SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION (PTGWO), Petitioners, v. HON. BLAS F. OPLE, [G.R. No. 53515.

February 8, 1989.]
On April 17, 1978, a collective bargaining agreement (effective on May 1, 1978 until January 31, 1981) was entered into by petitioner San Miguel
Corporation Sales Force Union (PTGWO), and the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1, of Article IV of which provided as
follows:j"Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission
based on their respective sales." (p. 6, Annex A; p. 113, Rollo.)
In September 1979, the company introduced a marketing scheme known as the "Complementary Distribution System" (CDS) whereby its beer
products were offered for sale directly to wholesalers through San Miguels sales offices.
The labor union (herein petitioner) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the Ministry of Labor, with a notice of strike on the ground that the CDS
was contrary to the existing marketing scheme whereby the Route Salesmen were assigned specific territories within which to sell their stocks of
beer, and wholesalers had to buy beer products from them, not from the company. It was alleged that the new marketing scheme violates Section 1,
Article IV of the collective bargaining agreement because the introduction of the CDS would reduce the take-home pay of the salesmen and their
truck helpers for the company would be unfairly competing with them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The complaint filed by the petitioner against the respondent company raised two issues: (1) whether the CDS violates the collective bargaining
agreement, and (2) whether it is an indirect way of busting the union.
In its order of February 28, 1980, the Minister of Labor found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . We see nothing in the record as to suggest that the unilateral action of the employer in inaugurating the new sales scheme was designed to
discourage union organization or diminish its influence, but rather it is undisputable that the establishment of such scheme was part of its overall plan
to improve efficiency and economy and at the same time gain profit to the highest. While it may be admitted that the introduction of new sales plan
somewhat disturbed the present set-up, the change however was too insignificant as to convince this Office to interpret that the innovation interfered
with the workers right to self-organization.
"Petitioners conjecture that the new plan will sow dissatisfaction from its ranks is already a prejudgment of the plans viability and effectiveness. It is
like saying that the plan will not work out to the workers [benefit] and therefore management must adopt a new system of marketing. But what the
petitioner failed to consider is the fact that corollary to the adoption of the assailed marketing technique is the effort of the company to compensate
whatever loss the workers may suffer because of the new plan over and above than what has been provided in the collective bargaining agreement.
To us, this is one indication that the action of the management is devoid of any anti-union hues." (pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
The dispositive part of the Ministers Order reads:j"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the notice of strike filed by the petitioner, San Miguel
Brewery Sales Force Union-PTGWO is hereby dismissed. Management however is hereby ordered to pay an additional three (3) months back
adjustment commissions over and above the adjusted commission under the complementary distribution system." (p. 26, Rollo.)
The petition has no merit.cPublic respondent was correct in holding that the CDS is a valid exercise of management
prerogatives:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Except as limited by special laws, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. . . . (NLU v.
Insular La Yebana Co., 2 SCRA 924; Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226, 235.)" (Perfecto V. Hernandez, Labor Relations Law, 1985 Ed.,
p. 44.) (Emphasis ours.)
Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may adopt or devise means designed towards that goal. In Abott
Laboratories v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713, We ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly
management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied."cralaw
virtua1aw library
So long as a companys management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold them (LVN
Pictures Workers v. LVN, 35 SCRA 147; Phil. American Embroideries v. Embroidery and Garment Workers, 26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. v.
Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel Corporations offer to compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the
implementation of the CDS, by paying them a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of
the CDS, proves the companys good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED

WILTSHIRE FILE CO., INC. VS. NLRC193 SCRA 665FELICIANO, J.:

