M. L. S.

Rodriguez
CONFLICTS
US and CITIZENSHIP CASES
Kearney
Barney

vs.

Salomon

Smith

and

Facts:

based upon the recording that

occurred in the past. The complainants
in this case were employed in
California by MFS Communications
when the company was acquired in
1996
by
Worldcom
(
telecom
company) . After the acquisition , both
plaintiffs continued to work for
Worldcom in California and during the
course of their employment , both
were granted
stock options in
Worldcom that could be exercised only
thru defendant SSB . The complaint
alleged that in 1998, Worldcoms HR
department
informed
Levy
that
Atlanta branch of SSb handled the
financial matters for Worldcoms
employees and that this matters
involving the exercise of his stock
options. Both Levy and Kelly opened
accounts with SSB Atlanta branch and
during the course of their relationships
, each plaintiff, while in California,
made
and
received
numerous
telephone calls
from individual
brokers in the Atlanta Office.

(Overview)
The complaint alleged that the
employees
at
the
Atlanta-based
branch of defendant Salomon Smith
and Barney, a large brokerage firm
that
has
numerous
offices
in
California-repeatedly have recorded
telephone
conversations
with
California
clients
without
the
knowledge or consent of the latter.
These facts give rise to a classicchoice of law issue, because the
relevant California privacy statute
generally prohibits any person from
recording a telephone conversation
without the consent of ALL PARTIES to
the
conversation,
whereas
the
comparable Georgia Statute does not
prohibit the recording of a telephone
conversation when the recording is
made with the consent of ONE PARTY
to the conversation.
California clients ,Kelly Kearney and
Mark Levy of SSB filed a putative
class action against SSb seeking to
obtain injunctive relief against its
Atlanta-based
branchs
continuing
practice
of
recording
telephone
conversations, resulting from calls
made to and from California, without
the knowledge or consent of the
California clients , and also seeking to
recover damages and or restitution

At some point, the 2 filed their claims

against
SSB
with
the
National
Association of Securities Dealers ,
alleging that SSb and its individual
brokers had engaged in malfeasance ,
fraud , breach of fiduciary duties in
providing advice to them . Apparently
in the
course of litigation, the 2
learned that numerous telephone calls
1

that were made and received by SSBs

Atlanta office to and from California
clients, while the clients were in
California , were taped-recorded by
SSB employees without their clients
consent of knowledge.

denial of all relief sought by the

plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs then filed the present

action, seeking relief on their own
behalf and on behalf of all other
clients of SSB who resided in California
and whose accounts were serviced by
Atlanta branch of SSB . The complaint
alleged that there was a clear violation
of privacy and that the conversations
concerning their personal financial
affairs had an expectation of privacy.
The complainants maintained that the
conduct of SSb provided a basis for a
cause of action under Section 637.2 of
the California Penal Code- Invasion of
privacy statutory scheme as well as
the violation of unfair competition law
of California.

Held:

Issue: What is the applicable law

in this case? California Law or
Georgia Law?

California Law.
California Law
applied
the
so-called
GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST
ANALYSIS in resolving choice of
law issues in this case. It has 3
steps:
1. The
court
determines
whether the relevant law of
each
of
the
potentially
affected jurisdictions with
regard to the particular
issue in question is the
same or different;
2. If there is a difference, the
court
examines
each
jurisdictions interest in the
application of its own law
under the circumstances of
the
particular
case
to
determine whethere a true
conflict exists; and
3. If the court find that there is
a true conflict, it carefully
evaluates and compares the
nature and strength of the
interest of each jurisdiction
in the application of its own
law to determine which
states interest would be
more impaired if its policy
were subordinated to the
policy of the other state,
and then ultimately applies
the law of the state whose
interest would be more

SSB filed a demurrer to the complaint,

maintaining that no relief is warranted
, because the conduct of its Atlantabased
employees
was
and
is
permissible under the Law of Georgia.
Further,
any
attempt
to
apply
California Penal Code to recordings
made in Georgia would be pre-empted
by federal law and violate the
Commerce
clause.
Trial
Court
sustained
SSBs
demurrer
and
dismissed
the
action.
CA: Affirmed the judgment ,
concluding that the law of Georgia
is appropriate and supports the

impaired if its law were not

applied.

