SIBAL v.

VALDEZ
G.R. No. L-26278 August 4, 1927
Johnson, J.
Doctrine:
A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no sense
forms part of the immovable.
Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other
words, the phrase personal property should be understood to include
ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field
ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of
the realty.
A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in
existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence. A man may sell
property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.
Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the
Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez
the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of
land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter,
the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid
thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However,
Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the
plaintiff.
Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property
hence not subject to redemption.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the sugar cane is to be classified as personal property
2. Whether or not future crops to be harvested can be considered a valid
object of sale
Held:
1. No. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the
immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be
gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment creditors.

Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other words,

the phrase personal property should be understood to include ungathered
products. Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be
harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.
2. Yes. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in
existence, is reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural
increment or usual incident of something already in existence, and then
belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the
thing comes into existence (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me., 387;
Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63.).
A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually
possessed.

Mananzala vs Court of Appeals

GR 115101, March 2, 1998
Facts
: Petitioner Fidela Mananzala owned a parcel of land located in Quezon City,
and in actual possession of the land since 1955 by virtue of a conditional sale
made in her favor by the PHHC, now NHA. 1960, however, the PHHC awarded
the land to Nestor and Elisea Mercado. Petitioner contested the award in
court. She claimed precedence not only in actual occupation of the land but
also in application for its purchase. Her right to the land was upheld the
courts. In 1984, petitioner paid in full the price of the land. The NHA
therefore executed a deed of sale in her favor on January 14, 1985.

Private respondent Corazon Aranez brought an action for specific

performance against petitioner to enforce a alleged deed of sale covering the
same lot in 1960. The contract stipulated that title to the land shall be
transferred to private respondent within 30 days after full payment of the
purchase price by petitioner to the PHHC.

Private respondent alleged that petitioner refused, despite repeated

demands made by her, to comply with the stipulation in their contract.

Petitioner denied selling the land to private respondent. The trial court
dismissed the complaint. Although finding petitioner's signature on the deed
to be genuine, it nevertheless ruled that there was no perfected contract of
sale because petitioner never really intended to sell the land. Furthermore,
the trial court also found the alleged contract to be null and void because, at
the time of the sale, petitioner was not yet the owner thereof.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that there was a meeting
of the minds between the parties as evidenced by the signature of the
petitioner on the deed of sale which the NBI found to be genuine. The
notarization of the deed gave rise to the presumption of its regularity.

The Court of Appeals further held that petitioner could validly sell the land
even before the actual award to her pursuant to Art. 1461 of the Civil Code,
which provides that things having a potential existence maybe the object of
a contract of sale.
Issue
: Whether or not the contract between petitioner and private respondent is
validand binding
Held
: Yes.
The SC affirmed the CAs decision
The petitioner's contention that the sale to private respondent is void
because it was made within one year after the title to the property was
issued in the name of petitioner, while raised by petitioner in her answer in
the trial court, was not passed upon and she did not urge it anymore except
now. As already noted, the trial court based its decision on its finding that the
sale was void on the ground that there was no meeting of the minds of the
parties. When its decision was appealed, petitioner did not urge her original
defenses to uphold the decision in her favor. She merely relied on the ruling
of the trial court.

The appellate court, in reversing the trial court, simply considered the issues
raised by the trial court's decision, namely, whether petitioner's signature on
the deed was a forgery, whether there was a meeting of the minds of the
parties, and whether there could be a sale of future property. The question
whether the sale was void because it was made within the one-year period
of prohibition to petitioner as awardee was never briefed or in any way
argued below. For all intents and purposes, therefore, petitioner waived this
ground and cannot now urge itas ground for reversing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Heirs of Severina San Miguel vs CA

-

In 1974, Respondent, Dominador San Miguel, filed a petition with the

CFI to issue title over lots in dispute which was a parcel of land
originally claimed by Severina San Miguel
August 22, 1978, Severina filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite a petition for review of the decision alleging that the land
registration proceedings were fraudulently concealed by Dominador
from her.
The registration procceddings by Dominador San Miguel was declared
null and void upon petition of Severina San Miguel who was succeeded
by her heirs.
In 1987, the TCT for the land was issued in the names of petitioner.
From 1990-1991, several writs of possession were returned unsatisfied.
(For the land to be transferred in the name of Severinas heirs.)
To solve this problem, the heirs of Severina did not pursue the writs of
possession and demolition, and instead entered into a compromise
with Dominador.
According to the compromise, the heirs were to sell the land for P1.5M
with the TCT conditioned upon the purchase of another lot, which was
not yet titled, at an additional sum of P300K.
It was agreed that the 300K shall be fulfilled by Dominado 2 months
from the date of the execution of sale, which is August 1993.
3 months after, Dominador filed a complaint with the trial court a
motion to deliver the owners copy of TCT, and admitted that he did not
pay the P300K for the reason that the petitioner failed to adduced
proof of ownership.
In time, petitioners opposed stressing the condition in the compromise
agreement.

