affd, 708 F.3d 106 (2d
Cir. 2013) ([T]he Court finds that both the in-district partner and the out-of-district partner
billing for some of the same work was somewhat excessive (and/or unnecessarily duplicative). . .
. Having each practiced law for at least nineteen years, and therefore presumably attended
numerous settlement conferences, there was little, if any, reason for both in-district counsel and
out-of-district counsel to attend an initial settlement conference.).
16
C.
Gibsons records are larded with hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of charges for
intra-office conferences and yet fail to explain why multiple attorneys were necessary. In re
Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 213 B.R. 234 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1997) (It is [ ] an accepted
principle that generally no more than one attorney may bill for time spent in intra-office
conferences or meetings absent an adequate explanation.); Simmonds v. New York City Dept of
Corr., 2008 WL 4303474, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008) (reducing total number of hours by
40% where attorneys spent approximately sixty (60) hours drafting and reviewing
correspondence to each other and discussing the case internally and thirty (30) hours were
billed by the second, third, fourth, and often, fifth attorneys who attended court conferences and
participated in conference calls and meetings with Simmonds and opposing counsel).
For example, associate Jeana M. Maute block billed $1,620 on June 6, 2011 to, inter alia,
meet with M. Karlan, B. Fleming, and T. Kung to be introduced to team. Karlan Decl., Exh. 1.
That same day, associate Teresa M. Kung block billed $2,075.80 to [m]eet with M. Karlan, B.
Fleming, and J. Maute to discuss case and initial administrative matters[.] Id. And also on that
same day, associate Brendon S. Fleming billed $2,568 for conference and electronic
correspondence with M. Karlan, J. Bisnar Maute, and T. Kung. Id.
Similarly, on July 27, 2011, Karlan billed $1,642.50 for [c]onference call with team;
email with opposing counsel; trial preparation. Id. That same day, partner Aric H. Wu billed
$1,650 for [t]elephone calls and e-mails regarding prep for preliminary injunction hearing. Id.
Likewise, associate Teresa M. Kung billed $428 for [p]articipate in team conference call on
that day. And also at that same time, associate Molly M. Claflin block billed $2,408 for, inter
alia, [c]orresopnd with co-counsel, J. Maute, A. Wu, B. Fleming re hearing prep tasks. Id.
17
Finally, associate Jeana M. Maute block billed $3,375 hours to [m]eet with team, and associate
Brendon S. Fleming block billed $2,996 for, inter alia, [t]elephone conferences with J. Bisnar
Maute and M. Claflin regarding planning for preliminary injunction hearing; telephone
conference and electronic correspondence with J. Bisnar Maute, T. Kung, M. Claflin, A. Wu, M.
Karlan, and P. DerOhannesian regarding same, again on July 27, 2011. Id. These duplicative
charges are unjustified and should be substantially reduced.
D.
Attorneys cannot justifiably charge their full rates for travel time. Hines, NYLJ
1202659661779, at *14 (Consistent with Northern District precedent, . . . reimbursement for
travel time should have been billed at . . . one-half of counsels hourly rate.) (quotation
omitted); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v. County of Albany, 419 F. Supp.
2d 206, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding the traditional
one-half hourly rate for time spent traveling to be reasonable). A reduction is especially
warranted where, as here, attorneys have compounded the problem by block billing their travel
time. See, e.g., LV v. New York City Dept of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 510, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(The Court agrees that [plaintiffs entries that seek to bill travel time at full rates] should be
reduced by 50 percent. This includes travel time that is included in block-billed entries.).
For example, Karlan billed $12,550 to [a]ttend trial; return from trial on August 1,
2015; $12,200 to [t]ravel to and from Albany for pretrial conference; attend conference with
client; conference with panel on August 10, 2014; and $15,060 for [t]ravel to Albany; team
phone call; attend trial; return from Albany on December 1, 2015. Karlan Decl., Exh. 1. In
total, Karlan block billed hundreds of thousands of dollars for travel, yet he failed to identify any
legal work completed while traveling. Id.
