G.R. No.

39519 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee vs.DANIEL PINTO, JR. and NARCISO
BUENAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for petitioner-appellee.K.V. Faylona & Associates for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on Christmas day in 1970
a search warrant on Francisco Bello who was allegedly training a private army, patrolmen Daniel Pinto,
Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then Circuit Criminal
Court in said city, of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and Rosalio Andes and
seriously wounding Maria Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the decision of June 13,
1974. 1 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Daniel Pinto, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of:
(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer
imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heir of
Rosalie Andes in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and
severally; and to pay the costs;
(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer
imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs of
Francisco Bello in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and
severally; and to pay the costs;
(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer
imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs of
Richard Tiongson in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly and
severally; and to pay the costs;
(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them
to imprisonment of from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum; to indemnify the
victim, Maria Theresa Tiongson, in the amount of Eight Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos,
jointly and severally; and to pay the costs.
In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification
from public office.
According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police secured from the City
Court of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the house and premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa,
Legazpi City on the ground that the police had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally possessed a
garand rifle, a thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols. 2 The police had earlier undertaken a surveillance of
Bello on the basis of information it had received that he was conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat since October, 1970. 3

Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado,

4 called his officers to a "confidential

conference" at the residence of Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at the said conference were the mayor, his secretary, and the officers of the patrol division,
secret service and the administration of the city police. The Chief of Police was assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police,

in briefing the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the latter had been identified as the one who shot Salustiano Botin the night
before. At the time of the briefing, no warrant of arrest had yet been issued against Bello. 5

The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) who were also present were assigned to the different teams. 6 Team 3 was placed under the charge of Sgt. Salvador de
la Paz with a policeman named Luna and appellants Buenaflor and Pinto as members. Wilfredo Romero was the PC member assigned to the team. 7 Except for
Romero and Pinto who were each armed with a carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each carried a .38 caliber pistol. 8

Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon
arriving there at around seven o'clock in the evening. The four vehicles met at the junction of Homapon
and the road to Mariawa. They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when one of the jeeps
bogged down because of the muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right
side of the road with the teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams
maintaining a distance o around ten meters between them. 9
Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard
someone shout, "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. The team
had by then deployed to the right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by shouting the
agreed password of "bayawas" for which the person challenged answered "santol", 10 he found that Buenaflor was
5 meters in front of him "at the bank of the road", Pinto was two meters to the right of Buenaflor, Sgt. de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's) right, Luna
who was holding a walkie-talkie was to his left and another policeman was in front of Luna. 11 When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw "flashes of fire" "just in
front" of him or from the place where Buenaflor was. 12

The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling
of a jeep going towards the direction of Homapon when he heard the burst of gunfire and saw the
flashes of fire from the direction of Buenaflor. 13
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida
Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the driver. They had just come from a lechonada party in
the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs. Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello. Fr. Capellan
had celebrated mass to commemorate the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr.
Capellan decided to go back to his parish, the Anduiza's offered their jeep for his transportation. 14 Seated
on the front seat of the "McArthur type" jeep which had only a canvass top but no cover on the sides and back, 15 were the driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on
her lap and Fr. Capellan. 16 Richard Tiongson was seated on the steel seat behind the driver while his sister Maria Theresa was beside him. 17 The three other
children were also seated at the back.

After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high gear with a
dual", 18 Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some 300 yards ahead. 19 Fearing that there might be "people with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan
told the driver to go faster. 20 Then Fr. Capellan heard one shot and after a few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid firing with some of the
bullets hitting the jeep. 21 According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel Tiongson of the PC, the rapid firing sounded "automatic". 22 The firing came
from the left rear side of the jeep. 23

Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on
the left side of the road just ahead of the jeep. 24 Through the light of the jeep, Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a
jacket and a hat and he was on the shoulder of the road. 25 After passing the man, the rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the floor of the jeep.
Maria Theresa was about to hold Richard when she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then they all screamed. 26

The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it
not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep came to a full stop. Fr. Capellan saw three men with
flashlights but he could not distinguish their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were focused on
the ground. 27 Mrs. Tiongson saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that one of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia Citang, the mother of
the mayor, at the same time identifying herself. 28She must have managed to take Richard from the jeep and was cuddling him on the ground near the left rear
end of the jeep when she requested Fr. Capellan to administer extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan had no holy oil, he gave the boy absolution. 29

Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around,
nobody listened to her appeal for help. When she approached Chief of Police Adornado, she hit him and
asked him why they shot her and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the shooting was no
longer his fault because Mrs. Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She

requested the Chief of Police for a car in which to take Richard to the hospital or for a driver and even
for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of Police did not heed her
pleas. 30 (TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22).
A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduiza arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and her children boarded
the jeep. At the intersection of the road to Legazpi City proper and the road to Mariawa, the area was
brightly lighted and armed men ordered them to put their hands up. They were told to alight from the
jeep to be searched but Mrs. Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let them pass so they
could bring her two children to the hospital. 31
Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old
Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot wound at the "right upper quadrant of the right buttocks." 32 Her
pelvis and abdomen were x-rayed. One of the x-ray plates 33 revealed an oval spot indicating a foreign body in Maria Theresa's pelvis. The attending physician
decided not to extract the foreign body as Maria Theresa was not a "very good surgical risk".34 The hospital charged P282.90 for Theresa's
hospitalization. 35 She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and
hospitalization 36 but the foreign body was never removed from her pelvic area.

Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar vertebrae. The bullet
travelled obliquely to the left kidney, the lesser sac, the liver and the right auricle. 37 Richard was operated at the
hospital but he died at 8:45 the following morning due to massive hemorrhage caused by the gunshot wound. 38 When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found
embedded in his heart.39 His mother paid P862.35 40 for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by the church. Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Funeraria Oro
for Richard's burial.41

Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons,
the police pursued their mission to serve the search warrant on Bello. When they reached Bello's
residence in Mariawa, they were met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted and a certain
Escober met him. Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police
searched the area and found a Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition of a garand rifle, ammunition of a
carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an automatic pistol. 42 Thereafter, the Chief
of Police declared the search terminated and the entire searching party left for headquarters. 43 The following day, he issued Special Order No. 24 which states:

The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of
Bello.45 It was not necessary to specify the mission in the order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close understanding with the squad that went to
Homapon".46 For a "convenient tactical deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three groups with patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto composing
Group II.47

At noontime of December 26, 1970, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the
residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando, Talahib, Daraga, Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother,
Francisco Andes, Francisco's son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son of Francisco, also
arrived with the group. 48Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and his group be allowed to spend the night in Inocencia's house. 49
Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1970. At the sala, on her way
from her room to the kitchen, she saw Bello sleeping alone. From the kitchen, Inocencia went to the
balcony through the sala. On her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello, who was wearing a red
shirt and an underwear, had awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He
reentered the sala and saying that it was cold, Bello put on his clothes and pants. He also wore his
jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water. Inocencia's husband gave Bello a glass of
water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and ask Inocencia's husband for a cup of
coffee.50
Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of
gunfire. Bello, who was the balcony facing the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree,
gradually fell to the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of gunfire. From
the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she
later identified as Pinto, near the pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and
another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs. 51

Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms,

52 was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled her. Just then a man,
whom Inocencia identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The man asked
them where the gun was. Inocencia told him that there was no gun in the house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long firearm with its muzzle
pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters from where Bello laid flat on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in its holster
tucked on his waist. 53 It was Buenaflor who took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's holster.54

When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead.

55 Inocencia went near the pili

tree where Rosalio's body was, knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered that Rosalio fought back. However,
Inocencia did not notice any weapon near Rosalio's body. 56

Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two
men, one of them being Francisco Andes, could carry the cadaver. 57 Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds". 58 A former pilot and 28 years old at the time of his death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at the left temple,
an inch above the highest point of the pinna of the left ear. The bullet which entered his head through the squamous temporal bone travelled towards the
occipital region down to the floor of the left middle cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.

Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of the right scapular
area about the level of the third thoracic vertebrae. The bullet travelled to the right inna in a slightly
upward direction making its exit at the lateral part of the right supraclavicular fossa above the clavicle.
The second gunshot wound was at the left side interscapular area. The bullet travelled upwards and to
the right fracturing the 7th rib, entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the pulmonary conus,
went through the junction of the right auricular appendage and the right auricle, the anteromedial side
of the pericardium, grazed the medial surface of the middle lobe of the right lung and exited at the right
side of the chest. The third gunshot wound was below the right nipple. The bullet went to the chest
cavity, the lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the diaphragm, the right lobe of the liver, the 8th
thoracic vertebrae and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior interscapular area. 59
While Bellos corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments
were found at the base of his skull and a slug was extracted from the floor of his mouth. 60
Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his
right temporal area, macerated the brain, fractured both parietal bones and exited at the left parietal
bone. Another bullet entered the left scapular area below the level of the 6th rib, travelled to the dome
of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum
below the ramus of the right pubis. The slug was found at the gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches
below the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A third bullet entered the left knee
and exited at the medial side of the leg. 61
The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on December 29, 1970 by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for
safekeeping purposes.62 The empty shells and slugs which both the PC and the Legazpi City police found in Talahib were also turned over to the
NBI 63 in the same manner that the four empty carbine shells 64 found by the PC near the coconut tree a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were
also turned over to the NBI.65 Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve Smith & Wesson caliber .38 revolvers, two Smith & Wesson
"paltik" caliber .22, four Tell caliber revolvers, one Bosque automatic pistol caliber .380, four carbine Inland rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles
caliber.30, one Thompson submachine gun caliber .45 and one Colt automatic pistol caliber.45. 66

Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family. 67 Pinto,
who admitted carrying a caliber .30 carbine during the incident, 68 testified that the shooting occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going towards"
them.69

According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air.

70 After the search had

been conducted in Bello's premises, Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity including
Mariawa". 71While he and Buenaflor were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they "chanced upon a house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They
captured four of Bello's bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives.72

At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a
single shot coming from the house rang out. It was answered by a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed"
came from Buenaflor. By reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a nearby coconut tree. But

before he reached the coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the
man was menacingly near him, Pinto shot him. 73
After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bello's other companions. He saw the body of
Bello on the porch and "near" it was a garand which he took. He also got Bello's short firearm "from a
holster." He turned over both the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of the captured
persons kicked Bello's body saying that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter,
the two dead persons were carried by the captured bodyguards to Mariawa. 74
In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps
arrived. When they reached the junction in Homapon, Major Molo, who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told
Pinto to go back with him to Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it would be dangerous to go
back because one of Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other
policemen, they arrived there between eight and nine in the morning where they were instructed to
"look for evidence specifically . . . for a thompson." He found in the porch two shells and the others
found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to Mariawa and later, to Legazpi City proper. 75
On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was
beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He admitted that while they were instructed patrol the area, they
were also told to effect the arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged against him. 76 According to
Pinto, of the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine, only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots during the "Bello incident". 77

Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters.
Rosalio was "face to face" with him when Pinto shot him. As Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto
continued shooting him. 78 When he went up the porch he saw the garand "lying on the floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's waist was still in its
holster. 79

On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his
carbine. 80 When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a flashlight being waved. A little later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to
stop. Then he heard one shot and immediately after, the volley of fire as the jeep was going towards his direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's
passengers shriek. 81

For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried
the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which had been issued to him by the Legazpi City Police Department.
He did not fire his gun at the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered his firearm for ballistic
examination. 82 In the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo issued him a Thompson submachinegun. 83
While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could
guide them to where Bello was. At the place which they later found to be Talahib, they went near a pili
tree from where they saw a house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be Mostoles.
Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber
firearm with him. He came by another man with a bolo, named "Banteque" and apprehended him also.
Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They waited for a while until
another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four meters of him. Buenaflor pointed
his submachinegun at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber
firearm. 84
From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a
pistol tucked in his holster as well as a garand. He and Pinto then tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he
saw a person in the balcony of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice: "Paquito, mag-surrender
ka!" Then Buenaflor heard a "a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive
shots." He sought cover behind the pili tree and, while in a crouching position, fired his submachinegun
towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto shifted his position while firing his carbine,
Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going down to the nipa shack" until he was near the

coconut tree. There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was
the son of Francisco Andes. 85
After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor
went back to the pili tree, untied the four persons they had captured, and told them to do something so
they could carry the bodies of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes. 86
Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying
the Tiongsons. 87 While admitting that the person who led them to Bello had told them that the latter was in Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that
Talahib was a barrio of Daraga, Albay and not of Legazpi City.88 He reiterated that he shouted at Bello urging him to surrender 89 but he was not able to fire a
warning shot or identify himself as a member of the police force "because after the second shot there was already a burst of gunfire".90

Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talalib which was
around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came from a "high caliber firearm". 91 After they had found out that Bello was
dead, Pinto went up the house. Later, Pinto gave him Bello's 380 automatic pistol and garand. 92 Although he looked at those firearms, he did not determine
whether they had been fired. 93 He noticed, however, that the magazine of the garand was "intact". 94 Aside from Bello's firearms, Buenaflor and Pinto
confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos found on Bello's bodyguards. 95

Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets.
When he gave back the firearm to Major Molo, only four bullets were left of the one clip he had
used. 96 He remembered having squeezed twice the trigger of his Thompson submachinegun or automatic rifle in Talahib.97 His service revolver was still
with him then. 98

As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor.
The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor for the murder of Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971
reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga,
Albay and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause or
motive, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
treachery and evident premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Pat. Daniel
Pinto, Jr., and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, SN-213436 and a US
Carbin Inland, Cal. 30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by said accused, shoot one
Rosalio Andes, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the attached Autopsy
Report marked as Annex "A" and being made an integral part of this Information, thereby
causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his
instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same
allegations as the above and it was filed on the same date. On August 24, 1971 two other informations
were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and another for the
frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not
guilty to all the charges.
After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello
and Andes, the trial court appreciated evident premeditation as a qualifying circilmstance and
treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the incident involving
the Tiongson children, it considered the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of
public position.

Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their
claim that the killings were perpetrated in the course of the performance of their official duties as peace
officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors.
In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a)
the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the
second requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating
circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. 99
Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal
duty: the service of a search warrant on Bello. In the process, however, appellants abused their
authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a search
warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and
deprived Bello and two other persons of their lives.
While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds
ranging from taking the harvest of their hacienda without the permission of his parents to assaulting his
stepfather, and that he was "dangerous while under the influence of liquor", 100 there was no proof that he had been
convicted of any offense or that he was a dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a "shoot to-kill" order from police authorities. Proof of bad moral
character of the victim only establishes a probability that he committed a crime but it certainly cannot be the reason for annihilating him nor may it prevail over
facts proven showing that the same victim had been cold-bloodedly killed. 101 As such, the suspicion that Bello was maintaining a private army was not a
sufficient justification for his being rubbed out without due process of law.

The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on Christmas eve is neither a
justification for his arrest without a warrant. It should be observed that while the police had obtained a
search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day which was
supposed to be a holiday, no such effort was made in securing warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged
frustrated killing of Botin. The improbability of the defense evidence through the testimony of Botin
himself that Bello had shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is bolstered by the same
testimony showing that while he was shot by Bello in the presence of the police force who were
converging at the junction of Homapon and Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable to arrest
Bello. Besides the fact that no other eyewitness corroborated Botin's testimony even in the face of his
own admission that Bello had no reason to shoot him, no complaint was ever lodged against Bello for
the alleged shooting. 102
On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during
said shooting incident the police were looking for Bello at the store of a certain Serrano. 103 Unable to find
Bello, the police, specifically Pinto, mauled Escober while asking him to testify against Bello for allegedly shooting Botin. 104 The police had focused their
vehicles' headlights near the bodega of ex-Mayor Los Baos in their effort to flush out Bello who, unknown to the police, had earlier left the vicinity. It was when
the police fired at the said bodega that Botin must have been accidentally shot. 105 This story was uncorroborated but if true, would show the police's
dangerous propensity for using otherwise official operations in an unlawful manner.

A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving the Tiongson
children. Since the jeep coming towards them was owned by the Anduizas, the appellants acted
obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even without any
inquiry as to the identity of its passengers.106 Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot, sound discretion and restraint
dictated that, there being no responding shots from its passengers after the alleged warning shot and considering the condition of the road which was not only
muddy but uphill, instead of directing aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that they could have done was to render the jeep immobile by shooting its tires.
That way, they could have verified the identity of the passengers. As it were, they riddled the jeep with bullets injuring in the process innocent passengers who
were completely unaware of what they were up against.

Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the face of various
circumstantial evidence which point to their culpability. There is the unflinching testimony of Sgt.
Romero that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the Tiongsons

passed by. Said testimony was corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of team 2, that
while no one in his team fired his gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the first of fire which
occurred while the jeep was "abreast of team 2". 107Even defense witness Mariano Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was "sure"
that he heard gunshots at the moment when "the jeep had just passed team 2". 108

Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where,
according to Romero, Pinto was deployed. While he himself carried a carbine, Romero did not fire it and
his testimony was never contradicted. The four empty shells were compared with the test shells which
were fired from the US carbine, caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the
aforequoted information charging appellant with having killed Andes, was used by Pinto, they were
found to have "significant similar individual characteristics". 109
While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was
fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm 110 and Buenaflor was proven to be carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver, the findings of expert
witnesses or, in this case, the ballistic report pointing to another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound only serves as a guide for the
courts after considering all the facts of the case.111 The undisputed fact is that Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his firearm
as the Anduiza jeep bearing the Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin responsibility on Buenaflor was ever
presented, there is, therefore, no reason to discredit his testimony. 112

In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such
motive provided a circumstantial evidence leading to the inference that indeed he fired his
gun. 113 According to the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the Napal hacienda and constant companion of Bello, on November 1,
1970, Buenaflor and another policeman named Santos Urbana, Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep on the pretext that they needed it to transfer Moscoso, the suspect in
the Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it was returned, the jeep had bloodstains. Bello and Escober later learned from a PC officer that the
jeep had been used in dumping in Guinobatan the body of Moscoso. Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was borrowed by Buenaflor and
Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn statement on the matter. Consequently, the PC authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the Moscoso killing.

Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want to give your
statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for thirty minutes. This is a brotherly advice because
something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he would do what was right and that was to tell the
truth. Urbina said that it was up to Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly warning
that something might happen to him 114 (TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were of course denied by Buenaflor. However, as
between the positive declaration of a prosecution witness and the negative denial of the accused, the former deserves more credence. 115

All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor
fired their guns in defiance of their superior officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello 116 and
to desist from using their weapons "without clearance from the Chief of Police". 117 Since there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 118

The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save
them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as
when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact
that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) without checking
carefully the latter's identity as to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. 119 Neither may the fact that the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of another be
considered a mitigating circumstance. 120

It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of
Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they
acted in conspiracy with each other. 121 Prior agreement between the appellants to lull their intended victim is not essential to prove
conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design. 122 In this case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by
the fact that only the two of them fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons passed by. This they did in defiance of the order of their superior
not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees. 123

The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was
shown by the manner by which they killed the two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense
as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim.

Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following
elements of said exempting circumstance: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. 124 The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,
unless
the victim has committed an unlawful aggression on the person defending himself. 125

In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his
shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto corroborates his story but the principal prosecution eyewitness
in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender nor a gunshot from
Bello's direction before Bello was fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the
testimonies of Buenaflor himself and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the
truth.
Rafael Seora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to
take pictures, found no bullet marks at the crime scene which would pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik"
firearm which Bello's men allegedly used. 126 As no other "paltik" firearms were recovered from the crime scene other than the two
which Buenaflor confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the possibility of said firearms or one of its kind having been used by Bello's men against the
appellant particularly the one who escaped is nil.

Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered gun

127 obviously referring to

the firearms recovered from Bello himself. According to Buenaflor however, when he found the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did not manipulate the
rifle to know how many of its bullets had been used. 128 Moreover, if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster and not the garand which
was found a couple of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did not fire any of his two firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was
smoking with his back towards them when he was shot at and that at that moment, he did not see Bello holding a gun. 129 We cannot help, therefore, but
conclude that the defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello was answered by a gunshot is but a figment of their imagination designed for their own
exoneration.

Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have been clarified had
any of Bello's men whom they had captured been presented in court. These men, Leoncio Mostoles,
Francisco Andes, Domingo Bantique and Ananias Andes had executed statements before the Legazpi
City police to the effect that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that Bello fired his
gun at the appellants. However, all four of them later executed statements before the NBI retracting
said earlier statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened them to make the statements
favorable to the appellants. 130
As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe
Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not
see Rosalio Andes attack Pinto. 131 Inocencia swore that she did not see any weapon near the fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the aggression did
occur, Pinto would not have lost time in presenting in court the bolo which Andes threatened to use on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not
justified in inflicting the wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening attitude of the victim will not constitute unlawful aggression. 132 Moreover,
Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached him with a bolo after Buenaflor had released a sunburst directed at the house where Bello was, is
contrary to human behavior if not totally ridiculous. On the contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing until he saw Rosalio fell.

An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not only on the weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if weak,
the prosecution evidence gains more credibility. 133 Unfortunately, in this case, inspire of the fact that the prosecution had only one
eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants had not presented sufficiently strong evidence to shore up their claim of self-defense.

We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four crimes in this case. The
killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello and Rosalio Andes as well as the wounding of Maria Theresa
Tiongson were all so sudden that all of them were left defenseless. This is shown not only by the
testimonial evidence on the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location of the wounds
of all the victims. 134 The presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the wounding of Maria Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime,
however, may not be appreciated as there is no proof that it was specifically sought in the commission of the crime and therefore we deem it absorbed by
treachery.

Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but we find that the
appellants indeed took advantage of their public position in perpetrating the crime. Under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
There being no mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the said Code, the proper
penalty is death. 135 However, in view the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the
appellants for each of the three murders they committed.

For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal
Code, isprision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. There being no reason to further lower
the penalty by one degree pursuant to the provision of Article 250, and there being one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range of prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 136 the proper
penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand pesos imposed by the lower court should be respected considering that while there is evidence
as to the actual amount she spent while confined at the Sacred Heart Hospital in Legazpi City, there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she was
transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in Quezon City.

As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of frustration in everyone.
The crimes committed here ought to have no place in this democratic and civilized society. True it is that
a police officer is sometimes left in a quandary when faced with a situation where a decisive but legal
action is needed. But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court of Appeals (96 Phil. 216, 225
[1954]), "(t)he judgment and discretion of public officers, in the performance of their duties, must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear
and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion,
and with the spirit and purpose of the law." Police officers must always bear in mind that although they
are dealing with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals are also
human beings with human rights. In the words of then Justice Moran in theOanis case (Supra):
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without
regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may
approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot
see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal
a mere trifle in the hands of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness an vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost
of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever warrant action of such
character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnationnot condonation
should be the rule; otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that
appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three
murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayormaximum as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five months

137 when the crimes were

committed, let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the President for whatever action may be proper to temper his penalty. 138

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but agree with Justice Bidin.

ARTICLE 12
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the Decision

* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga,

convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife
hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting
upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex,
the crime was committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of
superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours
of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place

where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a
brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several
times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood
stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN,
pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim)
in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the
procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my
own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the
amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN,
pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of
the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her,
her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months.
Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband
did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical
treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly checkup. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a
small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her
husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before;
demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when
their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her husband would inform her
that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at
around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to
buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store.
When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his
proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had
arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak"
(translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with
people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did
such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her
husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die,
and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was
corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July
10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender
me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the
accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on
August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic
or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was
classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 433, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to
finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic.
However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen
Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in
jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused
was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim
testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness.
Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of
medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning
at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The
act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to
evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendantappellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act
is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from
criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA
151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is
manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under
the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an
insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A
person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the
power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the
time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted

condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of
disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the
mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of
the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined
above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue,
at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in
question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read
the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of
the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by
perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment
of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from
psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did
not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals
unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated
with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the
manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been
mentally ill?

A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my
record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his
contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is
noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self,
complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about
January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of
1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical
and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in
quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has
no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the
crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter.
He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the
victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused
at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he
wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him
to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he
wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen
Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell
him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a
request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of
the landholding in the name of my father and my name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during
this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may
have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the
memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that
the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by
the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he
is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts,
do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in
short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is
really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he
burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really
deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like
for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was aware of
what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this
case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the
act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983;
emphasis supplied)

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the
expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he
had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As
stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was
sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was

carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the
accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack
classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away
from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to
evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and
knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People
v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor
of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code:
U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary,
and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109
Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of
proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on
the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the
presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendantappellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:p

Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant
Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita
Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother
of the accused, Ines Rafananalias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at
Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother
of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6)
meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and
as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the
store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not
like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2
feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening
her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed,
removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of
complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and
struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave
the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the
accused that evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily
routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel
ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's
mother confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant
could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976
that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing
what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied
her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in
Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the
complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch
the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo,
Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due
course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors

1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of
the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and
C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental
condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering
from insanity. 2

Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he
contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct
examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony
on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day.
Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have
contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March
1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross
examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not
touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair
the credibility of the complainant. 3
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in
this respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and
brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled
you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to
do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate,
if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the
bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do
immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to
your pants and your panty?
A He removed them, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he
succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he
still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you
saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused
when he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a
leading question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q After that where did you go?
A I went home already, sir.

