Art.

206
Layola vs. Judge Gabo, Jr. 323 SCRA 348 AM No. RTJ-00-1524 Jan 26,

Facts:
Complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy of the
Ombudsman for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2 Tomasito
H. Gagui, members of the Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria, Bulacan, with
homicide for the death of complainant's son. The complainant alleged that the
respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be held in the custody of his
immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an order sans any
legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused being
indicted for murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Layola initiated a complaint
charging PresidingJudge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court
in Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether respondent judge issued an unjust interlocutory order by granting the
petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2
German.
Held:
The Office of the Court Administrator found the charge to be unfounded. Knowingly
rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: (1) that the
offender is a judge and (2) that he performs any of the following acts: (a) he
knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree, or (b) he renders a
manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance. There was no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned
order knowing it to be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice.

PD. 968
Pablo vs .Castillo 337 SCRA 176
Fact:
Petitioner Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for
issuing three bad checks to complainant Mandap. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
94-00197-D, 94-00198-D and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not
consolidated. The first two were raffled and assigned toBranch 43 while the third
case to Branch 41 of the RTC in Dagupan City.
Issue:
Whether the denial of petitioners application for probation valid.
Held:
Section 9 paragraph (c) of the Probation Law, P.D. 968 provides that those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than
two hundred pesos cannot avail of the benefits of probation. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not only
that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced
that the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law. In the present case of petitioner, when she applied
for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a
previous conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D, which thereby disqualified her
from the benefits of probation.

Art. 210
Aguirre vs. People
155 SCRA 337 No. L-56013
Oct.30, 1987

Facts:
On or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, the accused Liwanag Aguirre,
being then an Acting Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC was charged of having willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously demanded and obtained from Hermogenes Hanginon, an
employee of the business firm Guardsman Security Agency, the sum of 50 pesos, as
a consideration for the said accused refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately
implementing a Writ of Execution of a final judgment of the NLRC Regional Branch XI
against said security agency. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as
principal of the crime charged. Petitioner assailed that the judgment of conviction
upon the ground that the evidence presented failed to prove his guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan erred in giving
weight to the uncorroborated testimony of the lone prosecution witness.
Issue:
Whether the accused Aguirre be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bribery, wherein the conviction was anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony
of a single prosecution witness.
Held:
In this case, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness that do not
inspire belief. It appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from
him, a mere employee of the security agency, without authority to accept any writ
or legal paper and without money. Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in
this situation where it could have been quite easy to catch the petitioner red
handed with the bribe money. There is a nagging doubt as to whether the testimony
of Hankinson, the sole witness for the prosecution, proves the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds that the judgment of conviction under review
must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Art. 294
People vs. Domingo 383 SCRA 43 GR No. 143660 Jun 5, 2002

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, attempted murder,
frustrated

murder,

and

frustrated

homicide.

On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house when
Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen
knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her
daughter

but

teh

appellant

answered

Ngayon

pa,

nagawa

ko

na.

Two

of

her

children

died.

Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime, appellant suffered
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. Appellant averred that
when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already detained.
They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized
speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out when the
appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient
indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. The counsel of the
appellant

raised

the

defense

of

insanity

of

the

appellant.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.

HELD:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder
refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the crime. This
was not the case in the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of appellants mental disorder that existed five
years after the incident, but not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that
appellant had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,
Ngayon

pa,

nagawa

ko

na.

Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to kill people, while
suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the
power

to

discern.

Mere

abnormality

of

mental

faculties

will

not

exclude

imputability.

