Indias Nuclear Weapons Program

Raj Bhakta & Jackie Austell

Evaluation of a Indias Capabilities and Pathways to Proliferation

India is not a signatory of the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons) or the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) but does
have facility specific agreements with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency). It is also allowed by the NSG ( Nuclear Suppliers Group) to engage
in civilian nuclear related commerce. It does have a nuclear arsenal as
evidenced by its peaceful nuclear detonation named Smiling Buddha 1974
in Rajasthan (1) .
In 1954, India opened its Department of Atomic Research which sought
to provide India an atomic research program for energy independence as
well as for building nuclear weapons. This program was started despite
public opposition from Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India at the
time. However, given Indias loss to China in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 ,
Chinese nuclear explosion of 1964, and constant pressure from Pakistan, it
needed to provide itself a means to national security (2). These national
security concerns in conjunction with their interests to advance energy
research in the way of nuclear, allowed India to build an economic,
technological, and industrial infrastructure to achieve proliferation status (3).
Having a nuclear infrastructure affords a country the potential to couple a
nuclear weapons program to its nuclear energy program. This is precisely
what India did. However, in terms of its economic growth, during the 1960s it
was a bit sluggish (8). As a result, India was presented with a great deal of
economic aid through the Atoms for Peace program with the help of the US
and Canada in terms of financing its CIRUS reactor and other nuclear
activities. The US guaranteed around $93 million in aid with grants and
loans, with 75% of it being subsidized (9). India was very lucky to receive the
knowledge, expertise, and financing to start their nuclear program without
the corresponding safeguards.
In 1958, India reached an agreement with the US and Canada to build
a heavy-water research reactor under the Atoms for Peace program (1). This
was a significant point in Indias path to proliferation as it brought in the

initial flux of knowledge and expertise India needed to run its nuclear
program. This reactor was brought in mutual agreement that it be used for
peaceful purposes only. Interestingly, India did not buy its nuclear fuel from
Canada or the US. Instead, it pursued its own fuel cycle based on its threestage nuclear program. Additionally, in 1964 it was able to build a
reprocessing plant dubbed Project Phoenix that had a 30-ton capacity for
reprocessing plutonium (4). This plan was was based on the US plutoniumreprocessing method known as PUREX (4).
Indias nuclear technology centered around the nuclear energy
program that India was increasingly allocating its resources to. It is believed
that the Dhruva heavy-water reactor in the suburbs of Mumbai was used to
produce weapons grade plutonium(4 ). It is believed to produce on the order
of 20 kg of weapons grade plutonium in its spent fuel (4). Dhruva was
safeguards free as the IAEA did not exist at the time of the agreement for the
CIRUS reactor. Dhruva was based on CIRUS, a CANDU reactor which India
received from the US and Canada to utilize in their three-stage nuclear
program to breed the plutonium needed to utilize thorium as their base
nuclear fuel (1). However, CIRUS was outlined by the US as only for civilian
use. The help that India received from Canada and the US to develop its
reactors along with their budding nuclear energy program, afforded India a
chance to secretly produce their nuclear weapons. The foreign expertise
received from the US and Canada fed India with valuable knowledge that
would later be used to produce a weapon.
The path to proliferation for India began during P.K. Iyengars 1968 visit
to the Soviet Union to tour the fast fission reactors there. Iyengar was the
head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and a nuclear physicist who
helped elevate India to the nuclear club. He was impressed by the facilities in
the Soviet Union and the potential to conduct fission research that could help
pave the way for a nuclear weapon given that fast fission is essentially the
basis for nuclear fission in nuclear bombs (3). He later set out for a plan to
make a fast fission reactor dubbed Purnima. This reactor brought much

