right

is the opposite of

correlates with

duty

no-right
correlates with

is the opposite of

privilege

Figure 1. Four legal relations for ordinary actions

Hohfeld [Hohfeld1913-sflc] defines two groups of four legal relations between individuals, the first group
having to do with ordinary actions:
right
Person P has the right to do action A if every other person Q has the duty to allow P to do A.
A right is one's affirmative claim against another [Hohfeld1913-sflc:55].
duty
A duty ... is that which one ought or ought not to do.
privilege
[A] privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of another [Hohfeld1913-sflc:55].
no-right
Person P has the no-right to do action A if at least one other person Q does not have the duty to allow P
to do A.

power

is the opposite of

correlates with

liability

disability
correlates with

is the opposite of

immunity

Figure 2. Four legal relations for actions that change

legal relationships
and the second group having to do with actions that change legal relations:
power
[A] power is one's affirmative control over a given legal relation as against another [Hohfeld1913sflc:55].
disability
immunity
... [A]n immunity is one's freedom from the legal power or control of another as regards some legal
relation [Hohfeld1913-sflc:55].
liability
Each relation is paired with its opposite, the relation that is in a sense its negation, and also with its correlative,
the relation that is in a sense its inverse (Figures 1 and 2).
If R and Ropp are opposites, then for P to have relation R is equivalent to P to fail to have relation Ropp.
If R and Rcorr are correlatives, then for P to have relation R is equivalent to all other persons Q to have a
corresponding relation Rcorr.
Each relation is fundamentally between two people; where a relation is presented as between a person P and
many or all people, the meaning is the union of all the pairwise relations between P and one of the other people.

For each relation R, its opposite Ropp, and its correlative Rcorr:
1.

2.

"P has R" is equivalent to "P fails to have Ropp". For the first quartet of relations, R concerns doing an
action A; for the second quartet of relations, R concerns changing a legal relation S. Examples:

"P has the right to do A"

"P fails to have the no-right to do A".

"P has the duty to do A"

"P fails to have the privilege to not do A".

"P has the power to change S"

"P fails to have the disability to change S".

"P has immunity from changes to S"

"P fails to have the liability to changes to S".

"P has R" is equivalent to "Every person Q other than P has Rcorr". Examples:

"P has the right to do A"

"Every Q other than P has the duty to allow P to do A".

"P has the duty to do A"

"Some Q other than P has a right that depends on P doing

A".

"P has the no-right to do A"

"Some Q other than P has the privilege to prevent P from

doing A".

"P has the privilege to do

A"

"Every Q other than P has the no-right to do anything

prevented by P doing A".

"P has the power to change

S"

"Some Q other than P has a liability to changes in S".

"P has the liability to

changes in S"

"Some Q other than P has a power to change S".

"P has the disability to

change S"

"Every Q other than P has immunity to changes in S".

"P has immunity to

changes in S"

"Every Q other than P has the disability to change S".

Quotations from Hohfeld's writings

1.

A duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought not to do. Duty and right are
correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated. (Hohfeld1913-sflc p32)

2.

if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that
Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place (Hohfeld1913-sflc p32)

3.

whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the
privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off.
(Hohfeld1913-sflc p32)

4.

The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. (Hohfeld1913-sflc p32)

5.

... when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a
duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. (Hohfeld1913sflc p32)

6.

... if A has not contracted with B to perform certain work for the latter, A's privilege of not doing so is
the very negation of a duty of doing so. (Hohfeld1913-sflc p33)

The term right has been used in different ways. In its strict sense
it has been used as correlative of legal duties. In legal terms a
right is an interest recognised and protected by the State and

enforceable through the court of law. A right is enforceable only to

the extent it is protected by the state. Legal rights, in a wider
sense of the term, do not necessarily correspond with duties. In
this generic sense a legal right may be defined as any advantage
or benefit conferred upon a person by a rule of law. Of rights in
this sense there are four distinct kinds. These are: (1) Rights (in
the strict sense), (2) Liberties, (3) Powers, and (4) Immunities.
Since the rights cannot exist in vaccum, each of these has its
correlative, namely (1) Duties, (2) No rights, (3) Liabilities, and
(4) Disabilities. The concept of right envisages the presence of
two parties: one, who has the right and the accompanying
capacity to get it enforced, and the other against whom the right
has been conferred and can be enforced.
Each of these kinds of rights has its correlative, namely, (1)
duties, (2) no right, (3) liabilities, and (4) disabilities.
These relationships are designated as Jural relations.
1.) Ys duty with regard to X would be expressed by X as you
must (X has a right in strict sense or claim).
2.) Xs freedom to do something in relation to Y would be
expressed by X as I may (X has a liberty or privilege).
3.) Xs ability to alter Ys legal position would be expressed by X
as I can (X has a power).
Ys inability to alter Xs legal position would be expressed by X as
You cannot (X has an immunity).
Hohfelds concept of Jural relation
Hohfeld set forth the eight fundamental conceptions in terms of
which he believed all legal problems could be stated. He gave two
relations Jural Correlatives and Jural Opposites. Later Prof. G.L.
Williams added one more relation i.e. jural contradictories.
Prof. G.L. Williams table of jural relations
An important point is that a jural relation between two parties
should be considered only between them, even though the
conduct of one may create another jural relation between him and
someone else.
A. Jural Correlatives (vertical arrows and read both ways): in

