W.E.B.

Du Bois Institute

Amin's Uganda
Author(s): Philip Short
Source: Transition, No. 40 (Dec., 1971), pp. 48-55
Published by: Indiana University Press on behalf of the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2934129
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TRANSITION 40

'

--

Amin's

Uganda
(A half-yearlyreport]

Philip Short
'To save a bad situation from getting worse' is a
modestenoughambitionfor a coup: most governmentsto-be speakof makinga bad situationbetter.Yet it was
this phrase which was used to justifythe overthrowof
Dr. Milton Obotein Ugandaon January25. The words,
'It has been necessaryto take actionto save a bad situation from getting worse', formed the opening sentence
of the proclamation which announced that MajorGeneral Idi Amin had seized power. Ugandans still
repeat them today as a kind of watchword. To what
extent has that early objectivebeen achieved,and how
has it been modifiedin the interveningmonths?
Theunnamedgroupof soldierswhoproclaimedAmin's
coming to power listed 18 grievanceswhich, they said,
had left the people 'angry,worriedand very unhappy'.
They includedthe curtailmentof fundamentalfreedoms
of speech and association; the breakdownof law and
order;materialand politicalcorruptionwithinthe ruling
elite; economic hardshipsamong largesectionsof the
population;the neglectof the armedforcesin favourof
Dr Obote's General Service Unit (GSU); tribalistic
manipulationwithinthe armyand a high level of tribal
tension within the country as a whole; and Uganda's
isolationfrom the East AfricanCommunitythroughthe
impositionof currencycontrols.
Some were clearlymore importantthan others. The
impositionof currencycontrols,for instance,disadvantaged mainly those Ugandans whose homes bordered
Kenya and Tanzania, a strategicallyimportantgroup
but numericallya small minority.Economichardships
were widespread,affecting city dwellers through the
rising cost of living, and farmersthroughlower prices
for cash crops. Political corruptionand restrictionson
48

freedom of associationantagonisedboth civil servants

and Dr Obote'spolitical opponents,notably adherents
of the proscribedDemocraticPartyledby BenKiwanuka.
The breakdownin law and order was anothergeneral
problem, but particularlyacute in Buganda. The
Baganda, too, suffered most from detentionwithout
trial. Lack of freedomof expressionwas felt throughout
Uganda,but especiallyin the academiccommunityand
by professionalpeople. Dr Obote'smanipulationof the
army alienatedsignificantelementsin the officercorps.
Other groups, whose grievancesthe soldiersdid not
list, includedAfricanbusinessmen,disenchantedat the
continuingdominationof commerceby the Asian community; the Asians themselves,who saw their future
being eroded; capitalistsof all colours, alarmedat the
move to the left; radicals who regardedObote as a
lukewarm socialist; and Baganda traditionalistswho
yearnedfor the restorationof theirKingdom.
The combinedhostilityof these groupswas such that
the coup encounteredlittle opposition. Obote'spower
basehadgrownso narrowthatthe generalreactionto his
fall was one of rejoicingand what resistancethere was
came from GeneralServicepersonneland Langi army
officers.To most Ugandans,moreover,it was immaterial
that Amin had actedfrommotivesof rivalryratherthan
from any deepdesireto rightpast wrongs. But that this
was so was shownboth by Amin'smagnanimitytowards
Obote'scolleaguesand by the absenceof reformistelements from the coup. Speakingon Radio Uganda on
the evening of January25, Amin said his government
would be 'purely a caretakeradministration'to hold
the fortuntilelectionscouldbe arranged.Consistentwith
its interimnature,therewould be no Presidentbut only

