SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY, 2014, 42(6), 913-920

Society for Personality Research

http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2014.42.6.913

APPLYING GAME THEORY TO THE BALANCE BETWEEN

ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER IN UNIVERSITIES
QIAN MENG, XU LIU, AND XIAODONG XU
Huazhong University of Science and Technology
Academic power and administrative power are the 2 basic types of authority in a university.
While closely related to each other, they are at the same time opposed to each other. Whether
a university is dominated by academic power or administrative power, they are all influenced
by the political and market needs of the country. Game theory is an effective tool to analyze
the relationship between academic power and administrative power. In this study we analyzed
the game relationships between these 2 types of authority in universities with the help of a
prisoners dilemma game model, to achieve a new theoretical interpretation of the balance
between academic power and administrative power.
Keywords: academic power, administrative power, game theory, theoretical research,
prisoners dilemma.

Since 1978, reform has become the main thrust of social development in China.
Society, consequently, pays the costs, resulting in a risky and often difficult
transformation. As a social organization, a university is not exempt from the
reform process. However, such reforms often produce unpleasant results, whereby
unreasonable restrictions are placed upon the development of the university
(Peng & Liu, 2006; Shi, 2006; Ye, 2011). In Chinas universities, administrative
power exerts much more influence than does academic power, because of Chinas

Qian Meng, School of Education, Xu Liu, School of Public Administration, and Xiaodong Xu, School
of Education, Huazhong University of Science and Technology.
This research was supported by the Scientific Research Fund of Hunan Provincial Education Department
(11C1149) and Hunan Association of Education Researchers Programs (XJK011CGD004). The
authors thank the staff at the Decision Analysis Laboratory, Huazhong University of Science and
Technology.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Xiaodong Xu, School of Education,
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, No. 1037 Luoyu Road, Wuhan, Hubei Province
430074, Peoples Republic of China. Email: mengqian_china@hotmail.com

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BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

power-centralized political model and centralized administrative system. This

means that university administrators have more power than academic staff do.
The coexistence of administrative power and academic power is the characteristic
of higher education governance structure. The configuration of power decides the
pattern of resource allocation. In the case of administrative power being stronger
than academic power, administrative staff members have more authority over
resources allocation when compared with academic staff. Game theory is the
theory regarding conflict and cooperation between rational decision makers.
It can be used to effectively analyze the interests behind the conflict. In this
way, using game theory to analyze the academic and administrative powers of
a university can assist in defining boundaries and forming a reasonable power
structure. Using the classic prisoners dilemma game model, in this study we
analyzed the game relationships between administrative power and academic
power, with the aim of finding a new theoretical explanation for the balance
between academic power and administrative power.
The Basic Elements of the Game: Administrative Power
and Academic Power
Power conflict is the most common phenomenon in human society and
power is the most basic element of an organization (Clark, 1986). As a social
organization, a university has the double characteristic of being an academic as
well as a social organization. Administrative power and academic power, as two
distinctive authorities in a university, have differing missions, responsibilities,
scopes, contents, and operational mechanisms. Academic power is concerned
with the implementation and guarantee of academic standards, protecting the
rights and interests of academic staff, and assuring the development of discipline
according to its logic. Administrative power is principally concerned with
ensuring the implementation of national education policy and law, and assuring
the efficiency of management. The win-win situation between academic and
administrative authorities is the ultimate goal of the reform of the university
internal management system.
Altbach, Gumport, and Berdahl (1998) pointed out that along with the
expansion of university administrative power comes increasing control over the
budget and planning of a university. This dual property of universities leads to
the issues: (a) how to coordinate the inherent conflict, and (b) how to adjust and
balance academic and administrative powers. Therefore, reaching an acceptable
balance between the two powers is an institutional necessity for the resolution
of a universitys internal conflicts. In China, the independent consciousness of
universities is weak. At present, the greatest concern is the Chinese governments
control over the university decision-making process, creating serious bureaucratic

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915

problems in the management of universities (Hayhoe, 1996; Lin, 1993). The

government maintains firm control of universities through financial allocation
and the appointment of university officials, such as the president and secretary of
the Party Committee. On behalf of the government, the president and secretary
govern the university, control the allocation of various resources, and have a
decisive voice in decision making, whereas teachers and students, the most
significant members of a university, have fewer opportunities to speak up and let
their thoughts be known.
Table 1. The Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative Power
Administrator
Centralization
Decentralization
Academic staff

