People
Issue: Was Tugaoen under custodial investigation when he was invited
and made statement before PNP investigating committee?
Ruling:
At any rate, even if we were to hold that the investigation
conducted by the PNP was custodial in nature, the improprieties that
Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and overwhelming evidence
showing her and her co-conspirators guilt. Allegations of impropriety
committed during custodial investigation are material only when an
extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present
case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and Tugaoen was not deduced solely
from Tugaoens admission, but from the confluence of evidence showing their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. People v. Ibanez
Issue: Was Nabilgas provided with a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice when he executed the extra judicial confession?
Ruling: No. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession,
to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession
must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel[,] preferably of the confessant's chaoice; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. Nabilgas confession was not
made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The
services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI itself; she
was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys
investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo
Paglinawan.
3. People v. Guillen
Issue: Was appelants silence during the investigation an implied admission
of guilt?
Ruling: No. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the
accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and
fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be
taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state
that appellants silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In
fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
4. Tanengge v. People
Issue: Is the Petitioners written statement admissible in evidence if the
questioning was initiated an internal affairs management bank?
De la Cruz v. People
Issue: Is the drug test on urine samples admissible in evidence if they were
obtained from the suspect (arrested for extortion) during custodial
investigation and without the assistance of counsel?
Ruling: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended
or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article
II of R.A. 9165. Extortion is not one of those enumerated under the particular
section. Making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only
under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend
the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug
testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which
the arrest is being made.
2008
BAR
Having received tips that the accused was selling
narcotics, two police officers forced open the doors of his room.
Finding him sitting partly dressed on the side of the bed, the
officers spied two capsules on a night stand beside the bed. When
asked, Are these yours? the accused seized the capsules and put
them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the
officers pounced on the accused but failed to extract the capsules.
The officers handcuffed the accused, took him to a hospital where at
their direction, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube
into the accuseds stomach against his will. This process induced
vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two capsules which
proved to contain heroin. In the criminal case, the chief evidence
against the accused was the two capsules.
a) As counsel, for the accused, what constitutional rights will you
invoke in his defense?
b) How should the court decide the case?
ANSWERS:
a) As counsel for the accused, I would invoke the Constitutional right to
be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures(Art. III, Sec. 2
of the Constitution) which guarantees:( 1) sanctity of the home, (2)
inadmissibility of the capsules seized, (3) and inviolability of the
person. A mere tip from a reliable source is not sufficient to justify
warrantless arrest or search(Peo v Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233 Feb. 22,
2007).
b) The court should declare the search and seizure illegal:
1) The entry into the accuseds home was not a permissible
warrantless action because the police had no personal knowledge
that any crime was taking place.
2) Due to the invalid entry whatever evidence the police gathered
would be inadmissible.
3) The arrest of the accused was already invalid and causing him to
vomit while under custody was an unreasonable invasion of
personal privacy(US v Montoya, 473 US 531(1985)).
2009
BAR
William, a private American citizen, a university
graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S.
embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino
citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the
person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him to
the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police
investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda
rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William
refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted
by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was
denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the
duration of the investigation. William protested his arrest. He
claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not
given the lawyer of his choice that being an American, he should
have been informed of his rights in proper English and that he
should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken
into custody, not when he was already at the police station. Was
William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not?
ANSWER: William was not denied with his Miranda rights. True that he has
the right to counsel preferably of his choice. But if he cannot afford the
services of a counsel, he should be provided with one. Moreover, the Miranda
rights are available only during custodial investigation that is, from the
moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of
eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused.
Therefore, it is proper that he was only informed of his right at the police
station.
ALTENATIVE ANSWER: The fact that the police officer gave him the Miranda
warning in halting English does not detract from its validity. Under Section
2(b) of Republic Act No. 7438, it is sufficient that the language used was
known to and understood by him. William need not be given the Miranda
warning before the investigation started. William was not denied his Miranda
rights. It is not practical to require the police officer to provide a lawyer of his
own choice from the United States (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCAR 642,
[1998]).
If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under
the international standard of justice and that he comes from a US
State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William be
granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: William is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. His
contention is not tenable. Observing the territorial jurisdiction of commission
of the offense, the applicable law in the case is Philippine laws not the law of
the country to where he is a national (Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution).
Under our law, bail is not a matter of right if the felony or offense committed
has an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher and the evidence
of guilt is strong.
