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Science & Education 10: 423451, 2001.

2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

423

Molecular Representations: Building Tentative


Links Between the History of Science and the
Study of Cognition
MARIA YAMALIDOU
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Wilhelmstr. 44, D-10117 Berlin, Germany

Abstract. This paper addresses questions concerning the cognitive character of nineteenth-century
British molecular discourse. At a time when no proof of the existence or the intimate structure of
the material particle was yet available or even possible, scientists were free to suggest and discuss
possible, alternative, or even incompatible, molecular pictures of the unseen level of the material
substratum, leaving aside all realistic considerations. The role of these molecular representations
was to provide the necessary causal links between physical phenomena and underlying mechanisms,
thus infusing intelligibility into scientific explanations. Focusing on processes of thinking rather
than on formal theories, the analysis in this paper will suggest that, precisely because of its fluid
character, molecular discourse produced a common universe of meanings which sustained an ongoing thought experiment regarding the intimate structure of matter, and that, by so doing, it initiated
a process of familiarisation of scientists with the unobservable realm. Beyond realism and scepticism,
the attitude of nineteenth-century molecularists, which can be adequately described as suspension
of judgement, may prove highly suggestive in science education.

1. Introduction
The language and point of view of psychology can find a prominent position in
the expanding field of the history of science. Peter Gays recognition of the fact,
that the writing of history often involves questions that cannot be settled unless
we talk, in one way or another, about human nature or behaviour, brought to the
foreground what seems to have been a hidden agenda for historians.1 William
McKinley Runyans assertion that psychology is unquestionably relevant in the
writing of biographies2 resonates with the initial interest of psychologists to understand the achievements of eminent men and, less often, women of science
in psychological terms.3 According to Thomas Kohut, the relevance of psychology
for history is almost self-evident because there is a psychological dimension in the
past, which cannot be ignored by historians.4
Although a considerable amount of evidence has been accumulated by diverse
studies, which indicate that the process of evaluation and interpretation of scientific data are greatly determined by personal attitudes and dispositions which,
in turn, can be affected by educational background, social conditions, political

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attitudes, and gender,5 these early attempts to fertilise historical investigation with
psychological considerations did not exhaust the suggestive possibilities of this
interconnection. Since R. Fischs review of the field of psychology of science,6
which diagnosed a series of methodological and philosophical problems in the
earlier attempts of psychologists to explicate the experience of scientists in the
production of knowledge including lack of integration, fragmentation of the research, and absence of cohesive concepts the joint efforts of cognitive scientists
and historians of science have been intensified and tend to acquire, in recent years,
a programmatic form.
The central desideratum of this synthetic approach concerns its unavoidable
interdisciplinary character. From the point of view of cognitive science, this interdisciplinarity has been established in the very definition of the field, which
comprises cognitive psychology, studies on artificial intelligence, and cognitive
neuroscience.7 And although the recognition of the fact that science is primarily
a cognitive activity makes the involvement of cognitive scientists self-evident,
their own understanding of this involvement encourages the interaction between
different approaches. Hence, Ronald Giere points out that cognitive science is one
of the potentially most powerful resources for studying science,8 and William R.
Shadish Jr. and Robert A. Neimeyer, argue that this interdisciplinarity expresses a
commitment to a metascience in which psychology, although an important force,
represents only one of many valid approaches.9
For historians of science, the prerequisite of interdisciplinarity was arrived at,
mainly, through a critique of the constraints that the traditional, prescriptive philosophy of science imposed on the understanding of scientific developments. Trying
to loosen the strong embracement of theoretical explanations which focus on the
logical structure of scientific theories and on the notions of truth and progress, in
recent years, historians of science shifted their attention from the finalised product
of scientific investigation to the specific intellectual, religious, socio- economical,
and political conditions that affect the production of knowledge. However, this
intense preoccupation with the contextual dependency of scientific developments
in recent historiography should not be equated with a regression to empiricism.
On the contrary, the consideration of the complex interactions between the personal and the collective in the negotiation of the meaning of scientific concepts,
between the technical and the rhetorical manipulation of facts and ideas, between
the prerequisites for internal coherence of the content of science and the social
justification of its results, invites a multiplicity of theoretical frameworks for its
understanding and interpretation.
At each of these steps which lead from private contemplations to shared systems
of knowledge, an understanding of the cognitive dimension of science is becoming
increasingly relevant. The potential of certain great thinkers to produce ideas which
transcend the constraints of the current understanding of the world, and whose
validity is tested through a complex process of justification, was among the first
questions which attracted the attention of cognitive psychologists and creativity

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quickly became one of the favourite topics of research in this field.10 Valuable as
this approach has been in providing an understanding of scientific innovation, it
perpetuates and, somehow, magnifies the distinction that Reichenbach introduced
between the context of discovery and that of justification, a distinction which has
been under critical examination in recent years. Nancy Nersessian negates the
validity of this distinction arguing that discovery is both creative and reasoned,
a fact which becomes more apparent if we redefine creativity and understand it
as a process rather than an act.11 In a similar tone, David Gooding suggests that
the basic question that should be addressed in relation to scientific innovation
concerns the way in which the unfamiliar can be represented yet still retains its
potential to change the structure that represents and explains it.12 His analysis of
Michael Faradays experimental work as well as Nersessians analysis of James
Clerk Maxwells electrodynamical models exemplify this choice in practice.
The main thrust for such studies has been provided by questions concerning
conceptual change. Although catalytic for the change of outlook of the history of
science, Thomas Kuhns suggestion of an abrupt change between pre-paradigmatic
and normal science did not leave much space for the consideration of such
questions.13 According to Ronald Giere, it was the choice of gestalt psychology
on behalf of Kuhn which restricted his understanding of the gradual character of
conceptual change,14 or, as Nancy Nersessian puts it, his scheme does not provide
an understanding of the mechanism which affects this change.15 Similar concerns
have been expressed by Michelene Chi who insists on the distinction between the
outcome of conceptual change and the process which affects it. She suggests a way
to understand conceptual change, as a process, in terms of ontological categories and of the migration of concepts within and across these categories.16 Ronald
Giere, on the other hand, chooses models as the units of his analysis of science17
and argues that scientific theories are structured on the basis of certain families of
models and that the progressive understanding of physics is exemplified by a shift
from central to peripheral models.18
The notion of mental models has become central to cognitive psychology especially through the work of Johnson-Laird.19 Nancy Nersessian brings his analysis
to bear upon concrete historical episodes in order to understand the representational
resources that are available to scientists and the way in which these resources
are utilised during the process of problem-solving through which new concepts
emerge. She argues that the cognitive dimension of analogies, metaphors, and
thought experiments is central, in the sense that it is these tactics which suggest the
inferential reasoning which actually generates new representations form existing
ones.20
The move from the private understanding of individual scientists to the shared
understanding of the scientific community has been put within the scope of cognitive science most prominently by David Gooding. Far from denying the role of
individual imagination, which plays a central role in the process of abstraction
form actual observations to constructed visual and linguistic representations of the

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observed phenomena, Goodings approach seeks to understand the process through


which a newly discovered phenomenon is made easy-to-see, that is easily accessible to others. According to his analysis, the modelling of the world is basic,
and the mastering of observational and experimental techniques enables scientists to stabilise the meaning of the observed phenomena. Hence, the symbiosis of
thought and action results in the merging of representable cognitive processes and
unrepresentable skills.21
Finally, the explanatory possibilities of a combined examination of the social
and the cognitive dimensions of science, although not unquestionable,22 have been
exemplified by Terry Shinns detailed study of everyday work in a modern laboratory. His interpretation of science as a network of activities where, at certain nodes,
cerebral and social events merge and function symbiotically,23 thus producing
a convergence of cognitive operations and social conduct, attempts to resolve the
earlier rivalry between social hegemony and epistemological determinism.
The analysis presented in this paper will attempt to bring a specific aspect of
nineteenth-century British science, that addressing the general idea that matter is
particulate at the unobservable level, within this synthetic framework of analysis. It
will be suggested that the consideration of the way in which scientists were thinking and talking about material particles, and more specifically, in physics, about
molecules, may prove highly suggestive in our attempt to understand the intricate
cognitive processes which turns a body of initial speculations and contradictory
observations into that widely accepted framework of knowledge which gradually
becomes the authoritative science. The extended examination of instances of molecular discourse, in Section 1, will attempt to highlight the fact that, in the period
which preceded the establishment of formal theories concerning molecular interactions, scientists were free to explore alternative molecular models. This pluralism
in the expression of the basic idea of material molecularity did not give rise to
scientific debates; on the contrary, it provided a rich repertoire of ideas, whose
productive character has not passed unnoticed by Stephen Toulmin, who points out
that the major triumphs of the atomic theory were achieved at a time when even
the greatest scientists could regard the idea of atoms as hardly more than a useful
fiction.24
That the construction of alternative possibilities constitutes a productive way of
thinking was made explicit, in 1889, by Thomas Chamberlin, who argued that the
true explanation is . . . necessarily multiple, while the interpretative effort of scientists consists in the organisation of a complete set of multiple hypotheses.25 This
view is not irrelevant to certain suggestions that are being put forward within cognitive science. For example, Shadish Jr. and Neimeyer point out that [s]cietists use
multiple cognitive strategies in their work,26 and Nersessian argues that Maxwell
used multiple knowledge domains and informational formats.27 Howard Gruber
argues that the division of the creative life of a person into separate, distinctive
enterprises is constructive; on the one hand, their relative autonomy enables constructive work in one without affecting the other, while on the other hand, chancy

