Hanley 2008 Enlightenened Nation Building Science of The Legislator in Smith and Rousseau

Enlightened Nation Building: The "Science of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau
Author(s): Ryan Patrick Hanley

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Apr., 2008), pp. 219-234
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Nation
Enlightened
Building: The "Science
in Adam Smith and Rousseau
of the Legislator"
Ryan Patrick Hanley
is famous
"
as
Rousseau
the legislator,
to
approach
Marquette University
as an
developed
Here
statecraft.
advocate
the politics
of
in the Geneva
Rousseau
of
and
Manuscript
claims
that
legislative
right with sensitivity to actual political conditions?a

account
of the science
conclusions:
of the
Smith's
first,
and prejudices
passions
legislator
and
Rousseau
But
"denaturing"
science
to his
attention
on Poland
his writings
requires
conception
and Corsica,
tempering
reveals
commitment
of modernity;
to principles
of political
claim that importantly and unexpectedly parallels the better known
In comparing
Smith.
these conceptions,
developed
by Adam
s shared moderation
reveals
their common
commitment
their fundamental
second,
of the "science
of
a more moderate
concerns
difference
not practical
this article
to
draws
accommodating
legislative
methods
three
the
but
rather differing conceptions of natural justice and political right; and finally, theirprudential approach to legislation helps
the specific
clarify
of "moderation"
types
and
"intelligence"
required
et al. 2003; Feldman 2004; Fukuyama

(see, e.g., Dobbins
on
Yet
debates
these subjects have been hampered
2006).
over the questions of the origins
serious
by
disagreement
tification
of rational, universal norms, the most valuable

legacy of Smith and Rousseau's approach to nation build
ing lies rather in its skeptical counsels of prudence, and
of national identity and of how national integration might

best be achieved; where some advocate the recovery of na
tive
cultural
others
characteristics,
of national
a more
envision
the necessity of both accommodating

the moral and cul
tural "passions and prejudices" of a nation and making
institutional provisions
for a nation's continued moral
artifi
In light of such dis

nation builders might wonder
identities.1
agreements, contemporary
where best to turn for guidance. The present article argues
that this debate would do well to reconsider the contri
butions of two leading thinkers of the Enlightenment
era,
and cultural flourishing.

With regard to the second question, comparing their
of the science of the legislator also affords
conceptions
an opportunity
to reconsider the standard contrast of
Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular

their concept of "the science of the legislator."
Two questions
thus animate this article. The first
ismore explicitly political: what insights do Smith and
second
Patrick
Ryan
as the champion of either primitivism or classi

cal republicanism
and Smith as the herald of commer
cial modernization.
On this front, my principal claim
Rousseau
nation builders? The

provide to contemporary
is perhaps more
scholarly: namely, how do
Rousseau
is assistant
Hanley
of
professor
political
science,
builders.
Rousseau's
gard to the proper role of the United States in constructing

self-governing democracies with stable national identities
cial fabrication
nation
and Smith's visions of the science of the legis

lator compare given their famously incommensurate
po
sitions on modernization
and commercial liberalism? The
article's answer to the first question
itself implies a need
to reconsider a certain conception of the Enlightenment.
In contrast to a received vision of the political thought
as mainly concerned with the jus
of the Enlightenment
American
foreign policy has reawakened,
with great urgency, interest in the methods and the
legitimacy of nation building, particularly with re
Recent
of contemporary
below is that Rousseau's vision of the true legislator's sci

ence closely parallels Smith's in one respect and
sharply
Marquette
PO
University,
Box
1881, Milwaukee,
WI
53201-1881
(ryan.hanley@marquette.edu).
Earlier
versions
of
of this article were
meetings
audiences?and
the New
reviewers?for
many
For a helpful
see
especially
American
?2008,
to Richard
particularly
helpful
review
Journal
Midwest
England
Barrington
in 2005
Science
Boyd,
at the
of Wisconsin
University
and the American
Association
Eric MacGilvary,
Alice
Behnegar,
Political
Political
Louis Hunt,
Theory Workshop,
Science Association.
David
Lay Williams,
and also at the 2005
annual
I am very
to those
grateful
and the three anonymous
suggestions.
of contemporary
(2006,
of Political
Political
delivered
Political
primordial,
constructivist,
and
instrumentalist
perspectives
on nationalism
and nation
building,
13-14).
Science,
Science
Vol.
Association
52, No.
2, 2008,
ISSN
Pp. 219-234
0092-5853
219
220
departs from it in a second. The first two sections of the
article demonstrate
that Smith and Rousseau each sub
scribe to the classical distinction
of the best regime from

the best possible regime and also that each insists that the
task of a nation builder is to devise mod
fundamental
to
perverse,
tailored
erate, prudential
of particular given circumstances
universal political norms within existing conditions. The
next section of the article examines how this intention in
regard
Rousseau
as a contributor
to
this
project. Rousseau's advice to nation-building

legislators,
as presented
in his writings on Poland and Corsica and
Geneva, seems to counter Smith in advocating resistance
to commerce
and a recovery of
on classical re
based
good
in his early draft of the
ideals. Yet it is Rousseau,
and liberal individualism
a commitment
to the exigencies
in order to instantiate
mechanisms
not
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
to the common
publican
Social Contract
who advances
(the Geneva Manuscript),
of "the science of the legislator" (GM
I.iv, 168; Il.i-vi, 179-94), elsewhere called "the true legis
lator's science" (L, 66).3 Our first task is to see how these
the second vision
practical works on Corsica and Poland,

that
in
these Rousseau practices his commitment
arguing
to accommodate
to accom
exigencies, and particularly
forms Rousseau's
two
visions
compare.
famously diagnosed
fourth section of the article turns to the tension between
is today famous as the champion of the

of
natural
is, as the champion of
"system
liberty"?that
a self-regulating
economic
would seem to
which
system
the moderation
have
modate
the conditions
and vices of modernity

that he
in the Discourse on Inequality. The
of these practical writings
of the legislative science described
characteristic
and the immoderation

in the Social Contract
arates Rousseau
and argues that the divide that sep

from Smith on this front is to be traced
to realism or idealism,
not to their differing attachments
of "natural justice" and
but rather to their conceptions
to be instantiated.
In
the
ideals
specific
"political right,"
the article examines two specific implications
concluding,
nation builders, ar
of these analyses for contemporary
that Smith and Rousseau's
greatest
guing in particular
on
to
in
their
the
front
lies
this
spe
ability
clarify
legacy
cific types of "moderation"
nation builders today.
and "intelligence"
Adam
Smith
of
little need, or even room for, the interventions
actors.
The
associated
of
fame
Smith's
political
advocacy
of such devices as the "invisible hand" and the theory of
spontaneous or unplanned order further seem to suggest
that Smith's political philosophy
defends or engenders a
minimization
of the importance of political agency and
leads to a "deflection" of politics towards
consequently
1993 ). But if true,
;
(see Cropsey 2001 Minowitz
on
articulating a science for the
why then does Smith insist
legislator? Thus Winch's helpful question: if indeed Smith
economics
means
required of
to teach that politics does better when directed

nature
rather than the "active statesman as purposive
by
then "what positive
moulder
of events and outcomes,"
part is there for any legislator to play?" (Winch 1996,94).
Smith's answer
rests on his distinction
between
two
he agrees
types of statesmen, one of whom
should be excluded from political action, but the other
of the
of whom he deems vital to the proper functioning
one
of his central
system.4 He presents this contrast in
different
Natural Justice and Particular

Circumstance:
Smith on the
Legislator's Science
one
of the legislator. Here Smith distinguishes
directed by "the science of a legislator, whose deliberations
are al
ought to be governed by general principles which
and
from
insidious
"that
the
same,"
ways
crafty animal,
or politician, whose councils
vulgarly called a statesman
discussions
offers students of the history of po