TRANSITION 40

a Military Head of State. Whatever reforms were needed,

Amin implied, would have to await the formation of
the next civilian regime. In another speech the following
day he said he hoped some of Obote's former ministers
might join in whateverinterim government he might form.
At this stage Amin had no clear idea of what support
he could expect from the civil service or of how the
country would take the coup once the initial shock was
over. The next week showed him that the bulk of the
civil service was behind him, and that the country as
a whole was well-disposed to the change of rule. The
need to use the ex-ministers fell away, and a cabinet
composed mainly of technocrats was sworn in on February 5. Meanwhile Amin came under strong pressure
from several sources - the group of soldiers who had
helped him in the coup, certain prominent civilians, and
perhaps also external elements (the British and the
Israelis were already beginning to line up behind his
embryonic regime)-to look beyond his original objective of merely removing Obote from power.
On February 21, the same soldiers who had proclaimed
the coup announced that the new government no longer
intended to act in a caretaker capacity, but would remain
in office for five years. (The following day Amin himself
said 'much less than five years' might suffice. Subsequent
government statements suggested that it was thinking in
terms of two years. In practice, however, and assuming
that the regime is allowed to remain in power, the soldiers,
five years seems a more realistic minimum). Meanwhile
steps were taken to formalise the suspension of political
activities announced three days after the coup, and Amin
agreed to take the title of President. At the same time
the first reformist elements appeared. Then, as now, they
were very vague: 'We want to clean up this country in
all its aspects', Amin explained. What was noteworthy
was that it had taken four weeks even for so much to
emerge.
Long before the decision was taken to extend the
government's term, the Buganda problem was raised.
The omission of any direct reference to Buganda in the
soldiers' proclamation was understandablein view of the
army's role in its subjugation in 1966. But it was precisely for that reason that Amin felt constrained to
consolidate his position with the Baganda while their delirium at Obote's overthrow was still at a high pitch. He
knew that the ease with which the coup had been
effected was partly due to the fact that the inhabitants of
Uganda's heartland had been so opposed to Obote's
regime as to welcome any change. But he also knew that
his own part in leading the attack on the Kabaka's
palace in Mengo in May 1966, and the subsequent behaviour of the army in Buganda, would make his regime
suspect to the Baganda once the first enthusiasm died
down.
Accordingly, at his first press conference on January
26, he announced he would bring back from its resting
place in Britain the body of Sir Edward Mutesa for a
ceremonial state funeral. It was a shrewd move, for
one of the bitterest Baganda grievances had been Obote's
refusal to allow even memorial services to be held in
Uganda at the time of the Kabaka's death.
While Amin's announcement had the desired effect, it
ramified beyond its immediate objective. Many Baganda
began to believe that the restoration of their kingdom and
the institution of a new Kabaka might be imminent. To

curb mounting Baganda hysteria the soldiers announced,

in their statement of February 21, that 'there can be no
return to feudal kings and kingdoms because Uganda is
marching forward not backwards'. The blow was softened when later that day Amin (not the soldiers) announced
that the State of Emergency, operative in Buganda since
May 1966 and in the rest of Uganda since December 1969,
was being revoked. Thereafter the government stressed
the importance of the funeral as a gesture of national
reconciliation, and a strong propaganda campaign
along these lines was mounted through the local press.
At the end of March Sir Edward'sbody was duly returned
and buried in accordance with Baganda custom after five
days of state mourning; the exercise was skilfully stagemanaged, the army behaved well, and none of the disturbances which had been widely predicted materialised.
But before it was over, the scene was set for the next act
of the Baganda's struggle for their kingdom. Sir Edward's
16-year old son, Prince Ronald Mutebi, was installed as
Ssabataka (chief of the Baganda clan elders) at a ceremony at Bamunanika, Sir Edward's family home, the
night after the burial had taken place. Traditionally the
functions of Ssabataka and Kabaka are combined.
When Ronald Mutebi (the government no longer
recognised his title) returned to Uganda four months
later for his summer holidays, the government's insistence that his visit was 'purely private' did not prevent
some 30,000 Baganda gathering at the airport and lining
the route along which he passed. The adulation they
showered on him testifies to Obote's lack of success in
demythifying the Kabakaship. Three days later,
Amin met Baganda elders in conference in Kampala, and
was told bluntly that the Baganda wanted the kingdom
back. It was clearly a question he had been expectingPrince Mutebi was at his side and arrangementshad been
made to televise the proceedings. But he fluffed his answer. On the one hand he said, quite justifiably, that the
Baganda should realise the government had other no less
pressing problems on its hands, and there was little to be
gained by making the kingdom a burning issue. But on
the other he invited the Baganda to submit a memorandum on the question which he would consider with the
cabinet and the defence council. By so doing he not only
reopened a matter which, officially at least, had been
closed, but assumed personal responsibility for whatever
decision might eventually be taken-something which
until then he had been careful to avoid.
The next day Amin tried to recoup by declaring that
the question was too important to be decided by himself
alone, and that a conference of delegates from all districts would be called to discuss it. But the Baganda
retained the impression that the answer lay in Amin's
hands. His willingness to have the issue discussed indicated he had no rooted objection to a restoration, their
argument went.
It is possible to make a case for allowing the institution
of an emasculated Kabaka and the formation of an
impotent Lukiiko (the Baganda 'parliament' of elders)these seem to be the Baganda's minimum demands-as
the price of defusing their underlyingdesire for the formal
restoration of Buganda's distinctive cultural identity. A
possible counterweight to the resurgence of cultural
arrogance which would follow on such a move might be,
as Dr. Mazrui has suggested, the elevation of Swahili as
Uganda's second national language. But even a limited
49