FACTS:
1.Private respondent Vicente Ong was the Sales Manager of petitioner from March 16, 1981 up to June 18, 1985.
2.On 13 June 1985, upon private respondent's return from a business an d pleasure trip abroad, he was informed by the
President of petitioner that his services were being terminated.
3.Private respondent maintains that he tried to get an explanation from management of his dismissal but to no avail.
4.When private respondent again tried to speak with the President of petitioner, the company's security guard handed
him a letter which formally informed him that his services were being terminated upon the ground of redundancy.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is validly terminated.
HELD: The Court indeed found that petitioner had serious financial difficulties before, during and after the termination of the services of
private respondent. The company showed a net loss of P4,431,321.00 in its audited financial statements. Moreover, Wiltshire finally
closed its doords and terminated all operations in the Philippines on January 1987, barely 2 years after the termination of private
respondent.
The Court considered that finally shutting down business operations constitutes strong confirmatory evidence of petitioner's previous
financial distress. It is also to be noted that the letter informing private respondents of the termination of his services used the word
redundant, that letter also referred to the company having incurred financial losses which in fact has compelled it to resort to
retrenchment to prevent further losses. Thus, what the letter was in effect saying was that because of financial losses, retrenchment
was necessary, which in turn resulted in the redundancy of private respondent's position.
That no other person was holding the same position that private respondent held prior to the termination of his services, does not show
that his position had not become redundant. Redundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee
are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where it is
superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions maybe the outcome of a number of factors such as over hiring of workers,
decreased volume of business, or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the
enterprise.

Royal Plant Workers Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013
FACTS: PETITIONER Royal Plant Workers Union is the union of bottling operators employed with respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.Cebu Plant (CCBPI).
In 1974, the bottling operators were provided with chairs upon their request. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs were removed pursuant to a
national directive of respondent. This directive is in line with the I operate, I maintain, I clean program of petitioner for bottling operators.
The CCBPI maintains that the removal of the subject chairs is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Is there merit to this contention?
Ruling: Yes.
The Supreme Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including
hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.
In the present controversy, it cannot be denied that CCBPI removed the operators chairs pursuant to a national directive and in line with its I
Operate, I Maintain, I Clean program, launched to enable the union to perform their duties and responsibilities more efficiently. The chairs were not
removed indiscriminately. They were carefully studied with due regard to the welfare of the members of the Union. The removal of the chairs was
compensated by a) a reduction of the operating hours of the bottling operators from 2.5-hour rotation period to a 1.5-hour rotation period; and b) an
increase of the break period from 15 to 30 minutes between rotations.
Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions, as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job
while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact that the chairs were not necessary, considering that the
operators constantly move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPIs
exercise of its management prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers rights

Ymbong v. ABSCBN
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto G. Ymbong started working for ABS-CBN in 1993 at its regional station in Cebu as a television talent, co-anchoring Hoy
Gising and TV Patrol Cebu. His stint in ABS-CBN later extended to radio when ABS-CBN Cebu launched its AM station in 1995.
Like Ymbong, Leandro Patalinghug also worked for ABS-CBN Cebu. Starting 1995, he worked as talent, director and scriptwriter for various radio
programs aired.
On January 1, 1996, the ABS-CBN Head Office in Manila issued Policy on Employees Seeking Public Office. The pertinent portions read:
1.
2.

Any employee who intends to run for any public office position, must file his/her letter of resignation,
Any employee who intends to join a political group/party or even with no political affiliation but who intends to
openly and aggressively campaign for a candidate or group of candidates must file a request for leave of absence
subject to managements approval.