The Enlightenment
at
least two visions of "the science of
litical philosophy
the legislator."2 By far the more well known is that set
forth by Smith and David Hume, the philosophers
chiefly
and
for
subsequently defending
articulating
responsible
the project of commercial modernity. As has been shown,
Hume and Smith aspired to teach potential legislators in
their audiences how to devise political and economic insti
man's selfish passions
tutions capable of accommodating
or transforming them into agents
and in turn meliorating
of social stability and growth (see esp. Cohen 1989,51,54,
1996,
1998;Winch
1981; McNamara
59, 62; Haakonssen
117). Given
this objective,
itmay
at first seem strange,
if
are directed
by the momentary
variants
eighteenth-century
(1988), Haakonssen
esp. Lieberman
in n8 below.
see
of the legislator's
science,
cited
studies
and
the
(1996),
of affairs"
3
Rousseau's
are abbreviated
as CC = Plan for a Constitution
works
= Geneva
=
GP = Government
Emile; GM
Manuscript;
for Corsica; E
=
= Oeuvres
= Letter to d'Alembert;
L
OC
compl?tes; PE
of Poland;
SD = Second Discourse
SC = Social Contract;
Political
Economy;
have been used
on Inequality).
translations
Standard
as LJ = Lectures
are abbreviated
Smith's works
=
WN = Wealth
on Iurisprudence;TMS
Sentiments;
Theory ofMoral
of Nations.
{Discourse
whenever
possible.
of the science of
account
of Smith's understanding
following
in Haakonssen
made
claims
the
follows
central
the legislator
largely
M?ller
(1996,
(1993, 84-92,
139), and Winch
(1981, esp. 83-98),
are also acknowledged
more
90-123);
specific debts and deviations
4The
2
For other
fluctuations
below.
IN SMITHAND ROUSSEAU221
THE "SCIENCE
OF THELEGISLATOR"
feature of legislative
IV.ii.39). The distinguishing
to those
is its commitment
science, on this account,
a politics so guided
"general principles" which prevent
Else
into vulgar Machiavellianism.
from degenerating
(WN
in noting the po
repeats
to
be abused, he hints that
tential for general principles
idea of the perfec
"some general, and even systematical,
tion of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for
where
the claim. Even
Smith
directing the views of the statesman" (TMS VI.ii.2.18).

in sug
But what precisely did Smith have in mind
gesting that political deliberation ought to be governed by
attention
to "general principles"? Charles Griswold notes

insistence that the "general principles" which
that Smith's
to guide the science of the legislator "unquestion

ably echo" his discussion of those "general principles of
in the closing pages of
described
law and government"
on natural
TMS, inwhich he anticipates a book-to-come
ought
(Griswold 1999, 36n59). There he distin

for particular
law designed
guishes systems of positive
states in particular historical periods from "the natural
jurisprudence
of all positive
institution."
rules of justice independent
The latter were the intended focus of his project on "what
a the
might properly be called natural jurisprudence, or
run
to
ory of the general principles which ought
through
and be the foundation
of the laws of all nations"?a
field
from the study of

of study he rigorously distinguishes
"the particular institutions of any one nation" (cf. LJA Li;
LJB 1-3). This in turn led Smith to promise "an account
and of
of the general principles of law and government,
in the dif
the different revolutions they have undergone
ferent ages and periods of society" (TMS VII.iv.36-37).5
And while this project was not in fact executed, Smith's
essential claim is clear: that appreciation of the principles
justice is the "backbone" of the science of a
Haakonssen
1981, 151).
legislator (
of the legislator in the uni
science
the
By grounding
versal norms of justice, Smith intended to provide amech
of natural
above the pol

capable of elevating statesmanship
itics of interest characteristic of his insidious and crafty
"politician." Yet Smith was also acutely aware that a states
anism
in the abstract principles of natural

grounded
is
itself
justice
susceptible to abuses of another kind. His
own failure to execute a treatise on the idea of natural jus
tice itself suggests the difficulty of establishing
its princi
manship
ples. But lacking a clear definition of such principles, am

bitious politicians might well substitute their own more
convenient abstractions. This is precisely the problem that
Smith diagnoses
in his famous portrait of the "man of sys
tern." The man of system is first and foremost aman driven

own conceit" he
by his ideals: "apt to be very wise in his
is "often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his
that he cannot suffer the
ideal plan of government,
smallest deviation from any part of it" (TMS VI.ii.2.17).
Indeed his fascination with his Utopian vision inspires his
own
political zealotry, for when this "spirit of system" mixes

with a certain kind of "public spirit," this "often inflames
of fanaticism," which in turn "in
fall under the sway of "the imaginary
it even to the madness

all who
toxicates"
Caught up
beauty of this ideal system" (TMS VI.ii.2.15).
seek in practice
in this dazzling beauty, such visionaries
and in all its parts, without
"to establish it completely
to
either
the
any regard
great interests, or to the strong
which
may oppose it." This leads to Smith's
prejudices
of the systemic political re
former who "seems to imagine that he can arrange the
of a great society with as much ease
different members
condemnation
well-known
arranges the different pieces upon a chess

indifferent to or unaware of the fact that "in the
as the hand
board,"
great chess-board
a principle
that which
society, every single piece has

of its own, altogether different from
the legislature might chuse to impress upon it"
of human
of motion
But good government

(TMS VI.ii.2.17).
requires that the
statesman's hand not deviate from the path traced by the
invisible hand. Smith repeatedly insists on this lesson in
for his system of natural liberty, claiming that
people should always be given free rein to pursue their in
terests, as they always know these interests better than any
IV.v.b.16; IV.v.b.43; IV.ix.51).
superior might
(e.g., WN
arguing
science is thus
Legislative
to the enthusiasm of systematic
intended
as an antidote
reformers. Yet this itself
insofar as the "system of

prompts an obvious question:
natural liberty" is itself a "system" in its own right, how
can Smith guarantee that the legislator claiming to act in
the name of this "system" will not himself be overcome
by the "spirit of system"? The problem ismade even more
acute by his recognition
that the legislator's tremendous
abilities render him capable of effecting "the greatest rev
... in the situations and
olutions
opinions of mankind"
Smith
describes
his
(TMS VI.iii.28).
remedy for this po
tential fanaticism in describing the importance of appre
He nods at this even in
ciating political circumstances.
man
his
with
the
of system: not only
frustration
venting
does he exhibit "the highest degree of arrogance" and a
to "fancy himself the only wise and worthy
predilection
man in the commonwealth,"
but he moreover
thinks "his
fellow-citizens
should accommodate
themselves to him
and not he to them"
that Smith,
in his own words,
rightly notes
only "partly
executed"
this project
Smith was capable of
(TMS, 3). On whether
see Griswold
the project,
cf. Fleischacker
(1999, 31-37);
executing
Ross
(2004, esp. 145-48);
(2004, 45-46).
5Griswold
an accommodation
calls for in building
the fanaticism
Yet it is precisely
(TMS VI.ii.2.18).
of interests and prejudices that Smith
actual nations if they are to be free of
to which
political
idealism
is prone.
222
Smith's
claim
per his commitment

the specific contexts
then is that the legislator must tem

to idealism with an appreciation of
will
respect the established powers and privileges

even of individuals, and still more those of the
into which
the state
great orders and societies,
in which he serves. Only by so do

his project to the people, rather
ing will he accommodate
than force the people to accommodate his project. But this
claim sets the bar high for the legislator, as it compels him
to cultivate a political wisdom
or
differ
understanding
ent from that wisdom or
which
understanding
might en
able him to comprehend
the principles of natural justice.
is divided. Though he should consider some of

them as in some measure abusive, he will content
himself with moderating,
what he often cannot
annihilate without
great violence. When he can
not conquer the rooted prejudices of the
people
by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to
subdue them by force; but will religiously observe
Haakonssen
nicely captures the distinction between these

two forms of comprehension
in distinguishing
"system
the knowledge
knowledge" from "contextual knowledge,"
of the connecting principles of a system from the knowl
edge that enables one to understand actual given political
what, by Cicero, is justly called the divine maxim

of Plato, never to use violence to his country no
more than to his parents. He will accommodate,
as well
as he can, his public arrangements

to the
confirmed habits and prejudices of the people;
and will remedy as well as he can, the inconve
conditions
1981, 79-82, 89; see also McNa

