EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950.]

JEAN
L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine
Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.
J. C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla and Eduardo Arboleda, for
petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong,
Lorenzo Taada, and Vicente J. Francisco, for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.LAW; POWER OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY. The power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY. The Congress of
the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the
Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, and the field
of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to
define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded. Sufficed it to say that it must be coextensive with the
range of legislative power.
3.ID.; POWER OF HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A
WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT. No person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is
required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire.
4.ID.; ID. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to
answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject
of the course to his constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.
5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION. The
materiality of a question that it may be propounded to a witness is
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and
not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON
MATERIALITY. Where the immateriality of the information sought
by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention.
Although the legislative body has the power to make the inquiry,
the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power .

7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH

LEGISLATIVE ACTION. Since the Court has no power to determine
what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that
the information sought from a witness which is material to the
subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or
possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to
determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may
take after the completion of the legislative investigation.
8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO
COMMIT A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF
LEGISLATIVE SESSION. There is no sound reason to limit the
power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. While the existence of the House of
Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so
limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not ceases to
exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the
House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted.
9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL
OF WITNESS TO ANSWER. Testimony which is obviously false or
evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so
punishable.
10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE
WHETHER QUESTION IS INCRIMINATORY. It is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate, as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his
general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful
excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure
immunity to a third person.
11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN. It is the
duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony
before a competent authority. His Constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that
duty. when a specific right and specific obligation conflict wit each
other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and
imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is

one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the
state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others.
DECISION
OZAETA, J p:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the
petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which
he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the
Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
"Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore,
be it.
"Resolved, That for his refusal to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further
order of the Senate or by the special committee
created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge
to be ordered when he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said
special committee the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other
pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution,
insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine
Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought
two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of
P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum,
P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates,
Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said
Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all
paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact,
the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean
L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the
Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San
Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year
lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for
P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from

January 1, 1939. The occupation republic of the Philippines

purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the
sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court
on June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to
P324,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession
of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the
Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a
down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P500,000 within
one year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000
each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of
said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of
P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him.
Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other
payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the
Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust
Company sold said estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H.
Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promised to pay P90,000 within
nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive
annual installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period
within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on
February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other
amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine
Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong
Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of
sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948,
the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the
Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and
cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust
Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within
the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance
of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the
issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress
Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme
Court. 1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last
three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine Government,
through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution

No. 8, which reads as follows:
"RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine
Government,
through
the
Rural
Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the
Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of five
million pesos;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that under the
decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31,
1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought
for three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered
into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and
Philippine Government in 1939;
"WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the
Philippine Government did not have to purchase the
Buenavista
Estate
because
the
occupation
government had made tender of payment in the
amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency,
which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of
ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the
validity of payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine
Government did not have to pay a single centavo for
the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically
owned by the Philippine Government by virtue of a
deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated
September 3, 1947, for seven hundred and fifty
thousand pesos, and by virtue of the rescission of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest
in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
"RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as
it hereby is, created, composed of five members to
be appointed by the President of the Senate to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate
deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to
determine whether the said purchase was honest,
valid, and proper and whether the price involved in
the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible

therefor, and any other facts the Committee may

deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall
have the power to conduct public hearings;
issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel
the attendance of witnesses or the production of
documents before it; and may require any official or
employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the government to
assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special
Committee in the performance of its functions and
duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of
findings and recommendations within two weeks
from the adoption of this Resolution."
The special committee created by the above resolution
called and examined various witnesses, among the most important
of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing
question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved
in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the
Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his
alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt
aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of
October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account
in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in
which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and
that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks;
one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It
was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate
recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present
case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
"Mr. ARNAULT (reading
from
a
note).
Mr.Chairman, for questions involving the disposition
of funds, I take the position that the transactions
were legal, that no laws were being violated, and
that all requisites had been complied with. Here also
I acted in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from making
answer which might later be used against me. I have

been assured that it is my constitutional right to

refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that
the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I
understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my
position."
At a subsequent session of the committee (March 16)
Senator De Vera, a member of the committee, interrogated him as
follows:
"Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions,
according to your own typewritten statement, were
legal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
"Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that
fund involved, according to your own statement, did
not violate any law?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx xxx xxx
"Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were
disposed of in such a manner that no laws were
violated, how is it that when you were asked by the
Committee to tell what steps you took to have this
money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the
questions, saying that it would incriminate you?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights
of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other
people.
xxx xxx xxx
"Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state
how the money was disposed of because you would
be incriminated, or you would be incriminating
somebody?.
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand
on my privilege to dispose of the money that has
been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction
without having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee,
Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified
as follows:
"The CHAIRMAN. The other check of
P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949,
is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000
on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that
amount?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain

person.
"The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of
P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain
parson to whom you delivered these P440,000 which
you cashed on October 29, 1949?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name;
he was a representative of Burt.
"The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt
to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
"The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the
name of that representative of Burt to whom you
delivered this big amount of P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not
remember the name.
"The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who
represented Burt to whom you delivered this big
amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for
the amount?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask for a
receipt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
"The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that
certain person, representative of Burt, this big
amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1-1/2
million paid to Burt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to
that effect.
"The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the
instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
"The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction;
was that in writing?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you
receive that instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

"The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this

verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these
P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not
like to reveal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply
with the request of that person.
"The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that
instruction to you by Burt was verbal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction
given to you by Burt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
"The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give
you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here
in the Philippines?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt
already knew that he would receive the money?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when
Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you
the verbal instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
"The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain
person done for Burt to merit receiving these
P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when
he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain
person should receive these P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
"The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized
you to give this big amount to that certain person
without receipt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain
person would represent him and where I could meet
him.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that
certain person as early as 1946?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person
have any intervention in the prosecution of the two

cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong

estates?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person
have anything to do with the negotiation for the
settlement of the two cases?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
"The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person
related to any high government official?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the
name of that certain person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his
name; I cannot remember the name.
"The CHAIRMAN. When you gave that certain
person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew
already that person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several
times.
"The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that
certain person is a Filipino name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian
name; is it also a Spanish name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial
is J.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle
name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family
name which according to your recollection is
Spanish; can you remember the first letter with
which that family name begins?
"Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
"The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter
of the family name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person
again after you have delivered this P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

"The CHAIRMAN. When was the last time that

you saw that certain person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Sometime in December.
"The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?"
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that
you met that person two or three times, you never
were able to find out what was his name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken
it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we
have not done business. Lots of people in Manila
know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't
know them. They say I am 'chiflado' because I don't
know their names.
"The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a
male or a female?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
"The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a
male at least?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. How old was he?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 to 40 years,
more or less.
"The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or
less, a description of that certain person? What is his
complexion: light, dark, or light brown?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there
(pointing to Sen. Cabili), but smaller. He walks very
straight, with military bearing.
"The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence
of that certain person to whom you gave the
P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times
that you met that certain person, you never came to
know his residence?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to
the office.
"The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain
person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6."
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar
of the Senate, which approved and read to him the following
resolution:

"Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in

Session assembled:
"That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the
Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of
contumacious acts committed by him during the
investigation conducted by the Special Committee
created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the
Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October
21, 1940, and that the President of the Senate
propounded to him the following interrogatories:
"1.What excuse have you for persistently
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a
person whose name it is impossible for you not to
remember not only because of the big amount of
money you gave to him without receipt, but also
because by your own statements you knew him as
early as 1946 when General Ernest B. Burt was still in
the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of
money to him without receipt, and the last time you
saw him was in December 1949?"
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted
for him a written answer alleging that the questions were
incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand
on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator
Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner,
propounded to the latter the following question:
"Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation,
when the Committee asked you for the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said
that you can [could] not remember his name. That
was your reason then for refusing to reveal the name
of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just
cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the
ground that your answer will be self-incriminating.
Now do I understand from you that you are
abandoning your former claim that you cannot
remember the name of that person and that your
reason now for your refusal the name of that person
is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In
other words, the question is this: What is your real
reason for refusing to reveal the name of that parson

to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not

remember his name or that your answer would be
self-incriminating?
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. Orendain. Mr. President, we are begging
for the rules of procedure that the accused should
not be required to testify unless he so desires.
"The President. It is the duty of the
respondent to answer the question. The question is
very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement
that I have made before the senate Committee on
the first, second, and third hearings to which I was
made to testify. I stand by the statements that I have
made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in
which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers
to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in
those statements that I made because they
represent the best that I can do, to the best of my
ability.
"The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the
question. The answer has nothing to do with the
question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that
I have made before the Senate Committee on the
first, second, and third hearings to which I was made
to testify. I stand by statements that I have made in
my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I
gave all the reasons that were on my powers to give,
as requested. I cannot change anything in those
statement that I made because they represent the
best that I can do, to the best of my ability.
"The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the
question. The answer has nothing to do with the
question.
"Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you,
Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the
investigation for not revealing the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the
same reason that you are now alleging because
during the investigation you told us: 'I do not
remember his name." But, now, you are now saying:

'My answer might incriminate me.' What is your real

position?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand
by my statements that I made at the first, second,
and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused
from answering the question. I beg to be excused
from making any answer that might be incriminating
in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not
remembering the name of the person has not been
included, it is an oversight.
"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly
answer a simple question: Do you remember or not
the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember.
"Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not
remember the name of that person, how can you say
that your answer might be incriminating? If you do
mot remember his name, you cannot answer the
question; so how could your answer be selfincriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me
to explain. Please I do not see how to answer those
questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can
help me. I have no means of knowing what the
situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without
communication with outside. How could I answer the
question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or
rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx xxx xxx
"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that
the question be answered.
"The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to
answer the question. It is very clear. It does not
incriminate witness.
xxx xxx xxx
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on
my constitutional rights. I beg o be excused from
making further answer, please.
xxx xxx xxx
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeograph letter
that you sent addressed to the President of the
Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you
cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you

gave the P440,000 because he is a public official you

might render yourself liable for prosecution for
bribery, and that if he is a private individual you
might render yourself liable for prosecution for
slander. Why did you make those statements when
you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom
you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private
individual? We are giving you this chance to convince
the Senate that all these allegations of yours that
your answers might incriminate you are given by you
honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for
not revealing the information desired by the Senate.
"The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer
the question.
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the
question.
(The question is restated and explained.)
"Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2 was
prepared by a lawyer for me and I signed it. That is
all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no
knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I
had to secure to help of a lawyer to help me in my
period of distress."
In that same session of the Senate before which the
petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be adjudge
guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to
the petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to
identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the
petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember.
the President of the Senate then propounded to him various
questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when
witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the
postliberation period which questions as the witness answered
satisfactorily. In view thereof. the President of the Senate also
made an attempt to elicit the desired information from the witness,
as follows:
"The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that
you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver
the P440,000 as a gift, or for any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had
instruction to deliver it to that person , that is all.
"The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you
saw that person?

Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have

already said.
"The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not
have the least remembrance of the name of that
person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not
remember events that happened a short time ago
and, on the other hand, you remember events that
occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain."
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of
May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was committed
to the custody of the Sergeant-at-arms and imprisoned until "he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to
the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions
in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date anther
resolution (No. 16), to wit:
"That Special Committee created by Senate
Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to
continue its investigation of the Tambobong and
Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more
particularly to continue its examination of Jean
L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000 an other matters related
therewith."
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at
midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. W have given it
earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the first of its
kind to arise the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was
adopted. For the first time this court is called upon to define the
power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a
member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our
pronouncement here will set an important precedent for the future
guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties,
we deem it necessary to lay down the general principles of law
which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution
vests the powers of the Government in three independent but
coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The

Legislative is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate

and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Member. (Section 10 Article VI.) The judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
may me established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express
provision empowering either of the two House of Congress to
punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that
whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared
between the Congress of the United State, on the one hand, and
the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other
the powers not delegated to the Unite States by the Constitution
nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the states,
respectively, or to the people in the Philippines, the legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may
therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than the Congress of the Unites States or
any State Legislature.
Our form of government being patterned after the
American system the framers of our Constitution having been
drawn largely from American institution and practices we can, in
this case. properly draw also from American precedents in
interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have
done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so
far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislations is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not frequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
(McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R.,
1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to congress the

power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by

necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt
any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton. 204; 5 L ed.,
242.)
But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness
before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter
into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Killbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)
Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a
wider range of legislative field than either the congress of the
United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say
that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It
would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter
of its inquiry can be bounded. It is necessary for us to do so in this
case. Suffice it to say it must be coextensive with the range of the
legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the
special Committee created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and
we entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as
to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. the
transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and
irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of
which the Congress is the constitutional guardian. It is also
involved government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the
investigating committee has recommended and the Senate has
approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising
powers than those attached to his own office, without previous
congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near
relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening
directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in
which the Government is a party, more particularly where the
decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers
who are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that
purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed
estates at a price of P100,000 or more, and loans guaranteed by
the Government involving P100,000 or more, shall not become
effective without previous congressional confirmation. 2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions
raised by the petitioner in support of his contention that his
commitment is unlawful.

First. He contends that the senate has no power to punish

him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, because such informations is
immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative prices. It is
argued that since the investigating committee has already
rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to
what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings,
there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give information
desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to
Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of
suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated,
and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the
senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot
remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
and answer questions which will definitely of that person . . . ."
Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and
argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only
purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness,
He said that the investigation had not been completed, because,
due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet
determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction
as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 19, his
committee was empowered and directed to continue its
investigation, more particularly to continue its examination of the
witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 and other matters related herewith; that the bills
recommended by his committee had not been approved by the
House and might not be approved pending the completion of the
investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the
measures that congress might deem it necessary to pass after the
investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness
to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to

answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of

the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that
may propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or
possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question
must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the
inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the
respondents that the power of the Court is limited to determining
whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry
or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court
cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of
Congressional discretion; and, it is insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the
witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of
the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As
we said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to
presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have
no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex
relMc. Donald vs. Keeler. 99 N. Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N. E.,
615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the United
States in McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra.) Applying this principle to
the question at hand, we may concede that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the
witness is presumed to be correct. But, as noted by the Supreme
Court of the Unite States in the said case of
McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is a necessary deduction from the
decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that were the questions
are not pertinent to the matter under the inquiry a witness
rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that were
the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the
legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention.
The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to
make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct
a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding
paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under consideration, we

find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner
was held in contempt by the Senate which the petitioner was held
in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8,
the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner requires
the Special Committee, among other things to determine the
parties responsible for the Buenavista an Tambobong estates deal,
and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness
gave the P440,000 it is in fact the very things sought to be
determined. The contention that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has in relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not
necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.
The Court cannot determine, any more that it can direct
Congress, what legislation to approve or not to approve; that would
be an invasion of the legislative prerogative. The Court, therefore,
may not say that the information sought from the witness which is
material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to
any proposed or possible legislation.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three
bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the
uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000.
But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved
by the lower court house and by the President and that they may
be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they
should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to
prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem
necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called
upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what
those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for
overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman, 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1554, is
in point here. The inquiry there in question was conducted under a
resolution of the Senate and related to charges, publish in the
press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in
considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were
speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by
pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of
stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining

Company, appeared before the committee in response to a

subpoena and was asked, among others, the following questions:
"Had the firm, during the month of March
1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known
as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or
indirectly, of any United States senator?
"Was the said firm at that time carrying any
sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest,
directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?"
He refused to answer those questions and was prosecuted under
an act of Congress for contempt of the Senate Upon being
convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the
Unite States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions
decided by the Supreme Court of the united States in that case
was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to
answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did
have such right, saying:
"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent
to the subject matter of the inquiry. The resolution
directed the committee to inquire 'whether any
senator has been, or is, speculating in what are
known as sugar stocks during the consideration of
the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the
Senate might or might not do upon the facts when
ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon
to inquire whether such ventures might be
defensible, as contended in argument, but it is plain
that negative answers should have cleared that the
body of what the Senate regarded as offensive
imputations, while affirmative answer might have led
to further action on the part of the Senate within its
constitutional powers." (Emphasis ours.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties
responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather than
upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or
in a law for such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the
validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly
requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the
deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the
due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the
inquiry, if the act is capable of being construed. On the other hand,
there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to
determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the
circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned

transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice

himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal; or the Court
of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the parties responsible for the deal and unless the
Senate shall have determined who those parties are and shall have
taken such measures as may be within its competence to take the
redress the wrong that may have been committed against the
people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the
transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That
certainly is a matter of public concern, which it is the duty of the
constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is
within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony called relate to that subject, obedience to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
(Sulivan vs. Hill. 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S. E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1926
B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L.
ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In
that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of
the United States related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook & Company had
had an interest in the pool but had become bankrupts, and their
estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy
court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors.
the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement
of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was
subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the
bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United
States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the
House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and
history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement
with the amount of property involved, in which Jay Cooked & Co.
were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said
settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report
to this House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no
suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in
respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the
bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in
the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other
creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on
these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation
"the house of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its

own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly

exercised by another branch of the government, because the
power was in its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced
and applied in that case are: that neither House of congress
possesses a "general power of making actually possessed is limited
to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular House of
jurisdiction and in respect of which it rightfully may take other
action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or
redress could be had only judicial proceeding, it is not within the
range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to
the constitution separation of governmental powers.
That case differs from the present case into two important
respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of the inquiry,
which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not
within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is
not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a
transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction
of the Senate. (2) There the claim of the government as a creditor
of Jay Cooke & Company, which had had an interest in the pool,
was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition
of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be
expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate
shall have determined who the parties responsible are shall have
taken such measures as may be within its competence to take
redress the wrong that may have been committed against the
people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of
Kilbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from legal
scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa L. Rev., 692-699; Janes M.
Landis,Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 214-220.) We quote
the following from Professor Landis' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw
the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the
Government certain priority rights as creditors of the bankrupt
concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the
Government and Jay Cooke & Co., with the Government, acting
through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of
established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not
before the courts but before Congress. That the bankruptcy
proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke & Co. in
a federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The

House was seeking to oust of prior acquired jurisdiction by an

extraordinary and unwarranted of assumption of 'judicial power'!
The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to
the Court. That Jay Cooke & Co.'s indebtedness and the particular
funds in question were only part of the great administrative
problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies,
that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to
the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts
connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other
and greater maladministration, such consideration had not been
put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the everyday nature of the particular investigation and the powers there
exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and
familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of
an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, placed in its
proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and
customary part of the legislative process. detailed definiteness of
legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the Court in
Kilbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results
that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control
over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but
one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the
problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the
extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such
disclosure. their presence, whether determinative of legislative or
judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress
nor the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of
investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is
Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61 L. ed., 881. The question
there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its
power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the district
Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written,
published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an illtempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes
of the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand
jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of
Representatives. Power to make inquiries and obtain evidence by
compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized
distinctly that the House of Representative had implied power to
punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that its
action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The
decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and
vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of

its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief

statement of the facts and the issues decided in that case is
sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case.
There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's
writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and
vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the
refusal of the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject
of an inquiry which the Senates has the power and jurisdiction to
make. But in that case it was recognized that the House of
Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a
member for contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in
favor of the Senate's (not not of the petitioner's) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the
Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18,
1950. This contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice
Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real in the case
of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it
appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a
member of the House of Representative while the latter was going
to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session
which was then about to begin as a result of which assault said
representative was unable to attend the session on that day and
those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which
Candido Lopez made against him. By resolution of the House
adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt
of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by
confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That
resolution was not complied with because the session of the House
of Representatives adjourned at the next session on September 16,
1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for
the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
six justices voted to grant the writ: Justices Malcolm, Street, and
Villa-Real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out
to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session
of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns,
Villamor, and Ostrands, on the ground that the Philippine
Legislature had no power to punish for contempt because it was a
creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and
not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice
Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote a separate
opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street and Villa-Real,
that the Legislature has inherent power to punish for contempt but

dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could

only be executed during the particular session in which the act of
contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was
equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was made. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following
passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn,supra:
"And
although
the
legislative
power
continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to
exist on the amount of its adjournment or periodical
dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must
terminate with that adjournment."
as well as on the following quotation from
Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also
makes clear the cogency and application of the two
limitations which were expressly pointed out in
Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power
even when applied to subjects which justified its
exercise is limited to imprisonment and such
imprisonment may not extended beyond the session
of the body in which the contempt occurred."
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea
held:
"From this doctrine it follows, in my
judgment, that the imposition of the penalty is
limited to the existence of the legislative body, which
ceases to function upon its final periodical
dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and
not to any particular session thereof. This must be so,
inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such
penalty is the right which the Legislature has to selfpreservation, and which right is enforceable during
the existence of the legislative body. Many causes
might be conceived to constitute contempt to the
Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to
its prevention during the existence of the legislative
body against which contempt was committed.
"If the basis of the power of the legislature to
punish for contempt exists while the legislative body
exercising it is in session, then that power and the
exercise thereof must be perforce continue until its
final adjournment and the election of its successor."

Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by

quotations from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and from
Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez
said: "In my opinion, where, as in the case before us, the members
composing the legislative body against which the contempt was
committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the
House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn. and
Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm areobiter dicta.
Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeantat-Arms of the House of Representatives of the United States for
assault of the United states for assault and battery and false
imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the
House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by
the Speaker, and then discharge from custody. The question as to
the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The
question there presented was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempts committed
against themselves, under any circumstances." The court there
held that the House of Representatives had the power to punish for
contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of
the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was
whether the House had the power under the Constitution to deal
with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious
letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon
the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The
court held that the House had no such power because the writing
of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty
and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House
to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and
not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the
discharge of the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is
McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the Senate
had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select
committee of five senators to investigate various charges of
misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after
Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head.
In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be
served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and
president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court, Ohio,
a subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of
giving testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The

witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure.
The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter
adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro
tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or
his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M. S.
Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M. S. Daugherty
before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such
questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may
order the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to
keep the said M. S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order
of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the
federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal
court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground
that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the
arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of
the witness was that the case had become moot because the
investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed
during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926.
In overruling the contention, the court said:
". . . The resolution ordering the investigation
in terms limited the committee's authority to the
period of the Sixty-eight Congress; but this
apparently was changed by a later and amendatory
resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such
times and places as it might deem advisable or
necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: 'Neither
House can continue any portion of itself in any
parliamentary function beyond the end of the session
without the consent of the other two branches. When
done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners
for the particular purpose.' But the context shows
that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament
when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the
King. The rule may be the same with the House of
Representatives whose members are all elected for
the period of a single Congress; but it cannot well be
the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body
whose members are all elected for a term of six
years and so divided into classes that the seats of
one third only become vacant at the end of each
Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next
Congress, save as vacancies may occur through
death or resignation.

"Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents,

says: 'The Senate, as a continuing body, may
continue its committees through the recess following
the expiration of a Congress;' and, after quoting the
above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says:
'The Senate, however, being a continuing body, gives
authority to its committees during the recess after
the expiration of a Congress.' So far as we are
advised
the
select
committee
having
this
investigation in charge has neither made a final
report nor been discharged; nor has it been
continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its
activities have been suspended pending the decision
of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that
the committee may be continued or revived now by
motion to that effect, and, if continued or revived,
will have all its original powers. This being so, and
the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot
be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense.
The situation is measurably like that in Southern P.
Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission,
219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31
Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to
enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not become moot
through the expiration of the order where it was
capable of repetition by the Commission and was a
matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be
carried into effect and the investigation proceeded
with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus
proceedings. In these circumstances we think a
judgment should be rendered as was done in the
case cited.
"What has been said requires that the final
order in the District Court discharging the witness
from custody be reversed."
Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the
Philippines is a continuing body whose members are elected for a
term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third
become vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into
the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or
resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all
elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress

is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was

constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December
30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the petitioner
was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which
began on the fourth Monday of January and ended on May 18,
1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the
House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the
final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in
1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of a legislative
body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to
the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during
recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which that power is recognized in the legislative body
as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function.
It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does
not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress
or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of
the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has ordered an
investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which
we have found it is within its competence to make. That
investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the
petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee
to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to
answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance
by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the
power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness to
answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have
answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which
is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular

legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness

for contempt only during the session in which investigation was
begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its
function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and
appropriate means for its performance. Aside from this, if we
should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon
the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume
the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat
the contempt proceedings against the witness until the
investigation is completed an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the
petitioner that the power may be abusively and oppressively
exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for
life. But we must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to
exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this
assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this
Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against
self- incrimination. He contends that he would incriminate himself if
he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 because if that person be a public official he (witness)
might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private
individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too
shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first he told the
Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were
violated, and that all requisites had been complied with; but at the
same time he begged to be excused from making answers "which
might later be used against me." A little later he explained that
although the transactions were legal he refused to answer
questions concerning them "because it violates the rights of a
citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people. . . . I simply
stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid
to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account
for any use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the
Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified
that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to
a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with
Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far as he know,
that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the
settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had

seen that person several times before he gave him the P440,000
on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again
two or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in
Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between
5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. But the witness
would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: "I
don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am
not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the
important question, What is the name of that person to whom you
gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before
the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to
him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent
to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that
a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15,
Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U. S., 61 L. ed.,
1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand
jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six
other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said
men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions,
claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a
game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table
at which you were sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being
played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand
jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all
of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would
not tend to incriminate the witnesses." Mason was again called and
he refused to answer the first question propounded to him, but,
half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second
question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt,
the Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:
"In the present case the witnesses certainly
were not relieved from answering merely because
they declared that so to do might incriminate them.
The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well
illustrated by the enforced answer, 'I don't know,'
given by Mason to the second question, after he had
refused to reply under a claim of constitutional
privilege."
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was
legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in

compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis

upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on
the applicable rule, to wit:
"Generally, the question whether testimony
is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole
judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination
must appear reasonable and real to the court, from
all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of
the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The
fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination,
unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness
cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful
excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person." (3
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,
1136.)
"It is the province of the trial judge to
determine from all the facts and circumstances of the
case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N. E. [2d], 210 [Ill.
App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an
answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the
trial judge to decide that question." (Mason vs. U. S.,
244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a
constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank,
sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The
state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation,
consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The
witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming
constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his
duties and obligations to the Government which protects those
rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation

conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the
other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the
latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen
may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his
corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice
Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the
gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not
less certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the
security." Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the
petitioner may not relish the restraint of his liberty pending the
fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws
under which his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be
denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave rise to petitioner's
examination by a committee of the Senate was one that aroused
popular indignation as few cases of graft and corruption have. The
investigation was greeted with spontaneous outburst of applause
by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was rightly commended
for making the lead in getting at the bottom of an infamous
transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the
consideration of this case with circumspection, lest the influence of
strong public passions should get the better of our judgment. It is
trite to say that public sentiment fades into insignificance before a
proper observance of constitutional processes, the maintenance of
the constitutional structure, and the protection of individual rights.
Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation stone of
human liberty, be strengthened and made secure for that very
public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I
am constrained to dissent.
The power of legislative bodies under the American system
of government to punish for contempt was at the beginning totally
denied by some courts and students of constitutional law, on the
ground that this power is judicial in nature and belongs to the
judiciary branch of the government under the constitutional
scheme. The point however is now settled in favor of the existence
of the power. This rule is based on the necessity for the attainment
of the ends for which legislative body is created. Nor can the
legitimacy of the purpose of the investigation which the Senate

ordered in this case be disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise

legitimate and necessary for the committee to summon the
petitioner with a command to produce his books and documents,
and to commit him to prison for his refusal or failure to obey the
subpoena. And, finally, there is no question that the arresting
officers were fully justified in using necessary bodily force to bring
him before the bar of the Senate when he feigned illness and
stalled for time in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the
then current session of Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also universal agreement that
the power is not absolute. The disagreement lies in the extent of
the power, and such disagreement is to be found even between
decisions of the same court. Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204,
may be said to have taken the most liberal view of the legislature's
authority, and Kilbourn vs.Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, which partly
overruled and qualified the former, the strictest. By the most
liberal standard the power is restricted "by considerations as to the
nature of the inquiry, occasion, or action in connection with which
the contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be
resorted to for the efficient exercise of the legislative function.
Even Anderson vs. Dunn speaks of the power as "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the
witness does not, in my opinion, meet the constitutional
requirement. It is obvious, I think, that the query has nothing to do
with any matter within the cognizance of the Congress. There is, on
the contrary, positive suggestion that the question has no relation
to the contemplated legislation. The statement of the committee in
its report that the information sought to be obtained would clear
the names of the persons suspected of having received the money,
is, on the surface, the most or only plausible reason that can be
advanced. Assuming this to be the motive behind the question, yet
little reflection will show that the same is beyond the scope of
legislative authority and prerogatives. It is outside the concern of
the Congress to protect the honor of particular citizens except that
of its own members' as a means of preserving respect and
confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention
must assume, if it is to materialize, that the persons under
suspicion are really innocent; for if they are not and the witness will
tell the truth, the result will be to augment their disgrace rather
than vindicate their honor. This is all the more likely to happen
because one of those persons, is judged from the committee's
findings, the most likely one, to say the least, who got the money.