Accordingly, the Court found that

the interest of California would be
severely impaired if its law were
not applied in this context,
whereas, Georgias interest would
not be significantly impaired if
California Law rather that Georgia
law were to be applied in
determining whether the alleged
secret recording of telephone
conversations at issue in this case
constitutes unlawful invasion of
privacy.

First, contrary to the cited cases

dealing with personal jurisdiction
by SSB, it is clear that there can
be no constitutional objection to
Californias exercising personal
jurisdiction
over
SSB
by
adjudication this Civil suit in
California court. The complaint
alleges that SSB systematically
and continually does business in
California and SSB does not deny
that
it
maintains
offices
in
California and that the telephone
conversations arouse from SSBs
business activity. Hence, clearly
California
Law
has
personal
jurisdiction over SSB.

Furthermore, applying California

Law to a Georgia businesss
recording
of calls between its
employees
and
California
customers will not severely impair
Georgias
interest
because
California does not totally prohibit
a party to record a telephone call
but rather prohibits only the
secret or undisclosed recording of
telephone conversations, that is ,
the
recording
of
such
calls
without the knowledge of all
parties to the call.

Second, California clearly has an

interest in protecting the privacy
of telephone conversations of
California
residents
while
in
California- sufficient to permit this
state, as a constitutional matter,
to exercise legislative jurisdiction
over such activity. This is not a
case in which California would be
applying its law in order to alter a
defendants conduct in another
state vis a vis another states
resident. Instead,application of
California Law would be limited to
defendants
surreptitious
or
undisclosed recording over the
telephone by California residents
while they are in California. This is
a traditional setting in which a
state may act to protect the
interest of its own residents while
in their home state.

In this case, the Court ruled that

although that in general California
law is applicable in the setting
and that the plaintiffs may seek
relief to require SSB to comply
with California Law in the future,
the court shall apply Georgia Law
with respect to SSBs potential
monetary liability for its past
conduct, thus relieving SSB of any
liability for damages for its past
recording
of
conversations.
( Application of choice of law rule
prospectively)

Michael Butler et al vs. Adoption

Media, LLC

In 2004, plaintiffs filed a suit against

the Gwilliams and 2 Arizona limited
companies owned by the Gwilliams
Adoption Media LLC and Adoption
Profiles. Plaintiffs alleged violations of
Unruh Civil Rights and violations of
Californias unfair competition and
false advertising laws. Complainant,
however, amended the complaint due
to the dismissal of the 1st complaint,
impleading additional defendants.

Facts:
Defedants
Gwilliams ( Dale and
William), are partners in Arizona
general
partnership
known
as
Adoption.com who run businesses that
operate adoption-related websites in
US.
One
of
the
websites,
ParentProfiles.com , offers a service
that allows prospective adoptive
parents, for a fee, to post profiles
containing info about themselves, for
review by women who have given
birth or about to give birth and plan to
give up the children for adoption.

Each side has moved for Summary

judgment. While, defendants, averred
that the injuctive relief sought by the
plaintiffs
would
violate
the
1 st
amendment
and
that
California
substantive law may not be applied in
this case , and that plaintiffs lack legal
standing to bring unfair competition
and false advertising claims.

Plaintiffs Michael Butler and Richard

Butler ( The Butlers) have been
registered
domestic
partners
in
California since 2000. In 2002, they
were seeking to adopt a child. They
were certified and approved to adopt
in California , and applied to have their
profile posted on Parentprofiles.com
Their application was rejected. The
partnership had adopted a policy
allowing only individuals in an
opposite-sex marriage to post profiles
on the website and such requirement
is essential component of the policy.
Nathan testified that a same-sex
couple registered under Californias
domestic partnership law would not
qualify under the policy because they
are not married, and that even if
same-sex couples were permitted to
marry in all 50 states , defendants
would still be reluctant to change the
policy and would instead look at all
the evidence gathered altogether and
make a decision as to whether to
modify their policy.