(Haakonssen
mara 1998, 87-91; Winch
1983, 510-11). This suggests
that the science of the legislator requires a "superior pru
dence," an appreciation of both the potential and limits of
actual peoples for whom one hopes tomake a normative
intervention
(TMS VI.i.15).6 Such prudence is

as it enables legislators to shape their
legislative
principally valuable
ideals to circumstances
and thereby better guarantee that

a political community will in fact receive the intended
benefits of the legislation.
Smith goes on to explain that an appreciation of such
circumstances will lead not only to a tempering of ideal
ism, but also to an appreciation of the limits of politics,
of po
legislation, owing to the imperfectability
litical phenomena
1996,
(Griswold 1999, 301-10; Winch
123). Smith's favorite historical example of a legislator,
Solon, is consistently praised for his capacity to legislate
and hence
within
the horizons
a second-best
and his ability to craft
of imperfection
approach
for
such
situations;
hence
his
en
of a modern
dorsement
that
policy with the observation
"with all its imperfections,
however, we may perhaps say
of itwhat was said of the laws of Solon, that, though not the
best in itself, it is the best which the interests, prejudices,
and temper of the times would admit of WN
(
IV.v.b.53).7
niencies which may flow from the want of those

regulations which the people are averse to submit
to.When
he cannot establish
the right, he will not

the wrong; but like Solon,
when he cannot establish the best system of laws,
to establish the best that the
he will endeavour
can
bear.
(TMS VI.ii.2.16)
people
to ameliorate
disdain
Here
Smith teaches that political humility

is a prerequi
site for the science of a legislator. In contrast to the arro
gance and superiority of the man of system, Smith here
praises the humility of statesmen who work with rather
than against the prejudices and preconditions
of a nation.
Such statesmen, Smith further insists, know the limits of
their wisdom;
that they lack the omni
fully conscious
science of the divine, they instead represent the more lim
ited "perfection of human political wisdom"
(Griswold
such legislators
1999, 308). Unlike Caesar and Alexander,
never fall under the spell of the delusive and "excessive
that might suggest the direct inspiration
self-admiration"
of divinity (TMS VI.iii.28). A properly scientific legisla
tor thus strikes a balance between
the ideals of natural
The Solonic
recom
justice and the reality of actual
mends
(Winch
achieves
example is itself the example Smith

to remedy the idealism of men of system
1996, 96-97, 104-5). Thus the best legislator
tween
In this context
eration
13, where
see the excellent
in Brubaker
Smith's
ingly immoderate
see Anhalt
(1993,
(2006,
legislator
"moralism"
discussion
201-205)
is explicitly
of Smith's
but
Solonic
cf.
191-92,
distanced
from
of Rousseau's.
mod
200, 212
the seem
salutary
moderation
the hubris
naticism
here is Haakonssen's
observation
that "the intention
be
6Helpful
or utopianism,
criticism
of excessive
in
hind Smith's
rationalism,
no means
a
is
the
abdication
of
but
"rather
reason,"
very
politics
by
rational
of its limits"
(1981, 92).
appreciation
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
conditions
and thereby
in
a course
steering
of scientific management
of the idealists.8 Smith's emphasis
be
and the fa
on respecting
and prejudices
indeed represents a recov
ancient
of
the
ery
conception of the distinction between
the best and the most fitting or best possible regime (see
Aristotle
1999, 305).
1984, 1269a30, 1337al0; Griswold
Before turning to Rousseau, a final aspect of Smith's
settled habits
approach
to the science of the legislator demands
notice.
For Solon's
intentions,
of Solon's
self
Anhalt's
11-14,
135-39).
study
as
conscious
of himself
is a useful point
presentation
poet-lawgiver
for the claim that legislators
of reference
should
seek to "persuade
see esp.
without
(SC II.vii.10);
Kelly (1987, 326-31).
convincing"
8
Such
of Hume
echo the legislative methods
proposals
particularly
see Hume
and Montesquieu;
and
260-63,
280, 512-13)
(1985,
Winch
75; 1983, 506); Montesquieu
6, 14;
(1996,
(1989, XIX.5,
and Pangle
XXVI.23)
(1973, 273-77).
IN SMITH AND
THE "SCIENCE OF THE LEGISLATOR"
reputation for a commitment

in the civil or economic
interventions
Smith's
ROUSSEAU 223
to limited political
spheres would seem
to a restricted view of the proper sphere

of the legislator within a well-ordered
state; there indeed
would seem to be little room for a legislator if in fact "little
else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of
to commit
him
opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes,

and a tolerable administration
of justice; all the rest being
about by the natural course of things" (Smith in
in a
1982, 322). But elsewhere?and
particularly
in
The
little-noted passage
Theory ofMoral Sentiments?
brought
Stewart
takes a much
Smith
moral
stronger
stance on the necessity
of
to suffer from his own Problem.10 Aside
lem initially posed by Cassirer?the

question of whether
or
is better seen as a classical eudaemonist
Rousseau
more political Problem concerns
Kantian deontologist?a
or as a friend of totalitarianism.11
Res
tional democracy
olution of this question
is unlikely to be reached soon

and is not attempted here, but attention to his conception
of the science of the legislator and how it compares to
Smith's helps illuminate certain moderate
aspects of his
to
and
accommodate
his
thought,
especially
willingness
the characteristic prejudices of modernity.
To begin by suggesting
or
moderate
ity of the commonwealth,

by establishing good
and by discouraging
every sort of
discipline,
as a friend of constitu
he is better understood
whether
legislation:
The civil magistrate

is entrusted with the power
not only of preserving
the public peace by re
but
of
the prosper
straining injustice,
promoting
from the Prob
that there might
accommodating
at first seem odd. The most
be anything
in Rousseau's
famous
science
may
account
of the legis
offered in Book
lator in Rousseau's
account
corpus?the
seems to
II, chapter vii of the Social Contract?certainly
read as a direct challenge to, if not rejection of, several fun
damental tenets of the Smithean science. First Rousseau
rules,
impropriety; he may prescribe
which not only prohibit mutual
in
mu
but
command
juries among fellow-citizens,
tual good offices to a certain degree ... Of all the
the divine and the political

openly questions whether
should be separated, arguing that legislation benefits con
siderably from the popular impression of the legislator's
intimate association with the divine. Further, where Smith
duties
of a law-giver, however, this, perhaps,

is
it requires the greatest delicacy and re
serve to execute with propriety and judgment. To
cautions
that which
ciples foreign to their nature, Rousseau seems to endorse

precisely this in claiming that the nation-building
legisla
tor's first and most important task is to "transform" the
vice
and
therefore,
neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth

tomany gross disorders and shocking enormities,
and to push it too far is destructive of all liberty,
security, and justice.
the
attempt
to
"impress"
on men
prin
people:
(TMS II.ii.1.8)
dares to institute a people must feel

so
to speak, changing human nature;
of,
capable
of transforming
each individual who by himself
is a perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger
whole from which that individual would as itwere
Anyone
Smith does not provide precise rules for the conduct of

such judgment, but from his comments above it is evident
good legislation requires amiddle ground
be established between libertarianism and totalitarianism.
But even as Smith was silent on this front, the attempt to
define this middle ground was to become the particular
that he believes
intention
against
who
receive his life and his being; of weakening man's

in order to strengthen it; of substitut
constitution
a
and
moral existence for the indepen
ing partial
of Rousseau.
dent and physical

from
nature.
existence we have all received
In a word,
he must
take
from
man
his own forces in order to give him forces which

are foreign to him and of which he cannot make
use without
the help of others. The more these
natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater
Realism and Idealism and Rousseau's

"Science of the Legislator"
and more
lasting are the acquired ones, and the

solid and lasting also is the institution.
(SC
II.vii.3; GM Il.ii, 179-80; cf. PE, 12-13)
study of Smith was once dominated

by the famed
Adam Smith Problem: the question of how to reconcile
The
more
Smith's analysis of sympathy inmoral life with his analy

sis of self-interest in economic
life.9 But Rousseau seems
'Iowe
91 do
not
treatments
to treat
aspire
of the relative
(2002) andMontes
this
problem
significance
(2004).
here.
For
excellent
of this problem,
recent
see Otteson
this suggestion
to Eric
MacGilvary.
1*
Cassirer
totalitarianism
(1954). The classic sources on Rousseau's
Berlin
(2002) and Talmon
(1960). For a recent attempt
see Williams
in Rousseau,
liberalism
(2005a).
remain
find
to
224
It is difficult
Smith's. Not
to imagine a position
only does Rousseau's
more
repugnant to
legislator annihilate
the prejudices that Smith's is concerned to respect, but he

also seeks the alteration of human nature itself. Rousseau
on his intentions
in this regard in Emile. Such

is
he
necessary,
explains, because of the vi
denaturing
olence already done to human nature by the civilizing
institutions
that Smith defends. It is the corruptions
of
elaborates
civilized man, or the bourgeois, which make it necessary

"to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him
in order to give him a relative one and transport the I
into the common
unity" (E, 40). Yet modern

legislators
are not alone in seeking to "transform" human nature; the
greatest ancient legislators, Rousseau suggests, had similar
ambitions. Thus we are told that when Lycurgus legislated
for Spartans he "transformed them into beings more than
merely human," that Moses "made bold to transform this
herd of servile emigrants
into a political society, a free
Numa
that
and
gave Rome strength by "trans
people,"
forming the robbers into citizens..
.bymildly restrictive
institutions that bound each of them to the rest and all of
Such legislators cannot help
compared to Smith's.
call for "transformation"
hardly ex
them to the soil" (GP, 6-7).

