Land Titles Day 5 To 12.

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
petitioners, vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title,
may the Land Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the
subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the
LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which
asks this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration
in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022.[2]
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in
Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision
disposing thus:[3]
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic]
and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court
declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses
Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880
Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15,
1991 requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus.[5]
Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez,
director of the LRA Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said
decree:[6]
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991
relative to the above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might
be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as
per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696
and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is
Annex B hereof, requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the
name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this
Authority, a copy is Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is
Annex D hereof;

After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land
described therein is not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of
OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical
description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply to our letter has as yet been
received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B
of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached
as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title
issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several
sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the
Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being
premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for
an early resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995,
which ordered:[8]
x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resoon of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner
Erlinda Laburada herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken
by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot
subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and
situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration
Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was
attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree
Division, which states:[9]
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April
1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in
the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal. However, the title issued for the
subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the
petitioners pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the
duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the
torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon.
Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of
land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in
LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).

The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why
the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for
and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the
jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied with.[11] Since there was no showing
that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it
is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No.
29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to
institute in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of
petitioners application for registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the
issuance of their title, because of the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of
[sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595 notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the
holders of said titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this case[;] thus, the legislature must
recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its satisfaction.[13]
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is
not valid, considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.
[14] On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general
cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which held:[16]
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may
be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict
adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of
registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas
Estate was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been
issued under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case,
(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought
under a second action for registration. The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under
the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D.
1529. (Underscoring supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory
and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to
implement it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become executory until
after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs.
Court of Appeals:[17]
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously
maintain that said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside.
They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after
judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section
30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory
under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law, petitioners
assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981
and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.

Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long
as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the
purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may
have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act
not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were
personally notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This
stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496 which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be
entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in
accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration
shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein
before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the
appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No.
3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and
November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan
Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been
issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595.
Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified, may render the
judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and
void,[19] since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.[20] Thus, if it is
proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the
issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:
[21]

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes
indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for
the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been
our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November
24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of
respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an
appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court
a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30,
1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of
the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
title to the land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in
rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to
adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of
first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already
registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is
already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would
defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be
done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion
being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs.
De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for
transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This
requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in
an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the
decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys become
necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law very
wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the
reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an
officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De
los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a
judicial act involving the exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when
the petitioners legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete.[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by
law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded.[25] But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or
dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it
cannot be enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a judicial act is not

compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to decide a question according to its own judgment and
understanding of the law.[28]
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to
avoid multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite
its study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to
submit a report thereon to the court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the
said court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The
Land Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining
with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from
notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and
judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the
facts and the law as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1] This case was filed prior to the issuance of Revised Administrative Circular 1-95 which directs that actions
against quasi-judicial bodies in general should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
[2] Per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila (now Pasig City), Branch LXVIII.
[3] Rollo, p 5.
[4] Rollo, p 6.
[5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 25, 1997, upon this Courts receipt of the public
respondents reply in compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 10, 1996.
[6] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[7] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[8] Rollo, p 85; original text in upper case.
[9] Rollo, p 113.
[10] Rollo, p 70; petitioners memorandum, p 2.
[11] Rollo, p 71; petitioners memorandum, p 3
[14] Rollo, p 63; the LRAs rejoinder, p 2; citing Rojas, et al., vs. City of Tagaytay and Hon. Jimenez, 106 Phil 512,
November 24, 1959; Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154, September 29, 1961.
[15] 244 SCRA 418, 423-424, May 29, 1995, per Romero, J.
[16] Rollo, p. 165; the LRAs reply, p. 5.
[17] 168 SCRA 503, December 15, 1988, per Padilla, J.; citing Section 32, PD 1529; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil 113;
Valmonte vs. Nable, 85 Phil 256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622; Roman Catholic Bishops of Cebu vs.
Phil Railway Co., 49 Phil 540; De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June
22, 1922; Director of Lands vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA 678.
[18] Supra, at 422.

[19] Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783, November 17, 1992,
citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922.
[20] PD 1529 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -- The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
[21] Supra, at pp 159-160, per Labrador, J; citing Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, supra; Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil 587,
590, March 5, 1923; Perez vs. Bolbon, 50 Phil 791, 795, September 30, 1927; Singian vs. Manila Railroad Co., 60
Phil 192, 203, June 19, 1934; Addison vs. Payatas Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil 673, September 27, 1934;
Sideco, et al. vs. Aznar, 92 Phil 952, April 24, 1953.
[22] 85 Phil 256, 260-261, December 29, 1949, per Tuason, J.
[23] Go vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29, 1996.
[24] Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99, July 17, 1996, University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. CA, 230 SCRA
761, March 7, 1994; Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567, October 13, 1992; Marcelo vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA
439, July 7, 1986; Samson vs. Barrios, 63 Phil 198, July 20, 1936.
[25] Pelileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil 272, December 29, 1949.
[26] Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284, April 25, 1991; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil 608, July 11, 1952.
[27] Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28] Lupisan vs. Alfonso and Arguieta, 78 Phil 842, July 31, 1947.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004]
Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives
ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the
property is not registered under the Torrens system.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002
Amended Decision[2] and the July 22, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391.
The Amended Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original DECISION of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is
SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from,
as follows:
1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and with better right to possess the property in
question, being an innocent purchaser for value therefor;
2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit:
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. Cost of suit.
As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:
1. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4. Cost of suit.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents amply summarized by the trial court:
On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale became a
subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the vendor and the vendees.
On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year from
the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the
previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the
plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back
the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.
Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over
the parcel of land involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free patent was later
on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the herein
[Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo].
On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera
registered the sale and as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.

On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel
and Julie Abrigo] before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. 1452. On
February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant
case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question until the instant case is
terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.[5]
Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City]
for the annulment of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against
respondent and Gloria Villafania].
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the
properties to [petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners
and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a
valid one and hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.[7] Since Gloria Villafania had
already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera
was deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a
purchaser in good faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens
title of her vendor and must thus be protected.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is
valid.
2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser for value in good faith.
3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title over the property in question.[10]
In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because
it no longer belonged to her.[11] They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since respondent was
not a purchaser in good faith and for value.[12]
Law on Double Sale

The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first
sold the disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in turn,
derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with
Respondent Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title.[13] There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529[14] which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land until its registration.[15] Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only
between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.[16]
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the property. Since neither
petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act 3344.[17] For her part, respondent registered
the transaction under the Torrens system[18] because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer
certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.[19]
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens system should prevail over that of
petitioners who recorded theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L.
Paras:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but
the subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such
sale is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x.[20]
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been issued a free patent registered as Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-30522.[21] The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
212598, also in Villafanias name.[22] As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled
and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali[23] held that registration must be done in the proper registry in order to bind the land.
Since the property in dispute in the present case was already registered under the Torrens system, petitioners
registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court upheld the right of a party
who had registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had
registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not applied,
because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered under
Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under the
Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo[25] explained the difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and
those under the Torrens system in this wise:
10

Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party
with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to mean that the mere registration of a
sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land
having previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals[26] is a case in point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a
double sale of the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded
while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said
original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,[27] this Court held that Article
1544 of the Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a
buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and
merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because
the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said execution sale.[28]
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into believing that the property was
unregistered. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.[29] All persons must take
notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[30]
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith
and to register it in good faith.[31] Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the
registration.[32] We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,[33] which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with
good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights
except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil
Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them,
to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the second
buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge
taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the
second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the
first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first
buyers rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing
registration, by delivery of possession.[34] (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant
to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for value
and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the
certificate.[35] Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to determine
the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of title.[36]
Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith
acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds
at the time of the sale.[37]
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[38] petitioners contend that their prior registration under Act 3344 is
constructive notice to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she registered the sale. Santiago
affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C. Vitug:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer
of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second buyer first registers in good
faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer
of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with
bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No.
56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
11

paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell
vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
xxxxxxxxx
Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for the registration of all instruments on land neither
covered by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot improve his standing since Act
3344 itself expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs.
Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709,
Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been
held to be inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the shoes
of the debtor and acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals,
31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale (Remalante vs.
Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,[40] which held:
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As
stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can have the effect of
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the undisputed
fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the
registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued certificates of title in their names.
x x x.[41]
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system,
as can be inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.[42] There was no registration under Act 3344. In
Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land.[43]
Such registration was therefore considered effectual.
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In
Revilla, the first buyer did not register the sale.[44] In Taguba, registration was not an issue.[45]
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act
3344 does not apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was
evidently the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the land
(see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens
System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by
any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw
or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration
(see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera
vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"[46]
Respondent
in Good Faith
The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.
[47] After its factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus:
x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to be the registered owner. The subject land was,
and still is, registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in the
circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to
look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and
verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her vendors
12

title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that
when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under
litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria
Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and
positively, without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything about
the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only then when she
bought the same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal Court of
Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had
to rely was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the
law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x.[48]
We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their
position only on the general averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to consummating
the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession.
[49]
This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own admission that the parents and the sister of
Villafania were still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the property.[50]
The family members may reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have
notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, good faith on respondents
part stands.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Id., pp. 24-31. Former Fifth Division. Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with the concurrence of Justices
Hilarion L. Aquino (acting chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
[3] Id., p. 33.
[4] CA Amended Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 30-31.
[5] CA Decision dated November 19, 2001, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 163-164. Citations omitted.
[6] Id., pp. 3 & 164.
[7] Id., pp. 5 & 166.
[8] CA Amended Decision dated March 21, 2002, p. 7; rollo, p. 30.
[9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 29, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners
Memorandum signed by Atty. Villamor A. Tolete. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Daniel C. Macaraeg,
was received by this Court on May 13, 2003.
[10] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 252.
[11] Id., pp. 6 & 253.
[12] Id., pp. 11 & 258.
[13] Gabriel v. Mabanta, 399 SCRA 573, 580, March 26, 2003; Bayoca v. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154, 166, September
12, 2000; Balatbat v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858, 872, August 28, 1996.
[14] The Property Registration Decree, June 11, 1978.
13

