ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P.

CATITO
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian
citizen of German descent. He is an electrical
engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot
with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in the
Philippines in 1974, started engaging in
business in the country two years thereafter, and
married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In
1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed
and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in
Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to
King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a
massage where he met respondent Ederlina
Catito, a Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao
City.
Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in
Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a
German national. She left Germany and tried
her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found
employment as a masseuse in the King's Cross
nightclub. Alfred followed Ederlina to the
Philippines where they cohabited together in a
common-law relationship. During the period of
their common-law relationship, Alfred acquired in
the Philippines real and personal properties
valued more or less at P724,000.00.
Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was
disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines,
he agreed that only Ederlina's name would
appear in the deeds of sale as the buyer of the
real properties, as well as in the title covering
the same.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship deteriorated.
Alfred wrote Ederlina's father complaining that
Ederlina had taken all his life savings and
because of this, he was virtually penniless. He
further accused the Catito family of acquiring for
themselves the properties he had purchased
with his own money. He demanded the return of
all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had
"stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired
by him and Ederlina during their coverture.

Alfred filed a complaint against Ederlina with the

Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific
performance, declaration of ownership of real
and personal properties, sum of money, and
damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Ederlina.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to recover the
property.
HELD:
No. The Supreme affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. According to the Court,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
constitutional proscription, nor claim that he
acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is
less guilty than the respondent. Petitioner is fully
aware that he wasdisqualified from acquiring
and owning lands under Philippine law even
before he purchased the properties in question;
and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, he had
the deed of sale placed under the respondent's
name as the sole vendee thereof.
Being a party to an illegal contract, petitioner
cannot come into a court of law and ask to have
his illegal objective carried out because one who
loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in a contract or transaction which
involves his own moral turpitude may not
maintain an action for his losses. To allow
petitioner to recover the properties or the money
used in the purchase of the parcels of land
would be subversive of public policy.
MULLER v. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondents parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines
in 1992.

By this time, respondent had inherited the house

in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel
of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00.
The Antipolo property was registered in the
name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents
alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment,
the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision which terminated the regime of
absolute community of property between the
petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property,
the court held that it was acquired using
paraphernal funds of the respondent. However,
it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed decision modifying
the trial courts Decision. It held that respondent
merely prayed for reimbursement for the
purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It
also considered petitioners ownership over the
property in trust for the respondent. As regards
the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there
is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits
respondent from acquiring the same.
ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
HELD:
No. Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and
expressly admitted
his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared

that he had the Antipolo property titled in the

name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right on the said property
cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an
implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioners marriage
to respondent. Save for the exception provided
in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership
in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase
is made in violation of an existing statute and in
evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a
court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule
will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant
case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a
futile exercise on respondents part. To allow
reimbursement
would
in
effect
permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own.
DONATO REYES YAP and MELITONA
MARAVILLAS
vs.
HON. EZEKIEL S. GRAGEDA
G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983
FACTS:
Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap
who was then a Chinese national. After the
lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, Donato
Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen

and allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines.
On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the
major portion of a lot which he acquired by
purchase under the deed of sale in favor of his
engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino
citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his
mother and the naturalization of his father
Donato Reyes Yap.
Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir
of respondent Jose A. Rico, son of maximino
Rico, sold the remaining portion of that lot to the
petitioner who had his rights.
Donato Reyes Yap, has been in possession of
the lots in question since 1939, openly, publicly,
continuously, and adversely in the concept of
owner until the present time.
ISSUE: WON the sale of residential lot in
question to a Chinese national is null and void in
spite of the fact that the vendee had been a
naturalized born Filipino citizen.
HELD:
The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified
to own the subject property. There would be no
more public policy to be served in allowing
petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is
already in the hands of a qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in
Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng Giap & Sons:
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only
agricultural but also urban lands, as construed
by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve
the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.
VICENTE GODINEZ vs. FONG PAK LUEN
G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983
FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of

land sold by their father Jose Godinez to
defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant
executed a power of attorney in favour of his codefendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and
sold the above described parcel of land to codefendant Trinidad S. Navata.
Navata was aware of and with full knowledge
that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well
as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are
prohibited and disqualified to acquire real
property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired
any title or interest in said parcel of land as
purported contract of sale executed by Jose
Godinez alone was contrary to law and
considered non-existent.
The defendant filed her answer that the
complaint does not state a cause of action since
it appears from the allegation that the property is
registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that
as his sole property he may dispose of the
same; that the cause of action has been barred
by the statute of limitations as the alleged
document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on
November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to
defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a
title was issued to said defendant; that under
Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action
based upon a written contract must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues; that the right of action accrued on
November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed
only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10year period provided by law.
The trial court issued an order dismissing the
complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by plaintiffs but was denied.
ISSUE: WON the sale was null and void ab initio
since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code.
HELD:
No. Prescription may never be invoked to
defend that which the Constitution prohibits.
However, we see no necessity from the facts of
this case to pass upon the nature of the contract
of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak
Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or
merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that
insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription
is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his

heirs rely on an argument based on

imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941
is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against
whom the constitutional prescription was never
intended to apply.
As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the
disqualified alien vendee later sold the same
property to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to
acquire real property.
Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject
property.