2011 BAR Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White
to a nearby police station. Upon arriving at the police station, Brown
was asked to stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette
vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed them that they were
looking for a certain cigarette vendor who snatched the purse of a
passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point at the
vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked
from the vendors.
Page 128
2011 Bar
After X, a rape suspect, was apprised of his right to silence and to counsel,
he told the investigators that he was waiving his right to have his own
counsel or to be provided one. He made his waiver in the presence of a
retired Judge who was assigned to assist and explain to him the
consequences of such waiver. Is the waiver valid?
(A) No, the waiver was not reduced in writing.
(B) Yes, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired judge does not cast doubt
on his competence and independence.
(C) Yes, the waiver was made voluntarily, expressly, and with assistance of
counsel.
(D) No, a retired Judge is not a competent and independent counsel.
2012 Bar
Under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent, etc. The investigation referred to is
called:
a. preliminary investigation;
b. summary investigation;
c. criminal investigation;
d. custodial investigation.
2013 Bar
A robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong and Rollie were
invited for questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor that
he saw them come out of the victim's house at about the time of the
robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other
information they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing
the crime.
Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his
participation in the crime. Elated by this break and desirous of securing a
written confession soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to serve
as the trio's counsel and to advise them about their rights during the
investigation.
Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito's early admission, likewise
admitted their participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-judicial
confession which served as the main evidence against them at their trial.
They were convicted based on their confession.
Should the judgment of conviction be affirmed or reversed on appeal?
Suggested Answer:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on
the extrajudicial confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must
be independent. City Attorney Juan Buan is not independent. As City
Attorney, he provided legal support to the City Mayor in performing his
duties, which include the maintenance of peace and order (People vs. Sunga,
399 SCRA 624).
Alternative Answer:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed. The police officers
committed an offense by confronting the three accused. This is a violation to
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which states that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2014 Bar
Suggested Answer:
The evidence is inadmissible against Edward Gunman. The rule begins to
operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Edward
should have been informed of his Miranda rights when the policemen
interrogated him. Failure to do so, the evidence is inadmissible against him.
Page 134
CYRIL CALPITO QUI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196161
September 26, 2012
Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The RTC in Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced her
to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5
years, 4 months, and 21 days of prision correccional in its maximum period,
as minimum, to 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as maximum.
Petitioner
then
appealed
and
subsequently
filed
an
Urgent
Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The OSG urged for the denial of
the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law
and that she is a flight-risk. The CA denied petitioners application for bail
pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Is the accused entitled to the right to bail?
Ruling: No. Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Facts: The complaint stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking
(RA 9208) and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7610, which were filed
against Miralles, et al. before the RTC Tacloban City where respondent Judge
Bitas presides.
Respondent judge issued an Order which states that the Court finds that
there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e)
of R.A. 9208.
punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly
show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check.
Atienza v People
G.R. No. 188694
February 12, 2014
ISSUE
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanation, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, does the evidence fulfill the test of
moral certainty to sustain a conviction?
RULING
No. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this
case.
In the case at bar, the discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of
the crimes charged dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce
a conviction. Atibula attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 but the
alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document that is Volume
266. Hence, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of
interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard,
constitutes a mere proof of motive. Mere proof of motive, no matter how
strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction.
People v Feliciano
G.R. No. 196735
May 5, 2014
ISSUE
Was the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and
case of the accusation against them violated with the inclusion of the phrase
wearing masks and/or other form of disguise in the information?
RULING
No. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. Every aggravating circumstance
being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
Suggested Answer:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of
a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy
trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Preliminary investigation
Arraignment ------ (Sec. 19, Art. III)
Sentencing
Prosecution has rested its case.
p. 146
2012 BAR (Question #47)
The requisites of a valid trial in absentia exclude: _____.
a. Wherein his/her failure to appear is unjustifiable;
b. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself to be identified by the
witness in his/her absence, without further unqualified
admitting that every time a witness mentions a name by
Right to cross-examination;
Right to be presumed innocent;
Right to counsel ;------- (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752)
Right to production of evidence.
2013 BAR (Question No. VII) (p.37 of the Complied Q&A 2007-2013)
As he was entering the bar, Arnold who was holding an unlit cigarette
in his right hand was handed a match box by someone standing near the
doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and
as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The
guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its
contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he
immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police. At the police station,
the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold in
possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guards
statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any written
statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the statements he
gave the police over Arnolds counsels objections. While Arnold presented
his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been
set-up, he himself did not testify. The court convinced Arnold, relying largely
on his admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and
during trial. From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in
its ruling? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
44. Lozada vs. Arroyo, et. al.; G.R. Nos. 184379-80; April 24, 2012
ISSUE # 1: Must the alleged threat be imminent or continuing for Petition for
Writ of Amparo to prosper?