Because of the 1998 elections and based on his immediate recollection of the policy Mr. Dante Luzon, Assistant Station Manager issued a
memorandum stating any employee/talent who wants to run for any position in the coming election will have to file a leave of
absence the moment he/she files his/her certificate of candidacy. And added further that The services rendered by the concerned
employee/talent to this company will then be temporarily suspended for the entire campaign/election period.
Luzon, however, admitted that upon double-checking of the exact text of the policy he saw that the policy actually required suspension for those who
intend to campaign for a political party or candidate and resignation for those who will actually run in the elections.
After the issuance of the Memorandum, Ymbong got in touch with Luzon. Luzon claims that Ymbong approached him and told him that he would
leave radio for a couple of months because he will campaign for the administration ticket. It was only after the elections that they found out that
Ymbong actually ran for public office himself at the eleventh hour. Ymbong, on the other hand, claims that in accordance with the Memorandum, he
informed Luzon through a letter that he would take a few months leave of absence because he was running for councilor of Lapu-Lapu City.
As regards Patalinghug, Patalinghug approached Luzon and advised him that he will run as councilor for Naga. According to Luzon, he clarified to
Patalinghug that he will be considered resigned and not just on leave once he files a certificate of candidacy. Thus, Patalinghug wrote Luzon his
resignation letter.
Unfortunately, both Ymbong and Patalinghug lost in the May 1998 elections.
Later, Ymbong and Patalinghug both tried to come back to ABS-CBN Cebu. According to Luzon, he informed them that they cannot work there
anymore because of company policy.
ABS-CBN, however, agreed out of pure liberality to give them a chance to wind up their participation in the radio drama since it was rating well and
to avoid an abrupt ending. The agreed winding-up, however, dragged on for so long prompting Luzon to issue to Ymbong a memorandum stating
that his involvement as narrator of the drama continues until its director wraps it up one week upon receipt of a separate memo.
Ymbong in contrast contended that after the expiration of his leave of absence, he reported back to work as a regular talent and in fact continued to
receive his salary. On he received a memorandum stating that his services are being terminated immediately, much to his surprise.
Thus, he filed an illegal dismissal. He argued that the ground cited by ABS-CBN for his dismissal was not among those enumerated in the Labor
Code. And even granting without admitting the existence of the company policy supposed to have been violated, Ymbong averred that it was
necessary that the company policy meet certain requirements before willful disobedience of the policy may constitute a just cause for
termination. Ymbong further argued that the company policy violates his constitutional right to suffrage.
Patalinghug likewise filed an illegal dismissal complaint against ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN prayed for the dismissal of the complaints arguing that there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and Ymbong
and Patalinghug.
The Labor Arbiter found that there exists an employer-employee relationship between ABS-CBN and Ymbong and Patalinghug considering the
stipulations in their appointment letters/talent contracts.
In its memorandum of appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), ABS-CBN contended that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over the case because there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and Ymbong and Patalinghug.

In its Supplemental Appeal, ABS-CBN insisted that Ymbong and Patalinghug were engaged as radio talents and their contract is one between a selfemployed contractor and the hiring party which is a standard practice in the broadcasting industry.
The NLRC dismissed ABS-CBNs Supplemental Appeal for being filed out of time.
As to the issue of whether they were illegally dismissed, the NLRC treated their cases differently. In the case of Patalinghug, it found that he
voluntarily resigned from employment when he submitted his resignation letter. As to Ymbong, however, the NLRC ruled otherwise. It ruled that the
Memorandum merely states that an employee who seeks any elected position in the government will only merit the temporary suspension of his
services. It held that under the principle of social justice, the Memorandum shall prevail and ABS-CBN is estopped from enforcing the other
memorandum issued to Ymbong stating that his services had been automatically terminated when he ran for an elective position.
ABS-CBN moved to reconsider the NLRC decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution. ABS-CBN then filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA.
CA rendered the assailed decision. The CA declared Ymbong resigned from employment and not to have been illegally dismissed.
Issues:
1)
2)

Whether Ymbong, by seeking an elective post, is deemed to have resigned and not dismissed by ABS-CBN.
Whether such policy is valid.

Held:
We have consistently held that so long as a companys management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court
will uphold them. In the instant case, ABS-CBN validly justified the implementation of the Policy. It is well within its rights to ensure that it maintains
its objectivity and credibility and freeing itself from any appearance of impartiality.
We find no merit in Ymbongs argument that [his] automatic termination x x x was a blatant [disregard] of [his] right to due process as he was never
asked to explain why he did not tender his resignation before he ran for public office as mandated by [the subject company policy]. Ymbongs overt
act of running for councilor of is tantamount to resignation on his part. He was separated from ABS-CBN not because he was dismissed but because
he resigned.
Since there was no termination to speak of, the requirement of due process in dismissal cases cannot be applied to Ymbong.
Thus, ABS-CBN is not duty-bound to ask him to explain why he did not tender his resignation before he ran for public office as mandated by the
subject company policy.

