X.

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

1. Generally

Ebarle v Sucaldito

Facts:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur
Bienvenido Ebarle, was charged with various violations of certain
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act. The charges are
as follows

The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general

o nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019
o exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain
parcel of land in his favor, over which the provincial
government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
o and making untruthful statements in the certificates of
appointment of certain employees in his office.
On the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No.
33628 involve charges
o of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for
certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft statute;
o manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the
capitol building;
o testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged
that he was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of
Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code;
o and simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in
connection with another public works project.

For both of which petitioner requested the respective CFI and was granted
a restraining order, but through the subsequent motion of the
respondents, the restraining orders were lifted and the petitions
themselves dismissed.
Thus a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction was
initiated by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, which resulted in the stay
of the implementation of dismissal order. Subsequently, the SC
consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for
decision.

The issue being asserted by the petitioner is that the respondents City
Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"
Wherein paragraphs 4 & 6 of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 outlining the
procedure by which complainants charging government officials and
employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, states that
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the
President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial
governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly
acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in
accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials
or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the
innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that
other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the
interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been
exhausted.
The court thus held that it is plain from the very wording of the Order
that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints.
The ratio being that the very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of
criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the
more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials,
reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, while
paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police
Act of 1966. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter
of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is
no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such
a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a
condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued
forthwith by the interested parties, " but that does not, so we hold, cover
proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior

administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is

closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall
have been exhausted," which suggests civil suits subject to previous
administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question
makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ...
removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to
criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical
terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not
necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material
in construing the intent of the measure.
The court thus ruled that the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the
petitioners
People v Purisima
Refresher: This case is about the judges of the lower courts who
acquitted people supposed to be punished under PD9(3) for illegal
possession of dangerous weapon, saying that it needs a criminal intent to
perpetrate rebellion, subversion for the said act to be punished.
Doctrine:
1) Since the problem here requires to look into the intent and spirit of the
decree, the court can use the "preamble" or "whereas" clauses which
enumerates the facts & events which justify promulgation of the decree &
the stiff sanctions stated therein.
2.) It is a salutary principle of stat con that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statutes is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
Commission of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.
FACTS:
May 15, 1981- TMX Sales, Inc, a domestic corporation filed its quarterly
income tax return for the 1st Quarter of 1981, declaring a
taxable income of Php 571,174.31 and consequently
paying an income tax thereon of Php 247,010.00.
2nd - 4th Qcompany suffered losses
April 15, 1982- TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended
December 31, 1981 declaring:
Gross Income
Php
904,122.00
Total Deductions
7,060,647.00
Net Income (Loss) Php (6,156,525.00)

July 9, 1982-

TMX thru SGV & Co. (external auditor) filed with the
Appellate Division of the BIR a claim for refund
representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year
ended Dec. 31, 1981
(Amount: Php 247,010.00 paid in 1st Q).
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.
March 14, 1984TMX filed a petition for review before the Court of
Tax Appeals against the Commissioner praying for the
ordering of the refund.
The Commissioners defense was that granting, without
admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales,
Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than
two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981)
and the filing of the claim in Court ( March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and
295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended). The Tax Court granted the
petition and viewed the quarterly income tax paid as a portion or
installment of the total annual income tax due.
The Commissioner seeks a reversal of the decision, hence this
case.
ISSUES(S):

WON the two-year prescription provided for in sec. 292 of the

Tax Code should be counted from the date when the quarterly
income was paid (May 15,1981).

RULING:

Petition of the Commissioner denied and decision of the Court of

Tax Appeals affirmed.
RATIO DECIDENDI:

WON the two-year prescription provided for in sec. 292 of the Tax
Code should be counted from the date when the quarterly income
was paid (May 15,1981).

