Mirgorod direction oensive

The Mirgorod direction oensive (3 August 1943

23 August 1943) was an operation conducted as part
of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev between the Red
Army and Wehrmacht forces. It was one of the operations that followed the Battle of Kursk.

Manstein gathered his armour from all other areas. By

5 August 1943 the 4 divisionsd of the III Panzercorps
were deploying north and west of Kharkiv to counterattack the eastern ank of the Russian armoured spearheads driving towards Bohodukhiv. At the same time
4th Panzerarmee's XXIV Panzercorps prepared to attack
the western ank with Grodeutschland Panzergrenadier
Division. Manstein planned to use his panzer divisions
to slice through the communication lines of the lead Soviet mobile units and destroy their momentum. The Russian armoured forces advanced so quickly to the south,
that their rie divisions were left behind, rst due to
a lack of enough transport, and secondly to deal with
the task of reducing pockets of resistance in rear areas.
This left them vulnerable to isolation and destruction by
the superior German mobile forces. Despite deep penetrations, forces of the Voronezh Front had been frustrated along the banks of the Vorskla and Merla rivers by
German armour operating in a re brigade role which
characterised later years. SS armoured units had isolated Soviet units which had penetrated too quickly, and
this had halted the momentum of the assault. To relieve these units and prevent further German advances
the 6th Guards, 47th and 40th armies launched an assault on the left ank of 4th Panzerarmee's XLVII Panzercorps e . General Hoth was now faced with a difcult decision whether to cancel his planned assault to
defeat the overextended Soviet armoured formations or
to move his armour to relieve his left ank, he made
the decision to act aggressively gambling that his assault
would force the Soviets to move their forces to counter
his threat. On 18 August XXIV Panzercorps f began its
assault toward Parchomovka from Okhtyrka for the moment and achieved quick success by early afternoon of
the rst day they had penetrated 20 kilometres cutting
the communication lines of 27th Army and threatening
to encircle the divisions southwest of Okhtyrka. On 20
August 1943 at 1830 hours elements of Grodeutschland
linked up with 'Totenkopf' at Parchomovka. The link-up
resulted in the tenuous encirclement of several large soviet formationsg which were able to escape with heavy
vehicle losses and casualties. Increased soviet assaults
on the 4th Panzerarmee's left ank over the Psel River
by 40th and 47th armies later forced Hoth to withdraw
his 10th Panzergrenadier from the counter-attack and nally forced Grodeutschland back to the defensive at
Parchomovka.[4][5]

Prelude

During the Battle of Kursk, German armored units south

of the Kursk salient failed to penetrate the defences between the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in the Belgorod
sector on 8 July. The Red Army's Belgorod-Kharkov
Strategic Counter-Oensive followed Operation Citadel
and included as its objectives the immediate liberation
of Belgorod and Kharkiv, assigned to the Voronezh and
Steppe Fronts. On 23 July 1943, German forces of the
XLVIII Panzercorps and LII Armeecorps returned to
their old, well fortied positions, stretching to some 60
kilometres west of Tomarovka. Their combat strength
had been reduced by as much as 50% following the
Battle.[1][2]
Early on 3 August 1943, after a heavy Artillery barrage
which lasted 2 1 2 hours and overwhelming Soviet air support, the Forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts a from
the Kursk-Belgorod highway began advancing on a wide
front between Sumy and Vovchansk (175 km), crossed
the Vorskla river and quickly penetrated the defences
of the 332nd Infantry Division (north of Tomarovka)&
167th Infantry Division to a depth of 100 km[2]b between Tomarovka and Belgorod on the northern ank,
and as far as Okhtyrka. West of Belgorod 6th Panzer Division deployed hurriedly and counter-attacked the penetration in the 167th Infantry Division area but was unable to halt the Soviet ood. Schwere Panzer-Abteilung
502 and 19th Panzer Division were also swept aside by
the strength of the attack.[3]c These divisions were good
quality units and not badly understrength for this period
of the war on the Eastern Front, but the enormous weight
of Soviet repower, mass of infantry and hundreds of
tanks simply overran them. In Tomarovka German units
threatened with encirclement retreated along a narrow
corridor to Grayvoron. The shattered formations of LII
Armeecorps began a harrowing ght through the Russians
toward the southwest and their own lines, desperately
searching for a gap in the quickly closing noose. All the
while Soviet aircraft were descending upon the retreating columns, wreaking confusion and destruction. To
counter the breakthrough at the boundary of his armies
1