Work hard
Do not work hard

Pa1, Pb1
Pa3, Pb3

Pa2, Pb2
Pa4 = 0, Pb4

Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative Power

The game model shown in Table 1 is based on the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: There will be two participants in the game: administrators
and academic staff, both of whom have special rational interests, clear utility
functions, and value preferences, and the ability to judge accurately on revenue
whereby each attempts to maximize the benefits to themselves.
Hypothesis 2: Administrators will have two strategies: (a) centralization, and (b)
decentralization.
Hypothesis 3: Academic staff will have two strategies: (a) work hard, and (b) do
not work hard.
Based on the above hypotheses, the game matrix of academic power and
administrative power is as follows (see Table 1):
a. We define the revenue of academic staff as Pa, and the revenue of
administrators as Pb.
b. Pa1 stands for the revenue of academic staff under the condition centralized,
work hard; Pa2 stands for the revenue of academic staff under the condition
decentralized, work hard; Pa3 stands for the revenue of academic staff under
the condition centralized, do not work hard; the revenue of academic staff
under the condition decentralized, do not work hard is Pa4, which equals zero.
c. Pb1 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition centralized,
work hard; Pb2 stands for the revenue of administrators under the condition
decentralized, work hard; Pb3 stands for the revenue of administrators under
the condition centralized, do not work hard; Pb4 stands for the revenue of
administrators under the condition decentralized, do not work hard.

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BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

d. We assumed decentralization means academic staff autonomy is respected

and academic freedom is fully guaranteed. In this way, academic staff can gain
more revenue; therefore, Pa2 > Pa1.
e. If academic staff members use the work hard strategy, administrators
taking the centralized strategy will gain more revenue than when taking the
decentralized strategy. This means that Pb1 > Pb2. Similarly, if academic staff
use the do not work hard strategy, administrators taking the centralized strategy
will get more revenue than when taking the decentralized strategy, so Pb3 > Pb4.
f. Under the centralized condition, administrators will get more revenue if
academic staff use the work hard strategy rather than the do not work hard
strategy, so Pb1 > Pb3. Under the decentralized condition, administrators will get
more revenue if academic staff use the work hard strategy rather than the do not
work hard strategy, so Pb2 > Pb4.
Because Pb1 > Pb2 and Pb3 > Pb4, whereas Pb1 > Pb3 and Pb2 > Pb4, we
conclude that Pb1 is the best strategy, and Pb4 is the worst strategy. Thus, we
deduce that, for administrators, centralized, work hard is the optimal strategy,
whereas decentralized, do not work hard is the least effective strategy.
The Analysis of Game Results
We analyzed the game results under different situations. If administrators use
the centralization strategy, then academic staff may be able to hitchhike, i.e.,
just sit and enjoy the revenue (under this situation, Pa1 < Pa3 < Pa2). With Pb2
Pb3 and Pb2 Pb1, we used the following simulative digitals to indicate the above
parameter model (see Table 2).
Table 2. The Simulative Digitals of the Game Model of Academic Power and Administrative
Power
Administrator
Centralization
Decentralization
Academic staff

Work hard
Do not work hard

2, 6
3, 4

4, 5
0, 2

As can be seen from Table 2, administrators decentralization strategy and

academic staff members work hard strategy is the Pareto optimal, a state of
resource allocation in which it is impossible to make one individual better off
without causing at least one other individual to be worse off. When academic
staff members choose strategies, the preponderant strategy of an administrator
is centralization, not decentralization. Similarly, when administrators choose
strategies, the best choice is centralization. Corresponding to this strategy, do not

