Consti Law 2 Part 4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty.
Rovyne Jumao-as) 1
3RD EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
TAN v. BARRIOS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 85481-82
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and

vice versa.
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve
(12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal
Case No. MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before
the Military Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:
October 18, 1990
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE

TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice, THE CITY
FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE
HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally

possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of
General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25,
1973 of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai
family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a
pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in
violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 9.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused were:
On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated

September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September
27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create
military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to
them."
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972,

the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts,"
were vested with jurisdiction among others,
over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes
which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion
and the preservation of the safety and security of the
Republic.
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972,

"crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized
in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October
11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military
Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by
such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
However, although civil courts should have exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in
Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same
general order provided that "the President may, in the
public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun
8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 2

(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
3. Eusebio Tan
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan

de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the
recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to
the requests of the defendants' lawyers) to transfer the
case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained
in the military court (Annexes A to C of
Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All
the accused were detained without bail in the P.C.
Stockade in Camp Crame.
4. Alfonso Tan
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused

pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to
be used as a state witness. He was released from
detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13)
months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses
and 35 defense witnesses filled up twenty-one (21)
volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages
(p. 75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and
Sentence," was promulgated by the Military
Commission finding five (5) of the accused namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June
11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended
martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and
commissions.
On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision
in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150
SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on
December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34
against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military
commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians charged
with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil
courts, as long as those courts are open and
functioning as they did during the period of martial law.
This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the
military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all
their proceedings as follows:
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-one (21) days,
to twenty (20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found
guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).
Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
1. Oscar Yaun
2. Enrique Labita
Due process of law demands that in all criminal

prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either
his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to,
among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the
due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to
the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process,
not by executive or military process, Military
commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are
called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
the legislature for the President as Commander inChief to aid him in properly commanding the army and
navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized
under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives. Following the principle of separation

of powers underlying the existing constitutional
organization of the Government of the Philippines, the
power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when
an individual should be considered to have violated the
law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and
it cannot be the function of the Executive Department,
through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly
functioning, as they do so today and as they did during
the period of martial law in the country, military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over
civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it
otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional
right to due process of the civilian concerned.
(Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150
SCRA 144, 158-160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA
revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in
this Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the national
penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes
and convicted by the military commissions during the
nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos.
75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565
consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs.
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700).
The petitioners asked the Court to declare
unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the
military tribunals, annul the proceedings against them
before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil
courts where their right to due process may be
accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court
in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the
proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political
detainees who should have been brought before the
courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated
to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial
rule.
The Court
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered
the release of those of some who had fully served their
sentences, or had been acquitted, or had been granted
amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military
personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were
convicted and still serving the sentences meted to
them by the military courts, but, without ordering their
release, directed the Department of Justice to file the

necessary informations against them in the proper civil
courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as
petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino, 2Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado,
Daniel Campus, 3 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de
los Santos, 4 are concerned. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the
immediate release of the abovementioned petitioners,
unless there are other legal causes that may warrant
their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio
Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio
G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L.
Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F.
Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel
Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino
Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano,
Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio,
Rolando Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan,
Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana
who are all military personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is
hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary
informations against them in the courts having
jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one
hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision,
without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence
submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military
Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of the
petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are
filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the
necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant
of bail which may be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et
al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey
Ordoez issued Department Order No. 226
designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to
collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City
in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to
prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15,
1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was designated Acting
City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the
regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).

Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation,
Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2)
informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim.
Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against
all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No.
MC-1-67 including those who had already
died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the
informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court
Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile in
G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and
80565 as all accused are detained 6 except those that
are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the
accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he
increased the recommended bail to P140,000 for each
accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824).
In the murder case (Crim. Case No. 88-825), he
recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000
for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat
Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he
recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28, 1988,
he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9,
Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2) use of a
motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC,
Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the
sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before
issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge
Demecillo issued an order on October 26, 1988,
requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified
copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous
cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme
Court order "which is the basis of filing the aboveentitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his
said order (Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor
has not complied with that order for, as a matter of
fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the
criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their
twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 of
the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because
none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were
parties in theCruz vs. Enrile habeas corpus cases (160
SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh

and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the informations in Crim. Cases
Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent
Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that
the public respondents or any other prosecution officer
"be permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting
and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein
because they had already been acquitted of the same
by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-167" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court
dismissed the petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash
the allegedly invalid informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose
annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in the
lower court of such motion is the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of
that remedy (which they have not yet availed of) bars
their recourse to the special civil actions of certiorari
and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration
informing this Court that the lower court had issued
warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a
temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989
enjoining the respondents from implementing the
orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the
petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios
exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed
authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact
direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of
Justice against THOSE who, like the petitioners,
WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings
during the period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the
petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were
not heard, and over whom the court did not acquire
jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate
their right to protection against double jeopardy.

4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the
petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military
tribunal which the State itself had clothed with
jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against
them. The State may not retroactively divest of
jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted
them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the
military court that acquitted the petitioners would
amount to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo,
Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim.
Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed
without a prior preliminary investigation, nor a finding
of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief
State Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be
1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in
Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal possession of
firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a
hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp.
66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is
not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman
who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to
death by the Military Commission, is already deadpossibly executed. Hence, only the information
for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the
petitioners and twelve (12) others, including those
already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37,
Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the
petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute
double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction
of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented
the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their
acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not
applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been
interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets
with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment,
argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a
military commission were null and void because we
ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of
jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions,
whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar reprosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p.
102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents
gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third
paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's

decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in
the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners
who had been tried and acquitted by Military
Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is
an unreasonable application ofCruz vs. Enrile, for the
decision therein will be searched in vain for such
authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever
faced a court martial, much less those who had been
acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like
the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument
of oppression and injustice unless given a limited
application only to the parties/petitioners therein who
sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings
against themselves and prayed for a retrial in the civil
courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone
are affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all
and sundry who at one time or another had been tried
and sentenced by a court martial during the period of
martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium
faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice
those who were not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a
cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or
order in a case shall not adversely affect persons who
were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs.
Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's pronouncement
in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military
courts against the civilian petitioners therein and
ordering the refiling of informations against them in the
proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons
who were not parties in that case and who, not having
submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have their
day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil,
1033). Their reprosecution, based on the decision
in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part and were
not heard, would be violative of their right to due
process, the same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs.
Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it
nullified the proceedings against them in the military
tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial
of civilians by military process was not due process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in
the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs.
Enrilewhich needs to be rectified. For, although the
Court nullified the proceedings against the civilianspetitioners who were still serving their sentences after
conviction by the military courts and commissions, and
we directed the Secretary of Justice to file the
necessary informations against them in the proper civil
courts, we did not nullify the court martial proceedings