No, it should start from the filing of the Annual Income Tax Return.
The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in sec. 85 and
implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax
should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due. These
quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative
figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable
income, should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income
tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. This is
reinforced by sec. 87 which provides for the filing of adjustment returns
and final payment of income tax. Consequently, the two-year prescriptive
period provided in sec. 292 should be computed from the time of filing the
Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of

income tax. Hence, the action has not prescribed since the prescriptive
period starts from April 15, 1982 and the action was filed on March 14,
1984. 2 years have not elapsed.
(Sec. 292 if applied literally to the case, which involves quarterly
income tax payments, may lead to absurdity and inconvenience. It was
then interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order
to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law,
which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
The other provisions are: sec. 85 which provided for the method
of computing corporate quarterly income tax which is on cumulative basis;
and sec. 87 that required the filing of an adjustment returns and final
payment of income tax. Refer to p. 189 of the case for the original
provision)

People v Subido
Refresher: Subido was contending that even though he couldnt pay the
fine & indemnity imposed on him, he couldnt be required to serve the
amount of fine & indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment bec the
judgment didnt expressly & specifically provide for subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Doctrine: The aid to construction here is the use of punctuation marks
w/c may be an aid in the interpretation of statutes when there is ambiguity
(wherein you qualify the punctuation mark). As in this case, the court
based its ruling on the use of a comma in the questioned decision.
* sir stated however, that this must NOT be construed as controlling.

NOTES on AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION - Generally:

Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. No
suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously
or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive
or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has
been duly filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but such suit
or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or
sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after the
expiration of two years fro the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: x x x.
INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT
EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted.
Ppl v Rivera: statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will
give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.
Some Aids Given:
1. Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be
discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute
2. To discover intent: the whole statute and not only a particular
provision thereof should be considered.
3. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Refresher: The issue in this case is WON the plaintiffs as share tenants
are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the
purchasers thereof. They invoked the right of redemption granted by Sec.
12 of RA 3844. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the
exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code was given by respondent vendor to
petitioners-tenants. The SC ruled in their favor saying that the very
essence of the Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share
tenancy.
Doctrine: Where the true intent of the law is clear such intent or spirit
must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital
purpose of the statute.

2. Legislative History
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory [1957]
FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the
plaintiff-appellant imported sun-dried cocoa beans for which it paid the
foreign exchange tax of 17% totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption
from said tax under Section 2 of Republic Act 601 as amended, it sued the
Central Bank that had exacted payment; and its amended complaint it
included the Treasurer of the Philippines.
Section 2 of RA 601:
the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of
costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into
the Philippines of rice, flour * * * soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt
syrup * * * shall be refunded to any importer making application
therefore, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation * * *.

The suit was filed in CFI, wherein defendants filed motion to dismiss
because:
1. complaint stated no cause of action as chocolate was not cocoa
beans
2. it was a suit against the Government without the latters consent
Judge sustained the motion, and dismissed the case by his order of
November 15, 1954.
ISSUE: WON cocoa beans may be considered as chocolate for the
purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by RA 601
as amended.
RULING: NO
RATIO:
Appellants: dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably use the words
chocolate, cacao, and cocoa.

COURT: quotations refer to cocoa as chocolate nut chocolate

bean or chocolate tree. Legal exemption refers to chocolate
not the bean nor the nut nor the tree.
Respondents: in common parlance the law is presumed to refer to
chocolate and as a general rule, words used in a statute are to be given
their usual and commonly understood meaning.

COURT: agree, chocolate is a manufactured or finished product

made out of cocoa beans or cacao beans as they are locally
known. Cocoa beans do not become chocolate unless and until
they have undergone the manufacturing process above described.
The first is raw material, the other finished product. The latter is
ready for human consumption, the other is not.

Rockwood & Co. vs American President Lines and In re: Schiling

define chocolate as such.
Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statute
(since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to
make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and ambiguous terms),
petition is denied.
BUT WAIT THERES MORE.
May 1954 suit was brought to court
August 1954 Congress approved RA 1197 amending Section 2
by substituting cocoa beans for chocolate
Appellants: Legislatures intention is to include cocoa beans in the word
chocolate.
SUPREME COURT:
In approving House Bill 2576 (before it became RA 1197 it was HB
2576) in the Congress, the Congress agreed the bill is for a change in
legislative policy:

1. to exempt cocoa beans instead of chocolate with a view to

favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products, whereas the
exemption of chocolate aimed to benefit the consumers thereof
2. not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional
purpose
HISTORY of the statute:
Section 2 of RA 601 -> amended by RA 814 -> amended by RA
871. In both amendments chocolate was retained.
Furthermore, a look at the deliberations of RA 1197 was that the
prevailing impression, as the law then stood, chocolate candy or
chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were not.
1. Sen. Peralta:

we allow chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come into this

country exempt from the 17% tax when we do not allow cocoa
beans, out of our local manufacturers can make chocolate
candy, exempted

we allow chocolate to come here exempt and not exempt

cocoa beans which is used by our manufacturers in making
chocolate candy.
2. Sen. Puyat:

In the original law the exemption is for chocolate, and the

version that we got from the Lower House is (cocoa beans)
giving the impression that chocolate and cocoa beans are
synonymous.
Presidents proclamation No.62 of September 2, 1954 exemption of
cocoa beans shall operate from and after September 3, 1954. Appellants
cocoa beans importation January-October 1953 i.e. before exemption
decree.
As a general rule, statutes operate prospectively.
TO RECAPITULATE:
May 1954 suit was brought to court
August 1954 Congress approved RA 1197 amending Section 2 by
substituting cocoa beans for chocolate
Sept 2, 1954 Presidents proclamation specifying exemption of cocoa
beans from tax
Francisco v Bosier
FACTS

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA dismissing

complaint for redemption of property against respondent

Petitioner Adalia Francisco and three of her sisters (Ester,

Elizabeth, Adeluisa) were co-owners of four parcels of registered
lands

Sold 1/5 of their undivided share to their mother Adela Blas

August 8, 1986 Adela Blas, without the knowledge of her coowners, sold her share to Zenaida Bosier, another sister of
petitioner
Civil Case No. 15510
o August 5, 1992 petitioner received summons with a copy
the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510, filed by respondent
demanding her share in the rentals being collected
o Petitioner informed respondent that she was exercising her
right of redemption as a co-owner
o August 12, 1992 petitioner deposited P10,000 as
redemption price to redeem the property permissive
counterclaim
o Case was dismissed after respondent was declared nonsited and petitioners counterclaim was consequently
dismissed
Civil Case No. C-17055 with the RTC
o Petitioner alleged

30-day period for redemption under Art 1623 CC

had not begun to run against her since the vendor,
Adela Blas, never informer her and other coowners about the sale

Learned about it only on August 5, 1992 after

receiving summons
o Respondent contended

Petitioner knew about the sale on May 30, 1992

when she wrote petitioner a letter informing her
about the sale, with a demand that her share of
rentals be remitted to her

Copy of Deed of Sale was attached to said letter

Other letters were sent to the tenants of the

building informing them of the sale and requesting
1/5 of rentals be paid to her

Receipt of letter proved when petitioner wrote the

buildings tenants advising them to disregard
respondents request
o RTC dismissed petitioners claim for legal redemption

Art 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of

notifying co-owners about a sale of property owned
in common to enable them to exercise their legal
right of redemption

Considered the letter with the Deed of Sale as a

substantial compliance with the required written
notice

30-day period should be counted not from receipt

of summons (Aug 5, 1992) but the date petitioner
wrote letters to tenants (June 8, 1992)
petitioner failed to redeem property within period
CA affirmed RTC decision. Move for reconsideration denied.

ISSUE

WON May 30, 1992 letter notifying petitioner of the sale and
attached Deed of Sale can be considered sufficient as compliance
with the notice requirement of Art 1623 for the purpose of legal
redemption
DECISION

NO. Petition is GRANTED. CA decisions REVERSED. RTC ORDERED

TO EFFECT PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF HER RIGHT TO LEGAL
REDEMPTION.

Receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on

August 5, 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which
petitioner may now exercise her right of redemption within 30
days from finality of this decision
RATIO

RTC and CA relied on

o Distrito vs. CA Art 1623 does not prescribe any particular
form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for
notifying redemptioner
o De Conejero vs. CA and Badillo vs. Ferrer furnishing
redemptioner with a copy of the deed of sale is equivalent
to giving him the written notice required by law

Petitioner
o Cited cases are not relevant because case at bar does not
concern the particular form in which notice must be given
o Issue is whether a notice sent by the vendee may be given
in lieu of that required to be given by the
vendor/prospective vendor

CA ruling that notice given by vendee was sufficient relied on

Ectuban vs. CA
o So long as the co-owner is informed in writing of the sale
and the particulars, the 30 days for redemption starts
running, REGARDLESS of WHO (vendor or vendee) gives
the notice
o Overturned Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons the notice
required by Art 1623 must be given by VENDOR

HOWEVER, Slatandol vs. Retes decided a year after Ectuban,

AFFIRMED Butte
o Notice given by the Register of Deeds of the province is
insufficient
o Cites Butte