TRANSITION 40

concession of this kind would be a retrograde step, in

that it would make more difficult the eventual de-escalation of the inter-tribal tensions to which the Baganda are
party.
Why Amin laid himself open to the inevitable Baganda
attack at a time when feelings were running high over
Prince Ronald's return is not clear. Certainly it has become one of his favoured techniques to use conferences
of this kind as a safety-valve for the airing of grievances;
sometimes the conference is the end in itself and no other
steps are taken. But in this case he might have been
expected to put off a confrontation until emotions had
cooled, particularly since any change in the status quo
could not meaningfully be implemented until the resumption of political activity in 18 months time. One line
of speculation is that he felt himself under pressure
because of the deteriorating relationship between the
Baganda and the army. As he put it, the Baganda had
begun saying 'bad things' about his troops. 1
The Baganda-army relationship owes much to the
killings and gratuitous violence which succeeded the
Kabaka's flight in 1966. On the one hand these gave the
Baganda special reasons for hostility to the military, but
oh the other they enabled them to perceive what other
Ugandans failed to see-the true nature of the army's
role under Obote's regime. It was Obote as much as the
army that the Baganda blamed for the brutality of 1966,
and it was again Obote whom they blamed for looting,
civilian harassment, and the other hazards which followed from the army's lack of discipline. Other Ugandans,
lacking Baganda experience, failed to make such a direct
connection between army and government until the identity of the two was established by the coup. Only then did
army indiscipline become a potential source of antigovernment feeling at a national level, and the state of the
army generally a matter of paramount importance.
During the takeover itself the army behaved well. Very
few civilians died, and many of those at civilians' hands.
Non-victimisation was the official policy, and once the
initial fighting was over even Langi officers suffered less
than might have been expected. The soldiers' 18 points
appeared to focus attention more on the persons of
Obote and Akena Adoko and Akorokoro County, than
the Langi people. Tribalism was not an important element in the early stages of the coup.
Amin himself struck the first jarring note when he
explained, at the press conferenceon January26, how the
coup had come about. Obote had given orders that all
troops except those from Lango and Acholi should be
disarmed, he said. The coup had been effected to prevent
this taking place.
Such a statement might have been expected to provoke
immediate mass killings of Langi and Acholi officers. It
did not for two reasons: firstly, Amin put forward this
view of the coup only once at that time-later and earlier
statements, far from suggesting Acholi-Langi collaboration, referredto their mutual enmity; secondly, attention
was soon afterwardsdistracted from the internal position
by rumours of an external threat in the shape of an invasion by troops from Tanzania or the Sudan. But while no
pogrom followed, his claim alienated the Acholi and
created in them a sense of insecurity. At the same it reinforced Langi fears that their days were numbered.
The Langi were awkwardly placed from the start.
50