18
E.
Gibsons and D&Ds Time Records Contain Excessive Charges for Routine
or Administrative Tasks.
Both Gibsons and D&Ds time records contain excessive charges for routine tasks that
should have been performed by clerical staff or paralegals. Osterweil, 2015 WL 1066404, at
*15 (The Court agrees that the districts prevailing rate of $80 per hour for paralegal work
should apply to the following tasks: (1) preparation and filing of Plaintiffs notice of appearance;
(2) preparation and filing of the Second Circuits Form C and Form D, which are brief
administrative forms; (3) filing of various scheduling notifications; (4) conferral with the court
regarding filings; and (5) preparation and filing of Plaintiffs oral argument statement to the
Second Circuit[.]); Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *14 ([T]he Court finds that Plaintiffs
counsel should not have billed their full hourly rate for the performance of non-legal
clerical/secretarial task[s], such as (1) filing a complaint and (2) filing motion papers.).
For example, a Gibson associate billed .7 hours on August 15, 2011, to [d]raft and file
notice of appearance for a cost of $374.50; .4 hours on August 16, 2011, to [f]ile notice of
appearance for a cost of $214; and 1.57 hours on December 8, 2011, to [d]raft notice of
appearance; register for ECF; work on motion for expedited discovery for a cost of $839.95.
Karlan Decl., Exh. 1. On August 17, 2011, another Gibson associate block billed 1.2 hours to,
inter alia, [f]inalize and prepare for filing notice of appearance and certificate of service for
same at a cost of $642. Id. Such administrative work could have been accomplished by a
paralegal or clerical employee and is thus excessive.
Moreover, on June 26, 2011, DerOhannesian block billed 1.0 hours to [r]eview draft
complaints changes to relief requested, send to co-counsel; conference call with GDC re
complaint, filing (7:00-7:45) for a cost of $350. DerOhannesian Decl., Exh. C-1 (emphasis
19
added). And on June 12, 2013, D&Ds associate block billed 1.0 hours to, inter alia, file[]
notice of appearance at a cost of $215. These charges are excessive and should be reduced.
F.
Gibsons and D&Ds Time Records Are Too Vague to Support the Charges.
Both Gibsons and D&Ds time records contain intolerably vague entries that preclude
any review of the reasonableness of the work done or the amount billed and should therefore be
disallowed. Osterweil, 2015 WL 1066404, at *10 (excluding in their entirety all entries that
omit any reference to specific issues or subject matter and rely on generic descriptions, such as
examined, conferred, and corresponded and noting that [t]he courts in this circuit have
found that vague entries such as conference with or call to a specific person generally lack
sufficient specificity, while time entries that refer to unspecified communications with
unidentified outside counsel or colleagues are plainly inadequate) (quotations omitted);
Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *14-15 (reducing entire bill by 30%, in part because some of
the attorneys time entries contained vague descriptions, such as Adj. letter, Finish
discovery, and discovery discussion).
For example, Karlan billed the following vague entries:
4 hours (total) for [a]ppeal work on November 16 and November 17, 2011.
1.0 hours (total) for [v]arious discovery and expert issues on January 7 and January
10, 2013.
Karlan Decl., Exh. 1. Similarly, DerOhannesian billed the following vague charges:
.5 hours for [m]eet with Aaron (5:40 6:15) on June 22, 2011.
.25 hours for [l]etter to T. Homer ECF filing on November 16, 2011.
.25 hours for [t]elephone call Alice Green (1:20-1:40); see notes; additional
information for case on December 23, 2011.
.75 hours for [t]elephone call Aaron (4:00-4:35); email Brendon re experts and
depositions on December 31, 2011.
.25 hours for [t]elephone call Declarant (Joe Gomez) 4:30-4:50 on March 8, 2012.