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical
condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-incharge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental
condition were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up
whenever questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled
hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was
indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to
verbalize, even when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He
is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on
when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he
claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is
disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y
Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by
carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce],
smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility,
seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing
strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs
further hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental
condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is
dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by
himself and would show periods of being irritable saying "oki naman" with nobody in
particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not
know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed any wrong
act
and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa
is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability cursing
nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response,
dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved,
responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings
and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed

to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the
hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household
chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although,
occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small
children, talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while
appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he
needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores
and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying
having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a
mental condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that
appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented
Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the appellant.

Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo
Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that heacts without the least discernment; (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this
reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act
should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal
condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to
conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the
basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases.

11 A linguistic or grammatical
analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition "complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance
on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has
exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence,
whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has
recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly calleddementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an
usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia
in the following manner:

Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a

disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler
also stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic that is, his detachment from
reality and consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain
affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the
four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he
considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken
aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic
hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's
thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or
influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of
second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Secondrank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric
disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli
are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the
hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient,
discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment
on what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and

very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of
their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite
disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic
patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day,
but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the
night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three
dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory
modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning,
and that are idiosyncratic for the patient that is, not part of his cultural environment.
They are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid
type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious
power that exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for
many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up
with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships
that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance,

15 it has mostly been

rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was
not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.

The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he
was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in
this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?

A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his
penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said,
it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what
we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal
individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the
standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer
withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or
psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is
suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the
acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet
there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to
commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The
reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death
should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that

Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest,
through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not
only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not
believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition.
In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the
exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which,
however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or
immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the
defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.

Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because
it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness
which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance,
although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in
this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral
damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
PARAGRAPH 5

[G.R. No. 130602. March 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintif-appellee, vs. MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA,
ANTONINO FLORA y SABADO, JR., LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR., accused.
MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused Michael Fronda (hereafter FRONDA); Antonino Flora, Jr.; and Lauro Millamina, Jr., were charged
with and tried for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, [1] as amended, before the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R under an information whose
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of October, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
aiding one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 June
Corpuz and PO2 Ceasary Harry Bedey, members of the Philippine National Police, Baguio City, one (1)

kilo marijuana leaves wrapped with newspaper, a prohibited drug, well knowing that the sale and
delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the aforementioned
provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Ceasary Harry Bedey and PO3 June Corpuz,
who arrested the accused, and Police Senior Inspector Alma Margarita Villaseor, the forensic chemist.
After its Demurrer to Evidence was denied, the defense presented as witnesses the three accused and
their landlady, Mrs. Lolita Flora.
The prosecutions evidence was faithfully summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellees Brief as follows:
On October 8, 1998, around 12:00 high noon, Police Officer Cesary Harry Bedey, Desk Officer at the
Baguio City Police Office, was informed by a "concerned citizen" thru telephone that somebody was
engaged in selling marijuana at No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street, Baguio City (TSN, December 11, 1996, p.3).
The caller mentioned the names of Michael Fronda, Antonino Flora, Jr. and Lauro Millamina, Jr., as the
marijuana dealers (TSN, ibid., p.6).
After referring the matter to his superior, Officer Bedey was advised to look for Police Officer June
Corpuz who was also a resident of No. 341 A. Bonifacio Street (TSN, ibid., p.4).
When Officer June Corpuz arrived at the police station around 8:30 in the evening, Bedey immediately
relayed to him the information about the drug dealing activities at the given address (TSN, ibid., pp. 45). Both of them then agreed to verify "the information" and proceeded to 341 Bonifacio Street, which
was also Corpuz residence (TSN, ibid., p.5).
There were actually two (2) houses at 341 A. Bonifacio Street. The first house was the residence of the
land lady, Lolita Flora, while the second house was a two-storey building leased to bedspacers. There
were 2 rooms at the first floor and also two rooms at the second floor. One room at the first floor was
occupied by Fronda, Flora and Millamina and beside it was another room occupied by one Gilbert Mugot.
At the second floor, Officer Corpuz occupied the room directly above that of the accused (TSN,
December 3, 1996, pp. 8-9).
To avoid detection, Corpuz then went ahead of Bedey and a woman companion. Upon reaching the
place, he joined the drinking session held at the room of Gilbert Mugot (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 45, 10).
Meanwhile, Bedey and his woman companion following Corpuz, proceeded to the house of the landlady
and inquired where the appellant and his co-accused resided (TSN, December 3, 1996, pp. 5-6; TSN,
December 11, 1996, p. 5). After Lolita Flora had pointed to one of the rooms at the first floor, Bedey
proceeded there and knocked at the door (TSN, December 11, 1996, p.7). Somebody from inside then
pulled the door open half-way and asked, "What do you want?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 8-9,11,13).
As soon as the door was opened, Bedey stepped backwards, about 3 to 4 meters (TSN, December 11,
1996, p.9), and then asked if he could buy marijuana (TSN, ibid., pp.9,13).

Someone answered, "there is," and a square package wrapped in newspaper about 1 to 2 inches thick,
8 inches in width and 11 inches long was then handed to Bedey (TSN,ibid., pp. 9, 15, 16).
Bedey immediately opened the package a little, smelled it and determined that the contents were
marijuana (TSN, ibid., p. 20). At the same time, he asked, "How much?" (TSN, ibid., pp. 13-18).
When somebody answered "P1,000.00," Bedey immediately shouted "positive" (TSN, ibid., pp. 19-20).
Upon hearing Bedey, officer June Corpuz immediately rushed towards him from the next room (TSN,
December 3, 1996, p. 11). He and Bedey then advised/invited the occupants of the room to come out
(TSN, December 3, 1996, ibid; December 11, 1996, p. 20) Michael Fronda, Lauro Millamina., Jr., and
Antonino Flora, Jr. came out of the room (TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 22; December 3, 1996, pp. 11,14,
16-17).
The three were immediately brought to the police station and charged with selling marijuana (TSN,
December 3, 1996, p. 18; December 11, 1996, p. 32). Meanwhile, the brick of marijuana was turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory where Alma Margarita Villaseor, Forensic Chemist, subjected it to
physical, chemical and confirmatory tests (TSN, December 3, 1996, p. 38). The package, weighing 1.1
kilograms, was confirmed to be marijuana, a prohibited drug (TSN, ibid., pp. 38-40, Exhibit "D").
The accuseds defense is denial. Their version of the incident was also succinctly summarized by the
OSG in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellees Brief, thus:
[The accused] claimed that they hailed from Talogtog, Nueva Ecija and were freshmen students at the
University of Baguio (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 13-14; February 6, 1997, p. 2). Since June 1996, they
stayed as bedspacers at the boarding house/ apartment of Mrs. Lolita Flora at No. 341 A. Bonifacio
Street, Baguio City (TSN, February 4, 1997, p. 3; February 6, 1997, ibid).
From June 16 to September 30, 1996, only the three of them occupied a room located at the first floor of
the apartment. However, on October 1, 1996, one Ramil (Rommel) Oroy from Kapangan, Benguet, was
taken in by Mrs. Lolita Flora as another bedspacer and stayed with them in their room (TSN, February 4,
1997, pp. 3-4; February 5, 1997, p. 2; February 6, 1997, p. 8).
Around 7:00 oclock in the evening of October 8, 1996, Fronda, Flora and Millamina came home one after
the other from their respective classes at the University of Baguio. At the time, Oroy was inside, talking
with two (2) unidentified visitors. They did not mind Oroy and his visitors and proceeded to eat their
supper. Thereafter, the three of them went to sleep (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 6-7, 19 24; February 5,
1997, pp. 9-10; February 6, 1997, pp. 4-6).
They were suddenly awakened when they heard someone calling their names and ordering them to go
out of their room (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 8-9; February 5, 1997, p. 4.). As soon as they went out,
they were surprised when they were handcuffed and brought to the police station for allegedly dealing
in marijuana (TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 9-12; February 5, 1997, pp. 6-8; February 6, 1997, pp. 6-7).
Mrs. Lolita Flora confirmed on the stand that, indeed, on October 8, 1996, appellant Fronda, Flora and
Millamina were sharing their room with a new boarder, Rommel/Ramil Oroy.
All the accused vigorously denied having anything to do with the brick of marijuana recovered on the
night of 8 October 1996, which they allegedly saw for the first time only during the trial. [3] FRONDA
claimed that he did not even know what a marijuana was. [4] Millamina denied that he was engaged in
selling marijuana, and that any one of them handed the marijuana to PO2 Bedey. [5]