[15] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, 274 Phil. 516, May 20, 1991.
[16] Revilla v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484, March 30, 1960.
[17] 113 of Chapter XIII of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) provides:
SEC. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or
other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as
between the parties thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
x x x x xx x x x.
The sale by Gloria Villafania to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go was registered on June 18, 1993, while the sale by
Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go to the Spouses Abrigo was registered on October 30, 1997. Petitioners Memorandum,
p. 10; rollo, p. 257.
[18] Formerly Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, November 6, 1902; now PD 1529.
[19] Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 229.
[20] Id., pp. 13 & 236; citing Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1990), Vol. V, p. 154.
[21] Id., pp. 4 & 227.
[22] Ibid.
[23] 8 SCRA 489, July 31, 1963.
[24] 395 SCRA 43, January 13, 2003.
[25] Supra.
[26] 31 SCRA 558, February 18, 1970.
[27] The second paragraph of this provision states: Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser
or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment
obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. x x x. (Italics supplied.)
[28] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, pp. 521-522, per Gancayco, J.
[29] Alvarico v. Sola, 383 SCRA 232, 239, June 6, 2002; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595, October 2, 1915.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Gabriel v. Mabanta, supra; Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 38, 50, May 21, 2001; Bautista v. Court of
Appeals, 230 SCRA 446, 454, February 28, 1994.
[32] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[33] 344 Phil. 253, September 5, 1997.
[34] Id., p. 265, per Panganiban, J; citing Cruz v. Cebana, 129 SCRA 656, 663, June 22, 1984, per Teehankee, J
(later CJ).
[35] Lu v. Manipon, 381 SCRA 788, 796, May 7, 2002.
[36] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 456; Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, p. 518.
[37] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra.
14

[38] 247 SCRA 336, August 14, 1995.
[39] Id., p. 346, per Melo, J; citing Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence (1993), pp. 604-605.
[40] Supra.
[41] Id., p. 167-168, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
[42] Supra, p. 339.
[43] Supra, p. 159.
[44] Supra, p. 484.
[45] 132 SCRA 722, 728, October 23, 1984.
[46] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, supra, p. 604. This paragraph was originally between
the two paragraphs cited in Santiago.
[47] An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase
or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. De la Cruz v. De la Cruz,
GR No. 146222, January 15, 2004.
[48] CA Amended Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 29-30.
[49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 12; id., p. 259.
[50] Id., pp. 13 & 260.
EN BANC
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,
- versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179987
Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of
the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have
wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving
property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
15

informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of
which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field
a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who
does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which
the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the
Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under
Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide
phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately
been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our social obligations
dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness,
Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited
the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested
that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of
the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of
Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
16

SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that
since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on
15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period
of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed
the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11]
which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto
cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing
was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural
lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral
arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable
and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance
with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should
be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14]
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred
interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman
17

Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property,
thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land
sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time
of the application, the property had already been converted into private property through prescription. To bolster
their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to patrimonial
property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period
refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription
under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the
subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision,
reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may
be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right,
subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term agricultural lands was
changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment
18

restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to
disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only
agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However,
this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property,
including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the
public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1)
those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest
who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree
warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171514
July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
19

REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square
meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known as Lot
No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the property from his mother,
Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he
and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the concept of an owner for more than
thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As
proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance
survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER L.C.
MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable &
Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels
name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137 to prove that she had been in possession of the property since
1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa
presented a Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu
and three (3) tax declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and
010717.8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-ininterest possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that his
possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and for the length of time required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the registration and the
confirmation of title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this
decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with
Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is alienable and disposable and that he
complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and
so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is within
the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual,
public, continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par.
1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels
possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA.
On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property only in 1970 following the sale that transpired
between him and his mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to
petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than thirty (30)
years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
20

Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia
copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and Director of Lands v.
Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing
the identity of the land subject of the application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to
prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated
August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it commenced
after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the property to private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has successfully established valid title over the subject land
and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession
of said land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established
jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years
of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant
and his predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in certain cases result in inequity
and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open,
notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not necessarily the original
tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can be established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of
land for registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission, the
court may sufficiently order the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and
other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October 10,
1986). The said case provides further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the registration and
confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land
Registration Commission for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights of the applicant.
Such is especially true in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been
shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both by the lower court and
the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of land contained
therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the
submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for
application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such
requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not be taken as an
iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind the submission of
the tracing cloth plan.
x x x:
xxxx
21

As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent evidence like a duly
approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499,
containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the original
tracing cloth plan may be excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan
As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is
certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and alienable
land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs assailed decision and attributes the following
errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable;
(b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in preparation for a judicial proceeding but
does not convert the property into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes and bounds of the
property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of
the property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the subject
property that is worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529;
and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who conducted the
survey sufficed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence supposedly
showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect title
over the property in question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to
Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary,
Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest,
Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have
been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to
apprise themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48(b) of the
PLA originally states:
22

own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July 26, 1894
or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession and occupation for a
period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073
states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed after
the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove possession and occupation that dated back to June
12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights may have been acquired under Section 48(b) prior to its amendment
by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already been in possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D. No. 1073 was
promulgated be denied because their possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this
Court resolved this legal predicament as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public Land Act,
as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does
not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by
operation of law, then upon Abejarons satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already
gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly
stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years,
or at least since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations omitted)
23

Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that
such possession and occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is not
the case that there is an option between possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section 48(b) that if possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to acquire an
imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years at the time of the filing of the
application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the
PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-ininterest had been in possession of the property for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his
application. However, there is nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of
P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation of the property for
thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in Isabels name was for the year 1965 indicating
that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into
possession.
The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the
application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said
with respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein was filed
on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48(b) as amended by
R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants therein entered into possession of the property on June 17,
1978 and filed their application on February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals from
whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession since
1937. Thus, during the effectivity of Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the prevailing rule was
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year
prescriptive period was already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply
in this case, as the lower courts held, it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that
Isabels possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. That in view of the established fact that
Isabels alleged possession and occupation started much later, the lower courts should have dismissed
Espinosas application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA. That there
were instances wherein applications were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for thirty (30) years
was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it follows that the subject property being
supposedly alienable and disposable will not suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only private
properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are
considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there must be an official
declaration to that effect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are
public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth." (Emphasis supplied)
24

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of
thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly
alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by the State in its private capacity,
acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation to
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For prescription to run against
the State, there must be proof that there was an official declaration that the subject property is no longer
earmarked for public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such official declaration should
have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application
for registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the conversion of the property to private or
patrimonial shall not be considered in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of
land is still reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is alienable and
disposable, possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give rise to any title
that would defeat that of the States if such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable
public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of
land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the notation
made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the positive
government act that would remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence
accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved
by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of
Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains part
of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
25

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.
Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the
survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act
validly changing the classification of the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable."31 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be dismissed due to his failure to present the original tracing
cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey
plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed
by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services (LMS) of the
DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct by the
geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32
the identity of the land, its boundaries and location can be established by other competent evidence apart from
the original tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to
provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for
registration and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands
to be no reason why a registration application must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth
plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the survey
plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may likewise substantially and with as
much certainty prove the limits and extent of the property sought to be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as evidence of the identity, location and
the boundaries of the property applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of alienability
and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents that are deemed
relevant and sufficient to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretarys declaration or the
Presidents proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record.1wphi1
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.35 (Citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O. No.
1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1) of P.O. No.
1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the
property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the other
hand, applying Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to
whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the character
prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad.
545-D (New) located at Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
26

SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Di.cdican. with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato,
Jr., concurring; rol!o, pp. 32-39.
2 Associate Justice Enrico!\.. Lanzanas replaced Associate Justice Sesinando E. Vi lion; id. at 40-41.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652
June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No.
1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to
and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land, with an
area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of
Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui
and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982,
issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for
27

purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same
boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern
side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had
receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters
(1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against
respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in
peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land
under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land
as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the ownership of
the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession
thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of alluvium
brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion
was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey
of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land
surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the
accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the
boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one
hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo
Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion
since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow
the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for
which, it was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes
since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision
of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil
Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the
accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does
not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit
becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of
appropriation on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in possession
of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the
land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not
been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary
prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the
registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act
No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the early
thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some
superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with
the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the
owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through
28

prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the
plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original estate, and since
in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section
46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant
began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the
present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a
natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of
title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and
described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the
title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55),
so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area
added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the
Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No.
19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of time that
the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for
the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as
the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was
superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed
from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties
nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the
land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the
peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the
defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one
hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of the
plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied
the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the
defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958,
because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan;
and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande
admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because
he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the
property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their
possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1wph1.t
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession from 1933 to 1958 is not
only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really
been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to
recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is
too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their
right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order
to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had
been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter,
were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs
woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription
had already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
29

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in question
through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old, petitioners
are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The
question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is
covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land
does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received
by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the
land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain,
however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the
time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore,
never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility
enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession.
The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the
alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of
the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the Civil
Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in
force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that
the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:t.hqw
30

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the
question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare
land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the Bureau of
Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of
Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the
Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids for the
purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro
submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason
that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of
the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone
bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing
10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the dispositive
portion of which reads: 2+.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection with the Sales Application No.
5436 were in accordance with law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to the
said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the tract
herein awarded, which is more particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,+.wph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:+.wph!1
NMaria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SEProvincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SWPublic Land;
WMunicipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was
approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus
stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed
by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude
therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be
given due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of
12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2
from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of
Staff, Philippine Army.
31

On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400
hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the military
camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the
payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance
of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400
hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of
agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the disputed Lot
1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the
Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328
and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the
Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens registration of the
12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple"
title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed
the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by
virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare portion on
the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966, directing "the
registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the
Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court and
appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: +.wph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant Arsenio
Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby
decreed in the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the appellee that
portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion and their
reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership over the
entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the motion on June
17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares,
designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous
disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President
Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act.
Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands,
provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines
32

are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It
would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances,
and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2
of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence of the
president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or
service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe
other disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the private domain of the
Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be
used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly,
Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or
tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any
of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for ... other improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had acquired
ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him on November
23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081
hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to draw such conclusion. On the
contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of
22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial
road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22
hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same
area was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to
Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having
an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales
Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public
land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00
centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably
bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes imperative to
conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as
applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a bid of
100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase
price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of
which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare
and the 10% deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio
de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have made
the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden
for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last
payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400
hectares, the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the
military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said site, at the time of last
installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the
Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22 hectares
and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of
12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then would have been left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not
20.6400 hectares would have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on
wrong assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of
22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because
the amendment was already reflected in the Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion that
the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of
33

"whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries.
Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and
bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial
road and the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 16
Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general description, or that which is more certain to what which is
less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered that the series of executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85,
328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the Government to reserve the subject land for a specific
purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most strongly against the
grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be
resolved in its favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from the description in
the patent is exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a
tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged occupation,
cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in
him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was controverted into "a
special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the
Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33
hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np contractual or vested right in
the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public,
or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title threof stands, even though
this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and
improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and
are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain
lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands
by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents for lands
which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be," but
Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property reserved.
Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain
portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as
grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro
de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch
as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the
original sales application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions
applied for are part of the public domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided
in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the military "camp site"
(Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the
Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be returned to him
when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the Department of
National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could
have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus,
would prove by secondary evidence the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who
supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty may be
established by secondary evidence, it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument
evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document. And the due of the execution of the document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the
person or persons who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who
was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution
thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessorin-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with
34

Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The notary
public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the instrument were never presented.
It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the
signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence
of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code
requires the accomplishment thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo
Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper" signed by
Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June
1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and
Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of
donation signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as
to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First none of
these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and
delivery ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had previously
confessed the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" ambigous as to be synonymous with
a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus
were not parties to the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of the
document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that the copy of the deed which
his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself,
Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The
replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the
property was "still needed for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation cannot
substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less
official admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed between Eugenior
de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no
dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of
President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes.
Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but
"the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the
gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the term "right" must be understood in a
"propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations, there
results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be
said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed
12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of
disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's
assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia
argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of
donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the land
so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words, the right granted to the
sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary right," for the fundamental reason
that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State.
35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of
the Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only
after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued
and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a circumstance
that demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales applicant to pursue the
requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its resolution
of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside. The
disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby
adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the petitioner for leave to
construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital
motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
35

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Footnotes+.wph!1
1 Eugenio de Jesus previously applied for the purchase of 65.6374 hectares in 1918, but his application was
unacted upon due to the prior application of natives, Marcelo Palmera and Pantaleon Palmera, for a portion of
the property.
2 Annex "C", Petition, petitioner's.
3 Annex "E", Petition, petitioner's.
4 Annex "E-2", Petition, petitioner's.
6 Proclamation No. 328, Annex "F", Petition, petitioner's.
7 Proclamation No. 350, Annex "F-1", Petition, petitioner's.
8 Reyes, A., ponente, Leuterio, Fernandez, Pascual, JJ., concurring. Chanco J., dissented, voting for the
reconsideration of the decision and awarding the whole Lot 1176-B-2 (12.8081 hectares) to Mindanao Medical
Center. The decision of July 2, 1974 was penned by Reyes, A., J., with Pascual and Chanco, JJ., concurring.
9 See also Sec. 87 of the Public Land Act which directs the registration of unregistered lands included in a
Presidential Proclamation.
10 Republic v. Octobre, L-18867, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 848.
11 Vide, dispositive part of Sales Award, quoted in this Decision.
13 Sec.25, CA 141, provides: "All bids must be sealed and addressed to the Director of Lands and must have
inclosed therewith cash or certified check, Treasury warrant, or post-office money order, payable to the order of
the director of Lands, for ten per centum of the amount of the bid, which amount shall be retained in case the
bid is accepted, as part payment of the purchase price ....
15 Vide, dispositive part of Sales Awards, quoted in this Decision.
16 Idem.
17 See 72 ALR 412, quoting Von Herff case, 133 SE 533.
18 63 Am. Jur. 2d 544; 73 C.J.S. 853.
19 Leavenworth, L & R Co., 23 L ed. 634.
20 63 Am Jur 2d 544; 73 C.J.S. 853; U.S. vs. Union Pacific R. Co., 1 L ed 2d 693.
21 63 Am. Jur 2d 515.
22 Idem, at 489-490.
23 Sec. 87, Public Act (CA 141); Whitehill v. Victorio L and Cattle Co., 139 P. 187.
24 73 C.J.S. 720.
36

25 Hennington v. State of Georgia, 41 L. ed 176; Lake Superior Ship Canal, R & I Co., v. Cunningham, 39 L. ed
190.
26 Director of Lands v. Reyes, L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, En Banc, per Antonio J., 68 SCRA 177, Lee Hon Hok v.
David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 378-379.
27 Cano v. De Camacho, L-28172, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 390; Kayaban v. Republic, L-33307, August 30, 1973,
52 SCRA 361; 55 ALR 2d 554.
28 Sec. 4, Rule 130, Revised Rules of court provides: "When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destrucuion, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of
witnesses. "See also Director of Lands v. court of appeals, L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 637-38.
29 Government v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 (1918); Hernaez v. McGrath, 91 Phil. 565 (1952).
30 See Jones on Evidence, Vol. I, 5th ed., 459.
31 "Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberty whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it."
32 That is why, "future property" cannot be donated, because ownership does not yet reside in the donor (Art.
751, new Civil Code).
33 An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Reyes & Puno, Vol. II, 1967, ed. p. 225.
34 Heirs of Francisco Parco v. Haw Pia, L-22478, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 175-76; Francisco v. Rodriguez, L-31083,
Sept. 30, 1975, First Division, 67 SCRA 212. The requrements are: (1) full payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the land , minus 10% deposit, if not paid in full upon the making of the award (Sec. 27, CA
141); (2) not less than 1/5 of the land awarded shall have been broken and cultivated by the awardee within 5
years after date of award; and before issuance of patent, actual occupancy, cultivation, and improvement of at
least 1/5 of the land appliced for until date of final payment (Sec. 28, Idem).
35 Director of Lands v. Court of Appels, L-17696, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 80.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
37

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The
Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties
pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes
(paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe
and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October
29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates
back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from
1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought
said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00)
Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the
land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the
townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors
of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels
for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not
found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
38

acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited
and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that
Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of
the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof,
entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed.
Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article
XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to
Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding
lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a
similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of
the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest,
Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that
the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or
natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a
majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a
juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2
thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
39

better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs.
Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable
to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914,
by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is
of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than
the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
40

The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in
force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the
Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or
"imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change
in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt
or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings,
there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their
lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
41

already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not
having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption
and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation
of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks
no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the
test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested
chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
42

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My
dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line
of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to
'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to
be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained
to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The
words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to
June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the
public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under
the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even
on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as
owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right
43

which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land
of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that
it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31,
1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31,
1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation
as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion
of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead
of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein
majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the
petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
44

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
(a) ...
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain
(Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
45

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons)
can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain.
That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should
not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct
352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the
act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended
beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything
which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court
to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799
[1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My
dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line
of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to
'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to
be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained
to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
46

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by
the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The
words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to
June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<re||an1w> We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law
without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations
such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the
public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under
the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even
on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as
owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P
45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the
municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right
which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land
of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that
it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31,
1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31,
1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
47

applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation
as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons
of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion
of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead
of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our
equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein
majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be
registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the
petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
(a) ...
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
(c) ...
48

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain
(Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of
the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons)
can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain.
That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should
not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social
Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct
352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the
act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
49

against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended
beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything
which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control
Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court
to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799
[1982] and related cases.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982
LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO
ADORMEO, VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO
CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON,
JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA,
LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA, MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO
ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON,
NICOLADA NAQUILA, TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES,
VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES,
petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and
BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
intervenors.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private
corporation from purchasing public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a sales
patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to the 1964 decision of the trial court, ejecting some of the
petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals. That legal
question arises under the following facts:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co., Inc. on the basis
of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio
District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot protested
against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the
occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made from that decision.
The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now
petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not
be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director characterized them as squatters. He found that some
claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of execution but the
protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). **
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on February 27,
1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The forty
defendants were Identified as follows:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic
50

2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic
4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia
6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban
7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas
8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante
9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila
10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay
11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac
12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy
14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa
15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante
18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani
20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty of the
abovenamed defendants were among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision
already mentioned.
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co., Inc. On
November 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it was
stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation and other requirements under the Public Land Law
and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was issued to the
corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original Certificate of
Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources,
recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, that the land in question was free from claims
and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No.
64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section
11, Article XIV of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).
Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that the
applicant had acquired a nested right to its issuance (p. 259, Rollo).
51

Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of forty), namely,
Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto,
Toribio Naquila, Elpidio Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa, Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and
Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to
coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28, Record on Appeal).
The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the Bureau of
Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision
of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against the sales award (p. 30, Record on
Appeal).
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found that the
plantings on the land could not be more than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when
the sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to vacate the land and to restore the
possession thereof to tile company. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December 5, 1975 in its
decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied
by this Court on May 17, 1976 in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants,
some of whom are now petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the
Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible
to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no
private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area."
The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of the manifestation of the defendants
that they would file a petition for prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant prohibition action was
filed. Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Bian
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as
a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and
enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest
in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs.
Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change
in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just
and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl.
2nd 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution took
effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales
patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent
(p. 254, Rollo).
52

In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or
cultivation requirements and has fully paid the purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired by
purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not apply.
In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where the cultivation requirements were
fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect but the full payment of the price was completed after January
17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official carries great
weight and should be accorded much respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt
or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).
As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot entertain
petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed portions of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or free patent applications.
Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle
to the implementation of the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that
issue, we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability.
Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law
grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative authorities should find ways and means of accommodating some
of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the words of President Magsaysay
deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a little more shelter over their heads and a little more clothing on
their backs. The State should endeavor to help the poor who find it difficult to make both ends meet and who
suffer privations in the universal struggle for existence.
A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights, particularly freedom from want. The common man
should be assisted in possessing and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social security
and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizen in our democratic society.
To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a social
order where, as the architect of the French Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the superfluities of life
but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private
corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations
or private persons had owned social unrest.
Petitioners' counsel claims that Bian Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case No.
3711, the ejectment suit from which this prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners who were not
defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do they derive their
right of possession from the said defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and
separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were not defendants in that
litigation or who were not summoned and heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no man
shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship
Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).
53

To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who occupy portions of the
disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit, would
be violative of due process of law, the law which, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth
College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial. "The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in Lopez vs. Director of
Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977,
75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case, or at about four o'clock in the morning of December 12,
1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown Fruits and
Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was occupied
by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was leased by Bian Development
Co., Inc. to the canning corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of
coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the
improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that Emberador was not expressly named as a defendant
in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the trial court's decision although he was joined as a copetitioner in this prohibition case.
The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia, the
manager of Bian Development Co., Inc., be declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the restraining
order issued by this Court on August 29, 1977, enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial
sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).
Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio M.
Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the instance
of Garcia who told the barrio captain, petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore
for the termination of this case.
The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said incident, Emberador, in consideration of
P3,500, as the value of the improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and
Cannery Corporation (Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
We hold that no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining order was not directed to Bian
Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's
judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by reason of the destruction of
his improvements, his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions
against the destroyer of the improvements.
In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied
upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no
retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot
be enforced against those petitioners herein who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No.
3711, and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Escolin, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
54

VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression
that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage
may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of
Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against the
defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives or privies who derive their right
of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the
dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only
the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs.
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression
that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage
may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the parties thereto but also against "their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of
Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectment case may be enforced not only against the
defendants therein but also against the members of their family, their relatives or privies who derive their right
of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the
dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only
the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs.
Footnotes
* According to respondent corporation, some of the adverse claimants or protestants were not landless farmers
but were well-educated persons belonging to the middle class. Thus, Elpidio Okay was an elementary school
principal. Vicente Rehoy was a landowner and barrio captain. Patricio de Leon was a cashier and later assistant
branch manager of the Philippine National Baank. Ernesto Paares was a high school teacher and later a college
professor. Francisco Mateo was a former college dean (p. 105, Rollo).
According to the 44 petitioners, they are tillers of the soil (p. 126, Rollo).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19535
July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA
and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA,
applicants-appellants,
55

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for
registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio
Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos"
issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants
invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the
ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in
concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's
opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less,
was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No.
26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge,
the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the
applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente
S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de
Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and
under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the
case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from
raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601
which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata"
in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the
Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to
dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for
had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27,
1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having
jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only
the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a
brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the
previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to
be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on
the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public
Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
56

of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to
December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership
under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous
possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case
the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the proceeding was in
rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that
properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be
public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such
declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that
the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of
the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an
opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have
furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and
judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
57
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review
the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The
appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18,
1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the
respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC
of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan.
The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and
contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect
title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and
the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in
the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992,
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced
all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
58

thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land
which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not
intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles,
failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering
that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in
an order dated February 18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On
February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic
and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4,
2000.[10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding
that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession
of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the
property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land
was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to
1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close
examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves
59

or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of
ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation
nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there
is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted
that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
[15] In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the
Court concluded that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and certified as
within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the
claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as
alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus,
in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and
disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,
[21] forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is
inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.
The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June
12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
60

own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
xxx xxx xxx
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However,
this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant
with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public
domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after
June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the
alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as
correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of
owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier
to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual
findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of
50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by
Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
61

constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any
cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the
Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto
undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice P. Alio-Hormachuelos, concurred in by Justices A. Austria-Martinez and E.J. Asuncion.
[2] Penned by Judge E. Terencio.
[3] Penned by Judge R. Barrios.
[4] Rollo, p. 31.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Id. at 50.
[7] Id. at 40.
[8] Id. at 16; but see 103.
[9] Id. at 77.
[10] Id. at 10.
[11] Id. at 19.
[12] G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604.
[13] R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 1995 at 182.
[14] G.R. No. 127060, 19 November 2002, 392 SCRA 190.
[15] Id. at 201.
[16] Rollo, p. 21.
[17] 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
[18] See e.g., Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480; Director of Lands
v. Court of Appeals, 218 Phil. 666,674 (1984); Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 211 Phil 260 (1983);
Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals 429 Phil. 377 (2002).
[19] See Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 357 (1997).
62

[20] Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12 citing Director of Forestry v. Muoz, G.R. No. 24796, 28
June 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.
[21] Supra note 19.
[22] Id. citing Vano v. Government of P.I., 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Li Seng Giap y CIAA v. Director, 55 Phil. 693
[1931]; Fernandez Hermanos v. Director, 57 Phil. 929 [1931]; Military Reservations v. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238
[1973]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476; Vallarta v. IAC, 152 SCRA 679; Director of Forest
Administration v. Fernandez, 192 SCRA 121.
[23] See Rollo, at 35.
[24] Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.
[25] See Article 1113, Civil Code, which states: All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible
of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
[26] See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16 October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security
Group v. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
[27] Rollo, p. 35.
[28] Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 597 (1999); Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 38; Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130876, January 31,
2002, 244 SCRA 218; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 674 (1996); Heirs of Placido Miranda v. Court of
Appeals, 255 SCRA 368; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 375 SCRA 390.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
63

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES MENDOZA, respondents.
Demetrio B. Encarnacion & Carlos J. Antiporda for petitioner.
Norberto S. Gonzalez for private respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated February
27, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46581-R entitled "Generoso Mendoza, applicants", applicant-appellee vs. Daniel Gole
Cruz, et al., movant, which upheld the registration in the names of herein private respondents, purchasers of the
landholdings subject matter of an application for registration, notwithstanding that they were not parties in the
original registration proceedings.
Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, 1 filed with the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house
thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. A notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting the
date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published, posted and served but nobody appeared
nor filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for that purpose. Consequently, the registration court
entered on July 6, 1965, an order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte.
2
From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, it was proven that he and his
wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of land subject of the application but the same were sold by
them, during the pendency of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private
respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights. The instrument embodying such sale was presented as
Exhibit 1. On the basis of such evidence, the registration court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza,
subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On the same day, a
copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza. 3
On November 5, 1965. after the decision had become final, the applicant-vendor, Generoso Mendoza, filed a
motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967, Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to
the land of vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the same in their
names, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787
was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. 4
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the decision dated
July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original
Certificate of Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground that the vendees, the registered owners, had failed to
pay the purchase price of the lands. 5
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a petition for review of the decree
and issued an order dated September 3, 1968 setting aside its decision, its order for the issuance of the decree,
and the decree of registration, on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to order the registration of the
lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the application for registration. Moreover, said court
ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and directed the registration of the lands in the names of spouses,
Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon, subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza,
stated in the deed of sale. 6
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order, but their motion was denied
on October 17, 1968. On December 19, 1968, said spouses appealed from the order dated September 3, 1968.
On March 11, 1969, Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and on April 10, 1969, the registration court
dismissed the appeal. 7
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 43250-R. The Court of Appeals on January 5,
1970, ordered the registration court to give due course to the appeal. The registration court approved the
64

Record on Appeal and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals together with all the evidence adduced
during the trial. 8
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46581- R, the Court of Appeals rendered on February
27, 1973, the decision, subject matter of the present petition for review. It set aside the order of the land
registration court of September 3, 1968 which set aside its decision of July 21, 1965 and the decree issued
pursuant thereto. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for reconsideration dated April 15 (filed April 16),
1968, which was considered as a petition for review of the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
1. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HIMSELF CAUSED THE REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE NAME OF THE APPELLANTS.
2. ... IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD LEGALLY
ORDER THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF VENDEES BECAUSE THE APPLICANT HIMSELF PROVIDED THE BASIS
FOR ADJUDICATION; AND THAT THE APPLICATION COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
ALREADY ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE SAID APPLICANT.
3. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT BASED ON FRAUD PERPETRATED ON THE
APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. 9
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering the registration
of the landholdings subject matter of the application for registration in the names of herein private respondents
who are the purchasers of the landholdings, notwithstanding that they were not parties in the original
registration proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' holding that he himself caused the
registration of the land in question in the name of the vendees, the herein private respondents. But whether or
not the petitioner did in fact cause the registration of the land in favor of private respondents is a question of
fact which cannot properly be raised in the present petition for review inasmuch as Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court of Appeals to this Court, only questions of law
my be raised. 10 Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner caused the registration of the land in
favor of the private respondents cannot now be raised in this Appeal much less disturbed by this Court.
However, by petitioner's insistence that he could not be deemed to have caused the registration of the land in
the names of private respondents as he never testified in court having sold the same to said Private respondents
11 he, in effect, invokes the exception to the above-stated rule of conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals'
findings of fact, namely: that the Court of Appeals' finding is grounded entirely on surmises or conjectures and
has no basis in the evidence on record. 12 Consequently, We are tasked with the e petition of the records of the
case to determine the veracity of petitioner's claim that he never testified in court as having sold the property to
the herein private respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should the records confirm such claim of
the petitioner, the Court of Appeals' holding that he caused the registration of the land in the names of private
respondents would have no basis in the evidence and should, thus, be reversed.
A careful study and consideration of the records of the case, however, belie petitioner's claim that he did not
testify relative to the aforementioned deed of sale. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on
the application for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly show that petitioner and his wife testified
before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the property sought to be registered to the
private respondents. Thus, the records show that petitioner testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Valentin:
Q. You said that you are the owners of these two parcels of land subject matter of this litigation, after you have
caused the filing of this application, was there any transaction that took place with respect to the same?
A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife Dolores Mendoza.
65

Q. Showing to you this document which is an original carbon copy of a deed of sale written in Tagalog and
executed and ratified on October 15, 1964, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court which is Exhibit I, will you
tell this Honorable Court if you know this Exhibit I? (sic)
A. Yes, sir, that is the carbon copy of the deed of sale I have just mentioned. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, applicant-petitioner's wife, Diega de Leon, testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject matter of this registration proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties.
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of the
same.
Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza co-possessing with you these two parcels of land?
A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this property to them with one of the conditions that until my husband
and myself or anyone of us die, we will live with them. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm the
aforesaid sale of the subject property. Thus, Cruz testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know the property covered by this registration proceedings?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know the same?
A. Because we have been living in said place since I got married and besides, on October 15, 1964, the said two
parcels of land were sold to us by the herein applicant and his wife.
Q. Showing to you this Exhibit 1, would you Identify and tell this Honorable Court if you know the same?
A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed of sale executed in our favor. 15 (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe applicant-petitioner's claim that he did not previously
cause the registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents. For, while it granted
applicant-petitioner's petition for review of the decree and ordered the re-registration of the land in his name,
the Court, nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order that:
66

Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, he himself produced evidence that on
October 15,1964 he and his wife sold the Land in favor of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for
the amount of P6,000.00 payable in installments (Exh. 1). ... 16 (Emphasis supplied).
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the respondent Court of Appeals did not incur any error when it
held that applicant. Petitioner himself caused the registration of the land in the names of private respondents.
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of error, that the registration court could not legally order
the registration of the land in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were neither the applicants nor the
oppositors in the registration case below. Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the
buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of
time between the filing of the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title, thus
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, the land therein described may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto
shall be recorded in the office of the register of said at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the
same manner as if no application had been made. The interested Party may, however, present such instruments
to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of the register of deeds, together with a
motion that the same be considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties,
shall order such land registered subject to the ecumbrance created by a said instruments, or order the decree of
registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments. ... (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land subject matter of an
application for registration to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval of time
between the filing of the application and the issuance of the decree of title, and to have the instruments
embodying such disposition or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the ,interested party" for the
court to either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said instruments, or order the
decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed
by said instruments. 17 The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by
substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does
it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He
may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that
the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.
As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the petitioner to the private
respondents was duly presented to the registration court for consideration. That the purpose was to have the
land registered in the names of private respondents subject to the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife
is explicit in the following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the petitioner himself, the applicant in the
registration proceedings, who presented the deed of sale (Exh. I) to the court and testified before the same that
he did sell the land to the private respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have
the land registered in his name as an order of general default had been issued and the hearing on the
application for registration had been conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly, as if to fully convince the court of the fact
of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and private respondent, Daniel GolE Cruz, to confirm the
said sale of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the petitioner even filed the motion for the
issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having received the decision of the court ordering the
registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees-respondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary
rights thereby signifying his full assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale in relation with the
application for registration. But the law does not require that the motion accompanying the presentation of the
instrument be in writing. And the above- enumerated acts of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances
surrounding the same accept of no interpretation than that the applicant-petitioner did in fact move the court to
order the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendees- respondents, subject only to the stipulated
usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first
requirement of the law.
67

Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties, the relevant fact to be considered is that an order of
general default had been issued prior to the presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-petitioner, since
nobody filed an opposition to the application for registration. Thus, the only person who should have been
entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner himself, as the only party with a legal standing in
the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration of the
lands in the names of vendees-respondents may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of prior notice to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, respondent Court of Appeals
did not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the
names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends in a desperate effort to justify the validity of the appealed order of September
3, 1968 that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that he was not the victim of fraud perpetrated by
the vendees, private respondents, herein, who allegedly failed to pay the purchase price of the landholdings.
This is also without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides as follows
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be
entered. ... Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree: subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the
decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground upon which a decree of registration may be set aside
is fraud in obtaining the same. In the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the
decree of registration for as heretofore stated, it was solely upon his testimony and proof that the lots were
ordered registered in the names of the vendees-respondents and it was also upon his motion that the decree of
registration was issued by the lower court. What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud
in obtaining the decree of registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase
price of the landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court of Appeals:
(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to
decide the contentious issue of whether or not the deed of sale, Exh. "1", should be rescinded for the alleged
failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price. The issue on the breach of contract has to be letigated in the
ordinary court. 18
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit any error in setting
aside the order of the lower court dated September 13, 1968, and thus allowing the registration of the lots of the
names of the vedees, herein private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 1973 is hereby affirmed with costs against
petitioner.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Guererro, * JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:

I concur in the judgment and the main opinion in this case. After all, as I view the whole controversy here,
whether the title of the land in qustion be in the name of the Mendoza or Cruz spouses is of secondary
importance, since the title issued to the latter would anyway carry the appropriate annotations protective of the
rights of the former under the deed of sale and vice-versa. Inasmuch as the factuality of the sale to the Cruz
68

spouses is beyond dispute and it is evidenced by a public instrument, it is unquestionable that the title to the
property, which is real property, passed to them upon the execution of the deed of sale and delivery thereof to
them. In fact, in recognition of such transfer of title it is expressly stipulated in the deed that the vendors would
retain possession and usufruct of the properties sold, as long as the total price has not been paid. Thus, the only
right that has remained with the Mendozas is to exact complieance with such conditions of the sale.
The alleged failure of the vendees to pay a single centavo of the price does not, to my mind, constitute fraud in
securing the registration of the property in their names. Worse, the Cruz spouses were not even parties to the
registration proceeding they were not represented therein by anybody; it was the court that caused such
registration at the instance, according to the evidence, of the petitioner himself. And on this score, I am not
ready to assume that Generoso Mendoza did not actually testify, even as I feel that anyway his recorded
testimony denied by him to have been actually given is hardly indispensable, considering it merely
confirmed what is alleged in the application, qualified by the deed of sale in favor of the Cruz spouses, the
authenticity and due execution of which are, as I have already stated, beyond dispute. The reopening of the
decree of registration by Judge de Borja had no legal basis.
As aptly held in the main opinion, the mere presentation to the court of that deed of sale, in one way or another,
justified the issuance of the title to the respondent, subject to the annotated rights of the petitioner, in
connection with which, if it be true that the stipulated price has not been paid even partially, I might suggest
that all that petitioner or his successor or heirs should do is to file a sworn manifestation with the register of
deeds to such effect, so that together with the provisions of the deed of sale, the fact of such alleged nonpayment may be known to the whole world, so to speak, for his protection. That protection is as good as if the
title were in his name.
In short, I believe there is not much real substance in the controversy before Us. It should be disposed of in the
simplest manner possible. For may part, I am more inclined to leave things as they are, rather than
unnecessarily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, since for all practical purposes, it would not make
any difference in whose name the title in question is issued. The respective rights of the parties would remain
the same either way.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the names of the spouses Daniel
Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. The registration in their names is not proper because they did not intervene in
the land registration proceeding; they did not defray the expenses thereof, and they have not paid to Generoso
Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6.000 as the price of the two lots. The antecedents of
Generoso Mendoza's appeal are as follows:
On May 15, 1964 Generoso Mendoza filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of two residential lots, with a total area of 258 square meters, located in the poblacion of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. He prayed that his title thereto be confirmed and registered.
On October 15, 1964, or during the pendency of the proceeding, Generoso Mendoza and his wife Diega de Leon,
both seventy-five years old, conditionally sold to the Cruz spouses, 25 and 26 years old, the said residential lots
for P6,000 as follows: P1,000 upon the signing of the deed and P1,000 annually until the balance of P5,000 is
paid. Among the conditions of the sale is that as long as the total price had not been paid, the vendors, or the
survivor in case one of them died, would retain the possession and usufruct of the two lots and the house
thereon. Upon full payment of the price, the vendees or either one of them, would take care of the vendors, or
the survivor, as if the latter were the parents of the vendees.
At the hearing, the deed of sale was presented in evidence. Judge Juan de Borja in a decision dated July 21,
1965, ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza "subject to the usufructuary rights of the spouses Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon". Lorenzo C.
Valentin, who notarized the deed of sale, represented the Mendoza spouses in the land registration proceeding.
On May 16, 1967, a decree of registration was issued. Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to the
Cruz spouses. On April 16, 1968, or within one year from the issuance of the decree, Generoso Mendoza,
through another lawyer, filed a motion to set aside the decree and title on the ground that the Cruz spouses had
not paid a single centavo of the price and, "hence, they have dirty hands". A copy of that motion was personally
served upon the Cruz spouses.
69

Without denying that they had not paid the price, they opposed the motion on the ground that the decision,
which had long become final, could no longer be set aside. Generoso Mendoza, in his reply, argued that the
review of the decree was sought on the ground of fraud and that the deed of sale had become void for nonpayment of the price.
At the hearing of the said motion on May 15, 1968, the old man, Generoso Mendoza, was placed on the witness
stand. He declared that during the hearing of his application for registration he was in the courtroom but that he
did not testify; that only his lawyer, Atty. Valentin and the stenographer were present at the hearing, and that he
did not give his consent to the issuance of the title in the name of Daniel Gole Cruz.
Judge De Borja, in his order of September 3, 1968, treated the motion as a petition for review under section 38
of Act No. 496. Realizing that he might have perpetrated an injustice in his decision, when he ordered the
registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses, Judge De Borja set aside that decision and the
decree of registration and ordered that the two lots be registered in the name of Generoso Mendoza, "subject to
the rights of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza" under the aforementioned deed of sale.
The Cruz spouses filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they alleged that they had already paid P3,000 out
of the price of P6,000 (p, 42, Record on Appeal). Judge De Borja denied the motion. The Cruz spouses appealed.
Judge De Borja did not give due course to their appeal. He issued a writ of execution requiring the register of
deeds to cancel the title issued to the Cruz spouses.
However, the Court of Appeals in the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the Cruz spouses,
ordered the lower court to give due course to their appeal (Cruz vs. De Borja, CA-G. R. No. 43250-R, January 5,
1970).
Later, the Court of Appeals in adjudicating the appeal upheld the registration of the lots in the names of the Cruz
spouses and reversed Judge De Borja's order for the registration of the lots in the name of Generoso Mendoza
(De Leon vs. Gole Cruz, CA-G. R. No. 46581-R, February 27, 1973, per Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. and
Gancayco, JJ., concurring). Diega de Leon, in substitution for her deceased husband, Generoso Mendoza,
appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals assumed that at the hearing of Generoso Miss. Mendoza's application on July 6, 1965, the
Mendoza spouses testified that they sold the two lots to Daniel Gole Cruz. According to the Cruz spouses, Daniel
Gole Cruz supposedly testified also at the hearing on July 17, 1965 (pp. 83-84, Record on Appeal).
However, as already noted, Generoso Mendoza at the hearing on May 15, 1968 of his motion to set aside the
decree and the title testified that he was never interrogated, meaning that he did not take the witness stand at
the hearing of his application for registration, and that only his counsel, Atty. Valentin, and the court
stenographer were present at the hearing.
We have, therefore, the conflicting versions of the parties as to what transpired at the hearing before the
commissioner of Generoso Mendoza's application for registration and as to whether there has been any payment
of the price for the sale. Generoso Mendoza himself, by testifying that he never took the witness stand at the
hearing of his application, destroyed the basis for the confirmation of his alleged title to the land or for its
registration in the names of the Cruz spouses.
In my opinion the ends of justice would be served by setting aside all the proceedings in the lower court and
holding a rehearing. The Cruz spouses should file a counter-petition in the trial court for the registration of the
two lots in their names on the basis of the deed of sale. The trial court should ascertain whether the price of the
sale had been paid by the this time. (See Vda. de Catindig vs. Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA
83).
At this juncture, it may be stressed that in the deed of sale (which was executed after the land registration
proceeding had been commenced), it was stipulated that, since the two lots were unregistered, the parties
agreed that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered land as provided for in Act No. 3344.
Had the parties intended that the vendees, the Cruz spouses, would be substituted as applicants in the land
registration proceeding, it could easily have been so stipulated in the deed of sale. But no such stipulation was
made. And no move was made by the vendees to have themselves substituted as applicants maybe because the
sale was conditional and they had allegedly not paid any part of the price. Neither did the vendor, Generoso
Mendoza, the applicant in the land registration proceeding, amend his application after the deed had been
70