1.75 hours for [t]elephone call Lucy McKnight (1:05-1:25); telephone call Brendon,
Molly, Aaron (3:10-4:00); telephone call Brendon, Molly & Kyle (5:20-6:05) on
May 4, 2012.
.25 hours for [t]elephone call Molly & Brendon on July 10, 2012.
1.25 hours for [c]onference with Dr. Liu, Brendon and Molly (4:30-5:45) on
September 4, 2012.
.25 hours for [c]onference call S/J, additional plaintiffs on April 4, 2013.
.5 hours for [e]mails with Brendon; meet with Aaron (5:45-6:15) on August 12,
2013.
.5 hours for Call and review of Reply to Countys two trial briefs on February 7,
2015.
DerOhannesian Decl., Exh. C-1. These entries account for tens of thousands of dollars in
unsupportable charges and the descriptions are inscrutably vague. Marshall v. State of New York
Div. of State Police, 31 F. Supp. 2d 100, 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (Plaintiffs vague and blanket
description of prepare for trial in its time records does not adequately inform the Court of the
nature and extent of the work performed and therefore provides an inadequate basis to determine
the reasonableness of these claimed hours.) The bill should be reduced substantially as a result.
G.
As demonstrated above, Gibsons and D&Ds exorbitant bills are rife with errors and
over-billings that, taken together, cast the entire bill in doubt. But these problems are severely
and irreparably compounded by Gibsons decision to block bill nearly all of its time, making it
impossible for defendants or the Court to determine whether the time spent was reasonable.
Hines, NYLJ 1202659661779, at *14-15 (reducing bill by 30%, in part because attorneys failed
to specify the amount of time spent on separate tasks, frustrating meaningful review of the
reasonable number of the hours billed); In re Bownetree, LLC, 2009 WL 2843278, at *2 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) (reducing fees from all block billed entries by 50%).
For example, on November 18, 2014, Gabriel K. Gillett billed 17.1 hours for
Revise trial modules; attend trial; teleconference with N. Lebron to prepare for
testimony; revise trial outline.
Karlan Decl., Exh. 1. This sundry list of tasks racked up $11,542.50 in charges, yet it is
impossible to tell what work was done, whether the time spent on each task was reasonable, or
whether the work could have been performed by someone less qualified and less expensive.
22
On January 7, 2015, Gibsons associate Jonathan D. Fortney block billed $9,473 through
the following entry:
Finalize compilation of documents and turning of edits from M. Karlan for
Merrill testimony and Marcelle testimony; conference with M. Karlan and K.
Kolb to turn and finalize Merrill and Marcelle exam scripts; finalize documents
and take to court; attend court for examination of Merrill and Marcelle;
conference with team to turn edits from M. Karlan on McCoy exam script;
finalize exhibits and script for court; attend court for examination of McCoy;
conference with team regarding preparations for spoliation witnesses; read Perrin
deposition transcript and work on exam script for cross of Perrin.
Id. These tasks took 14.5 hours to complete, yet it is impossible to discern whether the amount
spent on any individual task was reasonable because the associate did not break out his time.
Similarly, on November 17, 2014, DerOhannesian block billed 6.75 hours at a cost of
$2,531.25 through the following entry:
Review counterproposal fr County review fees; research legal issues on lay
opinion; email JEC (TU); trial prep w Kyle and Brittany, witness outlines and
exhibits; go to Fed Ct drop off boxes and review IT in courtroom; prep w and
for Dr. Liu; meet w Anne Pope 3:30-5:50; emails County re maps, possible
restitution; prepare Alomar and Pope testimonies; Countys filing PFOFCOL
R&R
DerOhannesian Decl., Exh. C-1. Block billing thoroughly infests the records and frustrates any
effort to assess the reasonableness of the work performed and renders the bills meaningless.