Issue: Which States interest would be

impaired if its law were not applied?
Held: California. The court found that
the failure to apply California Law in
the present case would undermine
Unruh Act ( Unlawful discrimination on
the basis of marital status, sexual
orientation, and sex) for the same
reasons.
If
businesses
with
headquarters in other states could
maintain
a
regular
practice
of
discriminating
against
California
residents,
that
practice
would
substantially impair the protection
afforded by the statute. The Court is
not
persuaded
by
defendants
argument that Arizonas interest would
be seriously impaired by applying
California law. In the present case, the
Unruh Act is more protective of
consumers than the comparable
Arizona Law. Application of California
4

law would not violate any right

protected by Arizona Law, and Unruh
Act merely provides protection in
addition
to
those
specifically
enumerated protections in Arizona.
Arizona law does not require or even
permit , discrimination by businesses
against same-sex couples.

application. However, the claim for

injunctive relief can go forward.
The court, likewise, is not persuaded
by
defendants
claim
that
Parentprofiles.com is not a business
establishment under the California law.
However, with regard to the merits of
the claim of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, defendants
are correct that a claim of disparate
effect cannot proceed under Unruh
Act. Thus, the argument of plaintiffs
that defendants married-couples-only
policy
is
facially
discriminatory
because
it
has
the
effect
of
discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation , that claim is barred ,
hence,
precluded
a
summary
judgment , and that claim must be
tried to jury.

Thus, defendants can comply with

California law while doing business in
California
without
violating
any
provision of Arizona Law, and any
interest Arizona may have in its own
law would not be seriously impaired by
the application of California law. As in
Kearney case, where the court found
that it would be feasible for a business
located outside California to identify
the calls that its employees were
making to California residents, or were
taking from California residents, it
would be feasible in the present case
for defendants to identify those
potential
customers
of
Parentprofiles.com who were living in ,
and certified to adopt in , California.

As to the contention of defendants

that the plaintiff has no right to seek
injunctive relief because there was no
ongoing relationship between them
and the plaintiffs in this case as the
application was rejected in 2002, was
without merit. The website is not an
expressive speech. It is a commercial
enterprise , consisting of a website
where
prospective
parents
post
profiles for a fee. It is more akin to
commercial internet dating service
than internet publication.

Additionally,
defendants,
have
provided no evidence that the
application of California Law would
pose an undue and excessive burden
on interstate commerce by making it
impossible for defendants to comply
with the requirements of the Unruh act
without altering their conduct with
regard to parentprofiles.coms nonCalifornia clients.

But the court dismissed the claims

of
unfair
competition
and
misleading
advertising
claims
under California law.

However, the court found that given

the status of California law in 2002,
that defendants should not be
subjected to damages for marital
status discrimination in connection
with their rejection of plaintiffs

Ernesto
Francisco
Achivement MT
Facts:
5

vs

Stolt

Appellant
Ernesto
Francisco,
a
Philippine national , was injured on a
chemical tanker ship located on
Mississipi
River.
Francisco
was
employed aboard the MT Stolt
Achievement ( the vessel) , which was
allegedly operated by Stotl-Nielsen
Transport
Group,
a
Liberian
corporation. Stotlt testified that when
it hires Philippine seamen, latter must
comply with employment contract
requirements of the POEA. Francisco
signed a contract. The contract
contains lengthy provisions addressing
employee compensation and benefits
in the event of work-related injury,
illness or death. It provides in Sec. 29
of the Standard terms and conditions
that in the event of claims and

Awards , a convention to which US and

Philippines
are
both
signatories.
Francisco filed a motion to remand the
case to state court while Stotlt filed a
motion to compel arbitration. The
district court denied the remand and
granted the arbitration. Francisco,
then, appealed. He argued that his
case is not capable of settlement by
arbitration and not fell under the
Convention. Title 9 of the US Code has
2 chapters relevant to the appeal,
Francisco argued that under the the
Arbitration Act, seaman employment
contracts are excluded from the reach
of the Convention act.
Issue: Whether Lousiana Court may
exercise jurisdiction over the case or
the Philippines pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the employment
contract?

disputes
arising
from
this
employment the parties agree to
arbitrate
their
disputes
in
the
Philippines; and in Sec. 31 of the same
document provides that the applicable
law for any unresolved dispute, claim
or grievance arising out of or in
connection with the contact shall be
governed by Philippine laws.