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interactions between them enhances creativity.28 From a different perspective, Johan de Kleers study of expert problem-solvers led him to recognise the fact that
an expert problem-solver should be able to employ multiple representations for
the same problem in order to be effective.29
In Section 2, a parallel examination of the similarities between nineteenthcentury molecular discourse and the intuitive explanations of ordinary people will
provide a further opportunity to discuss processes of thinking. It seems that the importance of molecular explanations, for both groups, is related to the establishment
of causal relations between observable phenomena and underlying mechanism.
The aim of these explanations was to make these phenomena intelligible rather
than to express any final view about the nature of the individual particle. That the
prerequisite of intelligibility is important for the selection of meaningful concepts
has been highlighted by Goodings analysis of Faradays treatment of the notion of
lines of force.30 Moreover, for both scientists and ordinary people, the process of
understanding resulted in a distinct, three-level categorisation of molecular models. This evidence can be understood in relation to the views expressed by Ryan
Tweney, Michael Doherty and Clifford Mynatt that the establishment of taxonomic
systems creates meaning for both unity and diversity, thus facilitating scientific
communication.31 Lastly, both groups were producing molecular models of the unseen level of physical reality by pasting together familiar pictures and this process
was not restricted by any strict criterion of coherence of the suggested models.
The cognitive dimension of this tactic has been highlighted by Nersessian who
argues that [b]y clustering connected information and making visual a chain of
interconnected inferences the imagistic representations support a large number of
immediate perceptual inferences.32
The aim of Section 3 is to investigate the conditions of intelligibility of
nineteenth-century molecular discourse. It will be suggested that, precisely because
of its highly flexible nature, this discourse created cognitive loops through which,
on the one hand, physical phenomena became intelligible because they could be
visualised in terms of molecular interactions, and, on the other hand, molecular
reality became a familiar and, hence, intelligible framework of analysis of physical
phenomena. The production of mental images of the unseen level of physical reality, which were sometimes highly complex and did not correspond to any specific
physical system, creates the opportunity for a discussion which centres on the role
of metaphors and analogies in scientific thinking. Arthur Millers investigation of
the role of mental imagery in the formulation of scientific theories in the nineteenth
and twentieth century,33 and Michael J. Webbs argument that analogies cannot
be constructed in situations beyond the limit of our pictorial representations,34
suggests a meaningful way to relate the discussions on analogical thinking to the
broader context of visual, or imagery thinking.35
In the concluding section, the main points of this understanding of molecular
science will be used in order to disentangle certain problematic aspects of grammar
school curricula. Far from being exhaustive, these concluding remarks will attempt

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to highlight the fact that the way of thinking suggested by nineteenth-century molecularists may be further explored as a possible pattern of molecular thinking for
young children.
The historical understanding of science has become, in recent years, increasingly relevant to science education.36 The factor which mostly contributed to this
turn, must have been the phenomenal persistence of childrens erroneous ideas
about physical world, which problematised the traditional methods of instruction
and urged for a more detailed examination of what learning involves. Hence, it
has been suggested that the question of instruction cannot be resolve unless we
understand the dynamical interaction between the partial pieces of information
presented to children and their own knowledge structures.37 The assimilation of the
former into the latter is not a simple and straightforward process, because childrens
mental representations do not comprise only concepts, that have to be somehow
changed, but also beliefs about the truth-value of those concepts which are meaningful for children.38 The realisation that scientific and non-scientific thinkers share
important characteristics concerning not only the process of cognition but also their
methodological choices,39 highlighted the possibility that the study of the historical
process may reveal a model of the learning activity itself.40
The main argument of this paper, namely that the consideration of alternative
possibilities plays an important role in the process of understanding, repeats itself
in the implicit assumption which permeates the whole paper and culminates in the
suggestion that an understanding of the history of science may assist educationists
to understand the children as thinking acotrs and to design more effective strategies
of instruction, exactly because the knowledge of history provides us a repertoire of
possibilities.

2. Molecular Discourse: A Fluid Dialogue About Alternative Possibilities


Around the middle of the nineteenth century, molecular science was not yet an
established field of scientific investigation. Although an increasing amount of evidence indicated that it was possible to understand macroscopic phenomena in terms
of molecular activity at the unobservable level of physical reality, neither the mathematical tools nor the art of experimentation were so advanced as to provide the
necessary framework which could deal with such immensely complex interactions.
The alternative approach, namely the formulation of macroscopic theories which
could be both heuristically suggestive and mathematically sound proved productive
in diverse scientific fields as for example in hydrodynamics, thermodynamics,
and the methodologically positivistic chemistry and liberated many scientists
from the obligation to formulate sub-microscopic models about the unobservable
realm. Maxwells suggestion, in the 1860s, of a statistical framework, which could
describe molecular complexity, translating various experimental results into mathematical language, gave a tremendous impetus to the investigation of the ultimate
structure of matter.

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In a large part of the historical literature, this distinction, between the prehistory of molecular speculations and the genesis of a new scientific field, has
been put into a narrative of pivotal moves: from the pre-paradigmatic to normal
science, from inconclusive evidence to mathematical theories, from speculative
ideas to testable truths. Especially because the history of nineteenth-century British science has been, largely, understood, until recently, within an interpretative
framework which stressed the view of a supposedly widespread empiricism,41 the
intense preoccupation of historians with the establishment of Maxwells kinetic
theory of gases, put into a prominent position the role of authority for the acceptance and establishment of scientific innovation.42 However, this reading of history
passes over in silence a remarkable fact: that molecular explanations of physical
phenomena were frequently suggested and openly discussed even by scientists of
lesser importance, even before the establishment of the Maxwellian framework,
at a time when such terms as molecules and atoms had not yet acquired their
final position in scientific semantics. And in so doing, this narrative of distinctive and pivotal moves minimises the potential significance that diverse molecular
conceptualisations might have had for the development of science, promulgating
the view that pre-Maxwellian molecular models were nothing more than barren
speculations.43
The extended use of a vocabulary of material particles is not difficult to prove.
Numerous instances have been preserved in the historical record which show that
the notion of molecularity created a shared discourse which cut across diverse
scientific fields, referred to all three states of matter, and suggested meaningful
explanations for scientists of different educational backgrounds.44 Even when molecules could not claim any higher position in the hierarchy of scientific notions
than that of speculations, they became equally important for great mathematical physicists like William Thomson,45 as for self-educated experimentalists like
George Gore,46 and engineers like John Scott Russell.47 And if the widely accepted mobility of gases could be easily justified through the mobility of smaller
parts,48 the gap between the macroscopic cohesion of liquids or the rigidity of
solid masses and the supposition of unobservable molecular mobility49 signified
an intellectual transformation which was not at all self-evident in the context of
nineteenth-century science. Neither did the state of knowledge of such fields as
geology50 and physiology51 require the introduction of sub-microscopic considerations for their further development at that period. And yet, molecules were there,
almost visible to scientists, even when these same scientists did not know with
absolute certainty what they were referring to. The frequent and free negotiation of
molecular representations of the unobservable level of physical reality, in parallel
with the existence of a strong rhetorical framework of empiricism throughout the
nineteenth century,52 poses an urgent and interesting question to the analyst of
scientific knowledge: if molecules were mere hypothetical constructions and if,
moreover, they were totally unnecessary for the development of formal theories,
why were they so frequently evoked by scientists? In other words, why did George

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Gabriel Stokes, just to mention the most provocative case, feel obliged to discuss
molecular interactions in a scientific paper which introduced and established a
successful macroscopic hydrodynamical theory, a theory which could be expressed
in mathematical equations for which no molecular view of matter was required?53
Historians and philosophers of science often discuss the importance of models
in the development of science in relation to the distinction between their realistic
and heuristic role. The former presupposes an ontological commitment on behalf
of the scientists as regards the ultimate level of physical reality, whereas the latter
stresses the fact that no such commitment was necessary and that these models
were, merely, tools for the composition of theoretical hypotheses which could
be experimentally tested.54 The discussion of the heuristic function of scientific
models has been especially important to historians who subscribe to the view of
the so-called British empiricism, because it provided an explanation for the, otherwise unintelligible, persistence of theoretical models of unobservable particles.55
According to this view, the subsequent experimental verification, at the level of
macroscopical phenomena, of theoretical views based on sub-microscopical models, validated, in the minds of the empirically-minded Britons, this brief diversion
from their own philosophical dicta.
However, this distinction cannot provide a sufficient understanding of the situation of molecular discourse as described above. As regards realism, apart from
the philosophical lacuna that Sign Goldstein has pointed out, namely that there is
no final way of checking any claim that scientists might make about the reality of
their models,56 there is no historical evidence, to my knowledge, that a discourse,
which attempted to validate or negate the ontological status of the material particle,
was of any significance to physicists, at least until the late nineteenth century. It is
very hard to find instances of explicit reference to the reality of molecules in the
scientific literature of that period, and hence, I find it highly restrictive to argue
that British scientists were either realists or anti-realists. On the contrary, one has
to realise the historicity of the discourse of realism itself.
As regards the heuristic value of molecular models, it must be understood that
this argument presupposes a conscious design of a two-step procedure, involving
the formulation of testable theories based on these models and the subsequent rigorous testing of these theories. This schema does not explain the historical material
examined in this paper. If we consider, for example, Thomas Tates experimental
work on the absorption of liquids by porous substances, we shall see that the
concept of molecularity was introduced, without further justification, as an explanation of the deviation between the observed and the expected values of certain
parameters. Tates assertion that, during the process of filtration, the filters undergo
a progressive molecular change57 was not accompanied either by a formal theory
or by a parallel formulation of testable predictions that his molecular hypothesis
suggested.
Tates attitude was not atypical. Quite the contrary: for the larger part of the
nineteenth century, discussions about the conditions of material molecularity were