but seem immoderate when
But Rousseau's
hausts his conception of the legislator, for alongside this

vision. In
grandiose vision lies another more moderate
the published version of Social Contract, this moderate
vision takes the form of an attempt to mitigate what the
subtitle calls the "principles of political right" with
the "maxims of politics" (SC III.xviii.3). As Arthur Melzer
the Social Contract
and Roger Masters have demonstrated,
at its heart seeks to establish a balance between these two
work's
principles?a
balance
between,
on
the
one
hand,
a com
to the abstract principles of "universal justice"

of
(SC II.vi.2), and on the other, the practical maxims
to bring a project to fruition (see es
politics necessary
1968, 290-93, 301-13;
322; Masters
1987,
pecially Kelly
Masters
1990, 114-19). Rousseau's
1972, 412-18; Melzer
mitment
study of the aims of legislation in the chapter prior to his

of the legislator in SC Il.vii makes clear that
description
such
a balance
is necessary,
as a commitment
to univer
sal justice in the absence of positive law cannot guarantee

re
of actual justice; hence Rousseau's
the establishment
comes
from God, he alone
that while "all justice
minder
is its source," it remains true that to be realized, justice
requires a set of positive institutions; hence "conventions
and laws are therefore necessary to combine rights with
duties and to bring justice back to its object" (SC II.vi.2).
Such a conception will remind us of Smith's commitment
to balancing natural justice and positive law at the end of
to establish
TMS. But more crucially, the commitment
a
the
best
and
the
best
possible also
ing balance between
serves to mitigate
most
rhetorically
his transformative
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
the seeming extremism of Rousseau's

charged comments on the legislator and
duties. In this way Rousseau's concep

tion of the legislator leads back to Smith's, for the at
tempt to establish a balance between "universal justice"
and the "maxims
of politics" parallels Smith's commit

to describing a balance between the universal prin
ciples of "natural justice" and "contextual knowledge."
This parallel is extended when we turn to Rousseau's
on the science of the legislator.
comments
explicit
ment
Rousseau's
complete account comes in

or the Geneva
the Social Contract,
As Masters
details, Rousseau
comprehen
first and most
the first draft

Manuscript.
sively revised
of
this section of the work, with SC II.vii vir

all
that
remains
of the sustained investigation of the
tually
science of the legislator that occupied most of Book II of
in
GM; the "science of the legislator" is never mentioned
the final published version (Masters 1968, 293 and 1972,
the "true
413, 417). Yet Rousseau does explicitly mention
to
in
Letter
Here he
science"
the
dAlembert.
legislator's
explains that the mere task of crafting and writing legisla
tion is not a difficult one: "On the whole, the institution
of laws is not such a marvelous
thing that any man of
sense and equity could not easily find those which,
observed, would be the most beneficial for society."
challenge of legislating lies not simply in writing
laws, but inwriting laws well suited to a people: "the
well
The
good
force
of the laws has itsmeasure,

and the force of the vices that
one
too.
It
is
has
only after one has compared
they repress
two
and
found
that the former surpasses
these
quantities
the latter that the execution of the laws can be depended
the
of these relations constitutes
upon. The knowledge
true legislator's science" (L, 66). The central claim here
is that legislation cannot be judged good in the abstract,
but only by the degree of its fittingness for the people and
problems
for which
it is established.
legislators should strive to fit
of the people and the needs of
takes an important step back from the
on "transforming"
and "denaturing"
that wise
By insisting
their laws to the nature
the state, Rousseau
Utopian insistence
that he elsewhere
seems to advocate. This continues when

of the
example of a practitioner
he offers us a historical
"true legislator's science." In the Letter to dAlembert, his

a
example is Solon. Solon did more than simply author
to
adapt
legal code, Rousseau explains: "The problem is
it ismade and to the
this code to the people for which
it decrees to such an extent that its
things about which
of these re
execution follows from the very conjunction
lations; it is to impose on the people, after the fashion
of Solon, less the best laws in themselves than the best of
in the given situation" (L, 66). In echo
of Solon by Smith,
the endorsement
ing (or anticipating)
which
it admits
IN SMITHAND ROUSSEAU
THE "SCIENCE
OF THELEGISLATOR"
225
makes plain that legislative science is a science
the Letter one
of the second-best.12
Indeed throughout
a
realist insistence on the need
finds less idealism than
Rousseau
to accommodate
proposals
to circumstances:
"let
us
not
of perfection but for the best pos

sible according to the nature of man and the constitution
of society" (L, 110).
In GM Rousseau would further explore this aspect
of the Solonic or second-best approach to legislation. His
seek for the chimaera
constant
lesson throughout GM is that "these general ob

in each
institutions
should be modified
jects of all good
that arise as much

country according to the relationships
from the local situation as from the character of the in
habitants; and it is on the basis of these relationships that
each people must be assigned a particular system of leg
islation that is the best, not perhaps in itself, but for the
that a sole emphasis

otherwise
on transforming
or denaturing might
encourage.13
One
final aspect of Rousseau's

tor requires review before turning
science of the legisla

to the practical polit
to
above that common
It has been argued

ical writings.
both Rousseau's
and Smith's science
is an insistence
ical writings
we
that we
are about
turn to Rousseau's
accommodating
context.
Such
To see how,
for the import of
to examine.
final argument
accommodation
is neces
sary, he insists, because the particular ills of a given society

themselves contain the key to their reconciliation. This is
suggested explicitly in GM:
State for which
it is intended" (GM Il.vi, 193; SC II.xi.4;

In developing
cf. E, 34-35).
this claim, Rousseau makes
clear that legislators must tailor specific policies to the
In
exigencies of particular customs and circumstances.
But although there is no natural and general soci

ety among men, although men become unhappy
in becoming
and wicked
sociable, although the
GM this contrast takes the form of a distinction between

"right" on the one hand and "those matters of expedi
to every good institution"
ency which are indispensable
on the other (GM Il.iii, 183). The published version drops
who
the explicit distinction between right and expedience, but

claim that this distinction
in
repeats the fundamental
troduces, namely, that "just as a skillful architect, before
putting up a building, observes and tests the ground to see
whether
it can bear the weight, so the wise founder does
not start by drafting laws at random, but first examines
whether the people for whom he intends them is suited
to bear them" (GM Il.iii, 183; cf. SC Il.viii.l). The lesson
in each case is that legislators must begin their efforts to
improve men by taking them as they are (Masters 1972,
429). This leads Rousseau to insist that one should strive
always to work within the context of the material one has
been given: "he should not try to change the institution
of a people that is already subject to laws, let alone try
to restore an institution that has been abolished or to re
vive worn
out mechanisms"
(GM Il.iii, 188). Further, it
is the task of a wise legislator to take not just people but
also conditions as they are, and hence the call for the law
giver to attend to "the location, the climate, the soil, the

the neighbors, and all the particular relations of
morals,
the people that itwas his task to institute" (PE, 12). Seen
thusly, the science of the legislator
12Excellent
tempers
the idealism
of Rousseau's
account
of "Solonic"
analyses
legislation
on his "contextualism"
its influence
are provided
in Forman
Barzilai
and now inWilliams
(2003, 445-50)
17-18, 25-27,
(2007,
and
29-31).
on
the import of tailoring legislation to the ills of the times.

But this suggestion was to have a particularly
important
effect, and take on a unique cast, in the practical polit
laws of justice and equality mean nothing to those

live both in the freedom of the state of na
ture and subject to the needs of the social state,

far from thinking that there is neither virtue nor
happiness for us and that heaven has abandoned
us without
resources to the depravation
of the
us
to
let
draw
the
ill
itself
from
species,
attempt
the remedy that should cure it. Let us use new as
sociations to correct, if possible, the defect of the
general association. Let our violent speaker him
self judge its success. Let us show him in perfected
art the reparation of the ills that the beginnings
of art caused to nature. (GM I.ii, 162)
Herein
lies what
Starobinski
has called "the fundamental
the idea that

insight" of Rousseau's political philosophy:
the most effective political remedies are homeopathic,
or
internal to the disease being treated (Starobinski
1993,
118-31, quote at 127; Forman-Barzilai
2003, 462-63).
But what
precise form should this homeopathic

remedy
take? And put more directly: what are the "ills that the
beginnings of art caused to nature?" Rousseau's most di
rect treatment of this question

comes in the Discourse
on Inequality. In
transition between
the
the
describing
state
nature
of
and the corruptions of the civil state,
pure
Rousseau
identifies a middle position
characterized by
precisely the incipient ills that separate art from nature.
This he describes as the "period in the development
of
13
Masters
notes
that
such
commitment
Rousseau's
see Masters
also
from those of "value-free"

prescriptions
Smith's critique of positivistic
( 1972,419).
is a principal
theme of Fleischacker
(2004).
distinguishes
social science;
social science
226
faculties, occupying a just mean between the in
state and the petulant activity
of the primitive
state in which the "idea of
of our amour propre"?the
human
dolence
had been awakened in its nascent form,