signed, by praying that the two lots be registered in the names of the Cruz spouses. He did not do so because,
as already noted, the stipulation in the deed of sale was that the deed would be registered in the registry for
unregistered land.
Evidently, the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses was the Idea of the notary Valentin
who acted as counsel of Generoso Mendoza in the land registration proceeding. He did not bother to get the
written consent of the septuagenarian Generoso Mendoza, to the registration of the two lots in the names of the
Cruz spouses.
The Cruz spouses never contradicted nor refuted the declaration in court of Generoso Mendoza at the hearing of
his motion to set aside the decree and the title that he never testified during the hearing of his application and
that it was only Atty. Valentin who appeared before the stenographer during that hearing.
Any practising lawyer who has appeared in hearings before a commissioner deputed by the land registration
court to hear uncontested applications for registration knows that in some instances the hearings are not
conducted in a formal manner; that only the applicant's lawyer and the stenographer are usually present; that
the deputy clerk of court, as commissioner, or the hearing officer does not even bother to hear the applicant's
testimony, and that the stenographer and the applicant's lawyer may fabricate the testimonies that appear in
the transcript, which usually indicates that the applicant and his witnesses testified when in truth they did not
testify at all. Such reprehensible practice should be condemned. Trial courts should exercise close supervision
over the hearings of uncontested land registration cases so as not to make a farce or mockery of the hearing.
I vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the nullification of all the proceedings in the
lower court and for the holding of a new hearing on the application for registration of Generoso Mendoza and the
counter-petition of the, Cruz spouses as above-indicated.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I concur in the judgment and the main opinion in this case. After all, as I view the whole controversy here,
whether the title of the land in qustion be in the name of the Mendoza or Cruz spouses is of secondary
importance, since the title issued to the latter would anyway carry the appropriate annotations protective of the
rights of the former under the deed of sale and vice-versa. Inasmuch as the factuality of the sale to the Cruz
spouses is beyond dispute and it is evidenced by a public instrument, it is unquestionable that the title to the
property, which is real property, passed to them upon the execution of the deed of sale and delivery thereof to
them. In fact, in recognition of such transfer of title it is expressly stipulated in the deed that the vendors would
retain possession and usufruct of the properties sold, as long as the total price has not been paid. Thus, the only
right that has remained with the Mendozas is to exact complieance with such conditions of the sale.
The alleged failure of the vendees to pay a single centavo of the price does not, to my mind, constitute fraud in
securing the registration of the property in their names. Worse, the Cruz spouses were not even parties to the
registration proceeding they were not represented therein by anybody; it was the court that caused such
registration at the instance, according to the evidence, of the petitioner himself. And on this score, I am not
ready to assume that Generoso Mendoza did not actually testify, even as I feel that anyway his recorded
testimony denied by him to have been actually given is hardly indispensable, considering it merely
confirmed what is alleged in the application, qualified by the deed of sale in favor of the Cruz spouses, the
authenticity and due execution of which are, as I have already stated, beyond dispute. The reopening of the
decree of registration by Judge de Borja had no legal basis.
As aptly held in the main opinion, the mere presentation to the court of that deed of sale, in one way or another,
justified the issuance of the title to the respondent, subject to the annotated rights of the petitioner, in
connection with which, if it be true that the stipulated price has not been paid even partially, I might suggest
that all that petitioner or his successor or heirs should do is to file a sworn manifestation with the register of
deeds to such effect, so that together with the provisions of the deed of sale, the fact of such alleged nonpayment may be known to the whole world, so to speak, for his protection. That protection is as good as if the
title were in his name.
71

In short, I believe there is not much real substance in the controversy before Us. It should be disposed of in the
simplest manner possible. For may part, I am more inclined to leave things as they are, rather than
unnecessarily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, since for all practical purposes, it would not make
any difference in whose name the title in question is issued. The respective rights of the parties would remain
the same either way.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the names of the spouses Daniel
Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. The registration in their names is not proper because they did not intervene in
the land registration proceeding; they did not defray the expenses thereof, and they have not paid to Generoso
Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6.000 as the price of the two lots. The antecedents of
Generoso Mendoza's appeal are as follows:
On May 15, 1964 Generoso Mendoza filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of two residential lots, with a total area of 258 square meters, located in the poblacion of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. He prayed that his title thereto be confirmed and registered.
On October 15, 1964, or during the pendency of the proceeding, Generoso Mendoza and his wife Diega de Leon,
both seventy-five years old, conditionally sold to the Cruz spouses, 25 and 26 years old, the said residential lots
for P6,000 as follows: P1,000 upon the signing of the deed and P1,000 annually until the balance of P5,000 is
paid. Among the conditions of the sale is that as long as the total price had not been paid, the vendors, or the
survivor in case one of them died, would retain the possession and usufruct of the two lots and the house
thereon. Upon full payment of the price, the vendees or either one of them, would take care of the vendors, or
the survivor, as if the latter were the parents of the vendees.
At the hearing, the deed of sale was presented in evidence. Judge Juan de Borja in a decision dated July 21,
1965, ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza "subject to the usufructuary rights of the spouses Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon". Lorenzo C.
Valentin, who notarized the deed of sale, represented the Mendoza spouses in the land registration proceeding.
On May 16, 1967, a decree of registration was issued. Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to the
Cruz spouses. On April 16, 1968, or within one year from the issuance of the decree, Generoso Mendoza,
through another lawyer, filed a motion to set aside the decree and title on the ground that the Cruz spouses had
not paid a single centavo of the price and, "hence, they have dirty hands". A copy of that motion was personally
served upon the Cruz spouses.
Without denying that they had not paid the price, they opposed the motion on the ground that the decision,
which had long become final, could no longer be set aside. Generoso Mendoza, in his reply, argued that the
review of the decree was sought on the ground of fraud and that the deed of sale had become void for nonpayment of the price.
At the hearing of the said motion on May 15, 1968, the old man, Generoso Mendoza, was placed on the witness
stand. He declared that during the hearing of his application for registration he was in the courtroom but that he
did not testify; that only his lawyer, Atty. Valentin and the stenographer were present at the hearing, and that he
did not give his consent to the issuance of the title in the name of Daniel Gole Cruz.
Judge De Borja, in his order of September 3, 1968, treated the motion as a petition for review under section 38
of Act No. 496. Realizing that he might have perpetrated an injustice in his decision, when he ordered the
registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses, Judge De Borja set aside that decision and the
decree of registration and ordered that the two lots be registered in the name of Generoso Mendoza, "subject to
the rights of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza" under the aforementioned deed of sale.
The Cruz spouses filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they alleged that they had already paid P3,000 out
of the price of P6,000 (p, 42, Record on Appeal). Judge De Borja denied the motion. The Cruz spouses appealed.
Judge De Borja did not give due course to their appeal. He issued a writ of execution requiring the register of
deeds to cancel the title issued to the Cruz spouses.
72

However, the Court of Appeals in the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the Cruz spouses,
ordered the lower court to give due course to their appeal (Cruz vs. De Borja, CA-G. R. No. 43250-R, January 5,
1970).
Later, the Court of Appeals in adjudicating the appeal upheld the registration of the lots in the names of the Cruz
spouses and reversed Judge De Borja's order for the registration of the lots in the name of Generoso Mendoza
(De Leon vs. Gole Cruz, CA-G. R. No. 46581-R, February 27, 1973, per Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. and
Gancayco, JJ., concurring). Diega de Leon, in substitution for her deceased husband, Generoso Mendoza,
appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals assumed that at the hearing of Generoso Miss. Mendoza's application on July 6, 1965, the
Mendoza spouses testified that they sold the two lots to Daniel Gole Cruz. According to the Cruz spouses, Daniel
Gole Cruz supposedly testified also at the hearing on July 17, 1965 (pp. 83-84, Record on Appeal).
However, as already noted, Generoso Mendoza at the hearing on May 15, 1968 of his motion to set aside the
decree and the title testified that he was never interrogated, meaning that he did not take the witness stand at
the hearing of his application for registration, and that only his counsel, Atty. Valentin, and the court
stenographer were present at the hearing.
We have, therefore, the conflicting versions of the parties as to what transpired at the hearing before the
commissioner of Generoso Mendoza's application for registration and as to whether there has been any payment
of the price for the sale. Generoso Mendoza himself, by testifying that he never took the witness stand at the
hearing of his application, destroyed the basis for the confirmation of his alleged title to the land or for its
registration in the names of the Cruz spouses.
In my opinion the ends of justice would be served by setting aside all the proceedings in the lower court and
holding a rehearing. The Cruz spouses should file a counter-petition in the trial court for the registration of the
two lots in their names on the basis of the deed of sale. The trial court should ascertain whether the price of the
sale had been paid by the this time. (See Vda. de Catindig vs. Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA
83).
At this juncture, it may be stressed that in the deed of sale (which was executed after the land registration
proceeding had been commenced), it was stipulated that, since the two lots were unregistered, the parties
agreed that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered land as provided for in Act No. 3344.
Had the parties intended that the vendees, the Cruz spouses, would be substituted as applicants in the land
registration proceeding, it could easily have been so stipulated in the deed of sale. But no such stipulation was
made. And no move was made by the vendees to have themselves substituted as applicants maybe because the
sale was conditional and they had allegedly not paid any part of the price. Neither did the vendor, Generoso
Mendoza, the applicant in the land registration proceeding, amend his application after the deed had been
signed, by praying that the two lots be registered in the names of the Cruz spouses. He did not do so because,
as already noted, the stipulation in the deed of sale was that the deed would be registered in the registry for
unregistered land.
Evidently, the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses was the Idea of the notary Valentin
who acted as counsel of Generoso Mendoza in the land registration proceeding. He did not bother to get the
written consent of the septuagenarian Generoso Mendoza, to the registration of the two lots in the names of the
Cruz spouses.
The Cruz spouses never contradicted nor refuted the declaration in court of Generoso Mendoza at the hearing of
his motion to set aside the decree and the title that he never testified during the hearing of his application and
that it was only Atty. Valentin who appeared before the stenographer during that hearing.
Any practising lawyer who has appeared in hearings before a commissioner deputed by the land registration
court to hear uncontested applications for registration knows that in some instances the hearings are not
conducted in a formal manner; that only the applicant's lawyer and the stenographer are usually present; that
the deputy clerk of court, as commissioner, or the hearing officer does not even bother to hear the applicant's
testimony, and that the stenographer and the applicant's lawyer may fabricate the testimonies that appear in
the transcript, which usually indicates that the applicant and his witnesses testified when in truth they did not
testify at all. Such reprehensible practice should be condemned. Trial courts should exercise close supervision
over the hearings of uncontested land registration cases so as not to make a farce or mockery of the hearing.
73

I vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the nullification of all the proceedings in the
lower court and for the holding of a new hearing on the application for registration of Generoso Mendoza and the
counter-petition of the, Cruz spouses as above-indicated.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or
directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed
this petition to set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution[2]
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one
entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7,
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the
issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5] The application was docketed as
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD
1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G').
74

Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the
instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the
first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same
paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation,
and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is
indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a
particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper
of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside
the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19,
1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes
that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on
Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as
one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.[9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion[10] in holding
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation
to comply with the notice requirement of due process.[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:[13]
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication
in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to explain matters fully and
present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way.
Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting
at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is
minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
75

Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have
an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may
concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the
due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon
the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.[15] While concededly such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision,
we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs.
Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice
of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with.
If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of
mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of
adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the
process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by
satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the
same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned -- nay,
the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to
come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process
require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the
applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
76

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the
law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties
may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the allencompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the
whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application.[19] There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been
duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and
VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued
by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs.
Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2, 1980, dismissing the opposition
filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of
Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of
land, particularly described as follows:
77

