Digest Complete Part 1

PART THREE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT
A. RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT OF

WORKERS
1. STATE POLICY 12
2. DEFINITION 13
a. ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment
alleged to have been committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period from August
to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO
CORPUZ, 1 NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H.
TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first
securing the required license or authority from the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. 2
After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati
RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, 3 the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES
ABOVE
CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA
C. RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences
her [to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT
YEARS and to pay the costs. 4 (Underscoring
supplied)
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note
of the fact that while the information reflected the
commission of illegal recruitment in large scale,
only the complaint of the two of the five
complainants was proven.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly
synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as
follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that
sometime in August and September 1984, accusedappellant approached private complainants Necitas
Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited
them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai.
The accused-appellant being their neighbor, private
complainants agreed and went to the formers
office. This office which bore the business name
"Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a
building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati,
Metro Manila. In that office, private complainants
gave certain amounts to appellant for processing
and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing

fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B).
Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit
D). Appellant then told private complainants that
they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on
September 8, 1984. However, private complainants
and all the other applicants were not able to depart
on the said date as their employer allegedly did not
arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to
September 23, but the result was the same.
Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked,
private complainants demanded of appellant to
return their money. Except for the refund of
P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return
private complainants money. Tired of excuses,
private complainants filed the present case for
illegal recruitment against the accused-appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment, the
prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior
Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), who
testified that accused-appellant was neither licensed
nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment to recruit workers for overseas
employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching
private complainants to recruit them for
employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the
private complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and
friend, she brought the private complainants to the
Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency
because she knew Florante Hinahon,5 the owner of
the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted
that she received money from the private
complainants, she was quick to point out that she
received the same only in trust for delivery to the
agency. She denied being part of the agency either
as an owner or employee thereof. To corroborate
appellants testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who was
also an applicant and a companion of private
complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit
them. On the contrary, they were the ones who
asked help from appellant. To further bolster the
defense, Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and
cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not
connected with the agency and that he saw appellant
received money from the applicants but she turned
them over to the agency through either Florantino
Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court but modified the penalty
imposed due to the trial courts failure to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellate court thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this
Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed
Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is
hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to
1
seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual

disqualification from engaging in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers. 7
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied, 8 the present petition was filed,
faulting the appellate court
I
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING
WITNESSES, [AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED
GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO
PROVE
HER
GUILT
BEYOND
REASONABLE
DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her
witnesses, her companion Milagros Cuadra, and
Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of
the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial courts and the
appellate courts failure to consider that the
provisional receipts she issued indicated that the
amounts she collected from the private
complainants were turned over to the agency
through Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At
any rate, she draws attention to People v. Seoron10
wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing
of receipts for placement fees does not make a case
for illegal recruitment. 11
The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal
provisions applicable when the offense charged was
committed, 12 provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of
authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
Article 39. Penalties. x x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a
holder of authority under this Title found violating
any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years
nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the
court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment,
which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of
workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any
activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code. 13 If another element is present that the

accused commits the act against three or more
persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an
illegal recruitment in a large scale. 14
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines
"recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)
That the first element is present in the case at bar,
there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas
Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, testified that the
records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is
authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. 15 A Certification to that effect was in
fact issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the
Licensing Division of POEA. 16
Petitioners disclaimer of having engaged in
recruitment activities from the very start does not
persuade in light of the evidence for the
prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of
recruitment and placement without first complying
with the guidelines issued by the Department of
Labor and Employment. She contends that she did
not possess any license for recruitment, because she
never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory
declarations and statements, greater weight must be
given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article
38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an
offense that is essentially committed by a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee
means any person, corporation or entity to which
the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement;
or whose license or authority has been suspended,
revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor
secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity
to operate a private employment agency, while
authority is given to those engaged in recruitment
and placement activities.
xxxx
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed
nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment was certified by Veneranda C.
Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and
Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza,
manager of the Licensing Branch both of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she
recruited them for jobs in Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The
act of referral, which is included in recruitment, 18
is "the act of passing along or forwarding of an
applicant for employment after an initial interview
2
of a selected applicant for employment to a selected

employer, placement officer or bureau." 19
Petitioners admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows
and her acceptance of fees including those for
processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts
indicating that the amounts she received from the
private complainants were turned over to
Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not
free her from liability. For the act of recruitment
may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that the
accused "promises or offers for a fee employment"
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. 20 As
the appellate court stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does
not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the
placement money for himself or herself. For as long
as a person who has no license to engage in
recruitment of workers for overseas employment
offers for a fee an employment to two or more
persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal
recruitment. 21
Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the
payment of fees from the private complainants
when, in light of her claim that she merely brought
them to the agency, she could have advised them to
directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred
no explanation.
On petitioners reliance on Seoron, 22 true, this
Court held that issuance of receipts for placement
fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment.
But it went on to state that it is "rather the
undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority" that makes a case for
illegal recruitment. 23
A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed
to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law which also
applies to offenses punished by special laws.
Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide
for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All
Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts
of the Philippine Islands; To Create A Board of
Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds
Therefor; and for Other Purposes) provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As
amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)
While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the

appellate court is within the prescribed penalty for
the offense, its addition of "perpetual
disqualification from engaging in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers" is not part
thereof. Such additional penalty must thus be
stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION in
that the accessory penalty imposed by it consisting
of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the
business of recruitment and placement of workers"
is DELETED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
b. G.R. No. 141221-36

2002
March 7,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL
REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused-appellants
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in Criminal
Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433,
6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529,
6530 and 6531 finding accused-appellants, Spouses
Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty
of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1) count of
syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.1
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated
and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8)
informations for estafa were filed against accusedappellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl,
together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl
spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court
as
Francisco
Hernandez
remained
at
large.1wphi1.nt
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimonies of private complainants; a certification
from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez,
Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their
personal capacities were neither licensed nor
authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment;2 the receipts for the payment
made by private complainants; and two documents
signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted
that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas
for private complainants and that they would return
all the expenses incurred by them if they are not
able to leave by March 24, 1993,3 and where Karl
3
Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants

the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the
amounts they paid for the processing of their
papers.4
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher,
was first to testify for the prosecution. She stated
that Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the
spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of
a certain Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City. At the time, she also saw the other
applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin
Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel
Matira. Karl and Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that
they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy.
They, however, required her to pay the amount of
P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and
travel documents. She paid the fee in three
installments. She paid the first installment of
P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment
of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in
the amount of P75,000.00 on December 27, 1992.
She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in the
presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's
residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for
the first and second installment5 but not for the
third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December
17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl Reichl
explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy
in Austria, but she could not yet leave for Austria
because the hotels were fully booked at that time
because of the Christmas season. Narcisa's
departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993,
but it still did not push through. Narcisa stated that
they went to Manila several times supposedly to
obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl
Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave
once she gets her visa. The accused set the
departure of Narcisa and that of the other applicants
several times but these proved to be empty
promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with
the three accused at the residence of private
complainant Charito Balmes and asked them to
refund the payment if they could not send them
abroad. The meeting resulted in an agreement which
was reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl.
Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants'
departure by April, otherwise, they would return
their payment.6
Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the
following testimony: In July 1992, her sister,
Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco
Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision,
Batangas City. Francisco Hernandez convinced her
to apply for a job in Italy. When she accepted the
offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare
P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In
August 1992, Leonora, together with her sister and
Francisco Hernandez, went to Ramada Hotel in
Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At
said meeting, Leonora handed her payment of
P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl. Yolanda assured her
that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco

Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told Leonora to
wait for about three weeks before she could leave.
After three weeks, Francisco Hernandez invited
Leonora and the other applicants to the house of
Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some
matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the
applicants that their departure would be postponed
to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the
applicants were still unable to leave as it was
allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl
nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as
domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of
$1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl
spouses promised the applicants that they would
leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in
January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the
residence of Leonora and collected the sum of
P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare. Francisco
issued a receipt for the payment. When the
applicants were not able to leave on the designated
date, Francisco Hernandez and the spouses again
made another promise. Tired of the recruiters'
unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to
withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl
constantly assured them that they would land a job
in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The
promised
employment,
however,
never
materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document
stating that he would refund the payment made by
the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The
document was executed and signed at the house of
one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora
St., Batangas City.7
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the
latter's testimony that she paid a total amount of
P100,000.00 to the three accused.8
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar
story when she testified before the court. She said
that Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply
for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required
her to pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her
to prepare her passport and other papers to be used
to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave
P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They
proceeded to Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and
Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business
partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl.
Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the
spouses so that they could secure a visa for her. The
Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They
said she and the other applicants would leave on
December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992,
Charito paid the amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco
Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco
Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses.
On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to
Francisco Hernandez who delivered the same to the
spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a
receipt for the payment made by Charito because he
told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the
4
other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the

country despite the numerous promises made by the
accused. They gave various excuses for their failure
to depart, until finally the Reichls told the
applicants that Karl Reichl had so many business
transactions in the Philippines that they would not
be able to send them abroad and that they would
refund their payment instead. Hence, they executed
an agreement which was signed by Karl Reichl and
stating that they would return the amounts paid by
the applicants. The accused, however, did not
comply with their obligation.9
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private
complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the witness
stand. She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied
for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez.
Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare
P150,000.00 to be used for the processing of her
papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie
made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco
Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and
Yolanda Reichl.10 Upon receipt of the payment,
Francisco Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda
Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on
August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,11 and
another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of
P51,000.00.12 Three receipts were issued for the
payments.13
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant
Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his wife
applied for the job of domestic helper abroad. In
June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to
Karl and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly
sending workers to Italy. Rustico and his wife
prepared all the relevant documents, i.e., passport,
police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a
total placement fee of P130,000.00.14 They paid
P50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August
8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3, 1993. The
payments were made at the house of Hilarion
Matira and were received by Francisco Hernandez
who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses.
Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the
payment. The Reichls promised to take care of
Estela's papers and to secure a job for her abroad.
The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail
on their promise. As with the other applicants,
Estela was also not able to leave the country.15
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen,
claimed that he entered the Philippines on July 29,
1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in
Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to
explore business opportunities in connection with
the import and export of beer and sugar. He also
planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in
Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda
Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel.
On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown
Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992.
After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to
another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned

to Vienna on September 19, 1992.16
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco
Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda around
August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco
Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European
equipment to be used for the quarrying operation of
his friend. Before accepting the deal, he made some
research on the background of the intended
business. Realizing that said business would not be
viable, Karl Reichl advised Francisco Hernandez to
instead look for a second-hand equipment from
Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco
Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in
September 1992.17
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October
21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly
approached him and sought his help in securing
Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl
Reichl refused and told him that he was planning to
stay permanently in the Philippines. On one
occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an
excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez
told him that he would also bring some of his
relatives with him and he would introduce him to
them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora
Perez. Leonora Perez, together with Francisco
Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl at the house
of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City
and asked him if he could help her obtain an
Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on
his refusal.18
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl
denied any knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's
recruitment activities. He said that Francisco
Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help
his relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he
promised private complainants that he would give
them overseas employment.19 As regards the
document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay
P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed
that he signed said document under duress.
Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him that private
complainants would harm him and his family if he
refused to sign it. He signed the document as he felt
he had no other option.20
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the
testimony of her husband and denied the charges
against her. She claimed that she was in Manila on
the dates alleged in the various informations, thus,
she could not have committed the acts charged
therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that she did
not know of any reason why private complainants
filed these cases against her and her husband. She
said that several persons were harassing her and
pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum
of at least P50,000.00.21
After assessing the evidence presented by the
parties, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of
illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts
5
of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision

reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused spouses KARL
REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ
REICHL 1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of
syndicated and large-scale illegal
recruitment as charged in the abovementioned Criminal Cases Nos.
6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of
estafa as charged in the abovementioned Criminal Cases Nos.
6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of syndicated and largescale illegal recruitment, as charged,
in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6439
and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of estafa, as charged, in
the above-mentioned Criminal Cases
Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and
6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accusedspouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of
syndicated
and
large-scale
illegal
recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429,
6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a
fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
to suffer the indeterminate sentence of Six
(6) Years of prision correctional, as
minimum to Sixteen (16) Years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the
amount of P150,000.00;
to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six
(6) years of prision correctional as minimum
to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as
maximum and to indemnify the complainant
Leonora Perez in the amount of
P100,000.00;
to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum and to indemnify the
complainant Melanie Bautista in the amount
of P150,000.00;

to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal
complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the
amount of P130,000.00;
(6) years or prision correctional as minimum
to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal
complainant Charito Balmes in the amount
of P121,300.00; and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of
the trial court. They raise the following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding accusedappellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of
estafa and illegal recruitment committed by
syndicate and in large scale based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution which
miserably failed to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime of illegal
recruitment on a large scale by cummulating
five separate cases of illegal recruitment
each filed by a single private complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a
matter of course an automatic guilty verdict
against accused-appellant for the crime of
estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate
crime for illegal recruitment. It is submitted
that conviction in the latter crime does not
ipso facto result in conviction in the
former."22
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal
recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority." The term
"recruitment and placement" refers to any act of
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not, provided that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.23
The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large
scale as they are considered an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group
of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
6
confederating with one another in carrying out any

unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
engaged in activities that fall within the definition
of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code.
The evidence on record shows that they promised
overseas employment to private complainants and
required them to prepare the necessary documents
and to pay the placement fee, although they did not
have any license to do so. There is illegal
recruitment when one who does not possess the
necessary authority or license gives the impression
of having the ability to send a worker abroad.25
Accused-appellants assert that they merely
undertook to secure Austrian visas for private
complainants, which act did not constitute illegal
recruitment. They cite the document marked at
Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain
Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We
are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa
Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes
categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl
told them that they would provide them overseas
employment and promised them that they would be
able to leave the country on a specified date. We do
not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their
testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive
for these witnesses to falsely testify against
accused-appellants if it were not true that they met
with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented
themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful
employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in
the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by
accused-appellants in their brief do not impair their
credibility, especially since they corroborate each
other on the material points, i.e., that they met with
the three accused several times, that the three
accused promised to give them overseas
employment, and that they paid the corresponding
placement fee but were not able to leave the
country. It has been held that truth-telling witnesses
are not always expected to give error-free
testimonies considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory.26 Moreover, it was
shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked
as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the
payments given by private complainants for the
processing of their papers. We are not inclined to
believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by
Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There
is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of
his wife, that private complainants threatened to
harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr.
Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that
he did not understand the contents of the paper he
was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon,
he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure
the departure of private complainants and to provide

them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation
arose from the promise of overseas placement made
by him and his co-accused to private complainants.
The admission made by accused-appellants in
Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian
visas for private complainants does not negate the
fact that they also promised to procure for them
overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of the private
complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00.
However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a
later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to
each
complainant
an
amount
exceeding
P150,000.00. This is an acknowledgment that
accused-appellants received payments from the
complainants not only for securing visas but also for
their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail
to impress us. The acts of recruitment were
committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in
Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July
29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he
returned to the Philippines and stayed in Batangas
from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the
other hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the
dates alleged in the various informations. It is of
judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few
hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses
were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them
from going to Batangas to engage in their
recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that
the three accused worked as a team and they
conspired and cooperated with each other in
recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to
Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and
Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business
partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave
assurances to private complainants that they would
seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco
Hernandez remitted the payments given by the
applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter
undertook to process the applicants' papers. There
being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be
equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if
he himself did not personally take part in its
execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in
convicting accused-appellants of illegal recruitment
in large scale by cummulating the individual
informations filed by private complainants. The
eight informations for illegal recruitment are
worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
"That on or about July 14, 1992 and
sometime prior and subsequent thereto at
Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority from
7
the Department of Labor and Employment

or any other authorized government entity,
conspiring and confederating together, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large
scale recruitment and placement activities
by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor
de Hernandez and to more than three other
persons, job placement abroad, by reason of
which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez
relying on these misrepresentations, paid
and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime
prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor
Subdivision, Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing
fully well that they are non-licensees nor
holders of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring
and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Leonora
Perez y Atienza and to more than three other
which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying
on these misrepresentations, paid and/or
gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND
(P100,000.00)
PESOS,
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 26, 1992 and
and promising for a fee to one Melanie
Bautista y Dolor and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Melanie Bautista y
Dolor relying on these misrepresentations,

paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED
FIFTY
THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
to said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.1wphi1.nt
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 12, 1992 and
and promising for a fee to one Annaliza
Perez y Atienza and to more than three other
which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza relying
SIXTY
THOUSAND
(P160,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said
accused, which acts constitute a violation of
the said law.
Contrary to Law.
"That on or about August 15, 1992 and
and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling
y Coling and to more than three other
which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 5, 1992 and
8

and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel
de Manalo and to more than three other
which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on
these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
THOUSAND
(P130,000.00)
PESOS,
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime
prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta.
Rita Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, knowing
fully well that they are non-licensees nor
holders of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring
and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale
recruitment and placement activities by
enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering
and promising for a fee to one Anicel
Umahon y Delgado and to more than three
reason of which said Anicel Umahon y
Delgado
relying
on
these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
THOUSAND
(P130,000.00)
PESOS,
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about November 25, 1992 and
No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named

and promising for a fee to one Charito
Balmes y Cantos and to more than three
reason of which said Charito Balmes y
Cantos relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY ONE THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00),
Contrary to Law."
We note that each information was filed by only one
complainant. We agree with accused-appellants that
they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale based on several
informations filed by only one complainant. The
Court held in People vs. Reyes:27
"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of
illegal recruitment 'committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a
group,' it must be understood as referring to
the number of complainants in each case
who are complainants therein, otherwise,
prosecutions for single crimes of illegal
recruitment can be cummulated to make out
a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In
other words, a conviction for large scale
illegal recruitment must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of
three or more persons whether individually
or as a group."28
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty
imposed upon accused-appellants. The charge was
not only for illegal recruitment committed in large
scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)
or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor
Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda
Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with
each other in convincing private complainants to
apply for an overseas job and giving them the
guaranty that they would be hired as domestic
helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to
do so. Thus, we hold that accused-appellants should
be held liable for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate which is also punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) under Article 39 of the Labor
Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the
guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A
person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may,
in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315
(2) of the Revised Penal Code provided the
elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Article
9
315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is

committed by any person who defrauds another by
using a fictitious name, or falsely pretends to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions,
or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
The offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the
accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damages.29 It has been
proved in this case that accused-appellants
represented themselves to private complainants to
have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy,
although they did not have any authority or license.
It is by this representation that they induced private
complainants to pay a placement fee of
P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa
under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED.
The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Cost against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
10
3. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF SEC 14

4. PRIVATE RECRUITMENT 16 IN REL.
TO 25
5. THE POEA 17, E.O 247
a. VINTA MARITIME CO INC VERSUS NLRC
FACTS:
Leonides Basconcillo, a chief engineer of the
M/V Boracay, was dismissed for his gross
negligence and incompetence as exemplified
by the recorded incidents which the
petitioner , Vinta Maritime Co. Inc and Elkano
Ship Management submitted. However,
Leonides denied such allegations claiming
that he was not given a chance to explain his
side regarding the mentioned accidents. He
thereafter filed a complaint with the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration (POEA) Worker's Assistance
and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal.
The POEA ruled that Basconcillo was illegally
dismissed. It was affirmed by the NLRC.
Hence this present action.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT WAS
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED?
RULING:
Yes, the respondent was illegally dismissed.
The petitioners in this case failed to prove
the elements of valid dismissal, namely: (1)
just cause and (2) due process.
Where there is no showing of a clear, valid,
and legal cause for the termination of
employment, the law considers the matter as
illegal dismissal. The burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause.
In this case at bar, the absence of valid
cause for termination was patent. The
alleged incompetence of respondent was
contradicted by the remarks in his seamans
book showing that his services was highly
recommended and that his conduct and
ability were rated very good. It was not
supported by relevant and convincing
evidence. Neither did they explain the
instances
where
respondent
allegedly
endangered the ship and its crew.
Due process, the second element, requires
notice and hearing. Article 282 of the Labor
Code requires the service of a written notice
containing a statement of the cause(s) of
termination and giving said employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself. The twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process, and neither of these elements
can be eliminated without running afoul of
the constitutional guarantee.
We therefore conclude that respondent was
illegally dismissed. No notice was ever given
to him prior to his dismissal. These requisites

cannot be replaced as they are not mere
technicalities, but requirements of due
process to which every employee is entitled
to ensure that the employers prerogative to
dismiss is not exercised arbitrarily. Illegally
dismissed workers are entitled to the
payment of their salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of their employment
where the employment is for a definite
period.
b. ASIAN CENTER VERSUS NLRC

FACTS:
Petitioner hired respondent IBNO
MEDIALES to work as a mason in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1, 200
Saudi Riyals (SR). The term for his contract
was two years, from February 28, 1995 until
February 28, 1997.
On May 1996, he applied with
petitioner for vacation leave with pay which
he earned after working for more than a
year, which was granted. While en route to
the Philippines, his co- workers informed him
that he has been dismissed from service.
He thereafter, filed a complaint with
the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, refund of
transportation fare, illegal deductions, nonpayment of 13th month pay and salary for
the unexpired portion of his employment
contract.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner
guilty of illegal dismissal. It is noteworthy,
however, that in the body of his decision, he
applied Section 10 of RA 8042, the law
relative to the protection of Filipino overseasworkers, and computed private respondents
salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract as follows: SR 1,200 X 3 months=
SR 3, 600.
It was affirmed by the NLRC on Appeal
but modified the decision by deleting the
order of refund of excessive placement fee
for lack of jurisdiction. It, however,
subsequently denied petitioners motion. It
ruled that RA 8042 does not apply as
respondents employment which started in
February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity
on July 15, 1995. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHEN IS JURISDICTION DETERMINED?
RULING:
Jurisdiction is determined by the law at
the time of the commencement of the action.
In the case at bar, private respondents cause
of action did not accrue on his date of
employment or on February 28, 1995. His
cause arose only from the time he was
illegally dismissed by petitioner from service
in June 1996, after his vacation have expired.
11
It is thus clear, that RA 8042 which took

effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to
the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of RA 8042 a worker
dismissed
from
overseas
employment
without just, valid or authorized cause is
entitled to his salary for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
In this case, the unexpired portion of
respondents employment contract is eight
(8) months. He should therefore be paid his
basic salary corresponding to three (3)
months every year for the unexpired term,
whichever is less or a total of SR 3, 600.
c. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
FACTS:
Manuel Zaragoza had been an
employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping
Lines for several years, having served as
engineer on board several of Easterns
vessels since 1973. At the time of his death
on 1983, he was in Kakogawa, Japan serving
as Chief Engineer of the M/V Eastern Meteor,
a vessel then owned by Freeasia Shipping
Company S.A. and chartered by Eastern.
Two years after his death, Zaragosas
wife, herein respondent, filed with the POEA
a formal complaint against petitioner after
the latter refused to act favorably on the
widows claim for gratuity arising from the
death of her husband. She alleged that at
the time of her husbands death, the ship
was registered in Panama and that she is
entitled to P100,000 indemnity as provided
in the Memorandum Circular #71 issued by
the National Seamen Board (NSB).
Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the
POEA over the complaint, asserting that the
latter had no jurisdiction on the ground that
the company is not engaged in overseas
employment even as it admits that its
vessels are ocean going vessels. The
petitioner further concludes that the claim
for the death benefits should have been filed
with the Social Security System and not with
the POEA.
ISSUE: W/N POEA AND NOT
JURISDCITION OVER THE CASE?
SSS
employment of Filipino Workers overseas. It