consideration"
and "public esteem acquired a price" (SD 11.16-18). In
what follows I argue that it is Rousseau's
identification
of the civilizing potential of incipient love of consider
ation properly directed that characterizes his moderate
to Corsica
advice
remedy for their ills,

in the violent uprooting of the
and Poland.
The
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
edy proposed is not simply eradication of amour-propre,

of the common good
but its redirection to the promotion
Smith's and
1968, 380-82).
(Dent 1988, 225; cf. Masters
a
sciences of
Rousseau's
legislator thus share a common
aim: namely, demonstrating
how vanity can be steered
an agent of social stability and the promotion
The difference
in their sciences
well-being.
to become
of common
to which
their respective
seems
their
Smith's
train
attention;
legislator
legislators
to have inmind the prudent regulation of economic
self
lies in the forms of selfishness
argues, lies not

and
that constitute
the evidence of
passions
prejudices
their corruption, but rather the redirection of such pas
Rousseau
sions and prejudices towards more useful ends. For if in

deed it is true that today "everybody wants to be admired,"
it is then necessary "to excite the desire and to facilitate
of the love of honor and glory. But both are keenly sensitive
and
to the empire of opinion that dominates modernity,
both recognize that the central task of modern
legislators
of attracting by virtue the same admiration

that one today attracts only by wealth"
(OC III, 502-3;
cf. GP, 17).
and thereby redirect the vices modernity

encourages. This strategy is suggested in the discussion of
censors in the Social Contract:
Rousseau
the means
interest (see, e.g., M?ller

1993; Rosenberg
1960), whereas
seems more interested in the proper regulation
is to cultivate
to draw
It is useless
Science in Practice:
and Poland
The Legislator's
Corsica
The previous section of the article sought to demonstrate

that beneath Rousseau's extreme depiction of the legisla
claim:
tor in his theoretical writings
lies amore moderate
a distinction
between
the objects of its esteem;

from the same principle and
converges. Among all peoples of the
and
nation's morals
for all this follows
necessarily
the
determines
world, not nature but opinion
Reform
their
men's
choice of
opin
pleasures.
ions and their morals will be purified of them
is fine or what
selves. One always loves what
that so far from denaturing or transforming citizens, wise

same
legislators instead meet them where they stand. This
one finds
practical writings on
In
each
of
these
Corsica and Poland.14
works, Rousseau's
extreme republican rhetoric is striking. But when exam
that has to be regulated. Whoever

judges morals
whoever
and
honor,
judges honor takes
judges
tension
ined
is to be found
closely,
so
far
in Rousseau's
from
revealing
Rousseau
as
an
advo
cate of political denaturing or the recovery of supposed

instead suggest
these writings
ancient disinterestedness,
In each es
to
a more prudential
legislation.
approach
to the problems of existing
to
and
encouraging
passions and
regimes by appealing
to
As
these
endemic
such,
they stand
regimes.
prejudices
as examples of Rousseau's
efforts to practice the funda
crafts solutions
say, Rousseau
task of legislative science: namely, "to draw from

the ill itself the remedy that should cure it." Yet it is not
mental
that binds Rousseau's

ap
only this general formulation
to
ill that Rousseau diag
The
Smith's.
principal
proach
noses in each of the nations he examines is precisely a
form of the incipient selfishness characteristic of moder
in the Second Discourse
(see especially SD
nity diagnosed
the rem
in
of
these
each
11.27, 52, 57). Further,
writings,
to
that Rousseau
argues
applied
to the po
below
with
described
regard
strategies
and Corsica.
of Poland
14See also Hanley

the same
Geneva
litical ordering
(2006),
which
that one
opinion
to be
so, but
is mistaken;
it is in this judgment
it is this judgment
hence
as his law. (SC IV.vii.3; cf. Masters
1968,
385)
own advice
applies precisely this strategy in his
to actual states. It is perhaps most evident in his advice
to Geneva in the Letter to dAlembert. The seeming story
in its uncorrupted
of the Letter is that Geneva,
purity,
Rousseau
should ban the theater and thereby preserve its republican

simplicity. But the true story, always present just beneath
the surface, is that corruption has already made significant
headway
in Geneva,
and that its efforts might be better

that which it is already too
to meliorate
spent attempting
late to cure. Thus directly after introducing
legislator's
science,"
Rousseau
us to the "true
asks,
on
a
By what means can the government get hold
If
answer
is
it
that
I
morals?
by public opinion.
sen
own
our
are
our habits in retirement
born of
timents, in society they are born of others' opin
ions. When we do not live in ourselves but in oth
ers, it is their judgments which
guide everything.
THE "SCIENCE OF THE LEGISLATOR"
IN SMITH AND
ROUSSEAU
22J
appears good or desirable to individuals

Nothing
which the public has not judged to be such, and
the only happiness which most men know is to be
esteemed
(L, 67)
happy.
So far from a hopeful

tion, Rousseau's most
call of the idealist for transforma
forthright advice for the ennobling

to precisely the
demands a concession
of his fatherland
worst of all corruptions, the empire of amour-propre.

Put
state
receiv
knows
of
he
is incapable
differently: the best
must rest content
Rousseau
the
best
and
absolutely,
ing
of a nation whose
focusing on the transformation
tastes are already corrupted. Such advice is in fact con
sistent across Rousseau's works. He knows that he "may
be told that anyone who has to govern men should not
with
look for a perfection beyond their nature

are not capable," yet he remains optimistic
of which
they
that "it is not
impossible to teach them to love one object rather than

another, and to love what is genuinely fine rather than
what ismalformed,"
and "thus to transform into a sub
In recommending
this course of moral
simplicity
Rousseau of course seems
and economic self-sufficiency,
for
far from Smith's own practical
recommendations
Britain.16 Yet as the essay develops, Rousseau moderates
the extremism of his opening republican sallies, qualify
ing his initial statements with the disclaimers that his hope
was "not to destroy private property absolutely, because
that is impossible, but to restrict itwithin the narrowest
can
limits" (CC, 148), and his hope that even ifmoney
not practically be done away with altogether, "at least it
can be reduced to so small a thing that itwill be difficult
to arise" (CC, 147). As he continues he also
he has not forgotten his earlier lessons on
that
suggests
to specific conditions,
tailoring proposals
reminding us
that there are qualities "in the nature and the soil of each
for abuses
country" that render a particular type or form of govern

ment particularly well suited to it (CC, 127), and that wise
legislators must begin by taking the principle of "national
character" into account (CC, 133). In so doing Rousseau
lime virtue
reminds us that he remains aware that he is not legislat

ing for a new people, but one with cultural traditions and
of our vices"
institutions
the dangerous disposition

that gives rise to all
form the foun
This
advice
would
(PE, 36).
of his practical legislative advice to Corsica and
dation
Poland.15
Rousseau's Plan for a Constitution of Corsica presents

itself on its face as a rejection of accommodation
and an
endorsement
Its intro
of the politics of transformation.
duction reads as an explicit rejection of accommodation
to exigencies. Noting
ment from the people
Rousseau
that the separation of the govern

is the source of Corsica's difficulties,
that
explains
in such
a case,
wise
men,
"observ
for the
ing relations of suitability, form the government
nation. Nevertheless,
there is something much better to
do, that is to form the nation for the government"
(CC,
123). And he is clear on how Corsica should best pursue
this course. Throughout
is unstinting
his piece Rousseau
in his admonitions
for the Corsicans not to encourage
commerce.
So
far
from
of Corsica within wider
advocating
an
accommodation
European trade networks,

to take all possible means
stead calls the Corsicans

sure their economic
self-sufficiency.
on money,
he in
to en
Not
only must they

but they must also dis
discourage dependence
courage the growth of large urban centers and encourage
of both
agriculture that will promote the self-sufficiency
the nation and its citizens, and in so doing eradicate the
indolence, selfishness, and "stupid pride of bourgeois"
(CC, 131).
Furthermore, Rousseau also explicitly recognizes that

Corsica is the product of a series of specific historical cir
cumstances.
In the Social Contract, he praised Corsica as
the only country in Europe still capable of receiving leg
islation, owing to "the valor and steadfastness with which
this brave people was able to recover and defend its free
dom"
(SC II.x.6). Back then Corsica seemed the perfect

of a state "fit for legislation" on account of its self
sufficiency, independence, moderate wealth, and civic af
fection (SC II.x.5). But what does Rousseau find when he
reexamines Corsica from the point of view of a poten
model
tial legislator? Now he explains that the fundamental

fact
that shaped the Corsicans was their occupation by the Ge
noese who succeeded in "crushing" Corsica and reducing
it to abject poverty and dependence.
This leads him to
observe that even though Corsica has retained some of its
original virtues, in its servitude it contracted tremendous
vices that cannot be removed without recourse to extreme
measures
(CC, 137).
How
fledged
advice,
associated
with
regarding
rather than one who merely

legislator
see
(2003, 78-81).
especially
Kelly
Rousseau
provides
as a full
legislative
then does Rousseau
respond to such incipient

