ALVAREZ v.

IAC

ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY v. LUZON SURETY

FACTS: The real properties involved are two parcels of land (lot 773 and 823) in Murcia,
Negros Occidental which were registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.
Aniceto was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents
are his grandchildren. His children and grandchildren left the province to settle in other
places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. From the "Japanese time up to peace
time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when one of
the grandchildren went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was
informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession
of said lots.

REYES, J. B. L., J. FACTS: The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate for
reimbursement based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each
subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary
guarantor in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having
guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. RTC dismissed the
claims of Luzon Surety Co., on the ground that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys
death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be
guarantor.

It is on record that in 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued TCT covering the lots. In 1955,
Santiago sold the lots to Monico Fuentebella, Jr. After Fuentebella's death, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) sold said lots to Rosendo Alvarez after
having been authorized by the court to sell the same. Two years later, Teodora Yanes and
the children of her brother Rufino filed in the CFI of Negros Occidental a complaint against
Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of the lots. During the
pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lot 773 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
Meanwhile, in 1962, the plaintiffs, filed a quitclaim in favor of Fuentebella.
In 1963, CFI ruled ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs the said lots and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the
plaintiffs. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773
since the lot was already "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason and that it could not be delivered
to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution."
In 1968 the Yaneses filed a case for recovery of real property against Siason, the
Alvarez. The lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in
question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a
buyer in good faith. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice
of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their
rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they
recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and
Siason was without court approval. The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees.
ISSUE: W the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of the lots to
Siason could be legally passed or transmitted by operations of law to the petitioners.
RULING: Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code will apply, specifically Articles 774, 776, and 1311.Petitioners being the heirs
of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the
monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and
we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment
of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only
to the extent of the value of their
inheritance.________________________________________________________________________

ISSUE: W a solidary guarantors liability is extinguished by his death.

RULING: We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311),
the rule is that Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. In our
successional system the heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but
also to his obligations: ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
The heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation
to any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to
their hands by right of inheritance. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of
the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of
a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed
among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from
the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the
amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs
would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed
by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring
those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. The second exception is
intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. This intransmissibility should not be easily
implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the
provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate
that they are non-transferable. The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations
exists when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference
to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by
death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct
(Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and
agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or
suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished
upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.

The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one who
is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to
bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees. It
will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time
of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has
become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor
would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057 which infers that the
supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity
after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the
creditor to demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the
creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and hold the
guarantor to his bargain.
The Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the
principal debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file
such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his
principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may
equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter
does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor. The
foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against
the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil
Code.___________________________________________________________________

UNION BANK v. SANTIBAEZ

FACTS: In 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into two loan agreement intended for the payment of the purchase price of 2
units of Ford Tractor and 1 unit Howard Rotamotor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund, as one
of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and
his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by
them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed
by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay.
Thus the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs Edmund and
Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.

the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial
court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs was, in effect, a
partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition
until after the will has been probated. CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: a) W the partition in the Agreement of the heirs is valid; b) w the heirs assumption
of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) w the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.
RULING: a) In testate succession, there
can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. The joint
agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
In executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction
of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of
the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the
court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to
the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
b) The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. The heirs assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent
on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as
earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
c) Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence
presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were
executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary
to delve into the matter further.________________________

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

The RTC of Makati City held that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as

FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of 5 parcels of land

in Labrador, Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four
children before the CFI of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment. Defendants set up as special defense that on February 21,
1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their
separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she
renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his
death.
After trial, CFI ordered the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and
possession of the lands in dispute. Defendants interposed the present appeal. Defendants
contend that under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, the 4 minors
are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights
which the law accords (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these
successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the prior legislation (Article 2253, NCC)
ISSUE: W these successional rights declared in the NCC may be given retroactive effect.
RULING: The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the
lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her
husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered
into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti
Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
There is no merit in their claim invoking Article 2253. Said article provides indeed that
rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is
so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the
same origin. As already stated, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because
of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.____

