Pardell vs.

Bartolome [L-4656 November

18, 1912]
Facts: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell
and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome
were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz
and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and codefendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took
it
upon
themselves
without
an
judicial
authorization or even extra judicial agreement
the administration of the properties of the late
Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a
house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house
in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in
Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of
rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia;
and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the
judgement be rendered in restoring and returning
to them one half of the total value of the fruits
and rents, plus losses and damages from the
aforementioned properties. However, respondent
Matilde asserted that she never refused to give
the plaintiff her share of the said properties.
Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her
husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the
former for their occupation of the upper story of
the house in Escolta Street.
Issue: Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are
obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the
said property
Held: No. The Court ruled that the spouses are
not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said
property was a mere exercise of their right to use
the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on
a co-owners right of use is that he must use it in
such a way so as not to injure the interest of the
other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other
party failed to provide proof that by the
occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they
prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.

RESUENA vs. CA
CASE DOCTRINES: Co-owners right to file an
action for ejectment; occupation by tolerance.
Respondents action for ejectment against
petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all co-owners of the property since
petitioners were not able to prove that they are
authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the
properties, coupled with respondents right under
Article
487,
clearly
settles
respondents
prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No.
2587.
Time and again, this Court hasruled that persons
who occupy the land of another at the latter's

tolerance or permission, without any contract

between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them
.FACTS:Petition for Review on certiorari under
Rule 45.Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and
overseer of certain parcels of land located in
Pooc, Talisay,Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587
and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. He
owned six-eighths (6/8) of LotNo. 2587 while the
Sps. Bascon owned two-eights (2/8) thereof. On
the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned incommon
by Borromeo and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja.
However, the proportion of their undivided
shareswas not determined a quo. Tining Resuena,
Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio
Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in
theupper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under
the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and
their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand,
petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of
Lot No. 2592, allegedly with thepermission of the
heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original coowners of Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed
thatthey have occupied portions of the subject
property by virtue of his own liberality.
Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587
and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as
theBorromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to
expand and extend the facilities of the resort that
he
established
on
thesubject
properties,
respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the
property. Petitioners, however, refused tovacate
their homes.On 16 February 1994, Borromeo filed
a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC against
the
petitioners.MTC
decision
(summary
proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo
had no right to evict thepetitioners because the
area was owned in common and there was no
partition yet.RTC decision: reversed the MTC
decision. It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code,
which allows any oneof the co-owners to bring an
action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked
by the respondent because, in asense, a coowner is the owner and possessor of the whole,
and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to
beinstituted for the benefit of all co-owners.CA
decision: affirmed the RTC decision.I
ISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the
petitioners.
RULING: Article 487 of the Civil Code, which
provides simply that *a+ny one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment, is a
categorical and an unqualified authority in favor
of respondent to evict petitioners from the
portions of Lot. No. 2587.This provision is a
departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that

an action for ejectment must be brought by all

the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an
action to exercise and protect the rights of all.
When the action is brought by one co-owner for
the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit
them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice
their rights.
Respondents action for ejectment against
petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all co-owners of the property since
petitioners were not able to prove that they are
authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the
properties, coupled with respondents right under
Article
487,clearly
settles
respondents
prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No.
2587.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons
who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them
.HELD: Petition is DENIED.

ACABAL vs. ACABAL

FACTS: Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas,
owned a parcel of land situated in Barrio Tanglad,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area of
18.15 hectares more or less, described in Tax
Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 6, 1971, his parents transferred
for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to
[Villaner Acabal], who was then married to
Justiniana Lipajan. On April 19, 1990, Villaner
executed the deed in question, by which the lot
was transferred to his nephew and godson
Leonardo Acabal, who later sold it to Ramon
Nicolas. On October 11, 1993 Villaner filed a case
for annulment of the sale to Leonardo and to
Nicolas. Villaner claimed that he did not know the
contents of the deed he signed, which he claimed
was a Deed of Sale (earlier in the proceedings he
said it was a Lease Contract). The RTC dismissed
the complaint. Villaner appealed to the CA, who
reversed the RTC and held that the deed in
question was simulated and fictitious. Leonardo
and Ramon thus appealed to the SC on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the deed is valid
2) W/N the property in question is conjugal
property
HELD/RATIO:

1) YES. The failure to deny the genuineness and

due execution of an actionable document does
not preclude a party from arguing against it by
evidence
of fraud,
mistake,
compromise,
payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and
want of consideration. It is a basic rule in
evidence that the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegations. If he claims a
right granted by law, he must prove it by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of
his own evidence and not upon the weakness of
that of his opponent. Villaner failed to prove his
allegations for he failed to adduce evidence to
support his claims of simulation and lack of
knowledge as to the nature of the deed.
Leonardos witness (the drafter of the actual
deed) on the other hand was able to prove that
the deed was duly drafted, read and signed by
Villaner.
Even assuming that the disposition of the
property by Villaner was contrary to law, he
would still have no remedy under the law as he
and Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence, he is
not entitled to afirmative relief one who seeks
equity and justice must come to court with clean
hands. In pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis.
2) YES. The issue arose when Villaners co-heirs
denied the validity of the transfer as to their
shares because they did not consent to such
transfer. Art. 160 of the Civil Code gives rise to a
presumption that properties acquired during the
marriage are conjugal. In this case it was clear
that Villaner was married when he acquired the
land. A tax declaration or [r]egistration of the
properties in the name of the husband does not
destroy the conjugal nature of the properties.
What is material is the time when the land was
acquired by Villaner, and that was during the
lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana.
Upon his wifes death, the conjugal partnership
was dissolved and Villaner became entitled to a
undivided share. The other share accrued to
Justinianas heirs: Villaner and their 8 children.
They are now the co-owners of the lot in
question. With respect to Justinianas one-half
share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs
inherited, applying the provisions on the law of
succession, her eight children and Villaner each
receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited
one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in the conjugal
partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire
conjugal partnership and is himself already the
owner of one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths
(9/18), Villaners total interest amounts to teneighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While
Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed
property, he could not claim title to any definite
portion of the community property until its actual
partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to

partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract

quota or proportionate share in the property.
Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property
has the right to sell his undivided share thereof,
by virtue of NCC 493; but such sale will only be
valid as to the portion pertaining to Villaner. In
effect, the buyer becomes a co-owner of the
property. The proper action in cases like this is
not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common from
the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the
DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it. The
proper action is partition under Rule 69. The rule
in Cruz v. Leis, which held that [w]here a parcel
of land, forming part of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership
of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who
merely relied on the face of the certificate of title
thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow,
the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land
even as against the heirs of the deceased
spouse does not apply because the land subject
of that case was unregistered. The issue of good
faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where
the subject of the sale is a registered land but not
where the property is an unregistered land.
DISPOSITION:
GRANTED.

WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is

LAVADIA v. COSME
Object of litigation: a gold crown, choker, belt,
bracelet, necklace, all made of gold and
encrusted with diamonds and precious gems in
the possession and custody of 6 religious ladies
of the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna all
surnamed Lavadia. By agreement, they decided
to entrust the safekeeping of the jewelry to Pia
Lavadia (depositary). From Pia, to Paula, to her
husband Pedro, to their daughter Paz, and to her
husband Baldomero. Jewelry is kept at a BPI
safety deposit box in the name of Rosario Cosme
de Mendoza (defendant). the 6 ladies used their
own money to have the jewelry made specifically
to adorn the image of the Lady of Guadalupe, the
patron saint of the municipality. In effect, they are
the co- owners of the jewelry. Rosario, in her
capacity as administrator of the estate of
Baldomero Cosme, announced that she would be
making a formal delivery of the jewelry to the
Bishop of Lipa, but the plaintiffs objected and
filed a suit to retain possession and custody of
the same.
"There shall be no majority unless the resolution
is approved by the co- owners who represent the
controlling interest in the object of the co-

ownership." In this case, the plaintiffs constituted

the majority, since they represent 4/6 of the
original owners. Defendants only represent 2/6.
Thus CFI ruling that Rosario return the jewelry as
an obligation of a depositary holds.
DOCTRINE:
1. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them
may be the depository, and when he is, he is
subject to the same obligations imposed by law
on all depository with respect to the preservation
of the thing with the care, diligence and interest
of a good father.2. For the administration and
better enjoyment of thing owned in common,
according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is
mandatory that there be an agreement of the
majority of the participants (owners).
ISSUES:
1) Whether Ramona was a depositary and
therefore obligated to return the jewelries to the
owners even if she is a co-owner? (YES)
2) Whether the plaintiffs constitute the majority
of the co-owners and therefore can elect who has
custody of the property owned in common? (YES)
3) Whether, assuming that Ramona is a
depositary, the property cannot be withdrawn as
she has complied faithfully in performing their
duties as repository? (NO, it can be withdrawn)
RATIO:
1) The contract which existed between the first
owners of the jewels at issue and the first person
who had their custody, was a contract of deposit.
According to this contract as defined in Articles
1758 and following the Civil Code, Pia Lavadia
first, and afterwards Paula Lavadia and then her
descendants, one being Rosario, received and
possessed, one after the other, the said jewels,
only for purposes of custody or such that they
must not use them for their own benefit.
If it was under a deposit agreement, it is clear
that to those who received the jewelry has an
obligation to return them to their owners as soon
as claimed by the latter.
Article 1766 of the Civil Code: "The, depositary
is obliged to keep the thing and restore it, when
so requested, to the depositor, or his successors,
or the person who has been designated in the
contract. Their responsibility for the care and the
loss of the thing, is governed by the provisions of
title I of this book. "
The restitution must be made with all the fruits
and accessions of the thing deposited, if any,