Held: Philippines. The Convention Act

provides
that
a
court
having
jurisdiction may direct that arbitration
be held in accordance with the
agreement at any place provided for.
In applying the convention, the court
should compel arbitration if :

Franciso sued Stolt in Luisiana state

court, asserting claims under Jones Act
and under general maritime law of
unseaworthiness and for maintenance
and cure. He alleged that suit in state
court was authorized by the saving to
suitors clause.

1. There is an agreement in writing

to arbitrate the dispute;
2. The agreement provides for
arbitration in the territory of a
convention signatory;
3. The agreement arises out of a
commercial legal relationship;
and
4. A party to the agreement is not
an American citizen.

Stolt removed the case to federal

district court alleging that Francisco
had signed an employment contract
agreeing to arbitriate in the Philippines
and that this agreement was subject
to Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Arbitral

If these requirements are met, the

Convention requires the district courts
to order the arbitration.
6

The elements were met in the case.

Francisco, a Philippine national signed
a written
employment contract ,
stating that claims an disputes arising
from his employment , including
personal injury , were subject to

arbitration in the Philippines. The

applicable law under the contract is
Philippines Laws, and such Convention
and treaties to which the Philippines
and US are a signatories.

The
Convention
Act
does
not
recognize an exception for seamen
employment
contracts.
On
the
contrary, they recognize that the only
limitation on the type of legal
relationship
falling
under
the
Convention is that it must be
considered commercial and the
Court conclude that an employment
contract is commercial. Even if the
court is doubtful of the correctness of
the conclusion, doubts as to whether a
contract falls under the Convention
Act should be resolved in favour of
Arbitration, in the light of the strong
federal policy in favour of arbitration
agreements, and its recognition of the
goals of the Convention.

ended without Watson ever knowing

that the affair existed. Lori continued
in her marriage to Watson, giving birth
to the couples 3rd child in 2002.
In 2003, while Lori was 6 months
pregnant with their 4th child, David
learned about the affair. As a result,
David filed for divorce. Tennessee
granted the divorce. Despite divorce,
the couple continued to reside
together in the house and to share
responsibilities in raising the 4
children.
Thereafter, david filed an alienation of
affection action against the boyfriend,
Hancock. A motion to dismiss was
denied, and the boyfriend filed an
interlocutory appeal. Hancock argued
that the Tennessee law should have
applied in the case; that Tennessee
law has abolished alienation of
affection as a viable cause of action ;
therefore,
Hancock,
argued
that
applying the choice of law, motion to
dismiss should be granted in his favor.
He ( hancock) further argued that
even if Mississipi law applied, the
statute of limations has expired, and
david is procedurally barred from
bringing his claim.

The Court also recognized that the

federal policy favouring arbitration
applies with special force in the field of
international commerce.
Roger Hancock vs David Steven
Watson
Facts:
David and Lori Watsons , both
residents of Tennessee , were married
in 1989. During the 1 st 10 years of
their marriage, the couple had 2
children. According to allegations of
the amended complaint filed by David,
Roger Hancock began a sexual affair
with Lori in 1999. The last incident
allegedly occurred in 200. The affair

David arguments:
Mississippi was properly applied by the
Trial Court because the alleged tort
occurred in Mississippi and action was
7

not barred by statute of limitation

because he filed the action 1 year
after the discovery of the affair.

2. Not a resident
Northern Samar

of

Laoang,

HRET favoured Ong. MR

petitioners were denied
HRET.

Issue: Whether Mississippi Law or

Tennessee law is applicable in the
case?

by
by

Issue: Whether Jose Ong is a citizen

of the Philippines?

Held: Under Mississippi Law, alienation

of affection is an intentional tort with
no specifically prescribed statute of
limitations; therefore the 3 year
statute of limitations applies to
alienation of affection claims.In 2003,
David discovered the affair of his wife
and in 2004 he filed the case but more
than 3 years after the affair ended.