For all the above reasons, including erroneous, duplicative, vague, and block billing,
defendants respectfully request that the Court reduce Gibsons and D&Ds requested hours by
90% or more applying Northern District of New York rates. Guardians Assn, 133 F. Appx at
786 (affirming district courts 80% across-the-board reduction where attorneys time records
were vague; attorneys billed full rates for travel time and time spent performing clerical tasks;
and counsel billed excessive hours even though plaintiffs complaint was drawn largely from a
complaint in a factually related case); Romeo & Juliette Laser Hair Removal, Inc. v. Assara I,
LLC, 2013 WL 3322249, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (employing across-the-board 75%
23
reduction where the block billing made it [so] difficult to separate tasks that are compensable
from those that are not, or tasks that should have been billed at lower rates from those
compensable at ordinary rates that the only feasible way of reducing [her] fees is to apply an
overall reduction).
Further as demonstrated by Appendix 1 fee requests seldom rise for civil rights cases above
$250,000 for work which includes pleading to summary judgment to trial (including an occasional
interlocutory appeal) in the Northern District of New York. The average award is much smaller. A
reasonable plaintiff would expect to pay at most no more than $240,000 to secure the work performed by
plaintiffs attorney. Given the fatally flawed submission, this award is more than reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully request that this Court enter an Order that:
(1)
(2)
Of counsel:
Adam Giangreco, Esq.
24
APPENDIX 1
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
Case Name
Case Cite
2015 WL
58178
Osterweil v. Bartlett,
Zhou v. State Univ. of
New York Inst. of Tech
2015 WL
1066404
2014 WL
7346035
2014 WL
295842
2013 WL
791603
2012 WL
2873533
2011 WL
817499
Dotson v. City of
Syracuse
2014 WL
1764494
Shepherd v. Goord
McClellan v. Smith
2010 WL
2834910
2010 WL
1507016
Attn'y Fee
Requested
Attn'y Fee
Awarded
AppealResult of Appeal
ed
Affirmed
$238,871.32 $54,305.65
Affirmed
Vacted for low award and
remanded
Yes
$10,951.48
No
$57,990.00
$34,860.80
No
No
$99,485.25
Yes
Affirmed
Affirmed
$29,200.00
$6,534.00
No
$86,008.40
(includes
costs)
$86,008.4
(includes
costs)
Yes
2010 WL
610694
2009 WL
4730698
2009 WL
3587431
unlawful imprisonment
Summary Judgment, Appeal, Jury Trial, motion in
and malicious prosecution opposition to FRCP 50 &59
$97,293.00
$1.40
Yes
Affirmed
Affirmed
$104,252.50 $104,252.50 No
$97,293.00
Yes
Affirmed
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
Attn'y Fee
Requested
Attn'y Fee
Awarded
AppealResult of Appeal
ed
Amount not
provided
$16,668 .00
No
Jury Trial
$198,357.37 $132,451.42 No
$242,083.00 $151,997.80 No
Case Name
Case Cite
2009 WL
2356798
2009 WL
Lore v. City of Syracuse 2957784
2009 WL
2835263
Countryman v. Farber
2008 WL
5157395
Martinez v. Thompson
Lewis v. City of Albany 554 F. Supp.
2d 297
Police Dep't
Luessenhop v. Clinton
Cnty., N.Y.,
558 F. Supp.
2d 247
Due Process
McDaniel v. Cnty. of
Schenectady
2007 WL
3274798
4th Amendment
Trudeau v. Bockstein
2008 WL
3413903
First Amendment
Lee v. Glessing
2006 WL
2524185
1983-Due Process
$47,252.00
$44,009.00
Yes
Affirmed
$99,082.53
(includes
costs)
$62,980.50
Yes
Affirmed
Affirmed
$395,222.00 $104,191.00 No
$149,336.69 $12,500.00
No
$41,129.00
Yes
$10,962.00
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
Case Name
Case Cite
Attn'y Fee
Requested
Attn'y Fee
Awarded
AppealResult of Appeal
ed
Romaine v. Rawson
2004 WL
1013316
$73,484.00
$10,858.80
No
Kassim v. City of
Schenectady
Torres v. Cross
Patterson v. Balsamico,
Patterson v. Julian
Baim v. Notto
People ex rel. Vacco v.