Since Dominador, et al. have not paid the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00), then they were justified in withholding
release of the certificate of title.

Ruling of RTC:
-

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent.

The respondent vendors are ordered to surrender to the petitioners
vendees.

Ruling of CA:
-

The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the appeal, and

affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue of this Case:

-

Whether or not respondent shall be compelled to pay the P300K

despite the petitioners lack of evidence of ownership.

Ruling of SC:
-

SC held in the negative. The respondent cannot be compelled to pay

the P300k deposit.
Severinas heirs anchor their claim on the compromise agreement,
stressing on their freedom to stipulate and the binding effect of
contracts. This argument is misplaced. The Civil Code provides:
Under Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although
a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law
which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit
and govern the relations between the parties.
True, in contracts of sale, the vendor need not possess title to the thing
sold at the perfection of the contract. However, the vendor must
possess title and must be able to transfer title at the time of
delivery. In a contract of sale, title only passes to the vendee upon full
payment of the stipulated consideration, or upon delivery of the thing
sold.

In relation to the case:

Under the facts of the case, Severinas heirs are not in a position to
transfer title. Without passing on the question of who actually owned
the land, SC noted that there is no proof of ownership in favor of
Severinas heirs.
In fact, it is a certain Emiliano Eugenio, who holds a tax declaration
over the said land in his name. Though tax declarations do not prove
ownership of the property of the declarant, tax declarations and
receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land.
To insist that Dominador pay the price of the untitled lot, would result
in Severinas Heirs unjust enrichment.
The essence of a sale is the transfer of title or an agreement to
transfer it for a price actually paid or promise.
If the sellers cant deliver the object of the sale to the buyer, such
contract may be deemed inoperative.
Severinas heirs insist that delivery of the certificate of title is
predicated on a condition - payment of three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to cover the sale of. SC said that it is not meritorious.
Article 1183 also provides that:
Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or
public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation
which depends upon them. If the obligation
is divisible, that part
thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition
shall be valid.
Hence, the non-payment of the P300k is not a valid justification for
refusal to deliver the certificate of title.
Besides, it was noted that the certificate of title covering the land in
question were fully paid for by Dominador, et al.

Therefore, Severinas heirs are bound to deliver the certificate of title

covering the lots.

CONCHITA NOOL and GAUDENCIO ALMOJERA vs.CA

GR No. 116635
July 24, 1997
Facts:
One lot formerly owned by Victorio Nool has an area of 1 hectare. Another lot
previously owned by Francisco Nool has an area of 3.0880 hectares. Spouses
(plaintiffs) Conchita Nool and Gaudencio Almojera alleged that they are the
owners of the subject lands. They are in dire need of money, they obtained a

loan DBP , secured by a real estate mortgage on said parcels of land, which
were still registered in the names of Victorino and Francisco Nool, at the
time, Since the plaintiffs failed to pay the said loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed; that within the period of redemption, the plaintiffs contacted
Anacleto Nool for the latter to redeem the foreclosed properties from DBP,
which the latter did; and as a result, the titles of the 2 parcels of land in
question were transferred to Anacleto; that as part of their arrangement or
understanding, Anacleto agreed to buy from Conchita the 2 parcels of land ,
for a total price of P100,000.00, P30,000.00 of which price was paid to
Conchita, and upon payment of the balance of P14,000.00, the plaintiffs were
to regain possession of the 2 hectares of land, which amounts spouses
Anacleto Nool and Emilia Nebre failed to pay. Anacleto Nool signed the
private writing, agreeing to return subject lands when plaintiffs have the
money to redeem the same; defendant Anacleto having been made to
believe, then, that his sister, Conchita, still had the right to redeem the said
properties.
Issue: Is the purchase of the subject lands to Anacleto valid?
Held:
Nono dat quod non habet, No one can give what he does not have;
Contract of repurchase inoperative thus void.
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that where goods are sold by a
person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under
authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to
the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his
conduct precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell. Jurisprudence,
on the other hand, teaches us that a person can sell only what he owns or is
authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the seller can legally transfer. No one can give what he does not have
nono dat quod non habet. In the present case, there is no allegation at all
that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the property to the private
respondents. Further, the contract of repurchase that the parties entered into
presupposes that petitioners could repurchase the property that they sold
to private respondents. As petitioners sold nothing, it follows that they can
also repurchase nothing. In this light, the contract of repurchase is also
inoperative and by the same analogy, void.