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very rarely tied to formal theories. They constituted, rather, a parallel discourse
which cut across the main line of scientific arguments at certain very delicate
points, in order to explain away difficulties that the formal theories could not even
address. Stokes use of molecular conceptualisations, which has been mentioned
above, signifies one such instance: the development of the formal, mathematical
theory of hydrodynamics in the nineteenth century excluded, explicitly, a whole
range of observable phenomena, those concerning internal friction and viscosity.
These phenomena, Stokes argued, could not be understood without reference to the
molecular conditions of liquid matter.58
According to the view that scientific hypotheses nurture scientific imagination
and out of which theoretical views are being crystallised, one expects such molecular hypotheses to be part of the private contemplations of scientists. But the
appearance of molecular conceptualisations in the published papers, even when
these conceptualisation did not participate either in the mathematical formalism
or in the construction of testable predictions, produces, not infrequently, an embarrassment to certain historians. An even greater embarrassment is caused by the
fact that scientists were suggesting significantly different and, even, incompatible
molecular models, and that, for a long period of time, no attempt was made to
homogenise molecular terminology. For Foster molecules were spherical59 for
Richard Potter they were small cubes60 for Robert Mallet they were fibrous.61
Particles were considered as simple portions of mass implicitly taken as homogeneous by William Rankine,62 but they were complex systems of internal structure
for O. Richter.63 Thomas Graham believed that the crucial factor which affected
the rate of liquid transpiration was molecular magnitude,64 whereas John Tyndalls
experiments with magnetic and diamagnetic substances showed that the phenomena in question are not due to the shape of the molecules, but to their manner
of arrangement.65 James Challis envisaged a molecular theory of liquids, which
would take into account molecular forces,66 while for John Scott Russell the operative concept was molecular motion.67 This pluralism in the conceptualisations of
material molecularity was the most persistent characteristic of molecular discourse.
The degree to which this plurality of meanings causes a problem to a significant
part of the traditional historiography of science is apparent in the fact that certain
historians were led to assume that this was due to lack of communication among
scientists.68 Additionally, the fact that, for a long period of time there was neither
a consensus nor any attempt to arrive at a consensus regarding the inner structure
of particles cannot be given any intelligible explanation within the framework of
analysis which concentrates upon the procedure which aims at the stabilisation of
meaning of scientific concepts.69 Instead of attempting to elucidate and finalise
their views of the material particle, nineteenth-century molecularists were engaged
in a discourse, which was sufficiently fluid so as to encourage a multiplicity of
alternative conceptualisations.
The fact that this pluralistic discourse was not merely tolerated but actively
encouraged by scientists can be made more obvious if we consider Maxwells own

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views on the subject. In both his seminar papers, which are taken to be the most
formal articulation of molecular science in the nineteenth century, Maxwell insisted
on a multiple representation of the individual molecule. Hence, in 1860 he argued
that [i]nstead of saying that the particles are hard, spherical and elastic, we may if
we please say that the particles are centres of force,70 while in 1867 he repeated
that [t]hese molecules may be mere points, or pure centres of force, they may be
systems of several such centres of force bound together . . . if necessary, we may
suppose them to be small solid bodies.71 Even in the late 1880s William Thomson
would insist that he had put forward various suggestions . . . towards a Theory of
Matter but he has never settled any in his own mind.72

2.1. HISTORICAL RECORD AND EXPERIMENTS CONCERNING COGNITIVE


PROCESSES : A ONE - TO - ONE CORRESPONDENCE
In order to understand why leading scientists of the nineteenth century, like William
Thomson, could not settle their minds as to such serious matters, I shall now turn
to Allan Collins and Dedre Gentners experiments concerning ordinary peoples
understanding of certain molecular phenomena. In a preliminary study, Collins and
Gentner presented four subjects with eight questions concerning evaporation and
arrived at two very important results: first, that one subjects explanation involved
molecular models constructed by pasting together his models of how familiar objects behave,73 and second, that this subject could deal with given questions even
when his model was not correct. Collins and Gentner attempted to formalise the
different kinds of mental models that people use, and produced a classification of
macroscopic models, aggregate models and molecular models. At the second
phase of their research, they arrived, through an extended experiment, at two fairly
general conclusions: first, that by mapping down to the aggregate level people can
understand a macroscopic dependency in terms of a set of dependencies at the
aggregate level,74 and second, that people have many different kinds of models at
each level of analysis.75
The results of this investigation bear a striking similarity with the historical
situation of molecular discourse. First, the process of pasting together familiar
aspects of the world in order to envisage molecular interactions was frequently
encountered in the nineteenth century. Take, for example, the molecular model
which presupposed point masses interacting through their inherent forces to certain
distances, which were given the name spheres of action. This model is an intellectual construct which synthesises a perception of basic characteristic of physical
space (matter and empty space), elements of the established dynamical framework
of nineteenth-century science (the relation between motion and force), common
experience (repulsion internalised through observations on magnetic phenomena),
and previously established metaphysical beliefs (the belief in the existence of inherent forces in matter). In a similar way, Thomas Grahams explanation of liquid
transpiration: [w]hen one of these definite hydrates . . . is being forced through

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the capillary, it may be imagined that a small portion of the hydrate compound is
molecularly decomposed by friction,76 denotes actually a way of thinking which
synthesises knowledge about chemical decomposition and fluid friction into a
single model.
Second, the fact that the subjects understanding of given phenomena was not
hindered by lack of true knowledge of the ultimate structure of the individual
molecule also resonates with nineteenth-century evidence. William Thomsons ingenious conception of aetherial vortices in the 1860s had all the characteristics of
a successful theoretical construct: it could provide explanations both for physical
and for chemical phenomena, it could be put in mathematical language through
the framework of the hydrodynamics of perfect fluids, it resolved the philosophical
problem of circularity in the explanation of the elasticity of matter, and it could
be made experimentally visible.77 It was not a true representation of the individual
molecule after all, and it was eventually disproved. But, in the meantime, it encouraged a productive way of thinking about the dynamical interactions of vortices and
foster original research on the subject.78
Third, the fact that the same person may use many different models bears a
striking similarity with Maxwells pluralistic representation of the material particle
which was discussed earlier, an attitude which was, by no means, unique or idiosyncratic. Similar attitudes can be found, for example, in the case of James Prescott
Joule, who argued, in 1848, that we conceive the particles to be revolving round
one another, according to the hypothesis of Davy, or flying about in every direction according to Herapaths view,79 and also of John Scott Russell, whose
discussion of the sound wave, in 1844, introduced a series of possible, alternative
molecular transformations which could provide an intelligible explanation of this
phenomenon: a change in the form of the molecules of the liquid, or a change
of their density if they were supposed to be in contact, or even a change in the
intermolecular distances if they were not in contact.80
Fourth, Collins and Gentners categorisation of three kinds of models macroscopic, aggregate and molecular corresponds, largely, to the three levels of
physical reality that British scientists defined, namely, the level of phenomena, the
level of molecular interactions, and the level of the individual particle. The initial
coarse distinction between macroscopic and microscopic phenomena has been
an elegant but insufficient dualism for the analysis of the development of molecular
science.81 Major nineteenth-century texts and discussions aimed at a translation of
scientific results in molecular terms while, at the same time, they left untouched
all questions regarding the specificities of the structure of the individual particle.
We must now leave these speculations about the nature of molecules . . . and contemplate the material universe as made up of molecules, declared Maxwell in his
article on Atom, which can be safely regarded as the manifesto of nineteenthcentury molecular science.82 William Thomsons attempt to clarify the relation
between Maxwells molecular theory of gases and the much needed and difficult
to arrive at ultimate theory of matter, made it clear that the former constitutes just

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a first step towards the latter, and that the discussion concerning molecular conditions does not lie at the same level with the discussion concerning the molecule per
se.83
Lastly, Collins and Gentners observation that the establishment of some correspondence between dependencies at the macroscopic and the aggregate level
fulfilled some basic condition of understanding, resonates with one of the most
pronounced characteristics of nineteenth-century molecular discourse, namely the
establishment of causal links between what was observed and what those observations presupposed at the level of submicroscopic reality. Hence, liquid friction
was attributed to the sliding of molecules as one moves relatively to the other,84
electrolysis was understood in terms of the motion of ionised particles within the
mass of a solvent,85 the strain of a metallic bar was connected to the state of tension
or relaxation of the constituent particles,86 the structure of crystalline bodies was
envisaged as a spatial symmetrical arrangement of the individual molecules,87 the
directionality of certain phenomena was explained through the directionality of
molecular behaviour,88 expansion or contraction of masses presupposed molecular
mobility.89
It may seem paradoxical that nineteenth-century molecularists, as well as the
subjects of Collins and Gertners experiments, were not embarrassed by the incompatibility of their diverse molecular explanations. I believe that any attempt
to understand this attitude should take into consideration the fact that the question
posed to both groups was not a question about the individual molecule. If such were
the case, than, most probably, members of both groups would have felt obliged to
express a clear opinion true or false about the nature of the material particle. The
question posed to both groups concerned the explanation of certain macroscopic
phenomena.
This line of thought may shed some light, if further pursued, on the important
question concerning the role of coherence in a given discourse. Evidence from
the history of science suggests that coherence and the deduction of reasonable
conclusions operate within a given framework of analysis which determines central
questions that should be answered and basic restrictions that should be observed.
What is a molecule? the anonymous writer who set for himself this question
in the Popular Science Monthly, in 1881, left it unanswered, because molecular
science itself left it unanswered. Instead of turning to this question, the writer
chose to begin his presentation with the single, secure proposition of modern science, namely that every substance consists of an aggregation of extremely small
particles, which are called molecules,90 and then presented a significant number
of phenomena which were explicable in molecular terms, without ever attempting
to clarify the exact meaning of this concept.
Molecules could be anything for mid-nineteenth-century science. Even in the
most formal expression of molecular theorising, that of Maxwells kinetic theory
of gases, the nature and structure of the material particle was not directly addresses.
On the contrary, as Peter Harman accurately points out, the gradual elaboration of

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Maxwells theory was such that left open the question of the physical nature of
the molecules.91 As late as 1873, basic characteristics of the individual particles,
like absolute mass and diameter of molecules, as well as their number in a given
volume, were still undecided, as Maxwell clarified in his review of the field, in the
article on Molecules.92
This attitude did not make molecular discourse incoherent. Quite the opposite:
the determination of a minimal set of constraints ensured that molecular explanations did not disturb the established framework of dynamics. Notice that Maxwells
advocacy of molecular explanations was based on a two-step argument: first that
Our definition of a molecule is purely dynamical and second that [t]his kind of
reasoning [i.e. dynamical reasoning] . . . has a high degree of cogency.93,94 Years
later, talking at the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Horace
Lamb would say that what characterised the modern school of English physicists
was this attempt to make out . . . how much can be recognised as a manifestation
of general dynamical principles.95

3. Molecular Pictures Conditions of Intelligibility


As we have discussed above, molecular representations were adequately diversified
so as to encourage and sustain a pluralistic discourse about physical phenomena.
At the level of epistemic content, the requirements that this discourse should fulfil
were minimal: acceptance of the particulate nature of gross matter, establishment
of causal links between physical phenomena and underlying mechanisms, and submission of all molecular models to the requirements of the framework of dynamics.
By keeping the prerequisites at a minimum number, molecular discourse could
play an important role in the establishment of a broad consensus among scientists.
Genevive Paichelers review of studies in the psychology of group interaction
makes it obvious that the establishment of a consensus presupposes a sharing of
[the] same representations by both influencer and influenced . . . and their reference
to the same universe of meanings.96
No such broad consensus could be established for any specific molecular model
at the period under consideration, because it was obvious to scientists that at the
present state of knowledge a phrase which was often repeated during the nineteenth century and expressed the measured optimism of the scientific community
for the development of science any final suggestion concerning the structure of
the individual molecule would violate basic philosophical requirements. For, example, the fact that Stokes never attempted to work out a coherent molecular theory
of fluid motion, in spite of the fact that he frequently referred to the unobservable
level of reality, is interpreted, by David Wilson, as a sign of Stokes characteristic
attitude, a blend of caution and realism.97 According to this interpretation, it
was impossible for Stokes to subscribe to any final molecular model since it was
obvious, to him and to his peers, that a multiplicity of molecular hypotheses might
be true, in so far as none could be finally proved or disproved.