against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had
finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted
amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military
courts. We did not order their reprosecution, retrial,
and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set
them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians
who were convicted by the military courts and were still
serving their sentences, and another rule for those
who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the
service of their sentences. The Court applied a rule
of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the
Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper
civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the
others (whom the Court ordered to be released from
custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold
that Olaguer should,
in
principle,
be
applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or
acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians
before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such
final sentences should not be disturbed by the State.
Only in particular cases where the convicted person or
the State shows that there was serious denial of the
Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered
based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is
no longer possible, the accused should be released
since the judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of
due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a
court martial which sentenced him to death without
receiving evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel
distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority
for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike
Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and
regardless of whether they have already been
acquitted and released, or have accepted the
sentences imposed on them and commenced serving
the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a
military court, much less those who were acquitted and
released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second
trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed,
why should one who has accepted the justness of the
verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a
fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in
full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing
in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time

perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is
a chance of being acquitted the second time around, it
would be small comfort for the accused if he is held
without bail pending the completion of his second trial
which may take as long as, if not longer than, the
sentence he has been serving or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes
before military tribunals and commissions during the
ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an
operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The
belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality
and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the
reality of their consequences which occurred long
before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the
limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality
of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the
question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity
of the creation of a municipality by executive order
wiped out all the acts of the local government thus
abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.' Accordingly, he held
that bonds issued by a board of commissioners
created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to
say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of
Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are
a nullity because the executive order is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never
been passed.' For the existence of Executive Order
386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be
ignored.' As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L.
Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative

fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot be
justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents'
apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of
unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the
validity of the creation of that municipality. (Municipality
of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the
proceedings against the petitioners and their coaccused before Military Commission No. 1. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the
military courts over civilians should not be allowed to
obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular
case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that
there were no serious violations of their constitutional
right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the
military commission that heard and decided the
charges against them during the period of martial law,
had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military
Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the
refiling of the information against the petitioners would
place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in
constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused
from harassment by the strong arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A
single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows.
It protects an accused from harassment, enables him
to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his
life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to
whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to
unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and
expense-producing for the state as well. It has been

referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of
a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not
whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The
Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection
of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military
commission in their particular case by retroactively
divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it
had exercised over them would amount to an ex post
facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict
constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is
one which
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only,
in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay
Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits
the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of
attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument
that the information against them is invalid because
there was no preliminary investigation, no finding of
probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior
approval of the information by the City Fiscal before it
was filed.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor
and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby
ordered to discharge the petitioners from the
information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The
temporary restraining order which we issued on
January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SEC. OF NATIONAL DEFENSE v. MANALO
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are
separated from the rest of the world behind secret
walls, they are not separated from the constitutional
protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The
case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and
security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed
before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set
aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo
and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents
(therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein
petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers
and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty

and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought
ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under
Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and
Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead,
including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment;
and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of
therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing,
abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty,
and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III,
Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing
Petition as AmparoPetition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits,
and
to
Grant
Interim
and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition
be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under
Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the
writ commanding therein respondents to make a
verified return within the period provided by law and
containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they
be granted the interim reliefs allowed by
the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the
Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in
Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the
August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the AmparoRule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to
respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working
days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition
to the CA and designate the Division of Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary
hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00
p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein

respondents),
reads, viz:
the
dispositive
portion
of
which
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within
five days from notice of this decision all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already on file
herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this
decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical
reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment
given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and
(sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007
within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under
the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of
Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority
to be express and made apparent on the face of the
sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.
10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first

unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about
one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the
CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
theirbarangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents
were not able to attend as they were not informed of
the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers
when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their
house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At
past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts,
fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his
mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond,

not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and
forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the
hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then
forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to
follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her
to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond
recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la
Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all
acted as lookout. They were all members of the
CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU.
While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside
of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan
and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed
men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once
inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded,
he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in
his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The
one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie
Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of
age or older. The leader of the team who entered his
house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall,
thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, whiteskinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was
brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road,
he recognized the voice of the person beside him as
his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times
until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With
the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw
several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with
the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which,
Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it
was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other
room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of
the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not,
he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades were, how many
soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members
he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit
him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to
be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the
high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived
and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from
those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was
tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes,
instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and
knew much about his parents and family, and
a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the
respondents'
abduction.16 While
these
officials
interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But
once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up.
When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled
respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only
at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men
arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up.
They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his
stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead
twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and
burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood.
When he could no longer endure the torture and could
hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected
Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before
their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they
would come back the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He
waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise
with the chains put on him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came to check on him, he
managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped
through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he
used stones to break his chains. After walking through
a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni
Kristo church. He talked to some women who were
doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to
Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort
Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some
soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The
soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They
brought him to another place near the entrance of what
he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed
repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back
bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called
"Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she
wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The
soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside
Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from

all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed,
particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May
2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel
bars. He stayed all the time in that small room
measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there,
including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing,
eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen
people22 had been detained in thatbartolina, including
his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents
were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a
small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room
was made into the bartolina. The house was near the
firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn,
soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
"DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine
respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took
their urine samples and marked them. When asked
how they were feeling, they replied that they had a
hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and
they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two
ladies in white arrived. They also examined
respondents and gave them medicines, including
orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought
with them the results of respondents' urine test and
advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times.
Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master"
of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at
Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two
weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who
said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and
take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo
vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other
armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a
big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with
them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo.
They were detained in a big unfinished house inside
the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months.

When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to
them. They were brought out of the house to a
basketball court in the center of the compound and
made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting,
seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt
well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him.
Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond
if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen.
Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be
because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an
evil man.27
should prove that they are on the side of the military

and warned that they would not be given another
chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified
Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
Raymond narrated his conversation

Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took

Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should
introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from
Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he
saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him
from his house, and got acquainted with other military
men and civilians.34
with
Gen.
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap

mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond

take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine,
named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and
instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if
they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
"Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and
they felt heavy upon waking up.33
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng

isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo
ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang
mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa
Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo.
Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag
paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na
sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was

brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in
a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond
was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he
was kept in the barracks.35
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them

as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00
in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men the same group that abducted them - brought them to
their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his
parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because
he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and
other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what
Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened
Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human
rights rallies, they would never see their children again.
The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he

was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then
he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them
were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the
barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she
had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She
was crying and longing to go home and be with her
parents. During the day, her chains were removed and
she was made to do the laundry.36
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen.

Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the
four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario
and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond,
he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle.
Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan
told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and
to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He
said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each,
and would make them strong. He also said that they
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp

Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and
Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name
they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called
"master" or "commander" by his men in the
24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were
put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but

were put back on at night. They were threatened that if
they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
Raymond narrated what

experienced in the camp, viz:
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp

Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along
their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6
or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents
to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents
were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in
that camp from September 2006 to November 2006,
and Raymond was instructed to continue using the
name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military
trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions
he stated in his affidavit.38
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na

matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang
kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald
na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig,
walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang
bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo.
Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with

Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan.
There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in
that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the
battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion
soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy"
beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns.
Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in
the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help
in raising livestock.39
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila

na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,
piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong
nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo
ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong
pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban
ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was

launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him
and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers
of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayanbayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an
old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA
and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was
brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the
house who was sick was there. They spared him and
killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and
Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with
them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to
do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the
camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp.
he
witnessed
and
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and

ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6
na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga
bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang

dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa
pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng
bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1
kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na
dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi
ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni
Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot
pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal,
narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa
isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang
mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni
Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel
sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming
hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na
kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin
ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo
were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry
for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also
farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take
care of the food of their family. They were also told that
they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell
their produce. They were no longer put in chains and
were instructed to use the names Rommel (for
Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could
see the highway from where they stayed. They helped
farm adjoining lands for which they were paid
Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their
earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular
phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a
girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but
he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some
more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond
and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards.
Respondents' house did not have electricity. They
used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a
radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and
his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m.,
Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When
none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond
and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving
behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They
boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed
from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the
contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related
to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added
that when they were taken from their house on
February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors
before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also
named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18
months he was detained. When Raymond attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was
severely beaten up and told that they were indeed

members of the NPA because Raymond escaped.
With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back
and punched in the face until he could no longer bear
the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond
and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was
separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by
Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a
friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was
instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo
in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in
San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the
vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought
to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of
"Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove
a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded
while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the
blindfold once outside the province. In one of their
trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp
Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board,
"Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was
connected with the Medical Action Group, an
organization handling cases of human rights violations,
particularly cases where torture was involved. He was
requested by an NGO to conduct medical
examinations on the respondents after their escape.
He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded
with the physical examination. His findings showed
that the scars borne by respondents were consistent
with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon
them. The examination was conducted on August 15,
2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the
results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino
took photographs of the scars. He testified that he
followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their
alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the
October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a
Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction
but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were
not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained,
held incommunicado, disappeared or under the
custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to

rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry
Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander
of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents
therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4,
2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party
respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr.,
then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan,
then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan
City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was
introduced to establish their personal involvement in
the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated
June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his
involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of
the Manalo brothers, although it held that the
remaining respondents were illegally detaining the
Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the
latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of
therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of
National Defense, which attested that he assumed
office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of
the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also
claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage
in actual military directional operations, neither does
he undertake command directions of the AFP units in
the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary
of National Defense is focused in providing strategic
policy direction to the Department (bureaus and
agencies) including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the
Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed
the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in
compliance with Section 9(d) of the AmparoRule and
to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a
Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I
have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief
of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following
rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is

issued by a competent court against any members of
the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the
death or disappearance of the person identified in the
petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person
or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time
of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted
his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of therein
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be
issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose
of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and
submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of
the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s,
dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007,
addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine
Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB
PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as
ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor
the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the
same units relative to another Petition for the Writ
ofAmparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of
relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending
before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent
will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding
circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners
and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had
complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to
the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and
the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit
of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed
in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this
Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which
averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition
implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as
detention area, I immediately went to the 24 th IB
detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino
being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of
Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan, we
made further inquiries with the Philippine National
Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions
or deaths and were informed that none was reported to
their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1 st Lt.
Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse
in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place
where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel
Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no
such beachhouse was used as a detention place found
to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan,
Empeo and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack
of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo,
and other persons implicated by therein petitioners
could not be secured in time for the submission of the
Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the

summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez,
Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija.
The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva
Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and
a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is
part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the
Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of
Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit,
namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula;
CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka
Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He
was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the
abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the
alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if
any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation
was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw
news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on
the television, and he was concerned about what was
happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the
purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006. 59 The
investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and
finished at 10:00 in the evening. 60 The investigating
officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that
day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not
even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according
to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate
the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the
statements.63 The six persons were not known to
Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet
them.64 During the entire time that he was beside
Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost
Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question
to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on
May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their
statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that

the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29,
2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over
to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30,
2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave
his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation
Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the
report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND
MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were
forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14
February 2006 by unidentified armed men and
thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said
incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for
Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz,
Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza
as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka
Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he
was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a
church located nearby his residence, together with
some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February
2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo
Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was
one of the suspects, he claims that they only
implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that
they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo
brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU.
Subject vehemently denied any participation or
involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y
Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also
knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of
being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That
at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2)
brothers and for accusing him to be one of the
suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was

one of those working at the concrete chapel being
constructed nearby his residence. He claims further
that he just came only to know about the incident on
other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by
Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident
and claimed that they only implicated him because he
is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas
dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na
Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very
much aware about the background of the two (2)
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters
of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their
elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on
14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he
learned only about the incident when he arrived home
in their place. He claims further that the only reason
why they implicated him was due to the fact that his
mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason
they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject
CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated
May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims
that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried
and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was
at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan.
He claims that he was being informed only about the
incident lately and he was not aware of any reason
why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by
alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only
reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with
their family particularly victims of summary execution
(killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando
Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it
was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father
and he was living witness to that incident. Subject
civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz
dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based
at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him
being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are
active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That
he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only
about the incident when rumors reached him by his
barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and
Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino
dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a
CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment,
San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well
the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their
barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty
(20) years. He alleged further that they are active
supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE
is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one
of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was
helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in
their place and he learned only about the incident
which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person
of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He
claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation
against him as being one of the abductors and he
considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his
name that remains loyal to his service to the
government as a CAA member.
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this

investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each
families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the
father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE
TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a
fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as
a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the
testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos
are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA,
this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors.
Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's,
they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from
any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their
village, they were fully aware of the activities of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their
connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows
that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the
above named respondents has not been established in
this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them
for any administrative punishment and/or criminal
liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent
of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela
Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2)
civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza
be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and
closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the
appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence
and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the
following grounds, viz:
IV. DISCUSSION
I.
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents

in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the
alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006
at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND

GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNCORROBORATED,
CONTRADICTED,
AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELFSERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND
GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED
IN
REQUIRING
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A)
FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO
THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH
THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF
M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND
DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS,
AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED,
IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE
A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let
us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a
recurring proposition in the recommendations that
resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit
on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The
Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and factbased perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings
and
enforced
disappearances,"71 hence
"representatives from all sides of the political and
social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the
justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to
resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated
the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." 73 It
was an exercise for the first time of the Court's
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime. 74 As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." 75 On the other
hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the

following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo"
literally means "protection" in Spanish. 77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available
in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of
the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to
many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel
Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for
his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the
power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their
constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the
Republic in the exercise and preservation of those
rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws
enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the
Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or
state governments, limiting themselves to granting
protection in the specific case in litigation, making no
general declaration concerning the statute or
regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part
of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the
judge determines that a constitutional right of the
petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the
official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take
the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the
full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from
the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power
characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for
the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the
Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various
forms, in response to the particular needs of each
country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the
Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of
Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the
world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield
of human dignity, her own painful history

conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts
or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2)Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for
the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of
a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and
(5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants'
rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
American and Philippine experience of human rights

abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The
remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.91
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ

of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses especially committed in
countries under military juntas. In general, these
countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect
the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including
socio-economic rights.86Other countries like Colombia,
Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to
limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and

curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive
in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of
both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the
further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not

explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our
charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause,
provides for the judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the Amparo contra
leyes, Amparo
casacion,
and Amparo
administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions
of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring
of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review,
which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the
Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a
petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these
remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required
to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law
and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action

for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving the respondents of their right to
liberty and other basic rights on August 23,
2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule.
They also sought ancillary remedies including
Protective
Custody
Orders,
Appointment
of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and
other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24,
2007, they moved to have their petition treated as
an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and
suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers'
enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of
the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in
believing and giving full faith and credit to the
incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony
of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to
mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action,
to determine whether the evidence presented is metalstrong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides
for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ
of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the
degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
bysubstantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we
affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously
detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the
respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond
Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account
is dotted with countless candid details of respondents'
harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape,
captured through his different senses and etched in his
memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip
ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo
ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang

hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang
nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan
kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang
mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay
kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko
gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa
malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court,
largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's
affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who
were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein
respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men
who barged into his house through the rear door were
military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and
army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely:
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la
Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU
and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and
the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six
military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting
team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George.
Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as
narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of
the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the
abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were
either members or sympathizers of the NPA,
considering that the abductors were looking for Ka
Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look
into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial.
The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the
7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version
of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness
might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall
could delve only into the participation of military
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should
have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also
established. At the very least, he was aware of the
petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform
assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other

officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person
in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he
wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing.
Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during
their long captivity at the hands of military personnel
under his command bespoke of his indubitable
command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not
merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due
process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the
Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and
Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear
and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the
detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be
then established after Evangeline Francisco, who
allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the
abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the
habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario
drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners
were brought away from their houses on February 14,
2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated
in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched
them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and
conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at
least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren)
brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on
board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more
or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was
there where the petitioners came face to face with
Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was
presented to the parents to relay the message from
Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that
occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would
not again see their sons should they join any rallies to
denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp.
205-206) Hilario was also among four Master
Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and
Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the
occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to
take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
206) There were other occasions when the petitioners

saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in
the abduction and forced disappearance of the
petitioners was established. The participation of other
military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and
Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found
them personally involved in the abduction. We also do,
for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is
overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent
Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated
by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were
corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo
Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared
by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of
the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents,103 also
corroborate
respondents'
accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.
Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the
facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as
shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col.
Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," 104 firms up
respondents' story that they were detained for some
time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among
others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz
was abducted and tortured by agents of the
Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was
kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on
the consistent and credible statements, written and
oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her
recognition of portions of the route they took when she
was being driven out of the military installation where
she was detained.107 She was also examined by a
medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111
circular second degree burns on her back and
abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of
cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in
detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance
and the torture perpetrated on the victim during

detention, it logically holds that much of the information
and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can
be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks
they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are
implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the
privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that
the enforced disappearance of both respondents
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as
they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But
while respondents admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that they
are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as their
"movements continue to be restricted for fear that
people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and
testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at
large and have not been held accountable in any way.
These people are directly connected to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position
to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and
security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim
that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general,"
respondents point out that this right is "often
associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an
"expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding
that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that
their rights "to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention
places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to
security of person under the writ ofAmparo." They
submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of
the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more
meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the
State on the exercise of that liberty" 114 such as a
requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions

that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or being
put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action
consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty,
and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to
determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents
assert. The right
to
security or
the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's
person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects - against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power
over a person's home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was
enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal,
Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property
and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation
when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858;
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to
privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental
right against unreasonable searches and seizures
must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a
man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the
assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section
1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive 121 upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life
to which each person has a right is not a life lived in
fear that his person and property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with
the assurance that the government he established and
consented to, will protect the security of his person and
property. The ideal of security in life and property...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of man's existence." 122 In a broad sense, the
right to security of person "emanates in a person's
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs,
his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the
right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of
life but also of those things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123
A closer look at the right to security of person would
yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom
from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates
that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied)
Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is
not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right. 124 It is the "right to
security of person" as the word "security" itself means
"freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and

the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,
"freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, acause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear
can vary from one person to another with the variation
of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus,
in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the
"right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to
security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot
be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
constitute more than a search or invasion of the body.
It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities,
and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are
an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.129
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR,

Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the
right to security of person, viz:
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe

invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate
the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal
or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person includes the exercise
of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of

person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest
or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law. (emphasis
supplied)
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or

any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him (any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense). Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of

person.126 (emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and
intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless
constitute a violation of the right to security in the
sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from
dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation
for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced
disappearances who are not even under such
investigation should all the more be protected from
these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security
of person as a right against torture was made by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent
case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant,
who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state
authorities had physically abused him in prison,
thereby violating his right to security of person. Article
5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases
supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that
"(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged illtreatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied
heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the
attention of domestic authorities at the time when they
could reasonably have been expected to take
measures in order to ensure his security and to
investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in
custody or to comply with the procedural obligation
under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into
his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women has also made a
statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of
women may also be related to the right to security and
liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the
enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental
freedoms under general international law or under
specific human rights conventions is discrimination
within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on

the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the
right to liberty and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee
of protection of one's rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into
the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person (as freedom from threat
and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy
that the State "guarantees full respect for human
rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective
investigations,
organization
of
the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims
of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a
serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must
have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private
interests that depends upon the initiative of the
victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the
government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a
guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights
Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9 137 of
the ICCPR. While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under
Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to
security of person can exist independently of the
right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia,
Colombia, whose social views differed from those of