Rac Holding, Inc
Noga v. Potenza
Young v. Healey
Blissett v. Casey
John S. v. Cuomo
Cay v. Burleigh
Carroll v. DeBuono
250 F. Supp.
2d 36
316 F. Supp.
2d 113
135 F. Supp.
2d 359
1983-Due Process
$65,400.00
$12,000.00
Yes
$66,429.25
$1,500.00
Yes
Amount not
provided
$18,885.00
Yes
Title VII and Due Process 5-day Jury Trial, Post-Trial Motions
Partial Summary Judgement, Trial, Post-Trial
4th Amendment
Motions
Amount not
provided
Amount not
provided
$48,313.13
Yes
$7,969.50
No
$42,006.22
$36,163.55
No
$44,375.00
No
$4,012.49.
No
$14,747.42
No
Title VII
Civil Rights Violation
2002
(under 42 U.S.C. 1983
WL34945085 and NY Sate Law)
1999 WL
1281503
Excessive Force
1999 WL
1034502
8th Amendment
1999 WL
592693
1999 WL
408790
8th Amendment
48 F. Supp. 2d Equal Protection and 14th
191
Amd
8th Amendment
$5,726.74
Amount not
provided
$243,996.50 $165,327.20 No
Bench Trial
Class Certification and Summary Judgment
$33,270.42
Amount not
provided
Jury Trial
Amount not
provided
$32,395.42.
No
$75,580.00
No
$118,912.08 Yes
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
Attorney Fees Awarded in the Northern District of New York under 1988
I am the County Attorney for the County of Albany and counsel for the County of
Albany and the Albany County Board of Elections (Defendants or the County) in this action.
I make this Declaration in opposition to Plaintiffs application for attorneys fees and costs.
2.
election law. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is an excerpt from D&Ds website that describes the
firms expertise in election law.
3.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Gibson) is an international firm with over
1,000 lawyers dispersed across four continents. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is an excerpt from
Gibsons website that describes the firms magnitude.
4.
Gibson and D&D represented plaintiffs against the County of Albany in Arbor
Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assn v. County of Albany, No. 1:0-3cv-00502 (N.D.N.Y.
2003). That action involved the exact same issues, the exact same Defendants, the exact same
lead counsel, and the exact same experts.
5.
The underlying litigation featured more than 30 depositions, almost all of which
Gibson overstaffed with an inordinate number of associates in what was clearly an effort to
provide young associates with litigation experience.
6.
Four Gibson attorneys billed 77.5 hours at a cost of $39,792.25 for the deposition
Five Gibson attorneys billed 63.55 hours for the deposition of Frank Commisso,
even though the deposition lasted for less than two hours. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 are the
relevant portions of the deposition transcripts from this action which show the inordinate number
of Gibson attorneys per deposition.
8.
Many of the depositions in the underlying litigation were only required because
Plaintiffs amended their complaint after summary judgment, while the County prevailed on
every single discovery dispute.
9.
Plaintiffs overstaffed nearly every aspect of this litigation in order to train their
junior associates.
opportunities is to train its associates. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is an excerpt from Gibsons
website that describes the firms pro bono practice. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is an excerpt
from Gibsons website that describes the awards the firm has received for its pro bono practice.
I hereby declare under penalties of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Exhibit 1
Email *
anyofthefollowing,callusat18006756420orcontactusonlinetotellusaboutyoursituation.
Submit
Antitrustviolations
Embezzlement
Bankfraud
Extortion
Bankruptcyfraud
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Bribery
Insurancefraud
Computer/Internetfraud
Moneylaundering
Creditcardfraud
Securitiesfraud
Counterfeiting
Taxevasionandfraud
Economicespionage
Clickheretoreadaboutournotablewhitecollarcrimecase.
