Samar Mining Company vs Francisco Arnado

24 SCRA 402 Legal Ethics Duty to Assist in the

Administration of Justice
In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against
Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded
compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a
disease he incurred while working for Samar Mining. The
decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer
duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a regional
administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961,
Samar Minings lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed an
action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that
Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case
because he was a mere labor lawyer who had no
authority to render the award being complained of. CFI
Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made
a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-15658,
August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by
regional administrators of the labor department may
issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still
filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is
just to delay and prolong the litigation in the hope of
draining the resources of the poorer party and of
compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion. The
conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the
duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice,
not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court
ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas to shoulder the
litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975
NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit
against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain
machineries.-1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and
Henson- 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court
issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was
made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the
sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the
petition;
SC
affirmed
dismissal- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of prelimin

ary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of

execution; his motions were denied- 1963 sheriff sold
the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed
to redeem- 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale;
CFI issued writ of possession to the properties- 1964
Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered
against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal
obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal
house could not legally be reached by the levy made;
CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and
the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the
battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining
order continued- 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of
possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition
with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos
appealed to SC which dismissed the petition- Agos filed
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid
controversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of
their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them,
for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty.
Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicia lprocess to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty.Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator
ofcontroversy and a predator of conflict instead of amedi
ator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.- A counsels assertiveness in espousing
with candor and honesty his clients cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does
not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence
despite the patent futility of his clients position. It is the
duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or
lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as
defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter
toacquiesce and submit rather than traverse theincontro
vertible. A lawyer must resist the whims andcaprices of
his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.

Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna

54 SCRA 243
Facts:
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered
owner of a residential land where petitioner and her late

husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, constructed a residential

house Unable to pay the lease rental an action for
ejectment. The filing of said case spawned various court
suits such as petition for certiorari, which further prolong
the litigation process.
Issue:
Should the petitioners counsel deserved condemnation
before SC.
Held:
Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and
a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate
the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to
prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the
part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigorous
condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant
misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be
resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind
unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and
simply wastes the precious time that they could well
devote to really meritorious cases.

ROXAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 118436
March 21, 1997

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the CA decision

dated December 8, 1994 alleging reversible error
committed by respondent appellate court when it
affirmed the decision of the RTC of Cavite.
On July 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun
Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun
Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two
parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay City. In
support of its application for registration, Maguesun
Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor
and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00.
Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the
original petitioner herein (because she was substituted
by her heirs in the proceedings upon her death), Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half
months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) on the basis of Maguesun
Corporations application for registration enumerating
adjoining owners, occupants or adverse claimants; Since
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named therein,
she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. After an
Order of general default was issued, the trial court
proceeded
to
hear
the
land
registration
case. Eventually, on February 1991 the RTC granted
Maguesun Corporations application for registration.

It was only when the caretaker of the property was being

asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon
Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of
the lots in Maguesun Corporations name.
Hence, on April 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review
before the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on
the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the
properties she inherited from her husband, former
President Manuel A. Roxas and that her family had been
in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property in the concept of
owner for more than thirty years before they applied for
its registration under the Torrens System of land titling
(in which no decision has been rendered thereon).
Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida
Melliza whom she had never met before and that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. She also claimed that
Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as
an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the
application for registration submitted to the LRA such
that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial
Hearing.
A document examiner from the PNP concluded that
there was no forgery.Upon petitioners motion, the
signatures were re-examined by another expert from
NBI. The latter testified that the signatures on the
questioned
and
sample
documents
were,
however, not written by the same person.
Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements,
the trial courtdismissed the petition for review of decree
of registration. Placing greater weight on the findings
and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it
concluded that the questioned documents were not
forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not
Maguesun
Corporation,
who
was
responsible.
Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit
actual fraud.
In a decision dated December 8, 1994, respondent
court denied the petition for review and affirmed the
findings of the trial court. The CA held that petitioner
failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or
extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic
fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a
judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged
that the CA erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation
did not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside
of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on
the basis of Maguesun Corporations good faith.
Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in
the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that
said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and
that respondent corporation pay for damages.
ISSUE: WON private respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud (signature forgery) in obtaining a
decree of registration over the two parcels of

land, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or

review a decree of registration.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the CA is hereby
REVERSED AND SET AS
1. The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration sought to be reviewed by
petitioner. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record
leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery
was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there
is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporations direct
participation in the execution and preparation of the
forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which
proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the innocent
purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law.
Even to a laymans eye, the documents, as well as the
enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal
forgery. Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas non-appearance
raises doubt as to her existence
Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces
of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants.
This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the
value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that
indication that she would sell over 13,000 sqm of prime
property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly
P200,000.00. Would an ordinary person sell more than
13,000 sqm of prime property for P170,000.00 when it
was earlier purchased for P200,000.00?
3. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun
Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of
the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant
of the subject property.
The names in full and addresses, as far as known to the
undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of
the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5
(mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the
person shown on the plan (original application
submitted in LRC No) as claimants are as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road
all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30
The highlighted words are typed in with a different
typewriter, with the first five letters of the word
provincial typed over correction fluid. Maguesun
Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded
application for thepetition to review case. In the copy
submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same
number is as follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears

intentional. If the word Roxas were indeed erased and
replaced with Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no
house No.) in the original application submitted in LRC
No. TG-373 BUT the copy with the word Roxas was
submitted to the trial court, it is reasonable to assume
that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
Roxas was placed in the original application as an
adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant,
the same application which formed the basis for the LRA
Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing.
(Section 15 of PD No. 1529 actually requires the
applicant for registration to state the full names and
addresses of all occupants of the land and those of
adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent
of the search made to find them. Respondent
corporation likewise failed to comply with this
requirement of law.)
Respondent corporations intentional concealment and
representation of petitioners interest in the subject lots
as possessor, occupant and claimantconstitutes actual
fraud justifying the reopening and review of the
decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the
Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration
proceedings involving their property, thus effectively
depriving them of their day in court.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in
possession of the property uninterruptedly through their
caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun
Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same
application that the subject land was unoccupied when in
truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in
the subject property.
To conclude, it is quite clear that respondent corporation
cannot tack its possession to that of petitioner as
predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed not
title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun
Corporation
as
she
was
not
the
owner
thereof. Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled
to the registration decree which the trial court
granted in its decision.
Petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than
thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and
notorious possession in the concept of an owner over
the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida
Melliza.She therefore retains title proper and sufficient
for original registration over the two parcels of land in
question pursuant to Section 14 of PD No. 1529.