does not limit their coverage to non- Filipino
employers. Filipinos working overseas share
the same risk and burdens whether their
employers be Filipino or foreign. The
underlying policy is the Filipino seaman
working in ocean going vessels should
receive the same wages and benefits without
regard to the nationality or nationalities of
the vessels on which they serve.
Furthermore, the standard contract of
employment for Filipino seamen allows the
payment of death benefit, pension, funeral
and burial gratuity to the private respondentworker.
Also, POEAs jurisdiction was further
clarified substantially in the Rules and
Regulation on Overseas Employment issued
by POEA, Section 1 thereof which provides
that, claims for disability and other benefits
arising out of employment fall within the
POEAs original and exclusive jurisdiction.
d. DE JESUS vs ECC
FACTS:
Ester de Jesus was employed by the
Philippine National Railways as telephone
operator. She was transferred to the
switchboard of the PNR hospital. She worked
every other day during the night shift, for
continuous periods of 16 hours starting from
4pm to 8am of the following day. She was,
thereafter, hospitalized four times and
diagnosed having chronic pyelonephritis,
diabetes mellitus, anemia and lung cancer.
She died later.
The husband of the deceased filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626. It was
denied by the GSIS on the ground that the
deceaseds ailments were not occupational
diseases under the Labor Code. Moreover,
they argued that it was not shown that her
being a telephone operator increased the
risk of contracting those ailments.
The
Employees
Compensation
Commission affirmed such decision. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
THE CLAIM.
HAS
RULING:
Yes, POEA has jurisdiction over the
case.
Section 4 of E.O. 797 provides that
the POEA shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases including money
claims,
involving
employer-employee
relationship arising out of or by virtue of law
or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen.
The statute and regulations refer to
RULING:
SC RULED IN THE NEGATIVE.
The
ailments
of
the
deceased
manifested themselves in 1978 or beyond
January 1, 1975, the law therefore, governing
the petitioners claim is, the New Labor
Code.
Under the code, for the sickness and
resulting
disability
or
death
to
be
compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex A of the Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
12
shown that the risk of contracting the

diseased
increased
by
the
working
conditions.
The petitioner in this case at bar,
failed to prove by competent evidence that
the risk of contracting said diseases was
indeed
by
the
working
conditions
concomitant
with
the
deceaseds
employment. While the court has always
maintained that the strict rules of evidence
are
not
applicable
in
claims
for
compensation, the basic rule that a mere
allegation is not evidence should not be
disregarded.
e. INTER ORIENT v NLRC
FACTS:
Jeremias Pineda was contracted to
work as Oiler on board the vessels, MV
Amazonia, owned and operated by its
foreign
principal,
Firecroft
Shipping
Corporation. He was repatriated to the
Philippines due to a mental condition. He
met his death when he was shot by a Thai
Policeman while in Thailand for a stopover.
The mother of the deceased filed a
claim for death compensation benefits
against inter- orient and its foreign principal.
She contended that her son should not have
allowed to travel alone on the ground that he
was already mentally unsound.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argued,
invoking the De Jesus case, that the cause of
Pinedas death is not one of the occupational
diseases listed by law. Hence, not entitled to
the claim.
ISSUE: W/N THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR
THE CLAIM?
RULING: YES, PETITONER IS LIABLE.
Petitioners reliance in the De Jesus
case is misplace. The death and burial
benefits being claimed in the case at bar are
not
payable
by
the
Employees
Compensation
Commission
and
are
chargeable against the State Insurance Fund.
It arose from the responsibility of the
foreign employer together with the local
agency for the safety of the employee during
his repatriation until his arrival in this
country, the point of hire. Though the
termination of Pineda was effected in Dubai,
still, the responsibility of the foreign
employer to see to it that Pineda was duly
repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted.
The foreign employer may not have
been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it
cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by
its agreement to assure the safe return of
said worker.
The petition was therefore, dismissed.
13
f. NFD v NLRC
Facts:
The private respondents (wives of the two
deceased
husbands)
filed
for
death
compensation benefits under the POEA
Standard Contract of employment before the
petitioners but were denied on the ground
that the seamans deaths were due to their
own wilful act who implanted fragments of
reindeer horn in their respective sexual
organs that due to the lack of sanitary
conditions at the time and place of
implantation, all three seamen suffered
"severe
tetanus"
and
"massive
viral
infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died
within days of the other; that the third
seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed
death only because the vessel was at port in
Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus
became critical. Private respondents filed
separate complaints before the POEA
Adjudication Office. POEA Administrator
dismissed the case for lack of merit. Private
respondents
appealed
to
respondent
Commission. During the pendency of the
appeal, private respondents submitted
additional documentary evidence in support
of their Memorandum on Appeal. Respondent
Commission
reversed
the
POEA
Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay
private respondents. Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON the seamans deaths were from their
own willful and deliberate act.
Held:
Yes. Under Part II, Section C, no. 6 of POEA
Standard Employment Contract Governing
the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on
Board
Ocean-Going
Vessels
No
compensation shall be payable in respect of
any injury, incapacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful act on his own life by
the seaman, provided, however, that the
employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly
attributable to him. In this case, the
testimonies of the officers are insufficient to
prove the fact that death of two seamen
were caused by self-inflicted injuries and in
fact Fajardo, one who did the same, did not
submit
any
testimony
regarding
the
implantation. No autopsy report was
presented to corroborate their testimonies.
Based on medical reports cause of death of
Misada was due to viral infection, while
Envidiado was due to viral myocarditis.
Hence, petitioners evidence insufficiently
proves the fact that the deaths of the two

seamen were caused by their own wilful and
deliberate act.
g. Phil. International v NLRC
Facts:
A claim for disability compensation benefits
and hospitalization expenses was filed by
Brigido Samson against Phil. International
with the National Seamans Board (NSB).
The NSB ruled in favor of Samson and
ordered Phil. Int. to pay him $3,800.00 and
$380.00 for attorneys fees.
Phil. Int. filed an appeal with the NLRC and
during the pendency of such, they offered
P18,000.00 to Samson as settlement.
Samson then executed a Release
Document which purportedly settled all
liabilities of Phil. Int. to him.
The NLRC affirmed the decision of the NSB
which subsequently became final and
executory.
Upon execution, Phil. Int. presented the
Release Document averring that they have
been released of their obligation. Samson for
his part contends that he was forced by the
attending circumstances to sign and execute
such document because at that time he
badly needed money for his on-going
medical treatment. The NLRC considered the
P18,000.00 as partial fulfillment of the
money judgment.
Issue:
WON there was a valid waiver.
Held:
No. In the case of MRR Yard Crew Union v
Philippine National Railways, this Court held
that the fact that the employee "has signed a
satisfaction receipt does not result in waiver;
the law does not consider as valid any
agreement to receive less compensation
than that the worker is entitled to recover."
Moreover, from the records it appears that
there was a hearing on June 7, 1982 called
by the National Seamen Board precisely to
consider and resolve whether the payment of
P18,000.00 admittedly made by petitioner
was in full or partial satisfaction of the award
for disability compensation benefits due to
the private respondent. The said Board gave
credit to the manifestations of private
respondent that the latter was constrained to
accept the payment of P18,000.00 and
execute the release of document as at that
time he was still undergoing on-going
14
medical treatment for which apparently he

needed funds for his expenses. A decision on
a question of fact by an administrative body
is entitled to respect. Courts, as a rule,
refuse
to
interfere
with
proceedings
undertaken by administrative bodies or
officials in the exercise of administrative
functions, absent any showing that such
decision was rendered in consequence of
fraud, imposition or mistake.
Aside from the reasons above-stated, we also
note that the release document was
executed by private respondent on May 7,
1981 during the pendency of the appeal
made to the NLRC by petitioner Philippine
International Shipping Corporation from the
decision of the National Seamen Board,
dated April 2, 1981. Despite the execution of
said release document, the petitioner herein
did not file any motion to dismiss its appeal
or to have said appealed case declared
terminated due to the alleged satisfaction of
the judgment. This omission negates an
inference that the parties had actually
agreed that the payment of the P18,000.00
would be equivalent to a full satisfaction of
the award and/or a waiver of the balance on
the award.
h. Pacific v NLRC
Facts:
Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pascor as
Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to
Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship
Management Limited (Gulf). He was then
terminated
for
misbehavior
and
insubordination.
Pascor then filed a complaint against Rances
with POEA for acts unbecoming of an officer.
Rances for his part denied the allegation and
interposed
a
counterclaim
demanding
$1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had
awarded in his favor against Gulf. POEA ruled
in favor of Pascor. However it was silent as to
the alleged Dubai court decision.
Rances then filed a complaint against Pascor
for the enforcement of the alleged Dubai
decision.
Issue:
WON POEA has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
No. Petitioner argues vigorously that the
POEA had no authority and jurisdiction to
enforce the judgment of a foreign court.
Under Section 1, Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA
Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that
the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases
'involving employer employee relations
arising out of or by virtue of any law or

contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen."
Respondent Rances, however, relied not
upon the employer - employee relationship
between himself and petitioner corporation
and the latter's foreign principal, but rather
upon the judgment obtained by him from the
Dubai Court which had apparently already
been partially satisfied by payment to
respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The
POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a
claim for enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Such a claim must be brought before the
regular courts. The POEA is not a court; it is
an administrative agency exercising, inter
alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.
Neither the rules of procedure nor the rules
of evidence which are mandatorily applicable
in proceedings before courts, are observed in
proceedings before the POEA.
6. BAN
ON
DIRECT
HIRING
EMPLOYMENT 18, BK. IV, RULE II,
POEA RULES ON OVERSEAS
a. Facilities Management vs. de la Osa
Facts:
Facilities Management Corporation and J. S.
Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island while J.
V. Catuira is an employee of FMC stationed in
Manila. Leonardo dela Osa was employed by
FMC in Manila, but rendered work in Wake
Island, with the approval of the Department
of Labor of the Philippines. De la Osa was
employed as (1) painter with an hourly rate
of $1.25 from March 1964 to November
1964, inclusive; (2) houseboy with an hourly
rate of $1.26 from December 1964 to
November 1965, inclusive; (3) houseboy with
an hourly rate of $1.33 from December 1965
to August 1966, inclusive; and (4) cashier
with an hourly rate of $1.40 from August
1966 to March 27 1967, inclusive. He further
averred that from December, 1965 to
August, 1966, inclusive, he rendered
overtime services daily, and that this entire
period was divided into swing and graveyard
shifts to which he was assigned, but he was
not paid both overtime and night shift
premiums despite his repeated demands
from FMC, et al. In a petition filed on 1 July
1967, dela Osa sought his reinstatement with
full backwages, as well as the recovery of his
overtime compensation, swing shift and
graveyard shift differentials.
15
Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al.

