The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean

Author(s): Colin G. Clarke

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Nov., 1977), pp. 337-345
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156132 .
Accessed: 13/03/2012 10:59
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of
Latin American Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

i. Lat. Amer. Stud. 9, 2, 337-345 Printed in Great Britain

337

Review Article
THE

QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

THE CARIBBEAN

IN

Territorial fragmentation and small size destined the Caribbean archipelago

to a long history of colonialism and metropolitan rivalry. The partitioning
of the region between the Spanish, French, British, Dutch and Danish during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and United States intervention in the Greater Antilles since the nineteenth, culminating in the annexation of Puerto Rico in I898, have ensured that each territory's connexions political, economic, and intellectual - have been forged almost exclusively
with the major countries of Western Europe or North America.
Seventeenth-century colonialism dictated the mode of Caribbean production - the cultivation of sugar and lesser primary products on plantations
manned by unfree labour. Moreover, European imperialism created a Creole
system of colour stratification in which whites dominated brown freemen
and black slaves. After slave emancipation in the British West Indies in
i834-38, indentured workers were imported from Madeira, China, and
especially India. The system of East Indian contract immigration continued
until 19I7 and was crucial to the development of plantation economies in
the most recently acquired British Colonies, Trinidad and Guyana.
External influences and internal developments are inextricably interwoven
in Caribbean affairs. The islands have always been affected by the climate
of ideas developed in metropolitan countries, and the French Revolution,
the United States' sense of 'manifest destiny', and Cold War geopolitics
have all at one time or another impinged on the decolonization process.
Nevertheless, pressure for self-government within the Caribbean units has
been intense. The quest for political freedom has frequently led to social
conflict, and in several instances racial hostility, even genocide, has occurred.
Interplay between metropolis and colony, between ideals of liberty and
equality and the realities of Caribbean social inequality unite all the books
reviewed in this article. Nowhere have these themes been more clearly
expressed than in the earliest successful attempt to secure autonomy in the
Caribbean - the Haitian Revolution of I789-I804.
L.A.S.-IO

338 Journal of Latin American Studies

Revolutionary Independence
Social and racial strife was the salient feature of the labyrinthine course
of the independence movement in Saint Dominique. By the late eighteenth
century the social hierarchy was composed of 24,000 whites, an almost equal
number of free coloureds, and a slave population of 408,000. Tensions existed
between bureaucrat and grand blanc, grand and petit blanc, white and
mulatto, mulatto and black, black and white. Beginning with the French
Revolution in 1789, each played a vital role on the Haitian stage. Between
1789 and I79I the grands and petits blancs created an explosive situation
with their intra-caste struggle; from I790 to 1799 the mulattoes sought
elevation to white status, yet ignored slave pressure for freedom and
citizenship.
Ott's 1 scholarly account of the Haitian revolutionary wars shows that the
blacks were ultimately the chief beneficiaries of the warfare. To further
their own ends whites and mulattoes triggered, but failed to control, slave
rebellion and thus set the blacks on a course for freedom and independence
which otherwise, he argues, might have been beyond their awareness and
ability to achieve. Haitian scholars will reject this interpretation, preferring
to stress the active role of the slaves. Yet they will probably agree that
important though the French Revolution, key personalities, and foreign
intervention were to the detailed course of events, these factors should be
considered subsidiary to the process of social and racial conflict which culminated in the expulsion and massacre of the whites by Dessalines. In a
wide-ranging conclusion, Ott extends his discussion into the post-revolutionary period. He emphasizes the influence of the protracted period of
armed conflict on the subsequent pattern of militarism and dictatorship;
and he traces black-mulatto rivalry through to the Duvalier regime.
A larger time-scale than Ott's provides the framework for Jonathan
Brown's account of Santo Domingo, first published in two volumes in
I837.2 It eschews Ott's sympathetic treatment of the black revolutionaries
and lacks his voluminous documentation. However, Brown's concluding
chapter, despite the tincture of color prejudice so common among whites
in his day, offers an interesting eye-witness account of Haitian life in the
I830s: he documents administrative malpractice and judicial ineptitude,
ecclesiastical anarchy, the decay of the plantations, and hostility between
mulattoes and blacks.
1 Thomas, O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution 1789-i8o4

(Knoxville, University of Tennessee

Press, I973). Pp. x + 232. $8.50.

2

Jonathan Brown, The History and Present Condition of St Domingo (London, Frank Cass,
1972; first published Philadelphia, William Marshall and Co., I837). I, Pp. iv + 307; IT,.
Pp. 289. $34.50.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 339

For nineteenth-century whites, Haiti, the Black Republic, and the second
oldest autonomous state in the Americas, was a symbol of the dangers
inherent in slave emancipation and coloured self-government. 'The fact is
indisputable', Brown asserted, 'that as a nation the blacks of St Domingo
are in a retrograde movement as regards intellectual improvement, and no
obstacle seems to exist to prevent this descent to barbarism'. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that Britain imposed a century-long hiatus between
emancipation and the granting of universal adult suffrage in its Caribbean
colonies, and almost two more decades of constitutional decolonization were
to pass before independence was finally achieved by the larger territories in
the i96os.
Constitutional Decolonization

It was never British policy to spawn a myriad of island states in the

Caribbean. In British eyes a federation of all the Commonwealth units was
the ideal vehicle for decolonization and for the creation of a viable, democratic and sovereign state. After more than a decade of negotiations, a West
Indies Federation was inaugurated in 1958. The union included the 'big
three' islands - Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados - together with the
Windwards and Leewards. But such were the tensions between the constituent units that a Jamaican plebiscite in 1961 narrowly removed the island
from the federation. Almost immediately afterwards Trinidad seceded
from the rump federation, and both colonies became independent in 1962.
Trinidad and Tobago's involvement in the federal venture is briefly traced
by A. N. R. Robinson,4 formerly a leading figure in the ruling Peoples'
National party, and an erstwhile Minister of Finance. However, the greater
part of his book is devoted to reforms of tariff, banking, insurance, tax and
budgeting procedures since Trinidad became independent. Little significance
can be attached to this disappointing, disjointed, modern history of Trinidad
and Tobago, which completely fails to reflect the author's deep involvement
in national politics.
Robinson's book symbolizes the West Indian politician's preoccupation
with legislation as distinct from other aspects of innovation. The quest for
constitutional panaceas persists, however, and Robinson ends with a plea
for Caribbean collaboration. 'A decade ago we witnessed the futility of
half-hearted union. Now we are experiencing the futility of separateness,
3 Ibid., II, 288-9.