His
actual
corruption?
remedy is in fact far more accom
than
his
modating
opening rhetoric might have led one to
his poli
expect. In particular he strives to accommodate
cies to the main passion that has already been encouraged
in the Corsicans,
the consequence
presumably
of their
consists
same time, Rousseau's

distinction
between
and
money
that national
wealth
(CC, 140; cf. GP, 73) and his claim
in available
are also central
labor (CC, 125-26)
themes of
Smith's
antimercantilist
16At the
15On the difficulties
and habits.
wealth
argument
inWN
IV.
228
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
at the hands of the commercial Genoese;

is precisely the same passion on which
it
terestingly,
famous diagnosis of corruption
in the SD rests:
occupation
in
his
This stridency is particularly

regard to modernity.
evident in the choice Rousseau compels the Poles tomake
between agriculture and commerce.
"If what you wish is
with
merely
Thus
in order
to awaken
a nation's
it is
activity
necessary to give it great desires, great hopes, great
positive motives for acting. When well examined,
the great motive powers that make men act are
sciences,
to vanity alone.
claim in light of what has come before.

not
For
only does Rousseau here concede that his legisla
tive project for Corsica is conceived within the horizon
of the second best rather than the best absolutely, but he

also suggests that the key to its success lies in the prudent
directing of the chief passion of modernity. He goes on to
explain that the vanity of which he here speaks "is only
one of the two branches of amour-propre,"
the modern
failing on which SD focused. But rather than up
root amour-propre,
he here suggests that the legislator's
task lies in redirecting
it from vanity, its base form, to
moral
pride, its less base form (CC, 153-54).17 What is striking

then is the fact that even though Rousseau
is clearly an
advocate of ennobling
the moral conditions of the mod
ern Corsicans,
the ascent that he envisions is the limited
from
one
form
of
amour-propre
to
another.
Rousseau's advice to Poland follows a trajectory simi

to
lar his advice to Corsica. By far the most striking feature
of GP is its fervor for a recovery of republican simplicity.
Yet read closely it appears that rather than simply ad
the rejection of corruption, Rousseau means to
encourage the Poles to discover a solution to their vices
that emerges from their incipient corruption. Rousseau's
a practical application
advice in this respect constitutes
vocating
of the vanity-directing
project described in CC. Yet again
this may seem an odd place to start. GP frequently seems
as adamant as CC in calling for an institution of ideals
and rejection
of contextual
17
Rousseau's
methods
to its nobler
form
Smith's methods
terman
accommodation,
particularly
from
its base
of educating
amour-propre
are nicely
I compare
in Cooper
treated
(1999);
on this front in
to Rousseau's
(2008). Put
Hanley
account
of how both
offers a very helpful
485-89)
(2001,
amour
to the desire
and CC appeal
for opinion
prompted
by
to Rousseau's
these intentions
propre
(though without
connecting
account
For a quite different
of Rousseau's
science of the legislator).
in GP see Jeffrey Smith, which
claims
that far from ac
intentions
Rousseau
the conditions
of modernity,
forthrightly
commodating
virtue?a
in keeping with his call to the Poles

predilection
to "seize the opportunity
afforded by the events of the
and
raise
souls to the pitch of the souls
moment,
present
of the ancients" (GP, 12). And one must not be gentle in so
laws are not enough to ennoble men's

doing. Sumptuary
souls and "stamp out luxury": "You must reach deep into
men's hearts and uproot it by implanting there healthier
and nobler tastes" (GP, 18).
Here again the plan seems clear: not moderation
but
measures
are necessary if corruption
dire
is to be defeated
and expelled. Yet elsewhere Rousseau reminds us that he
has not forgotten the prudence of the legislator's science.
In the opening of the book he reminds us of the im
portance of sensitivity to context. "One must know thor
lest the
oughly the nation for which one is building,"
final product, "however excellent itmay be in itself, will
prove imperfect when it is acted upon" (GP, 1). Rousseau
presents his own proposal as tailored to the Poles, and
thus
an
exception
to the
pan-European
in his day; rather than imitate others, he seeks to

craft legislation suited to Poland itself (GP, 11,80,82,86).
But what then does he find when he turns to the nation
in question? The truth is that it fits his model of the ideal
state for legislation no better than had Corsica. Poland is
hardly the sort of small nation inwhich the bonds of civic
and unity,
affection guarantee national self-identification
but rather a large state, wracked by internal faction and
and bordered by large, powerful neighbors
dissension,
(GP, 10, 31; cf. GM ILiii, 183-84; SC II.x.5). In addition,
it seems that Poland may be no more free of the cor
than the rest of Europe.
ruptions endemic to modernity
Thus just before examining
the three great legislators of
antiquity, Rousseau describes the difference between the
and the moderns:
ancients
aspires
18
It should, however,
be noted
in the piece,
claims elsewhere
of ancient
virtue"
(2003,
412).
systems
legislative
common
GP
to "the cultivation
industry."
the
if perchance
try to combine them" (GP, 67-68). Thus not only does a

seem unlikely, Rousseau also
moderate
accommodation
here states his preference for ancient virtue over modern
This is a remarkable
ascent
commerce,
"cultivate
"But
if possible, useless besides."18 Yet either way, one must

choose: "Since the two plans of action I speak of are for
the most part mutually
exclusive, you must, above all, not
(CC, 153)
or moderate
arts,
a great splash," he counsels,
to be a free nation, a peaceful nation, a wise

nation," you must both recover older customs and tastes,
to become an object of contempt and,
and "cause money
to two, sensual pleasure and vanity, still if

remove
from the first everything that belongs
you
to the second, in the final analysis, you will find
is reduced almost
the
you wish
reduced
that everything
tomake
that Rousseau
just as he does
qualifies
in CC
these
extreme
(see GP,
73).
IN SMITHAND ROUSSEAU229
THE "SCIENCE
OF THELEGISLATOR"
base to its less base form. The same movement
prevents us from being the kind of men they

and
were? The prejudices,
the base philosophy,
the passions of narrow self-interest which, along
to the welfare of others, have
with indifference
What
in the examination
Poland:
in all our hearts by ill-devised

inwhich we find no trace of the hand
been
One
inculcated
This of course
admits of several different readings. On

the one hand, itmight be seen as a call for modern
leg
islators to emulate those ancients who sought to trans
republicanism
insisting that "we" today are shaped by "prejudices"
well as by the "passions of narrow self-interest"?indeed
Such advice is indeed
(cf. Danford
1980,694-95).
passions
fully in keeping with Rousseau's earlier admonition
that
are established
and prejudices have taken

to want
root, it is a dangerous and foolhardy undertaking
to touch them" (GM Il.iii, 184).
As we read on, it at least becomes clear that Rousseau
to appeal to the modern passions, if not pre

cisely the "passions of narrow self-interest."
Interestingly
he uses the example of the ancients to introduce this de
is concerned
man
conception
on
founded
the
rather
emulation,
republican
proper
channeling
than
the
of
recovery
amour-propre
of
recognition
In
seeking
is to direct
individual
to
V.i.f.4;
encourage
the native
Poles
emulation,
via
love of honor
to work
upon public esteem as to be unable

dependent
to do anything, acquire anything, or achieve any
it. The resulting emulation among
thing without
its turn, would
raises
men?as
above themselves.
nothing
else
can
raise
them?
(GP, 87)
goal
in the hearts of the

In this
good.
sense, it is lesson analogous to the lesson taught in Corsica.
There Rousseau's goal was not to abolish amour-propre,
but to effect an ascent from vanity
produce a ferment that, in

awaken that patriotic fervor which
all the citizens would
I.iii.2).
for the common
passions,
that everyone?from
the least of the nobles, or
even the least of the peasants, up to the king him
be so completely
self, if that were possible?shall
disinterestedness.
Rousseau's
these
upward and win success except by public appro

shall be
bation; that every post and employment
filled in accordance with the nation's wishes; and
not merely
to
but also to the modern
love of
cf. TMS
foment
It consists in seeing to it that every citizen shall

feel the eyes of his fellow-countrymen
upon him
no
man
of the day; that
shall move
every moment
for the self that is fundamental