DE BORJA v. VDA DE BORJA

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
FACTS: Case No.L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana de Borja, special administratrix of the
testate estate of Francisco de Borja, from the approval of a compromise agreement by the
CFI of Rizal. Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval
of the same compromise agreement by the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco in 1940, filed a petition for the
probate of her will in the CFI of Rizal. In 1946, Francisco was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died in 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his
mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a
second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate
proceedings in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar. In order
to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963, by and between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja. The
compromise agreement contained, inter alia, the ff provisions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in
Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana the amount of P800,000,
in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata
shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be
considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the
estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her
for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall
depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total
and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise,
the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND
WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court
declared it void and unenforceable.
ISSUE: W the heirs can enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco de Borja RULING: There was no attempt to settle or distribute the
estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The
clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of
any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other
claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of
such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present
Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional
interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and

would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a
previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases,
cannot apply to the case of Tasiana. It is clear that the transaction was binding
on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court,
is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is
explicit on the point: Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
This brings us to the plea that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the
compromise with Jose de Borja because Tasiana was not an heir in the estate of Josefa
Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja,
whose estate was the object of a special proceeding in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as
already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the
Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code: Art. 1088. Should
any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price
of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.

vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which
is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her
death. Her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for
her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for
them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the
respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were
still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent
Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the
instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court
that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them.
Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the
case.____________________________________________

HEIRS OF CONTI v. COURT OF APPEALS

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a
coheir could not be
forbidden.__________________________________________________________________________________
__

BONILLA v. BARCENA

FACTS: Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners
of the property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot in Lucena City. In 1986
Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue. Subsequently, in1987 private respondents,
all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an action for
partition before the RTC of Lucena City.

FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to
quiet title over certain parcels of land. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a MD the
complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal
capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for
substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court
after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot
be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that
private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as
party-defendant by his children.

ISSUE: W the minors may substitute for their mother.

RULING: The Court reverses the respondent. While it is true that a person who is dead
cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its
completion. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From
the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived
of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is
the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased

ISSUE: W a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner can
prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal
requirements, especially publication.
RULING: A prior settlement of the
estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to
the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud. Conformably with the said case and taken
in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes
Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her
rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised
the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.

In 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. It further ordered respondents and petitioners to
submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the
court. The CA affirmed the assailed RTC decision.

Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of
estates of small value. But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere
segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through
intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between coowners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and
second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what
portion should go to which co-owner. The documentary and testimonial evidence submitted
are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes
Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent. ___________________________________________

RAYMUNDO v. VDA. DE SUAREZ

FACTS: Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez marriage was blessed with both material
wealth and progeny in herein respondents. During their marriage, governed by the CPG
regime, they acquired the subject properties. After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista
and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.s estate. All the properties were held pro indiviso by
Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not changed, with Teofista
as de facto administrator thereof. In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation and Teofista, the latter
owning ninety percent (90%) of the formers shares of stock, were sued by petitioner
Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in
consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages. Thereafter, in 1975, the
CFI of Rizal, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the respective contracts of plaintiffs with
Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs for
damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00. Eventually, a certificate of
sale was issued to the plaintiffs, having bought the properties levied on execution to satisfy
the judgment. Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, herein
respondents filed a revindicatory action against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No.
51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied
properties.Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject
properties. CA affirmed.
Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the RTC for failure of herein respondents to
prosecute. But in yet another turn of events, the RTC lifted its previous order of dismissal
and directed the issuance of alias summons. Thus, it was now petitioners turn to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the various orders of the RTC, which all rejected
their bid to dismiss. The CA granted their petition. From this ruling, herein respondents
appealed to the SC. SC reversed the decis of CA and ordered Civil Case No. 51203
reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.