4 A. N. R. Robinson, Patterns of Political and Economic Transformation in Trinidad and

Tobago (Cambridge, Mass., MassachusettsInstitute of Technology Press, 197I). Pp. xiii +

200. $8.95.

340 Journal of Latin American Studies

however purposeful. To seize and maintain the better future that can be
ours, we must impel ourselves towards purposeful union. We must build up
the nation of the Caribbeanin our own likeness.' 5
But Caribbeanidentity is riven by race as well as by insularity. Robinson,
with Creole sleight of hand, disregards the East Indian segment in Trinidad's society. However, black-East Indian relations are the focus of two
of the three books which deal with Guyana, Trinidad's sociological 'twin'
on the mainland of South America.
Vere Daly has written a slight, but clearlypresented, textbook that
chronicles the development of Guyana within the context of European
exploration and colonization.6 He describes the establishment of European
hegemony in Guyana, the creation of sugar plantations and the system of
black slavery, the dyking of the coastlands, British annexation in 1814, the
free village movement among the emancipated slaves, and the settling of
indentured East Indians. Yet the involvement of race in national elections
is glossed over, and political issues are confined to boundary disputes, independence in 1966, and the creation of a Co-operative Republic in I970.
Significantly, Daly has nothing to say about the West Indies Federation or
Guyana's refusal to join this British-inspiredinstitution unless independence
was instantly granted
Guyana's road to independence was infinitely more tortuous than that of
the larger British islands which were originally part of the Federation. iBasil
Ince has charted Guyana's protracted struggle to escape the colonial fold by
looking at the territory's social, political and economic evolution, and by
setting its constitutional changes against the debate which was taking place
contemporaneously in the Special Committee on Colonialism at the United
Nations.7
Ince locates the origins of the idea of self-determination in the American
and French Revolutions, the Peace Treaties of I9I9, the Atlantic Charter
of I94I, and the Cairo Declaration of I943. However, he attributes the
practice, as distinct from the theory, of decolonization to the Cold War:
the two major post-war powers, the United States and the USSR have been
concerned with bloc-building and adding to their list of iclient states and
satellites. 'Since suppressing colonial peoples' struggles for independence
was not conducive to bloc-building, the obvious move was to support, willingly or unwillingly, the subjugated peoples' struggle for freedom'.8
t, Ibid., p. I68.

Vere T. Daly, The Making of Guyana (London, Macmillan, 1974). Pp. vi + I28. /I-20.
7 Basil A. Ince, Decolonization and Conflict in the United Nations: Guyana's Struggle for
Independence (Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman Publishing Company, 1974). Pp. xiv + 202.

$6.70.

8 Ibid., p. 2.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 341

Why then, was there so much opposition to Guyana's bid for independence in the I95os and early Ig6os? Ince plausibly argues that it was due to
the Marxist ideology of the ruling Peoples' Progressive Party (the PPP).
This party, led by Cheddi Jagan, came to power in i953, winning eighteen
out of the twenty-four seats in the first Guyanese general election based on
universal adult suffrage. After less than five months, the constitution was
suspended. The British Government asserted that 'from actions and public
statements of these extremists it is clear that their objective was to turn
Guyana into a state subordinate to Moscow and a dangerous platform for
extending communist influence in the Western Hemisphere'.9 Communist
Guyana in the I95os might prove as infectious to South America as Haiti's
independence a century and a half earlier!
British policy was initially to halt and later to proceed very gradually with
Guyana's constitutional advance to self-government and independence until
a more acceptable leadership emerged. After the Cuban Revolution in 1959
and the election of President Kennedy, strong United States support was
given to British strategy. Through the CIA and the AFL-CIO the United
States funded a strike in 1963 aimed at destabilizing the self-governing
Jagan administration. A beleaguered Jagan joined opposition leaders in
inviting the British colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, to impose a constitutional settlement as a prelude to independence. Proportional representation was introduced - the only instance of its application in the Commonwealth Caribbean- and Jagan was swept out of office at the general election
in 1964. Support for Jagan at the United Nations from the Soviet bloc and
from Afro-Asian countries failed to counter British and United States'
machinations - a point which Ince takes three chapters to explore.
However, Ince correctly concludes that Guyana's plight in the early I96os
was not due entirely to Jagan's ideological position or to Cold War tactics.
Guyana's economic dependence - 80 per cent of its exports were provided by
bauxite and sugar, both of which were exclusively owned by North American and British companies - complicated the issue. More important still was
the cultural plurality of the society and the sharp distinction between
Africans and East Indians. This cleavage was prised apart by British and
United States' policy to produce, temporarily at least, an ideologically more
acceptable Guyanese government into whose hands independence could be
placed.
The schism in Guyanese,society and the fluctuating relationship between
race and electoral politics are the subject of J. E. Greene's careful and
9 Ibid., p. 39.

342 Journal of Latin American Studies

interesting study.10 Greene's research is based upon data collected from

almost I,ooo respondents, though his sample material is not controlled by
standard tests of significance. However, it is compared with electoral results,
which provide a framework and historical basis for the book.
Greene shows that the Guyanese working-class party, the PPP, which
came to power in the landslide victory of I953, was a coalition based upon
the East Indian majority of the population and the large African minority.
After the suspension of the constitution, Jagan, the East Indian leader, and
Burnham, the most prominent African, split: ideology, racial difference and
opportunism all played a part. Jagan continued to lead the PPP, while
Burnham formed the Peoples' National Congress (PNC), taking with him
some members of the original multi-racialparty. iBoth leaders extended their
support by enlisting their own racial and cultural segments, and in 1961
D'Aguiar, a Portuguese, rounded off the pattern of alignments by creating
the United Force, with an appeal to whites, coloureds, Chinese and Amerindians.
Greene characterizes the change in mass political support between I953
and 1968 as a shift from class-basedparties to those reflecting racial distinctions. After the i955 split, the PPP was founded upon the rural, East Indiandominated Guyana Agricultural Workers Union, the Hindu Sanathan
Maha Sabha and the Islamic Anjuman E Islam. Burnham, whose original
support was both urban and trade-union based, developed firm links with
Creole organizations, such as the Guyana Teachers' Association and the
League of Coloured Peoples. By 1961 Burnham had achieved a pact
with Sidney King's Association for Social and Cultural Relations with Independent Africa (ASCRIA) and the Guyana Civil Service Association; three
years later he was joined by the Manpower Citizens Association and Muslim
defectors from the predominantly Hindu PPP.
The capacity of Burnham to orchestrateelectoral support was crucial after
the protracted period of racial violence in 1963 had ushered in proportional
representation. Although Jagan secured the largest block of votes in 1964,
Burnham entered a coalition with D'Aguiar and forced the PP,P into
opposition. Moreover, Greene demonstrates that between 1964 and 1968,
after which Burnham was able to secure a majority of seats without UF
help, the PNC gained strength at the expense of the PPP and UF. The
racial minorities, the Muslims, and some Hindus, too, defected to the PNC.
This re-alignment is attributed to the strength of PNC party organization
and to Burnham's rapid realization that under proportional representation
10 J. E. Greene, Race v. Politics in Guyana (Jamaica,Institute of Social and Economic Research,
I974). Pp. xvii + 198. J$3.5o.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 343