the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee
held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a
separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph
one could lead to the view that the right to security
arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The
travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of
the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt
with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to
the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to
security of the person. These elements have been
dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant.
Although in the Covenant the only reference to the
right of security of person is to be found in article
9, there is no evidence that it was intended to
narrow the concept of the right to security only to
situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the
same time, States parties have undertaken to
guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It
cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States
can ignore known threats to the life of persons
under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she
is not arrested or otherwise detained. States
parties are under an obligation to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect them. An
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State
party to ignore threats to the personal security of
non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would
render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling
was
reiterated
in Bwalya
v.
Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and
prisoner of conscience who continued to be
intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements
following his release from detention. In a catena of
cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar
import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving
discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state;Tshishimbi
v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's
husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in
Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the
complainant's partner and the harassment he
(complainant)
suffered
because
of
his
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only
as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving
liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to
afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR

interpreted the "right to security of person" under
Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's
son had been arrested by state authorities and had not
been seen since. The family's requests for information
and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved
futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation
of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR
ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been
effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in
keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts.
For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring
the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an
arguable claim that a person has been taken into
custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis
supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security
of person to the case at bar, we now determine
whether there is a continuing violation of respondents'
right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as
freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty
and security.
While respondents were detained, they were
threatened that if they escaped, their families,
including them, would be killed. In Raymond's
narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline
after he was caught the first time he attempted to
escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain
"Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed,
spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The
condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It
should be stressed that they are now free from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a
lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It
ought to be recalled that towards the end of their
ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents
were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents' captors even told them that they were still
deciding whether they should be executed.

Respondent
affidavit,viz:
Raymond
Manalo
attested
in
his
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang

mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared
them in the eye while they were in detention. With their
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent,
moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own
abduction and torture, but also in those of other
persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among
others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have
been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and
security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced
to
limit
their
movements
or
activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they
cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of
threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written
threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless,
the circumstances of respondents' abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they
will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even
executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a
writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as
protection by the government. Apart from the failure
of military elements to provide protection to
respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in
conducting an effective investigation of respondents'
abduction as revealed by the testimony and
investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col.
Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7thInfantry
Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was
very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely
relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in
the investigation for the first time. He was present at
the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound
a single question to ascertain the veracity of their

statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the family or neighbors of the
respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National
Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the event the writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include
verification of the identity of the aggrieved party;
recovery and preservation of relevant evidence;
identification of witnesses and securing statements
from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance;
identification and apprehension of the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
bringing of the suspected offenders before a
competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also
submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received
the above directive of respondent Secretary of
National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
immediately caused to be issued a directive to the
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the
recent reappearance of the respondents, and
undertook to provide results of the investigations to
respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year
after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007,
respondents have not been furnished the results of the
investigation which they now seek through the instant
petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial
evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents' right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security
as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent
threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective
investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of
Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official
and
unofficial
reports
of
the

investigation undertaken in connection with their
case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the
present places of official assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the
Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and
charts, and reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to
the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs,
petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search
warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant must be complied with
prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1)
the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2)
the search warrant must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense; and
(4) the probable cause must be personally determined
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.152 In the case at bar, however,
petitioners point out that other than the bare, selfserving and vague allegations made by respondent
Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name, with
no other supporting details. They also argue that the
relevancy of the documents to be produced must be
apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the
involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not
been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The
production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
This Constitutional provision is a protection of the
people from the unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the government from
the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened
to the production of documents or things under Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause

therefor, the court in which an action is pending may
(a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge
Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of
Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and inspection of among others, the books
and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The
company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on
the ground that it violated the search and seizure
clause. The Court struck down the argument and held
that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that
"cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff
himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor
the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs,
petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission
of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the
petition for a writ ofAmparo. They add that it will
unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise
of official functions and duties of military officers and
even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to
threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure
that these military officers can be served with notices
and court processes in relation to any investigation
and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The
list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of

respondents
and
make
appropriate
medical
interventions, when applicable and necessary.
specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision

reads:
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life,

liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims
of
extralegal
killings
and
enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind
secret walls.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is
PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
ROXAS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189155
September 7, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT

OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C.
ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT
TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN.
JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ,
MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY
GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO
GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, Respondents.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from

distributing or causing the distribution to the public of
any records in whatever form, reports, documents or
similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C.
Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPPNPA or pertinently related to the complained incident.
Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production
order and for the return of the specified personal
belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there
is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for
the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner,
said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete
the investigation of this incident with the end in view of
prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents
are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner
and her family while in the Philippines against any and
all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as
may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino
descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with
the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a
member.5 During the course of her immersion,
petitioner toured various provinces and towns of
Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to
join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial
health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.7
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on
Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly
under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision,
the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner,
Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an
inspection order, production order and return of
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her

passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope and medicines.9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner
and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and
John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the
house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz,
Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however,
petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled

by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front
door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner
and her companions to lie on the ground face
down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes
and, with the exception of their leader, were also
wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of
the armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other
armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue
van. Petitioner started to shout her name. 15 Against her
vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner
towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and
knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be
blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one
of the armed men sitting beside her.17The van then
sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van
stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were
ordered to alight.19After she was informed that she is
being detained for being a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPPNPA), petitioner was separated from her companions
and was escorted to a room that she believed was a
jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. 20 From there,
she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of
planes taking off and landing and some construction
bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military
camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was five (5) straight days of
interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon
her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the
fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of
taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the
petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was
made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds
when she was allowed to take a bath, during which
she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose"
who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when
she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her
surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner
was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as

"Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner
that those who tortured her came from the "Special
Operations Group," and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the "Order of
Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and
returned to her uncles house in Quezon City.31 Before
being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner
a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper
containing an e-mail address with password, 33 a plastic
bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs
used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner
was also sternly warned not to report the incident to
the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to
receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to
her.37Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM
card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as
well as the suppression of any existing government
files or records linking her to the communist
movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June
2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying
the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction
and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit
"Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1)
respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be
issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the
7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva
Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce
documents relating to any report on the case of
petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence
report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or
branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May
2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the
records of the respondents any document pertinent or
connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any
name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be
ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external

hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued
the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the
respondents to file their verified written return.42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Return of the Writs43 on behalf of the
public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public
respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged
abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support
of their accusation, the public respondents principally
rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the
Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the
Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the
purported abduction, petitioner and her companions
instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the
house.46 From this statement, the public respondents
drew the distinct possibility that, except for those
already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any
way of knowing where petitioner and her companions
were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public
respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by,
or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her
companions themselves.48
Public respondents also cited the Medical
Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her
claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five
(5) days. The public respondents noted that while the
petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by
her abductorsinflictions that could have easily
produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate
only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in
question the very authenticity of petitioners alleged
abduction and torture, more so any military or police
involvement therein. Hence, public respondents
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was
no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to
put the government in bad light, and at the same time,
bring great media mileage to her and the group that
she represents.51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and

torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on
the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition
based on the following grounds: (a) as against
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b)
as against all of the public respondents, in general, in
view of the absence of any specific allegation in the
petition that they had participated in, or at least
authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not
been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind
the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and
military arms of the government machinery, inquiries
were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported
abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19
May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel
came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report
the presence of heavily armed men somewhere
in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the
police station launched an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement
of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an
abduction incident involving three (3) personslater
identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito
Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all
staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the
abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the
afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8)
heavily armed men who forced their way inside his
house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction also
confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van
with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda
XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the
investigators sent a Flash Message to the different
police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort
to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the
suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative
results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation
were included in a Special Report61 that was
transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office,
headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin
(Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in
turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3

about the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were,
at the same time, pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon
Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police
Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special
Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group
CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the
abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a
series of background examinations on the victims of
the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive
behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the
perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained
liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for
Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations
trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the
latters
participation
in
the
ongoing
66
investigations. Unfortunately, the letters sent by the
investigators requesting for the availability of the
petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task
Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General
Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police. However, as of their latest report
dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still
unable to make a definitive finding as to the true
identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task
group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the
petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in
their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of
National Defense, first came to know about the alleged
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of
the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other
respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately
thereafter,
he
issued
a
Memorandum
Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry
to determine the validity of the accusation of military
involvement in the abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public
respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of
Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed to
public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit
(Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the
Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on
the abduction of the petitioner.74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the
amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit
instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A.
Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort
Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding
the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at
the camp in the purported abduction of the
petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen.
Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal
(OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the
investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division
released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results
of its inquiry. In substance, the report described
petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and thereby
cleared the military from any involvement in her
alleged abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight
and consideration to the petitioners version that she
was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for
five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the
sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed
the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was
thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth. 80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded
the argument of the public respondents that the
abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it
is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only
the latter and her companions knew where they were
staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The
Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical
Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the
existence of a true abduction, as its findings are
reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have
sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly
when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her
abductors onto their van.82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of
an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner,
as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and
monitor her, even after she was released.83 This threat,
according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more
compounded by the failure of the police authorities to
identify the material perpetrators who are still at
large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by
directing the public respondents to afford protection to
the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of

extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction.85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a
transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of "records of
investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate
court derived the existence of such records from a
photograph and video file presented in a press
conference by party-list representatives Jovito
Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover),
which allegedly show the petitioner participating in
rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed
that the photograph and video came from a female
CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of
the photograph and video, as well as any form of
media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPPNPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to
privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on
her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate
court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data
mandating the public respondents to refrain from
distributing to the public any records, in whatever form,
relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of
Appeals was not convinced that the military or any
other person acting under the acquiescence of the
government, were responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed
that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner
merely "believed" that the military was behind her
abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the
public respondents from any complicity in the
abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was
likewise dismissed as against public respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her
immunity from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of
her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioners
prayers for an inspection order and production order
also met the same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95 Corollary

to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of
Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her
personal belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her
abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she
heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her
two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are
already sufficient evidence to prove government
involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes
the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the
high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded
as
respondents
in
her
amparo
petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a
pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit
in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the
return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as
the justification in impleading the public respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a
rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead
a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to
examine command responsibility in the context of an
amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used
to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine
finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command
responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine
of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable
for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should
he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission
mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior
is
made
responsible
for crimes

committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or
punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he
ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring
supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is
more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of
the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted
by the court, in order to address specific violations or
threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its
proceedings is the initial determination of whether an
enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats
thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing,
fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale
underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ
has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case
of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings. 109(Emphasis
supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be impleadednot
actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but
interrelated
concepts
of
responsibility
and
accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to
wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors

have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to
the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that
the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public
respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility
on their part, based on her assumption that they, in
one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and
torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to
show that it was government agents who were behind
her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the
circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture
i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of
vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds;
conducting interrogations to elicit communist
inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse
which, according to her, is consistent with the way
enforced disappearances are being practiced by the
military or other state forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held
inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel
time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence
presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military
or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with those

surrounding
previous
instances
of
enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such
abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is
concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as
substantial evidence of the involvement of the
government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability
or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has
the potential of directly proving the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to
remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to
include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the cartographic
sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces
she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these
cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of
giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and
affiliation of petitioners abductors. Unfortunately for
the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in
view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel.
Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of
command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken
to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by
her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place
where she was detained and by the sounds that she
heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are
not inclined to take the estimate and observations of
the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only
because they were made mostly while she was in
blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a
mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity
with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to
reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but
obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim
that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere
speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a
concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the

military or the police organizations. Neither does the
evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed
taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the
exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in
turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether
the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public
respondents. On account of this insufficiency in
evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the
part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be
made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above
prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the
latter to prove that the public respondents were
involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely
with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this
Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether
there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public
respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the
liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a
full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed
above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying
the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a
persons right to be restituted of his property is already
subsumed under the general rubric of property rights
which are no longer protected by the writ of
amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, 120 which
defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by
the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of
the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing
to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this
Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals
in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a
contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a
"fishing expedition," which was never intended by the
Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection
order.122 Contrary
to
the
explicit
123
position espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo
Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an
amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making
a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo
court may grant an inspection order is that the place to
be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. While the
Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be
inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie
case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to
do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the
petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima
facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay,
an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered.
An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and
doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to
the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data,
by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing
or causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPPNPA or pertinently related to her abduction and
torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal,
this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to
rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by
the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant
portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the

records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged
from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in
the Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay
Laya which listed political opponents against whom
false criminal charges were filed based on made up
and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner
could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito
Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held
a press conference where they revealed that they
received an information from a female NPA rebel who
wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information
reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner
holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video
CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that
she was the person in said video, there were records
of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a
doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable
connections, one way or another, to petitioners
abduction where she claimed she had been subjected
to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly
caused her life precisely due to allegation of her
alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said
report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy
will certainly be in danger of being violated or
transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments
or aversion against members of this group. The
unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD
or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption
without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly
violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be
protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons
right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement
before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual
or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim. 127 This, in the case at
bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of
Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record
that shows that any of the public respondents had
violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to
the public respondents that would have violated or
threatened
the
right
to
privacy
of
the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and
other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPPNPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the
origin of such records were virtually unexplained and
its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that
any of the public respondents had access to such
video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by
the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents
from "distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid
of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be
ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in
the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public
respondents were found to be actually responsible for
the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any
inference regarding the existence of reports being kept
in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the
writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while
telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents,
revealed two important things that can guide Us to a
proper disposition of this case. One, that further
investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence
must be made in order to identify the perpetrators
behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and