It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present
petition. Part of the records went missing and were lost. In this regard, herein respondents
filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records of the case. The RTC eventually granted
the motion for reconstitution. Thereafter, an Urgent Motion to direct compliance by
respondents with SC Decision or to consider the matter submitted without evidence on the
part of respondents was filed by petitioners.
The case is dismissed. Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA. The appellate court granted the petition. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on
the order of the RTC. The appeal, on motion of [herein respondents] was denied. The denial
of petitioner Valentes MR prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari. On the
ground that: The CA ignored and violated the SCs ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario which held that a declaration of heirship must be made in a special administration
proceeding and not in a civil action.
ISSUE: W theres still a need to re-declare respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
RULING: We find the petition bereft of merit. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint was
dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate any proof or even a semblance of it
that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses
Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal that there is no need
to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably. Petitioners became owners of the properties only by virtue of an execution
sale to recover Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofistas,
and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not
absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in
fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s
death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership
was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs. Compulsory succession is a
distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil Code. It
reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of
heirs, or combination of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so
reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code defines legitime as that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain
heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. Herein respondents are primary
compulsory heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring
compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedents estate.
Herein respondents ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became
absolute upon Marcelos death, although their respective shares therein remained pro
indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to
answer for Teofistas judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents share
therein was null and void. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to
dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of
the subject properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and
sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by
herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject
properties.
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where we scrutinized our ruling
in Heirs of Yaptinchay We ruled thus: The common doctrine in these cases in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are

no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file
one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs has lost the right to have
himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein
respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and
require herein respondents to institute a separate special proceeding for a declaration of
their heirship.__________________________________________

will a question of legal title be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the
power of the court to put a purchaser in possession. A very serious question may arise upon
full proofs as to where the legal title to the property rests, and should not be disposed of in
a summary way. The petitioner, it is held, should be required to establish his title in a
proceeding directed to that end.
Here, petitioners as children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of spouses Nicolas, acquired
ownership of portions of the lots as their legitime upon the death of their father or prior to
the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by the respondent of its petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession. Consequently, petitioners are strangers or third parties therein
whose rights cannot be determined as they were not impleaded by respondent. Verily, they
should not be deprived of their legitime by the enforcement of the writ of possession.
Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession should not include parts of the two lots pertaining
to petitioners.

HEIRS OF NICOLAS v. METROPOLITAN BANK

FACTS: Sps. Domingo and Josefa Nicolas are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of
land located at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City . On these lots is the residential house of
spouses Nicolas and their two children, herein petitioners. These properties are conjugal.
On May 19, 1986, Domingo Nicolas passed away. On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the office
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Among the records destroyed were the original
copies of TCTs of the lands. Sometime in 1988, Josefa filed with the LRA an application for
reconstitution of the two (2) land titles. In 1991, the LRA approved the application and
ordered the reconstitution of the destroyed TCTs but only in the name of applicant Josefa
Nicolas.
In 1998, petitioners learned that their mother mortgaged the lots with the Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co., herein respondent; that the mortgage had been foreclosed; that
respondent had the land titles consolidated in its name; and that respondent filed with the
RTC a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession which was granted. Petitioners then
filed for Annulment of Reconstituted Titles, Mortgage and Sale at Public Auction. This case
is still pending trial.
Petitioners also filed a motion to quash the writ of possession, but it was denied.
Thereupon, they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed. MR denied,
hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: W the writ of possession may apply to the portion of the lots pertaining to the
children.
RULING: No. In Rivero de Ortega v.
Natividad SC has ruled: The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree
in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the
latter will not be driven to an action in law to obtain possession. The power of the court to
issue a process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that
it has power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious
litigation. But where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and
did not acquire his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but
who is a mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was
begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the
decree. The reason for this limitation is that the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor

Records indicate that the estate of Domingo Nicolas has not been judicially or extrajudicially settled. Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that such
writ of possession should apply only to the share of Josefa as may be determined in Civil
Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any other proceeding that may be instituted by petitioners for
the purpose of settling the undivided estate of Domingo Nicolas.___________