(cf.WN
to
insists, can the characteristic

Only in this way, Rousseau
vice of modernity,
the love of opinion, be employed to
recover what modernity
has lost. Thus the remedy most
likely to succeed:
ing that emulation and "the love of glory" will prove the
best means of shaping the hearts and minds of the Poles,
Rousseau advocates a prudent means of appealing to the
love of honor
reservoir of several strong
seek to overcome selfishness; his legislative proposals rest

on steering self-interest well rather than attempting
to
transcend it. Secondly, Rousseau makes clear how he in
tends to steer selfishness, namely by attempting to direct
it to the love of glory and away from the love of wealth.
is striking here is less Rousseau's endorsement of

ancient methods
than his sense that such methods might
be particularly suited to modern Poland. For in suggest
the ancient
how
The effect of this passage is twofold. First, Rousseau clearly

distances his position from that of the idealism that would
But what
concern
.Learn
learn how to open up a direct path to their satis

faction that can be travelled without money, and
money will soon lose its price. (GP, 70)
that is, is itself
virtue,
heart
there is a natural
passions..
cidedly modern approach. Thus he explains the principal

aim of Greek legislators seeking to fashion peoples was
to "set them on fire with the spirit of emulation," which
"tied them tightly to the fatherland" (GP, 8). Rousseau's
of classical
act only by appealing to their

I know. Of all interests, how
(I reiterate this with confidence

least im
and shall always insist upon it)?the
In the heart of every
portant and compelling.
as
it is to this fact that his advocacy of Polish nationalism has

been traced (Hassner 1997, 209). But such a formulation
brings Rousseau much closer to Smith; both emphasize
the largely overlooked fact that the proper task of legisla
tors is principally to attend to these existing prejudices and
"once customs
the human
in
of ancient
That
ever, that in pecuniary gain is the most evil, the

most vile, the readiest to be corrupted,
though
of
the eyes of one who has knowledge
also?in
peoples. On the other hand, Rousseau

to remind us of our distance from the
disinterestedness
ostensible
can make men
self-interest.
institutions,
of genius. (GP, 5)
form corrupted
explicitly means
is suggested
that Rousseau makes in
of selfishness
to pride, or its more
The key to elevating the moral character of the Poles is to

them where they stand. So far from insisting that the
love of opinion engendered by amour-propre
should be
abolished, Rousseau employs it as the source of its tran
meet
scendence.
Already
corrupted
by an extreme
solicitude
230
for esteem, the Poles' best hope lies in total submission to
opinion. The division of the bourgeois between his pri
vate happiness and his solicitude for public esteem which
always transports him outside of himself is to be rectified
by rendering the solicitude for esteem the only source of
his happiness: "let him be conscious always that every de
tail of his conduct is being observed and evaluated by his
that no step he takes will go unnoticed,
fellow-citizens,
that no action he performs will be disregarded, and that
the good and the evil he does are being posted upon a
that will affect every
scrupulously accurate balance-sheet
subsequent moment
of his life" (GP, 88). The struggle for

thus become the only concern of
public recognition
the good citizen (GP, 15,22,64,102).
Rousseau hopes that
such competition
for the honors and esteem of the public
must
will ultimately
lead each to "channel all their efforts into
the
glory and prosperity of the state" (GP, 52).
forwarding
In such amanner, his legislative science comes full circle
back to Smith's, for what is true of Smith's market holds
true for Rousseau's
not the disinterested
Poland:
love of
virtue, but the competition of each with all, inwhich every

individual is driven by a desire for the external good of es
for promoting
the universal
teem, becomes amechanism
of the whole.
well-being
RYANPATRICK
HANLEY
the moderation
of their
necessary for the instantiation
and Smith
ideals, how do Rousseau
respective political
understand
those principles themselves?
We begin with Smith. The foundations of Smith's sys
tem of natural
liberty are to be found in his commitment

to the existence of "rules of natural justice." The question
has rightly been raised by several of Smith's commentators
as towhether
in fact the sort of skeptical epistemology

that
allows him to claim that the principles of
Smith articulates
natural justice are in fact humanly knowable; on this view,

it is held that the "standpoint external to the human spec
tacle" necessary for the investigation of the first principles
of natural
(Griswold 1999, 256

justice is "unavailable"
58 and 2006, 182-86; Fleischacker 2004, 166-69). This
question of whether Smith's skepticism can be reconciled
with his faith in the existence of natural order is impor
tant and demands
separate treatment. But what ismost

us
here
is less the potential epistemological
important for
of natural order
problems posed by Smith's conception
than the positive political work that this conception does
in Smith's system of natural liberty. Indeed, in one sense,
the fact that the universal principles of natural justice can
not be comprehensively
known is of the greatest political
Smith.
Smith's
for
import
primary defense of individual
is founded not in an ap
liberty in the Wealth ofNations
to
in the evidence that he
but
rather
natural
peal
rights
"Rules of Natural Justice" and

"Principles of Political Right"
adduces
for what Griswold calls "the epistemic limits of

(Griswold 1999, 302-4). One of Smith's
statesmanship"
the science
normative
intentions in presenting
principal
I have argued that both Rousseau's and Smith's vi

sions of the science of the legislator seek to promote mod
of the legislator in the manner

that he does is clearly to
the
induce humility?and
hence a greater restraint?via
our
of
reminder that the imperfection
ability to under
Above
eration
as each
insofar
emphasizes
the need
to
mitigate
principles of justice with a

a
to
of
the
given political context. Yet
sensitivity
exigencies
itself raises a
this emphasis on expedience, or moderation,
heretofore unaddressed question: how is Rousseau's con
commitment
to the universal
stand
natural
order
ought
to restrain
our
interventions.
Yet such an approach to legislation can only work

if indeed the system of natural liberty can be assumed
immoderation
to operate with minimal

external involvement. Much of
Smith's positive political program rests on the claim that
natural order ismore efficient than the constructs of men,
a view that itself seems to be founded on Smith's faith in
dressing a second question. For while it has been argued

above that both Smith and Rousseau are dedicated to tem
pering the ideal with the real, it is by no means clear that
natural or
the existence of a providential or ideological
der (see esp. Alvey 2004; Hill 2001; Waterman
2002; cf.
Haakonssen
1981, 77). Put differently, Smith's argument
interests by ambi
the
of human
manipulation
against
to be squared with the explicit political

that the
of SC Il.vii?19 It is this question
article's remainder will address. Yet doing so requires ad
cealed moderation
of what it is that requires

they have similar conceptions
not
that Smith's vision of
is
clear
That
it
is,
tempering.
or
"rules of natural justice" is
the "general principles"
commensurate
with Rousseau's vision of the principles
justice" or the "principles of political right."
to
Thus we might ask: given their shared commitment
of "universal
19I am
question.
grateful
to Louis
Hunt
for compelling
me
to address
this
tious legislators is founded on the claim that human in

terests are naturally self-regulating
and can promote the
common
interest of the whole,
independent of extensive
It is, however, precisely this claim
to challenge. Despite
concerned
his several explicit invocations of natural order, Rousseau
serve
consistently denies that it can be known or might
as a guide for political order. Given this skepticism, the
human
intervention.
that Rousseau
fundamental
is most
legislative
task is not
imitation
of natural
231
OF THELEGISLATOR"
THE "SCIENCE
of an artificial order to replace a nat
and to the degree
ural order that is largely unknowable,
to justice.
to
inimical
be
is
that it knowable, appears
on
the
front?indeed
this
Rousseau's consistent claim
claim that necessitates the extensive political proposals of
order but creation
the claim that unregulated nature

tends towards injustice. Thus Rousseau's
striking rejoin
der to Smith's natural justice is that nature, left unto it
self, tends to promote injustice: "Far from there being an
1983, 640-42). This in turn be