The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are voluntary,
and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads
the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was
insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

Art. 294
People vs. Dinamling 379 SCRA 314 GR No. 134605 Mar. 12, 2002

FACTS:
Marilyn Pajarillo was in their house lying down in bed with her 2-year old daughter.
Seated beside her was 11-year old Rosemarie Malalay, who was waiting for her
father Rogelio. Rogelio was then in the patio, outside the house, drinking gin with
Marilyn's husband Charlie Pajarillo and Deogracias Acosta. Suddenly, Orlando
Dinamling entered their house and poked a long gun at Marilyn's forehead, ordered
her to lie prone on the ground. Marilyn merely sat down. Dinamman, with a short
firearm, entered their sari-sari store, searched their belongings and took more or
less P1,500.00 in cash representing her sales, two (rims of Champion cigarettes, one
dozen cans of sardines and one pack of Juicy Fruit chewing gum. Outside, Fernando
Dinamling and Linnam poked guns at the heads of Rogelio and Deogracias, who
were then lying prostrate on the ground.. After a while, Rogelio and Deogaracias
were shot to death. The trial courts ruled that Orlando and Fenando Dinamling,
Diinamman and Linnam are guilty of "robbery with double homicide"
HELD:
Accused-appellants' crime is robbery with homicide. The trial court's denomination
of the offense as robbery with double homicide" is erroneous. It is settled that
regardless of the number of homicides committed, the crime should still be
denominated as robbery with homicide. The number of persons killed is immaterial
and does not increase the penalty prescribed by Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code. Stated differently, the homicides or murders and physical injuries,
irrespective of their numbers, committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

PD. 968
Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747)
Facts:
Petitioner, as President and General Manager of the company, humiliated his
employees and blurted out invectives against the latter. He was charged with
multiple grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees who were allegedly the
recipient of the said invectives. He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out of 5
cases filed against him. Petitioner elevated the judgment from the MTC to the RTC;
however, the latter affirmed his conviction, with modification, accrediting to him the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no
avail also.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation?
Decision: NO
Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the
court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors
of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. The
Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. That an appeal
should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely
to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4
of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The penalties imposed by the MTC were already probation able. Hence, there was
no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation, unless
he is otherwise specifically disqualified. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term
of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those
sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of
their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity
and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. Considering
that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as
the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted

by the MTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally

accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the
Decision of the MTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the
law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
Art. 294
People vs. Matic 377 SCRA 314 GR No. 133650 feb. 19, 2002

Facts:
That on or about the 12th day of October, 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Norberto Sotelo y
Soriano who is still at large and two (2) unidentified male persons whose true
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
divest one Rolando Villamin y Mutas of his cash money amounting to P50.00, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforecited amount of P50.00; and that by
reason and on the occasion of the robbery, Norberto Sotelo y Soriano, with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Rolando
Villamin y Mutas on his chest, thereby inflicting upon him a stab wound which
directly caused his death.

Issue:
Wether the conviction of the appellant was based on material and legit facts and
witnesses.
Held:
The appellants contention is devoid of merit. We agree with the Solicitor General
that the divergence of Escalas testimony from his sworn statement did not impair
his credibility. The infirmity of affidavits as a species of evidence is a common
occurrence in judicial experience. Being ex parte, they are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but these factors do not denigrate the credibility
of witnesses.As such, affidavits are generally considered to be inferior to testimony
given in the court.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in
Criminal Case No. 107080-H finding appellant Ramil Matic y Bactad guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentencing him to

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim, Rolando Villamin, civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
((P50,000.00), actual damages in the amount of Fifty Pesos (P50.00), and moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is deleted. Costs
against the appellant.

PD. 968
Senior vs. CA 319 SCRA 609

Fact:
Petitioner Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for
issuing three bad checks to complainant Mandap. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
94-00197-D, 94-00198-D and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not
consolidated. The first two were raffled and assigned to Branch 43 while the third
case to Branch 41 of the RTC in Dagupan City.
Issue:
Whether the denial of petitioners application for probation valid.
Held:
Section 9 paragraph (c) of the Probation Law, P.D. 968 provides that those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than
two hundred pesos cannot avail of the benefits of probation. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not only
that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has pronounced
that the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law. In the present case of petitioner, when she applied
for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a
previous conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D,which thereby disqualified her
from the benefits of probation.