two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights and to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights," 128must
be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and
remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason
why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial
evidence proving her allegations of government
complicity in her abduction and torture, may be
attributed to the incomplete and one-sided
investigations conducted by the government itself. This
"awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged
to be involved in an enforced disappearance or
extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones
tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main
source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any
petitioner in any amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule
placed a potent safeguardrequiring the "respondent
who is a public official or employee" to prove that no
less than "extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any
of the public respondents is able to show to the
satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary
diligence has been observed in their investigations,
they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility
despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that
effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence,
as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully
observed in the conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by
Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the
part of the police investigators to identify the
perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports
are replete with background checks on the victims of
the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively
silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have
been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime.
Although conducting a background investigation on the
victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive
behind the abductionits necessity is clearly
outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators,

especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who
was no longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their
investigations solely on the cooperation or noncooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was
less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that
the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated
the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation,
this Court believes that the formers reticence to
cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group
CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues
from which they could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed,
while the allegations of government complicity by the
petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate
evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless,
a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must
be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high
standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in
the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task
Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it
never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus
Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central
witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group
CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr.
Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the
very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was
not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a
comparative material to the sketches included in
petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out,
were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters
independent investigation on the abduction and torture
of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR
sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that further investigation under the
norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken.
This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the
basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the
police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to
security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
because of the deficient investigation that directly
contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate courts directive,
however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the
primary task of conducting further investigations on the

abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the
CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the
military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the
petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and
participation in the hearings already conducted by the
commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations
of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears
the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus,
vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this
perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the
petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic
sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor,
to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a
copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution
and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or
his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a
copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already
part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court
of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and
its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide
or continue to provide protection to the petitioner
during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such
time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the
Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient
evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making
such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit
its own report with recommendation to this Court for
final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have
jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its
tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for
the return of her personal belongings;
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the

Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish
to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner
or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than
those that are already part of the records of this case,
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human
Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of
the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or
visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of
Appeals for the following purposes:
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for

an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken

by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas

data, without prejudice, however, to any modification
that this Court may make on the basis of the
investigation reports and recommendations submitted
to it under this decision.
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and

recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and
torture of the petitioner was committed by persons
acting under any of the public respondents; and on the
basis of this determination
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation

must be undertaken, as follows
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from

receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which
shall include a recommendation either for the
DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public
respondents who were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE
UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible
and/or accountable.
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as

the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human
Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic
sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on Human Rights,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy
of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution
and existing laws.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain

personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA
that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. ANDAN

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 116437
March 3, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @
BOBBY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant
Pablito
Andan
y
Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of
rape with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the
municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes
against her will and without her consent; and the
above-named accused in order to suppress evidence
against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes,
attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow
blocks in her face and in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which
directly caused her death.
take her blood pressure as the old woman was her

distant relative. She did not know that nobody was
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her.
His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl
to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her
there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled
Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side
by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side
was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside
the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body
over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the
girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete
block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the
other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow
portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994,
the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked
from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt
pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with
a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc
revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries"
sustained as follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear,
generally oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
Contrary to Law.
2.2 cheek, right.

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994
at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision,
Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of
age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of
Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her
final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne
wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school
uniforms, some personal effects and more than
P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when
appellant invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.

2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,
approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left
AAL.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:

3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline
lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of
1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and
frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both
labia, introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the
vaginal cavity showed negative for spermatozoa
(Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr.
Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to
Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and
prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a
crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Searching the place where Marianne's body was
found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of
concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a
pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the
police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen
in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the
house and learned from Romano Calma, the
stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant
also lived there but that he, his wife and son left
without a word. Calma surrendered to the police
several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a

pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain,
a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The
clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the
house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On
February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They
took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the
police headquarters where he was interrogated.
Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with
the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the
bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and
said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo
Dizon, killed Marianne and that he was merely a
lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and
Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. 6 Immediately, the
police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon,
who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought
there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at
the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and
retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which
were later identified as belonging to Marianne.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and
the two other suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to
the police headquarters. The following day, February
25, a physical examination was conducted on the
suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side.
Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at the
back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index
finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were
already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived
and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing
the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a
request that they talk privately. The mayor led
appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there,
appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to
let the public and media representatives witness the
confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered
the proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In
the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives

of the media and appellant's own wife and son,
appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he
killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness
from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against
them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his mind
because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he
read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant
hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and
covered by the media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters.
The next two days, February 26 and 27, more
newspaper, radio and television reporters came.
Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his
confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of
"not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of
February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in
Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his
nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00
P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their
one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke
up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to
Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went
to his parents' house where he helped his father
cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in
the afternoon and they stayed there until February 24,
1994 when he was picked up by the police.16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at
Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the
policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and
kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess
that he raped and killed Marianne. When he refused,
they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected
something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant
confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was
taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors,
Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to
the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags
from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant
did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court
convicted appellant and sentenced him to death
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also
ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00
as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial
expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan

y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof
beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in
accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law)
Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the
heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of Marianne
Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of
Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial
and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages. After automatic review of this case and the
decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be
carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in
accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR
ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED
DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE
ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A
FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE
IN
ITS
TOTALITY
SHOWS
THAT
THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant
on the testimonies of the three policemen of the
investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news
reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral
confessions. It was also based on photographs and
video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the
testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news
reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel.

Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
suspect even before the police found him at his

parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of
SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of
the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it
was accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last
found is at the backyard of the house of the accused.
Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and
third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his
other companions in the house, he said that, it was
Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and
whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
(4) . . .
A: Yes, sir.
Plainly, any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to
remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed
of
such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is
inadmissible
in
evidence
against
him. 21 The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that
the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
and runs through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion
physical
and
psychological,
is
forcefully
22
apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later
judicial determination of what really transpired. 23
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12

are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense." An investigation begins
when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts
interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect
in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
"investigation conducted by police authorities which
will include investigations conducted by the municipal
police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no
longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of
Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from
information we learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him
there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation
when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional
rights
when
he
was
investigated
and
interrogated. 27His confession is therefore inadmissible
in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from
appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of
the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to
recover these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1
because accused pointed to them, where did he point
these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the
two (2) bags beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information
where these two (2) bags were located?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags
could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the
accused so that we would know where the two (2)
bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before
the accused pointed to the place where the bags were
located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he
covered the canal, he really showed where the bags
were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's
uncounselled confession to the police. They are
tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial
confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited
the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room
and appellant confessed that he alone committed the
crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad
testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when
there were already many people from the media,
Andan whispered something to me and requested that
he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened
inside the office of the Chief of Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told
me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I
am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was
telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I
opened the door to allow the media to hear what he
was going to say and I asked him again whether he
was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was
even covered by a television camera. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to
you that he will tell you something and then you
responded by bringing him inside the office of the
Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he
killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words

"Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay
Marianne," was that the only admission that he told
you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was,
when we were alone and the second one was before
the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the
room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I
stopped him from making further admissions because I
wanted the media people to hear what he was going to
say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully
claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible.
It
is
true
that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and
control"
over
the
local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section
12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact,
the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was
appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the
mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been
held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under
Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest
use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused
to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we
hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was
correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise
properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to

news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
and everything that transpired during the killing of

Marianne Guevarra.
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television

reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed
appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was
recorded on video and showed that appellant made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the
presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9
also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He
testified that:
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or

ask permission from the accused Pablito Andan that
you were going to interview him?
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were

able to reach the place where the body of Marianne
was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and
interview inside the police station of Baliuag and I
identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned
earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one
who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from
him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and
that he was responsible for raping and killing the
victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission
was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or
violence that was committed on his person because I
knew that there were five other suspects in this case
and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the
influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom
lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused
was present, was the uncle beside him at the time that
you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain
whose name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay
captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the
crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra
resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the
office of the Station Commander, there was no air of
any force or any threatening nature of investigation
that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was
able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he
admitted to me that he was the one who raped and
killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying
me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused
at the office of the Baliuag PNP, you also went to the
scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen
including Mayor Trinidad and some of the relatives of
the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused,
Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of
Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were
present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many
wailing, weeping and crying at that time when he was
already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police,
sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the
crime in Concepcion, Baliuag, Bulacan, what
transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig
deeper on how the crime was committed by the
accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and
asked him to narrate to me and show me how he
carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra,
sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your
interview at the PNP Baliuag up to the scene of the
crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam

mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay
at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
A: Yes, sir. 39
xxx xxx xxx
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite"
likewise covered the proceedings for three successive
days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own
inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to
interrupt their own investigation so that we can have a
direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included
the mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the
policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several
other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor
presented the suspect to us and after the suspect
admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I
reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware
that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with
murder is a capital offense? And you could be
sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do
you really admit that you were the one who did it and
he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you
mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my
camera to take some pictures of the suspect, the
mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the
group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions
from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?

A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me
was because a devil gripped his mind and because of
that according to him, your Honor, were the
pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which
he, according to him, reads almost everyday before
the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr.
Reporter, will you tell the court and the public what was
the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on
his body that he was really down physically and I think
he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only
apparent but there was no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you

mentioned?
xxx xxx xxx 41
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera"

interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also
testified that:
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same

as the accused answered you affirmatively, what was
the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the
question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused

Pablito Andan give you the permission that you asked
from him?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who
were present?
She entered the house and he boxed her on the

stomach.
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor

Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the chief
investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the
chief of police was suspended, it was the deputy who
was there, sir.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when

you interviewed the accused?
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that

you made a news item on that?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was

crowded with people. There were people from the PNP
and people from Baliuag, sir.
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I

did.
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the

reason why he killed the victim was because he was
afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?

Q: How about the other representatives from the
media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived
late and there were people from the radio and from TV
Channel 9.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side
of the fence, sir.
Q: How about Channel 7?

A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop
first, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of

Marianne to the other side of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to

interview him, was his wife also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not
very sure if she was really the wife but they were
hugging each other and she was crying and from the
questions that I asked from the people there they told
me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the
accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many
people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item
about the interview. May we know what question did
you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his
answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that,
he saw the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that

interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters
were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They
were not acting under the direction and control of the
police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant
to grant them an interview and reenact the commission
of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission
before interviewing him. They interviewed him on
separate days not once did appellant protest his
innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt
to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters
were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There
was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of
appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the
newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does
not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. 46 It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the
State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of
the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to
protect. 47Governmental power is not unlimited and the
Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its
agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the
sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr.
Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the
Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy
and found no spermatozoa and no recent physical
injuries
in
the
hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been
caused by her menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was
conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda,
a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of
spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had
lacerations, thus:
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that

what you did on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy,
that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before
you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found
in the vagina could have been sustained on account of
the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted
the autopsy on the victim which was already dead, no
amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more
circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I
presumed that when the doctor examined the victim
with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor,
then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it
is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen
were caused by those instruments because the victim
was already dead and usually in a dead person we do
not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the
lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock
positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could
have been inflicted or could have been sustained while
the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Hymen contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations

with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding
to
the
walls
of
the
clock. 51
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the

edges of the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go
over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the
edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the
clotted blood?
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and

that they may have been caused by an object forcibly
inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive,
indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His
testimony is as follows:
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is

the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot
at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges
of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found

lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position
corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because
within the edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot,
that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?

A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is
forcibly inserted into that small opening of the hymen
causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she
sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the
commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete
penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female
organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations
found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the
first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim
was raped by appellant are supported by other
evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an
investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along
the subdivision road near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother
and grandmother were not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the
fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the wall.
Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and
at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating
that her body had been dragged over a flat rough
surface.60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown
over the fence and dragged to where her body was
found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were
found in the laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of
appellant were found positive for the presence of blood
type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not
determined but her parents had type "A" and type
"AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were
found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his

body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their
residence after the incident and were later found at his
parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together
with the other circumstantial evidence justify the
conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the
prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the
test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a
few kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and
can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant
Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide under
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the
Court, however, voting to imposereclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and
P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty.

under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and

October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE

(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally

The accused were:

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated

1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972,

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972,

2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 2

Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

Due process of law demands that in all criminal

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 3

release, directed the Department of Justice to file the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 4

On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 5

paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 6

in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 7

expense-producing for the state as well. It has been

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 8

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE

and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 9

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first

mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 10

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 11

should prove that they are on the side of the military

Raymond narrated his conversation

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen.

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 12

Raymond narrated what

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 13

severely beaten up and told that they were indeed

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 14

rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 15

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (Atty. Rovyne Jumao-as) 16

suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was