Butte
o Effect must be given to the change in statutory language
notice must come from VENDOR

Art 1524 of the former CC immaterial who gave

notice (does not expressly specify), so long as the
redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation, the
redemption period began to run

Art 1623 of the new CC expressly prescribes that

the 30 days for making the redemption are to be

counted from notice in writing by the vendor

(expressly specifies notice must be given by the
vendor)
o Logical that the notice should be given by the vendor

Vendor is in the best position to know who are his

co-owners who under the law must be notified of
the sale

Only vendor can remove all doubts as to the fact of

the sale, its perfection, and its validity

In a contract of sale, the vendor is in the best

position to confirm whether consent to the
essential obligation of selling the property and
transferring ownership to the vendee has been
given
HOWEVER, it is UNJUST to further delay petitioners exercise of her
right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given by the
vendor before petitioner can exercise her right since the sale has
already been established before RTC, CA, SC
o Not immediately notifying the co-owner can delay or
prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption
o Serious prejudice to petitioners right of legal redemption
o Minor adverse effect to vendor and vendee is sale could
not be registered non-binding insofar as third persons
are concerned
THEREFORE, receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No.
15510 on August 5, 1992 constitutes actual knowledge on the
basis of which petitioner may now exercise her right of redemption
within 30 days from finality of this decision
o Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court precedent

Dispensed with the need for written notification

considering that the redemptioners lived on the
same lot on which purchaser lived and were thus
deemed to have actual knowledge of the sales

For 13 years, none of the co-heirs moved to

redeem the property period for redemption
expired
o Receipt of summons on August 5, 1992 amounted to
actual knowledge of the sale from which 30 day period
commenced
o Deposited P10,000 redemption price on August 12, 1992
exercised right of redemption within period (before
September 4, 1992) HENCE it should be given effect
Buenaseda v Flavier

FACTS

On September 10, 1992, this court required respondents to

Comment on the petition and thereafter, received a Supplemental Petition
and an Urgent Supplemental Manifestation from petitioners dated

September 14 and 22, 1992. On the same day of September 22, 1992,
the court Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN STATUS
QUO pending filing of comments on the original supplemental
manifestation.
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent
Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 and in a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required
respondent Secretary of Health to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted
its Comment on the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation in a pleading entitled Omnibus Submission.
Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them.
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement
to Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with the 22
September 1992 Resolution and on November 13, 1992, the Solicitor
General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992, alleging that
xxx (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution dated September 22,
1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners preventive
suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant
petition; xxx.
This court, in the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, required
respondent Secretary to comply with the said status quo order stating
that:
xxx the last peaceable uncontested status xxx was the situation xxx
wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their respective
positions, the Court hereby ORDERS
that petitioners be allowed to
perform the duties of their respective positions xxx, and that respondents
and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist and refrain
from performing any act xxx until further orders from the Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the
Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints
filed against said officials and employees.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 Preventive Suspension
The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect

in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from
the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.

RATIO DECIDENDI

In the claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting o lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order
without affording petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges
against them, the order for preventive suspension is validly issued even
without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence. In
the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order only after: (a)
petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative complaint and the
Motion for the Preventive Suspension of petitioners; (b) private
respondent had filed a reply to the answer of petitioners, specifying
23cases f harassment by petitioners of the members of private
respondent; and, (c) a preliminary conference wherein the complaint and
the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their list of
witnesses and documentary evidence.

The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman
power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is
procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed,
procedural statutes are liberally construed.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and
Investigator Amy de Villa Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias
in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that
the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting
favorably on their recommendation.

As to the preventive suspension, it is imposed as an aid in the

investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the
ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate
official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees.
And in order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend
such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation where the
need to suspend the respondents may arise to conduct such investigation
in an expeditious and efficient manner.

The motion for Contempt which charges the lawyers of petitioners with
unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and
disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by he Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The motion should be filed, as in fact
such a motion was field, with the Ombudsman. The court find the acts
alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by
said lawyers to question the validity and propriety of the preventive
suspension of their clients.

The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as
he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the
Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be
given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives
of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the
Ombudsman should be avoided.