needed physics and nuclear engineering knowledge and experience. It was

not directly used to make the fissile material for Smiling Buddha or any
subsequent bombs, but it provided a test bed for fast fission experiments
that would be indispensable for the technical developments of the bomb.
In 1970, there was substantial progress in regards to nuclear
technology. The plutonium alloys needed for the construction of the bomb
core were being fabricated as well as implosion simulations on a Soviet Besm
6 computer. The Soviet Union, interestingly aided India by giving it much
needed technology and exposure to key ideas and methods needed to build
the bomb. The implosion research was taken over by V.S. Ramamurthy and
the electronics research was taken over by R. Dastidar. IN July 1970, Dr.
Chaudari took over as the director of the Defense Research and
Development Organization. He and Ramanna then spearheaded the Terminal
Ballistics Research Laboratory to develop the explosive lens needed for a
nuclear bomb. The next year in 1971, weapon design continued with the
fission process models, efficiency calculations, plutonium state model,
implosion model, nuclear fission chain reaction models, and mechanical
processes of the device. Progress greatly increased and the research phase
was quickly achieving the level of development needed for India to realize its
dreams of nuclear proliferation.
In 1972, there was ample progress made towards completing the basic
design of the first bomb (Smiling Buddha). Research continued as then Prime
Minister Indira Ghandhi tracked the progress and continued on the path of
proliferation. Finally, in 1974 in the deserts of the Indian state of Rajasthan,
the Smiling Buddha was detonated breaking the silence of the international
non-proliferation regime and laying to waste the existence of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty ( 3). Subsequently, Canada froze its aid to India but
the US did not (3). The detonation of 1974, also served to be a motivator for
establishing stronger trade restrictions for nuclear related technology thus
establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (1). India never signed onto this
treaty. The fact these organizations and treaties either did not exist or

werent signed by India, allowed India to freely pursue their nuclear

proliferation agenda for national security. As a result of Indias international
stance and history as a democratic nation, it was given the opportunity to
pursue nuclear energy with economic and technological aid from the US,
Canada, and Soviet Union. It can be argued that India was seen as a key ally
in the south asian subcontinent given that China was already a big nuclear
power. However, India, pressured by Pakistan and China used this help to
build its own nuclear weapons program while increasing its nuclear
infrastructure. It is an interesting pathway to proliferation given the
geopolitical complexities of the parties involved. It signaled to the world, that
any country with the resources and drive could pursue a nuclear weapon.
The need for stronger safeguards was imminent as ever, yet no state can be
absolutely stopped from building a nuclear weapon - they can only be
prevented.
Objectives and Consequences
There are varying opinions about the reason why India chose to
develop nuclear weapons. Some believe India developed a nuclear weapons
program to achieve goals of national self-expression and identity
constructions, however, there was a bigger problem next door. China
detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1964. Coming out of a humiliating ending
to the Sino-Indian war, India did not want to be caught napping again like
they had previously. While China was developing their nuclear program in the
60s, India had no way of protecting themselves. They did not have any
ballistic range missile capabilities. Having China detonate a nuclear bomb did
not ease any tension between the two countries. India wanted full deterrence
against China. When China detonated their bomb, India was afraid it would
be used against them giving India more the reason to develop a nuclear
weapon.
When India and China erupted into the Sino-Indian War in 1962, India
was left powerless. India and the Soviet Union have had a long history of a

militant relationship. While the USSR had provided India with military aid in
the past, when India needed support during the war, they did not provide
military help. The Soviets were facing down to the US at the same moment in
the Cuban Missile Crisis and switched to support the Chinese to bolster its
own position (5). This resulted in the USSR as an unreliable ally. They didnt
want to be at the same disadvantage with the Soviets as they were with the
Chinese.
Being a fish in a pond of sharks, India was surrounded by diplomatic
countries. China was getting much attention for being a superpower in the
early 60s. The only reason they were seen as a superpower was due to their
nuclear weapons. They were given a seat on the UN Security Council
whereas India was not. With the same economic growth as China, India had a
hard desire to have the same self prestige that China was getting. Pakistan
also had a relationship with China making them feel even more powerless.
India had a desire for prestige and respect in the international community.
The leaders of India chased after the idea of power and social recognition
which became a driving force for the goal of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan proved not to be a concern. When Pakistan and India fought in
1971 over borders between the two countries, India won. India did not see
them as a threat because they were able to be handled by conventional
means (5). Chinas militant relationship with Pakistan proved to be nothing
since they failed to provide any means of assistance. Pakistan suffered
military defeat as well as demonstrating inferiority to India. The fear of the
relationship between China and Pakistan proved to be nothing. During this
time, India had grown closer to the USSR because of the CIRUS project.
India detonated their first nuke in 1974. While Indias reasoning for the
detonation was for peaceful purposes, it soon came clear that there was no
scientific evidence for peaceful purposes but just to see that it worked (5).
For the next few years, Indias weapon program and civilian program halted.
They lacked resources due to the halt of aid from other countries. India
struggled to gain credibility. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came into power for