[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one
hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on
the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand
Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125)
meters at the North and South; bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui,
on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B",
Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and
exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano,
who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by
virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of
Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He subsequently erected a six-door
apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against
private respondent for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal,
however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court
and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is
completely different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective
area and boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much
less covers that of the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by
the appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was
prepared by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or
prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified with that described in the
complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the
New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of
decision [sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same
from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he
lets to both transients and residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore,
possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541
of the New Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in
the matter of Identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position
of the land in relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and
landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration
No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property are mere estimations, reached thru pure
78

guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted
authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors
to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the Identity of the land
proved by the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be
disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for
Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355,
Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an
application for registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the
aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A",
Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private
respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a
prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners
to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's
opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration
was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES
JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE
AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION
CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN
THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING
TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs.
Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the
given period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case was consider submitted for decision without the
brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega,
Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to
be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar,
i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and
peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion
to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land
registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the
expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the
dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5]
oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the
lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors.
79

To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility.
The same consideration applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil
cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the
plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the
counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what
respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land
registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a
motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case,
Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a
claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set
up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran
and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court, instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to
entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of
petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents
but it will certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of
cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound
rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v.
Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court
invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res
judicata in a registration case when the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v.
Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the
former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA
344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration
and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The
inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration
does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the
interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus,
when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of
the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was
the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners
are the very same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for
relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second
case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action
because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in
registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the
applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the
former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is
directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in
Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an
action to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the
employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the
cases cited therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21
SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824;
Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, et
al., 70 Phil. 281].
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It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is
being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which
decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of
another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership
over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had
set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom
the principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle
of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court
of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either
the application for registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at
bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as
it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It
is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No.
60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the
land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the
same remains the law of the case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such
dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by
means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from
which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
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There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution
may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal
which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another
case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to
rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the
constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to
be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our
judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion
withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be,
or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of
appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not
only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being
prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all
register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondentappellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this
case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If
we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case,
not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case
was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his
appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and
indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by
this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having
reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our
conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful
consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be
taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never
come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the
validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their
superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result
that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the
legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this
stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then
proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization
of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any
kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference
to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all
lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And
82

this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term
"public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known
to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in
several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See
Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither
mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and
planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must
necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision
with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only
whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever
the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain
were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public
agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including
residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention
had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been
in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have
used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs.
Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning
which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the
instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be
presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526;
203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict
literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such
citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for,
under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are
the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential,
commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has
83

both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it
embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition,
into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are
residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or
disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No.
2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands
is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or
industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall
only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that
the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of
the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether
or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be
interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered
the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held
that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or
more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be
classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the
character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25).
In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming
methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a
person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief
Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon
who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the
Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor
General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have
always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.
It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
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Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak
into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino
citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained
in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same
subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the
very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural
land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or
phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention
appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under
section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to
the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony,
what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of
Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for
such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in
mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private
residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential
lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the
prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in
view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential
lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later
changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from
these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to
limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not
accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid
uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to
include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the
prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in
harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber
and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the
words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural
land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more
specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in
their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes
that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was
embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the
sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.)
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Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in
a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens
from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos."
(Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be
one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be
compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the
shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid
that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a
mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional
Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural
resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the
members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr.
Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an
alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he
allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly
passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to
the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right
to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations
organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon,
or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and
while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any
other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine
Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were
actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or
any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws,
and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized
by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act,
such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so
capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the
Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any
of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in
effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:
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SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands
terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of
the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition
by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further,
That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally
capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations
shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five
years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference
being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This,
undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which,
in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who
approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions.
We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to
land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are
deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and
more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including
residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to
bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no
distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or
commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a
clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of
opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would
have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the
Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it
was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the
constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution
as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted
freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate
of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied,
however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a
lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share
our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
87

Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future
generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its
duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility
of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most
important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside
to be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and
who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse
they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the
crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and
boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered
heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for
truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure
to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision.
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a
citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of
Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main
grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands
under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands
appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two
assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error
as follows:
The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who,
according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos who, while
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese addressed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by
the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the
appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that
is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme
Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed
in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of
the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that,
after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time
submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal
question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming
majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to
ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching,
decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been
out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question
raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion
that it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question
upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively
argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in
the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on
the question.
88

The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we
deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question
was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than twothirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July
10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing
the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional
question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its
conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at
all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this
Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February
24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the
highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and
Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr.
Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a
tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section
2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be
promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity
of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the
members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the
motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting.
But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its
denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration
by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one
section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on
August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or
association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for
registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or
any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy
national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition
contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural
land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with
Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly
ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the
Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens
are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
89

controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the
Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is
transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary
entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied unless and/or until
otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the party in interest shall
be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of
section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the
prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and
sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No.
615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long
and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29,
1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed
a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter
specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice
Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was
consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be
asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the
Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the
motion to withdraw is considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of
seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once
on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be
present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the motion
stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a
tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the
inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the
resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the
members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to
withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices
voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules,
the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to
by Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were
granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the
same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were
present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr.
Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about
one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the
result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the
necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed
its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no
formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since
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Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this
Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be
counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not
have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was
arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two
votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to
cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it
became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that
the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of
an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for
reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of
this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a
year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the
Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in
this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest.
The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people
as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining
public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority,
already knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same
zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian
mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has
in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most
cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a
new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded
in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old
Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the
conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish,
Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since
Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises,
with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to
defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First
came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown
immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their
sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous
enrichment. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues
of obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced
with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the
disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside
all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other
means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation
or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven,
renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or
other apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious
landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family
of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people
into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to
unlimited proportions.
91

Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in
the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be
disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians
resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away enemy
attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the
national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed
and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians
of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a
case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it
"shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and
branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article
XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to
Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands
of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save
by hereditary succession the only exception allowed by the Constitution no foreigner may by any means
acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the
Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the
dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on
Style the drafter of the final text has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in
the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be
overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and
registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the
transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia
case is an objective lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P.
Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock
example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The
1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it
was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next
legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had
completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had
bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by
leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal
of the grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had
bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it
was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case
"as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so
reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact
that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his
greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the
appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to
overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal
technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had
fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In
our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe
sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the
prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public
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officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions,
are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare
no efforts so that any and all violations which may have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino
citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by
the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the
appealed decision, which we affirm.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while
still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court
which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for registration
over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area
of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before
the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens
and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court
a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia
and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and
residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9,
Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title
to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
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On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in
controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also
that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to
confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since
1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was
not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and
register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189,
March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and
ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the
time of their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be
taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su,
G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse,
which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the
constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in
their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the
principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it
still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the
court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two
adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12,
1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of
their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby
entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established
by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of
strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicantsspouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and
that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years
prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino
citizens such that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute
had already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent
spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
94

18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This
is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession "since June 12, 1945." (PD No.
1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents'
possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they
needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987),
they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of
Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or
more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-ininterest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for
only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land
not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent
spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore
short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private
respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession
thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue
thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case
of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia
ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa,
declared that:
95

(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . .
.
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest,
title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter,
it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality,
the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is
of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State
than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in
truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Cario, ". . .(There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director
of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the
land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As
could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish the nature of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest
had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true
copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that
the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented
in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots
were part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA
GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
96

In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco
sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative,
under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and
was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review
and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership
based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the
private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old
Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the
"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous
title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the
rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890
[1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest (Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario
and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v.
Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more
than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive
averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the
application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and
therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question.
Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen the
beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession
was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
97

. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the
property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs in such manner as to remove the same
from the public domain under the Cario and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31
May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the
case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying
that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American
citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been
segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest
under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapias mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads:
has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal
capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum
area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
98

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature
on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could
be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law
provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee
of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be
used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels
of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the
mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private
respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private
land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of his birth; the
names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines;
the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be
submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a
certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving
the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when
the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of
deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration
is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
99

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:

With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons. It was
really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at
the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses
were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a former
natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name have
been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should
also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have become
foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be
less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion,
of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who
happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they
became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It
100

is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land
(not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not
be exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons. It was
really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-born Filpinos at
the time they acquired the land does not settle the question posed.
The important point is that the respondent spouses are no longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized
Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they acquired the land,
they can register it in their names now even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses
were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of private land to a former
natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a foreigner.
Thus it states:
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private respondents have
observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents' name have
been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should
also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who have become
foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our own citizens, I see no reason why we should be
less so with those who have renounced our country.
Feliciano, J.: concurring
101

I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive portion,
of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P. Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982,
does not purport to cover the set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e., the respondent spouses became
transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who
happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as I can
determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were already foreign nationals at the time they
became transferees of private land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It
is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even at the
subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185,
especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a specific limitation on the quantity of land
(not more than 1,000 square meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not
be exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185)
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by the respondent spouses, that is,
purchases made after they were naturalized as Canadian nationals.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17587
September 12, 1967
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendantappellant.
Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila.
This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres
street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino
Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses,
while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a
portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other
heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was
left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her
otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become
the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping,
including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong
himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf,
of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household
expenses.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on
November 15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to
102

him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was
given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract
covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4)
so as to make it cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at
an additional monthly rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of the rental due from him, an
amount not exceeding P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids.
On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises
for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog,
imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the
charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a
petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this
application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On
October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would
confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99
years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the
contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she
appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the
contracts.
On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that
the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence
and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were
made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and
also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to
cancel the registration of the contracts and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a
month from November 15, 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240
a month.
In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the
information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to him for safekeeping,
another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had with one of her maids. But he
denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the execution of the contracts in question. As
counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed him for advances.
Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus
on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on
different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957);
P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957); P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An
accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded.
In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the
Security Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G.
Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person.
In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties.
He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but
contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the instructions of Justina Santos; he
expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might make with respect to the sums of P22,000 in
the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
[A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which is the lease
contract of 15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru
guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended
103

complaint; he is also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the
document of lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he has consigned since then shall
be imputed to that; costs against Wong Heng.
From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both
parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted
by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine
Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease contract (Plff
Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality;
because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis; because the contract was obtained in
violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her consent was obtained through undue influence,
fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely
simulated.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is
claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind
both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."
We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy
Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a contract
for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties.
Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract
dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the
contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the
fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the
cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment.2
And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee, at any time
before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of
article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code."
The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality,
because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could occupy the premises
as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said, "If this defense were to be
allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by continuing the payment of the rentals, the
owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the owner should desire the lease to continue
the lessees could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple
expedient of stopping payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or
to terminate it is so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the
lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at
most justify the fixing of a period5 but not the annulment of the contract.
Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos
was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such
portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon the death of her sister Lorenzo on
September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November
15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a
property under judicial administration:
That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may
not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The
ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession
by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.6
It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with
Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents
104

