Ruiz vs.

CA (1996)
Short Summary: Hilario Ruiz left a holographic will wherein he named as his heirs his
only son, his adoptive daughter and his grandchildren from his only son. His only
son was also named executor of the will. Upon his death, the only son did not
petition for the probate of said will, and even opposed the probate of the will. The
probate court ordered that support be given to the grandchildren, and that the titles
to the two apartments being rented out be released to the heirs. Court held that as
to the support to be given, the rules of court provides that ONLY CHILDREN of the
deceased (as well as the surviving spouse) are entitled to support, not the
grandchildren. As to the release of the titles, court held that it was too early to
release the titles yet as the estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised, the
charges upon the estate has not yet been paid, and there is still an issue as to the
intrinsic validity of the will which the court should proceed to determine first. Finally,
court held that right to possession of Executor is not absolute, only as it is
necessary for the payment of debts and expenses of administration.

Facts:
Hilario Ruiz left holographic will making the ff his heirs:

Edmond Ruiz (ONLY SON) - also named executor

Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes (adopted daughter)

Maria Cathryn (Edmond's daughter)

Candice Albertine (Edmond's daughter)

Maria Angeline (Edmond's daughter)

-Hilario died. Cash component of the estate distributed among the heirs in
accordance with the will
-4 years after Hilario's death, Maria Pilar filed petition for probate and approval of
Hilario's will + issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
>>>EDMOND OPPOSED: will was executed under undue influence
pending this, the Valle Verde house bequethed to the daughters of Edmond were
leased by Edmond to 3Ps
-PROBATE COURT JAN 19, 1993 ORDER: Edmond deposit rental deposit and
payments for 1 yr lease of Valle Verde property (worth P540k)
>>>Edmond turned over only P348,583.56 (deducted expenses for repair and
maintenance)

-Edmond moved for RELEASE OF P50k to pay the REAL ESTATE TAX - approved only
P7,722
-Edmond w/drew Opposition to probate of will

MAY 18, 1993 ORDER:

1. WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE
2. Edmond Ruiz issued letters testamentary (finally issued June 23, 1993),
conditioned upon filing of P50k bond

EX-PARTE MOTION FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS filed by Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, w/
Edmond as executor: prayed for release of rent payments deposited w/ Branch Clerk
>>>OPPOSED by Montes (adopted daughter); filed MOTION FOR RELEASE OF
FUNDS TO CERTAIN HEIRS + MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF
ALLOWANCE OF PROBATE WILL: prayed for
1. Release of rent payments to the daughters of Edmond (note: the property rented
out by Edmond was bequeathed to his daughters)
2. Distribution of testator's properties in accordance w/ the holographic will
*PROBATE COURT:
1. Denied Edmond's motion for release of rent payments
2. Granted Montes' motion for release of the rent to the daughters instead
3. Granted the delivery of the titles to and possession of the Valle Verde and Blue
Ridge properties to the 3 granddaughters and to Montes, upon filing of P50k bond
>>>MR by Edmond

PROBATE COURT (DEC 22, 1993 ORDER):

1. Release funds to Edmond only as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of the testator's 3 granddaughters,
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance
2. Release of titles to respondents held in abeyance until lapse of 6 months from
date of first publication of notice to creditors

>>>Edmond filed MR for GADALEJ

CA: dismissed petition, affirmed Probate court

1.
WON IT WAS PROPER FOR THE PROBATE COURT TO GRANT ALLOWANCE
FROM THE FUNDS OF THE ESTATE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE TESTATOR'S
GRANDCHILDREN? NO
-R83.3 (see CODAL)
-Edmond argues:
a.
Provision only gives the WIDOW and MINOR or INCAPACITATED CHILDREN of
deceased the right to receive allowances for support
b.

3 GRANDCHILDREN does not qualify

i.
ii.

Not incapacitated
Not minors: of legal age, married, and gainfully

employed
iii.

