First Substance is something 'standing on itself'.

It is physically
generated from an initial condition : the elements of the dynamical
system, plus the dynamical law (going to be the E s s e n c e of the
first substance in question) inherent in those system elements. This
first substance, as it stands, is a (unique) collection of properties.
Each property is, as a property, not ' standing on itself ', because it
always is a property of some first substance. They are in a way
beings but they are not (self)subsistent. These 'beings' are
called a c c i d e n t s. But they need not always to be accidental.
Some accidents are directly caused by the essence of the thing,
others are caused by extrinsic (extrinsic in relation to the Essence)
factors.
First Substance is something 'standing on itself'. It is physically
generated from an initial condition : the elements of the dynamical
system, plus the dynamical law (going to be the E s s e n c e of the
first substance in question) inherent in those system elements. This
first substance, as it stands, is a (unique) collection of properties.
Each property is, as a property, not ' standing on itself ', because it
always is a property of some first substance. They are in a way
beings but they are not (self)subsistent. These 'beings' are
called a c c i d e n t s. But they need not always to be accidental.
Some accidents are directly caused by the essence of the thing,
others are caused by extrinsic (extrinsic in relation to the Essence)
factors.
The first substance itself is situated in the fenotypical domain and is
the totality of its properties which are also situated in that same
domain. If we speak in the context of predication, then we can say
that the First Substance is never in a subject, and as a predicate can
never be predicated of a subject, while the Second Substance is
always in a subject (this subject is the first substance), and as a
predicate can be predicated of a subject. Accidents also are always
in a subject, but, in contradistinction to Second Substance, accidents
belong to the fenotypical domain.

In the philosophy of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas a distinction is

made between First Substance and Second Substance.
I. The obvious division of things into the stable and the unstable, the more or less
independently subsistent and the dependent, or essentially inherent, appears beset with
obscurity and difficulty as soon as it is brought under reflective consideration. In their
endeavour to solve the problem, philosophers have followed two extreme tendencies. Some
have denied the objectivity of the substantial or noumenal element, and attributed it wholly
or in part to the mind; others have made the phenomenal or accidental element subjective,
and accorded objectivity to substance alone. These two extreme tendencies are represented
among the ancient Greek materialists andatomists on the one hand and the
Eleatic pantheists on the other. Aristotle and his medieval followers steer a middle course.
They hold to the objectivity both of substance and of accident, though they recognize the
subjective factor in the mode of perception. They use the term accident to designate
any contingent (i.e.nonessential) relation between an attribute and its subject. As such it is
a merely logical denomination, one of the five predicables or universals, modes of
systematic classification genus, difference, species, property, accident. In this sense it is
called predicable, as distinguished from predicamental, accident, the latter term standing for
a real objective form or status of things, and denoting a being whose essential nature it is
to inhere in another as in a subject. Accident thus implies inexistence in substance i.e. not
as the contained in the container, not as part in the whole, not as a being in time or place,
not as effect in cause, not as the known in the knower; but as an inherent entity or mode in
a subject which it determines. Accidents modify or denominate their subject in various
ways, and to these correspond the nine "Categories":