Backtotop
Electionlaw
AtDerOhannesian&DerOhannesian,weworkhardtoupholdNewYorkStatevoters'rightsandensure
adherencetolocalandstateelectionadministrationprocess.Whenrightsandprocessareviolated,we
staunchlydefendthem.Ourfirmalsoworkswithclientstochallengeredistrictinginitiatives,campaign
financing,andotherelementsofelectionlaw.
Backtotop
Personalinjury
NewYorklawentitlesyoutocompensationifyouhavebeeninjuredthroughthenegligenceor
wrongdoingofsomeoneelse.DerOhannesian&DerOhannesianrepresentsclientswhohavebeeninjured
inthefollowingsituations:
Autoaccidents
Boatingaccidents
Truckingaccidents
Premisesliability
Motorcycleaccidents
Slipandfall
Busaccidents
Wrongfuldeath
Wehandleyourlegalmattersoyoucanfocusonyourhealing.Weworkwithinsurancecompanies,
witnesses,andexpertstosecureforyoucompensationthatcoverspastandfuturemedicalexpenses,
lostwagesandearningcapacity,andpainandsuffering.
Backtotop
Medicalmalpractice
Whenyouseekmedicalhelpfromahealthcareprofessional,youexpectthatpersontoadheretoa
certainsetofstandards.Butsometimes,proceduresgoawry.Ifthishashappenedtoyouoralovedone,
weapplyourskilledteamofinvestigatorstodeterminenegligenceofthemedicalprofessional.Youare
entitledbylawtocompensationandweworkzealouslytorecoverdamagesforyou.
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Productsliability
Youcanholdmanufacturers,resellers,distributors,andproductdesignersresponsiblefordefective
productswhentheycauseharmtoyou.Safetyorwarninglabelsmaynothaveappropriatelyprovided
cautionortheproductmayhaveoperatedincorrectlyduetoamanufacturingordesigndefect.Ifyouor
alovedonehasbeenavictimofaproductdefect,contactDerOhannesian&DerOhannesian.We
conductathoroughinvestigationoftheproducttodeterminetherootcauseofitsfailuretoperform
safely.Webringyourclaimtojusticeandfightforfaircompensationforyourdamages.
Backtotop
Estatesandestatelitigation
Estates
Exhibit 2
Hom e > O f f i c e s
GLOBALREACH
Gibson,Dunn&Crutcher,withmore
than 1,200 lawyers in 18 offices in
major cities throughout the United
States,Europe,theMiddleEast,Asia
and South America, is committed to
providing the highest quality legal
servicestoitsclients.InEurope,our
established,
internationally
networked group of qualified U.S.,
English, French, Spanish and
German lawyers have considerable
experience in representing clients
with global business interests that
require a coordinated, seamless
responsewithinandacrossEuropean
nationalborders.
VIEWGIBSONDUNNOFFICES
Beijing
Brussels
CenturyCity
Dallas
Denver
Dubai
HongKong
London
LosAngeles
Munich
NewYork
OrangeCounty
PaloAlto
Paris
SanFrancisco
SoPaulo
Singapore
Washington,D.C.
EXHIBIT 3
EXHIBIT 4
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher has a longstanding and greatly valued tradition
of service to the community. We are
privileged to be able to give back to
the communities that have been such
a part of our success, and believe that
community involvement adds an
important dimension to the growth
and development of our attorneys, as
both lawyers and citizens of those
communities.
IN THE COMMMUNITY
Our Commitment
Awards and Accolades
Frank Wheat Award for Outstanding
Achievements in Pro Bono
Leaders in the Community
EXHIBIT 5
IN THE COMMMUNITY
Our Commitment
Awards and Accolades
Frank Wheat Award for Outstanding
Achievements in Pro Bono
Leaders in the Community