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Leaving aside, temporarily, all questions concerning the realistic content of their
models, scientists often linked molecular concepts with mental states, and in so
doing they established the notion of intelligibility as a central aim of scientific
investigation. William Grove, for example, in his Friday lecture at the Royal Institution on January 25, 1858, connected explicitly the conception of molecules with
a line of reasoning which leads the mind to regard the so-called imponderables as a
mode of motion with the ultimate goal of comprehending natural phenomena.98
In 1871, Peter Guthrie Tait expressed his conviction that this splendid suggestion
of Vortex-atoms, if it be correct, will enable us thoroughly to understand matter.99
William Thomson believed that Stokes elastic solids must when we understand
them properly, be recognised as properly packed crowds of vortices.100 George
Gore stated that a scientific investigation of electrolysis should aim at a more
clear understanding of the circuit and the circulation of the electric forces.101 In
1863, A. W. Williamson argued in a reverse form, saying that chemical formulae
[contrary to atomistic conceptions of chemical reactions] give no physical image
of the process by which the reaction is brought about.102 Scott Russell believed
that it is only by supposing some kind of molecular change that the existence of
such a wave [i.e. a sound wave] can be conceived to be possible.103
The suggestion that molecular discourse constituted, for many years, just a
way of thinking which infused intelligibility into scientific observations may seem
paradoxical. The notion of theory has been so catalytic in the interpretations
of scientific development that it is difficult to believe that the fluid and unstructured molecular discourse of the nineteenth century was of any significance to
science. And the emphasis put on mathematical results and on testable predictions
sometimes conceals that fact that, as Norwood Russell Hanson puts it, scientific
endeavour aims towards a conceptual pattern in terms of which . . . data will fit
intelligibly.104 The establishment of a closure which presupposes, among other
things, a broad consensus among the members of the scientific community about
the meaning of scientific terms, is indeed the final product of the process of doing
science. However, in the absence of conclusive evidence about the existence and
detailed nature of the individual molecule, no such closure could be produced for
a long time. Molecular discourse became an extended thought experiment of the
following form: what can we understand about physical phenomena if molecules
are billiard balls, elastic springs, aetherial vortices, etc.? What would the world be
like if molecules are in motion, if they rotate, if they vibrate, if they occupy stable
positions? Concepts like the incubation of ideas, the mental completion of notions referring to unobservable entities, or even what Crovits called the tinkering
with a model are more apt for understanding this situation.
In its etymological definition molecule was, merely, a small mass, a simple
notion that scientists could manipulate in their thought so as to subject it to a process of mental completion, utilising the evidence they had gathered from diverse
investigations. According to John Tyndall, who believed that imagination was a
faculty inherent in human mind, scientific investigation could reveal the unseen by

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437

prolonging the mental vision beyond the boundaries of sense, [until] we see [the]
atoms.105 The creation of pictures is frequently encountered in nineteenth-century
molecular discourse. One could, indeed, say that it was the essence of molecular
discourse, because it participated in the structure of the arguments: unless his audience could see that the particles of water describe certain curves, and not others, in
flowing past a solid immersed in water, William Rankine could not explain why he
preferred to construct his ships in accordance with the plane water-lines.106 The
construction of large and fast-moving vessels required an understanding of fluid
resistence which, in turn, required, among other things, that the engineer could
see how water particles slide over the surface of the ship and even to estimate,
approximately, what was their velocity relatively to the velocity of the ship.107
These mental pictures had a distinctive dynamical character: once introduced,
they gained autonomy and could be mentally modified in accordance to specific and
diverse requirements. During this process, scientists were synthesising different
aspects of reality into a single picture and set this picture in motion, so to speak, in
order to see what kind of meaningful extrapolations could be produced that would
make sense in the light of relevant observations. It was perfectly clear to Rankine
that the motion of a steady current in relation to a moving ship could not be actually
seen, but it could be represented to the eye and to the mind by means of a group
of stream-lines.108
The phrase the minds eye has been largely used by those thinkers who wished
to establish the significance of visual imagery in cognition,109 and has been ridiculed by those who believed that all knowledge is ultimately prepositional.110
Within psychology, these two approaches gave rise to a furious debate with strong
arguments and experimental support in both sides.111 The central issue in this debate concerns the format in which information is encoded in the brain. Imagists
argue that information is represented in the brain as a spatial arrangement; nonimagists argue that all information is encoded in a propositional format while the
creation of mental images is merely an epiphenomenon. However important the
question is in relation to the neurological basis of mental processes, for the purpose
of the present analysis it is sufficient to recognise the significance of visualisation
in the process of thinking, at a level where both sides agree images are indeed
created.112 Cases from the history of science113 and technology114 have established
the significance of visual thinking.
The problmatique of this area of study is obviously relevant to molecular discourse. Before mathematical formalism, before the emergence of testable theories,
before the establishment of an orthodoxy, molecules were mere pictures in the
minds of scientists in the dreams of scientists, William Crookes said.115 The
creation of such pictures was not antithetical to verbal thinking; molecular conceptualisations were not drawn but verbally described in scientific papers. Although
valuable, the distinction which some analysts attempt to establish between the
verbal and the visual is meaningless for the material presented in this paper.116
The creation of mental images within molecular science signified a moment of

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MARIA YAMALIDOU

concentration, a conscious effort to focus attention on what was observed, actually


to go beyond the level of physical vision, to reason and to articulate what could be
under the surface of phenomena, what could act under the surface of phenomena,
in order for these phenomena to be intelligible.
For major figures of the nineteenth century the intelligibility of molecular representations was almost self-evident. Maxwell, for example, argued that molecular
explanations were complete because they reduced phenomena to ideas, like configuration, motion, mass and force [which] . . . are so elementary that they cannot
be explained by means of anything else.117 This view resonates with William
Whewells philosophy of fundamental ideas which were supposed to be inherent
in the mind and reflected the existing harmony between the mind of God and the
mind of man.118 However, one should not underestimate the fact that the framework
of analysis which made the basic ideas of molecular discourse intelligible had a
long history in scientific thought and shaped in very specific ways the scientists
perception of the world: on the one hand, the unchallenged authority of Newton
ensured the validity of the dynamical framework of analysis; on the other hand, the
ancient idea of material particles came to the foreground and gained visibility, once
again, through the intense preoccupation of Victorians with Greek antiquity.119
Scientific ideas do not operate into a cultural vacuum. The pre-existing patterns of thought play an important role in the establishment of the self-evident
elements of science. The utility of molecular discourse can be understood also
in this light: during this process of mental manipulation of molecules, these
hypothetical constructs became familiar entities for scientists. According to Herbert Simon anything can become a symbol through repeated exposure to it, or
familiarisation.120 Gerald Holton argues that when a certain picture recurs in
many situations, it becomes an ordering element, a concept.121 Also, certain ideas,
which have emerged in the context of anthropological studies, can be applied in
the situation of molecular discourse. Hence, Mary Douglas approach which focuses on the role of exemplars, whose properties are collectively agreed and whose
learning actually constitutes a community,122 and Godfrey Lienhardts model of
cognition based on repeated enactement of exemplars, are crucially significant at
this point.123
According to such views it is not difficult to understand that molecular discourse
constituted a process of familiarisation to which scientists were exposed and which
established molecule as a symbol in scientific semantics. Given the situation as
described in this paper, given the absence of any conclusive evidence about the
inner structure of the individual particle, the frequent appearance of molecular
explanations prepared the scientific community to accept, later, an ontology of
electrons. From this perspective Erwin Hieberts conclusion that [t]he fundamental
significance of the corpuscular theory of matter for physics came about only after
the discovery of the electric atom (the electron)124 is also understandable.

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439

4. Conclusion
In this paper I attempted to understand the cognitive dimension of nineteenthcentury molecular discourse. In the light of the view that science is not confined in
mathematical equations and rational deductions, but it has something to do with the
construction of intelligible accounts of phenomena and the production of meaning
for the physical world, it has been argued that, for a long period of time, the basic
operation of molecular representations was to infuse intelligibility into scientific
explanations by introducing causal links between the level of phenomena and that
of underlying mechanisms, by generating possible pictures of the unseen level of
physical reality, and by creating the conditions of an extended thought experiment
which examined alternative possibilities. For the investigation of such issues the
available historical narratives are not sufficient. Beyond the question of rational
choices, beyond strict categories established in the philosophy of science, beyond
even the sociologists attempt to connect dogmatic adherence to certain scientific
ideas with the promotion of specific social interests, the relatively new field of
the psychology of science encourages the historian to seek something meaningful
in the unstructured but tolerant consideration of molecularity, in the free dialogue
of scientists which lay outside the formal theoretical-mathematical framework of
science.
Expressing a strong belief that this kind of synthetic approach to the investigation of processes of thinking which, potentially, could be of great value to science
education, I shall attempt in this concluding section, to sketch some possible routes
which will bring the above analysis to bear upon the situation that pupils face when
they are first introduced to basic concepts of physics. And in order to do so, I shall
use the curriculum of physics in Greek grammar school as a case study.
For molecular science, the extrapolation from the historical situation into contemporary Greek classroom is, I believe, permissible, not so much because of the
correspondence that some analysts attempt to establish between the unmediated
understanding of pupils and some obsolete scientific beliefs, but because the introduction of molecular ideas in the Greek curriculum of physics have specific
similarities with nineteenth-century molecular discourse. First, the presentation of
various aspects of molecular activity in the grammar-school curriculum is equally
sporadic and fluid as it was in the nineteenth century. Second, molecular representations are evoked both in teaching and in molecular discourse precisely when some
measure of physical understanding of the examined phenomena is required. Third,
the ultimate structure of the individual molecule is not a prerequisite of molecular
explanations of physical phenomena in either setting.125
Given the requirement for some basic understanding of the submicroscopic
behaviour of matter, and given the fact that the investigation of the ultimate structure of matter, as it is now understood by physicists, is beyond the capacity of
young children, grammar-school textbooks limited the scope of teaching mostly
to that level of molecular activity which was addresses by nineteenth-century mo-