If the process of deduction is pressed further, the

reasonable conclusion seems to be that the object of the question
is, to mention only one, to prepare the way for a court action. The
majority decision indirectly admits or insinuates this to be the case.
It says, "It appearing that the questioned transaction was effected
by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not
reasonable to expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of
Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the
parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall
have determined who those parties are and shall have taken such
measures as may be within its competence to take, to redress the
wrong that may have been committed against the people as a
result of the transaction." So here is an admission, implied if not
express, that the Senate wants the witness to give names because
the fiscal or the courts will not initiate an action against parties
who should be prosecuted. It is needless to say that the institution
of a criminal or civil suit is a matter that devolves upon other
departments of the government, alien to the duties of the Congress
to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any
investigation for the purpose of aiding the fiscal or the courts, and
ask any question which a witness may please to answer, but this
liberty does not carry with it the authority to imprison persons who
refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is
often impossible to foretell before its close what relation certain
facts may bear on the final results, and experience has shown that
investigators and courts would do well to veer on the liberal side in
the resolution of doubtful questions. But the Senate is not now in
the midst of an inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or tentative
state. Now the facts are no longer confused. The committee has
finished its investigation and submitted its final report and the
Senate has approved a bill on the bases of the facts found. All the
pertinent facts having been gathered, as is to be inferred from that
report and the nature of the Senate's action, every question, every
fact, every bit of testimony has taken a distinct meaning
susceptible of concrete and definite evaluation; the task has been
reduced to the simple process of sifting the grain from the chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill
introduced and approved in the Senate, it seems quite plain that
the express naming of the recipient or recipients of the money is
entirely unessential to anything the Senate has a right or duty to
do in the premises. Names may be necessary for the purpose of
criminal prosecution, impeachment or civil suit. In such

proceedings, identities are essential. In some legislative

investigations it is important to know the names of public officials
involved. But the particular disclosure sought of the petitioner here
is immaterial to the proposed law. It is enough for the Senate, for
its own legitimate object, to learn how the Department of Justice
was being run, to know the part the Secretary of Justice had in the
purchase, and to have a moral conviction as to the identity of the
person who benefited thereby. The need for such legislation as was
envisaged in the resolution and translated into the bill approved by
the Senate is met by an insight into a broad outline of the deal. To
paraphrase the U. S. Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn,
although the passage was used in another connection, legislation
is a science of experiment and the relation between the legislator
and the end does not have to be so direct as to strike the eye of
the former.
One of the proposed laws prohibits brothers and near
relatives of any president of the Philippines from intervening
directly or indirectly in transactions in which the Government is a
party. It is stated that this is subject to change depending on the
answer Arnault may give. This statement is wide open to
challenge.
If Arnault should name Antonio Quirino it must be admitted
that the bill would not be altered. But let us suppose that the
witness will point to another man. Will the result be any different?
Will the Senate recall the bill? I can not perceive the slightest
possibility of such eventuality. The pending bill was framed on the
assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in
question. As has been said, the committee entertains a moral
conviction that this brother of the President was the recipient of a
share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of assurance
by Arnault to the contrary would be believed by the committee in
the face of his absolute unreliability for truth. And, I repeat, the
proposed legislation does not need for its justification legal
evidence of Antonio Quirino's intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be
assumed that the present bill is aimed solely against Antonio
Quirino whose relation to the Administration is but temporary. It is
more reasonable to presume that the proposed enactment is
intended for all time and for all brothers of future presidents, for in
reality it is no more than an extension or enlargement of laws
already found in the statute book which guard against temptations
to exploit official positions or influence to the prejudice of public
interests.

The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but

moot. This is decisive of the irrelevancy of this question. As has
been noticed, the committee has submitted its final report and
recommendation, and a bill has been approved by the Senate
calculated to prevent recurrence of the anomalies exposed. For the
purpose for which it was instituted the inquiry is over and the
committee's mission accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the
recess of Congress, but it is obvious from all the circumstances
that the sole and real object of the extension of the committee's
sittings is to receive the witness' answer in the event he
capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal which
the Senate could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents
and this Court have not pointed out any. That the committee has
not sat and nothing has been done so far except to wait
for Arnault's answer is a convincing manifestation of the above
conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in
Senate Resolution No. 16 cannot disguise the realities revealed by
the Senate's actions already referred to and by the emphasis given
to the instruction "to continue its (committee's) examination of
Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000." The instruction 'to continue the investigation' is not
entitled to the blind presumption that it embraces matters other
than the revelation by the witness of the name of the person who
got the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of liberty outside
the usual process is not acquired by innuendos or vague assertions
of the facts on which jurisdiction is made to depend. If the
judgment of a court of law of limited jurisdiction does not enjoy the
presumption of legality, much less can the presumption of
regularity be invoked for a resolution of a deliberative body whose
power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is wholly derived
by implication and vehemently contested by some judges. At any
rate, "the stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at
the trial", and "it is incumbent" upon the respondents "to show that
the question pertains to some matter under investigation."
(Sinclair vs. U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This rule stems from the fact that
the power is in derogation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, which presupposes "a trial in which the rights of the
parties shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law, which
tribunal is to be governed by rules of law previously established."
Powers so dangerous to the liberty of a citizen can not be allowed
except where the pertinency is clear. A Judge who abuses such

power may be impeached and he acts at all times under the sense
of this accountability and responsibility. His victims may be
reached by the pardoning power. But if the Congress be allowed
this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there is no redress. The
Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and
there is no power on earth to stop its hand. There is, there can be,
no such unlimited power in any department of the government of
the Republic. (Loan Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663;
Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No. N. Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the
instruction to the committee in the original resolution, "to
determine the parties responsible for the deal." It goes without
saying that the Congress cannot authorize a committee to do what
it itself cannot do. In other words, the Senate could not insist on
the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the
investigation if the Senate were conducting the inquiry itself
instead of through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines,
the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines
alone, and therefore that the Congress of the Philippines has a
wider range of legislative field than the Congress of the United
States or any state legislature." From this premise the inference is
drawn that "the field of inquiry into which it (Philippine Congress)
may enter is also wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that
congressional or legislative committees both here and in the
United States, do not embark upon fishing expeditions in search of
information which by chance may be useful to legislation. Inquiries
entrusted to congressional committee, whether here or in the
United States, are necessarily for specific objects within the
competence of the Congress to look into. I do not believe any
reason, rule or principle could be found which would sustain the
theory that just because the United States Congress or a state
legislature could legislate on, say, only ten subjects and the
Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's power to commit to
prison for contempt is proportionately as great as that of the
former. In the consideration of the legality of an imprisonment for
contempt by each House, the power is gauged not by the greater
or lesser number of subject matters that fall within its sphere of
action, but by the answer to the question, has it jurisdiction over
the matter under investigation? Bearing this distinction in mind, it
is apparent that the power of a legislature to punish for contempt
can be no greater nor less than that of any other. Were it possible

for the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to

undertake an investigation of exactly identical anomalies in their
respective departments of justice, could it be asserted with any
support of logic that one Senate has a wider authority to imprison
for contempt in such investigation simply because it has a "wider
range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by
the lower house and that even if it should pass in that chamber it
would still have the President's veto to hurdle. It has been
expressly stated at the oral argument, and there is insinuation in
this Court's decision, that the revelation of the name or names of
the person or persons who received the money may help in
convincing the House of Representatives or the President of the
wisdom of the pending measure. Entirely apart from the discussion
in the preceding paragraphs, it is enough answer to this that the
House of Representatives and the Chief Executive have their own
idea of what they need to guide them in the discharge of their
respective duties, and they have the facilities of their own for
obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the
Senate invoking the interest or convenience of the other House or
the President as ground of jurisdiction. The House of
Representatives and the President are absolutely independent of
the Senate in the conduct of legislative and administrative
inquiries, and the power of each House to imprison for contempt
does not go beyond the necessity for its own self-preservation or
for making its express powers effective. Each House exercises this
power to protect or accomplish its own authority and not that of
the other House or the President. Each House and the President are
supposed to take care of their respective affairs. The two Houses
and the Chief Executive act separately although the concurrence of
the three is required in the passage of legislation and of both
Houses in the approval of resolutions. As the United States
Supreme Court in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, said, "No general power
of inflicting punishment by the Congress (as distinct from a House
is found in the Constitution." "An act of Congress it said which
proposed to adjudge a man guilty of a crime and inflict the
punishment, will be considered by all thinking men to be
unauthorized by the Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said, can not be relied
on in this case as a precedent because, so it is also said, "the
subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of
Congress; while here it is not disputed that the subject of the

inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable

expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is
within the jurisdiction of the Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge
Landis which are quoted in the majority decision point out that the
inquiry "was a normal and customary part of the legislative
process." Moreover, Kilbourn vs. Thompson is important, not for
the matter it treated but for the principles it enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with
universal approval as Judge Landis' article above mentioned shows.
The jurist who delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Miller,
was one of the "giants" who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal
Bench, venerated and eminent for the width and depth of his
learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I have been able to
ascertain, have not rejected or criticized but have followed it, and
it still stands as a landmark in this branch of constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for
comfort, the petitioner can cite one by a legal scholar and author
no less renown and respected than Judge Landis. I refer to Judge
Wigmore who, referring to an investigation of the U. S. Department
of Justice said in an article published in 19 (1925) Illinois Law
Review, 452:
"The senatorial debauch of investigations
poking into political garbage cans and dragging the
sewers of political intrigue filled the winter of
1923-24 with a stench which has not yet passed
away. Instead of employing the constitutional, manly,
fair procedure of impeachment, the Senate dung selfrespect and fairness to the winds. As a prosecutor,
the Senate presented a spectacle which cannot even
be dignified by a comparison with the persecutive
scoldings of Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell
rather in popular estimate to the level of professional
searchers of the municipal dunghills.'
It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vitupiration as
applied to our Senate. Certainly, this august body did not only do
the right thing but is entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people
for taking the courageous stand it did in probing into an anomaly
that robbed a depleted treasury of a huge amount. I have tried to
make it clear that my disagreement with the majority lies not in the
propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in the
pertinency to that investigation of a single question. The
investigation, as has been said, was legal and commendable. My
objection is that the Senate having started within the bounds of its
authority, has, in entire good faith, overstepped those bounds and

trespassed on a territory reserved to other branches of the

government, when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a
point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let
alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict
with the views of Judge Landis and all other advocates of wide
latitude for congressional investigations. All are agreed, and the
majority accept the proposition, that there is a limit to the
legislative power to punish for contempt. The limit is set in
Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Landis approved "the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed."
||| (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, [July 18, 1950], 87 PHIL 2977)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10405. December 29, 1960.]
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity
as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner and
appellant, vs.THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents and
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A.A.
Torres for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
LEGISLATIVE
POWERS;
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUES ONLY FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSES; WHAT DETERMINES VALIDITY OF A PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE. "It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax
and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interests, and the prosperity
of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use of public money." (23 R. L. C. pp. 398-450).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNDERLYING REASON FOR THE RULE.
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the
constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose.
The right of the legislature to appropriate public funds is correlative
with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against
taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection
of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriate of state funds can be made for other than
a public purpose. (81 C.J.S. p. 1147).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. The test of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although such advantage to individuals might incidentally serve
the public. (81 C.J.S. p. 1147).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF CONGRESS AT THE TIME OF
PASSAGE OF A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. The validity
of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,

subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of

the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the
constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE
NULL AND VOID; SUBSEQUENT DONATION TO GOVERNMENT NOT
CURATIVE OF DEFECT. Where the land on which projected feeder
roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an
appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void,
and a donation to the Government, made over five (5) months
after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of
giving a "semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure
the basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of
said appropriation.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF TAXPAYERS TO CONTEST
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATION. The relation between
the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the one hand,
and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to
that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and
its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to
that existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and
the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic
of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully
direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple
and unitary type of our national government is not subject to
limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution
upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the states of the Union. For this
reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assailed the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public
funds - which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) - has greater application in
the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress
of the United States appropriating federal funds.
7. CONTRACTS; DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY; EXCEPTIONS TO
ARTICLE 1421 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Article 1421 of the Civil Code
is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an
illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177
of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except
only those which are inherent in his person, including his right to
the annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not
affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in
said legal provision.
DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled
case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein
issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory
relief, with injunction upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,
entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on
June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h])
of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen.
Roxas Gen. Araneta Gen. Lucban Gen. Capinpin Gen.
Segundo Gen. Delgado Gen. Malvar Gen. Lim)"; that, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned
feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . .
situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the tracings attached to
the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, nor far
away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54),
which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the
aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which
said feeder roads were to be constructed) were private respondent
Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on
May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13,
1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the
condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and
agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of
donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however,
executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another
letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of
Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated
therein for the construction of the projected feeder reads in
question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of
respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the
present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch
as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at
the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the
appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said

projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio";

that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress
because its members were made to believe that the projected
feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets
of a private subdivision"; that, "in order to give a semblance of
legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12,
1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an
alleged deed of donation copy of which is annexed to the
petition of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said project
feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was on the same
date, accepted by the ten Executive Secretary; that being subject
to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a
contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our
fundamental law prohibition members of Congress from being
directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the
Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and
void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in
question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the
value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,
"aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his
subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the
construction of said projected feeder roads was then being
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless
restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to
execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and
prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of
Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the alleged
deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be
issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works, the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Highways and Jose C.
Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the abovementioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any
new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic
Act No. 926 and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public
Works and Communications, the Bureau of Public Works and the
Bureau of Public Highways from making any further payments out
of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that
pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction

be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from

making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid
item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further
payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the
ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the
petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion,
respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not
its provincial governor, should represent the Province
Administrative Code; that said respondent "not aware of any law
which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvement of . . . private proper"; and that, the constitutional
provision invoked by petitioner inapplicable to the donation in
question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract.
The other respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could
not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no
actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No.
920 is necessarily involved and petitioner "has not shown that he
has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its
enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury".
Acting upon said motion to dismiss, the lower court
rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953,
holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the
Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who
represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to
question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act
No. 920; that "the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the construction
and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads
were private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being
subject to the following condition:
"The within donation is hereby made upon the
condition that the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby
donated for street purposes only and for no other
purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood
that should the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed
upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall,
upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR,
JOSE C. ZULUETA." (Italics supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said
donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution"

and consequently illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existent and void from the very beginning
contracts "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may
not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his
"interests are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly,
the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case
dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned
with a decision granting the aforementioned motions to dismiss,
which as such, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the
allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein.
According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of
several parcels of residential land, situated in Pasig Rizal, and
known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had
been reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned,
which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was
approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further
alleges that the construction of said feeder roads, to be undertaken
with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have
the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of
constructing its subdivision streets or roads at his own
expenses, 1 and would greatly enhance or increase the value of
the subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that
under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was
"clearly for a private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion,
which is self-evident. 2 However, respondent Zulueta contended, in
his motion to dismiss that:
"A law passed by Congress and approved by the
President can never be illegal because Congress is
the source of all laws . . .. Aside from the fact that
the movant is not aware of any law which makes
illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvement of what we, in the meantime, may
assume as private property . . .." (Record on Appeal,
pp. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it
being inconsistent with the nature of the Government established
under the Constitution of the Philippines and the system of checks
and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is

refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating legislative

enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds
for a private purpose the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is
this:
"It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately
benefited
by
their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, doesnot justify their aid by the use of
public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics
supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the
following language:
"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must
be
exercised
for
public
purposes
only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals." (85
C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris
Secundum states:
"Generally, under the express or implied provisions
of the constitution, public funds may be used for a
public purpose.The right of the legislature to
appropriate funds is correlative with its right to
tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the
collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion
thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interests,

as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of

individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public. . . ." (81 C.J.S. p.
1147; italics supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the
foregoing views which, apart from being patently sound, are a
necessary corollary to our democratic system of government,
which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established
jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional
system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are,
likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to
uphold the appropriation in question, upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above
referred to because the same does not affect him directly. This
conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises
namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional
infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter
may not be annulled without a previous declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set
forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no
exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of
Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events
occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the
latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by
said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the
projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended
upon whether said roads were public or private property when the
bill, which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by
Congress, or when said bill was approved by the President and the
disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953
(see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to
the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need

not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said

appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other
statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the
creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions
set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and
actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his
person, including, therefore, his right to the annulment of said
contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same,
except indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5 upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes an
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. 6 Although there are some decisions to the
contrary, 7 the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:
"In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that
only
persons
individually
affected,
but
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation
and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (11
Am. Jur. 761; italics supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court
of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar
as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government is
different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its
government. Indeed, under thecomposite system of government
existing in the U.S., states of the Union are integral part of the
Federation from aninternational viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the
limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same
was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of the
people of the U.S., except insofar as the former represented the
people of the respective States, and the people of each State has,

independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In

other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have
become binding upon the people of the U.S. in consequence of an
act of, and, in this sense, throughthe respective states of the Union
of which they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation
between said people and the Federal Government of the U.S. is
reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen
directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen
by each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct
(Article II, section 2, of the Federal Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its
taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic of the Philippines,
on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people
and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer,
from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people
and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except
that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people
of the Philippines ismore fully direct than that of the states of the
Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national
government is not subject to limitations analogous to those
imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union,
and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of
the states of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the
right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds which has been upheld
by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S.
601) has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted
with respect to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating
federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257),
involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas,
two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the
purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as
unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the
Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the
Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of
an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in
Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs.
Commission on Election (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of
certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same.
Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such position
in said two (2) cases the importance of the issues therein raised
is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the

Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a

taxpayer. The province of Rizal, which he represents officially as it
Provincial Governor, is our most populated political
subdivision, 7 and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion
of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances
surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioner's action in
contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that
the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,
and the records are remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of
this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ.,concur.
||| (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No.
L-10405, [December 29, 1960], 110 PHIL 331-346)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10405. December 29, 1960.]
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity
as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner and
appellant, vs.THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents and
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A.A.
Torres for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
LEGISLATIVE
POWERS;
APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC REVENUES ONLY FOR PUBLIC
PURPOSES; WHAT DETERMINES VALIDITY OF A PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE. "It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a public
purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax
and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interests, and the prosperity
of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use of public money." (23 R. L. C. pp. 398-450).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNDERLYING REASON FOR THE RULE.
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the
constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose.
The right of the legislature to appropriate public funds is correlative
with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against
taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection
of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriate of state funds can be made for other than
a public purpose. (81 C.J.S. p. 1147).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. The test of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although such advantage to individuals might incidentally serve
the public. (81 C.J.S. p. 1147).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POWERS OF CONGRESS AT THE TIME OF
PASSAGE OF A STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. The validity
of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,

subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an amendment of

the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the
constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION FOR A PRIVATE PURPOSE
NULL AND VOID; SUBSEQUENT DONATION TO GOVERNMENT NOT
CURATIVE OF DEFECT. Where the land on which projected feeder
roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an
appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void,
and a donation to the Government, made over five (5) months
after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of
giving a "semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure
the basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of
said appropriation.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF TAXPAYERS TO CONTEST
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATION. The relation between
the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the one hand,
and the Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to
that obtaining between the people and taxpayers of the U.S. and
its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to
that existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and
the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic
of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully
direct than that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple
and unitary type of our national government is not subject to
limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution
upon the states of the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal
Government in the interest of the states of the Union. For this
reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assailed the
constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state public
funds - which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) - has greater application in
the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress
of the United States appropriating federal funds.
7. CONTRACTS; DEFENSE OF ILLEGALITY; EXCEPTIONS TO
ARTICLE 1421 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Article 1421 of the Civil Code
is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an
illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article 1177
of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except
only those which are inherent in his person, including his right to
the annulment of said contract, even though such creditors are not
affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in
said legal provision.
DECISION