there were no dispensable constituencies; every vote counted. In addition,

Greene indicates that the PNC secured its position by two gerrymandering techniques - proxy voting and the bogus registration of Guyanese
citizens overseas.
Greene's study is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Caribbean electoral politics and the role of race in political behaviour. He shows
that once social forces are unleashed, 'individuals... may find themselves
responding rather than innovating' 1: such was the situation in Guyana
during the racial violence in i963-4, as it had been, too, in the War of the
Knives between black and brown in Haiti in i800.
Sovereignty withheld
Notwithstanding Guyanese experience, Britain has been as anxious to
decolonize since the Second World War as its Caribbean dependencies have
been to secure autonomy: no strident expressions of national sentiment have
been required to launch independence. In contrast, the French and Dutch
West Indies have been decolonized by incorporation. Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana have become separate departements of France
and send representatives to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. Holland
combined with its Caribbean possessions to form the Tripartite Kingdom
of the Netherlands, from which Surinam seceded as recently as I975.
Puerto Rico's status is midway between incorporation and independence.
A colony of Spain for four hundred years, it was annexed to the United
States at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Unlike Cuba,
Puerto Rico had not sued for independence from Spain, though there was
a strong autonomist movement in the island in the decades following the
Grito de Lares in I868. In 1897 the Spanish Liberals granted Puerto Rico
internal self-government, but a year later the island became a permanent
possession of the United States, and remained an unincorporated territory
until 1952.

Both Golding 2 and Crampsey 3 have written 'popular' books which

treat the entire span of Puerto Rican history. Unfortunately, Golding's
account of the Spanish colonial period is journalistic, and it is only when he
discusses the United States' intervention that he writes with control and
conviction - though with obvious partisanship. Crampsey's work is far
11 Ibid., p. 140.
12 Morton
J. Golding, A Short History of Puerto Rico (New York Mentor, 1973). Pp. x +

I74.

$I.25.
13

Robert A. Crampsey, Puerto Rico (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, I973). Pp. 206.
?3-75'

344 Journalof Latin AmericanStudies

better. He ranges more widely, and deals fluently, if briefly, with historical,
social, economic and political issues.
Both authors emphasize the significance of the role played by Mufioz
Rivera in the passing of the Jones Act in 1917, which conferred adult male
suffrage and United States citizenship on Puerto Ricans; both are equally
fulsome in their praise of Muiioz Rivera's son, Mufioz Marin, who founded
the Partido Popular Democrdtico in 1938, became the first elected Puerto
Rican governor in I948, and was the architect of the island's current status as
an Estado Libre Asociado, or Commonwealth, of the United States.
As a result of Puerto Rico's close links with Washington, the island's
economy is deeply penetrated by United States' business interests; Puerto
Ricans have placed economic viability above political sovereignty. A referendum held in 1967 showed that 60 per cent preferred the continuance of
internal self-government without independence; 39 per cent opted for full
integration with the United States; and less than i per cent of those who
voted chose independence. Thus, although the Progressive Party, which is
pro-statehood, held the governorship between I968 and 1972, Puerto Rico's
status has remained unchanged.
A less 'orthodox' version of Puerto Rican experience is presented by
Silen in his book emphatically subtitled 'a story of oppression and resistance'.Ti He is unashamedly polemical, contending that ' confrontation
between official ideology and that of the revolutionary movement will bring
the necessary synthesis between national and class consciousness '.5 Silen's
'enraged generation' demand independence and a break with all forms of
United States imperialism. They stereotype Mufioz Rivera and Mufioz
Marin as apologists for the Puerto Rican ruling class and advocates of the
United States protectorate; they reject the island's economic dependency,
and criticize the high rate of unemployment. The independistas are young,
strongly associated with the University of Puerto Rico, and influenced by
Castro, Marx, and the revolutionary Negro patriot, Pedro Albizu Campos.
Unlike Haiti and Guyana, however, race is of lesser importance in social
differentiation - and therefore in protest movements - in Puerto Rico,
though, distinctions between Spanish and American life-styles are increasingly significant.
Issues of race and identity are highlighted rather than blurred by Puerto
Rican emigration to the United States mainland, where more than a million
islanders and their descendants have settled, especially since the Second
14

Juan Angel Silen, We, the Puerto Rican People: a Story of Oppressionand Resistance (New

York and London, Monthly Review Press, 197I). Pp. 134.

15 Ibid., p. 114.

.2'25.

The Quest for Independence in the Caribbean 345

World War. Paulette Cooper's interesting vignettes depict Puerto RicanAmerican youth as victims of white prejudice and police harassment.'1
Within their own group they are handicapped by overcrowding and broken
homes. Only a few succeed by white standards and their own; a few are
'saved' by conversion to Protestant sects; but the majority drop out of
school and are soon enmeshed in drugs and crime. The Puerto Rican in the
United States is just as trapped as the islander. Indeed, Jose Torres avers
that American children of Puerto Rican parentage ' who have never been
to Puerto Rico, would even kill for the freedom' of the island.l7
These books clearly demonstrate the constraints on sovereignty experienced by Caribbean societies, and illuminate the persistence of dependency
and social inequality as crucial dimensions of life for islanders and Guyanese.
Moreover, they provide a context for the anger of young West Indian
radicals. But can the radicals transform rhetoric into action?
COLIN G. CLARKE

16 Paulette
Cooper
$1.25.
17

Ibid., p. viii.