filed a motion to dismiss the subject petition
on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case, and on 24 May
1968, de la Osa interposed an opposition
thereto. Said motion was denied by the Court
in its Order issued on 12 July 1968.
Subsequently, after trial, the Court of
Industrial Relations, in a decision dated 14
February 1972, ordered FMC, et al. to pay de
la Osa his overtime compensation, as well as
his swing shift and graveyard shift premiums
at the rate of 50% per cent of his basic
salary. FMC, et al. filed the petition for review
on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the mere act by a nonresident
foreign
corporation
of
recruiting Filipino workers for its own
use abroad, in law doing business in
the Philippines.
2. Whether FMC has been "doing
business in the Philippines" so that the
service of summons upon its agent in
the Philippines vested the Court of
First
Instance
of
Manila
with
jurisdiction.
Held:
1. In its motion to dismiss, FMC admits that
Mr. Catuira represented it in the Philippines
"for the purpose of making arrangements for
the approval by the Department of Labor of
the employment of Filipinos who are
recruited by the Company as its own
employees for assignment abroad." In effect,
Mr. Catuira was alleged to be a liaison officer
representing FMC in the Philippines. Under
the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Board of Investments which took effect 3
February 1969, implementing RA 5455,
which took effect 30 September 1968, the
phrase
"doing
business"
has
been
exemplified with illustrations, among them
being as follows: ""(1) Soliciting orders,
purchases (sales) or service contracts.
Concrete and specific solicitations by a
foreign firm, not acting independently of the
foreign firm, amounting to negotiation or
fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or
service contracts, regardless of whether the
contracts are actually reduced to writing,
shall constitute doing business even if the
enterprise has no office or fixed place of
business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a

representative or distributor who is domiciled
in the Philippines, unless said representative
or distributor has an independent status, i.e.,
it transacts business in its name and for its
own account, and not in the name or for the
account of the principal; xxx (4) Opening
offices, whether called 'liaison' offices,
agencies or branches, unless proved
otherwise. xxx (10) Any other act or acts that
imply a continuity of commercial dealings or
arrangements, and contemplate to that
extent the performance of acts or works, or
the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, or in the progressive
prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
purpose and objective of the business
organization."
2. FMC may be considered as "doing

business in the Philippines" within the scope
of Section 14 (Service upon private foreign
corporations), Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "If the defendant is a
foreign corporation, or a non-resident joint
stock company or association, doing
business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose or, if
there be no such agent, on the government
official designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the
Philippines." Indeed, FMC, in compliance with
Act 2486 as implemented by Department of
Labor Order IV dated 20 May 1968 had to
appoint Jaime V. Catuira, 1322 A. Mabini,
Ermita, Manila "as agent for FMC with
authority to execute Employment Contracts
and receive, in behalf of that corporation,
legal services from and be bound by
processes of the Philippine Courts of Justice,
for as long as he remains an employee of
FMC." It is a fact that when the summons for
FMC was served on Catuira he was still in the
employ of the FMC. Hence, if a foreign
corporation, not engaged in business in the
Philippines, is not barred from seeking
redress from courts in the Philippines (such
as in earlier cases of Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company, vs. Pacific Star Line, etc. [GR L26809], In Mentholatum vs. Mangaliman, and
Eastboard Navigation vs. Juan Ysmael & Co.),
a fortiori, that same corporation cannot claim
exemption from being sued in Philippine
courts for acts done against a person or
persons in the Philippines.
16
Held:
7. NATIONAL SEA MEN BOARD NOW
POEA 20, BK. VII, RULE II, POEA
RULES
a. Wallem Shipping v MOLE
Facts:
While
on
a
port
on
Rotterdam,
representatives
from
the
International
Transport Federation (ITF) boarded the ship
where private respondents JAIME CAUNCA,
ANTONIO CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE
OJEDA and RODOLFO PAGWAGAN . The ITF
representatives talked to the captain of the
ship and administrative manager of Wallem
Philippines Shipping Inc. (Wallem) and
agreed on new salary rates based on ITF
standards. It was further agreed that Wallem
will pay the difference to the salary already
earned by the seaman.
However when the ship was in Dubai, the
seaman did not received any payment. The
Captain refused to pay the ITF standard
wage. The genral manager of Wallem upon
arriving in Dubai threatened the seamens
that they will be terminated in case they
keep on demanding ITF standard wage
instead of Far Easts, Wallem principal, rates.
The seamen were made to sign a new
contract where they agreed to accept Far
Easts rates. Private respondents on the
other hand were not able to sign because
they were on their working stations at that
time. They were subsequently terminated.
Upon arrival to the Philippines, private
respondents instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal and recovery of wages and other
benefits corresponding to the five months'
unexpired
period
of
their
shipboard
employment contract.
Petitioners for their part averred that, private
respondents together with the other crews
insisted on worldwide ITF rate and
threatened the ship authorities of picketing
or boycott and declare the ship as hot ship
by the ITF.
Issue:
WON the seamen were justified to demand
the worldwide ITF standard rates instead of
the contractual rates with Wallem and Far
East.
Yes. Respondents should not be blamed for

accepting higher salaries since it is but
human for them to grab every opportunity
which
would
improve
their
working
conditions and earning capacity. It is a basic
right of all workingmen to seek greater
benefits not only for themselves but for their
families as well, and this can be achieved
through collective bargaining or with the
assistance of trade unions. The Constitution
itself guarantees the promotion of social
welfare and protection to labor. It is therefore
the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in
disallowing the payment of the unexpired
portion of the seamen's respective contracts
of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceeding
to their demands, and this constitutes
serious misconduct as contemplated by the
Labor Code. This contention is not welltaken. The records fail to establish clearly
the commission of any threat. But even if
there had been such a threat, respondents'
behavior should not be censured because it
is but natural for them to employ some
means of pressing their demands for
petitioner, who refused to abide with the
terms of the Special Agreement, to honor
and respect the same. They were only acting
in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive
them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no
serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents'
dismissal just because of their firmness in
their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner
of its obligation it entered into without any
coercion, specially on the part of private
respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is
guilty of breach of contract when they
dismissed the respondents without just
cause and prior to the expiration of the
employment contracts. As the records clearly
show, petitioner voluntarily entered into the
Special Agreement with ITF and by virtue
thereof the crew men were actually given
their salary differentials in view of the new
rates. It cannot be said that it was because
of respondents' fault that petitioner made a
sudden turn-about and refused to honor the
special agreement.
17
b. Chavez v. Banto Perez ESALYN

CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. EDNA
BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T.
RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA,
HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM
PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR.,
and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Chavez, hired as an entertainment
dancer in Japan, entered into a standard
employment contract through a Philippine
placement agency for 2 to 6 months, at a
monthly compensation of $1,500. The POEA
approved
the
contract.
Subsequently,
however,
petitioner
executed
a
side
agreement with here Japanese employer
stipulating a monthly salary stipulating a
monthly salary of $750, and authorizing the
employer to deduct $250 as commission of
her manager. The salary therefore became
$500 only.
under Memorandum Circular No. 2,

Series of 1986. Any alterations or
changes made in any part of this
contract without prior approval by the
POEA shall be null and void
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand
Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties'
standard
employment
contract
is
in
accordance with the minimum employment
standards with respect to wages set by the
POEA, Thus, the side agreement which
reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven
Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null
and void for violating the POEA's minimum
employment standards, and for not having
been approved by the POEA. Indeed, this
side agreement is a scheme all too
frequently resorted to by unscrupulous
employers against our helpless overseas
workers who are compelled to agree to
satisfy their basic economic needs.
She returned to the Philippines on June 14,

1989.
On February 21, 1991, she filed a complaint,
seeking payment of $6,000 representing the
unpaid portion of her basic salary for 6
months.
The POEA Administrator dismissed the
complaint, holding that the agreement for a
monthly salary of $750 was valid. Moreover,
the POEA adjudged the complainantpetitioner guilty of laches or delay in filing
here complaint about 2 years after her
employment. On appeal, the NLRC upheld
the POEAs decision. Chavez petitioned for
review.
Issue: W/N the managerial commission
agreement executed by Chavez valid.
Ruling: No.
The managerial commission agreement
executed by petitioner to authorize her
Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred
Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her
monthly basic salary is void because it is
against our existing laws, morals and public
policy. It cannot supersede the standard
employment contract of December 1, 1988
approved by the POEA with the following
stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and
conditions stated in this Employment
Contract are in conformance with the
Standard Employment Contract for
Entertainers prescribed by the POEA
18
B. REGULATION OF RECRUITMENT
PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES
The secretary of Labor shall have the

exclusive power to determine, decide,
order or direct payment from, or
application of, the cash or surety bond
for any claim or injury covered and
guaranteedby the bonds.
AND
XX
5. BONDS
a. FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP.,
petitioner,
vs.
WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN
CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
AND
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, respondents.
Facts:
Pan Pacific is a private, fee-charging,
recruitment and employment agency. In
accordance with the requirements of Section
4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and
Regulations of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), Pan
Pacific posted a surety bond issued by
petitioner Finman and was granted a license
to operate by the POEA.
Private respondents filed with the POEA
separate complaints against Pan Pacific for
violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code and for refund of placement fees
paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged
that Pan Pacific charged and collected such
fees from them but did not secure
employment for them.
Then, the POEA Administrator impleaded
petitioner Finman as party respondent in its
capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. For its
part,Finmandenied liability and pleaded that
the POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety
bonds," because that jurisdiction is vested in
the Insurance Commission or the regular
courts.
Issue: W/N the POEA was the power to
enforce liability under cash or surety bonds.
Ruling: Yes.
There appears nothing so special or unique
about the determination of a surety's liability
under its bond as to restrict that
determination to the Office of the Insurance
Commissioner and to the regular courts of
justice exclusively. The exact opposite is
strongly stressed by the second paragraph of
Article 31 of the Labor Code:
Art. 31. Bonds. ... ...
To compel the POEA and private respondents

the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to
the Insurance Commissioner or to a regular
court of law to enforce that bond, would be
to collide with the public policy which
requires prompt resolution of claims against
private recruitment and placement agencies.
The Court will take judicial notice of the
appealing frequency with which some,
perhaps many, of such agencies have
cheated
workers
avid
for
overseas
employment by, e.g., collecting placement
fees without securing employment for them
at all, extracting exorbitant fees or
"kickbacks"
from
those
for
whom
employment
is
actually
obtained,
abandoning hapless and unlettered workers
to exploitative foreign principals, and so on.
Cash and surety bonds are required by the
POEA and its predecessor agencies from
recruitment and employment companies
precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and
effective recourse against such companies
when held liable for applicants or workers'
claims. Clearly that public policy will be
effectively negated if POEA and the
Department of Labor and Employment were
held powerless to compel a surety company
to make good on its solidary undertaking in
the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the
liability of the principal obligor, the
recruitment or employment agency, is
determined and fixed and where the surety is
given reasonable opportunity to present any
defenses it or the principal obligor may be
entitled to set up.
6. FEES PAID BY WORKERS
EASTERN
ASSURANCE&
SURETY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER
TRANGUILLAN, et al., respondents.
Facts:
J & B applied with the POEA for a license to
engage in a business as a recruitment
agency. In connection with this, a surety
bond was filed by the applicant and Eastern
Assurance in virtue of which they both held
themselves firmly bound unto POEA.
Then, 33persons applied for overseas
employment with J&B. In consideration of
19
promised deployment, complainants paid J&B

various amounts for various fees. Because of
non-deployment,
the
applicants
filed
separate complaints with POEA against J&B
for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code.
Eastern Assurance, the surety of J&B,
disclaimed liability on the ground that the
claims were not expressly covered by the
bond and that the POEA has no jurisdiction to
order a forfeiture of the bond.
The POEA administrator issued an order in
favor of the complainants. The nondeployment of the complainants strongly
indicates that there was no employment
obtained for them. Hence, such constitutes a
violation of Art. 32 and 34 of the Labor Code.
Eastern Assurance, being the surety of J&B,
is primarily liable.
Issue: Do the POEA and the Secretary of
Labor have jurisdiction over the claims for
the refund of the illegally collected fees?
Clarita Cruz worked in Kuwait for 2 yrs. After

that, she went back home to Philippines. She
filed
complaint
against
EMS
Manpower/Placement Services & foreign
principal
Abdul
Karim
Al
Yahya
for
underpayment of her salary &non-payment
of vacation leave. She also alleged that she
was charged a placement fee of 7k instead of
5k, the maximum amount required by law for
placement fee.
She added that her foreign employer treated
her as a slave and required her to work 18
hours a day. She was beaten up and suffered
facial deformity, head trauma and decreased
sensation in the right portion of her body. On
top of all this, she was paid only $120 per
month and her total salaries were given to
her only three hours before her flight back to
Manila.
The Complaint was dismissed because of the
affidavit of desistance.Private Respondent
said that Cruz is bound to it. For her part,
Cruz alleges that such affidavit was made
under duress, false pretenses & w/o counsel.
Ruling: Yes.
Issue:
The POEA has the power to order the refund
of illegally collected fees.
Implicit in these powers is the award of
appropriate relief to the victims of the
offenses committed by the respondent
agency or contractor, specially the refund or
reimbursement of such fees as may have
been fraudulently or otherwise illegally
collected, or such money, goods or services
imposed and accepted in excess of what is
licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and
absurd to limit the sanction on an offending
recruitment
agency
or
contractor
to
suspension or cancellation of its license,
without the concomitant obligation to repair
the injury caused to its victims. It would
result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it
would leave the victims without recourse, or
in compelling the latter to litigate in another
forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of
actions or proceedings which the law abhors.
7. PROHIBITED PRACTICES, LIABILITY