(from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them." But Wong was
never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties, although admittedly close and confidential, did
not amount to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition of the law.
Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express not
her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he
prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong and that she told him that "whatever Mr.
Wong wants must be followed."7
The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically
dictated the terms of the contract. What this witness said was:
Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doa Justina, the contents of this document before she signed it?
A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite
onerous for her, I don't really know if I have expressed my opinion, but I told her that we would rather not
execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a verbal month to month contract of lease.
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same?
A She agreed first . . .
Q Agreed what?
A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right, but after that, I was called again
by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly proper?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before, she told
me "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."8
Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is
not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by
her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the
lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted
the validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on
a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm and unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer,
she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng."9 Recounting the incident, Atty. Yumol declared on cross
examination:
Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just
natural when she said "This is what I want and this will be done." In particular reference to this contract of lease,
when I said "This is not proper," she said "You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is
any illegality, I am the only one that can question the illegality."10
Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend, Hermenegilda
Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side.11 Any of them could have testified on the
undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but neither of them was presented as a
witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think the matter over, the lawyer could not make
her change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity of the lease contract against the
claim that it was procured through undue influence.
Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference12 drawn from the fact that Justina
Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language in which the contract is
written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence.
105

Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in
question, was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to believe, had saved her
and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila. For while a witness claimed
that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina
Santos herself who, according to her own witness, Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her
sister would have perished in the fire had it not been for Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional
option (Plff Exh. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay
tiyak na kamatayan", and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).
As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) the
consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said:
[I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences,
they used to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about
them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's okay. It's all right."15
But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957,
on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their considerations are
fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the additional premises leased to
him, because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe him. Neither did it believe his statement
that he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises,
the extension of the lease to 99 years, and the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount
was returned to him by her for safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching
the conclusion that the contracts are void for want of consideration.
Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents, but his negative
testimony does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid at some other time as the contracts
in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one party to the other at the time a contract is
executed because the promise of one is the consideration for the other.16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part
with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to
quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty.
Alonzo:
The ambition of the old woman, before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that these
properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa Justina told me that she did not have
any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially
her consolation in life was when she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she
told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those properties. That is why we thought of the
ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire
Filipino citizenship; being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted, while
dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue to what we view as a
scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens. "The illicit purpose
then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an
insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien
for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he
is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since
their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
106

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear
that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it ( jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the
possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the
rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in
this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was
reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril.
It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left
where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of the
fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators to whom it would be
unjust to impute their guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important, article 1416 of
the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal per
se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if
public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional provision that
"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution
as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens admitted
freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate
of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . . . .
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.25
That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside
and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the
general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v.
Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as pro tanto qualified.
The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of
merit.
And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of
accounts, one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to him from time to time, and another pertaining to
rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he himself was leasing.
With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff
Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff Exh. 13); P10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff Exh. 14) ; and
P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He claims, however, that he settled his
accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was
found to be due to him.
He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes, attorneys' fees,
funeral services and security guard services, but the checks (Def Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose
amount to only P38,442.84.27 Besides, if he had really settled his accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we
cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In
his answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim
of liquidation and settlement of accounts must be rejected.
After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564 which,
added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.3528 in favor of Justina Santos.
As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in
Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was P1,000, and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee, was
P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the
107

salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged. This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6)
which shows a balance of P9,210.49 in favor of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and
Rizal Avenue properties was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact,
there should be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not allow either party to recover against the other.
Said the court:
[T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only by Francisco Wong
and Antonia Matias, nick-named Toning, which was the way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear
proof that Doa Justina had authorized these two to act for her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of
that was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doa Justina
apparently understood for as the Court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court .
. . the reason why she preferred to stay in her home was because there she did not incur in any debts . . . this
being the case, . . . the Court will not adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand,
while it is claimed that the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . .
this Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court faced with the
choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is permitted by the rules of proof,
Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a person will live within his income so that the conclusion
of the Court will be that there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here.
Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both claims
should be denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, we think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling
P37,235, as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be rejected as the evidence is none too
clear about the amounts spent by Wong for food29 masses30 and salaries of her maids.31 His claim for
P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as
late as 1960 he still had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of
the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking
Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine
Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended
complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from
November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendantappellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
With the able and well-written opinion of Justice Castro, I am in full agreement. The exposition of the facts leaves
nothing to be desired and the statement of the law is notable for its comprehensiveness and clarity. This
concurring opinion has been written solely to express what I consider to be the unfortunate and deplorable
consequences of applying the pari delicto concept, as was, to my mind, indiscriminately done, to alien
landholding declared illegal under the Krivenko doctrine in some past decisions.
It is to be remembered that in Krivenko v. The Register of Deeds of Manila,1 this Court over strong dissents held
that residential and commercial lots may be considered agricultural within the meaning of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the transfer of any private agricultural land to individuals, corporations or associations not
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines save in cases of hereditary succession.
That provision of the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935 when the Commonwealth Government was
established. The interpretation as set forth in the Krivenko decision was only handed down on November 15,
1947. Prior to that date there were many who were of the opinion that the phrase agricultural land should be
construed strictly and not be made to cover residential and commercial lots. Acting on that belief, several
transactions were entered into transferring such lots to alien vendees by Filipino-vendors.
After the Krivenko decision, some Filipino vendors sought recovery of the lots in question on the ground that the
sales were null and void. No definite ruling was made by this Court until September of 1953, when on the 29th of
said month, Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun,2 Bautista v. Uy Isabelo,3 Talento v. Makiki,4 Caoile v. Chiao Peng5 were
decided.
108

Of the four decisions in September, 1953, the most extensive discussion of the question is found in Rellosa v.
Gaw Chee Hun, the opinion being penned by retired Justice Bautista Angelo with the concurrence only of one
Justice, Justice Labrador, also retired. Former Chief Justice Paras as well as the former Justices Tuason and
Montemayor concurred in the result. The necessary sixth vote for a decision was given by the then Justice
Bengzon, who had a two-paragraph concurring opinion disagreeing with the main opinion as to the force to be
accorded to the two cases,6 therein cited. There were two dissenting opinions by former Justices Pablo and Alex
Reyes. The doctrine as announced in the Rellosa case is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alienvendee of a residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor
has no right to recover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to prevent
this continuing violation of the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by allowing the alien vendees
to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. Thus: "By following either of these remedies, or by
approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution
regarding our natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto."7
Were the parties really in pari delicto? Had the sale by and between Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee occurred
after the decision in the Krivenko case, then the above view would be correct that both Filipino-vendor and alienvendee could not be considered as innocent parties within the contemplation of the law. Both of them should be
held equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution.
Since, however, the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the assumption
could be honestly entertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the sale of commercial or
residential lots by Filipino-vendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite decision by the Supreme Court, it
would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the imputation of evading the Constitution. For
evidently evasion implies at the very least knowledge of what is being evaded. The new Civil Code expressly
provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith."8
According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based on the
broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the law." This statement that the sales entered into
prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty knowledge of the parties may be too
extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a constitutional system, wherein the words of the
Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme Court adjudication.1awphl.nt
Reference may be made by way of analogy to a decision adjudging a statute void. Under the orthodox theory of
constitutional law, the act having been found unconstitutional was not a law, conferred no rights, imposed no
duty, afforded no protection.9 As pointed out by former Chief Justice Hughes though in Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank:10 "It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have
to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination."
After the Krivenko decision, there is no doubt that continued possession by alien-vendee of property acquired
before its promulgation is violative of the Constitution. It is as if an act granting aliens the right to acquire
residential and commercial lots were annulled by the Supreme Court as contrary to the provision of the
Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring private agricultural land.
The question then as now, therefore, was and is how to divest the alien of such property rights on terms
equitable to both parties. That question should be justly resolved in accordance with the mandates of the
Constitution not by a wholesale condemnation of both parties for entering into a contract at a time when there
was no ban as yet arising from the Krivenko decision, which could not have been anticipated. Unfortunately,
under the Rellosa case, it was assumed that the parties, being in pari delicto, would be left in the situation in
which they were, neither being in a position to seek judicial redress.
Would it not have been more in consonance with the Constitution, if instead the decision compelled the
restitution of the property by the alien-vendee to the Filipino-vendor? Krivenko decision held in clear, explicit and
unambigous language that: "We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to aliens of any
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private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been . . . . This prohibition
[Rep. Act No. 133] makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that
are residential or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens,
which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. . . . It is
well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it
is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely
into the Philippines, from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of
the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity."11
Alien-vendee is therefore incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That incapacity and that
disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on November 15, 1935. That incapacity and
that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and to alien-vendee only upon the
promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947. Alien-vendee, therefore, cannot be allowed to
continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said property, when it is clearly included within the
Constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should thus be made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to
Filipino-vendor, its previous owner, if it could be shown that in the utmost good faith, he transferred his title over
the same to alien-vendee, upon restitution of the purchase price of course.
The Constitution bars alien-vendees from owning the property in question. By dismissing those suits, the lots
remained in alien hands. Notwithstanding the solution of escheat or reversion offered, they are still at the
moment of writing, for the most part in alien hands. There have been after almost twenty years no proceedings
for escheat or reversion.
Yet it is clear that an alien-vendee cannot consistently with the constitutional provision, as interpreted in the
Krivenko decision, continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over the real estate in question. It ought to
follow then, if such a continuing violation of the fundamental law is to be put an end to, that the Filipino-vendor,
who in good faith entered into, a contract with an incapacitated person, transferring ownership of a piece of land
after the Constitution went into full force and effect, should, in the light of the ruling in the Krivenko case, be
restored to the possession and ownership thereof, where he has filed the appropriate case or proceeding. Any
other construction would defeat the ends and purposes not only of this particular provision in question but the
rest of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. Restoration of the property upon payment
of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court is the answer. To give the
constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the dictates of equity and justice, the
restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by the court is the better remedy. He thought he
could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After the Krivenko case had made clear that he had no right to
sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the property in question, the obvious solution would be for him to reacquire
the same. That way the Constitution would be given, as it ought to be given, respect and deference.
It may be said that it is too late at this stage to hope for such a solution, the Rellosa opinion, although originally
concurred in by only one justice, being too firmly imbedded. The writer however sees a welcome sign in the
adoption by the Court in this case of the concurring opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon. Had
it been followed then, the problem would not be still with us now. Fortunately, it is never too late not even in
constitutional adjudication.
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Republic of the Philippines

July 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

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JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Republic of the Philippines

June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

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Republic of the Philippines

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Republic of the Philippines

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

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TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

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