However, the court take cognizance of the intemperate language used by

the counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their
counsel. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients
cause. The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing
counsel constitutes disrespect to dignity of the court of justice.

xxx.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the status quo ordered to be
maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should

be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives
for which it was created.
Further, as it can be inferred from the Ombudsman Law, the Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials
and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of the
whether they are employed in his office or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed
with the Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority
and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.

As to the Motion for Disbarment, it has no place in the instant special civic
action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion
for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and
quasi-judicial officers.
CONCURRING OPINION: BELLOSILLO, J.
I agree as to the authority of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any
government official or employee administratively charged before him
pending the investigation of the complaint to avoid prejudice in
respondents continued stay in the prosecution of the case.
But in the case at bar, the facts that were presented were not adequate to
reasonably place the petitioners under preventive suspension. It is also

important to determine whether it is necessary to issue the preventive

suspension under the circumstances. I do not see any sufficient basis to
justify the preventive suspension.
I would be amenable to holding oral argument to hear the parties if only to
have enough factual and legal bases to justify the preventive suspension
of petitioners. The court may be suspending key government officials and
employees on the basis of mere speculation, which may not serve the ends
of justice but would deprive them of their right to due process.
Petition dismissed.
People v Yadao
Refresher: This is the case where Yadao & others were charged with
offering someone for claiming a US Veteran benefits. However, LC held
that Yadao can't be punished cause the law clearly states that it punishes
persons assisting a claimant who shall a) direct/indirectly solicit b) attempt
to solicit, c) shall have collected a sum of money in lieu of the assistance.
In assessing the information charged, it was not shown that they
ACTUALLY assisted the claimant. They only offered to assist. Yet,
prosecution presents an earlier case which used a different law.
Doctrine: But such adjudication is not conclusive because the statute
therein construed differs materially form ours. It punishes "any person
who shall directly or indirectly contract for excessive compensation.
Section does not contain phrase "assisting a claimant" after the words
"any person" & before the words "who shall". The phrase conditions each &
every violation of Sec 1 RA 145. di nio gets? simple lang... old law not
applicable in case at bar.

3. Contemporary Construction
Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. CA
Refresher: Nestle increased their capital stock from 3 million to 6 million.
They paid the necessary fees for the said increase. They issue 344,500
shares out of previously authorized unissued capital stock. They filed for
an exemption fro payment which the SEC denied. SEC said it did not fall
within the exemptions but could be considered under a different category.
Doctrine: The construction given by the SEC should be upheld because
interpretation and application of a statute given by the administrative
agency charged with its application is entitled great respect and accorded
great weight unless it is shown that such construction is in sharp conflict
with the governing statute or Constitution and other laws. Officials are
presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the consideration
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law. Their competence,

expertise and informed judgment are given respect.

The said
interpretation by the SEC was done to make sure that the investing public
is protected.
Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency Inc. v
NLRC
Refresher: Regalado worked as a security guard for the petitioners & he
requested for retirement pay w/c was refused. Labor Arbiter stated since
Regalado has no Collective Bargaining Agreement (w/c entitles him to
benefits), the other provisions of the Labor Code must be looked into; &
the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Regalado. But the SC held that he
wasnt legally entitled to retirement benefits despite the passage of RA
7641 (entitled benefits to those who retired bec of old age)
Doctrine: It is a rule in stat con that all statues are to be construed as
having only a prospective operation unless the purpose & intention of the
legislature to give them restrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied by the language used. In every case of doubt, the
doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.
Contemporaneous Construction of a statute by executive officers
tasked to enforce & implement said statute should be given great weight
by the courts. BUT if such construction is erroneous or is clearly shown to
be in conflict w/ the governing statute of the Consti or other laws, the
same must be declared null & void.

4. Statutory Directives
Valderama v. NLRC
Refresher: Andrea alleged that she was illegally dismissed by COMMODEX
due to her pregnancy. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
her. In the dispositive portion, only COMMODEX was ordered to pay the
backwages and damages. Andrea filed a motion for clarification to include
Valderama, as the employer in the dispositive portion wherein the Labor
Arbiter granted the prayer. Valderama contends that the Labor Arbiter's
decision is final and executory hence cannot be amended. NLRC affirmed.
The SC ruled in favor of Andrea.
Doctrine: General rules of procedure are merely suppletory in character
vis-a-vis disputes which are primarily governed by labor laws.
Furthermore, as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code, all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this code, including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor. The rule that the
NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in order to give life to the
constitutional mandate for the protection of labor is well settled.