(ed.), Growing Up Puerto Rican (New York, Mentor,

I972).

Pp. xii +

31..

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States

Author(s): Gordon Connell-Smith
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (May, 1976), pp. 137-150
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156208 .
Accessed: 13/03/2012 10:59
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of
Latin American Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 8, I, I37-150

Printed in Great Britain

I37

Review Article
LATIN

AMERICA
IN THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED
STATES

In the rhetoric of United States foreign relations, the countries of Latin

America occupy a very special place. They are 'our sister republics', 'the
Good Neighbours', fellow members of a unique international system, and
so on. The reality, not surprisingly, is different. Because of the vast disparity
of power between the United States and Latin America, relations between
them are inherently delicate and subject to strains. The issue of' intervention '
by the United Statesin the internal and external affairs of the Latin American
countries is ever present, whether it is a matter of marines being sent into a
small Caribbean republic or of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
'destabilizing' a major South American government. Pan American Day
speeches about' the inter-Americanfamily ' sound hollow when, for example,
the United States refuses to grant Latin American countries preferential trade
terms. Latin Americans know that theirs is, in reality, a low priority area for
Washington except on those rare occasions in the twentieth century when
United States hegemony in the western hemisphere has been seriously
challenged.
Yet Latin America is the subject of perhaps the most famous of all United
States foreign policies: the Monroe Doctrine. In essence this asserts that the
security of the United States would be threatened by extra-continentalintervention in Latin America. It has led the United States to pursue a policy of
excluding as far as possible from Latin America non-American influence
which might endanger her security. This has inevitably involved establishing
her own hegemony over the region. Significantly, the Monroe Doctrine is
closely linked with another fundamental' doctrine' of United S;tatesforeign
relations: isolationism. For the latter involved keeping the United States out
of the European balance of power system, and the Monroe Doctrine applied
this policy to the whole hemisphere. President Monroe assertedthat' America'
had a system separate from that of Europe. In I890 the 'inter-American
system' was established which, since I948, has had as its centrepiece the
Organization of American States(OAS).
The Monroe Doctrine, then, has been concerned fundamentally with the

138 Journal of Latin American Studies

security of the United States. This was underlined when, in ratifying the
Kellogg-Briand Pact (Treaty of Paris) of 1928, the United States Senate declared: 'The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its
national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the
treaty must necessarilybe included Itheright to maintain the Monroe Doctrine,
which is a part of our system of national defense.' The Monroe Doctrine was
likewise felt to be at stake in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, although the
Kennedy administration deemed it wiser to justify its response by reference
to the collective security pact signed with the countries of Latin America at
Rio de Janeiroin I947. T'he United States has been particularlysensitive over
her security in the Caribbeanregion and approachesto the Panama Canal. It
is in this area that the great majority of her armed interventions have taken
place. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt enunciated what became known
as the 'Roosevelt Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine. This affirmed the duty
of the United States to intervene in cases of 'chronic wrongdoing ' or 'impotence' on the part of Latin American governments which might otherwise
justify intervention by non-American powers. The Roosevelt Corollary thus
provided a rationale for the United States policy of intervention: to forestall
intervention by extra-continental powers. Although in principle applying to
Latin America as a whole, the Corollary was in practice limited to the sensitive Caribbeanregion. But it caused the Monroe Doctrine to be associatedin
the minds of Latin Americans not with extra-continentalintervention, but
with intervention by the United States herself.
A useful overview of Latin America's relations with the United States is
furnished for undergraduate courses in political science and history by
Federico Gil.1 In his judgement:
Perhapsthe most prominentfeaturein the historyof inter-Americanrelationshas
been its cyclicalnature.Periodsof risinginterestin and concernwith LatinAmerica
on the part of the United Stateshave invariablybeen followed by periodsof declining interest,increasingconflict,and almosttotal disregardfor the fate of these
nations.
And, he notes:
The cyclesof amityand attentiontowardLatinAmericahaveconsistentlycoincided
with particularcrises: the world conflictin I914-19I9, the great economicdepression, the emergenceof Europeanfascismand Nazism, the SecondWorld War, and
the new threatof Communismand the CubanRevolution.2
Two of the high-water marks for Latin America in the foreign relations of
1 Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., I97I). Pp. x + 339. Paperback, ?Ig9o.
2
Ibid., p. 284.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 139

the United States were the Good Neighbour policy associated with President
Franklin Roosevelt, and the launching by President Kennedy of the Alliance
for Progress. Gil is expressing a widely held view when he asserts that 'The
unprecedented example of continental unity that marked the conduct of the
American republics during the... [Second World War] more than vindicated the prescience of the builders of the Good Neighbor Policy '; while
'The advent of John F. Kennedy's administrationand the subsequent formation of the Alliance for Progress constituted a major turning point in the history of United States-LatinAmerican relations '.4 But President Kennedy died
less than three years after the Alliance had been launched, and Gil declares
that' The indifference of the Johnson and Nixon administrationstoward Latin
America' contributed to a feeling among Latin Americans that the United
States had again lost interest in the region.5
Inevitably, Latin America became a lower priority area for the United
States as the latter expanded her foreign relations. For Professor Joseph Tulchin,6 'This was part of the impact of World War I: to make Latin American
policy subordinateitothe expanded needs of American security and consistent
with American policy in other areas of the world '. At the same time, 'The
Great War in Europe presented the United States with a golden opportunity
to establish its hegemony in Latin America'.8 Hitherto, although she had a
firm grip upon 'the Caribbean danger zone ', European (especially British)
interests were still strongly entrenched in South America. During the war the
United States was able to pursue a more aggressive economic policy at the
expense of her European rivals. The war transformed her from a debtor
nation into the world's greatest creditor,and her businessmen and bankers saw
Latin America as a natural field for further expansion of their interests. The
United States government encouraged on traditional strategic grounds activities which diminished European influence in Latin America, even apart from
the particulareconomic and financial interests pressing for its support.
'At the end of World War I', in Tulchin's words, 'it became a part of
official policy to encourage foreign trade and investment by United States
citizens.' 9 Tulchin presents three case studies showing how the United States
government 'energetically sought to expand communications facilities under
American control, to win control over foreign petroleum reserves, and to
replace European bankers with United States bankers as arbitersof the Latin
3 Ibid., p. I84.
5 Ibid., p. 281.
6

4 Ibid., p. 227.

Joseph S. Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin

America (New York, New York University Press, I97I).