Aftermath

On 26 August the Soviet Central Front resumed its offensive against Army Group Centre striking the 9th at
Karachev and the 2nd German Armies at Sevsk and east
of Klintsy securing a deep penetration. This eventually
forced Kluge and Manstein to ask permission to withdraw to more secure defensive positions. Retreat to the
Dnepr River was now inevitable the only question, would
this happen at a time of their choosing or be a headlong ight.h The constant ghting never allowed Hitler
to build up a reserve large enough to regain the upper
hand in the east. Employing the peculiar rippling eect
that marked its oensives, the Red Army, thwarted in one
place, had shifted to others. For the rst time in the war it
had the full strategic initiative, and it grasped it jealously
without regard for economy of eort, tactical sophistication, or the danger of overreaching itself.[6] The failure of
Zitadel doomed the Germans to the loss of operational
initiative on the Eastern Front without any hope of regaining it, although Hitler seems to have been unaware or
unwilling to recognizing this reality. The terrible losses
in manpower that the Germans suered in July and August were ultimately fatal and left the armies of Army
Group South and Centre too weak to do anything but
delay the inevitable. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev
marked the rst time in the war that the Germans were not
able to defeat a major Soviet oensive during the summer months and regain their lost ground and the strategic
initiative.[7]

Footnotes

Consisting of the 1st Guards Tank Army, 5th

Guards Tank Army, 6th Guards Army, 5th Guards
Army, 40th Army, 27th Army.

Both belonging to LII Army Corps.

The 19th Panzer Division had only 28 tanks, the

6th Panzer Division which was in reserve and about
7-8 kilometres behind the front had 50 tanks. Both
were reinforced by the Schwere Panzer-Abteilung
502 which had 10 operational Tigers. Thus the entire German tank strength was 90 operational tanks
in this sector.
d

The III Panzercorps comprising the 3rd Panzer

Division, the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division
Das Reich, the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division
Totenkopf and the 5th SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. The SS divisions were severally
weakened after the failure of the 'Kursk Oensive'
and more recently Das Reich and Totenkopf had
suered heavy losses at failed Soviet breakthrough
on the Mius river in 6th Armies sector. Wiking had also suered heavy losses at Izium in 8th
Armies area.

REFERENCES

In the sector of the 57th and 68th Infantry

Divisions which were reduced to the strength of
kampfgruppe's.
The XXIV Panzercorps comprising the 7th Panzer
(40 tanks), 10th Panzergrenadier (40 tanks)&
Grodeutschland divisions (70 tanks and assault
guns) plus a heavy tank and several assault gun battalions.
The 166th and 71st Rie divisions and the 4th
Guard Tank Corps.
The new 6th Army was also reeling from renewed
blows on the Mius River.

4 Citations and notes

[1] Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
1996 Page 260
[2] Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of General
Raus 19411945 bt Steven H Newton 2003 Page 212
[3] Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
1996 pp 260261
[4] Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
1996 pp 316324
[5] Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by
Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 pp 150158
[6] Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East by
Earl F Ziemke by Dorset Press 1968 page 158
[7] Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.
1996 Page 330

5 References
Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III
Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5
Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of
General Raus 19411945 by Steven H Newton Da
Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9
Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East
by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

Sources
Decision in the Ukraine Summer 1943 II SS & III
Panzerkorps, George M Nipe Jr, JJ Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. 1996 ISBN 0-921991-35-5
Panzer Operations The Eastern Front Memoir of
General Raus 19411945 by Steven H Newton Da
Capo Press edition 2003 ISBN 0-306-81247-9
Stalingrad to Berlin - The German Defeat in the East
by Earl F Ziemke Dorset Press 1968

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