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917

work hard is the optimal strategy for academic staff. Therefore, centralization, do
not work hard, is associated with the Nash equilibrium, in which each player is
assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and, therefore,
no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy. A scenario
can contain multiple or no Nash equilibriums. In this study the Nash equilibrium
is achieved through the rational consideration of administrators and academic
staff who fall into a prisoners dilemma, one of the best known game strategies
in which it is demonstrated that two people might not cooperate even if it is in
both their best interests to do so (Osborne, 2003).
There are two Nash equilibriums in this game model: centralization, do not
work hard; and decentralization, work hard, and the appearance of each of these
depends on the specific situation. Decentralization, work hard is the combination
strategy whereby administrators and academic staff achieve more revenue.
Although centralization, do not work hard is not conducive to the development of
the academic institution, both academics and administrators can benefit from this
combination. Therefore, effective administrators should use the decentralization
strategy in order to promote and maintain the interest of academic staff and to
ensure that academic staff will use the work hard strategy.
In Table 2, compared with the first and third quadrants, the first quadrant is
obviously the Pareto optimal, whereby academic staff and administrators can
achieve a win-win situation. However, the value changes of Pb1 in the second
quadrant and Pa4 in the fourth quadrant will change the result of the game.
Avoiding a prisoners dilemma would require a decrease in the value of Pb1 and
an increase in the value of Pa4. A decreased value of Pb1 means that a university
can provide a comfortable environment for academic staff. Faculty governance
and democratic decision making are the characteristics of the university decentralization strategy (Miller & Katz, 2004). The increased value of Pa4 means
academic staff members understand that if they do not work hard they will get
less revenue than will peers or colleagues. We conclude that a university should
reduce undue administrative power, and give supremacy to the academic and
advocate the value of truth. Only if we respect the value of truth, can academic
staff achieve supremacy and hold the decisive power in decision making.
In the game model, both academic staff and administrators are concerned with
maximizing their own interests, but individual rational choices cannot definitely
lead to collective rationality. Collectivism is associated most strongly with
personal responsibility and with strong social support networks (Finkelstein,
2011). The game model of academic and administrative power also supports
the classic truth of game theory: it is not possible to create a definitive model
that guarantees the individual freedom and rights and generates a reasonable
distribution of interests (Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008). All players strategies
should be in favor of achieving Pareto optimality. Obviously, in the above game

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BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER

model, the expected equilibrium is the decentralization, work hard strategy,

aimed at promoting academic freedom and academic development.
The System Construction and Behavior Adjustment
Under Pareto Optimality
Through discussion of the game strategy of academic staff and administrators,
we refer to two questions: (a) How should we adjust our behaviors to break
the prisoners dilemma, and (b) What kind of university system do we need to
achieve Pareto optimality?
Whether an administrator chooses a centralization or decentralization strategy,
having academic staff with a strong sense of responsibility and initiative is crucial
to achieving the mission of the university (Zhang, 2011). Therefore, regardless
of the power state between the centralization and decentralization interval, the
university should limit the ability of academic staff to achieve their interests
through hitchhiking, negative coping, or doing only the minimum amount of
work to complete their duties. That is to say, in the above game model, Pa1
should be made to lead to Pa3, but it should be noted that, with fierce competition
between different disciplines, excessive expansion of academic power is likely to
open the door to academic bureaucracy, which tends to ignore market influence
and efficiency, and, thus, influences the capacity to realize the universitys goals.
Analysis of this game model suggests two phenomena. First, for administrators,
costs rise when they use the decentralization strategy, increasing the probability
of academic staff preferring to use the work hard strategy. Costs are reduced
when administrators use the centralization strategy meaning academic staff
members are more reluctant to use the work hard strategy, so that they then
move in opposite directions. Second, when administrators use the centralization
strategy and academic staff members use the do not work hard strategy, if the
utility Pa3 increases, the probability of administrators choosing centralization
decreases. This is because, as explained above, academic staff can achieve more
revenue with minimal effort on the back of administrative power.
North (1981) pointed out that a system is a series of rules, procedures and
law-abiding behavior of the moral and ethical norms, which seeks to pursue
the main constraints to maximize the effectiveness of well-being or personal
behavior (p. 226). Therefore, a system may be a possible way to avoid the
prisoners dilemma. A system consists of both endogenous and exogenous rules.
Endogenous rules would require academic staff to understand the promotion of
academic development as the nature of their job. Only if they choose to work
hard will they be able to achieve more revenue, otherwise they will be surpassed
by peers, especially when they have limited resources. Exogenous rules require
a university to create a suitable environment for the development of academic

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919

excellence. The level of leader self-sacrifice is positively associated with team

identification (Ruggieri & Abbate, 2013). In the case of a university, this would
involve administrators giving academic staff the right to teach, to do research, and
to be master of their fields. Only by setting up both endogenous and exogenous
rules, can a university control the interest payoff between administrative and
academic players.
Academic and administrative powers are the basic distinctive authorities
in a university. Reciprocity serves as a moderator for players (Yang, Li, &
Zheng, 2013). Although their operation is based on different values, goals,
procedures, functions, and roles, the common denominator is that they all
serve the achievement of university goals. For administrators, management
should comply with the inherent development of discipline and serve the
academic institution. For academic power, when academic freedom collides
with management efficiency, scholars can obtain the best development space
for the academy through cooperation, consultation, dialogue, and democratic
procedures rather than arbitrarily calling for academic freedom, autonomy, and
the disruption of organizational orders, which ultimately leads to the legitimation
crisis of academic authority. Achieving a win-win situation for academic and
administrative powers is necessary for the development of a university.
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