QUIJADA VS. CA- Resolutory Condition in Donations

When a person donates land to another on a condition. The condition

imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a
resolutory one.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada. Trinidad and her
siblings executed a deed of donation of a two-hectare lot in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the purpose of
constructing the proposed provincial high school. However, possession
remained with Trinidad. She subsequently sold the two hectares on two
separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar, who sold it to different persons.
Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted
ownership to the donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and
recovery of possession and ownership. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, but
CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory
condition
Whether the sale was valid

RULING:
When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the
school, only subject to a condition that a school must be constructed over
the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure to fulfill the condition
reverts the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.

(Not really a discussion in Property) When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to
Mondejar, she was not the owner of the land. Petitioners also did not sleep
on their rights to recover the possession and ownership over the property
since they immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the
resolution, reverting the ownership of land to the donors. However, a sale
being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon meeting of the minds,
and completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even
when Trinidad was not the owner when the sale was perfected, tradition
through delivery is only important upon the consummation stage. Such
transfer of ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened
when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating
that seller's "title passes by operation if law to the buyer," and therefore
making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be considered outside the

commerce of man, since nowhere in the law states that properties owned by
municipality would be as such.

Bagnas v. CA
Facts:
Hilario Mateum died on March 11, 1964, single, without ascendants or
descendants, and survived only by petitioners who are his collateral
relatives. He left no will, no debts, and an estate consisting of 29 parcels of
land in Kawit and Imus, 10 of which are involved in this controversy. On April
3, 1964, respondents who are also collateral relatives of the deceased, but
more remote, registered 2 deeds of sale purportedly executed by Mateum in
their favor. The considerations were P1.00 and services rendered, being
rendered, and to be rendered for my benefit. On the strength of the deeds,
respondents were able to secure title over the 10 parcels of land. On May 22,
1964, petitioners commenced a suit against respondents, seeking annulment
of the deeds of sale a fictitious, fraudulent or falsified or, alternatively, as
donations void for want of acceptance in public instrument. Respondents
contend that the sales were made for valuable considerations, and attacked
the legal standing of the petitioners as being mere collateral heirs.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioners have the legal standing to sue
(2) Whether the sale is void for want of consideration
Held:
(1) The law as it is now no longer deems contracts with a false cause, or
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious, merely voidable, but declares
them void, i.e., inexistent ("nulo") unless it is shown that they are supported
by another true and lawful cause or consideration. A logical consequence of
that change is the juridical status of contracts without, or with a false, cause
is that conveyances of property affected with such a vice cannot operate to
divest and transfer ownership, even if unimpugned. If afterwards the
transferor dies the property descends to his heirs, and without regard to the
manner in which they are called to the succession, said heirs may bring an
action to recover the property from the purported transferee. As pointed out,
such an action is not founded on fraud, but on the premise that the property
never leaves the estate of the transferor and is transmitted upon his death to
heirs, who would labor under no incapacity to maintain the action from the
mere fact that they may be only collateral relatives and bound neither
principally or subsidiarily under the deed or contract of conveyance.

(2) Upon the consideration alone that the apparent gross, not to say
enormous, disproportion between the stipulated price (in each deed) of P l.00
plus unspecified and unquantified services and the undisputably valuable
real estate allegedly sold worth at least P10,500.00 going only by
assessments for tax purposes which, it is well-known, are notoriously low
indicators of actual value plainly and unquestionably demonstrates that they
state a false and fictitious consideration, and no other true and lawful cause
having been shown, the Court finds both said deeds, insofar as they purport
to be sales, not merely voidable, but void ab initio. Neither can the validity of
said conveyances be defended on the theory that their true causa is the
liberality of the transferor and they may be considered in reality
donations because the law also prescribes that donations of immovable
property, to be valid, must be made and accepted in a public instrument,
and it is not denied by the respondents that there has been no such
acceptance which they claim is not required. The transfers in question being
void, it follows as a necessary consequence and conformably to the
concurring opinion in Armentia, with which the Court fully agrees, that the
properties purportedly conveyed remained part of the estate of Hilario
Mateum, said transfers notwithstanding, recoverable by his intestate heirs,
the petitioners herein, whose status as such is not challenged.
Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho
Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The
controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which
should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and
should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged
that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon
his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were
titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng
Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese
citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that
upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same
for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void

Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if
the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have
been in reality a donatin, or some other act or contract. The sale in this case,
was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The law requires
positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding
was based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a
simulation.