In its Decision of 6 March 1997,[6] the trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove that
the accused conspired in delivering or dealing in marijuana. It reasoned that (1) the accused were
literally caught flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing a brick of marijuana to PO2 Bedey; (2) only the
accused came out of the room where the brick of marijuana was obtained; (3) the marijuana was sold
and delivered by the three of them, if not by one of them; (4) since the accused chose to cover up for
each other, they must have acted together in dealing in the marijuana; and (5) notwithstanding the fact
that no money was exchanged, there was a transaction of the delivery of the marijuana and the "twin
elements of the selling transaction and the corpus delicti were present to uphold a conviction under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended."
The trial court did not find credible accuseds claim that they were mere students, since their classcards,
enrollment or registration papers, or even their teachers and classmates were not presented. It
dismissed as concocted and fabricated the defenses story that a fourth bedspacer named Rommel
Oroy/Ramil Uroy was inside the room of the accused with two unidentified visitors in the night of 8
October 1996 when the marijuana was obtained by PO2 Bedey, considering that PO3 Corpuz testified
categorically that only the three accused came out of the room as occupants. If indeed Ramil Oroy and
his two unidentified visitors were inside the room on that occasion, they could not have escaped the
attention of the policemen, there being only one door to the room and the two policemen were outside
that door when they asked the occupants to come out. Besides, when caught, the accused did not tell
the police that there were other occupants in the room. The Court disbelieved Lolita Floras corroborative
testimony that a certain Ramil Oroy was also a bedspacer in that room and considered it as a last
minute attempt on her part to help out the three accused to create a doubt on who were inside the
room at the time.
The trial court thus convicted all the accused of violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine ofP500,000, plus costs.
On 11 March 1997, all the three accused filed a Notice of Appeal. [7] However, two days later, Flora and
Millamina filed a Motion for Suspension of Sentence[8] under the provision of P.D. No. 603, as amended.
[9]
Pending its resolution, the trial court issued an Order[10] holding in abeyance Flora and Millaminas
Notice of Appeal until their motion was resolved. It also stated that FRONDAs appeal would be
forwarded to us only after the resolution of his co-accuseds motion for suspension of sentence.
During the hearing of the motion, the trial court informed Atty. Jaime Ulep, Flora and Millaminas new
counsel, that should the Supreme Court ultimately rule that the movants were not entitled to a
suspended sentence, they might lose their right to appeal because by their move to avail themselves of
the benefit of the suspended sentence, they could be deemed to have withdrawn their appeal and not
to have disputed the trial courts finding of guilt. Thus, Flora and Millamina were required to manifest to
the court whether
(1) they are pursuing only the appeal of the decision in this case and therefore their appeal should be
forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court and that they are withdrawing their Motion for Suspension
of Sentence which shall no longer be resolved by the court; or
(2) they are pursuing only the motion to suspend sentence and therefore withdrawing their notice of
appeal in which case the court will resolve the Motion to Suspend Sentence immediately; or
(3) they are pursuing their motion for a suspension of sentence which should therefore be resolved by
the court and in the event the accused minors do not qualify, their appeal of the decision of the court
convicting them should nevertheless be forwarded to the Supreme Court as they are also pursuing the
appeal.[11]

In his Manifestation of 26 May 1997 Atty. Ulep stated that accused Flora and Millamina were "pursuing
their motion for a suspension of sentence and/or for the suspension of further proceedings under Article
192 of P.D. 603, as amended"; and in the possibility that they would not qualify, they would file a
petition to be admitted to bail and to avail themselves of their right to appeal the decision. [12]
On 4 June 1997, the trial court granted Flora and Millaminas motion for suspension of sentence [13] and
amended its decision by (1) reducing their penalty to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum on ground of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, both being below 18 years of
age at the time the offense was committed; (2) suspending their sentence for two years from 4 June
1997; (3) releasing Flora and Millamina and committing them to the custody of their parents and
grandparents, respectively, with the supervision of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in Nueva Ecija; and (4) stating that should they behave properly, they would be discharged and
their case would be dismissed; otherwise, they would be returned to the court for pronouncement of
their penalty.
In its Order of 9 June 1997, the trial court forwarded to us the records of the case "for purposes of the
appeal of Michael Fronda only,"[14] and ordered FRONDAs commitment to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City for preventive imprisonment pending appeal. [15]
In our Resolution of 19 January 1998 we accepted not only the appeal of FRONDA, but also those of
Flora and Millamina. The acceptance of the appeals of Flora and Millamina was erroneous because they
did not appeal from the Amended Decision. Consequently, we shall deal only with FRONDAs appeal.
FRONDA alleges that (a) the trial court erred in convicting him solely on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, and in totally disregarding the evidence for the defense; (b) the prosecutions evidence is
insufficient to warrant a conviction; and (c) there being no factual or legal basis, the decision is a
complete nullity.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Appellees Brief, submitting that the prosecutions evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence
required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; and thus, regardless of the supposed
weakness of their defense, all the accused are entitled to acquittal. It therefore recommends the
acquittal not only of appellant FRONDA, but also of his co-accused, Flora and Millamina.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender or offenders, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Identification which does not preclude a reasonable
possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. [16] Thus, where eyewitnesses contradict
themselves on the identity of the malefactor, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be
lightly disregarded.[17] In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit,
the accuseds constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal[18] even though his innocence may be doubted.[19] The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and
the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution.[20]
In the instant case, as correctly pointed out by both FRONDA and the OSG, the trial courts finding that
FRONDA and the other accused were "literally caught flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing in a brick
of marijuana to Police Officer Bedey" is not supported by the evidence adduced by the
prosecution. Flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime."[21]To be
caught flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or
eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, which is "that which proves the fact in dispute

without the aid of any inference or presumption" [22] in contrast to circumstantial evidence which is "the
proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be
inferred as a necessary or probable consequence."[23] Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker
form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct evidence of
fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. [24] No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct; for in either
case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. [25]
In this case, as pointed out by the parties, neither PO2 Bedey, who transacted with and obtained the
brick of marijuana from "somebody" in the room at 341 A. Bonifacio St., Baguio City, nor PO3 Corpuz,
who rushed to the scene upon hearing Bedey shout "Positive," could identify the person or persons
Bedey was talking to and dealing with prior to and at the time the brick of marijuana was obtained.
Thus, the trial court had to resort to inference that since Bedey obtained the brick of marijuana from
"somebody" from the same room occupied by FRONDA and the other accused who, when their names
were called, "volunteered" as occupants of the room, then one or some of them must be responsible for
selling and delivering to Bedey the marijuana.
From the testimony of PO2 Bedey on the circumstances resulting in the delivery of a brick of marijuana,
it is clear that none of the accused was caught flagrante delicto selling or delivering marijuana. Due to
the darkness and lack of illumination inside and outside the door where the transaction took place,
Bedey could not identify the person he was dealing with. He was not even sure how many person or
persons he was talking to that night in question. Significantly, he admitted that there were several
persons who came out of the room other than the accused. Like PO3 Corpuz, he did not even bother to
enter the room to check whether there were persons other than the accused. When Bedey was given
the final chance to identify who among the three accused talked to him and handed him the marijuana,
he could not do so.[26]
PO3 Corpuz, who was in another room when Bedey obtained the marijuana, neither witnessed the
transaction leading to the delivery of marijuana. His testimony that only the accused came out of the
room was materially contradicted by Bedeys testimony that besides the accused, there were other
persons who came out of the room. Moreover, Corpuz also admitted during cross examination that, like
Bedey, he did not enter the room of the accused and thus could not definitely rule out the possibility
that there were other persons in the room aside from the three.[27]
In view of the admissions by the police officers who conducted the "operation" that they could not
identify the person or persons who transacted with Bedey and delivered the brick of marijuana, and that
they did not bother to enter the room where the marijuana was obtained, there is no moral certainty
that FRONDA and the other accused were responsible for the delivery of marijuana to Bedey.
Indeed, far from having been caught flagrante delicto, the evidence against FRONDA and his co-accused
is, at most, only circumstantial in nature. Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there should be
an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the
weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt of the accused.[28] Under the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for
conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each
other and consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty. [29]