7 Ibid.,
p. I54.
8 Ibid., p.
3.

Pp. xii + 287. $Io.oo.

9 Ibid., p. 241.

140 Journalof Latin AmericanStudies

American money market '.0 Weakened by the war, Europe was in no position
effectively to resist the challenge. United States objectives had been achieved
by 1925 and, in Tulchin's judgement, 'the Department of State could afford
to assume a less aggressive position with regard to United States private
interests abroad and to insist on no greater advantage for Americans than
equal opportunity '." In his introduction, Professor Tulchin underlines the
strength of the United States position in the years covered by his valuable
study (from the First World War to I925):
One striking featureof Latin Americanpolicy during this period warrantsmention.... With very few exceptions,the United Statesgovernmentformulatedand
executedforeignpolicy without referenceto the demandsor responsesof the Latin
Americannations. Though the latter tried to use the League of Nations and the
Pan Americanmovementto undermineUnited Statesparamountcyin the hemisphere,the United Stateshad no troubleneutralizingthe effect of multilateralorganizationsin the hemisphereand seemedto ignore the reactionsof othernations
in makingdecisions.12
But if the United States paid scant regard to Latin American susceptibilities,
her policy towards Latin America was not, Tulchin affirms, motivated by
economic considerations; nor did business control the State Department,
despite ' countless allegations ' to the contrary.'3
Another United States scholar who has been anxious to rebut such allegations is Dana Munro, now ProfessorEmeritus of History at Princeton University. His latest book 14 possesses particular interest since, during the years it
covers (I921-33), the author was intimately involved in some of the situations
he describesand analyses. Munro was in turn regional economist for Mexico
and Central America in the Department of State, a member of its Latin
American Division, Secretaryof Legation in Panama, Secretaryin Nicaragua,
Chief of the Latin American Division and, from I930 to I932, United States
Minister in Haiti. This experience gives his book a dimension lacking in
purely academic studies. Incidentally, Munro's name occurs a fair number of
times in Tulchin's study; on occasion, he is shown supporting by his actions
the thesis he expounds in his own work, viz. that the interests of the Caribbean
republics were not sacrificed to those of United States bankers. The United
States and the Caribbean Republics, 192I-1933, like its predecessor, is an
important book for students of inter-American relations. But Munro's protestations are in a sense somewhat academic: the motivation of United States
i'o Ibid.

11 Ibid., pp. 24I-2.

Ibid., p. vi.
13 Ibid.,
p. 93.
14 Dana G. Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933 (Princeton,
N.J., and London, Princeton University Press, I974). Pp. x + 394. $I7.50. /8-40.

12

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 14i

foreign policy has always (necessarily) been complex.l5 National security, the
main consideration, includes safeguarding economic interests - especially, as
Tulchin shows, when the control of strategic materials is involved. Moreover,
Munro reflectsthe views of the Department of State, and he and his colleagues
were by no means the sole architectsof United States policy in the Caribbean.
Interestingly, although Munro has rebutted charges of United States imperialism, his picture of the State Department acting as trustee of the interests
of the inexperienced Caribbeangovernments is reminiscent of a colonial office
approach.
One interesting incident illustrates the significance of an insider's contribution to the understanding of political matters. The publication of the Clark
Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, popularly believed to constitute a
repudiation of 'theRoosevelt Corollary, traditionally has marked a not unimportant step in the development of the Good Neighbour policy. Munro dismisses this. 'The fact was ', he says,' that the American government had not
taken any new official position about the Monroe Doctrine or about the
Roosevelt corollary.' 16 He believes that after it had been produced in 1928 the
Clark Memorandum was forgotten: ' I do not rememberthat I was told about
it when I took charge of the Latin American division in the spring of...
[1929].'

17 The gradual transition from intervention in the Caribbean region

to the Good Neighbour policy, involving United States acceptance of the

principle of non-intervention in her relations with Latin America, is the main
theme of the book.
In the year I933, when Munro's study closes, a new factor would enter
United States relations with Latin America: for this was the year of Hitler's
advent to power in Germany. The Good Neighbour policy was in part a
response to the deteriorating world situation in the subsequent years, and its
most notable successis judged to have been the degree of co-operationachieved
between the countries of Latin America and the United States during the
Second World War (which admirers of the policy have been inclined to
exaggerate). But the post-war period brought disillusionment. On the one
hand, United States hegemony was further strengthened and Latin American
dependence rendered greater than ever; and, on the other, the United States
was involved to an unprecedented degree in other areas of the world. When
the Cold War developed and Latin America was remote from it, the region
was relegated once more to a very low priority in the foreign relations of the
15

Cf. my review of Munro's earlier volume, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the
Caribbean, I900-1921

(Princeton,

N.J.,

Princeton University Press, I964), in History,

i69 (June I965), 26I-2.

16 The United States and the Caribbean Republics, I921-I933,

.17 Ibid., p. 377.

p. 378.

L,

142

Journal of Latin American Studies

United States. There was no Marshall Plan for Latin America, and economic
aid to the latter was minimal. Nor, when Latin America became more closely
concerned with the Cold War, did relations with the United States improve.
For the intervention issue again came to overshadow them.
In a new book based upon a diligent study of contemporarysources,18Dr
Parkinson examines the different phases of the Cold War as they affected
Latin America. He demonstratesnot only the reactions of the Latin American
governments as these developed, but also how cold war issues influenced intraLatin American relations and domestic politics in individual countries. In the
early stages of the Cold War Latin America was 'a pawn of the world
powers ,19 but by the late I96os, in Parkinson's judgement, the Cold War was

'largely out of the way' and 'a new diplomatic climate was beginning to
pervade Latin America .20 He concludes that:

With the direct influenceof the world powers declining in the underdeveloped
world in general,intra-LatinAmericanissues are likely to acquirea new importance, with greaterattentionbeing paid consequentlyto the notion of the balanceof
power. It is not impossible that, under these conditions, the future of Latin
America's internationalsystem will begin to resemble that of the nineteenth
centuryrathermore than that of the twentieth.21
This last possibilityimplies a very dramaticlessening of United States influence
over the region.
From his scant references to it, Dr Parkinson clearly does not believe that
the much-heralded Alliance for Progress importantly influenced Latin
America's response to the Cold War situation in the western hemisphere
during the I96os. JeromeLevinson and Juan de Onis,22in a' critical report ',23
conclude that 'A decade of the Alliance for Progress has yielded more
shattered hopes than solid accomplishment, more discord than harmony,
more disillusionment than satisfaction'.24 Yet, in words comparable with
those of Federico Gil,25 they declare at the beginning of their book: 'The
birth of the Alliance for Progressin I96I marked a dramatic and fundamental
18 F. Parkinson, Latin America, The Cold War, & The World Powers, 1945-I973: A Study in
Diplomatic History (Beverley Hills, Calif., and London, Sage Publications, 1974: Sage
Library of Social Research, vol. 9). Pp. 288. ?500o. Paperback, ?3-00.