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lecular discourse: electrolysis,126 diffusion,127 cohesion,128 adhesion,129 chemical


composition,130 motion of liquid currents.131 This presentation is indeed highly
unstructured: various pieces of information are scattered in various chapters; no
attempt is ever made to unite these partial evidence into a coherent picture.
According to Konstantinos Tzanakis meticulous analysis of the Greek
grammar-school curriculum of physics, this unstructured presentation of the submicroscopic realm is highly problematic mainly because no experiment which
could provide evidence for the existence of molecules can be performed at the level
we are referring to [i.e. 5th and 6th grade of grammar school].132 Gaining support
from various studies which highlight the fact that pupils do not internalise easily the
basics of the particulate nature of matter, Tzanakis argues that it is not at all obvious that such a reductionist presentation of physical phenomena is paedagogically
sound. However, it is significant to notice, at this point, that the paedagogical role
of molecular concepts was the most powerful argument of molecularists against
the scepticists attacks, which took a most combative form toward the end of the
nineteenth century.133
We may resolve this apparent paradox if we consider the philosophical presuppositions and the kind of historical interpretations which inform the view
that molecular concepts are difficult for the pupils to grasp. First, both Arnold
B. Arons conclusion that students should be allowed to doubt with the early
participants, and to articulate uneasiness about interpretation of some of the
evidence concerning the atomic-molecular picture,134 and Tzanakis assertion
that the atomic structure of matter . . . constituted a central point of intense or
even extravagant scientific and philosophical debates135 seem to be based upon
earlier interpretations of what has been called the anti-atomic feelings of nineteenth century.136 Based upon partial evidence regarding great anti-atomists of
the nineteenth century, these interpretations underestimated the significance of a
large corpus of nineteenth-century studies which actually presupposed the existence of material particles. More recent historical interpretations have qualified the
significance and extent of the doubts expressed about the existence of material
particles.137
Second, Joseph Nussbaums observation, that it is important for teachers to
realise that molecular concepts are theoretical constructs based upon hypotheses
which lay beyond direct perception,138 is significant but misplaced, in so far as
most basic physical concepts, which are taught in grammar school, cannot be directly perceived. In spite of the fact that physics curricula often adopt the rhetoric
of empiricism, putting into a prominent position experimental results and direct
measurements, the conceptual content of science, even at the grammar-school level,
is highly theoretical. Energy, electrical charge, field are equally unobservable
and equally important for the teaching of physics as molecules are. On the other
hand, the most tangible thing of all, mass cannot be given any proper scientific
explanation,139 and it is left to be understood gradually through the examination of
various phenomena.140

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441

At some very basic level all science has to do with the unobservable and,
instead of demonising certain concepts, it may be more productive to seek a method
of presentation which could make the unobservable intelligible. John Tyndall put
this view in the most elegant form when he argued that a central goal of science is
to enable us by means of the tangible . . . to apprehend the intangible.141 And his
imaginative lectures were so exciting exactly because he promised to his audience
a journey towards the unknown: I wished . . . to take you beyond the boundary
of mere observation, into a region where things are intellectually discerned, he
said.142
The distinction between realism and scepticism which is, frequently, put forward, in order to understand scientific attitudes towards the hidden aspects of
the world, is one of those familiar dualisms which haunts various intellectual
discourses. Beyond realism and scepticism, the attitude of nineteenth-century molecularists can assist us in understanding what it means to suspend judgement.
When Tyndall presented his views about the nature of heat he made it clear that
the great point, at present, is to regard it as motion of some kind, leaving its more
precise character to be dealt with in the future.143 The same view echoes in the
writings of Maxwell who admitted that [e]very hot body, therefore, is in motion
just to add, immediately afterwards, that [w]e have next to inquire into the nature
of this motion.144 This perception of a dynamic transformation of the matrix of
science, which was very clear to the participants of the rapidly evolving nineteenthcentury science, should be made explicit to young pupils for various reasons: first,
it will assist them to understand the complex reality of scientific practice; second,
it will provide some easily understood notion of the ethics of scientific activity
which involves, among other things, openness to future re-examination or even
falsification of established views; and third, it will make their basic experience
in science education, namely the gradually expanding area of investigation in
consecutive levels of study, intelligible. Such a presentation of science, not as a
final and rigid body of irrefutable knowledge, but as a process which enhance our
awareness both of physical phenomena and of our own limitations to comprehend
them, will resolve a serious problem in the teaching of molecular phenomena which
has been identified by Tzanakis, namely the identification, on behalf of pupils, of
the provisional molecular pictures, which are introduced as a means to understand
macroscopic phenomena, with the ultimate structure of matter.145
I believe that once this basic understanding is achieved, educationists may wish
to look deeper into the way of thinking suggested by nineteenth-century molecularists in order to investigate what it means for something to be easily understood
and what are the specific conditions which make it easily understood. For example, Joseph Nussbaums investigation showed that 14-years-old pupils cannot
internalise, to the same degree, the 5 specific propositions of the particulate model
of gases; the best understood proposition concerns the existence of unobservable
molecules.146 If we turn, now, to the historical record, we shall realise that this is
not a peculiar phenomenon. Maxwell, the scientist who established this model, as-

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MARIA YAMALIDOU

serted that the sole proposition which constitutes the molecular theory of matter is
[t]he doctrine that visible bodies consist of a determinate number of molecules.147
The acceptance of this doctrine created a language and a way of thinking, in other
words it created the intellectual conditions which enabled scientists to translate
macroscopic phenomena into molecular terms. According to Maxwell, through this
basic molecular understanding of matter [w]e have now arrived at a conception
of a body,148 and not at any final description of the specific structure of matter.
This would be the result of a long process which involves mental manipulation of
the available data, instruments, and techniques, negotiation of different meanings,
active thinking, and the production of meaningful and testable deductions.
If the above analysis of parallelisms and similarities between the historical
situation of nineteenth-century molecular discourse and the teaching of the basic
concepts of physics in grammar school is meaningful, a set of questions should
be properly investigated. To what extent, for example, should grammar-school
pupils be exposed to molecular discourse in order to be able to become familiar
with these difficult unobservable interactions? A number of phenomena which
encourage easy and elegant molecular conceptualisations temperature, expansion
and contraction of gases, friction, energy conservation are put into an entirely
macroscopic framework, even though they are introduced after the discussion of
the molecular structure of matter in the textbook for the 5th grade of the Greek
grammar school. Would it not be, perhaps, more fruitful to let grammar-school
pupils play for some time with certain basic ideas of the molecular framework
before we present to them the true picture of a molecule?149 Is it not, perhaps,
more significant for pupils to be allowed to explore possible causal links between
phenomena and underlying mechanisms by giving them the time to realise the limitations of their erroneous suggestions? Lastly, since no final experimental proof
concerning the ultimate structure of matter can be presented to grammar-school
pupils, would it not be meaningful, from an educational perspective, to explore
the significance of the specific mode of justification established by nineteenthcentury molecular discourse, a mode of justification which brought together pieces
of evidence from diverse fields of research in order to make obvious that molecular
notions can produce coherent explanations?
Given the fact that pupils bring into their explanations some commonsensical or
even idiosyncratic modes of thinking,150 given the fact that these improper explanations are persistent and cannot be easily overthrown through a mere exposition
of true, scientific conclusions, it may be worth examining whether the creation,
in the classroom, of a situation which resembles the fluid discourse of nineteenthcentury molecularists facilitates the process of intellectual transformation which is
the aim of science education.

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443

Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
for the post-doctoral research grant which enabled me to complete this work.

Notes
1 Peter Gay, Freud for Historians (Oxford, 1985).
2 William McKinley Runyan, in Life Histories and Psychobiography. Explorations in Theory and

Method (Oxford, 1984).


3 See, for example, J. Cattell, A Statistical Study of Eminent Men, Popular Science Monthly (February 1953): 359377; R.B. Cattell and I.E. Drevdahl, Comparison of the Personality Profiles of
Eminent Researchers with Those of Eminent Teachers and Administrators and the General Population, British Journal of Psychology 46 (1955): 248261; A. Roe, A Psychological Study of
Eminent Biologists, Psychological Monographs 65 (1951): 168; idem., A Psychological Study of
Eminent Psychologists and Anthropologists, and a Comparison with Biologists and Physical Scientists, Psychological Monographs 67 (1953); L.M. Bachtold, Women, Eminence and Carrer-Value
Relationships, Journal of Social Psychology 95 (1975): 187192; Doris B. Wallace, Giftedness
and the Construction of a Creative Life, in F.D. Horowitz and M. OBrien (eds.), The gifted and
talented: Developmental perspectives (Washington, 1985); D.N. Jackson and J.P. Rushton (eds.),
Scientific Excellence: Origins and assessment (Newbury Park, 1987).
4 See Thomas A. Kohut, Psychohistory as History, The American Historical Review 91 (1986):
336354, on p. 337.
5 J.L. Chambers, Relating Personality and Biographical Factors to Scientific Creativity, Psychological Monographs 78 (1964): 120; I.I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science (Amsterdam, 1974),
R.K. Merton, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, American Scholar 38 (1969): 197225; M.B. Parloff
& L. Datta, Personality Characteristics of the Potentially Creative Scientists, in J.H. Masserman
(ed.), Science and Psychoanalysis, Vol. 7, (New York, 1965), in pp. 91106; C.S. Fisher, Some
Social Characteristics of Mathematicians and Their Work, American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973):
10941118; L.E. Datta, Family Religious Background and Early Scientific Creativity, American
Sociological Review 32 (1967): 626635; L.V. Blankenship, The Scientist as Apolitical Man ,
British Journal of Psychology 24 (1973): 269287; R. Helson, Sex Differences in Creative Style,
Journal of Personality 35 (1967): 214233; J. Joesting, The Influence of Sex Roles on Creativity in
Women, Gifted Child Quarterly 19 (1975): 336339.
6 R. Fisch, Psychology of Science, in K.D. Knorr-Certina (ed.), Science, Technology and Society
(Dordrecht, 1980), pp. 277318.
7 See, Ronald N. Giere, Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.),
Cognitive Models of Science (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992), pp. xvxxviii.
8 Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science; A cognitive approach (The University of Chicago press,
Chicago and London, 1988), on p. 1.
9 William R. Shadish Jr. & Robert A. Neimeyer, Contribution of Psycology to an Integrative Science
Studies: The Shape of Things to Come, in The Cognitive Turn; Sociological and Psychological
Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 1338, on p. 13.
10 Howard E. Gruber, G. Terrell & M. Wertheimer (eds.), Contemporary approaces to creative
thinking (New York, 1962); Howard E. Gruber, Crativit et fonction constructiive de la rptition, Bulletin de Psychologie de la Sorbonne 30 (1976): 235; R.J. Sternberg (ed.), The nature of
creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); Doris B. Wallace &
Howard E. Gruber, Creative People at Work (Oxford, 1989).
11 Nancy Nersessian, Constructing and Instructing: The Role of Abstraction techniques in Creating and Learning Physics, in Richard A. Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton (eds.), Philosophy of