The only circumstantial evidence clearly established by the prosecution against the accused are the
following: (1) the fact that a brick of marijuana was obtained by Bedey from "somebody" inside the
room which the appellants were also occupying; and (2) when called out, the accused "volunteered" to
come out of the room. The concordant combination and cumulative effect of these circumstances do not
satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. They do not conclusively establish
the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. They do not exclude the possibility that other
persons might have been the ones who transacted with Bedey and handed him the marijuana
principally because the police officers failed to seal off the area from other curious boarders and to
enter the room to ensure that no other persons were still inside that room. Notably, Bedey testified that
there were other persons besides the accused who came out of the room.
The foregoing disquisitions render unnecessary a discussion on the trial courts finding of conspiracy.
A final word on the fate of Flora and Millamina is in order. We disagree with the view of the trial court
that the application and grant of Flora and Millaminas suspension of sentence presupposed their
acceptance of the finding of guilt against them and constituted a waiver of the right to appeal. It must
be emphasized that an application for suspension of sentence under the provisions of Article 192 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code is not the same as an application for probation, which is deemed a waiver
of their right to appeal.[30] There is nothing in the said Code which prohibits a youthful offender from
appealing his conviction after he proves to be incorrigible and the trial court proceeds to pronounce its
judgment of guilty and sentence against him.[31] In fact, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, Article 197 of the
Code expressly provides that the convicted offender may still apply for probation under the provisions of
P. D. No. 968. Conversely, the accused may pursue his appeal if he chooses not to avail himself of the
benefits of probation. Although the right to appeal is a statutory right, it is an essential part of the
judicial system. Courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this right; they
should, instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[32]
At any rate, even if Flora and Millamina did not pursue their appeal, the acquittal of FRONDA and our
finding that the prosecution has not established the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt
must, perforce, benefit Flora and Millamina.[33] First, neither the charge of conspiracy nor their individual
liability was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Second, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, an "[a]ppeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except in so far as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter." After all, the grant of suspended sentence to accused Flora and Millamina does not mean that
they are already exonerated from the crime charged; only that the pronouncement of judgment and the
service of sentence are suspended[34] until their return to court for final disposition depending on their
conduct and the progress of rehabilitation. [35] Should the criminal case against them be dismissed based
on their observance of good conduct, it would only mean that they would suffer no penalty. [36]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the RTC, Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 14570-R is
hereby REVERSED. A new judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING MICHAEL FRONDA y QUINDARA and
his co-accused ANTONINO FLORA y SABADO, JR., and LAURO MILLAMINA y CINENSE, JR. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to immediately release from confinement MICHAEL FRONDA unless
his further detention is warranted by virtue of any lawful cause, and to make a report of such release
within five (5) days from notice hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83325 May 8, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN, accusedappellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Carlito A. Corpuz for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused Dante Marcos y Sibayan, from the decision * of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 2890-R finding him
guilty of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited
Drugs) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds and declares the accused DANTE MARCOS y SIBAYAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale and distribution of marijuana as charged and hereby
sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his preventive imprisonment under the
terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The confiscated marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-9") are hereby declared forfeited in favor of
the Government, and upon the finality of this decision, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over
the same to the Dangerous Drugs Custodian (NBI), through the Chief, PC Crime Laboratory, Regional
Unit No. 1, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, for disposition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
An information was filed by the Second Assistant Fiscal Alberto G. Gorospe at the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Branch V, Baguio City on December 3, 1985 charging the accused, Dante Marcos y
Sibayan, of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Sale and Distribution of Prohibited
Drugs), having been committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of December, 1985, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, and without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and distribute dried marijuana leaves weighing
about nine (9) kilos, more or less, contained in a big sack, for P700.00 per kilo or a total of P6,300.00,
Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited drug in violation of
the above-mentioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
As gathered from the records, Major Florencio Junio, Commanding Officer of the First Narcotic Regional
Unit, Baguio City, acting upon an information given by a confidential informer that accused-appellant
Dante Marcos was selling marijuana at the Holy Ghost Hill Proper, Baguio City, organized on December
4, 1985 a "buy bust" operation team composed of A2C Serafin Artizona who was to pose as the buyer of

the prohibited stuff, with Major Junio, Maximo Peralta, Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera providing the
back-up support (Rollo, pp. 58-59). The testimony of this team which eventually apprehended the
accused, constitutes the major part of the prosecution's evidence
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
Lt. Carlos V. Figueroa, a forensic chemist at the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, testified that on January 2, 1986, he received a request for laboratory examination dated
December 16, 1985 (Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 3; Record, p. 4) for nine (9) bundles of
marijuana stuff, weighing 9.2 kilos. He examined the same by means of the Duquenois-Levine test and
the thin-layer chromatography test. Both tests showed that the bundles were positive for marijuana
(Hearing of March 18, 1986; TSN, p. 4; Records, pp. 5-6).
A2C Serafin Artizona, a soldier, assigned at the lst Regional Narcotics Command, Baguio City, testified
that on December 4, 1985, he was assigned by his immediate chief Major Florencio Junio to compose a
team to entrap accused Dante Marcos in the Holy Ghost Proper (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 1314; Records, pp. 14-15). Thereafter, together with the confidential informer they went to the Holy Ghost
Proper. He was also accompanied by the back-up team strategically positioned within the vicinity,
namely Major Junio, Maximo Peralta, Freddie Cortel and Philip de Vera (Hearing of April 28, 1986; TSN,
pp. 14-15; Records, pp. 15-16). Once at the Holy Ghost Proper, he was introduced by the confidential
informer as a buyer of marijuana to the accused who was then standing at the stairway together with
his companion. After a while, they were asked to proceed to the second floor (Hearing of April 28, 1986;
TSN, pp. 20-22; Records, pp. 21-23). He then ordered ten (10) kilos of marijuana priced at seven
hundred pesos per kilo (P700.00). The accused left the room to get the stuff, and returned with a light
blue sack and gave it to him. After inspecting the contents of the aforesaid sack, he gave the
prearranged signal to his companion by spitting through the window. Accordingly, the back- up team
went inside the house. Meanwhile, he introduced himself to the accused as a NARCOM agent (Hearing of
April 28, 1986; TSN, pp. 16-17; Records, pp. 17-18). Eventually, the accused was arrested while his
companion was able to evade the arrest. He also testified that he did not execute any affidavit to
support his complaint against the accused (Heating of April 28, 1986; TSN, p. 18; Records, p. 19).
Pat. Maximiano Peralta, an investigator of the lst Narcotics Regional Unit, testified that on December,
1985, he was a member of the back-up team of A2C Artizona who negotiated with the accused. He
rushed to the house when Major Junio who posted himself near the house of accused gave the
prearranged signal that the accused was already held by A2C Serafin Artizona (Hearing of January 14,
1987; TSN, pp. 31-32; Records, pp. 32-33). Inside the house, he saw Artizona holding the accused. He
further disclosed that the sack contained ten (10) bundles of marijuana weighing more or less 9-1/2
kilos (Hearing of January 14, 1987; TSN, pp. 33-34; Records, pp. 34-35). Moreover, he testified that he
was the one who prepared the affidavit of arrest and other supporting papers (Hearing of January 14,
1987; TSN, pp. 34-35; Records, pp. 35-36).
With the presentation of the oral testimonies of the witnesses by the prosecution and the documentary
evidence which consist of: (a) Letter-request for laboratory examination dated December 16, 1985,
signed by Murphy Bugtong, Chief of Narcotics Division, Baguio City Police Station (Exhibit "A", Original
Record, p. 195); (b) Blue sack which contained marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B" -"B-10", ibid., p. 196); (c)
Chemistry Report (Exhibit "C", ibid., p. 197); (d) Sketch (Exhibit "D", ibid., p. 198); (e) Joint Affidavit
(Exhibit "E", ibid., p. 199); as well as the physical evidence, the prosecution rested its case.
On the other hand, the defense presented the accused Dante Marcos as its principal witness who
vehemently denied the accusation against him and claimed instead that the sack of marijuana belonged
to a certain Roland Bayogan.