without it being given to the depositary who may

not withhold, as Sanchez says Roman, (IV
Sanchez Roman, 885), even under the pretext of
obtaining compensation for other credits or
compensated
for
expenses
incurred
for
preservation.
ROSARIO AND OTHERS: Contract is not that of a
deposit because the jewels cannot be considered
as belonging to other persons with respect to
Rosario as she is also a co-owner as descendant
of one of its early owners.
SC:The first owners of the jewelry concerned
who came to entrust the custody of the same to
some of them, expressly reserved them to their
property
.Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them
may be the depository, and thus it is subject to
the same obligations imposed by law on all
depository with respect to the conservation of the
thing with the care, diligence and interest of a
good father.
"Joint owner. The fact that the depositary is a
joint owner of the res does not alter the degree of
diligence required of him." (C. J. 18, 570).
2) Appellees are owners of said fourth-sixths of
jewelry, and appellants only own the remaining
portion (2/6). Therefore, EngraciaLavadia must
have the custody and administration of
constituting the majority of the primitive owners
As there is no evidence of the contribution of the
six primitive owners in the making or acquisition
of the jewels often mentioned in the same
proportion, the conclusion, as reasonable as it is and this is supported by a presumption of law
(Art. 393, Civil Code) -is that the cost is the same
and as such the portions corresponding to the
participants of the community shall be presumed
of an equal share.
For the administration and better enjoyment of
thing owned in common, according to article 398
of the Civil Code, it is mandatory that there be an
agreement of the majority of the participants 3)
The deposit agreement is such that allows the
depositor to withdraw from the depository, the
thing deposited, any time he wanted, especially,
when the latter, as in the case of Rosario Cosme
Mendoza, has executed an act against the order
received intrying to entrust to another's custody
and administration the thing deposited, on their
own without the consent of depositors or their
heirs.

MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY

Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was

originally owned by one Julain Melencio who died
before the 1905, leaving his widow Ruperta
Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta held nothing but a
widow's usufruct in the land. Contract of lease in
favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for
the establishment of a rice mill with necessary
buildings for warehouses and quarters for
employees.
Document
evidencing
lease
acknowledged but never recorded with the
Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession of the
land and erected the mill and other necessary
buildings. lease was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who
transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co.(unregistered
partnership); until the lease finally came to Dy
Tiao Lay. Land was registered under the Torrens
system in 1913 but the lease was not mentioned
in the title, though it was mentioned that one
house and 3 warehouses were owned by Yap Kui
Chin. 1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made an
extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance.
After Mrs. Macapagal, wife of one the heirs of
Julian, Ramon, demanded an increase of the lease
from P20 per mo. to P300/mo., she was informed
by Dy Tiao Lay that a written lease existed and
that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled
to an extension of the lease at the original rental.
Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and
in such case the lease was executed without their
consent and was thus void.
The power of the majority (of co-owners of an
indivisible property) would be confied to decisions
touching the management and enjoyment of the
common property and would not include acts of
ownership, such as a lease of 12 years w/c gives
rise to a real right, which must be recorded and
which can be performed only by owners of the
property leased. Where the contract of lease may
give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee
(constituting a sundering of the ownership which
transcends mere management) then the part
owners representing the greater portion of the
property held in common have no power to lease
the property for a period longer than 6 years w/o
the consent of all co-owners. In this case, the fact
that the lease was for 20 years amounted to an
act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere act of
management, thus necessitation the consent of
ALL co-owners.

MARIANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.

NO. 101522
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner
within the redemption period does not terminate
the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole
ownership.
FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered
owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his
lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of

Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan.