Langi officers had led the short-lived opposition to the

coup. Obote's attempts to pack the officer corps with
Langi had created widespread resentment among other
tribes-it was to this that the soldiers' proclamation referred when it spoke of tribal manipulation in the army.
And the very fact that Amin narrowed responsibility
for the mistakes of the past onto Obote and Akena
Adoko, while seeming to absolve from blame the other
prominent figures in the UPC government, exposed the
Langi to the penalties of collective guilt. This last factor
might not have been important had Obote accepted his
overthrow quietly. But his attempts from Dar es Salaam
to undermine Uganda's international standing and the
suspicion that he might also be planning to use Ugandan
guerrillas for an attack on the new government, steadily
increased anti-Langi feeling. At one stage Amin openly
warned that Obote was recklessly endangering the safety
of his fellow tribesmen by the stand he had taken.
By March Langi officers were deserting in appreciable
numbers. To a lesser extent Acholi were going too,
partly because of Amin's early statementimplicatingthem
in the alleged disarmament plan, and partly because of a
general upsurge in inter-tribal tension within the army.
The high proportion of Acholi troops in the armed forces
and their ambiguous relationship with the Langi had
been a source of friction long before the coup. Now however it was leading to intermittent killings. As tension
increased between Uganda and Tanzania and the Sudan;
and the threat of guerrilla incursions was taken more
seriously, troops from other tribes began to look on the
Langi and Acholi-and the latter in particular, because
of their reputation as good fighters -as a potential fifth
column. The assumption that they were deserting to join
the guerrilla cause led to more killings, in turn leading
to more desertions. While the army as a whole increased
in size as a result of a recruitment campaign launched
immediately after the coup, the officer corps contracted.
Discipline began to break down not only within the army,
but between the army and the civilian population.
Civilian harassment, looting, rape and murder occurred
all too frequently around garrison towns.
Amin's failure to act decisively in this deteriorating
situation is not easy to explain. His inaction and the resurrection of the tribal account of the coup may go some
way towards explaining why the first large-scale tribal
fighting within the army broke out at a time when the
putative guerrilla threat, and hence the pressure of suspicion on Acholi and Langi troops, had almost completely receded. Alternatively it can be argued that the very
recession of the external threat cleared the way for internal strife. In any event, on June 8 Amin declared that
guerrilla infiltration was no longer a problem. A few
days later he announced that Ugandan troops had been
withdrawn from patrolling the Tanzanian border. And
on June 24 a reported 150officersand men of the Mbarara-based Simba battalion were killed in a violent tribal
clash. Most of the dead were Acholi.
The Mbarara fighting was quickly followed by the
resurrection of the external threat. Amin announced on
July 3 he was postponing a planned State Visit to Malawi
because of guerrilla activity along the Uganda-Tanzanian
border, which, it was claimed, had cost 670 lives in the
previous five months. This was the first mention of
government troops being killed in that part of Uganda.
Four days later, he announced the closure of Uganda's
borders with Rwanda and Tanzania. Then, on July 11,

TRANSITION 40

Kampala

he left the country for the first time since the coup to pay
a weeklong private visit to Britain and Israel.
Hours after his departuretrouble broke out at Moroto.
By midnight there was fighting at Jinja and Magamaga,
which later spread to Masindi and Moyo. At Jinja it
continued until July 14; elsewhere it was less drawn out.
Following these clashes there was a significant improvement in the army's morale. Why? Two possible lines
of thought suggest themselves. Either it was because the
vast majority of Langi and Acholi officers had by now
deserted or been eliminated, and the immediate cause for
tribal factionalism had thus been removed. Or it was
because of some action Amin had taken. Since the
Mbarara incident, Amin has spoken frequently of the
need to improve discipline and soldier-civilian cooperation, and in some speeches has also referred directly to
tribalism. But while he appears to command the personal
loyalty of the majority of his troops, the effectiveness of
these verbal appeals is difficult to judge.
Even if the most obvious source of tribal friction has
now been removed, it would be foolish to pretend that the

potential for further tribal flare-ups no longer exists.