a second term with a renewed interest in nuclear weapons. They started to

develop weapons but were detected by the US. While leaders in the Indian
army were pushing for the nuclear option, Gandhi knew there would be
international repercussions for doing so. She was more focused on increasing
the relationship with the United States. She later approved of new nuclear
tests but then called it off due to US pressure. Economic reprisals due to new
nuclear tests were the primary reasons she called it off. Gandhi never
reproached the subject even after the Indian army asked. Despite her
rejections, the Indian army still advanced on the development of a nuclear
arsenal (5).
In the mid eighties, India heard of the advancement in Pakistans
nuclear weapons capability. They were getting attention for the nuclear
capability. Over the next few years, India and Pakistan encountered a few
complications over territory that turned into a mini-crisis. While India still
remained unconcerned with Pakistan, their development of nuclear weapons
pushed India to develop their own. This began the nuclear arms race against
the two countries.
In 1998, India successfully tested 3 bombs. With the Hindu nationalist
party in charge, their desire for great-power status came from nuclear
weapons. At this point, most of the world had taken up the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty which prohibited nuclear weapons test after 1996. There was
an outpouring of condemnation across the world. Pakistan was concerned
that the effort the United States put in to stop the nuclear arms race was
about to collapse (6). Pakistan pushed for the US to put sanctions on India.
The Cold War left everyone in a realization of the danger of nuclear
weapons. The US and USSR then began to advance on disarmament and
nonproliferation. In 1991, the START treaty was signed. The treaty was an
agreement between the US and USSR to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. If
the two countries that had the most weapons decided to reduce their
stockpile, it might help push other countries to follow suit. Along with a
series of disarmament treaties, the reduction of stockpile is how

nonproliferation will be achieved. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was

taken up by the world in 1996. When India successfully test 3 nuclear
weapons, there was an outpouring of condemnation across the world.
Pakistan was concerned that the effort the US put in to stop the nuclear arms
race was about to collapse (6).
Ultimately India was successful in developing a nuclear weapons
program. Today they are estimated to have 110 nuclear weapons (7). They
have achieved their goal to have a ballistic long range missile. When India
detonated their bomb in 1974, it stunned the world. Nobody was expecting
India to develop a successful nuclear weapons program. This was a big
turning point for nuclear non-proliferation. While the world was focusing on
non-proliferation by signing the NPT in 1968, India was developing their own
nuke. Their peaceful nuclear program was a blanket for their weapons
program. This means that anyone who has the capability and desire to create
a weapons program, can do it successfully behind closed doors. The test
shattered the worlds hope for non-proliferation. It really put a push for more
international safeguards at nuclear facilities to prohibit the development of
nuclear weapon material. The NSG was a direct result of Indias test in 1974.
There was a need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials
and technology. It allowed for countries that were apart of the NPT to be
brought in. The Trigger List and Dual List also followed the creation of the
NSG.

Conclusion
India was a perfect example of a country motivated to pursue nuclear
weapons in the midst of geopolitical threats. It coupled its nuclear energy
program with its nuclear weapons program which allowed it to pursue civilian
use of nuclear technology under the Atoms for Peace program and utilize the
knowledge and expertise from this infrastructure to develop its own nuclear

weapon program. In regards to international safeguards, India served as an

example of what a country could do if they indeed were driven enough to
pursue a clandestine nuclear program. The need for nuclear safeguards is
incredibly important given that there is no surefire way of stopping a state
from acquiring nuclear weapons or developing them. The most effective way
to tackle this international threat to global security is to collectively pursue
safeguards at the individual state level. International nuclear safeguards will
be a work in progress for some time to come.

Sources
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2015, from http://www.nti.org/facilities/858/
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