19 Ibid.,
p. i I f.
20 Ibid.,
p. 231.
21 Ibid.,

pp. 248-9.

A United States foreign aid official and a New York Times correspondent assigned to
report on the Alliance.
23 Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report
on the Alliance for Progress (Chicago, Quadrangle Books for The Twentieth Century
22

Fund, I970). Pp. xiv + 38I, $7.9524

Ibid., p. 307.
25 See above.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 143

reorientation of Washington's policy toward Latin America'.26 It would

seem, as the title of their book asserts, that the Alliance 'lost its way . What
went wrong? The authors are often very critical of the United States:
The Alliance,definedas the recordof inter-Americanrelationsin the past decade,
providesadditionaljustificationfor disillusionment.If it has succeededin preventing any new Castrosfrom coming to power in the hemisphere,it has done so by
militarymeans, failing conspicuouslyto advancethe cause of the democraticleft.
The United Stateshas intervenedopenly in the DominicanRepublicand less obviously in Brazil and Guatemalato assistnot the democraticleft but the military
and civilian forces of conservatism.In disputesbetween Latin Americangovernments and U.S. corporations,the United States has applied economic pressures
against the Latin Americangovernmentswith a fine disregardfor the disputed
issues. Loan officialshave consistentlyrequired that countriesseeking financial
assistanceundertakemonetarystabilizationprograms;they have not requiredprogramsof socialreform.The U.S. Congressand the executivebranchhave restricted
loan funds to purchasesof U.S. goods (particularlythose that are not competitively
priced) and such other uses as are consistentwith a favorableU.S. balance of
payments.27
For Levinson and de Onfs, the democratic ideals of President Kennedy had
been abandoned.
But is this a fair judgment? John F. Kennedy expressed great concern for
Latin America, which he described in 1963 as ' the most critical area in the
world today'. One Latin American country - Cuba - certainly had critical
significance for him personally, providing the occasion of humiliating failure
(the Bay of Pigs invasion) and his greatest triumph (the resolution of the
missile crisis). Moreover, in the early Ig6os it was widely believed in Washington that revolution was imminent in Latin America; President Kennedy himself declared that 'those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make
violent revolution inevitable'. The proclaimed objective of the Alliance for
Progresswas to promote economic development and far-reachingsocial change
within a democratic framework. But, as Levinson and de Onis themselves
point out, the Alliance contained serious inherent contradictions,and it would
be unfair to compare Kennedy's rhetoric with the performance of his successors. Traditionally, the United States has linked her own interests with the
maintenance of stability in Latin America, and has strongly opposed radical
change in the region. She was, therefore, singularly ill-equipped to lead a
crusade for fundamental reforms in Latin America, and the Alliance was
part of an essentially counter-revolutionary (anti-communist) strategy.
Ominously, the areain which the Alliance may arguablybe considered to have
proved most successful was that of counter-insurgency: a matter of particular
26
27

Levinson and de Onis, op. cit., p. 5.

Ibid., pp. I3-14.

144 Journal of Latin American Studies

concern to President Kennedy.28 When the danger of revolution in Latin

America receded - while United States involvement in Vietnam grew ever
greater - it was hardly surprising that the Alliance faltered. To declare that
it ' lost its way' could be misleading. But the book by Levinson and de Onis
contains a great deal of valuable information and comment on its subject.
By the time President Nixon took office, the war in Vietnam - or, rather,
the problem of how to end it - was overshadowing all other aspects of United
States foreign and domestic politics. Latin America was, even more than
usually, a low priority area. But the inquest on the Alliance for Progress went
on, and some politicians and scholars anxiously debated the question of what
United States policy towards Latin America should be in the I970s. Various
aspects of the debate appear in a volume edited by Richard B. Gray.29This
collection of speeches and articles can induce only pessimism, especially when
the generally optimistic platitudes of the official pronouncements are contrasted with the dismal realities which emerge from some of the other contributions. The Alliance for Progress has failed; Latin American economic integration (linked with the Alliance) remains an aspiration; and the Organization of American Sitatesis in decline. The book also includes ' The Rockefeller
Report on Quality of Life in the Americas ', published in I969 after the then
Governor of New York State had undertaken a mission to Latin America for
President Nixon. Tad Szulc, a journalist with considerableexperience of reporting Latin American affairs, declares that' in providing his perceptive and
flexible analysis and recommendationsMr Rockefeller has gone unexpectedly
far in establishing foundations for policies that must not be Nixon policies but
United States policies'.30 They were destined to become neither. Mr Nixon
preferred a 'low profile' policy to one of reviving the ' special relationship',
and his administration faced more urgent problems in other regions.
The book ends with an extractfrom the United States CongressionalRecord
in which Senator Frank Church is highly critical of current United States
Latin American policy, and calls for a new one. His denunciation of various
aspects of United States 'aid' echoes some of the criticisms made by Latin
Americans in the 'Consensus of Vifia del Mar', drawn up and presented to
28 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, a great admirer of Kennedy, wrote in A Thousand Days: John

29

F. Kennedy in the White House (paperback edn., London, I967), p. 287, that the President's interest in counter-insurgencywas ' an old preoccupationfrom Senate days '. More
recently, Schlesinger has written of 'the worst folly of his administration: the infatuation
with counterinsurgency': ' The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective', in Ronald G.
Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum(eds.), Latin America: The Search for a New International
Role (New York, Center for Inter-AmericanRelations, 1975), p. 74.
Richard B. Gray (ed.), Latin America and the United States in the 1970's (Itasca, Illinois,
F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., I97I). Pp. xii + 370). $Io.oo. Paperback, $5.95.