Held: YES. Ong is a citizen of the

Philippines. His Grandfather Ong
Te, arrived in the Philippines from
China to establish a residence in
Laoang, Northern Samar on the
land which he bought.
As a resident, Ong te was able to
obtain certificate of residence from
the
Spanish
Colonial
administration;

REMANDED for lack of sufficient

evidence and information.
Co vs Electoral Tribunal

The father of private respondent

Ong, Jose Sr. was born in China and
was brought to the Philippines by
Ong Te in 1915.

Facts:
Petitioners Co and Balingit asked
the Court to set aside and reversal
of a decision of the House of Rep.
Electoral Tribunal ( HRET). HRET
declared Jose Ong Jr as natural born
Filipino citizen and resident of Laoang ,
Northern Samar for voting purposes.

Ong Sr.,
grew up in Northern
Samar and established an enduring
relationship with his neighbours.
Ong Sr, absorbed Filipino culture
and was baptized into Christianity.
He married a natural born Filipino
Agripina Lao. The couple bore 8
children , one of whom is the
private respondent in this case ,
who was born in 1948.

The petitioners and Jose Ong were the

contenders
on
May
11,
1987
Congressional Election for 2nd District
of Northern Samar.
Jose Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative.

The father ( Ong Sr) filed with CFI

of Samar an application for
naturalization in 1954. In 1955, he
was declared as Filipino Citizen.

The petitioners filed election protests

against Ong based on the ff. grounds:
1. He is not a natural born citizen
of the Philippines;

There was no showing that the

family of private respondent left
their abode and home in Northern
8

Samar despite 2 fire incidents that

gutted their 1st and 2nd houses.
After which, the family constructed
16-door apartment building, 2
doors were reserved for the family.

the Court ruled that to expect him to

elect Phil. Citizenship is unnatural and
unnecessary because the reason is
obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only by his mother who was a natural
born citizen but his father had been
naturalized when he was only 9 yrs.
Old.

-PR then graduated college in

Manila and worked as examiner in
Central Bank as a CPA. His elder
brother was elected as a delegate
to
the
1971
ConCon.
Emil
(
brother)s
citizenship
was
challenged
too.
But
the
Convention,
in
drafting
the
Constitution
removed
unequal
treatment
given
to
derived
citizenship on the basis of the
mothers citizenship. Hence, the
brother ( Emil) was declared as
natural born Filipino citizen.
The pertinent provision of
Constitution provides that:

Board of Immigration Commissioner

vs. Go Callano
Facts:
( 1962) DFA informed the
Commissioner of Immigration that on
the basis of the findings of NBI the
signature of Secretary of DFA,
Serrano , on certain documents, one of
the docs was the cable document
authorizing Beato Go Callano and
others, were not authentic. Thereupo,
DFA declared the cable document to
be null and void and the travel of
brothers Go Callano from Hongkong to
the Philippine was cancelled.

the

Art. IV , Sec. 1:
1. Those who are citizen of the PH
at the time of adoption of the
Consitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the PH;
3. Those born before Ja. 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine
citizenship
upon
reaching the age of majority;
4. Those who are naturaalized in
accordance with law.

However,
the
Board
of
Immigration , exercising its power of
review under CA 613, issued, without
any previous notice and hearing, an
order reversing the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry, admitting
Beato and his 3 brothers for entry as
citizens; ordering their EXCLUSIONS as
aliens not properly documented for
admission; and ordering them to be
returned to the port where they came
or to country of which they are
nationals , upon the ground that they
had been able to enter this country
and gain Filipino citizenship by
fraudulently secured authorization. On
the
same
circumstance,
the
Commissioner issued a warrant of