Manila Pavilion Hotel vs. Delada, G.R. No. 189947, January 25, 2012
Facts:
Delada was the Union President of the Manila Pavilion Supervisors Association at MPH. He was originally assigned as Head Waiter of Rotisserie, a
fine-dining restaurant operated by petitioner. Pursuant to a supervisory personnel reorganization program, MPH reassigned him as Head Waiter of
Seasons Coffee Shop, another restaurant operated by petitioner at the same hotel. Respondent declined the inter-outlet transfer and instead asked
for a grievance meeting on the matter, pursuant to their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). He also requested his retention as Head Waiter of
Rotisserie while the grievance procedure was ongoing.
MPH replied and told respondent to report to his new assignment for the time being, without prejudice to the resolution of the grievance involving the
transfer. He adamantly refused to assume his new post at the Seasons Coffee Shop and instead continued to report to his previous assignment at
Rotisserie. Thus, MPH sent him several memoranda on various dates, requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be penalized for the
following offenses: serious misconduct; willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer; gross insubordination; gross and habitual neglect of
duties; and willful breach of trust. Despite the notices from MPH, Delada persistently rebuffed orders for him to report to his new assignment.
According to him, since the grievance machinery under their CBA had already been initiated, his transfer must be held in abeyance. Thus, on 9 May
2007, MPH initiated administrative proceedings against him.
Issue:
Whether MPH retained the authority to continue with the administrative case against Delada for insubordination and willful disobedience of the
transfer order.
Rulings:
Accordingly, we rule in this case that MPH did not lose its authority to discipline respondent for his continued refusal to report to his new assignment.
In relation to this point, we recall our Decision in Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
In Allied Banking Corporation, employer Allied Bank reassigned respondent Galanida from its Cebu City branch to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran
branches. He refused to follow the transfer order and instead filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal. While the case
was pending, Allied Bank insisted that he report to his new assignment. When he continued to refuse, it directed him to explain in writing why no
disciplinary action should be meted out to him. Due to his continued refusal to report to his new assignment, Allied Bank eventually terminated his
services. When the issue of whether he could validly refuse to obey the transfer orders was brought before this Court, we ruled thus:
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer. Employees may object to, negotiate and
seek redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared
illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. For Galanidas continued refusal to obey Allied Bank's
transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282(a) of the Labor Code. Galanida is thus not
entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
It is important to note what the PVA said on Deladas defiance of the transfer order:
In fact, Delada cannot hide under the legal cloak of the grievance machinery of the CBA or the voluntary arbitration proceedings to disobey a valid
order of transfer from the management of the hotel. While it is true that Deladas transfer to Seasons is the subject of the grievance machinery in
accordance with the provisions of their CBA, Delada is expected to comply first with the said lawful directive while awaiting the results of the decision
in the grievance proceedings. This issue falls squarely in the case of Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals x x x.
Pursuant to Allied Banking, unless the order of MPH is rendered invalid, there is a presumption of the validity of that order. Since the PVA eventually
ruled that the transfer order was a valid exercise of management prerogative, we hereby reverse the Decision and the Resolution of the CA affirming
the Decision of the PVA in this respect. MPH had the authority to continue with the administrative proceedings for insubordination and willful
disobedience against Delada and to impose on him the penalty of suspension. As a consequence, petitioner is not liable to pay back wages and
other benefits for the period corresponding to the penalty of 90-day suspension

St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRC

Facts:
1. The private respondent Maribel Santos worked as an X-Ray technician at the petitioner hospital (SLMC) but she does not possess a certificate of
registration as required under the newly passed Radiologic Act or RA 7431. Due to her non-compliance and her failure to pass the exams, she was
separated.
2. The private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter ordered
the petitioner to pay respondent separation pay and this was affirmed by both NLRC and the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. The petitioner
contended that respondent dismissal was valid.
Issue: Whether or not an employer can validly dismiss an employee based on her inability to secure a certification as required by the
Board
RULING: Yes, The petitioner is merely exercising its management prerogative and these rights are entitled respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play. There was no malice imputed upon an employer where the separation of an employee is undertaken in conformance with an existing law as
in this case.
Management prerogatives include the right of the employer to determine the place or station where an employee is best qualified to serve the
interests of the company on the basis of the qualifications, training and performance. - See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2013/03/stlukes-medical-center-v-nlrc-digest.html#sthash.cHk2TpTJ.dpuf