HELD: Yes. The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that
this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to
the right to life, liberty, and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as
not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ.
ISSUE # 2: Were the petitioners entitled to the Writ of Amparo?
HELD: No. In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security
has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to
prove the existence of a continuing threat. The Court is in agreement with
the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally
deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft
up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents. Nevertheless, it
must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so
much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that
manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered
the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. In this case, the totality
of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite
evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already
been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to
Lozadas liberty.
45. Navia vs. Pardico; G.R. No. 184467; June 19, 2012
ISSUE # 1: For the protective Writ of Amparo to issue, will the allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing be sufficient?
HELD: No. For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance
cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case
HELD: No. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers
caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action
amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo
rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of
the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian
was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before
the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC
during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who,
for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
1997
BAR
When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended? (b) If
validly declared, what would be the full consequences of such suspension?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be suspended when there is an invasion or rebellion and
public safety requires it.
(b) According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged with rebellion or offenses Inherent to or directly connected
with invasion. Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged
within three days. Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under
Section 13. Article III of the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
1997 BAR
A while serving imprisonment for estafa. upon recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, was granted pardon by the President on condition that
he should not again violate any penal law of the land. Later, the Board of
Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the
pardon granted him because A had been charged with estafa on 20 counts
and was convicted of the offense charged although he took an appeal
therefrom which was still pending. As recommended, the President canceled
the pardon he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and imprisoned to serve
the balance of his sentence in the first case. A claimed in his petition for
habeas corpus filed in court that his detention was illegal because he had not
yet been convicted by final judgment and was not given a chance to be
heard before he was recommitted to prison. Is A's argument valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres vs. Gonzales. 152 SCRA 272
a judicial pronouncement that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to
the condition that he should not again violate any penal law is not necessary
before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon.
Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison.
By accepting the conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by the
President that he violated the condition of his pardon shall be conclusive
upon him and an order for his arrest should at once issue.
2005 BAR
Bruno still had several years to serve on his sentence when he was
conditionally pardoned by the President. Among the conditions imposed was
that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
Bruno accepted all of the conditions and was released. Shortly thereafter,
Bruno was charged with 2 counts of estafa. He was then incarcerated to
serve the i expired portion of his sentence following the revocation by the
President of the pardon. Bruno's family filed a petition for habeas corpus,
alleging that it was error to have him recommitted as the charges were false,
in fact, half of them were already dismissed. Resolve the petition with
reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon and the
determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the
conditional pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 76872, July 23, 1987)
2012 BAR
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of:
a. imminent danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it;
b. grave danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;
c. clear and present danger of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it;
d. invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
2013 BAR
On March 1, 2013, Condrad informed his mother, Vannie, that uniformed
security guards had invited him for a talk in their office but he refused to
come. Later that day, however, Condrad appeared to have relented; he was
seen walking into the security office flanked by two security guards. Nobody
saw him leave the office afterwards. Condrad did not go home that night and
was never seen again. The following week and after a week-long search,
Vannie feared the worst because Col. Sangres reputation. She thus reported
Condrads disappearance to the police. When nothing concrete resulted from
the police investigation, Vannie-at the advice of counsel-filed a petition for a
writ of amparo to compel Col. Sangre and the Sagittatius Security Office to
produce Condrad and to hold them liable and responsible for Condrads
disappearance.
a.) Did Vannies counsel give the correct legal advice?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Vannies counsel gave the correct legal advice. The Writ of Amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, or security has
been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Since there has been an enforced disappearance on the part of Conrad, the
writ is applicable.
b.)
If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held
liable and/or responsible for Conrads disappearance? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Colonel Sangre, together with the Sagittarius Security Office should
be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Conrad because
of strong evidences supporting the claim of the Writ of Amparo as shown in
the case.
ASSIGNED CASE
Issue: Was Dacudaos right to speedy disposition of the case violated?
Ruling:
No. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. The cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr. were consolidated in order to obtain expeditious
justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as
the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during
the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the
consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the
efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation
of the cases. While there is a possibility that there would be more cases
reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and
other parties, yet, any delays in petitioners cases occasioned by such other
and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182.