He testified that he was a security guard of the Freeport and Vito Security Agency and an Architectural
drafting student at the University of Baguio. He was boarding at the ground floor of No. 23-C Sumulong
St., a two- storey boarding house owned by Melita Adase (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 2-3;
Records, pp. 74-75). On December 4, 1985, he went to his class until 2:30 p.m. Thereafter, he went to
his boarding house and reviewed for his last subject at 3:30 p.m. (Ibid., pp. 4-5; 15; Records, pp. 76-77;
87). However, while reviewing, Roland Bayogan, a student from Kalinga-Apayao who was occupying a
room on the second floor (Ibid., p. 4; Records, p. 76) knocked at his door and asked him to go to his
(Roland's) room to entertain his visitors as he was to go somewhere for a while. Accordingly, he went to
Roland's room, and there met Roland's visitors, an American, a Filipino and a Negro boy. He was
introduced to the three visitors and then Roland left (Ibid., pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 77-79). Ten (10)
minutes after, Roland returned carrying a big sack which he brought near the bed which was hidden
from his view by a curtain. Roland then called for the Negro boy who in turn called for the American.
When the American saw the contents of the sack he overheard him say, "Okay , I'll pay it," at the same
time brought out his money as he emerged from behind the curtain (Ibid., pp. 7-8; Records, pp. 79-80).
He testified that as Roland was sitting on his bed he was called by the Filipino visitor, who held the
former. He was also called by the same visitor who held his hands saying, "Relax lang kayo, this is
NARCOM." He saw the Negro boy jump out of the window while panicked-stricken Roland tried to free
himself from the hands of the Filipino, but the Filipino visitor pulled them both outside the door. When
they were near the stairs Roland was able to free himself. Roland ran downstairs and fled. Suddenly, he
heard a shot. The Filipino held on to him while the American went back to the room and got the sack.
Later, accompanied by the Filipino and the American, they were met by two male persons at the foot of
the stairs. He was pulled inside a vehicle and brought to the police station. He further declared that
once inside the said vehicle, he heard one of them say, "Hindi ito talaga ang target natin, iyong
nakatakbo." (Hearing of August 24, 1987; TSN, pp. 8-10,; Records, pp. 80-82). He further stated that
A2C Serafin Artizona was not one of the visitors of Roland Bayogan. He and Pat. Peralta were never at
the boarding house during the incident. He also claimed that the sketch of the place as presented by
A2C Artizona is erroneous (Ibid., p. 12; Record, p. 84) and insisted that his only purpose in going to the
room of Roland Bayogan was to entertain the latter's visitors.
On cross examination, the accused admitted that he came to know Roland Bayogan only on November
15, 1985. Their relationship was casual and he had been to the room of Bayogan for the second time
only on December 4, 1985, the day of the incident.
Renato Padua, a law student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation, testified and corroborated the
testimony of the accused that at about 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of December 4, 1987, he was reading
in the second floor of No. 23-D Holy Ghost Proper, about 1.5 meters from No. 23-C where the accused
Dante Marcos lived (Hearing of March 11, 1987; TSN, pp. 1-5; Record, pp. 49- 53); that on the said
afternoon he heard a commotion at 23-C which was followed by successive stamping of feet going down
to the first floor. He went out from his room and stayed at the porch of his boarding house. Later, he saw
Roland Bayogan, a boarder of 23-C running toward a small alley (Ibid., pp. 7-10; Record, pp. 55-58).
Meanwhile, he saw two persons who were then standing fire a shot into the air (Ibid., p. 1 0; Record, p.
58). Thereafter, the two men came down to 23-C and met the accused (Ibid., p. 11; Record, p. 59). At
the same time, the accused was being held by a certain man followed by an American holding a sack.
Finally, they boarded a jeep and then left (Ibid., pp. 11-14; Records, pp. 59-61).
Lastly, the defense presented Raul Bayangdan an AB-BSE student at Baguio Colleges Foundation, a
board mate and province mate of the accused. He testified that he has been a boarder at the first floor
of 23-C Holy Ghost St. from June 1984 to March 1986. He corroborated the testimony of the accused as
to the boarders of that house including Roland Bayogan and his sister Anita. He declared that he came
to know about the incident from Melita Adasen and Renato Padua, a neighbor, when he went home from
school. He also learned that Roland Bayogan ran away and never returned. He asserted that he has no

knowledge of the incident except that which has been told to him (Hearing of February 8, 1988; TSN,
pp. 2- 9; Records, pp. 94-100).
The trial court gave more weight to the evidence of the prosecution and found the accused-appellant
Dante Marcos guilty as charged.
Hence, this appeal.
On October 28, 1988, accused-appellant through his counsel filed his brief (Rollo, p. 35), while on May
19, 1989, the appellee's brief was filed (Rollo, p. 54).
The crucial issue of this case is whether or not there is instigation or entrapment of the accused.
Appellant contends that there was an instigation or even frame up and not a real entrapment. The "buybust" operation team who went to the place does not know the accused. In fact, the alleged buyer had
to be introduced. There was no marijuana yet when the authorities came or when the alleged poseur
buyer came to buy the prohibited drug. Thus, the accused was not about to commit a crime or
committing a crime.
The contention is without merit.
The testimony of Artizona, the poseur buyer, was clear and convincing and demonstrated that the
accused needed no instigation or prodding to commit a crime he would not otherwise have committed.
Noteworthy is the fact that the accused, as gathered from the records, had a ready supply of marijuana
for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the price asked for the prohibited material. Thus, the
acts of the arresting officers here constituted entrapment, a process not prohibited by the Revised Penal
Code (People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 77588, May 12, 1989; People v. Borja G.R. No. 71838, February 26,
1990).
It must be noted that in instigation, where the officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate
or lure an accused into committing an offense, which he otherwise would not commit and has no
intention of committing, the accused cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the criminal intent
or design to commit the offense charged originates from the mind of the accused and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the accused cannot justify his conduct.
Instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent." Entrapment is a trap for the unwary criminal (Cabrera v.
Judge Pajares, Adm. Mat. R-278-RTJ & R 309-RTJ, May 30, 1986, En Banc, Per Curiam, 142 SCRA 124).
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while
executing his criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation the instigator practically induces the
would-be defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal (People v.
Natipravat, infra). Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant
would have to be acquitted (People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159).
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the means
originate from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In
instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal
from liability. Instigation does (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 534 [1986]).
The mere fact that the authorities deceived the appellants into believing that the former were buyers of
heroin does not exculpate the latter from liability for selling the prohibited drugs. The police can

legitimately feign solicitation to catch criminals who habitually engage in the commission of the offense
(People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
Moreover, as noted by this Court, the defense that the accused was framed by the apprehending officer
can be easily fabricated and not acceptable for accused being a drug pusher or seller almost always
uses such defense. (People v. Francia, 154 SCRA 694 [1987]). For the defense of having set up or
framed up to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like alibi, it is a weak
defense, that is easy to concoct and is difficult to prove (People v. Nabunat, No. 84392, February 7,
1990, First Division, Gancayco, J.).
But the more important consideration is the fact that the appellant was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses. This should prevail over his denial and inadmission of having committed the
crime for which he was charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive testimony of
the prosecution witnesses than the accused's denial (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 52 [1986]; People v.
Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; People v. Marilao, G.R. No. 71681, September 5,1989). As between the
positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statement of the accused, the former
deserves more credence (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 157 SCRA 718; People v. Marilao, G.R. No.
71861, September 5, 1989). Moreover, even if the appellant denied the participation in the crime, his
presence during the negotiation and actual delivery indicates a common purpose with other accused to
sell marijuana (People v. Natipravat, supra).
In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court are as follows:
On the other hand, the accused's pretension that he went to Roland's room that afternoon of December
4, 1985 only to entertain the latter's visitors lacks appeal to reason. Considering his own admission that
he met Roland only on November 15, 1985; that he had gone to Roland's room only once before
December 4, 1985; that they are not even townmates as Roland is from Kalinga-Apayao while the
accused is from Pinged Sabangan Mt. Province, there is simply no discernible special relationship
between them that could have moved Roland to pick on the accused as his surrogate to entertain his
visitors. What is more, the accused had a scheduled examination at 3:30 o'clock for which he had to
review. Why should he accede to Roland's request and thereby lose precious time he badly needed for
his review? To top it all, even as Roland had already returned to attend to his visitors, the accused still
did not leave. The Court is thus inclined to believe that Roland and the accused were together that
afternoon because both were engaged in the illegal trafficking of marijuana.
It must be pointed out that ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime. The
mere act of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs
consummates the crime (People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123 [1987]).
Furthermore Artizona's testimony was corroborated by the "buy-bust" operation team especially Pat.
Maximo Peralta who confirmed that appellant was truly a marijuana dealer. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction (People
v. Macuto, G.R. No. 80112, August 25, 1989). In the case at bar, the appellant handed over the blue
sack containing the ten kilos of marijuana upon the agreement with Artizona to exchange it for money.
The circumstances show that there was an agreement between the poseur-buyer and the appellant to
consummate the sale. The fact that the appellant returned with the amount of marijuana corresponding
to the aforesaid price suffices to constitute if not sale, then delivery or giving away to another and
distribution of the prohibited drug punishable under Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425 (People v.
Rodriguez, April 25, 1989, G.R. No. 81332; People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989). What is
important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the
contents were presented as evidence in court. Proof of the transaction suffices (People v. Macuto,
supra).