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, vs RONALDO D. SIMBOL G.R. No. PUNO, J.:
We are called to decide an issue of first impression: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates
the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its
Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella) were
all regular employees of the company.1
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27,
1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy promulgated in 1995,2 viz.:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed
by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of
their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.3
Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy. 4
Comia was hired by the company on February 5, 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco
likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.5
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella
pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.6
The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in
the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.7
Respondents offer a different version of their dismissal. Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign
in view of an illegal company policy. As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuiga who misrepresented
himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship
with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy. On November 30, 1999, she met an accident and was advised by the doctor at the
Orthopedic Hospital to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. She returned to work on December 21, 1999 but she found out that her name was onhold at the gate. She was denied entry. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The
memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for
twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of
the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in
exchange for her thirteenth month pay.8
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were dismissed due to their
union membership.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
[T]his company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. This management
prerogative is quite broad and encompassing for it covers hiring, work assignment, working method, time, place and manner of work, tools to be
used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as provided for or limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment all the aspects of employment.9 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on January 11, 2002. 10

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 11 dated August 8, 2002. They appealed to respondent
court via Petition for Certiorari.
In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 31, 2002 (sic)12 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:
(1) Declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and ordering private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(2) Ordering private respondents to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of this suit.13
On appeal to this Court, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:
1. x x x the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of
Article 136 of the Labor Code; and
2. x x x respondents resignations were far from voluntary.14
We affirm.
The 1987 Constitution15 states our policy towards the protection of labor under the following provisions, viz.:
Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
xxx
Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
The Civil Code likewise protects labor with the following provisions:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which
provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the
Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to
resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

FACTS: Pedro A. Tecson signed a contract of employment with Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative in
October 1995.
He agreed to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The same provision on disclosure of relationship is provided in the Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo and it further states that if
management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment, it could
result in transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside the company after
six months.
But Tecson, with all helplessness of the sort that often attends matters that concern the heart, developed a forbidden liking for Bettsy,
an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo.
For reasons unmistakably attributable to feelings of love, their hearts refused to pump blood into their brains and so they suffered from
a major lapse of judgment and ended up marrying in 1998.
As conflict of interest arose according to his superiors, Tecson was pulled out of the Camarines sales area and transferred to Butuan but
he refused.
The matter was initially brought to Glaxos grievance committee but was not resolved and so the NCMB had to come in, which upheld
the validity of Glaxos policy on relationships.
The Court of Appeals likewise found for Glaxo citing the valid exercise of management prerogatives.

- ISSUE: WON Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
- WON the policy violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
- WON Tecson was constructively dismissed by his transfer from Camarines to Butuan.
- RULING:
YES.
- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
- The prohibition under the circumstances is reasonable because relationships of such nature might compromise the interests of the
company.
- Glaxos right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied as no less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to
adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investment and to expansion and growth.
- While protection is provided to labor, the law also recognizes managements rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.
- NO.
- It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under the color
of its authority.
- The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in
the wrongful private conduct.
- The exception is not presented in this case.
- The application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
- From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between itsYES.
- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
- The prohibition under the circumstances is reasonable because relationships of such nature might compromise the interests of the
company.
- Glaxos right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied as no less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to
adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investment and to expansion and growth.
- While protection is provided to labor, the law also recognizes managements rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.
- NO.
- It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under the color
of its authority.
- The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in
the wrongful private conduct.
- The exception is not presented in this case.
- The application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

- From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies.
- It merely seeks to avoid a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships.
- The company policy was clearly made known to Tecson prior to his employment; he is thus estopped from questioning said policy.
- A contract has the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.
- NO.
- Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
- None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
- Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to Butuan City sales area to avoid conflict of interest.
- Tecson was warned against the conflict of interest and after his marriage, was given time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from
the company or asking his wife to resign from Astra.
- It was only when the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting that Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a
sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra.
- He was not terminated from employment, only reassigned to another area where his home province was included.
- Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons family, dispelling any suspicision of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo..

DOCTRINE:
- While protection is provided to labor, the law also recognizes managements rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in
the interest of fair play.
- It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under the color
of its authority.
- The only exception occurs when the state in any of its manifestations or actions has been found to have become entwined or involved in
the wrongful private conduct.
- Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.