CONCEPCION, J p:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing the above entitled
case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein
issued, without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as
Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory
relief, with injunction upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920,
entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on
June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43[h])
of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen.
Roxas Gen. Araneta Gen. Lucban Gen. Capinpin Gen.
Segundo Gen. Delgado Gen. Malvar Gen. Lim)"; that, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned
feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision
roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . .
situated at . . . Pasig, Rizal" (according to the tracings attached to
the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw Boulevard, nor far
away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54),
which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the
aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which
said feeder roads were to be constructed) were private respondent
Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on
May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the
Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13,
1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the
condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and
agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of
donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however,
executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another
letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of
Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated
therein for the construction of the projected feeder reads in
question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of
respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the
present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch
as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at
the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the
appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said

projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio";

that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress
because its members were made to believe that the projected
feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets
of a private subdivision"; that, "in order to give a semblance of
legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12,
1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an
alleged deed of donation copy of which is annexed to the
petition of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said project
feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was on the same
date, accepted by the ten Executive Secretary; that being subject
to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a
contract; that, such, said donation violated the provision of our
fundamental law prohibition members of Congress from being
directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the
Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and
void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in
question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the
value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta,
"aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his
subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the
construction of said projected feeder roads was then being
undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless
restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to
execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and
prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of
Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the alleged
deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be
issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works, the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Public Highways and Jose C.
Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the abovementioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any
new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic
Act No. 926 and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public
Works and Communications, the Bureau of Public Works and the
Bureau of Public Highways from making any further payments out
of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that
pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction

be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from

making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid
item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further
payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the
ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to sue", and that the
petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion,
respondent Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not
its provincial governor, should represent the Province
Administrative Code; that said respondent "not aware of any law
which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvement of . . . private proper"; and that, the constitutional
provision invoked by petitioner inapplicable to the donation in
question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract.
The other respondents, in turn, maintained that petitioner could
not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no
actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No.
920 is necessarily involved and petitioner "has not shown that he
has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its
enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury".
Acting upon said motion to dismiss, the lower court
rendered the aforementioned decision, dated October 29, 1953,
holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the
Provincial Governor of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who
represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities" to
question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act
No. 920; that "the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the construction
and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads
were private property, would not be a public purpose; that, being
subject to the following condition:
"The within donation is hereby made upon the
condition that the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby
donated for street purposes only and for no other
purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood
that should the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed
upon it, the title to the land hereby donated shall,
upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR,
JOSE C. ZULUETA." (Italics supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said
donation or contract is "absolutely forbidden by the Constitution"

and consequently illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existent and void from the very beginning
contracts "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may
not be contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his
"interests are not directly affected" thereby; and that, accordingly,
the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case
dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned
with a decision granting the aforementioned motions to dismiss,
which as such, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the
allegations of fact made in the petition of appellant herein.
According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the owner of
several parcels of residential land, situated in Pasig Rizal, and
known as the Antonio Subdivision, certain portions of which had
been reserved for the projected feeder roads aforementioned,
which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when
Republic Act No. 920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the
"construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement"
of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was
approved by the President on June 20, 1953. The petition further
alleges that the construction of said feeder roads, to be undertaken
with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have
the effect of relieving respondent Zulueta of the burden of
constructing its subdivision streets or roads at his own
expenses, 1 and would greatly enhance or increase the value of
the subdivision" of said respondent. The lower court held that
under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was
"clearly for a private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion,
which is self-evident. 2 However, respondent Zulueta contended, in
his motion to dismiss that:
"A law passed by Congress and approved by the
President can never be illegal because Congress is
the source of all laws . . .. Aside from the fact that
the movant is not aware of any law which makes
illegal the appropriation of public funds for the
improvement of what we, in the meantime, may
assume as private property . . .." (Record on Appeal,
pp. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it
being inconsistent with the nature of the Government established
under the Constitution of the Philippines and the system of checks
and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is

refuted by the decisions of this Court invalidating legislative

enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws. 3
As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds
for a private purpose the principle according to Ruling Case Law, is
this:
"It is a general rule that the legislature is without
power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately
benefited
by
their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to
the state, which results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, doesnot justify their aid by the use of
public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics
supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the
following language:
"In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must
be
exercised
for
public
purposes
only, discussed supra sec. 14, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals." (85
C.J.S. pp. 645-646; italics supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris
Secundum states:
"Generally, under the express or implied provisions
of the constitution, public funds may be used for a
public purpose.The right of the legislature to
appropriate funds is correlative with its right to
tax, under constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and prohibiting the
collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion
thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public
purpose. . .
xxx xxx xxx
"The test of the constitutionality of a statute
requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interests,

as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of

individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public. . . ." (81 C.J.S. p.
1147; italics supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the
foregoing views which, apart from being patently sound, are a
necessary corollary to our democratic system of government,
which, as such, exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established
jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional
system ours has been patterned, said views and jurisprudence are,
likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to
uphold the appropriation in question, upon the ground that
petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above
referred to because the same does not affect him directly. This
conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following premises
namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional
infirmity of the aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter
may not be annulled without a previous declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set
forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code is absolute, and admits of no
exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of
Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events
occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the
latter consist of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by
said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the
projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended
upon whether said roads were public or private property when the
bill, which, later on, became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by
Congress, or when said bill was approved by the President and the
disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953
(see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to
the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need

not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said

appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other
statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions. For instance, the
creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions
set forth in Article 1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and
actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his
person, including, therefore, his right to the annulment of said
contract, even though such creditors are not affected by the same,
except indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal provision.
Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, 5 upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes an
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. 6 Although there are some decisions to the
contrary, 7 the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the
American Jurisprudence as follows:
"In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that
only
persons
individually
affected,
but
also taxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation
and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys." (11
Am. Jur. 761; italics supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court
of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262 U.S. 447), insofar
as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the
relationship of a taxpayer of the U.S. to its Federal Government is
different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to its
government. Indeed, under thecomposite system of government
existing in the U.S., states of the Union are integral part of the
Federation from aninternational viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the
limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution. In fact, the same
was made by representatives of each state of the Union, not of the
people of the U.S., except insofar as the former represented the
people of the respective States, and the people of each State has,

independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In

other words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have
become binding upon the people of the U.S. in consequence of an
act of, and, in this sense, throughthe respective states of the Union
of which they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation
between said people and the Federal Government of the U.S. is
reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen
directly, not by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen
by each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct
(Article II, section 2, of the Federal Constitution).
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its
taxpayers, on the other hand, and the Republic of the Philippines,
on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people
and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer,
from a domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people
and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except
that the authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people
of the Philippines ismore fully direct than that of the states of the
Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national
government is not subject to limitations analogous to those
imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of the Union,
and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of
the states of the Union. For this reason, the rule recognizing the
right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds which has been upheld
by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S.
601) has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted
with respect to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating
federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257),
involving the expropriation of a land by the Province of Tayabas,
two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the
purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as
unduly exorbitant. It is true that in Custodio vs. President of the
Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the
Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of
an appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in
Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs.
Commission on Election (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of
certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same.
Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such position
in said two (2) cases the importance of the issues therein raised
is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in the

Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a

taxpayer. The province of Rizal, which he represents officially as it
Provincial Governor, is our most populated political
subdivision, 7 and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion
of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances
surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioner's action in
contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this
action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that
the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed,
and the records are remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of
this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon,
JJ.,concur.
||| (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No.
L-10405, [December 29, 1960], 110 PHIL 331-346)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169777. July 14, 2006.]
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
FRANKLIN
M.
DRILON,
in
his
capacity
as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his
capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as
Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in
his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA
"LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
ALFREDO S. LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO
OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, MAR ROXAS and
MANUEL
B.
VILLAR,
JR., petitioners, vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in
his stead and in behalf of the President of the
Philippines, respondents.
[G.R. No. 169659. July 14, 2006.]
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO
LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep.
CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep.
LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL
VIRADOR,
COURAGE
represented
by
FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented
by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, petitioners, vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, respondent.
[G.R. No. 169660. July 14, 2006.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity
as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S.
SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of
Staf, respondents.
[G.R. No. 169667. July 14, 2006.]
ALTERNATIVE
LAW
GROUPS,
INC.
(ALG), petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA,

in
his
capacity
as
Executive
Secretary, respondent.
[G.R. No. 169834. July 14, 2006.]
PDP-LABAN, petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 171246. July 14, 2006.]
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M.
BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR
AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON
C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C.
BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V.
GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Pending consideration are 1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated May
18, 2006 filed by respondents, praying that the Decision promulgated
on April 20, 2006 (the Decision) be set aside, and 2) the Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 17, 2006 filed by petitioner PDP-Laban in so
far as the Decision held that it was without the requisite standing to file
the petition in G.R. No. 169834.
Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., Alternative Law Groups, Inc.,
Francisco I. Chavez, and PDP-Laban filed their respective Comments to
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
Respecting
PDP-Laban's
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al. and petitioner Chavez
endorse the same. Respondents, however, pray for its denial.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents argue that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
has not been published, hence, the President may properly prohibit the
appearance of executive officials before Congress.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Rules of Procedure had not been
published, such does not have any bearing on the validity of any of the
provisions of E.O. 464. The prohibition under Section 1 of E.O. 464 has
to do with the question hour, not with inquiries in aid of legislation. As
to the prohibition authorized by Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b),
the basis thereof is executive privilege, not the purported failure to
publish rules of procedure.
If the President would prohibit executive officials from appearing before
Congress on the ground of lack of published rules of procedure, such
would not be an exercise of executive privilege, but simply a claim to.
protection under the due process clause a right which the President
has in common with any other citizen. The claim to such protection is

not based on the confidential nature of the information held by the

official concerned, as in the case off executive privilege, but on the
defective nature of the legislative inquiry itself. The prohibition under
Section 3 in relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is based
solely on executive privilege, not on any alleged defect in the inquiry
arising from a lack of published rules of procedure.
Respondents go on to argue that the President's invocation of
executive privilege is "for practical purposes," in that since the
President would be in no position to raise an objection the moment a
question is asked by Congress, she must be alled to prohibit the
appearance of the official concerned, at least until she is able to
thoroughly discuss the matter with the said official. For, so respondents
contend, "once the information has been coerced out of the official,
there is not turning back, and the damage that could result might be
devastating to the functioning of government." 1
The tenative prevention of an official from appearing before Congress
pending discussion of the matter on inquiry with the President cannot,
however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not
even, one "for practical purposes." Any such discussion is meant
precisely to allow the President to determine whether the informaton
sought falls under privelege. Bofore such determination, the claim of
privelege could only be based on mere speculation that the information
soughtmight be confidential in nature. Certainly, cannot be bound by
such a tenuous invocation of the privilege. CSIHDA
The executive branch, nonetheless, need not be apprehensive that it
might not be able to invoke executive privelege in time to prevent
disclosures of legitimately confidential information. As this Court stated
in the Decision, the President and the Executive Secretary must be
given fair opportunity to determine whether the matter under
legislative investigation calls for a claim of privilege. 2 To secure this
fair opportunity, the executive branch need not resort to a
precautionary claim of privilege like that proffered by respondent. The
President may, instead, direct the official concerned to ask Congress
for reasonable time to discuss with her the subject matter of the
investigation.
Section 3 in relation to 2(b) of E.O. 464, however, is far from being a
mere directive to officials summoned by Congress to ask for time to
confer with the President. It is an authorization for implied claims of
privilege. 3 As such, the criteria for evaluating its validity must be
those for claims of executive privilege. On the basis of such criteria,
the Court found the implied claim authorized under Section 3 in
relation to Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 to be defective.
In fine, no argument in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration merits
a reversal or modification of the Decision.