CLARITA V. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS
MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.),
ABDUL KARIM AL YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS
INSURANCE, respondents.
Facts:
W/N the respondent

petitioner?
is
liable
to
the
Ruling: Yes
Even if the quitclaim had foreclosed the
petitioner's right, the fact that the
consideration given in exchange thereof was
very much less than the amount petitioner is
claiming renders the quitclaim null and void
for being contrary to public policy. The State
must be firm in affording protection to labor.
The quitclaim wherein the consideration is
scandalously low and inequitable cannot be
an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her
legitimate claim.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement
are unconscionable on its face, that the law
will step in to annul the questionable
transaction.
8. SUSPENSION/ CANCELLATION OF LICENSE

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION,
petitioner,
20
vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
revoke the license of a private fee-charging

employment agency.
Facts:
Ruling: Yes.
Trans
Action,
a
private
fee-charging
employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for
possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in
Hongkong. Private respondents sought
employment as domestic helpers through
petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon,
Ben HurDomincil and his wife Cecille.
The applicants paid placement fees ranging
from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner
failed to deploy them. Their demands for
refund proved unavailing; thus, they were
constrained to institute complaints against
petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and
34(a) 1 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner denied having received the
amounts
allegedly
collected
from
respondents, and averred that Aragon,
whose only duty was to pre-screen and
interview applicants, and the spouses
Domincil were not authorized to collect fees
from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be
held liable for the money claimed by
respondents. Petitioner maintains that it
even warned respondents not to give any
money to unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator
Edgar Somes testified that although he was
aware that petitioner collected fees from
respondents, the latter insisted that they be
allowed to make the payments on the
assumption that it could hasten their
deployment abroad. He added that Mrs.
HonorataManliclic,
a
representative
of
petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of
the interviews, told him that she was leaving
behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she
cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of
the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied
this version and argued that it was Somes
who instructed her to leave the receipts
behind as it was perfectly alright to collect
fees.
The Labor Undersecretary Nieves Confessor
ordered to reimburse the complainants.
Thereafter, the license of the agency was
cancelled.
Petitioner contended that it is the POEA
which has the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal
recruitment cases, including the authority to
cancel recruitment licenses.
Issues:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation

of license or authority are prescribed for
violations of the above quoted provisions,
among others. And the Secretary of Labor
has the power under Section 35 of the law to
apply these sanctions, as well as the
authority, conferred by Section 36, not only
to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also
to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out the objectives and implement the
provisions" governing said activities.
Pursuant to this rule-making power thus
granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the
POEA,"on its own initiative or upon filing of a
complaint or report or upon request for
investigation by any aggrieved person,
authority
to
conduct
the
necessary
proceedings
for
the
suspension
or
cancellation of the license or authority of any
agency or entity" for certain enumerated
offenses.
The power to suspend or cancel any license
or authority to recruit employees for
overseas employment is concurrently vested
with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
9. Ilegal Recruitment local
Case Digest (Ada Mae D. Abellera)

SALAZAR-FLORES (please refer to the TSN)
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity
as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.
This concerns the validity of the power of
the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) a
charge against petitioner Hortencia Salazar. Atty.
Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was
assigned, sent to Salazar a telegram directing
him to appear before the POEA anti illegal
recruitment unit. On the same day, having
ascertained that the had no license to operate a
recruitment
agency,
public
respondent
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and

Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or
21
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a

CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDERhaving verified
that Salazar have:
(1)
No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit
and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2)
Committed/are committing acts prohibited
under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation
to Article 38 of the same code.
POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation issued
an office order designating respondents as
members of a team tasked to implement Closure
and Seizure Order.
Doing so, the group proceeded to the residence
of Salazar. There it was found that latter was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited
with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was
unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the
team chanced upon twelve talent performers
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for
by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by
Mrs. Flora Salazar.
Thereafter, Salazar request that the personal
properties seized be immediately returned on the
ground that said seizure was contrary to law and
against the will of the owner thereof. Among our
reasons are the following:
ISSUE:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly
issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: No.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of
search and arrest.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand
as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not
being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we
declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor
Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in
question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a
general warrant:
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly
the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:
1.
Salazar has not been given any prior
notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure
Order violates "due process of law" guaranteed
under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.
Another factor which makes the search warrants

under consideration constitutionally objectionable
is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought
to be seized in this wise:
2.
The committed acts also violate Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose."
1)
All printing equipment, paraphernalia,
paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables, communications/ recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the
like used and/or connected in the printing of the
"WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile
of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
3.
The premises invaded are the private
residence of the Salazar family, and the entry,
search as well as the seizure of the personal
properties belonging to our client were without
her consent and were done with unreasonable
force and intimidation, together with grave abuse
of the color of authority, and constitute robbery
and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128
of the Revised Penal Code.
2)
Subversive
documents,
pamphlets,
leaflets, books, and other publications to promote
the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and
22
3)
Motor
vehicles
used
in
the
distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and
other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1)
Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate
No. NKA 892;
2)
DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate
No. NKV 969;
3)
A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4)
TOYOTA-TAMARAW,
Plate No. PBP 665; and
colored
white
with
5)
TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate
No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we
reaffirm the following principles:
1.
Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2.
The exception is in cases of deportation of
illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of
deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void.
The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials
seized
as
a
result
of
the
implementation of Search and Seizure Order No.
1205.
10.Illegal Recruitment - overseas
thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino,

Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y
Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria
Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the
amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in
consideration of the promised employment which
did not materialized causing damage and
prejudice to the latter in the said sum;
furthermore, the acts complained of herein
tantamount to economic sabotage in that the
same were committed in large scale.
The accused pleaded not guilty to these charges.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a
married couple, for permission to enter the same.
The owners granted permission after the raiding
party introduced themselves as members of the
CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some
supposed applicants. Application forms, already
filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol
Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a
permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was
not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza
nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He
took the application forms she was holding as the
raiding party seized the other papers5 on the
table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain
Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women
suspected to be applicants, to the office for
investigation.
In the course of their investigation, the CIS
discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases,
among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra.
The accused was not able to present any
authority to recruit when asked by the
investigators. A check by Ramos with the POEA
revealed that the acused was not licensed or
authorized to conduct recruitment. A certification
ldated February 2, 1994 stating thus was
executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-inCharge of the POEA.
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
a. G.R. No. 121777
January 24, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Facts:
Carol Dela Piedra, without having previously
obtained
from
the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration,
a
license
or
authority to engage in recruitment and overseas
placement of workers, offer and promise for a fee
employment abroad particularly in Singapore
The trial court rendered a decision convicting the

accused.
ISSUE:
WON Carol is guilty of Illegal Recruitment.
Held:
Illegal recruitment is committed when two
elements concur. First, the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable one
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement
of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either
any activity within the meaning of "recruitment
and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or
any prohibited practices enumerated under
23
Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal

recruitment in large scale, a third element is
added: that the accused commits said acts
against three or more persons, individually or as
a group.
In this case, the first element is present. The
certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay
states that appellant is not licensed or authorized
to engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is
presumed engaged in recruitment and placement
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that
appellant promised them employment for a fee.
Their testimonies corroborate each other on
material points: the briefing conducted by
appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees
involved. Appellant has not shown that these
witnesses were incited by any motive to testify
falsely against her. The absence of evidence as to
an improper motive actuating the principal
witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to
sustain that no improper motive existed and that
their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the
positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses.
Affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides
negative testimony.
That appellant did not receive any payment for
the promised or offered employment is of no
moment. From the language of the statute, the
act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it
suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a
fee employment" to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming
as they do from credible witnesses, meet the
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant committed recruitment and placement.
We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve
into the second and third assigned errors
assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the
seizure of the application forms. A warrantless
arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of
invalidating the search incidental thereto and the
articles so seized are rendered inadmissible in
evidence. Here, even if the documents seized
were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would
stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's
testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the
prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth
assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA
supposedly "planted" the application forms. She
also assails his character, alleging that he passed
himself off as a lawyer, although this was denied
by Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense

that has been invariably viewed by the Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult
to prove.43 Apart from her self-serving testimony,
appellant has not offered any evidence that she
was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even
hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law
enforcers are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
Considering that the two elements of lack of
license or authority and the undertaking of an
activity constituting recruitment and placement
are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable
for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty
of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find that
she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment
must be based on a finding in each case of illegal
recruitment of three or more persons whether
individually or as a group.In this case, only two
persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to
have been recruited by appellant. The third
person named in the complaint as having been
promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez,
was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least
three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence
proving that the offense was committed against
three or more persons.46 In this case, evidence
that appellant likewise promised her employment
for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends
to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy
Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez
and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that
they (she and her "friends") filled up application
forms.
The affidavitBaez executed jointly with Araneta
cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit
was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed,
by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that
appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit
is hearsay and inadmissible.48 In any case,
hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has
little probative value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting
CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other
persons present in the briefing of January 30,
1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the
three persons named in the information
Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does
not include Fermindoza or the other persons
present in the briefing as among those promised
or offered employment for a fee. To convict
appellant for the recruitment and placement of
persons other than those alleged to have been
offered or promised employment for a fee would
violate her right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.
24
b. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NIDA ADESER y RICO, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The RTC convicted appellant of the crimes of
syndicated
illegal
recruitment
constituting
economic sabotage and estafa.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay filed
before the RTC two Informations against appellant
Nida Adeser y Rico, Lourdes Chang, and the
spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson.
The information alleged that by means of false
representation and fraudulent allegation to the
effect that they could secure employment abroad
for complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO, recruit for a
fee aforesaid person without the corresponding
license from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, a syndicated illegal recruitment
involving
economic
sabotage,
that
they
defrauded private complainant JOSEPHINE R.
PALO, in the following manner to wit: that said
accused, by means of false representations and
fraudulent allegations that they could facilitate
private complainants working and travel papers,
and feloniously ask, demand and receive from the
said complainant the amount of P80,000.00 as
placement fee for the latters supposed
deployment to Australia as "Apple Picker/Office
Worker"; and said private complainant carried
away by said misrepresentations, in fact gave
and delivered to said accused the amount of
P80,000.00, which amount accused in turn
misapplied, misappropriated and converted to
their own personal use and benefit, failing,
however, to deploy private complainant to
Australia, and despite repeated demands accused
failed and refused to do so, or account for the
said amount, to the damage and prejudice of the
said private complainant in the aforesaid amount
of P80,000.00.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to
both charges while her co-accused remained at
large.
More than three months passed, however, but
Palo was not deployed to Australia. Neither did
she get her Australian visa.
In May 2003, she learned from the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that Naples had
closed down. NBI likewise informed her that
Naples had no license to operate and deploy
workers abroad. Upon advice of the NBI, Palo filed
a complaint against appellant, the spouses
Tiongson and Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges

against her. She admitted that she was the owner
and general manager of Naples which was a
travel agency that offered visa assistance,
ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and
courier services, but denied having engaged in
recruitment.
ISSUE:
Whether appellants guilt for the crimes of
syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was
proven beyond reasonable doubt..
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two
elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid
license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers, and (2) the offenders
undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined in Article
13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in
Article 34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b),
recruitment and placement refers to "any act of
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes
referrals,
contract
services,
promising
or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms,
illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send
workers abroad for employment purposes.12 The
law imposes a higher penalty when the crime is
committed by a syndicate as it is considered as
an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under
the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor
Code.
Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case
is illegal recruitment by a syndicate. As
categorically testified by Palo and Caraig,
appellant, together with her co-accused, made
representations to Palo that they could send her
to Australia to work as an apple picker. There is
no denying that they gave Palo the distinct
impression that they had the power or ability to
send her abroad for work such that the latter was
convinced to part with a huge amount of money
as placement fee in order to be employed. And
this act was committed by appellant and her coaccused even if they did not have the required
license to do so. Appellant herself admitted that
Naples, the travel agency which she owned and
managed, only offered visa assistance, ticketing,
documentation, airport transfer and courier
services. Clearly, neither she nor her agents had
a license to recruit Palo to work abroad. It is the
25
lack of the necessary license or authority that

renders the recruitment unlawful or criminal.
Thus, as against the positive and categorical
testimonies of Palo and Caraig, appellants
denials cannot prevail. Moreover, there is no
reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts
findings on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses as there is no showing that any of them
had ill motives against appellant or her coaccused and especially since it appears they were
motivated solely by the desire to bring appellant
and her co-accused to justice for the crimes they
have committed.
Neither can this Court sustain appellants
contention that her participation in the
recruitment is negated by the fact that her
signature does not even appear on the vouchers
issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not present
receipts signed by appellant, this would not rule
out the fact that appellant did receive the money.
This Court has consistently ruled that absence of
receipts as to the amounts delivered to a
recruiter does not mean that the recruiter did not
accept or receive such payments. Neither in the
Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is
the presentation of receipts required in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement
and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. Such proof may come from the credible
testimonies of witnessesas in the case at bar.
c.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS, ANGEL MATEO,
AIDA DE LEON (at large) and JEAN AMAMLAW (at large), appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) relates
how appellants, despite their lack of authority or
license, represented themselves as persons who
had the capacity to send the victims abroad for
employment. We quote its version of the facts as
follows:
"The prosecution presented three witnesses,
namely, Melchor Degsi and Perpetua Degsi
(Complainants for brevity) and Priscilla Marreo
(or Priscilla Marelo).
"The prosecution and appellants stipulated that

appellants are not licensed or authorized to
recruit workers for employment abroad, in lieu of
the testimony of Senior Labor Researcher Johnson
Bolivar of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
"Complainants are husband and wife, residents of
Baguio City. They made a living earning an
average of P20,000.00 a month by selling fish
and vegetables in a rented stall in said City, at
least until March 24, 1998 when they closed shop
for reasons of attending to the demands of the
promised jobs for them in Japan. Both
categorically identified Jane Am-amlao (or Jean
Am-amlaw), their co-vendor in Baguio City
Market, as the person who approached them and
assured them that she knew a legal recruiter, an
ex-POEA employee, who had the capacity to send
them both abroad. Jane Am-amlaw (or Amamlaw for brevity) recruited complainants and
personally accompanied them on March 24, 1998
to meet the person she earlier referred to, or Aida
de Leon (or Alma de Leon), in the latters
apartment at No. 7280 J. Victor St., Pio del Pilar,
Makati.
"Complainants likewise categorically identified
Aida de Leon (de leon for brevity) as the person
who arranged a meeting in her apartment on
March 24, 1998 between complainants and
appellant Angel Mateo (Mateo for brevity) whom
de Leon introduced as their contact person for
Japan-bound workers. In said meeting, Mateo
represented himself as having the capacity to
send people abroad and showed complainants
various documents to convince them of his
legitimate recruitment operations. Convinced that
Mateo had indeed the capacity to facilitate their
employment as an office worker and as a cook or
mechanic in Japan, complainants, on that same
day, handed Mateo P15,000.00 which Mateo
required them to pay for their processing fees.
This was to be the first of a series of sums of
money to be extracted from complainants.
"Complainants were able to positively identify
Mateo in court as the contact person of de Leon
and who collected from them, from March 24,
1998 to June 23, 1998, sums of money for the
alleged necessary expenses relative to the
promised jobs awaiting them in Japan in the total
amount of P158,600.00. Complainants likewise
categorically identified Mateo as the same person
whose authorization was needed for the recovery
of P40,000.00 of the P45,000.00 they gave Mateo
who in turn deposited it to Sampaguita Travel
Agency under his own name.
"Complainants likewise positively identified
appellant Vicenta Vicky Lapis (Lapis for brevity)
in Court as the person introduced to them by
Mateo as his wife on April 29, 1998 at Maxs
Restaurant in Makati when Lapis required
26
complainants to pay P49,240.00 for their plane

tickets and travel taxes. Lapis is, in fact, only the
live-in partner of Mateo. Lapis told complainants
that she was helping to speed up the process[ing]
of their papers relative to the promised jobs
awaiting them in Japan. Complainants met again
Lapis, who was with Mateo on May 2, 1998 at the
Makati Restaurant, annex of Maxs Restaurant,
when Lapis assured them that Mateo could really
send them abroad and even wrote in a piece of
paper appellants address at Phase I, Lot 14, Blk
13 Mary Cris Subd., Imus, Cavite. On May 17,
1998, complainants once more met Lapis who
was with Mateo, de Leon and de Leons husband
in Baguio City at the house of Priscilla Marreos
daughter. Both appellants updated complainant
as to the status of their paper and reiterated their
promise that complainants would soon be leaving
for Japan, then collected from complainants
unreceipted amount of P20,000.00. Complainants
met again with Lapis, who was again with Mateo,
on May 19, 1998 at the Sampaguita Travel
Agency. Mateo extracted P45,000.00 from
complainants and deposited it under his name.
On that occasion, Perpetua wanted to ask from
the Sampaguita Travel Agencys employees
where to pay the P45,000.00 but failed to do so
because Lapis took her attention away from
asking while Mateo asked Melchor to hand over to
him said sum.
"Priscilla Marreo (Priscilla for brevity) is the
sister of Melchor who loaned complainants part of
the P158,000.00 which appellants extracted from
complainant[s]. Thus, she made herself present in
most of the meetings between complainants and
appellants together with the two other accused
where she witnessed the assurances and
promises made by appellants relative to
complainants immediate departure for Japan and
their corresponding demands of sums of money.
The testimony of Priscilla underscored the
testimony of complainants showing that Amamlaw, de Leon, Lapis and Mateo indeed
corroborated and confederated in the commission
of illegal recruitment.
"The
prosecution
presented
documentary
evidence, such as varied unofficial receipts all
bearing the signature of Mateo; Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Perpetua L. Degsi executed on July
21, 1998; Affidavit executed by complainants on
July 21, 1998; Requirement for Guarantee Letter
of Visa bearing the names of both private
complainants; Request for Certification of POEACIDG, Team to Mr. Hermogenes Mateo, Director II,
Licensing Branch of POEA as represented by
Johnson Bolivar, Senior Labor Researcher of
POEA, and the various documents that
complainants alleged to have been shown to
them by Mateo to prove the legality of his
recruitment operations."10 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
For their part, appellants deny that they were

engaged in recruitment activities, and that they
promised foreign employment to the victims.
Below is the version of the facts presented by the
defense:
"VICENTA MEDINA LAPIS testified that she is the
live-in partner of her co-accused Mateo. They
have been living together for almost three (3)
years. According to her, she first met both
complainants at Maxs Restaurant in Makati when
they talked to accused Mateo. She was there only
to accompany her live-in partner. The subject of
the conversation between the complainants and
accused Mateo was a contract in Baguio City. She
did not see complainant deliver money to
accused Mateo while they were in that meeting.
She also has no knowledge about the transaction
between complainant and accused Mateo. She
admitted that she went to Baguio City together
with accused Mateo to talk to the City Mayor. She
likewise admitted that the handwriting appearing
in Exhibit F is hers but the reason why she gave
it was only to comply to the request of the
complainant Perpetua Degsi regarding a matter
to be followed up at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The result of her follow-up
rendered was that complainant Perpetua Degsi
has a pending case of estafa.
"ANGEL MATEO averred that he is engaged in the
importation of heavy equipment and containers
but he has never been engaged in recruitment. To
prove that he was really engaged in the delivery
of heavy equipment, he presented a document of
Import Service signed by a certain Alexander
Arcilla addressed to Honorable Timoteo Encar Jr.,
City Mayor, Cavite City dated March 14, 1997 and
were marked as Exhibit 1 and 1-a. He also
presented another document of Import Services
issued by the Department of Trade and Industry
addressed to Honorable Mayor Maliksi as
Municipal Mayor of Imus, Cavite; a photocopy of a
Bill of Lading from Trade Bulk cargoes by Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc.; and Invoice of used vehicles,
airconditioners and washing machines and the
packing list which were all marked as Exhibits 3
to 5. Sometime in March 24, 1998, he met the
complainants at Pio del Pilar, in Makati City at the
apartment of accused Aida de Leon. He went
there to follow-up their transaction about heavy
equipment with Mayor Binay because, it was
accused de Leon who entered the transaction
with Mayor Binay. While he was there, the
complainants were introduced to him by accused
de Leon. He admitted meeting the complainants
on April 29, 1998 at Maxs Restaurant but the
reason was for him to meet Mrs. Marero in person
and also because complainant Perpetua Degsi
has a pending case for large scale estafa and she
needed a clearance. He denied having signed
Exhibit B. He further claimed that the topic of
their meeting was to supply heavy equipment in
Baguio City. He denied having asked for
P50,000.00 on May 6, 1999. He likewise denied
27
signing the receipt showing the total amount of

P158,600.00."11
The Issues
WON the accused are guilty of violating RA NO.
8042 of illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate.
HELD:
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment
Appellants aver that the finding of syndicated
illegal recruitment by the lower court was
erroneous; its conclusion that the offense was
committed by three (3) or more persons had no
factual or legal basis. Allegedly, without sufficient
evidence, the trial court wrongfully presumed
that all of them had acted in conspiracy.
According to them, the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had
conspired and confederated in illegally recruiting
complainants. Appellants conclude that, if at all,
they could only be held liable for illegal
recruitment in its simple form. We disagree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two
elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid
license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers, and (2) the offenders
undertake any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement15 defined in Article
13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in
Article 34 of the Labor Code.16
Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement
refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers[;] and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment
is committed by persons who, without authority
from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.17
We believe that the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of the offense sufficiently.
The case records reveal that appellants did in fact
engage in recruitment and placement activities
by promising complainants employment in Japan.
Undisputed is the fact that the former did not
have any valid authority or license to engage in
recruitment and placement activities. Moreover,
the pieces of testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution clearly
show that, in consideration of their promise of
foreign employment, they indeed received
various amounts of money from complainants
totalling P158,600.
Where appellants made misrepresentations
concerning their purported power and authority
to recruit for overseas employment, and in the