Francisco died in without paying the debt. His
intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children
Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester,
Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.
The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before
the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma,
Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a
deed of assignment of the right of redemption in
favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to
Spouses Mariano.
Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in
the deed of assignment filed a complaint for
recovery and legal redemption with damages
against spouses Mariano.
RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for
Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems
the whole property with her own personal funds
becomes the sole owner of said property and
terminates the existing state of co-ownership?
HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in
question was mortgaged by the decedent, a coownership existed among the heirs during the
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed
property. Redemption of the whole property by a
co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership
over said property but will inure to the benefit of
all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to
the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is
not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Respondents have not lost their right to redeem,
for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
even begun to run.

RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ

FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain
leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a
French. In the project partition, the property was
divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and
2nd part to the grandnephews the naked
ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the
2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to
Wanda
de
Wrobleski,
an
Austrian.
The
grandnephews opposed on the ground that
usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition
of lands by aliens.
ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is
correct.
HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to

testamentary succession for otherwise the

prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda
because although it is a real right, it does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is
the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which
is proscribed by the Constitution.

AGUILAR v. CACo-ownership Any of the Co-owners may

demand the sale of the house and lot at any time
and the other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective
interests.
FACTS: Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen
bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their
father could spend and enjoy his remaining years
in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed
that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3;
but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was
left in the said lot to take care of their father
since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their
fathers death petitioner demanded from private
respondent that the latter vacate the house and
that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
divided among them but the latter refused.
Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the
property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the
courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent
filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel
had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City
where she would be a principal sponsor in a
wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial
proceeded on the scheduled date. The
respondents did not appear thus they were
declared in default. The trial went on ex parte
without the respondent and held that the
property should be sold to a third party and that
the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in
addition respondent was made to pay rent from
the time the action was filed. Respondents
appealed this and the decision was reversed by
the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring
respondents in default; the case was then
remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of
respondent through counsel to cancel the pretrial was dilatory in character and (2) in
remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial
and trial?

ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:

B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the
sale and rent?
RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the
respondents motion and remanding the case. The
law is clear that the appearance of parties at the
pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear
at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default. It is the discretion of the
court to grant the motion if it sees that the
reason for the cancelation of the same would be
reasonable. SC found that the reason for the
cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and
that the trial court was not in grave abuse of
discretion when they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and
respondents are co-owners of subject house and
lot in equal shares; either one of them may
demand the sale of the house and lot at any time
and the other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective
interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that
no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each co-owner may demand
at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states
that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the
others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed.
SC held that of the proceeds should go to the
petitioner and the remainder to the respondent
(1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos
per month with legal interest from the time the
trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for
the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel
the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment
of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased.

Perpetua
Appeals

Vda.

De

Ape

vs

Court

of

456 SCRA 193 Civil Law Law on Sales

Elements of a Contract of Sale Consent Vitiated
Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land
(Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The children never

formally
divided
the
property
amongst
themselves
except
through
hantal-hantal
whereby each just occupied a certain portion and
developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were
interested in the land so they started buying the
portion of land that each of the heirs occupied.
On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato,
entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In
exchange of his lot, Lumayno agreed to pay
P5,000.00. She paid in advance P30.00.
Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by
Lumaynos son in law (Andres Flores). Flores also
acted as witness. Lumayno also executed sales
transactions with Fortunatos siblings separately.
In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make
the the delivery to her of the registrable deed of
sale over Fortunatos portion of the Lot No. 2319.
Fortunato assailed the validity of the contract of
sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a
co-owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings
to Lumayno. Fortunato died during the pendency
of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract
of sale?
HELD: No. Fortunato was a no read no write
person. It was incumbent for the the other party
to prove that details of the contract was fully
explained to Fortunato before Fortunato signed
the receipt.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus,

it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It
is born from the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the
sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the
parties may reciprocally demand performance,
that is, the vendee may compel the transfer of
the ownership and to deliver the object of the
sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to
pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected
contract of sale, however, the following elements
must be present: consent, object, and price in
money or its equivalent.
For consent to be valid, it must meet the
following requisites:
(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact
notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it
should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous.
Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error;
freedom by violence, intimidation or undue
influence; spontaneity by fraud.
Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the
receipt to Fortunato, but Flores testimony belies

it. Flores said there was another witness but the

other was a maid who also lacked education.
Further, Flores himself was not aware that the
receipt was to transfer the ownership of
Fortunatos land to her mom-in-law. It merely

occurred to him to explain the details of the

receipt but he never did.