The Philippines was assigned for the hosting rights of the 12 th ASEAN
Leaders Summit. In preparation thereof, province of Cebu as the designated
venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified
projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and
installation of traffic safety devices and lighting facilities. After the summit, a
complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention
Office (PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit
street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the president of FABMIK
Construction was impleaded as one of the respondents. Braza was charged
for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.He pleaded not guilty.
Issue:
Was Brazas right to speedy disposition of his case violated?
Ruling:
No. The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It is a relative or
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Brazas right to speedy
disposition of the case has not been infringed.
2000 BAR:
Issue:
Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked in forfeiture
proceedings?
Ruling:
Yes. Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and
in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment
or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. The proceeding is one against
the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which
has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited. The prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a
witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the
penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. Forfeiture cases partake of
a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against selfincrimination is applicable to the proceedings.
The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination is amply protected
by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution of
individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which they are compelled, after having claimed the privilege against selfincrimination , to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.
i.
ii.
iii.
65. 2000 BAR Q: A man was shot and killed and his killer fled.
Moments after the shooting, an eye-witness described to the police
that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had
boots and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the
description given, was seen nearby. He was taken into custody and
brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were
forcibly taken and he weighed, measured, photographed,
fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja
objected to the admission in evidence of the apparel, his height and
weight, his photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results of
the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken in violation of his
right against self-incrimination. Rule on the objection.
Answer: The objection should be overruled. All information inferred from the
listed pieces of evidence do not partake of a communicative nature;
therefore, there is no testimonial compulsion. Various jurisprudence have
ruled that paraffin tests (People vs Gamboa, 25 Feb. 1991), mugshots
(People vs Gallarde, 17 Feb. 2000), fingerprinting, and seized personal
effects (People vs Malimit, 14 November 1996) are not covered by the right
against self-incrimination.
Answer:
The US Supreme Court that absent immunity, one federal jurisdiction may
not compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him in a
second jurisdiction.1
However, the decisions in some of its circuit courts have ranged from
denying the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege under foreign law 2
Answer:
D is invoking his right to liberty, specifically the freedom to choose whom to
work for and where. E is invoking his right to property, or the right to collect
the sum of money he previously lent to D.
3 Moses v. Allard(in re Moses), 799 F. Supp. 857, 970-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991), Yves
Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932, 939-41 (M.D.Ga. 1987), etc.
Answer:
Her petition must fail. There is no involuntary servitude in the instant case.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion,
or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid
or not.4
Her habeas corpus petition must also fail because her detention was a
consequence of her disobedience of a lawful court order. Such detention is
lawful.
Issue: May the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitute
cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious
injury?
Ruling:
Yes, the US Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. The core
judicial inquiry, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained,
but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated whether or not
significant injury is evident. A contrary ruling would then result to the Eighth
Amendment permitting any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or
inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.
2012 Bar The death penalty shall not be imposed:
a) unless reasons penalty for compelling death the involving crimes and
executive hereafter provides for it;
b) unless reasons for compelling heinous involving crimes and a
constitutional amendment provides for it;
c) unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and
Congress hereafter provides for it;
d) unless reasons crimes for compelling heinous Supreme involving and
the Court hereafter upholds it.
Answer: C, Equal Protection; Subsidiary Imprisonment
(1990) No. 4: "X" was sentenced to a penalty of 1 year and 5 months
of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of solvency. After serving his prison
term, "X" asked the Director of Prisons whether he could already be
released. "X" was asked to pay the fine of P5,000.00 and he said he
could not afford it, being an indigent. The Director informed him he
has to serve an additional prison term at the rate of one day per
eight pesos in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code,
The lawyer of "X" filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that
the further incarceration of his client for unpaid fines violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The petition should be granted, because Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code is unconstitutional. In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395, the United States
Supreme Court held that imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a
convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection, because
economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration
of the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and a
convict who is unable to pay it.
(2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Privitera vs. Kross, 239 F Supp
118, it was held that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for inability
to pay a fine does not violate equal protection, because the punishment
should be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel
Child Pornography. Yes. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so
as to include identical activities in cyberspace. ACPAs definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is
convincingly established that the CAs Decision dismissing the case was
attended by whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness
thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and
lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right
to appeal. Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the
state or its government of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or
remedies.
2001 Bar For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of
homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned.
Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance
of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of
prosecution witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case
was pending trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning
who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.
Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for
homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning.
Accused Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double
jeopardy. The prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not
able to present the said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding
out of fear. Resolve the motion.