30 Ibid., p.
274.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 145

President Nixon a year earlier (I969). Senator Church has since been a prominent critic of the activities of the CIA and the transnationalcompanies in
Latin America. But those who think like him are a minority in the United
States Senate where, for example, there is strong opposition to a new treaty
with Panama which would give the latter substantial concessions in respect
of the Canal. The Canal question is presently a focal point of Latin American
nationalism, and could prove, with the easing of the Cuban problem, the
major issue in United States relations with Latin America during the later
1970S. Strong domestic opposition in the United States to the granting of substantial concessions to Latin American demands has been a constant political
reality of the hemisphere situation.
What are termed 'the changing political realities' of relations between
Latin America and the United States are discussed in a book which consists
of papers (with commentaries) prepared for a conference of distinguished
social scientists held at Lima in i972.31The topics discussed are grouped into
four parts: 'Some Latin American Perspectives'; 'Some North American
Perspectives'; 'Brazil, Mexico, and the United States'; and 'Armed Forces
and Multinational Corporations in Hemispheric Relations'. The editors
declare that scholarship on inter-American relations ' must face squarely the
challenge of a Latin America that can no longer be understood as merely the
shadow cast by the Colossus of the North .32 For, in the words of one contributor, ' Latin America's " margin of freedom " is substantial and growing,
and is overlooked by an overly great concentration on " dependence " .33
The editors want to get away from ' the basic model in use... one of the
structure and functioning of U.S. imperialism .34 But they ruefully admit:

It is one moreindex of the politicaland economicimbalancesof the hemispherethat

the majorityof attentionin Lima and in the papersand commentswas focusedon
the United States, on North American-basedinstitutionsand actors,and on the
causesand consequencesof their behavior.... Even when the foreign policy of a

country as important in its own right as Mexico or Brazil was under consideration,

the questionsraisedmost often had to do with the influence(directand indirect)of

the United Stateson that policy. Countriesthat have been as innovativeas Chile
and Cuba in developmentaland foreign relationsenteredinto the discussionprimarily becausethey representchallengesto Yankee hegemony and thus test the
limits of U.S. power. At times, it was almost as if Latin America did not exist
exceptas definedby U.S. interestsand actions.35
31 Julio Cotler and Richard R.
Fagen (eds.), Latin America and the United States: The

Changing Political Realities (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press; London, Oxford
`2

University Press, 1974). Pp. xii + 417. $17.50. fio-oo.

Ibid., p. 20.

:' Ibid., p. 242.

Ibid., p. I9.

34

Paperback, $4.95. ?2-90.

35

Ibid., p. I8.

L.A.S.-IO

146 Journal of Latin American Studies

But, however regrettable, this does reflect a basic realty. For while Latin
America is a low priority area in the foreign relations of the United States,
the latter dominates the foreign relations of her weak neighbours. The papers
contained in this book are likely to prove more useful to theorists of international relations than to those concerned with analyzing specific contemporary issues in the western hemisphere. To draw upon the book's
plentiful jargon, there is not over-much 'policy-relevant knowledge',
although there is a great deal to be gleaned about the views of Latin American
and United States writers on the matters discussed. There is a considerable
variety of comments, for example, on the Alliance for Progress.
Discussion of United States relations with Latin America always raises
the question of how far the Twenty Republics can be meaningfully grouped
together in this context, given the very considerabledifferencesbetween them
in such important respects as size, natural resources, population, racial composition and the degree of political and economic maturity each has achieved.
This question can be illuminated by considering the cases of two major Latin
American countries, Brazil and Mexico, whose leaders have, in fact, claimed
a 'special relationship' with the United States. Brazil, then largest and most
populous Latin American country, differs from the others in the region both
for historical reasons and in her contemporary aspirations and prospects.
Mexico is 'special' because she borders upon the United States, and thus
constitutes the frontier between the two Americas. She has been described as
furnishing a barometer or touchstone of United States relations with Latin
America as a whole. But both Brazil and Mexico share with the rest of Latin
America (except, of course, Cuba) a high degree of dependence upon the
United States.
From the establishment of the First Republic (in I889) Brazil has generally
pursued a policy of co-operationwith the United States as being the best means
of achieving her foreign policy objectives. She has often been described as
seeking leadership of a ' sub-system' in South America under the overall
hemisphere hegemony of the United States. While aspiring to be something
of an intermediary between the latter and Spanish America, Brazil has sometimes been regarded as a ' Trojan Horse,' undermining efforts to confront the
United States with a common Latin American position on vital issues.
Argentina, with her own aspirations'to South American leadership, has been
especially suspicious of the 'unwritten alliance' between the United States
and Brazil. A recent book by ProfessorFrank McCann 36analyzes a significant
phase of 'Brazil's relations with the United States: the years of Getllio
D. McCann, Jr, The Brazilian-American Alliance,
Princeton University Press, I973). Pp. xiv + 527. $I8.50.

36 Frank

I937-1945

(Princeton,

N.J.,

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States I47

Vargas's dictatorship, which include the crucial period of the Second World
War. In McCann's judgment:
While the war undoubtedly increased Brazil's chances to realize its tremendous
potential it also made it subservient, very nearly a dependency, to the United States.
The growth of that dependency is an undercurrent that runs throughout the events
discussed in this book. The war years brought to a peak the tendency in Brazilian
foreign policy toward steadily closer approximation with the United States, which
had begun during the foreign ministry of the Baron of Rio Branco (I902-I9I2).37
On the Good Neighbour policy, which was being pursued by the Franklin
Roosevelt administration during the period covered by the book - and Brazil's
role in it - McCann declares:
The United States was seeking more than neighborliness, it was seeking economic
and political hegemony. Brazilian leaders did not seriously oppose this hegemony,
because they became convinced that they had more to gain than to lose by acquiescence. They were confident that Brazil could maintain its position in South America,
and that they could maintain their positions in Brazil.38
The last point has wider application, for there are groups in all the Latin
American countries who identify their interests with those of the United
States, and such groups are generally in or near the centres of power.
Professor McCann demonstrates how much more 'special' the relationship was to Brazil than -to the United States. In his words, 'When it suited
American interest ... Washington would stress the "Brazil is different"
theme, but when it was a question of Brazil's interests vis-a-vis the United
States it suddenly became a part of Latin America to be dealt with via policies
applicable to all republics '.3 His book well illustrates the illusions entertained by Brazil's leaders in !the matter of 'their country's importance in the
eyes of the United States; for example, their expectation that the latter would
press Brazil's claim for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security
Council. The United States ambassador reported that ' Vargas was especially
pleased when Roosevelt said that he would like to have him at his side during
the peace conference '.4 But, with the approach of peace, United States
leaders:
were maneuvering to insure control of Latin American markets and raw materials.
The American military were equally anxious to arrange postwar use of base
facilities, and to establish arms-supply arrangements and training missions throughout the area. The desire of big business for a continued supply of strategic materials
merged conveniently with military assessments of postwar national security
requirements.
37 Ibid., p. 5.
38 Ibid., p.
7.
39 Ibid., p. 332.
40