one person, X, implies the presence of its correlative , in

another person, Y. Thus, right in X implies the presence of duty in
Y (but in so far as duties may exist without correlative rights, the
converse proposition is not always true). Again, liberty in X
implies the presence of no-right in Y, and vice versa.
B. Jural Opposites including what one might here call jural
negations (diagonal arrows and read both ways): in one person,
X, implies the absence of its opposite, , in himself. Thus, right
in X implies the absence of no-right in him, and vice versa.
C. Jural Contradictories (horizontal arrows and read both ways):
in one person, X, implies the absence of its contradictory,, in
another person, Y. Thus, right in X implies the absence of liberty
in Y, and vice versa.
Right-Duty Relation (You Ought)
Generally it is said that rights and duties are correlative. Every
right has a corresponding obligation or duty. Without rights there
can be no duties or vice versa. If X has a right everyone else has
the duty to respect Xs right. If X has a duty someone else has
right to the thing X must do or omit. Thus according to
conventional jurists rights and duties are correlative, co-existent,
reciprocal and interdependent.
The correlation of right and duty is not perfect. On the one hand,
there can be no right without a corresponding duty or duty
without a corresponding right. Thus, Salmond said that there can
be no right without a corresponding duty or duty without a
corresponding right, as there can be no husband without a wife or
a father without a child. According to his view, every duty must be
a duty towards some person or persons in whom therefore a
correlative right is vested. And conversely every right must be a
right against some person or persons upon whom therefore a
correlative duty is imposed. Every right or duty involves a
vinculum juris or bond of legal obligation, by which two or more
persons are bound together. On the other hand, Austin
distinguishes between relative and absolute duties, the former
being those which have rights corresponding to them and the
latter being those which have none. Austin conceives it to be the
essence of a right that it should be vested in some determinate

person and be enforceable by some form of legal process

instituted by him. Austin thus starts from the assumption that a
right cannot vest in an indeterminate, or a vague entity like the
society or the people. The second assumption with which Austin
starts is that sovereign creates right and imposes and can change
these as its will consequently the sovereign cannot be the holder
of the right.
Duties in the strict sense have corresponding rights, and duties in
the wider sense do not. Non-correlative duties do not fit into the
Hohfeldian scheme. Article 51-A of Indian Constitution deals with
Fundamental Duties, which are absolute duties i.e. duties not
accompanied by rights. Although it is a duty of every citizen to
respect national flag, protect culture and environment, etc., yet
the State cannot have any right in respect of such duties.
Privilege-No-right Relation (I May)
According to the Hohfeld, privilege means the freedom which a
person has i.e. to do or not to do something. In other words it
means what one can do for himself without being prevented by
the law or one is free of the possibility of legal interference by
others e.g., a person of a certain age would be entitled to vote
this confers not right but in fact privilege because one may
entertain this right or notit is the choice of the individual
concernedthe state cannot compel him for the same. Hence
privilege has no corresponding duty. The jural opposition between
duty and privilege does not mean simply that the one cancels out
the other, but that they will only have that effect when the
content of one is irreconcilable with the content of the other. For
example, X normally has the privilege of wearing his hat. If he
puts himself under a duty to wear it, his privilege and duty of
wearing the hat are harmonious and co-exist. It is only when he
puts himself under a duty not to wear it that his privilege to wear
it and his duty conflict and are jurally opposite. Privilege is that
sphere of a persons activity within which the law leaves him
alone.
The relationship between privilege and right can be explained in
the following way
(1) If Y has a right, there must be duty on X. A duty in X
implies the absence of privilege in X. Therefore, a right in Y