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MARIA YAMALIDOU

Science, Cognitive psychology, and Educational Theory and Practice (New York, 1992), pp. 4868,
on p. 53.
12 David Gooding, Experiment and the Making of meaning; Human Agency in Scientific Observation
and Experiment (Dordrecht, 1990), on p. 25.
13 Thomas H. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1961).
14 Ronald N. Giere, Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive
Models of Science (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. xvxxviii.
15 Nancy Nersessian, Constructing and Instructing: The Role of Abstraction techniques in Creating and Learning Physics, in Richard A. Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton (eds.) Philosophy of Science,
Cognitive psychology, and Educational Theory and Practice (State University of New York Press.
1992), pp. 4868.
16 Michelene, T. H. Chi, Conceptual Change within and across Ontological Categories: Examples
from Learning and Discovery in Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 129186.
17 Ronald N. Giere, The Units of Analysis of Science Studies, in The Cognitive Turn; Sociological
and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 311.
18 Ronald N. Giere, The Cognitive Strucutre of Scientific Theories, Philosophy of Science 61
(1994): 276296.
19 P.N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge, 1983).
20 See Nancy Nersessian, How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change
in Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 344; also Nancy J. Nersessian, Should Physicists Preach What They
Practice?, Science & Education 4 (1995): 203226.
21 David Gooding, Experiment and the Making of meaning; Human Agency in Scientific Observation
and (Dordrecht, 1990).
22 Doubts about the usefulness of such an approach have been expressed, for example, by Steve
Woolgar, Representation, cognition and self: What hope for an integration of psychology and sociology, in The Cognitive Turn; Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht,
1989), pp. 201224.
23 Terry Shinn, Cognitive Process and Social practices: Experimental macroscopic Physics, in The
Cognitive Turn; Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 119
150, on p. 119.
24 Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science; An Introduction (London, 1962), on p. 138.
25 T. C. Chamberlin, The Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses, Science 15 (1890): 9296.
26 William R. Shadish Jr. & Robert A. Neimeyer, Contribution of Psycology to an Integrative Science Studies: The Shape of Things to Come, in The Cognitive Turn; Sociological and Psychological
Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 1338, on p. 17.
27 Nancy J. Nersessian, Should Physicists Preach What They Practice?, Science & Education 4
(1995): 203226, on p. 208.
28 Howard E. Gruber & P.H. Barrett, Darwin on Man; A Psychological Study of Scientific Creativity;
excerpt published in Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty, Clifford Mynatt, On Scientific Thinking
(New York, 1981), pp. 340354, on p. 342.
29 Johan de Kleer, Multiple Representations of Knowledge in a Mechanics Problem-solver, Proceedings of the 5th international Joint Conference on scientific Intelligence (1977): 299304, on p.
299.
30 See David Gooding, Experiment and the Making of Meaning; Human Agency in Scientific
Observation and Experiment (Dordrecht, 1990), on page 108.
31 Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford Mynatt, On Scientific Thinking (New York,
1981), on p. 285.

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32 Nancy Nersessian, How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in

Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 344, on
p. 24.
33 Arthur I. Miller, Imagery and Meaning, The Cognitive Science Connection, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1991): 3548; Arthur I. Miller, Imagery in Scientific Thought:
Creating 20th-century Physics (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
34 Michael J. Webb, Analogies and their Limitations, School Science and Mathematics 85 (1985):
645650.
35 Nancy Nersessian suggests a reverse hierarchy arguing that imagistic reasoning is a species of
analogical reasoning; see Nancy Nersessian, How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of
Conceptual Change in Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis,
1992).
36 Michael Matthews provides a review of the historical developments which brought about this
change and provides a valuable and comprehensive bibliography: Michael R. Matthews, History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching, Synthese 80 (1989): 17; Michael R. Matthews, History,
Philosophy and Science Teaching: A Bibliography, Synthese 80 (1989): 185195.
37 See, for example, Michelene, T.H. Chi, Conceptual Change Within and Across Ontological Categories: Examples from Learning and Discovery in Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive
Models of Science (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 129186.
38 See for example, Susan Carey, The Origin and Evolution of Everyday Concepts, in Ronald N.
Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 89128.
39 For the implications of this phenomenon in the interconnection of history of science and cognitive science see William R. Shadish Jr. & Robert A. Neimeyer, Contribution of Psycology to an
Integrative Science Studies: The Shape of Things to Come, in The Cognitive Turn; Sociological and
Psychological Perspectives on Science (Dordrecht, 1989), pp. 1338.
40 Nancy Nersessian, How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in
Science, in Ronald N. Giere (ed.), Cognitive Models of Science (Minneapolis, 1992), pp. 344, on
p. 40.
41 See for example Stephen G. Brush, Statistical Physics and the Atomic Theory of Matter, from
Boyle and Newton to Landau and Onsager (New Jersey, 1983).
42 See, for example, Robert Loqueneux, Bernard Maitte & Bernard Pourprix, Les statuts epistemologiques des modeles de la theorie des gas dans les uvres de Maxwell et Boltzmann, Fundamenta
Scienti 4 (1983): 2954; Stephen G. Brush, The Development of the Kinetic Theory of Gases
III. Clausius, Annals of Science 14 (1958): 185196; Eric Mendoza, The Kinetic theory of matter
18451855, Archives International dHistoire des Sciences 32 (1982): 184220; Elizabeth Garber,
Clausiuss and Maxwells Kinetic Theory of Gases, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 2
(1970): 299312.
43 Donald Franklin Moyer, Continuum Mechanics and Field Theory: Thomson and Maxwell, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 9 (1978), 3550; idem., Energy, Dynamics, Hidden
Machinery: Rankine, Thomson and Tait, Maxwell, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 8
(1977), 251268.
44 On the extent and significance of molecular discourse for nineteenth-century British scientists see
Maria Yamalidou, Thinking in molecular terms; British science around the middle of the nineteenthcentury (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis; University of Lancaster, September 1996).
45 William Thomson referred to the essential conditions of any molecular theory of matter in Note
on Gravity and Cohesion [1862], Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 4 (18571862):
604606.
46 George Gore, On the Molecular Properties of Antimony [abstract], Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London 9 (1857): 707; idem., On a Momentary Molecular Change in Iron Wire,
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 17 (18681869): 260265; idem., On the Molecular
Movements and Magnetic Changes in Iron etc. at different Temperatures, Philosophical Magazine

446

MARIA YAMALIDOU

(4th series), 40 (1870): 170177; idem., Mechanical Energy of Molecules of Gases, Philosophical
Magazine (5th Series), 37 (1895): 340 and 508.
47 John Scott Russells work on the behaviour of liquids is permeated by diverse molecular conceptualisations. See, for example, John Scott Russell, Report on Waves, Report BAAS 14th Meeting
(York, September 1844), pt. 1, pp. 311390; idem., The Modern System of Naval Architecture, Vol.
1 (London, 1865), especially the paragraph entitled Molecular effect of wave motion, on p. 175;
John Scott Russell & John Robinson, Report of the Committee on Waves, Report BAAS 7th Meeting
(Liverpool, September 1837), pt. 1, pp. 417496.
48 See, for example, Graham, Thomas, On the Molecular Mobility of Gases, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1863): 385405.
49 On the internal mobility of liquids and solids see, for example, George Gabriel Stokes, On the
Theories of the Internal Friction of Fluids in Motion, and of the Equilibrium and Motion of Elastic
Solids [1845], Transactions of Cambridge Philosophical Society 8 (1849): 287319 and Robert
Warrington, On a Re-arrangement of the Molecules of a Body after solidification, Philosophical
Magazine (3rd Series), 20 (1842): 537539.
50 Robert Mallet, On the Relation of Molecular Forces to Geology, Journal of the Geological
Society of Dublin 3 (1844): 2346.
51 See, for example, John Hughes Bennett, On the Molecular Theory of Organization [1861],
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 4 (18571862]: 436446.
52 On the rhetorical function of empiricist language see Richard Yeo, An Idol of the Market-place:
Baconianism in 19th-century Britain, History of Science 23 (1985): 251298.
53 George Gabriel Stokes, On the Theories of the Internal Friction of Fluids in Motion, and of the
Equilibrium and Motion of Elastic Solids [1845], Transactions of Cambridge Philosophical Society
8 (1849): 287319.
54 On the heuristic role of models in science see also: Mary Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference (London; 1974); Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, 1970); Michael
Redhead, Models in Physics, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (1980): 145
163; R.B. Braithwaite, Models in the Empirical Sciences, in Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes & Alfred
Tarski (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Stanford California, 1962); Wilfrid
Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield Illinois, 1967).
55 See Kostas Gavroglu, Reaction of the British Physicists and Chemists to van der Waalss Early
Work, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 20 (1990): 239; see also Kostas Gavroglu,
Differences in Style as a Way of Probing the Context of Discovery, Philosophica 45 (1990): 5375.
56 Sign B.B. Goldstein, The Concept and the Significance of the Model in Physics (Unpublished
Ph.D Thesis; Columbia University, 1969), on p. 137.
57 Thomas Tate, Experimental Researches on the Laws of Absorption of Liquids by Porous
Substances. II. On the Filtration of Liquids through different Porous Substances, Philosophical
Magazine (4th Series), 21 (1861): 5765 and 115120, on p. 117.
58 On the significance of molecular conceptualisations in hydrodynamics, see Maria Yamalidou,
Molecular Ideas in Hydrodynamics, Annals of Science 552 (1998): 369400.
59 Foster, On Molecular Constitution of Crystals, Philosophical Magazine (4th Series), 1 (1851):
108115
60 See Samuel Haughton, Remarks on Professor Potters Theory of Sound, Philosophical Magazine
(4th series), 1 (1851): 332334, on p. 334; emphasis added. On Poissons cuboidal molecule see Ivor
Grattan-Guinness, Convolutions in French Mathematics, 18001840, Vol. 1 (Basel, 1990), on pp.
462465.
61 Robert Mallet, On the Molecular Constitution of the Metals of Ordnance, as Affecting its Construction and Its Wear in Service, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (1858): 167206,
on p. 185.