Ibid., p. 308.
L.A.S.-IO*

148 Journal of Latin American Studies

According to McCann, the drive for United States domination of the hemisphere accelerated after Roosevelt's death, while President Truman's
Secretaries of State, Stettinius and Byrnes, 'had limited knowledge of
Brazilian-American relations and even less sympathy for Brazilian aspirations.4l
In the early i96os, under Presidents Quadros and Goulart, Brazil attempted
to pursue an 'independent' foreign policy, which expressed itself most
obviously in a refusal to support the United States position on Castro's Cuba.
It also involved broadening Brazil's foreign relations, notably with the Third
World: what Professor Selcher calls 'The Afro-Asian Dimension of
Brazilian Foreign Policy'.42 Within the context of a growing self-identification of Latin America with the Third World it was argued 'that Brazil is
uniquely suited to approach non-white Afro-Asia because it has achieved a
racial democracy through lack of racial discrimination and a natural process
of miscegenation, which represents the ultimate solution to the dangerous
racial problem '.43 The practicaldifficulties of implementing a policy of closer
relations with the countries of Africa and Asia, and the limited advantages
to Brazil (at least in the short-term)of so doing, are well analysed by Selcher.
With the overthrow of Goulart in 1964 a more pragmatic approach was
adopted towards the Third World, and Brazil reverted to a policy of close
co-operationwith itheUnited States. When the military government sought to
lessen Brazil's economic dependence upon the latter, it did so primarily
through expanding economic relations with other industrialized countries,
including communist ones.
While the vast power of the United States has been the determining factor
in her relations with Latin America, inevitably no country of the region has
felt the weight of that power more than has Mexico. Fulfilment of her
' Manifest Destiny' led the United States to acquire through conquest more
than half Mexico's national territory, and Mexico has experienced intervention by her powerful neighbour in all its main forms. Karl Schmitt has produced a useful new survey of relations between Mexico and the United
States 44 which, while essentially narrative, does reflect the power imbalance
between the two countries. In his final chapter, Schmitt considers ,the options
which have been open to Mexico in her situation, and the choices her leaders
have made. He concludes:
41 Ibid., p. 341.
42 Wayne A. Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Pohcy, 1956-1972
(Gainesville, Fla., University of Florida Press, 1974: Latin American Monographs, Second
43 Ibid., p. 55.
Series, no. 13). Pp. viii + 252. $IO.00.
44 Karl M. Schmitt, Mexico and the United States, 1821-1973:
Conflict and Coexistence
(New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., I974). Pp. xvi + 288. ?5.80. Paperback, z2.35.

Latin America in the Foreign Relations of the United States 149

if Mexico'sleadersdesirethe maximumfreedomof action in a world of unequal

powers, they must first keep their own house in order and, second, broadenthe
base of economicsupportto reducethe level of dependenceon the United States.
Finally, they can pray that primaryUnited States internationalinterestsdo not
focus on the WesternHemisphere,much less on them.45
Perhaps Professor Schmitt would apply these observations to Latin America
as a whole.
The foreign relations of the United States, like those of all sovereign states,
have been conducted basically to further national interests. This obvious point
is worth making only because, especially in respect of Latin America, her
political leaders and some influential historians have been at such pains to
maintain that United States foreign policies have been more altruistic than
those of traditional great powers; and, in the contemporary world, those of
her communist rivals. In the world of power politics the interests of weak
nations have, as a rule, been subordinated to those of strong ones. The case
of the Latin American countries as weak nations is no exception; and the
United States furnishes perhaps an outstanding example of that propensity
for equating morality with power which is a characteristicof great nations.
United States interventions (or 'imperialism') in Laitin America, and her
' neglect' of the region - the two major charges levelled against her - alike
derive from the vast margin of power she enjoys over her southern neighbours.
Until this imbalance of power is significantly redressed, the traditional role
of Latin America in the foreign relations of the United States will persist.
There are signs that such a process is beginning to take place. The fact
that Cuba - historically so closely linked with United States ambitions and
her ultimate emergence as a great power - has been detached from her system
and aligned with her major rival, alone suggests a dramatic change. The case
of Cuba also demonstratesthat United States relations with Latin America no
longer enjoy the traditionaldegree of isolation (never, of course, by any means
absolute) from her relations with the rest of the world. Yet there are no signs
of a ' second Cuba' in the hemisphere. Latin America's attempts to form a
common front to strengthen its position vis-a-visthe United States have so far
enjoyed very limited success. Efforts to develop international relations (above
all, economic relations) outside the hemisphere, both with non-American
industrialized countries, including members of ,the Soviet system, and in cooperation with the Third World, have been more significant. But the' margin
of freedom' remains smaller than some of the writers cited would appear to
believe.
Meanwhile, if Latin America does not loom large in the foreign relations of
45

Ibid., p. 269.

150 Journal of Latin American Studies

the United States, inter-American relations should be of considerable interest

not only to scholars concerned with Latin America, but also to students of
United States foreign policy. For Latin America may be considered as both
a test-case and a laboratoryof the latter. It has been a test-case, for example,
of the professed concern of the United States for democracy and the rights
of small nations. Perhaps more importantly, Latin America has been a
laboratoryin which the United States has developed techniques (as varied as
supervising free elections, and destabilizing governments of which she has
disapproved) for achieving her objectives, which she has later employed very often with success, sometimes disastrously - in other regions following
her emergence as a global power. It is to be hoped that these are matters to
which more scholars, especially historians, will address themselves.
GORDON

CONNELL-SMITH