I.vii, 178; PE 19;Melzer
comes the task of the legislator. Realizing the absence of
justice, the legislator is charged with the responsi
of
replacing natural law with positive law (GM I.iii;
bility
natural
SCI.i.2).21
the Social Contract?is
private interest and the general good,

exclusive in the natural order of things"
Rousseau
claims, nature
(GM I.ii, 160). Consequently,
cannot serve as a guide for politics (GM I.ii, 158-60; cf.
1983, 639, 645), insofar as politics must
PE, 6; Melzer
alliance between
they are mutually
nature.
artificially create the justice that is absent from
Hence Rousseau's departure from Smith: where Smith's
that
finds its anchor in his conviction
"libertarianism"
the natural order is capable of self-regulating private in
terest for the sake of general interest, Rousseau
argues
in this regard that
that it is precisely nature's insufficiency
requires replacing natural disorder with artificial order.
And hence Rousseau's
version
of Hume's
sensible knave
man necessarily fol

problem. Left unto nature, he insists,
lows his selfish instincts, and it is this that necessitates
order with the
conventional
creation of a comprehensive
sole purpose of redirecting individuals from the pursuit
of
of their "apparent interest" towards an appreciation
their interest "properly understood"
(GM I.ii, 163)?that
is to say, politics must be dedicated to "substituting justice
for instinct" (GM I.ii-iii, 163-65; SC I.viii.l).20 It is then
Rousseau's pessimism over the existence of natural justice
that leads him to propose the creation through convention
of "the rules of rational natural right" in order to supplant
what goes under the name of "natural right properly so
called," and is "based only on a true but very vague senti
that is often stifled by love of ourselves" (GM II.iv,
is founded on the
191 ). In this light, Rousseau's positivism
of
natural
of
the
justice that Smith is
principles
rejection
concerned to establish. "Law comes before justice and not
ment
nat
justice before law" precisely because the injustice of
it: "The true principles of the just
ural interest demands
and unjust must, therefore, be sought in the fundamental
and universal law of the greatest good of all, and not in
the private relations between one man and another; and
there is no particular rule of justice that cannot be easily
deduced from that first law" (GM Il.iv, 190-91; cf. GM
that wise
with
the suggestion
in conjunction
legis
to the gods"
their own wisdom
"attribute
(GM II.ii,
the ac
whether
182; SC II.vii.4, 9; cf. PE, 19), leads one to wonder
count of justice at SC II.vi.2 is delivered
in the voice of the political
20This
lators
claim,
should
philosopher
addressing
addressing
a people.
a potential
legislator
or that of the legislator
and
Conclusion: The Enlightenment

Nation Building Today
of the
conceptions
the legislator compare? Their fundamental
I have argued, lies in their shared insistence
agreement,
that legislators must temper their efforts at instituting
a prudential and moderate
sensi
general principles with
In
work.
contexts
in
which
to
and
the
conditions
they
tivity
an
the
of
"passions"
appreciation
particular they require
then do Smith's and Rousseau's
How
of
science
and "prejudices" native to the people for whom they legis

late, as well as an appreciation of the degree to which these
native passions and prejudices have been transformed by
exposure to passions and prejudices of alternative prove
nance. Their difference then lies not in their positions on
the conditions of modernity?
the need to accommodate
rather their differing concep
they agree?but
are intended
tions of the ideals that such accommodations
on which
science of the legislator, dedi

Rousseau's
to
cated
creating the principles of political right, in this
respect sharply clashes with Smith's. Where Smith seeks to
preserve natural justice, Rousseau seeks to create justice to
to instantiate.
remedy the challenges that an unregulated nature would

is
the goal of Smith's moderation
otherwise pose. Where
life and thereby
then to restrain the claims of political
allow for the persistence of nature in society, Rousseau's
is dedicated to the comparatively
legislative moderation
immoderate goal of transcending the injustice and chaos
that
are,
on
his
nation
Contemporary
to Smith's
attention
and
It would
agreements.
thinker in the history
ready
to our
answers
to nature.
endemic
view,
builders
Rousseau's
to gain
stand
agreements
and
from
dis
to suggest that any

be dangerous
can provide
of political philosophy
to extract
attempting
problems;
con
texts would be particu

in which the texts
in
the
instance,
present
larly egregious
in question teach the import of appreciating nuances and
in discrete situations and of resisting urges
particularities
temporary
21
Hence
ernment
and
lessons from historical
Rousseau's
is nothing
anti-foundationalism:
but
a science
"For the science
of gov
combinations,
applications
circumstances"
(Let
to times, places,
according
Later Political Writ
26 July 1767, in Gourevitch,
to the "positivistic"
important
reading of
challenges
see
Scott (1994) and Williams
(2005b).
especially
exceptions,
ter to Mirabeau,
ings, 269). For
Rousseau,
of
HANLEY
232 RYANPATRICK
to legislate via imposition of ideal templates. At the same
of the science of
time, the Enlightenment's
conception
the legislator is worthy of our attention for at least two
peoples
reasons.
important task is to grasp the nature of the particular

loves of a particular people, and craft legislation that ap
peals to such loves, however corrupted by recent experi
ences. The lesson isparticularly apt for democratic nation
cur
First, for all their internal disagreements,
over
concur
rent debates
in recognizing
nation building
that America is likely to be engaged in nation building for
some time, and that we have thus far failed to establish
an adequate framework
for dealing with its challenges
(Dobbins 2003, xiii-xxix;
Fukuyama 2006, 8-12). Con
temporary lack of clarity thus provides one argument in
favor of returning to the Enlightenment.
conception
tantly, the Enlightenment's
Yet more
impor
of the science of
the legislator also enables us to understand better both the

necessary disposition
required of nation builders, as well
as how nation builders might most effectively cultivate
a no
less necessary receptivity to the dispositions

peoples who comprise the nation to be built.
of the
featured
of initial
and the pessimism and despair of retrospective

in the
Itwould be easy to counsel "moderation"
reformers
assessors.
builders
to build democratic
seeking
nations.
America's
in na
recent nation-building
projects have largely been
tions emerging from undemocratic
and sometimes
total
to the science of the legisla

tor proposed by Smith and Rousseau would suggest that
while freedom and democratic
self-rule remain noble and
itarian conditions.
Attention
proper goals for these efforts, a direct appeal to such a peo

ple's love of freedom is unto itself unlikely to succeed; also
needed is engagement with the actual present loves and
of such a people, and not merely
those loves and
needs one might wish them to have (see also Williams
that is, can remind
2007, 30-31). Smith and Rousseau,
"our present-day
lawgivers, thinking exclusively in terms
needs
With regard to the former, Smith and Rousseau de

scribe a disposition
likely to be both more sustainable and
more successful than those often seen today. Recent Amer
efforts have prominently
ican nation-building
two dispositions:
the enthusiasm
and idealism
in which this psychology has been

In particular, Smith
their
shaped by
political experience.
and Rousseau counsel that the legislator's first and most
and the ways
they err in for

in the question
of coercion
and punishment,"
how much
that the essential problem consists
getting
of "how to reach men's
hearts"
(GP, 4).
this would miss the subtlety

face of such extremes?yet
Smith and Rousseau
of the particular sort of moderation
In the first place, their moderation
empha
intervention and calls for an
sizes the limits of political
solutions. But to leave matters at
embrace of second-best
to
realism rather
recommend a deflationary
that would be
recommend.
their vision
than genuine moderation. What distinguishes
of the science of a legislator is that it joins to this tempering
of idealism a steady attachment to guiding universal prin
realize that the hard-nosed
ciples. Smith and Rousseau
is likely to degenerate
dismissal of universal principles
into Machiavellianism,
just as the too-eager embrace of
is likely to lead to hubristic enthusiasm.
such principles
lies in its effort to establish
The genius of their moderation
ideals and context, and thereby enable
to navigate a course between the Scylla of un
a balance between
a legislator
practicality
mitigated
idealism.
and the Charybdis
of immoderate
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Enlightened Nation Building: The "Science of the Legislator" in Adam Smith and Rousseau

Author(s): Ryan Patrick Hanley

right with sensitivity to actual political conditions?a

claim that importantly and unexpectedly parallels the better known

et al. 2003; Feldman 2004; Fukuyama

of rational, universal norms, the most valuable

of national identity and of how national integration might

the necessity of both accommodating

In light of such dis

and cultural flourishing.

Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and in particular

as the champion of either primitivism or classi

nation builders? The

gard to the proper role of the United States in constructing

and Smith's visions of the science of the legis

below is that Rousseau's vision of the true legislator's sci

of this article were

and also at the 2005

of the best regime from

project. Rousseau's advice to nation-building

the second vision

practical works on Corsica and Poland,

is today famous as the champion of the

and vices of modernity

and the immoderation

and argues that the divide that sep

to teach that politics does better when directed

rests on his distinction

Natural Justice and Particular

offers students of the history of po

at first seem strange,

the claim. Even

directing the views of the statesman" (TMS VI.ii.2.18).

to "general principles"? Charles Griswold notes

to guide the science of the legislator "unquestion

(Griswold 1999, 36n59). There he distin

of the laws of all nations"?a

from the study of

above the pol

in the abstract principles of natural

ples. But lacking a clear definition of such principles, am

in his famous portrait of the "man of sys

tern." The man of system is first and foremost aman driven

political zealotry, for when this "spirit of system" mixes

it even to the madness

arranges the different pieces upon a chess

society, every single piece has

But good government

reformers. Yet this itself

insofar as the "system of

per his commitment

then is that the legislator must tem

respect the established powers and privileges

in which he serves. Only by so do

is divided. Though he should consider some of

nicely captures the distinction between these

what, by Cicero, is justly called the divine maxim

as he can, his public arrangements

1981, 79-82, 89; see also McNa

(TMS VI.i.15).6 Such prudence is

and thereby better guarantee that

and his ability to craft

niencies which may flow from the want of those