Dator vs. UST, Rev. Tamerlane Lana, and Rev. Rodel Aligan (G.R. No. 169464, 31 August 2006), where the
University discovered a faculty member being employed full-time with the Office of the Ombudsman. As such,
and in conformity with the provisions of its Faculty Manual, the University converted Dators full time faculty
status into one of part-time. Dator filed a case, alleging that deloading is in bad faith and in contravention of his
security of tenure rights and of CBA provisions. Dator argued that that he was under no obligation to disclose
his employment with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that the only information required of him pertained to
1) other colleges where he is teaching, 2) teaching loads outside the university, and 3) a business firm he is
employed with. He argues that the Office of the Ombudsman, being a government agency, does not fall under
any of the foregoing categories.
The Supreme Court upheld the Universitys right to deload the faculty member, and considered the latters
argument as flimsy. It found that the Universitys Faculty Code which provided that all faculty members must
submit each semester a statement of the number of teaching hours per week to be rendered in other institutions
and/or daily hours of work or employment, inside or outside the University as reasonable and justifiable under
the circumstances. The rationale behind the rule is unmistakable being that there is a need to maintain USTs
quality of education as well as to ensure that government service is not jeopardized.

Moreno vs. San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, 550 SCRA 415 [28 MARCH 2008], the College had a
policy which required the faculty members to secure prior permission before teaching in other schools. One
such faculty member was discovered to have taught in another school without having secured said authority, in
violation of the Faculty Manual which penalized the same with dismissal. However, the faculty member
defended herself, stating that she needed to augment income due to financial difficulty. Nonetheless, the
College terminated the faculty member for serious misconduct and wilful disobedience, for which reason this
case was filed against the College.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the faculty member and said that such misconduct FALLS BELOW the
required level of gravity that would warrant dismissal as a penalty. Moreover, willful disobedience of
employers lawful order as a just cause for termination must comply with the element that the willfulness is
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The College failed to prove that the faculty member indeed
harbored perverse or corrupt motivations in violating the aforesaid school policy. Note that the faculty member:
(a) voluntarily admitted her guilt; (b) was a first-time offender; and (c) had explained in detail her role as sole
breadwinner and the grave financial conditions of her family necessitating her engagement in illicit teaching
activities in other schools to augment her income.

AVON COSMETICS VS. LUNA

G.R. No. 163512 February 28, 2007
Facts: Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon), herein petitioner, acquired and took over the management and operations of Beautifont, Inc.
Nonetheless, respondent Luna continued working for said successor company. Aside from her work as a supervisor, respondent Luna also acted as
a make-up artist of petitioner Avons Theatrical Promotions Group, for which she received a per diem for each theatrical performance. Therafter,
petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement, entitled Supervisors Agreement and by virtue of the execution of the aforequoted
Supervisors Agreement, respondent Luna became part of the independent sales force of petitioner Avon.
Sometime, respondent Luna became a Group Franchise Director of Sandre Philippines, Inc. concurrently with being a Group Supervisor of petitioner
Avon and began selling and/or promoting Sandre products to other Avon employees and friends., A lawyer of the firm opined that the Supervisors
Agreement was contrary to law and public policy after she rendered a legal opinion as to the consequence of the Supervisors Agreement. Wanting
to share the legal opinion she obtained from her legal counsel, respondent Luna wrote a letter to her colleagues and attached mimeographed copies
of the opinion and then circulated them. The full text of her letter reads:
Thereafter, Petitioner Avon, through its President and General Manager, Jose Mari Franco, notified respondent Luna of the termination or
cancellation of her Supervisors Agreement with petitioner Avon. Aggrieved, respondent Luna filed a complaint for damages and the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of respondent Luna which was assailed by the Court of appeals upon appeal. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Supervisors Agreement is valid and not against public policy.
Ruling: Yes.Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good.As applied to contracts, in the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in
order to declare a contract void as against public policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be done, has a tendency to
injure the public, is against the public good, or contravenes some established interests of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals, or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of personal liability or of private property.
From another perspective, the main objection to exclusive dealing is its tendency to foreclose existing competitors or new entrants from competition
in the covered portion of the relevant market during the term of the agreement.Only those arrangements whose probable effect is to foreclose
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected can be considered as void for being against public policy. The foreclosure effect,
if any, depends on the market share involved.
The relevant market for this purpose includes the full range of selling opportunities reasonably open to rivals, namely, all the product and geographic
sales they may readily compete for, using easily convertible plants and marketing organizations.
Applying the preceding principles to the case at bar, there is nothing invalid or contrary to public policy either in the objectives sought to be attained
by paragraph 5, the exclusivity clause, in prohibiting respondent Luna, and all other Avon supervisors, from selling products other than those
manufactured by petitioner Avon