Amin is probably right in regardingthe improvement of
discipline as the most practical way of containing it and
at the same time curbing non-tribal army lawlessness.
The latter could become a more pressing problem as and
when Uganda's external relations improve. He is also
right in according this task the highest priority in his
immediate programme: as an example of the harm an
uncontrolled army can do, the events of the early 1960s
in neighbouring Congo-Kinshasa are too recent to be
ignored.
Present indications are that Amin is tackling indiscipline on three fronts: by reorganisingthe present military
structure; by improving existing army barracks-substandard and overcrowded for many years-and by
building four new ones to accommodate the expansion of
the army since the coup; and by launching, mainly with
British help, a massive training programme to. build up
afresh an effective officer corps. There is little point in
trying to speculate at this stage how successful these measures will be, or how long they will take to have effect.
But the Congo experience is again not irrelevant:
51

40
TRANSITION

althoughthe Ugandanarmyis veryfar fromthe anarchy

of the Congolesearmyin 1963,it has taken eight years
for orderto be restoredto the Congo'smilitarymachine,
and even now it is closely watchedby GeneralMobutu.
It may take much less time than that in Uganda, but
there will be no overnighttransformation.And in the
meantimethere is the problem of money: the critical
stateof the Ugandaneconomy.
In theirfirstproclamation,the soldierswereconcerned
only with those economicgrievanceswhichwereheld by
the ordinary man. They condemned Dr. Obote's
economicpoliciesfor bringinghigherunemploymentand
hardshipsto wage-earners,and deploredthe high level
and diversityof taxation,the low prices paid for cash
crops,andthe highrateof inflation.In theirsecondstatement, on February21, they reiteratedsome of these
complaintsandaskedthe governmentto puttheeconomy
'on a sound basis.' In April the Bankof Ugandacalled
for the tailoring of public and private expenditureto
available resourcesand a policy statementon private
sector investmentand the role of non-citizens(i.e. the
Asian Community). Africans engaged in commerce
requestedgovernmentassistanceto maximisetheirroleat
the expenseof Asian traders. The IMF adviseda drastic
andimmediatereductionin governmentexpenditure.
The government'sfirstmoveswere, understandably,
to
try to removesome of the sourcesof populareconomic
discontentto whichthe soldiershad alluded. Price controlswereimposedon a widerangeof basic commodities,
and the export of certain food crops was banned to
alleviateshortages.However,these measureswere vitiated by hoardingand the developmentof a blackmarket.
Laterthe irritatingbut relativelyunimportantdevelopmenttaxwasscrapped.
On May 1, the anniversaryof Obote'sannouncement
of the 60/40 nationalisationformula, General Amin
announcedwhat purportedto be Uganda'snew economicpolicy. Privateinvestmentwouldbe welcomedexcept
in a few key sectors where the governmentthought it
essentialto maintaina monopoly,and the 60/40formula
would be replacedby a 49/51 arrangementwhichwould
be applied,not to the 80-oddcompanieslistedby Obote,
but to a select group of 18 concerns. At the time the
move was hailedas a sign of flexibility;what was not
pointed out was that the economy, while no longer
moving in the directionin which Obote had pointedit,
had becomeaimless. The old policy was being dismantledbutno newthinkinghadreplacedit.
In the case of the Asian community,therewas no old
policy to dismantle-a situationwhichmight have been
expectedto make the formulationof a new policy that
much more urgent. Yet no clarificationof the position
of non-citizenshas been forthcomingthough Amin has
ordereda new censusof Asians. Insteadseveralgovernment ministershave attackedAsiansas exploitersof the
indigenous population. These attacks have not encouragedAsianinvestment.NeitherhaveAfricantraders
had morethan verbalcomfortand encouragement.
The encouragementof privateinvestmentwas referred
to at length in the budget speech of Finance Minister
EmmanuelWakhweyain June. But the budgetitselfnot
only containedno new incentivesto privateinvestment
-in view of the government'slimited options on recurrentaccount that was to be expected-but actually
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TRANSITION

includedtwo disincentives.The introductionof a withholdingtax on profitsremittedoverseasmadeUgandaa