process, collected from complainants various
amounts in the guise of placement fees, the
former clearly committed acts constitutive of
illegal recruitment.18 In fact, this Court held that
illegal recruiters need not even expressly
represent themselves to the victims as persons
who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is
enough that these recruiters give the impression
that they have the ability to enlist workers for job
placement abroad in order to induce the latter to
tender payment of fees.19
It is also important to determine whether illegal
recruitment committed by appellants can be
qualified as a syndicated illegal recruitment or an
offense involving economic sabotage.
Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic
sabotage when it is committed by a syndicate or
carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and confederating with one another.
In several cases, illegal recruitment has been
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with each other in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under Article 38(b) of the
Labor Code.20
In this case, it cannot be denied that all four (4)
accused -- Jane Am-amlaw, Aida de Leon, Angel
Mateo and Vicenta Medina Lapis participated in
a network of deception. Verily, the active
involvement of each in the various phases of the
recruitment scam formed part of a series of
machinations. Their scheme was to lure
complainants to Manila and to divest them of
their hard-earned money on the pretext of
guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution
evidence
shows
that
complainants
were
convinced by Jane Am-amlaw to go to Manila to
meet someone who could find employment for
them abroad. Upon reaching the city, they were
introduced to Aida de Leon and Angel Mateo;
Mateo claimed to have the contacts, the
resources and the capacity to employ them
overseas. After that initial meeting, complainants
made several payments to him, supposedly for
the processing requirements of their deployment
to Japan. Later on, they met Vicenta Medina Lapis
who volunteered her assistance in the processing
of their employment papers and assured them
that Mateo could easily send them abroad.
A Vicenta Lapis told us that she is just helping to
speed up the processing of papers so that we
could be sent abroad immediately and she even
showed us some documents and I even told her
that I could help them in typing those
documents."21
28
The
foregoing
testimony
very
clearly
demonstrates that the individual actuations of all
four (4) accused were directed at a singular
criminal purpose -- to delude complainants into
believing that they would be employed abroad.
The nature and the extent of the formers
interactions among themselves as well as with
the latter clearly show unity of action towards a
common undertaking. Certainly, complainants
would not have gone to Manila to meet Aida de
Leon and Angel Mateo without the prodding of
Am-amlaw. They would not have made various
payments for their travel and employment papers
without the fraudulent representations of Mateo
De Leon. Moreover, they would not have
complied with further instructions and demands
of Mateo without the repeated assurances made
by Lapis.
Even assuming that the individual acts of the
accused were not necessarily indispensable to
the commission of the offense, conspiracy would
have still been present. Their actions, when
viewed in relation to one another, showed a unity
of purpose towards a common criminal enterprise
and a concurrence in their resolve to commit it.
In People v. Gamboa,22 the Court had occasion to
discuss the nature of conspiracy in the context of
illegal recruitment as follows:
"Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract
workers was evident from the acts of the
malefactors whose conduct before, during and
after the commission of the crime clearly
indicated that they were one in purpose and
united in execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as
it may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. As such, all the accused,
including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of
the crime of illegal recruitment since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all."23
(Emphasis supplied)
To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be actual proof that all the conspirators
took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that
they acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.24
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the
criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed.25
The OSG avers, as an incident to this issue, and
in line with People v. Yabut,26 that complainants
are entitled to recover interest on the amount of
P118,000, which the trial court awarded from the
time of the filing of the Information until fully
paid. We agree with the OSGs observation and

hereby grant the legal interest on the amount
prayed for.
In a number of cases,27 this Court has affirmed
the trial courts finding that victims of illegal
recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the
amount to be recovered as indemnity, from the
time of the filing of the information until fully
paid.
d. G.R. No. 138535-38
April 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
LUZ GONZALES-FLORES, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
An information for estafa against accusedappellant. The said accused, defraud FELIXBERTO
LEONGSON, JR. y CASTAEDA in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of
false
manifestations
and
fraudulent
representation which she made to said
complainant to the effect that they had the power
and capacity to recruitment employ complainant
abroad as [a] seaman and could facilitate the
processing of the requirements thereof, and by
means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing said complainant to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the
strength
of
said
manifestations
and
representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of 1245,000.00, which amount once
in possession, with intent to defraud FELIXBER TO
LEONGSON, JR. misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to their own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant
in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
Also for estafa, the information charged that the
said accused defraud RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y
HUSENIA in the following manner, to wit: the said
accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to
said complainant to the effect that they had the
power and capacity to recruit and employ
complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the :.. " necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other
29
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in

inducing said RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA
to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered
to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the
strength
of
said
manifestations
and
representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were
made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud complainant
wilfully,
unlawfully
and
feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to
their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said RONALD
F[RE]DERI[Z]O Y HUSENIA in the aforesaid
amount of P45,000.00, Philippine Currency.
activities being done without the required license

or authority from the Department of Labor.
Another case for estafa, the information averred

that the said accuseddefraud LARRY TIBOR Y
MABILANGAN in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused, by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which they made
to said complainant to the effect that they had
the power and capacity to recruit and employ
complainant abroad as [a] seaman and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other
similar deceits, induced and succeeded in
inducing said complainant to give and deliver, as
in fact gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P38,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused
well knowing that the same were false and
fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in
fact they did obtain the amount of P38,000.00
which amount once in possession, with intent to
defraud LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously mis-appropriated
misapplied and converted to their own personal
use and benefit) to the damage and prejudice of
said complainant in the amount of P38,000.00,
Phi1ippine Currency.
On November 14, 1994, complainants went to the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and discovered that accused-appellant
and her companions did not have any license or
authority to engage in any recruitment activity.
On the other hand, the information for illegal

recruitment in large scale charged that the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
several persons whose true names and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained
and helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously canvass, enlist,
contract and promise employment to the
following persons, to wit:
1. RONALD F[R]EDERI[Z]O Y HlJSENIA
2. LARRY TIBOR Y MABILANGAN
3. FELIXBERTO LEONGSON, JR. y CASTANEDA
after
requiring
them
to
submit
certain
documentary requirements and exacting from
them the total amount of P128,000,00 Philippine
Currency as recruitment fees such recruitment
That the crime described above is committed in

large scale as the same was perpetrated against
three (3) or more persons individually or as group
as penalized under Articles 38 and 39) as
amended by P.D. 2018, of the Labor Code.6
Realizing that they had been deceived,
complainants file their complaints for illegal
recruitment
and
estafa
against
accusedappellant, Baloran, Domingo, and Mendoza.
Felixberto executed his sworn statement on the
same day, while Ronald and Larry gave their
respective statements14 on November 12, 1994.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Accused-appellant was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale, the essential elements
of which are: (1) that the accused engages in acts
of recruitment and placement of workers defined
under Art. 13 (b) or in any of the prohibited
activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) that
the accused has not complied with the guidelines
issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and
deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3)
that the accused commits the unlawful acts
against three or more persons, individually or as
a group.22
In these cases, according to the certification of
the POEA, accused-appellant had no license or
authority to engage in any recruitment
activities.23 In fact, this was stipulated at the
trial.24 Accused-appellant claims, however, that
she herself was a victim of illegal recruitment and
that she simply told complainants about job
opportunities abroad.
The allegation is untenable. Art. 13 (b) of the
Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement"
as referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not. The same article further states that any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.25
30
The evidence for the prosecution shows that

accused-appellant sought out complainants and
promised them overseas employment. Despite
their initial reluctance because they lacked the
technical skills required of seamen, complainants
were led to believe by accused-appellant that she
could do something so that their applications
would be approved. Thus, because of accusedappellant's
misrepresentations,
complainants
gave her their moneys. Accused-appellant's
companions, Domingo, Baloran, and Mendoza,
made her ploy even more plausible.
Accused-appellant contends that all she did was
to refer complainants to Domingo, Baloran, and
Mendoza. However, under Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code, recruitment includes "referral," which
is defined as the act of passing along or
forwarding an applicant for employment after
initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement
officer, or bureau.26 In these cases, accusedappellant did more than just make referrals. She
actively and directly enlisted complainants for
supposed employment abroad, even promising
them jobs as seamen, and collected moneys from
them.
The failure of complainants to present receipts to
evidence payments made to accused-appellant is
not fatal to the prosecution case. The
presentation of the receipts of payments is not
necessary for the conviction of accusedappellant. As long as the prosecution is able to
establish through credible testimonies and
affidavits that the accused-appellant was
involved in the prohibited recruitment, a
conviction for the offense can very well be
justified.27 In these cases, complainants could
not present receipts for their payment because
accused-appellant assured them she would take
care of their money.
Accused-appellant claims that she herself had to
borrow
P15,00.00
from
Jenny
Tolentino,
guaranteed by Maria Luz Leongson, to defray her
own and her son's application expenses. The
claim has no merit. Maria Luz Leongson, who is
Felixberto's wife, testified that accused-appellant
sought her help to guarantee a loan to pay the
tuition fees of her daughter and the rent of the
apartment in which she and her family were
staying,31 and not to finance her and her son's
overseas job applications.
Accused-appellant likewise testified that she paid
in cash a total of P36,500.00 in three
installments, i.e., P10,000.00 to Mendoza at her
house, and P10,000.00 and P16,500.00 to
Baloran, at the Mandarin Hotel. This testimony
cannot be deemed worthy of belief. When crossexamined,
accused-appellant
could
not
remember the dates when she allegedly made
these payments. For someone who was jobless32
and looking for employment, it is very doubtful

that she would pay considerable sums of money
to strangers without even remembering at least
the month or the year when the same were
supposed to have been paid.
Accused-appellant further contends that if she
was indeed a conspirator in the illegal
recruitment transactions with complainants, she
would not have filed a complaint33 in the NBI
against Domingo and Baloran. The complaint
was, as already stated, dismissed and it is
apparent that accused-appellant filed the
complaint only to make it appear that she herself
had been the victim of swindling and illegal
recruitment. First, the complaint shows that it
was filed on November 7, 1994, even before she
was detained at the Baler Police Station 2 upon
the
sworn
statements
of
complainants.
Complainants were included as complainants in a
complaint filed by accused-appellant. Yet, the
complainants were never told, nor did they ever
knew, of the complaint until the trial of these
cases. Second, accused-appellant could have
easily told them at least of the complaint because
Felixberto Leongson, Jr., Ronald Frederizo and Elsa
Cas, a relative of complainant Larry Tibor, were
her immediate neighbors. Third, it is also
noteworthy that despite her claim that she paid
P10,000.00 to Mendoza, accused-appellant made
the latter a co-complainant in the complaint she
filed with the NBI.
More importantly, accused-appellant's defense is
uncorroborated. Not one of the persons she
included in her complaint to the NBI was ever
presented in her defense in these cases. Nor did
she present Domingo, Baloran, or Mendoza to
corroborate her statements. It is probable that
had she presented any of these persons, their
testimonies would have been adverse to accusedappellant.34
In sum, we are of the opinion that the trial court
correctly found accused-appellant guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale: The imposition on
accused-appellant of the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 is thus
justified.
Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of
estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal
Code committed
By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar
deceits.
31
RULING: YES.
Both elements of the crime were established in
these cases, namely, (a) accused-appellant
defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit and (b) complainant suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation as a result.37 Complainants parted
with their money upon the prodding and
enticement of accused-appellant on the false
pretense that she had the capacity to deploy
them for employment abroad. In the end,
complainants were neither able to leave for work
overseas nor did they get their money back, thus
causing them damage and prejudice. 38
The issues that misappropriation on the part of
accused-appellant of the money paid by
complainants and their demand for the same
were not sufficiently established are immaterial
and irrelevant, conversion and demand not being
elements of estafa under Art. 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
e. SY vs. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
That sometime in the month of March 1997,
in the City of Las Pias, ROSITA SY, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Felicidad Mendoza-Navarro in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by
means of false pretenses and fraudulent
representation which she made to the said
complainant that she can deploy her for
employment in Taiwan, and complainant
convinced by said representations, gave the
amount of P120,000.00 to the said accused
for processing of her papers, the latter well
knowing that all her representations and
manifestations were false and were only
made for the purpose of obtaining the said
amount, but once in her possession,she
misappropriated, misapplied and converted
the same to her own personal use and
benefit.
The RTC finds the accused Rosita Sy NOT
GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
and she is hereby ACQUITTED of the said
offense. As regards the charge of Estafa, the
court finds the accused GUILTY. The accused
is ordered to reimburse the amount of sixtythousand. Aggrieved, Sy filed an appeal for
her conviction of estafa.
ISSUE: WON Sy can be convicted or Estafa
upon her exoneration from the charge of
illegal recruitment.
Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be