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447

62 William J. M. Rankine, On the Mathematical Theory of Stream- Lines, Especially Those with

Four Ffoci and Upwards, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 18 (1870): 207209, on p.
207.
63 O. Richter, On the Chemical and Physical Principles in Connexion with the Specific Gravity of
Liquid and Solid Substances, Report BAAS 33rd Meeting (August and September 1863), pt. 2, pp.
5455, on p. 54.
64 Thomas Graham, On Liquid Transpiration in Relation to Chemical Composition, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1861): 372386, on p. 384.
65 John Tyndall, On Poissons Theoretic Anticipation of magnecrystallic Action, Report BAAS
22nd meeting (Belfast, September 1852), pt. 2, pp. 20-21, on p. 21; emphasis added.
66 James Challis, Report on the Present State of the Analytical Theory of Hydrostatics and
Hydrodynamics, Report BAAS 3rd Meeting (Cambridge, 1833), pt. 1, pp. 131151, on p. 131.
67 John Scott Russell, The Modern System of Naval Architecture, Vol. 1 (London, 1865), on p. 176.
68 See Eric Mendoza, The Kinetic Theory of Matter 1845-1855, Archives International dHistoire
des Sciences 32 (1982): 184220.
69 On the process of stabilization of meaning in Michael Faradays work see David Gooding, Experiment and the Making of Meaning; Human Agency in Scientific Observation and Experiment
(Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1990).
70 James Clerk Maxwell, Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of Gases, reprinted in W.D. Niven
(ed.), The Scientific papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 377409, on p.
378.
71 James Clerk Maxwell, On the Dynamical Theory of Gases, reprinted in W. . Niven (ed.), The
Scientific papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 2678, on p. 33.
72 In a letter of William Thomson quoted in Silvanus P. Thompson, The Life of William Thomson
Baron Kelvin of Largs, 2 vols. (London, 1910), Vol. 2, on p. 1104; emphasis added.
73 Allan Collins & Dedre Gentner, Constructing Runnable Mental Models, Proceedings of the 4th
Annual Cognitive Science Society (1982): 8689, on p. 88.
74 Allan Collins & Dedre Gentner, Multiple Models and Evaporation Processes, Proceedings of the
5th Annual Cognitive Science Society (1983): 15, on p. 3.
75 Ibid., on p. 5.
76 Thomas Graham, On Liquid Transpiration in Relation to Chemical Composition, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London (1861): 372386, on p. 384.
77 On the reception of Thomsons vortex atom see Robert H. Silliman, William Thomson: Smoke
Rings and Nineteenth-century Atomism, ISIS 54 (1981): 461474.
78 In 1882, J.J. Thomson attempted to provide a vortex theory of chemical combination in an essay
for which he was awarded the Adams Prize. J.J. Thomson, A Treatise on the Motion of Vortex Rings
(London, 1883).
79 James Prescott Joule, On the Mechanical Equivalent of Heat and on the Constitution of Fluids,
Report BAAS 18th Meeting (Swansea, August 1848), pt. 2, pp. 21-22.
80 John Scott Russell, Report on Waves, Report BAAS 14th Meeting (York, September 1844), pt. 1,
pp. 311390.
81 Nineteenth-century scientists were aware of the fact that molecules lie far beyond the reach of the
microscope see John Tyndall, Optical Deportment of the Atmosphere in Relation to Putrefaction
and Infection [1876], in John Tyndall, Essays on the Floating-Matter of the Air in Relation to
Putrefaction and Infection (2nd edition; London, 1883), pp. 45129, on p. 76.
82 James Clerk Maxwell, Atom [1875], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The Scientific Papers of James
Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 445484, on p. 477.
83 William Thomson, Steps Towards a Kinetic Theory of Matter, Report BAAS 54th Meeting
(1884), pt. 2, pp. 613622, on p. 616.

448

MARIA YAMALIDOU

84 George Gabriel Stokes, On the Theories of the Internal Friction of Fluids in Motion, and of the

Equilibrium and Motion of Elastic Solids [1845], Transactions of Cambridge Philosophical Society
8 (1849): 287319.
85 George Gore, A Deductive View of Electro-metallic Deposition, Pharmaceutical Journal 13
(1854): 471478.
86 James Thomson, On the Strength of Materials, as Influenced by the Existence or Nonexistence of Certain Mutual Strains Among the Particles Composing Them, Cambridge and Dublin
Mathematical Journal 3 (1848): 252258, on p. 252.
87 James D. Dana, On Molecular Constitution of Crystals, Philosophical Magazine (4th series), 10
(1855): 329; T. Foster, On Molecular Constitution of Crystals, Philosophical Magazine (4th series),
10 (1855): 108115; Nevil Story Maskelyne, On the Insight Hitherto Obtained into the Nature of
the Crystal Molecule by the Instrumentality of Light [1859], in William Lawrence Bragg & George
Porter (eds.), The Royal Institution Library of Science, Vol. 1 (Barking-Essex, 1970), pp. 293304.
88 John Tyndall, On Molecular Influences. Part I. Transmission of Heat through Organic Structures,
Philosophical Magazine (4th series), 6 (1853): 121138.
89 M.D. Norris, On Certain Molecular Changes Which Occur in Iron and Steel During the Separate
Acts of Heating and Cooling, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 26 (1877): 127133.
90 What is a Molecule?, Popular Science Monthly (1881): 688693. The paper was reproduced for
Chambers Journal 58 (1881): 298300.
91 Peter M. Harman, The Natural Philosophy of James Clerk Maxwell (Cambridge, 1998), on p. 178.
92 Ibid., on p. 180.
93 James Clerk Maxwell, Atom [1875], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The Scientific Papers of James
Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 445484, on p. 456.
94 See Brush, Stephen G., The Kind of Motion We Call Heat, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1976); idem.,
Statistical Physics and the Atomic Theory of Matter, from Boyle and Newton to Landau and Onsager
(New Jersey, 1983); idem.
95 Horace Lamb, Address to Section A. Mathematical and Physical Science, in Report BAAS 74th
Meeting (Cambridge, August 1904), pt. 2, pp. 421432, on p. 423.
96 Genevive Paicheler, The Psychology of Social Influence (English translation; Cambridge, 1988),
on p. 208.
97 David B. Wilson, Kelvin & Stokes. A Comparative Study in Victorian Physics (Bristol, 1987), on
p. 110.
98 W.R. Grove, Inferences from the Negation of Perpetual Motion, in William Lawrence Bragg
& George Porter (eds.), The Royal Institution of Science; Being the Friday Evening Discourses in
Physical Sciences held at the Royal Institution: 18511939, Vol. 1 (Barking Essex, 1970), pp. 180
187, on p. 187.
99 Peter Guthrie Tait, Address to the Mathematical and Physical Section of the British Association,
Report BAAS 41st Meeting (Edinburgh, August 1871), pt. 2, 18; emphasis added.
100 Thomson to Stokes, 19 December 1872, in David B. Wilson (ed.), The Correspondence between
Sir George Gabriel Stokes and Sir William Thomson, Baron Kelvin of Largs, 2 vols. (Cambridge,
1990), Vol. 2, on p. 379; emphasis added.
101 George Gore, Inductive View of Electro-metallic Deposition, Pharmaceutical Journal 13
(1854): 2128, on p. 27; emphasis added.
102 See for example A.W. Williamson, Address by the President of the Chemical Section, Report
BAAS 33rd Meeting (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, AugustSeptember, 1863), pt. 2, pp. 2832, on p. 28;
emphasis added.
103 John Scott Russell, Report on Waves, Report BAAS 14th Meeting (York, September 1844), pt.
1, pp. 311390, on p. 382; emphasis added.
104 Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of
Science (Cambridge, 1958); excerpts reprinted in Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford
Mynatt, On Scientific Thinking (New York, 1981), pp. 305312, on p. 307.