There is no dispute that the

respondents mother was a natural
born Filipina at the time of her
marriage, and his father was a
naturalized Filipino citizen. Crucial to
this case is the issue whether he
elected his Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. However,
9

exclusion
commanding
the
deportation officer to carry out the
exclusion of the applications on the 1st
available transportation. However, the
warrant was not served immediately
upon the parties ordered deported.
The parties filed ( 1962) in CFI-Manila
an action for injunction to restrain the
Board of Immigration Commissioner
and the Commissioner of Immigration
from executing the order of exclusion
or deportation already mentioned
based on the ff; grounds:

were considered as citizen

of china;
3. The cable authorization was
a forgery .
CA: found for the Go Callano
Brothers.
Failed
to
adduce
evidence ( Board of Immigration)
to prove forgery.
Hence, this certiorari,
Issue: Whether the Go Callano
brothers, being Filipino citizen by
birth , lose their citizenship
because of prolonged stayed in
China and or by the alleged
recognition of their Chinese father
?

1. The Board had no jurisdiction to

exclude
them
from
the
Philippines because they were
not alines but Filipino citizens;
2. That the order of exclusion was
issued by the Board without due
process and in violation of the
Constitution;

Held: NO. As correctly found by

the CA, the brothers were the
illegitimate children of Emilia
Callano, who had a common law
husband, a Chinese citizen, hence,
they were Filipino citizens. The SC
ruled in favour of the Co Gallano
brothers. The petitioners failed to
establish evidence to support the
existence
of
forgery.
The
petitioners
became
Philippine
citizens because of their Filipino
mother.
Their
status
was
conferred on them neither by the
document by the consulate in HK
nor the finding of the Board of
Special
Inquiry
in
Manila.
Consequently, whatever defects in
the Immigration and board of
inquiry cannot affect their status.
Therefore, even assuming that
they
were
not
properly
documented, there is no basis for
the finding of the respondent

The
Go
Callanos
were
the
illegitimate children of Emilia
Callano , a filipino citizen with a
common law husband a Chinese
citizen. Hence , the brothers
averred that they were Filipinos
because their mother was a Filipino
citizen and that their chinese father
and mother were not married.
CFI: dismissed. Held that the
brothers were citizen of the
PR.China on the grounds:
1. They resided in china for 15
years before they decided to
return to the PH;
2. Under the Chinese Law of
nationality,
they
were
recognized by their father
as his children, hence , they

10

Board that they are aliens who

can be excluded.

Facts:
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina
Cabael , went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.

The brothers did not lose their

citizenship
by
the
abovementioned reasons, their
status must be governed by the
Philippine law wherever they may
be, in conformity with Art. 15 of
the CC, which provides , Law
relating to family rights and
duties
or
to
the
STATUS,
conditions and legal capacity of
persons binding upon citizens of
the Philippines , even though
living abroad; and that a Filipino
citizen may lose its citizenship
only by express determination of
law. The recognition by a Chinese
father is not among the ground
for losing Philippine citizenship.

In 1974, he embraced and was

converted to Islam, after which, he
married
herein
petitioner
in
accordance with Islamic rites. In 1979,
he returned to the Philippines.
Thereafter, petitioner, with 2 children
went to the Philippines and pretended
as guests of Bernard.
Banez executed an affidavit of
guaranty and support for his guests.
As guests, the 3 lived in the house of
Banez.
Petitioner and her children were
admitted to the Philippines as
temporary
visitors
under
the
Immigration Act of 1940.

Grounds for losing citizenship :

1. Express
renunciation
of
citizenship
2. Naturalization in a foreign
country
3. Subscribing to an oath of
allegiance
to
support
the
Constitution
of
a
foreign
country;
4. Declaration of competent Phil.
Authority that he is a deserter
of the Phil. Armed Forces in time
of war;
5. Rendering or accepting to be
commissioned in the armed
forces of a foreign country;
6. In case of a woman; by
marriage to a foreigner;

In 1981, Marina ( 1st wife) discovered

the true relationship of her husband
and petitioner. She filed a complaint
for concubinage with MTC- Pangasinan
against the 2. This case was
dismissed.
In 1982, the immigration status of the
petitioner and the children were
changed to permanent resident under
Sec. 13 (a) of the same law.
Subsequently, the petitioner was
issued
an
alien
certificate
of
registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez
eldest son, filed a letter-complaint
with the Ombudsdman , who later
referred the case to CID. On the basis
of the complaint, petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. She

Dyumantan vs. Domingo

11

was later relased after

bond. She moved for
of the deportation
ground that she
married to Bernard.

posting a cash
the dismissal
case on the
was validly

misleading
documents;
but
Leonardo informed CID more than
5 years had elapsed)
Bengson III vs. HRET
Facts:

CID: denied the contention of the

petitioner.

Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a

natural born citizen of the Philippines.
He was born in San clement, Tarlac in (
april 27, 1960) 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law was
then
applicable
was
the
1935
Constitution.

In 1994, Leonardo, the eldest son filed

a manifestation withdrawing their
objection to the granting of a
permanent resident visa to petitioner.
Issue: Whether the marriage by an
alien to a Filipino citizen removed her
from the operation of immigration
laws governing the admission and
exclusion of aliens

1985- he was enlisted in the US

Marine Corps and without consent of
the RP, took an oath of allegiance to
the US. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship under CA 63.

Held: NO. Marriage of an alien woman

to a Filipino citizen husband does not
ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her
failure to depart from the country
upon the expiration of her extended
stay here as an alien.

In 1990, he was naturalized as a US

citizen in connection with service in
the US Marine.
1994- He reacquired his Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation under RA
2630.

Sec. 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940,

it is not mandatory for CID to admit
any alien who applies visitors visa.
Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
Under Sec. 13 of same law, an alien
allowed to saty temporarily may apply
for change of status and may be
admitted as a permanent resident.
( As a wife of a Filipino husband) . The
entry of aliens into the country and
their admission as immigrants is not a
matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens.

1998- He ran for Congress and was

elected as the Representative of the
2nd district of Pangasinan against
Antonio Bengson, the petitioner in this
case.
Bengson filed a case for quo warranto
ad cautelam with HRET claiming that
Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of HRepresentatives since he
is not a natural born Filipino citizen as
required by the Constitution
2000- HRET dismissed the case and
ruled in favour of Cruz.

However,
the right of CID to
deport
the
petitioner
had
prescribed. (1979 entry based on
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Issue: Whether Cruz can still be

considered as natural born Filipino
citizen upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship?

Filipino parents but he acquired both

US and Philippine citizenships.
2nd Division of Comelec- granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of certificate of candidacy
on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and under the LGC , persons with dual
citizenship
are
disqualified
from
running for any elective position.

Held: YES. Cruz reacquired his

Philippine citizenship thru repatriation
under RA 2630. Repatriation results in
the recovery of the original nationality.
This means, Cruz, was originally a
natural-born Filipino citizen before he
lost his Philippine citizenship , will be
restored to his former status as a
natural born Filipino citizen. Under
this mode, he would not even need to
file a petition in court , and all he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance
to RP and to register the fact with the
civil registry in the place of his
residence
or place where he last
resided.

COMELEC en banc: reversed the ruling

of the 2nd division. Mazano was
allowed to run.
Petitioner in this case opposed and
pursued the case.
Manzano averred that when he
reached the age of majority , he
participated in election by exercising
his right to vote, hence , a sufficient
renunciation of his US citizenship.

*Natural-born citizens: those citizens

of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to perfect
his Philippine citizenship.

Issue: Whether private

effectively
repudiated
citizenship?

respondent
his
US

Held: YES. Manzano was a citizen of

the Philippines. To recapitulate, by
declaring
in
his
certificate
of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he
will defend the Constitution; and he
does so without mental reservation ,
private respondent as far as the laws
of the country are concerned ,
effectively
repudiated
his
US
citizenship and anything which may
have said before as a dual citizen.

Mercado vs Manzano
Facts:
Ernesto
Mercado
and
private
respondent
Edu
Manzano
were
candidates for vice-mayor in Makati in
May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the votes, Manzano won.
However,
his
proclamation
was
suspended in view of the pending
petition for disqualification filed by
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged
that Manzano was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the US; that he was
born in San Francisco, CA with both

The Sc considered the ff facts: PR

spent his childhood, adulthood and
received education in the Philippines;
practice his profession as an artist and
13

taken part in past elections in the

country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

14