filed simultaneously or separately. The filing
of charges for illegal recruitment does not
bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Sys
acquittal in the illegal recruitment case does
not
prove
that
she
is
not
guilty
of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are
entirely different offenses and neither one
necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other. A person who is
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC. In the same
manner, a person acquitted of illegal
recruitment may be held liable for estafa.
Double jeopardy will not set in because
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, in
which there is no necessity to prove criminal
intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the
prosecution of which, proof of criminal intent
is necessary.
The elements of estafa in general are the
following: (a) that an accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means
of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation is caused
the offended party or third person.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit
are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be
a false pretense or fraudulent representation
as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false
pretense or fraudulent representation was
made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was
induced to part with his money or property;
and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the foregoing
elements are present. It was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA, that Sy misrepresented
and falsely pretended that she had the
capacity to deploy Felicidad Navarro
(Felicidad) for employment in Taiwan. The
misrepresentation was made prior to
Felicidads payment to Sy of One Hundred
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). It was
Sys misrepresentation and false pretenses
that induced Felicidad to part with her
money. As a result of Sys false pretenses and
misrepresentations,
Felicidad
suffered
damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the money
she paid was never recovered.
32
The fact that Felicidad actively participated

in the processing of the illegal travel
documents will not exculpate Sy from
liability. Felicidad was a hapless victim of
circumstances and of fraud committed by Sy.
She was forced to take part in the processing
of the falsified travel documents because she
had already paid P120,000.00. Sy committed
deceit by representing that she could secure
Felicidad with employment in Taiwan, the
primary consideration that induced the latter
to part with her money. Felicidad was led to
believe by Sy that she possessed the power
and qualifications to provide Felicidad with
employment abroad, when, in fact, she was
not licensed or authorized to do so.
Deceived, Felicidad parted with her money
and delivered the same to petitioner. Plainly,
Sy is guilty of estafa.
C. EMPLOYMENT
ALIENS
OF
NON
RESIDENT
a. Chuan & Sons vs. CIR

FACTS:
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an

order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order
made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire"
about 12 laborers from time to time and on a
temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the
majority of the laborers to be employed should be
native." The petition was filed pending settlement
by the court of a labor dispute between the
petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Kahoy sa Pilipinas.
At the outset, the appellant takes exception to the
finding of the court below that Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc. is capitalized with foreign descent. This
question has little or no bearing on the case and may
well be passed over except incidentally as a point of
argument in relation to the material issues.
It is next said that "The Court of Industrial
Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection
of employees and workers so as to impose
unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The
restrictions of the number of aliens that nay be
employed in any business, occupation, trade or
profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws." Although the brief does not
name the persons who are supposed to be denied the
equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be
inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's
mind. certainly, the order does not, directly or
indirectly, immediately or remotely, discriminate
against the petitioner on account of race or
citizenship. The order could have been issued in a
case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a
matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75 % of its
shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a

statement which is here assumed to be correct.
ISSUE: WON Chuan & Sons Inc. is entitled to
challenge the constitutionality of a law or an order
which does not adversely affect it, in behalf of
aliens who are prejudiced thereby.
RULING: NO.
An alien may question the constitutionality of a
statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is
being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage.
The prospective employees whom the petitioner
may contemplate employing have not come forward
to seek redress; their identity has not even been
revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far
as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less
others who are unknown and undetermined.
U.S. vs. Wong Ku Ark and other American
decisions cited do not support the petitioner for the
very simple reasons that in those cases it was the
persons themselves whose rights and immunities
under the constitution were being violated that
invoked the protection of the courts.
The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of
interest when it complains that the appealed order
restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it
pleases. This complaint merits a more detailed
examination.
That the employer's right to hire labor is not
absolute has to be admitted. "This privilege of
hiring and firing ad libitum is, of course, being
subjected to restraints today." Statutes are cutting in
on it. And so does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The
regulations of the hours of labor of employees and
of the employment of women and children are
familiar examples of the limitation of the
employer's right in this regard. The petitioner's
request for permission to employ additional;
laborers is an implicit recognition of the correctness
of the proposition. The power of the legislature to
make regulations is subject only to the condition
that they should be affected with public interest and
reasonable under the circumstances. The power may
be exercised directly by the law-making body or
delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or
administrative agencies.
We are of the opinion that the order under
consideration meets the test of reasonableness and
public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act
No. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional
objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial
and agricultural disputes have given rise to
disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our
country."
33
"Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested

the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to
intervene in all disputes between employees or
strikes arising from the difference as regards wages,
compensation, and other labor conditions which it
may take cognizance of." Thus it has jurisdiction to
determine the number of men to be laid off during
off-seasons. By the same token, the court may
specify that a certain proportion of the additional
laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such
condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or
doing justice to the parties."
b. General Milling vs. Torres
FACTS:
The National Capital Region of the
Department of Labor and Employment issued
Alien in favor of Earl Timothy Cone, a United
States citizen, as sports consultant and
assistant coach for petitioner General Milling
Corporation ("GMC").
Following, the Board of Special Inquiry of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation
approved Cone's application for a change of
admission status from temporary visitor to
pre-arranged employee.
GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's
alien
employment
permit.
GMC
also
requested that it be allowed to employ Cone
as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional
Director, Luna Piezas, granted.
The Basketball Coaches Association of the
Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance
of said alien employment permit to the
respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23
April 1990, issued a decision ordering
cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment
permit on the ground that there was no
showing that there is no person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and
willing to perform the services required nor
that the hiring of petitioner Cone would
redound to the national interest.
ISSUE: WON the secretary validly revoked
the employment permit of Cones.
RULING: YES.
Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign
coach is an employer's prerogative has no
legal basis at all. Under Article 40 of the
Labor
Code,
an
employer
seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of
Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom
to employ is, of course, limited by the
statutory
requirement
of
an
alien
employment permit.
Petitioners will not find solace in the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. As
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, no
comparison can be made between petitioner
Cone and Mr. Norman Black as the latter is "a
long time resident of the country," and thus,
not subject to the provisions of Article 40 of
the Labor Code which apply only to "nonresident aliens."
In any case, the term "non-resident alien"
and its obverse "resident alien," here must
be given their technical connotation under
our law on immigration.
Neither can petitioners validly claim that
implementation of respondent Secretary's
decision would amount to an impairment of
the obligations of contracts. The provisions of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations requiring alien employment
permits were in existence long before
petitioners entered into their contract of
employment. It is firmly settled that
provisions of applicable laws, especially
provisions relating to matters affected with
public policy, are deemed written into
contracts.2
Private
parties
cannot
constitutionally contract away the otherwise
applicable provisions of law.
Petitioners' contention that respondent
Secretary of Labor should have deferred to
the findings of Commission on Immigration
and Deportation as to the necessity of
employing petitioner Cone, is, again, bereft
of legal basis. The Labor Code itself
specifically empowers respondent Secretary
to make a determination as to the availability
of the services of a "person in the Philippines
who is competent, able and willing at the
time of application to perform the services
for which an alien is desired."
In short, the Department of Labor is the
agency vested with jurisdiction to determine
the question of availability of local workers.
c. Almodiel vs. NLRC
FACTS:
Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant
who was hired in as Cost Accounting Manager of
respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a
reputable placement firm, John Clements
Consultants, Inc.
Before said employment, he was the accounts
executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for
34
several years. He left his lucrative job therein in

view of the promising career offered by Raytheon.
He started as a probationary or temporary
employee. As Cost Accounting Manager, his major
duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year
and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out
hard copies of Standard Product costing and other
cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3)
set up the written Cost Accounting System for the
whole company. After a few months, he was given a
regularization increase of P1,600.00 a month. Not
long thereafter, his salary was increased to
P21,600.00 a month.
In the meantime, the standard cost accounting
system was installed and used at the Raytheon
plants and subsidiaries worldwide. Almodiel was
summoned by his immediate boss, he was told of
the abolition of his position on the ground of
redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer
its action or transfer him to another department, but
he was told that the decision of management was
final and that the same has been conveyed to the
Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he
was constrained to file the complaint for illegal
dismissal against the company.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Almodiel. He
was reinstated and to be awarded damages. Upon
appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters
order. He claimed that the functions of his position
were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance
Department under the management of Danny Ang
Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working
permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by law. Petitioner relies on
the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect
that corollary functions appertaining to cost
accounting were dispersed to other units in the
Finance Department. And granting that his
department has to be declared redundant, he claims
that he should have been the Manager of the
Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled
general accounting, payroll and encoding. As a B. S.
Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21
years of work experience, and a natural born
Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than
Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial Engineer, hired
merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its
equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager
only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident
alien.
person in the Philippines who is competent, able

and willing at the time of application to perform the
services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang
Tan Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within
the ambit of the provision.
Petitioner also assails Raytheon's choice of Ang Tan
Chai to head the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department,
claiming that he is better qualified for the position.
It should be noted, however, that Ang Tan Chai was
promoted to the position during the middle part of
1988 or before the abolition of petitioner's position
in early 1989. Besides the fact that Ang Tan Chai's
promotion thereto is a settled matter, it has been
consistently held that an objection founded on the
ground that one has better credentials over the
appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter
possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not
allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the
position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion
and judgment for that which is clearly and
exclusively management prerogative.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the National Labor Relations
Commission in reversing and annulling the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the
contrary, the termination of petitioner's
employment was anchored on a valid and
authorized cause under Article 283 of the
Labor Code, the instant petition for
certiorari must fail.
ISSUE: WON Almodiel was illegally dismissed.

RULING: NO.
Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires
employment permit refers to non-resident aliens.
The employment permit is required for entry into
the country for employment purposes and is issued
after determination of the non-availability of a
35

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PART THREE: PRE-EMPLOYMENT

A. RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT OF

a. ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,

and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing

seven (7) years as maximum with perpetual

Code. 13 If another element is present that the

of a selected applicant for employment to a selected

While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the

b. G.R. No. 141221-36

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants

that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco

other applicants, Charito was not able to leave the

another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned

of estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision

5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being

confederating with one another in carrying out any

the departure of private complainants and to provide

the Department of Labor and Employment

Dolor relying on these misrepresentations,

Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas

scale recruitment and placement activities

315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is

3. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF SEC 14

to him prior to his dismissal. These requisites

b. ASIAN CENTER VERSUS NLRC

It is thus clear, that RA 8042 which took

employment of Filipino Workers overseas. It

shown that the risk of contracting the

proves the fact that the deaths of the two

medical treatment for which apparently he

arising out of or by virtue of any law or

Subsequently on 3 May 1968, FMC, et al.

business in the Philippines; (2) appointing a

2. FMC may be considered as "doing

Yes. Respondents should not be blamed for

b. Chavez v. Banto Perez ESALYN

under Memorandum Circular No. 2,

She returned to the Philippines on June 14,

The secretary of Labor shall have the

To compel the POEA and private respondents

promised deployment, complainants paid J&B

Clarita Cruz worked in Kuwait for 2 yrs. After

7. PROHIBITED PRACTICES, LIABILITY

W/N the respondent

8. SUSPENSION/ CANCELLATION OF LICENSE

vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR

revoke the license of a private fee-charging

The penalties of suspension and cancellation

Case Digest (Ada Mae D. Abellera)

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor and

Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a

Another factor which makes the search warrants

A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

10.Illegal Recruitment - overseas

thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino,

a. G.R. No. 121777

January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

The trial court rendered a decision convicting the

Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal

The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense

b. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

Appellant on the other hand denied the charges