implies the absence of privilege in X, i.e., right and privilege as

Jural contradictions.
Conversely, the presence of a privilege in X implies the absence
of a right in Y. Hohfeld calls the condition no-right therefore a
privilege in X implies the presence of a no-right in Y, i.e.,
privilege and no-right are jural correlatives.
Distinction between Right and Privilege
A right implies a correlative duty but a privilege does not. As
privilege to vote is not correlative to a duty in anyone. There is
indeed a duty in others not to interfere and others duty not to
interfere is correlative to As right against others and they shall
not interfere. Therein lies the distinction. As privilege to vote and
his right not to be prevented from so doing are two different
ideas. Thus, X may enter into a valid contract with Y whereby
X gives Y permission to prevent him from wearing the hat but
X says he will nevertheless try to wear it. If X succeeds in
evading Y and leaves the scene wearing the hat, he has
exercised his privilege to wear it and Y has no cause for
complaint. If, on the other hand, Y prevents him from wearing
the hat, he cannot complain, for he has by contract extinguished
his right against Y that Y shall not interfere. This shows that the
privilege and the right are separate and separable, the right can
be extinguished without affecting the privilege.
Bradford Corporation v. Pickles, (1895) AC 587, shows that a landowner has the privilege of abstracting subterranean water, but no
right against anyone else, who by abstracting the water before it
reaches the land-owner, prevents him from exercising his
privilege.
Power-Liability Relation (I can)
Salmond defines a power as the ability conferred upon a person
by the law to alter, by his own will, directed to that end, the
rights, duties or other legal relations, either of himself or of other
persons. That is to say that power denotes the ability in a person
to alter the existing legal condition, whether of oneself or of
another, for better or for worse. One can make a will of his
property or can alienate his property; one can rescind a contract
for fraud; one can marry ones deceased wifes sisterall these are

often termed as rights but close legal analysis implies that they
are not rights but powers. Power is of two kinds: public or private.
Public power is that which is vested in a person as an agent of the
state, as the judicial or executive power of the officers. Private
power is that power which is vested in a person as citizen for his
own interest. A power may enable one to determine the legal
relations of others. This kind of power is called authority. The
power to determine ones own legal relations is called capacity.
All these have no corresponding dutieshence they are not rights
in strict sense but termed as powers.
The correlative of a power is a liability. This connotes the presence
of power vested in someone else as against the power with the
liability. Salmond used the term subjection for it for the purpose
of avoiding confusion, because in law the term liability has two
meanings also. Liability gives the sense of being affected by an
act of a person who has power to do it. It is the position of one
whose legal rights may be altered by the exercise of a power.
Liability denotes the position of a person whose legal condition
can be so altered. X has power to make a gift to Y, and
correlatively Y has a liability to have his legal position improved
in this way. A persons legal condition may be changed by events
not under anyones control. Liability suggests something
disadvantageous on the part of the person. Hohfeld does not
confine the term liability only to loss or disadvantages. He says
that it includes a chance of being benefited also. For example, if a
person has a power to make a will, his children may be benefited
(if he makes a will in their favour).
Distinction between Right and Power
A right is always a sign that some other person is required to
conform to a pattern of conduct, a power is the ability to produce
a certain result. The right for example to make a will can be
dissected into a privilege to make a will (there is another privilege
not to make one), rights against other people not to be prevented
from making one powers in the sense of the ability to alter the
legal condition of persons specified in the will. The power itself
has no duty correlative to it. It would be incorrect to describe this
as a right in the testator correlative to the duty in the executor to
carry out the testamentary dispositions, for the will would take
effect as from the death of the testator and the executors duty

only arises from that moment. When the testator dies his rights
cease and the duty cannot correlate to any right in him.
Immunity-Disability Relation (You Cannot)
Immunity denotes freedom from the power of another, while
disability denotes the absence of power. Immunity is opposite of
liability. Disability is the opposite of power.
The relationship between power, liability, immunity and disability
may be explained as follows:
(1) If X has a power, Y has a liability. They are, therefore jural
correlatives. A liability in Y means the absence of immunity in
him. Therefore, immunity and liability are jural opposites.
(2) Conversely, the presence of immunity in Y implies the absence
of a liability in him. The absence of a liability in Y implies the
absence of a power in X. Therefore, immunity in Y implies the
absence of a power in X, i.e. power and immunity are jural
contradictories.
The absence of power could have been styled as no-power in the
same way as no-right, but Hohfeld preferred to give it the term
disability. Power and disability thus become jural opposites. It
follows from this that immunity in Y implies the presence of a
disability in X, i.e., they are jural correlatives.
Distinction between Privilege and Immunity
An ambassador or a diplomatic envoys position illustrates this.
Such a person is treated as being capable of committing a breach
of duty and is under a duty to pay damages, although immune
from the power of action or other legal process to compel him to
do so. In other words, he has no liberty to do the act, nor a
privilege from having to pay damages for it, but he has the
immunity from process all the same. It was held in Dickinson v.
Del Solar [(1930) I KB 376] that the fact that an envoy was thus
under a sanction duty to pay damages was sufficient to involve
his insurance company in responsibility. If, on the other hand, an
envoy voluntarily pays the damages, he cannot recover them
since there is the duty to pay.

Hohfelds scheme is however not free from criticism. The main

objection raised against the scheme is that some of Hohfelds
conceptions are without judicial significance for instance liability
and disability. Hohfelds editor has however, given an answer
and said that power, liability, immunity and disability are
necessarily interrelated. Once the concept of power is admitted,
the others follow. A power in X to alter the legal conditions of Y
implies that Y is liable to have his condition altered, if X has no
power (disability) then Y is immune.
Hohfelds scheme, in fact, has the clarity in thought though there
is no practical utility. No legal system has adopted it. These terms
are generally not used in common parlance as e.g., we always say
right to vote not power of voting.