Neither can the appellant aver that no consideration or payment was made. In the case of People v.
Tejada, supra, this Court held that so long as the marijuana actually given by the appellant was
presented before the lower court the absence of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the
prosecution's evidence (People v. Teves, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989). Recently, this Court ruled:
It is true that police officers did not have the amount of P1,600 with them to buy marijuana from the
appellants during the incident. Be that as it may, it was not indispensable for their operation. Sgt,.
Raquidan went through the motion as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the appellant who
produced and delivered the marijuana. There was no need to hand the marked money to the appellants
in the payment thereof. The crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods. (People v. Galtongoo, 168 SCRA 716 [1988]).
The alleged contradiction in the date of the affidavit or the fact that prosecution witnesses Artizona and
Peralta did not know the number and owner of the raided house will not impair their testimonies. There
is no cogent reason for the witnesses to know the number nor the owner of the house at Holy Ghost
Hills in Sumulong Street because Artizona who posed as a buyer was accompanied by a confidential
informer, who was familiar with the place. It has been ruled that contradictions in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses not on material points is not fatal (People v. Pulo, 147 SCRA 551 [1987]). The
doctrinal jurisprudence has consistently held that minor contradictions are to be expected but must be
disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the evidence as a whole (People v. Ancheta, 148
SCRA 178; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483; People v. Reriodica, Jr., September 29, 1989).
Conversely, the actuations of the appellant during his arrest during which he did not make a protest,
indicates his Unusually submissive stance of the appellant after his entrapment and absence of vigorous
protest when he was arrested, destroy his alleged innocence (People v. Madarang, supra).
Appellant failed to show that the police officers were actuated by any improper motive in testifying as
they did. There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by any reason other
than the desire of the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith and
credit to police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner (Rule
131, Section 5(m), Rules of Court; People v. Lamong et al., G.R. No. 82373, April 17, 1989; People v.
Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85; People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September
24, 1989; People v. Natipravat, supra; People v. de Jesus, supra). As such, their testimonies cannot be
discredited where no motive is shown why they would frame up the appellant (People v. Ranola, April
12, 1989, No. 71752; People v. Line, 71 SCRA 249 [1976]).
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of the witnesses'
testimonies are accorded great weight and respect on appeal because the trial judge has first hand
opportunity to examine and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the giving of
their testimonies (People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 81332, April 25, 1989; People v. Tejada, supra; People v.
Abonada, G.R. No. 50041, January 27, 1989; People v. Turla, G.R. No. 70270, November 11, 1988; People
v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were
charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The

information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another
eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation
of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two
(2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong
City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco
Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members.
P/Insp. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the
team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom,
gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 a
one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 as money for the buy-bust operation. The

market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his
initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. 4 The team rode in two cars and headed for
the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1)
kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to
wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. 5 An

hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team
were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03
Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his
associate named "Neneth. 6 "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's"

house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that
one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic
wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box
and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." 8 The policemen

arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked
bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned
that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of
dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house
were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried
marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house
reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many

"Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any
"Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community.
When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the
house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to
"Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as P03
Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three
minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw
Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there.
Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men
were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a
carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside.
P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police
headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy
Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness,
however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife. 11
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her
house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy,
aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant
woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a
housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son,
Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing
in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they
passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket
suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later
that the man was P03 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the
table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men
opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and
that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and
Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person. 12
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found
the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a
fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations
of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234
SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the
provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO
@ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City
Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED.

13

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR
THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES,
INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM
APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND
INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. 14
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE
POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH
DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS
TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN
CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT
BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING
TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT. 15
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of
accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of
her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense. 16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard

to constitutional and legal safeguards. 17

Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that
evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor
and narcotics offenses. 18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the

formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. 19 It also took off
from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but
ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist. 20
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as
the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal
prosecution against him. 21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts

in Sorrells v. United States, 22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment
is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by

one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the officers." 23 It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement
officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design
in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime
is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer. 24
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or
about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of
another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. 25Where the

criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction
may be had. 26 Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials
furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted. 27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature

of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once
established, the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a
defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent"
test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The
focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind
and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the
accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the
crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. 33 The
predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the
trap for the unwary criminal." 35 If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the
offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an
unduly persuasive inducement. 36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test
was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska.
Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of
the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. 39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by

government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.
For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than
one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; 41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a
law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is
permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to
sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this
test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls
outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods
employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some
extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement
improprieties. 45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the accused
and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the
crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the
effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person. 46
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
impermissible. 47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important

task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that
no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed
the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the other extreme, the purely

"objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His
predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of
whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The undisputed fact that the
accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a
criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy. 50
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United States now
combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In Cruz v. State, 52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that

the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the
analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca v. State, 54 the
New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal
defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to
commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper
investigation. 55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught
in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps, 56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking

opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the
crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he
overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony
was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three
times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. 57 The
conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v. Abella, 59 we acquitted
the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the apprehending police
officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high
one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct,
persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence
sufficient to convict the accused. 60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the accused
after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that
the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu
after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by
pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure
of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. 62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction between
entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris, 64

we held:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons
into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while
instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in
its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from
the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed
confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his
confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so,
assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held
that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a
"spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia, 66the

appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The
instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the

purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. 67 In People v. Tan
Tiong, 68 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker. 69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu
Ua. 70Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed

contrary to public policy and illegal. 71

It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is
instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. 72 To determine whether there is a

entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers,
not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United
States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. 73 Nevertheless, adopting the "objective"
approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst, 74 we applied
both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting
evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We
also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past
and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the
evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was
likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations. In
recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust
operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like antigambling laws are regulatory statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly

regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. 78 They are not
the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with
crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining crimes mala
prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order. 80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to
many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how
furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not
upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This
means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover
capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons. 82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system breeds
abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers
and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a
drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that
government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order
is not an inspiring one. 83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and

exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion
harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their
superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 where we
observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless
persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks. 85 The use of shady underworld characters as
informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of
trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have
compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. 86 Criminal activity is such that stealth
and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable
police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Barraza, 87

[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping,
false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all
spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is

condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal
class,' justifies the employment of illegal means . 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not
by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual. 89 It is

the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law
through lawless enforcement. 90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of
abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses. 91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 92 The manner by which the initial contact was

made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buybust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer,
must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however,
examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition
to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain
criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the
predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the
validity of the defense of inducement.
1wphi1.nt

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accusedappellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the
buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for
one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick
of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not
crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its
material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal
to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police. 93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently

denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting
officers,94 or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against
the appellant, 95 or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire
transaction, 96 the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of
the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. 97 There is no need to present the informant in court
where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. 98
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are
minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for
the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money
was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually
identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed
this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten
(10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the
trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were
identified and marked in court. Thus:
ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we
confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items
when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item from the box showed to him
and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
xxx xxx xxx
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed
to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the
PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the
PCCL, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. . .
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95 also Exhibit
"A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there are other entries
included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of
paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
xxx xxx xxx
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I gave
him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 99

The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner
of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as
Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 100
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for
appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot
capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the
usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and the
pusher.101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-

appellant.

102

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed
in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx 103

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of
marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and

seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws; 109(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure
of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however,
that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident
to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the
arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about, the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I gave
him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 112
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was 'sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house, she was
not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.

Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I
correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you were
just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you your role in
this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A P03 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there 's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the amount of
P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the
money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you are trying
to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I am through with this witness, your Honor. 113

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there
was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In

fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are

reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 117
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused.
PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response
to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. 118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant

Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her coaccused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, 119 with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom
agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no
showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable. 120

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence. 121 The "plain view" doctrine applies

when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 122 The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area. 123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 124 The object must be open to eye and
hand 125 and its discovery inadvertent. 126
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the
object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized. 127 In other words, if the package is such that an experienced

observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. 128 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 129
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this. . .
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing
ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?

A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by
Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in
possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua already retrieved
the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor. . .
Q You were only able to verify according to you . . .
PRESECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it . . .
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a small
one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to . . . Look at this, no even Superman . . . I withdraw that.
Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the Court, it could be
"tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . .
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor do
that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
xxx xxx xxx 130
P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria.
The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led
them to her. 131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of

said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box
was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents. 132 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the

contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of
the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to
a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags white, pink or blue in color. 133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the
contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he
had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. 134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the
content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court. 136
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao

does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. 138 Apropos is our ruling in People v.
Aminnudin, 139 viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself. 140
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659
punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., thecorpus delicti, as
evidence in court. 141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which

he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to
PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant
Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed. 142
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No.
3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and GonzagaReyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.