Not the "children" stated in the provision

-HELD:
a.
Children in R83.3 not limited to MINOR or INCAPACITATED CHILDREN,
following A188, NCC: during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or
gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.
The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
b.
GRANDCHILDREN are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of
decedent's estate. Law is clear.
2.
WON IT WAS PROPER FOR PROBATE COURT TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE
TITLES TO CERTAIN HEIRS? NO
-order releasing titles to properties of the estate = advance distribution of the
estate
-when advance distribution of estate's properties allowed:
(1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or

(2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a
bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
-HERE:

probate court only gave NOTICE to creditors, not payment of debts and
obligations

Estate tax not yet paid, much less ascertained

Estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised

Though will was already probated (and the probate of the will is conclusive as
to its due execution, extrinsic validity, and capacity of testator to make a will,
questions as to intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, legality of
any devise or legacy may still be raised so it's too early to order the release of the
titles. Here, Edmond contests the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
as his father's will included estate of his mother, allegedly impairing his legitime as
intestate heir of mother. So probate court could proceed to hear and decide the
same as in ordinary cases
3.
WON THE ORDER OF THE COURT DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO TAKE
POSSESSION AND MANAGEMENT OF ALL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE AS THE
EXECUTOR OF THE WILL? NO
-The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the
real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration (R84.3)
-he should first submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration
before he be released any more money:

he was already granted release of funds for the repair and maintenance
expenses and payment of real estate taxes, w/o rendering accounting for the same.

He only deposited a portion of 1-year rental income from the Valle Verde
property, but not the succeeding rents. Also no accounting of such funds
-Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his
father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned.
*As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in
his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a
trustee of the highest order.

*He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and
personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration,
the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.

ANA LIM KALAW, petitioner, vs. IAC.

Alberto R. De Joya for petitioner.
Cheng, Martinez & Associates for private respondent.
Facts: Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an
amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration naming 4 other
surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.
The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special
administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary inventory of all the
properties which came into her possession as special administratrix of the estate of
her late father.
Trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of
said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner after the
latter took her oath of office. Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner
to render an accounting of her administration of said estate which was granted by
respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz.
Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting
of her administration with the express instruction that said order be personally
served upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was returned to
the Court unserved. However, said order was also not received by the petitioner.
Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim
Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their father's estate
and to appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part
of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her administration
since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in violation of
Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix
alleging that the delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that Judge
Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned,
had then been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for
a considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of
cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did
not know to whom to render an accounting report.
IAC granted the removal.
MR and Petition for certiorari were both denied
Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the removal of petitioner as administratrix was proper

Held: YES
Subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her
negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies
petitioner's removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in
her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled rule is that the removal of an
administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court
appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala vs.
Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, 'the sufficiency of any ground for removal should
thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected
by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.'
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken
by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator
unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. (Borromeo vs. Borromeo,
97 Phil. 549; Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768.)
In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of
her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as
administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as required by Section
8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court."
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction, the same is hereby DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB Case Digest

PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB
G.R. No. 156403, March 21, 2005
FACTS: On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband
Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita,
Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed
Pahamotang. On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased
wife. The petition, docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court,
hereinafter referred to as the intestate court. In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners
Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin
was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785
also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI. On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an
order granting Agustins petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the
PNB and Arguna respectively. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions
prejudicial to them. The trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but
both were valid with respect to the other parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals; to the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral
attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
RULING: In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against
petitioners. The element of delay in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is
sorely lacking. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell
the estate properties. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had
notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although petitioners

finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by their father, and eventually
challenged the July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981
orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged decision of the appellate
court when they (petitioners) actually learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate
court. Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of
those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity thereof certainly cannot be
established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them.

RIOFERIO vs. CA
January 13, 2004
FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real
properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had
seven children who are the herein respondents.
Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that
petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent located in Dagupan City.
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents
filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of
Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real
parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator.
HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights
to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation.

Union Bank v. Santibaez

-

On May 31, 1980, First Country Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibanez entered into a loan agreement in
the amount of P128,000 which was intended for the payment of the purchase price of 1 unit of a tractor. In view of this,
Efraim and his son, Edmund executed a promissory note in favor of FCCC.
On Dec. 13, 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another similar loan agreement which was intended to pay the balance
of the purchase price of another unit of a tractor. And again, father and son executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of FCCC.
However, sometime in Feb 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will and subsequently testate proceedings were
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo with Edmund being appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, Edmund and his sister, Florence Santibanez Ariola, executed a joint
agreement on July 22, 1981 wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors; 2
for Edmund and 1 for Florence, each of them to assume indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
On August 20, 1981 a deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein FCCC as the assignor, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Not long after, demand letter for the settlement of the account were sent by Union Bank to Edmund but the latter refused
to pay. Thus Union Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against the Edmund and Florence before the RTC of Makati.
However the case was dismissed. The lower court said that the claim should have been filed with the probate court were
the testate estate of Efraim was pending. Furthermore, the agreement was void considering that the probate court did not
approve the agreement and no valid partition until after the will has been probated.
Also, the list of assets and liabilities of Union Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Also, it was contended
that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs already, in this case Edmund and
Efraim. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Hence this appeal.