MOLECULAR REPRESENTATIONS

449

105 John Tyndall, Comparative View of the Cleavage of Crystals and State Rocks, Philosophical

Magazine (4th Series), 12 (1856): 3548, on p. 35; emphasis added. On the significance of molecular representations for Tyndalls work see Maria Yamalidou, John Tyndall, the Rhetorician of
Molecularity, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 53 (1999): 231242 and 319331.
106 William J. M. Rankine, On Plane Water-lines in Two Dimensions, Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society of London 154 (1864): 369391.
107 William J. M. Rankine, On the Resistance of Ships, Report BAAS 32nd Meeting (1862): pt. 2,
pp. 263264, on p. 263.
108 William J. M. Rankine, On the Mathematical Theory of Stream-lines, Especially Those with
Four Foci and Upwards, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 18 (1870): 207209, on p. 207.
109 Stephen M. Kosslyn & Pierre Jolicoeur, A Theory-Based Approach to the Study of Individual
Differences in Mental Imagery, in Richard E. Snow, Pat-Anthony Federico & William E. Montague,
Aptitude, Learning, and Instruction, Vol. 2 (Hillsdale, 1980), pp. 139175.
110 Pylyshyn is one of the most strong advocates of the latter position; see Z.W. Pylyshyn, What
the Minds Eye Tells the Minds Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery, Psychological Bulletin 80
(1973): 124.
111 See Glyn W. Humphreys & Vicki Bruce, Visual Cognition; Computational, Experimental and
Neuropsychological Perspectives (Hove, 1991), Chapter 6; Pavio, Allan & Yarmey, A. Dan, Pictures Versus Words as Stimuli and Responses in Paired-associate Learning, Psychonomics Science
5 (1966): 235236; Collins, Alan & Gentner, Dedre, How People Construct Mental Models, in
Holland, Dorothy & Quinn Naomi (eds.), Cultural models in language (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 242
265; Kosslyn, Stephen M. & Jolicoeur, Pierre, A Theory-Based Approach to the Study of Individual
Differences in Mental Imagery, in Richard E. Snow, Pat-Anthony Federico & William E. Montague,
Aptitude, Learning, and Instruction, Vol. 2 (Hillsdale, 1980), pp. 139175.
112 Johnson-Laird wishes to place function and not coding at the center of the discussion; see P.N.
Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge, 1983), on p. 153.
113 Roger N. Shepard, The Mental Image, American Psychologist, Vol. 33 (1978): 125137.
114 Thomas P. Hughes, Model Builders and Instrument Makers, Science in Context 2 (1988): 59
75.
115 William Crookes, Les thorie sur la matire, Revue Scientifique 20 (1903): 225233, on p. 225.
116 See Eugene S. Ferguson, The Minds Eye: Nonverbal Thought in technology, Science 197
(1977): 827836.
117 James Clerk Maxwell, On The Dynamical Evidence of the Molecular Constitution of Bodies,
[1875], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge,
1890), pp. 418438, on p. 418.
118 Richard Yeo places Whewells epistemology within its theological and intellectual context; see
Richard Yeo, William Whewell, Natural Theory and the Philosophy of Science in Mid-nineteenth
Century Britain, Annals of Science 36 (1979): 493516, on p. 498.
119 Maxwell traced the origins of the idea of material molecularity to Democritus; see James Clerk
Maxwell, Atom [1875], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell,
Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 445484, on p. 445. On the Victorian debates on ancient atomism
see Frank M. Turner, Lucretius Among the Victorians, Victorian Studies 16 (1973): 329348; On
the significance of ancient Greek civilisation for Victorian culture see idem., The Greek Heritage in
Victorian Britain (London, 1981).
120 Herbert S. Simon, Scientific Discovery and the Psychology of Problem Solving, excerpts reprinted in Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford Mynatt, On Scientific Thinking (New
York, 1981), pp. 4854, on p. 51.
121 Gerald Holton On Trying to Understand Scientific Genius, The American Scholar 41 (1971):
102104, reprinted in Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford Mynatt, On Scientific
Thinking (New York, 1981), pp. 378382, on p. 380.

450

MARIA YAMALIDOU

122 Mary Douglas, Rightness of Categories, in Mary Douglas & David Hull (eds.), Nelson

Goodman among the Social Sciences (Edinburgh, 1992).


123 Ibid.
124 Erwin N. Hiebert, The Transformation of Physics, in Teich Mikulas & Roy Porter (eds.), Fin

de Siecle and its Legacy (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 235253, on p. 246.


125 The inner structure of the atom is discussed as an introduction to electric phenomena, see Investigating the Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 1, Section D
Electric and Magnetic Phenomena, pp. 155190.
126 Water Molecules May be Dissolved Through Electrolysis . . . To Atoms of Oxygen and Hydrogen, Investigating the Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 1, on p.
36. Compare with Maxwells presentation of that most wonderful molecular motion which is called
electrolysis, in James Clerk Maxwell, Molecules [1873], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The Scientific
Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 361378.
127 The Molecules of Gases and Liquids are Moving Fast to All Directions, Investigating the
Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 1, on p. 39. Compare to Rudolf
Clausiuss views that [t]he motion of molecules takes place in all three states of aggregation and
that on the average each direction is equally represented in his paper ber die Art der Bewegung,
welche wir Wrme nennen, Annalen der Physik und Chemie (No. 3), 100 (1857): 353380, on pp.
360 and 373 respectively.
128 Attracting Forces Which are Exercised Among Similar Molecules are Called Forces of Cohesion, Investigating the Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 1, on
p. 41. Compare with William Thomsons assertion that he intended his explanation of cohesion to
be compatible with any molecular theory of matter in William Thomson, Note on Gravity and
Cohesion [1862], Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 4 (18571862): 604606, on p.
606.
129 Attractive Forces Appear Also Among Molecules of Different Bodies. These are Called Forces
of Adhesion, Investigating the Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol.
1, on p. 44. Compare with the molecular understanding of adhesion suggested in the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Vol. 1 (9th edition; Edinburgh, 1875), p. 153.
130 The Molecule of Oil Consists of Carbon, Hydrogen and Oxygen, Investigating the Physical
World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 1, on p. 99. Compare with Maxwells
explanation [i]f this molecule be divided, its parts are molecules of a different substance from that
of which the whole is a molecule, in James Clerk Maxwell, Molecules [1873], reprinted in W.D.
Niven, The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 361378, on p.
363.
131 You Can Observe the Trajectory and Velocity of the Molecules of Water by Observing the Trajectories of Small Pieces of Paper or Wood [which are carried away by water current], [Textbook for
the 5th grade of grammar school], Vol. 2, on p. 98. John Scott Russell suggested a similar experiment
in order to show that wave motion is not identical with the motion of the liquid en mass in John Scott
Russell, Report on Waves, Report BAAS 14th Meeting (York, September 1844), pt. 1, pp. 311390.
132 Konstantinos Tzanakis, Thoughts and Suggestions for a More Rational Teaching of the Physical
Concepts and Laws in Grammar School (University of Crete preprint).
133 See Mary Jo Nye, The Nineteenth-century Atomic Debates and the Dilemma of an Indifferent
Hypothesis , Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976): 245268.
134 Arnold B. Arons, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives Attainable in Introductory Physics
Course, in Michael R. Matthews (ed.) History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Selected Readings
(Toronto, 1991), pp. 169184, on p. 173.
135 Konstantinos Tzanakis, Thoughts and Suggestions for a More Rational Teaching of the Physical
Concepts and Laws in Grammar School (University of Crete preprint).
136 Strong views about the generalised anti-atomic outlook of nineteenth-century science have been
expressed by W.H. Brock & D.M. Knight, The Atomic Debates, in W.H. Brock (ed.), The Atomic

MOLECULAR REPRESENTATIONS

451

Debates. Brodie and the Rejection of the Atomic Theory (Leicester; 1967), pp. 130, Gerd Buchdahl, Sources of Scepticism in Atomic Theory, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
10 (19591960): 120134, Maurice Crosland (ed.), The Emergence of Science in Western Europe
(New York, 1976), Mary Jo Nye, The Nineteenth-century Atomic Debates and the Dilemma of an
Indifferent Hypothesis , Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976): 245268.
137 The view that chemical atomism was a generalised framework of analysis has been suggested by,
Alan J. Rocke, Chemical Atomism in the Nineteenth Century. From Dalton to Cannizzaro (Columbus;
1984), and also by Helge, Kragh, Julius Thomsen and Nineteenth-Century Speculations on the
Complexity of Atoms, Annals of Science 39 (1982): 3760.
138 Joseph Nussbaum, The Particulate Nature of Matter at the Gaseous State, in Rosalind Driver,
Edith Guesne & Andre Tieberdhien (eds.), Childrens Ideas in Science (Greek translation; Athens,
1993), pp. 180207, on p. 198. See also, S. Novick & J. Nussbaum, Junior High School Pupils
Understanding of the Particulate Nature of Matter: An Interview Study, Science Education 62
(1978): 273281 and S. Novick & J. Nussbaum, Pupils Understanding of the Particulate Nature
of Matter: A Cross Age Study, Science Education 65 (1981): 187196.
139 we cannot say exactly what matter is, A, Zanakos, N. Lekatis & A. Schinas, Physics [Textbook
for the 2nd grade of high school], on p. 22. Compare with James Clerk Maxwells assertion that
[t]o explain mass may seem an absurd achievement, in Atom [1875], reprinted in W.D. Niven, The
Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 445484, on p. 472.
140 Material Bodies are Distiguished by Their Characteristics. These Characteristics are Called
the Bodies Properties, Investigating the Physical World [Textbook for the 5th grade of grammar
school], Vol. 1, on p. 13.
141 John Tyndall, On Radiant Heat in Relation to the Colour and Chemical Constitution of Bodies
[1866], in John Tyndall, Fragments of Science: A Series of detached Essays, Addresses and Reviews
(5th edition; London, 1876), pp. 7192, on p. 71.
142 John Tyndall, Scientific Use of the Imagination [1870], in John Tyndall, Fragments of Science:
A Series of detached Essays, Addresses and Reviews (5th edition; London, 1876), pp. 423458, on p.
425.
143 John Tyndall, Heat as a Mode of Motion (4th edition; London, 1870), on p. 61.
144 James Clerk Maxwell, Theory of Heat (3rd edition; London, 1872), on p. 284; emphasis added.
145 Konstantinos Tzanakis, Thoughts and Suggestions for a More Rational Teaching of the Physical
Concepts and Laws in Grammar School (University of Crete preprint).
146 Joseph Nussbaum, The Particulate Nature of Matter at the Gaseous State, in Rosalind Driver,
Edith Guesne & Andre Tieberdhien (eds.), Childrens ideas in science (Greek Translation; Athens,
1993), pp. 180207. on p. 188.
147 James Clerk Maxwell, Theory of Heat (3rd edition; London, 1872), on p. 285.
148 Ibid.; emphasis added.
149 On the role of negotiation of alternative ideas in classroom see Brje Ekstig, Teaching Guided by
History of Science: The Discovery of Atmospheric Pressure, in Michael R. Matthews (ed.), History,
Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Selected Readings (Toronto, 1991), pp. 213217.
150 See, for example, J. Clement, A Conceptual Model Discussed by Galileo and Used Intuitively
by Physics Students, in D. Gentner & A Stevens (eds.), Mental models (Hillsdale, 1983), pp. 325
340; M. McCloskey, Naive Theories of Motion, in ibid., pp. 299324; L. Viennot, Spontaneous
Reasoning in Elementary Dynamics, European Journal of Science Education 1 (1979): 205221.

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