Answer: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case
predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
2002 Bar A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was drunk,
sideswiped a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City, resulting in physical
injuries to the latter. The public prosecutor filed two separate information
against Cascasero, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of an
ordinance of Makati City prohibiting and penalizing driving under the
influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With
regard to the second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash the information invoking his right
against double jeopardy. He contended that, under Art. III, Section 21 of the
Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act He argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed
from the same act of driving allegedly under the influence of liquor which
caused the accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your answer
Answer 1: Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved
in the two cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries
arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v.
Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an
accused who was acquitted of driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance
could not be prosecuted for damage to property through reckless
imprudence because the two charges were based on the same act. In People
v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when there is identity in the
act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall bar prosecution under the other.
Answer 2: There is no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized by the ordinance of
Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting
Page 176
1. (2011 Bar) There is double jeopardy when the dismissal of the first case
is
(A) made at the instance of the accused invoking his right to fair trial.
(B) made upon motion of the accused without objection from the
prosecution.
(C) made provisionally without objection from the accused.
(D) based on the objection of the accused to the prosecution's
motion to postpone trial.
2. (2012 Bar) In which of the following would there be no double jeopardy
even if a subsequent case is filed?
a. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable
postponements against Pots wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the
right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor objected. Dismissal granted;
b. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After
innumerable postponements against Pots wishes, the prosecutor
moves for dismissal with the consent of Pot. Granted;
c. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable
postponements against Pots wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the
right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor posts no objections. Dismissal granted;
d. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable
engaged in. Bills of attainder are 'legislative acts that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. Punishment is a
prerequisite. Whether legislative action curtailing a privilege previously
enjoyed amounts to punishment depends upon 'the circumstances attending
and the causes of the deprivation. We are unable to conclude that
punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides
standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. (GARNER v. BOARD
OF PUBLIC WORKS OF LOS ANGELES)
5. (1987 Bar) Congress passed a law relating to officials and employees
who had served in the Government for the period from September 21, 1972
up to February 25, 1986. One provision of the law declared all officials from
the rank of assistant head of a department, bureau, office or agency "Unfit"
for continued service in the government and declared their respective
positions vacant. Is the provision valid? Why?
The law is a bill of attainder by which Congress, by assuming judicial
magistracy, in effect declares all officials and employees during martial law
(September 21, 1972- February 25, 1986) as disloyal and, on this basis,
removes some while subjecting others to a loyalty test. With respect to the
provision declaring positions vacant, even the power to reorganize cannot be
invoked because under the Freedom Constitution such power can be
exercised only by the President and only up to February 25, 1987. Since the
law under question was presumably passed after February 25, 1987 and by
Congress, it is unconstitutional.
[1988 BAR] Because of the marked increase in the incidence of labor strikes
and work stoppages in industrial establishments, Congress intending to help
promote industrial peace, passed, over the objections of militant labor
unions, an amendment to the Labor Code, providing that no person who is or
has been a member of the Communist Party may serve as officer of any
labor organization in the country. An association of former NPAs (New
Peoples Army) who had surrendered, availed of amnesty, and are presently
leading quiet and peaceful lives, comes to you asking what could be done
against the amendment. What would you advise the association to do?
Explain.
For these reasons, I would advise the association to work for the
veto of the bill and, if it is not vetoed but becomes a law, to
challenge it in court.
[2005 BAR] The Philippines and Australia entered into a Treaty of Extradition
concurred in by the Senate of the Philippines on September 10, 1990. Both
governments have notified each other that the requirements for the entry
into force of the Treaty have been complied with. It took effect in 1990. The
Australian government is requesting the Philippine government to extradite
its citizen, Gibson, who has committed in his country the indictable offense of
Obtaining Property by Deception in 1985. The said offense is among those
enumerated as extraditable in the Treaty. For his defense, Gibson asserts that
the retroactive application of the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post
facto law. Rule on Gibsons contention.
(b) Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines
adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will that change your answer?
[2008 BAR] The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its
members directed at the style and length of male officers hair, sideburns
and moustaches, as well as the size of their waistlines. It prohibits beards,
goatees, and waistlines over 38 inches, except for medical reasons. Some
police officers questioned the validity of the circular, claiming that it violated
their right to liberty under the Constitution. Resolve the controversy.
[2012 BAR] An ex post facto law has been defined as one: _____.
(A) which aggravates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
(B) which mitigates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
(C) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed;
(D) which aggravates a crime or makes it non-criminal after it was
committed.