WON the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid.

No, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated by the probate court. This is
specially because when the joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence partitioning the tractors among
themselves were executed, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will
covering the said tractors. Thus the probate court had already acquired jurisdiction over the said tractors which they cant
be divested of. Any extrajudicial agreement needs court approval.

WON the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid.

No, the assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent by Edmund and Florence is not binding. Such assumption was
conditioned upon the agreement above. Hence, when the agreement of partition between Edmund and Florence was
invalidated, then the assumption of the indebtedness cannot be given and force and effect. Also, the court should have filed
it money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court. Furthermore, it cannot go after Florence for she took no
part in the documents related to the tractors, specifically the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement; they
should have gone after Edmund being a co-signatory to the promissory notes and guaranty.
WON the Union Bank can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.

No, Union Bank cannot hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased because it had not sufficiently shown that it
is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities. Furthermore, the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the participation therein of Union Bank as a party can be found. As a result, Union
Bank has no personality to file the complaint and therefore cannot hold the heirs liable for the obligation of the deceased.

In a sense, it can be said that even money debts are transmitted to and paid for by the heirs, but this would be by
mere indirection
Because whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributes,
since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.

BUT only the payment of MONEY DEBTS has been affected by the Rules of Court. The transmission of other

obligations not by nature personal follows the rule in Art774 and is transmitted by
succession.
PNB vs. CA et al, June 29, 2001
FACTS: The spouses Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by a TCT and
registered in their names. Upon the husbands death, the probate court appointed his son,
private respondent Allan as special administrator of the deceaseds intestate estate. The
court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation from PNB to be secured by a
real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of land, which Allan did for
P450,000.00 with interest.
For failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder. However, the loan having a
payable balance, to claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan,
Batangas, against both Mrs. Chua and Allan.
The RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNBs complaint. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNBs appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: The WON it was error for the CA to rule that petitioner may no longer pursue by civil
action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property
securing the same.
HELD: petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
No
Petitioner relies on Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612, 615 (1990), holding that in
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay
the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the mortgagor.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured
by a mortgage. The case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising
out of a settlement of estate, wherein the administrator mortgaged a property belonging to
the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the probate court. As the CA
correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play decisively. The
applicable rule is Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court ( which PNB contends is
not.)
In the present case it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been
complied with [see notes]. It follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately
applicable to the controversy at hand, which in summary [and case law as well] grants to the
mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be
alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the
mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred
by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
Clearly petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially
foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent
deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased. Petitioner may no longer avail of the
complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after
petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this
case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the deceaseds estate.
NOTES:
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
Sec. 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and
prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution

of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by
action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property
pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim
his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely
upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any time within the
period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor,
and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing
herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property
mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for which it is hold as security, under the direction
of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate
mortgage is recorded in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court
order authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it
has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7 provides in part:
Sec. 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber
estate The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears necessary or
beneficial under the following regulations:
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate
thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of
the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which
shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.

Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI Mindoro

FACTS: Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a Spaniard and member of the
commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other members were his brothers. Santiago
Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and probate proceedings were instituted in the same year in the CFI of
Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino Aldamiz was appointed
administrator and was again represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna.
After ten years from the date of his appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through his attorney,
Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition

with a view to closing the proceedings. The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the
project of partition unless all debts including attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of partition, it was
expressly stated that attorney's fees, debts and incidental expenses would be proportionately paid by the
beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the court refused to sanction this clause of
the project. Attorney Luna, to comply with the wishes of the court, without filing a written petition to have
his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of
his services and professional standing so that the court may fix his compensation and the administrator
may make payment thereof.
It is to be noted that Attorney Luna served as attorney for the administrator as legal consultants to
Santiago and his brothers and to the "Aldamiz y Rementeria,". He did not charge them professional
services, thus showing disinterested and extreme liberality due to friendship and other personal
considerations toward his clients. When he wanted to close accounts of the estate, he showed no interest
in demanding for payment by preferring to leave the matter to the future negotiation or understanding with
the interested parties. When the amount of his fees was fixed by the court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him
for a substantial reduction, he answered that it was not he who had fixed the amount but the court, and
advised his client to file a motion for reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection
to any reduction in amount and to any extension of the time for paying what might be granted by the
court.
The Court issued its order of January 21, 1947, awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of his
professional services, an aggregate sum of P28,000. Petitioner was able to pay P5,000 only, and upon
his failure to pay the balance after several demands made upon him by respondent attorney, the latter
filed an ex-parte motion for execution which was granted by the respondent Court.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in fixing the amount of attorneys fees and issuing a writ of execution (YES)

HELD:
1. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney's fees, is for the counsel to request the
administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an
administrator should he fail to pay. If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he
may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may, instead of bringing such
an action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all
persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration."

No written petition for the payment of attorney's fees has ever been filed by the respondent attorney and
the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the court.
Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court for the payment of the respondents fees and all
subsequent orders implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued an excess of jurisdiction.
2. The order of execution is also null and void because a writ of execution is not the proper procedure
allowed by the Rules of the Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper
procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale of mortgaged of real property of
the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale
or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and
with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines.

Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their
respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of
administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case
"the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount
of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may
issue execution if circumstances require.

Quita vs Court of Appeals

December 22, 1998
Fact of the Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.
Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children.

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who
will be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held
that the divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private
respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are
recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954.
Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate
was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina
and the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the
other half to Fe Quita. Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage
to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of
Appeals that the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving spouse
of Arturo.
Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at
the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she
was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their
countrys national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-Ching

Facts:

1.
Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband (petitioner) and two minor
children.
2.
Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.
3.
Miguelitas mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of paraphernal properties. She
wished to be appointed. She also said that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on conditio ntaht they
would undertake a business endeavor as partners.
4.
The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed.
5.
Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator.
6.
No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory.
Emmanuel failed to file one.
7.
Court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
8.
Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax and
the partition and distribution of the estate.
9.
RTC denied the petition as to the partition and distribution. CA affirmed.
Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
Held:
1. General Rule: jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates
only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of
deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court
may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether
or not a property should be included in the inventory
i.

Pastor v. CA

As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title
2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA
a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance
is misplaced.
b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the
intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this
case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
i. First, the inventory was not disputed.

1. Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the
specific properties which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she
expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the
real estate properties.
ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondents son) did not file an inventory
He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which
respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows
that he acquiesced with petitioners inventory.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper
course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well- settled in
this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question
arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must
be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
a. Jurisprudence states that:
i. probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.
3. Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse
claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

REPUBLIC vs. CA
G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980 square
meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the
Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the
institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the
property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for the
property.
It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed a
manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the
court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof.
Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated
land to the Bulacan State University.
Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case
until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the
amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.
The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as
previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the
expropriated property.
The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979 Decision to
be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the
1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioners Motion to Permit
Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question
HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by
the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence
and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the
legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police

power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for
public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are
held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to
resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title
and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property,
not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public
use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving
balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other
hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In
determining public use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or
theactual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to
view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society
advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by
petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the
purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of
no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely,
petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to
alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use,
which, decidedly, it is.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on
the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. deVillaroya where the
unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in
question. It might be borne in mind that thecase involved the municipal government of
Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and
of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments
under Republic Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and allencompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments
to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national
legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking,
a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten
years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an
airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the

judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which
are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the
fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises'."
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the
recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner
was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The
landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property
computed at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise
adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their
privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights
vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or
satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on
grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of nonpayment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from
that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps
apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to
all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for
securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same
argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for
payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had
become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against
herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should
take good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action
upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their
ownership and possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use
before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal
value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation
proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the
amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being
an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant

fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil
Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency
at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations.
In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation
to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left
to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the
return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of
just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979
at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the
date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have
been fully paid.