As for its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner PDP-Laban avers that

there is no fundamental difference between it and petitioner Bayan
Muna to justify their unequal treatment since both of them have
members in. Congress. It claims, moreover, that all its members are
taxpayers and Filipino citizens whose right to information was, as held
in the Decision, violated by E.O. 464.
There are, however, fundamental distinctions between PDP-Laban
and Bayan Muna which call for this Court's contrasting rulings with
regard to their standing.
While both parties have members in Congress, PDP-Laban,
unlike Bayan Muna, is not represented therein as a party-list
organization. The PDP-Laban members in Congress were elected to
represent, not their party, but their constituents, i.e., their legislative
district in the case of representatives, or the nation at large in the case
of senators. The Bayan Munamembers in Congress, on the other hand,
were elected precisely to represent their party. 4 In fact, in light of the
party-list system, the representatives from Bayan Muna may be said to
have been elected only indirectly, since it was Bayan Munaitself, as a
party, which was voted for in the last elections where it received
enough votes to entitle it to three seats in the House of
Representatives. 5 This, again, contrasts with the situation of the PDPLaban members in Congress who were all elected in their individual
capacities.
Indeed, the rights of the Bayan Muna representatives are so
intertwined with their party's right to representation in Congress that,
in the event they change their party affiliation during their term of
office, they would have to forfeit their seat 6 a rule which clearly
does not apply to the PDP-Laban members in Congress.
Bayan Muna is thus entitled to participate in the legislative process in a
way that cannot be said of PDP-Laban.
With regard to PDP-Laban's assertion that it consists of taxpayers and
Filipino citizens, suffice it to state that its Petition did not assert this as
a ground for its standing to sue. It merely alleged that E.O. 464
hampers its legislative agenda and that the issues involved are of
transcendental importance, 7 which points were already addressed in
the Decision.
If PDP-Laban intended to sue as an organization of citizens in pursuit of
the right to information of such citizens, it did not so state in its
petition. As such, the Court could not be satisfied that its participation
in the controversy would ensure "concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 8
A final point. Petitioners Senate of the Philippines et al., by
Manifestation dated April 25. 2006, called this Court's attention to the

inadvertent omission, in the title of the petition in G.R. No. 169777, of

the name of Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr. The Manifestation reiterated
an earlier Manifestation dated October 24, 2005 requesting that
Senator Villar's name be included in the title of said petition. Finding
the Manifestations well-taken, the title of G.R. No. 169777 is hereby
amended to reflect the name of Senator Villar as one of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of Respondents
dated May 18, 2006 and the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of
Petitioner PDP-Laban dated May 17, 2006 are DENIED WITH FINALITY
for lack of merit. The title of G.R. No. 169777 is amended to include the
name Senator Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as one of the petitioners. TIaEDC
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario,
Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part. On leave when the case was decided on merits.
Carpio, J., is on official leave.
Tinga, J., please see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
TINGA, J.:
While I concur generally in the result begot by the adjudication of these
cases, there are nuances to my views that are not sufficiently
addressed by the majority. I thus write separately to elaborate on
them.
Executive Order No. 464 (EO 464) does not conform to the usual mode
of executive orders, defined in the Administrative Code as "[a]cts of
the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers". 1 On its face, it reads instead as a series of instructions by
the President to the members of the executive branch.
Without doubt, the President is vested with executive control of all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. Such power is granted by
the Constitution 2 and reiterated by statute. 3 A necessary implement
of executive control is the ability of the President to prescribe
instructions to members of the executive department on any matter
related to the exercise of their respective functions. Executive control
is not absolute, and its exercise may not contravene the laws of the
land, 4 yet it must be recognized as a constitutional prerogative of the
President which is entitled to respect from the other co-equal branches
of government.
This point is relevant, for Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464, on their face,
align with the presidential power of executive control.
The provisions bear replication:

SEC. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive

Privilege.
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by
this executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive department
who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by
the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP
are covered by the executive
privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in
the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined
by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials
Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of
separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation.
By itself, Section 2(b) is a mere enumeration of the officials covered
under the Executive Order and would be thus innocuous unless tied to
the other provisions. Section 3 however bears closer scrutiny.
The provision is styled as an instruction by the President to the officials
covered under Section 2(b) that they secure the consent of the
President before appearing before either chamber of Congress. No
other persons, certainly none outside the executive branch, are
brought into the purview and command of Section 3. Neither is the
provision worded in such a manner as intending to bind anybody
outside of the executive branch to its expressed prohibition. Section 3

is not even stated in declarative fashion such as: "No public official
enumerated under Section 2(b) may appear before Congress without
securing the prior consent of the President." Such phrasing would have
left room for interpretation that the President was imposing such rule
on Congress. Instead, Section 3 ordains that "[a]ll public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the
President. . ."
The difference should not be appreciated as merely semantic. Since
executive control guarantees the President the right to issue
instructions to members of the executive branch, any such set of
instructions, however worded or issued, should be recognized as falling
within the ambit of the President's constitutional prerogative. The
existence of the power of executive control would not shelter such
instructions or issuances from judicial review, as in this case. Yet it
would at least be a proper measure of balance come the time of
adjudication, especially if there is a competing constitutional value
against which executive control should be weighed. ETDHSa
Thus, it is a reasonable position to take that Section 3, on its face, is
valid as it embodies the exercise of executive control without expressly
binding those outside of the executive department to its restrictions.
It would be difficult to effectuate Section 3 on its face as representing a
broad claim of implied claim of executive privilege. I agree that the
concept of implied claim of executive privilege is legally untenable. Yet
the requirement of consent prescribed under Section 3 does not ipso
facto provoke the claim of executive privilege. It is the actual refusal of
the President to extend consent to the appearance that tyriggers the
claim of executive privilege. While Section 3 does recognize the
possibility or the scenario of the President withholding consent, I
submit that the authority of the President to withhold such consent is
drawn not from Section 3 or any other provision of E.O. 464, but from
the general principle of executive control. Even without E.O. 464, the
President, by virtue of executive control, can very well order a member
of the executive department not to appear before Congress, or any
other body for that matter. Still, this exercise of executive control
would not necessarily shield the official concerned if he/she refuses to
appear before Congress or any other body from judicial review over
such action. Nonetheless, the proper legal predicates to the impasse,
which include the concept of executive control, should be spelled out.
The Decision did suggest that the actual invocation of Section 3 by
several officials, as basis for their refusal to appear before Congress,
represents an implied claim of executive privilege. I think that
such refusal actually embodies an express claim of executive
privilege, as it derives from the withholding of consent by the
President. Still, the character of the claim has no effect on the

capacity of the courts initially to review the claim of privilege and

ultimately to reject the same.
Even as the claim of executive privilege is express, it is
nonetheless a general claim bereft of any specifics. Which leads
to my other main point. Even though I posit that Sections 2(b) and 3 of
EO 464 are valid on their face, the fact remains that their actual
application, as invoked by various members of the executive
department, engendered consequences that could not be sanctioned
by the Constitution.
It is a given that EO 464 was invoked by several members of the
executive department as basis for their non-appearance before various
committees of the Senate. 5 While these officials may have invoked a
broad but express claim of executive privilege, yet it is evident, as
stated in the Decision, that such claims were not accompanied by any
specific allegation of the basis of such claim. 6 Congress is entitled to
know of the particular basis of the claim of executive privilege.
Moreover, to prevent abuse of the right to executive privilege, the
Court properly mandated that the claim of executive privilege must be
formally invoked, in a manner that clearly states the grounds for such
privilege 7 , sufficiently particular without having to compel disclosure
of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. 8
The actual invocation of executive privilege by the officials concerned
herein, using Section 3 of EO 464 as basis, hardly conforms to any
acceptable and proper claim of the privilege. The application of Section
3 precludes Congress or the courts from any meaningful evaluation of
the invoked claim of executive privilege, since no basis for such claim
is supplied other than the rank or position held by the officials
compelled to testify. Given that the claim of executive privilege had
actually been invoked using Section 3, and that the Senate itself
resultantly sought judicial relief before this Court, the controversy was
rightly ripe for adjudication, and the ultimate denouement reached by
the Court was correct then and remains so, but only on a resultoriented basis and not on a strictly constitutional foundation.
I offer a final nuance. Following the principle of executive control, the
President need not have issued EO 464 in order to command executive
officials to secure presidential consent before appearing before
Congress. The mere invalidation of provisions of EO 464 alone did not
sufficiently strike, as it could not have sufficiently struck, at the heart
of the problem. However, the Decision stands as a vital precedent
which hopefully would resolve future controversies of similar nature.
For in invalidating portions of EO 464, the Court at the same time laid
down the standards for compelling members of the executive branch
to appear, before Congress, as well as the standards for the proper
invocation of the claim of executive privilege. These standards were

formulated with due recognition accorded to the constitutional

functions and prerogatives of both the executive and legislative
branches of government. ECAaTS
These standards, which should be now respected as doctrine, could
have very well been imposed by the Court without having to invalidate
Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464, since said provisions, as written, do not
purport to bind any person outside the executive branch. Ultimately
though, the invalidation of said provisions of EO 464, unneeded as it is,
serves the expedience of emphasis, if anything else, making it clear
that any valid claim of executive privilege binding on the legislature or
on the courts must be invoked in a particular manner and on specified
grounds.
I say again my view is that Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are void as
applied only, definitely not on their face.
||| (Senate of the Phil. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, 169659, 169660,
169667, 169834, 171246, [July 14, 2006])

EN BANC
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON
A.
DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners, - versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO
B. ABAD,
Respondents.
Promulgated: December 7, 2010

G.R. No. 192935

G.R. No. 193036

Present:

distributed among the several departments.[2] The Constitution is the

basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what
may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the
whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. [4]
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases [5] both of
which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
NACHURA,
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
BRION,
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
PERALTA,
of the Constitution[6] as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
BERSAMIN,
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. [7]
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action
VILLARAMA, JR.,
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
PEREZ,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
MENDOZA, and
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
SERENO, JJ.
Representatives.

MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the
Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are
established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to
the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino
found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft
and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July
30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing thePhilippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that
a public office is a public trust and mandates that
public officers and employees, who are servants of the
people, must at all times be accountable to the latter,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable
acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation
of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
seriously affects the political, economic, and social life
of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached
very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust
and confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination
of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale
graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and to deter
others from committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government and in their
public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his
campaign for the Presidency in the last elections kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirapexpresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the
evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and

corruption during the previous administration, and

which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders
and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as theCOMMISSION, which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such
scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral
and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and
four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:

a)
Identify and determine the reported cases of such
graft and corruption which it will investigate;
b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence
related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to
this end require any agency, official or employee of the
Executive Branch, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, to produce documents, books,
records and other papers;
c)
Upon proper request or representation, obtain
information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d)
Upon proper request and representation, obtain
information
from
the
courts,
including
the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;
e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their
testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a need to
utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the
ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of
Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g)
Turn over from time to time, for expeditious
prosecution,
to
the
appropriate
prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special orinterim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public
officers and employees and their private sector coprincipals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in
the course of its investigation the Commission finds
that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are
liable for graft and corruption under pertinent
applicable laws;

h)
Call upon any government investigative or
prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice
or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its
functions and duties;
i)
Engage or contract the services of resource
persons, professionals and other personnel determined
by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of
procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive
Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the
presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are
appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x
x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or
Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing
before the Commission refuses to take oath or
affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for
inspection, when required, shall be subject to
administrative disciplinary action. Any private person
who does the same may be dealt with in accordance
with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
Commission. x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of

the President shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers,
execute its functions, and perform its duties and
responsibilities
as
effectively,
efficiently,
and
expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission
shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31,
2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If
and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and corruption during
the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental
Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this
Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not
affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions
hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30 th day of
July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office

of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft

and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration,
and
thereafter
to
submit
its
finding
and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.[8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest.Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable
cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries
which have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial factfinding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past.
[9]
They are usually established by states emerging from periods of
internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms
for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the
following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they
investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as
opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish
their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more
about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to
prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.
[11]

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The

Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory
or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of
which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future
conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and

pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with
quasi-judicial
powers
duplicating,
if
not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more
emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while
the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it

selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the

Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural
speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they
mean that they would like us to simply forget about the
wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have
this to say: There can be no reconciliation without
justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we
give consent to their occurring over and over again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the
petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of
the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the
same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following
manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of

2010 violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth
commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law which
the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to
the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the
Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise
in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if
corruption is eliminated without even addressing the
other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual
question on the constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute.[13]
In their Consolidated Comment, [14] the respondents, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the
legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order
with the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress

to create a public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), [15]Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A.
No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle

of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to

appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman(Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of
other executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar
bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint
and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay,
Presidential
Committee
on
Administrative
Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential
Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the
following are the principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to
file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No.
1;

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the
requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of
judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners
has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to
file their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the
outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown
that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the
subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain
injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. [20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of
the
petitioners-legislators
to
assail Executive
OrderNo.
1.
Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This
certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an
institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power
and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held
in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so
is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no
standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its
operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation
and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds
already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and
disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional
action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere
in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor
for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David
v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a

court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule
as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the
real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises
in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He may be
a person who is affected no differently from any other
person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has
to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order
and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both
citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is
in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held
by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: In matter of mere public right, howeverthe
people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not
the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and
that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to
taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a
citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts
to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person

from seeking judicial interference in any official policy
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders
the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same
Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive
or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a
general interest common to all members of the
public.
This
Court
adopted
the direct
injury
test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of
Public
Works and Anti-Chinese
League
of
the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations
omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the
Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is
no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental

importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco [29] are nonexistent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar,
they should be resolved for the guidance of all. [30]Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the
country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to
overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of
the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its
constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching
significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that
the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body
of the Office of the President. [31] Thus, in order that the President may
create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a
statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to
petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32]since there is no
provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the
President to create a truth commission. [33] He adds that Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing
authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation
of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses
verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.
[34]
Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize
the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office,
Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the
effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that
the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and
not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of
the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to

create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the

reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the
President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the
Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of
agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
[36]
Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is
limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President
overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative
about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a
truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past
presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public
offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been
recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other
two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to
create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an
adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1
and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the
Constitution.[39]
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the
power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to
ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of
his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly
the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or
interfere with the discretion of his officials. [40] The power of the
President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends
further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to
discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and
licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters which he
is entitled to know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where
it was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department in line with his
constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily

includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may
create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported
large scale graft and corruption in the government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as
expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section
31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional
and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the
Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is
in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office
of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in
the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration
of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing
the President to reorganize any department or agency
in the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
"the President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the

Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323

SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization
"involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions." It takes place when there
is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter. [47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent
in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from
Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission
pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416,
as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including
the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services
and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O.
292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a
justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is
already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the
power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS,
the transition towards
the parliamentary form of government will necessitate
flexibility in the organization of the national
government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening
of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with
this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was
enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says
it was enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary
form of government, the legislative and executive
powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416
was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon
the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987
Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.]
1416,
Your
Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President
to reorganize the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the
1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on
the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of
the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the

Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of
power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in
this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency
is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such
authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:
[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought

back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that
"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
the powers of the President. It also grants the President
other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law,e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specificpowers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as

within the scope of "executive power."Corollarily, the

powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution.In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. [53] One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated
duty
is
the
power
to
create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus,
in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the
President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an
investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating
Committee
cannot
be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that
the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to
be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies
created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano

Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.

There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because
the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the
power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public
office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment
or
allocations
of
existing
funds
already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there
is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General,
whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
[55]
Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no
impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from thefaithfulexecution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department. [57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily
investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the
appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons
who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested
in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the
case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the

power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to
subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is
essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation"
being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly
or
popularly
understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially:
x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To
settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"

and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,

settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x.
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is
bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task
of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. [62] The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against them, [63] is certainly not a function given
to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation,
under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. [64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No.
6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it
was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman
by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is
not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and
officials is likewise concurrently shared with the

Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local

Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains
concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President
and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints
against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of
government,
the
investigation
of
such
cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated
above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the
determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically
out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under
Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative
Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the
findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its
predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and
the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their

mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for
possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the
investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in
upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1
reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is
violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not
apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the previous administration as its sole object makes the
PTC an adventure in partisan hostility. [66] Thus, in order to be accorded
with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the
reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former President
Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the
classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under
the recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial
distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their
public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification
is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and
grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the
strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]
Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1

identifies the previous administration as the initial subject of the
investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine
itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the commission would
confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the
petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal
protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public
officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of
investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions
and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.
[72]
To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it
recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view
of widespread reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the previous administration which have
eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the
truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to
them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public
servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding
administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted
by the reality that unlike with administrations long
gone, the current administration will most likely bear
the immediate consequence of the policies of the
previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous
administration as a separate class for investigation lies
in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal
activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of
public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to
be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
faithfully executed, are more easily establishedin the
regime that immediately precede the current
administration.

differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the
transactions of their predecessors to investigations to
provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life
or even as a routine measure of due diligence and
good housekeeping by a nascent administration like
the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C.
Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and
the Saguisag Commission created by former President
Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to
form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding
Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor,
former President Fidel V. Ramos.[73][Emphases supplied]

[78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions,

not just those of the legislature. [79] Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires
is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. [75] It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. [76] The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.[82]
For a
classification to
meet the
requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances
only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included
in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated inVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is

not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman
and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality
of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it
is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1
should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to single out the

previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has

been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders
and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall
primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such
scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral
and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during theprevious administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating

differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle

for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the
Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the
investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as
basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the
Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1
chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous
administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other
past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the
commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness. [89] The reason given is
specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it
breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing
evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point.
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither
is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous
administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. The law
does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court
logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys
worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order
No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its
mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate
all
past
administrations. While reasonable
prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and

impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and
an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad
hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered
view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be
circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law
of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should
be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the
PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption,
Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the
provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in
the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners
lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in
partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A
rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held
or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union
activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise
of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. [96] Such a classification must
not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in
situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory
legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members
of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated
by it in the same way as are the members of the class. [97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not
fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.

Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not allembracing and does not include all the evils within its reach. [99]It has
been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection
clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens
to be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was
not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where
the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These
cases refer to the step by step process. [101] With regard to equal
protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[102]
[98]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no

inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was
underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any
particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative
commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is
violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination. [103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate
discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only
confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed
during the previous administration.[104] The OSG points to Section 17 of
Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If
and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and corruption during
the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental
Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the
President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the
PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other
past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered
in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still
depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide

not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will
only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1
was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of
the Arroyo administration.[105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in
the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter
(composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the
equal protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of any
discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of
action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally
mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of
the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue
interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present
political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations
thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power
of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also
includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one

hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many
times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the
other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be
a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not
imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making
sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.
Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void
and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired
with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation
and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble
and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. [108] The Court

cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to
uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme.
All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency
must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for
power debase its rectitude.[109]
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth
commission
as
nobly
envisioned
by
the
present
administration.Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as
to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to
pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary
which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not
allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within
constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of
men.[110]
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to
cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order
No. 1.
SO ORDERED.