considerablyless attractive investmentarea, while the
introductionof a similar tax on businessconsultancy
servicesmeantthat enterpriseswhichwishedto makeuse
of suchserviceswouldhaveto pay considerablymorefor
them.
The budgetwas disappointingin other ways. While
Wakhweyaspokeof austerityand 'drasticcuts'in ministerial votes, the total draft recurrentand development
expenditureestimateswere both higherthan those approvedin 1970,largelydue to increaseddefenceexpenditure. The 50 per cent increasein recurrentdefenceexpendituredoes no more than reflectthe increasein the
sizeof the armedforces,butthe samecannotbe saidof the
threefoldincreasein the defence developmentbudget.
At a time whenthe governmenthas pledgedits determination only to put money into directly productive
devel o p ment projects, this non-productiveitem
accountsfor 28 per cent of all projecteddevelopment
expenditure. GeneralAmin has said that most of the
defence developmentbudget will be spent locally on
improvingand expandingbarracks.Since this appears
to be a prerequisitefor curbingindisciplineand raising
army morale,there can be no quarrelwith it; a stable
militarysituationis a sine qua non for economicprogress,and to achieveit the temporarysacrificeof orthodox developmentisjustifiable.ButAminhasalso spoken
of re-equippingthe army with modernweaponry,and
has sent militarymissionsto severalEuropeancountries
to investigatepossible sources of supply. Desirable
thoughthis may be froma militarystandpoint,it cannot
be justified in terms of Uganda's present foreign exchangeposition.
By June of this year, Uganda'sforeign reserveshad
fallento abouthalf theirlevel of nine monthspreviously,
and were sufficientto cover less than three monthsimports. Witha smallervisibletradesurplusforecastin the
comingmonths,continuinghighgovernmentexpenditure
anda highlevel of publicsectorcontractor-financing,
the
reservesseem certain to weaken. If the government's
presentpoliciescontinue,measuresof such severitymay
ultimatelyhaveto be resortedto that foreigninvestment
will befurtherdiscouraged.
The lack of a coherenteconomicpolicy and the problemsassociatedwith the Ugandaarmyare not the only
obstaclesin the way of economicprogress. Civilianlawlessnessand the high incidenceof armedrobbery(konThe prevalence
doism)are also development-inhibiting.
of kondoismwas one of the 18 points mentionedin the
soldiers'proclamation,and it has been an areain which
Amin'sgovernmenthas madesomeprogress. A ruthless
campaignlaunchedby the army in April has reduced
violent crime in city centres and wealthy suburbsto
manageableproportionsfor the firsttimein severalyears
-but in the poor suburbsandin muchof ruralBuganda,
in areasadjacentto Kampala,lessiumpession
particularly
hasbeenmade.
Among the peculiarlyUgandancauses of the crime
explosionin the last yearsof Obote'sregimewerelack of
confidencein the policeforce,whichwascorrupt,undermannedand under-equipped;lengthydelaysin judicial
process;the exampleof armyindiscipline;the exampleof
corruptionby political and businessleaders; and the
politicaland social frustrationand deracinationof the

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53

TRANSTION 40

Baganda after the destruction of their traditional institutions in 1966. Amin has promised to revitalise the police
force, and as with the army Britain is expected to provide
training assistance and perhaps also equipment. Some
improvement has already been noticeable, and in recent
weeks there have been policemen on the beat in Kampala,
where previously there were none. Lack of resources may
delay the transformation of the force into a fully effective
unit; the police budget published in June was slightly
lower than that for last year. The rejuvenation of the
judiciary, also undermannedand tainted by allegations of
corruption, has been put in the charge of the former
Prime Minister and ex-detainee, Ben Kiwanuka, whom
Amin appointed Acting Chief Justice-a move which
incidentally won him widespread support among former
members of Kiwanuka's Democratic Party.
Corruption was discussed at length in the soldiers' proclamation, not so much because it encouraged lawlessness but rather as an evil in itself. Corruption stemming
from political activities and from the General Service
Unit was ended by the suspension of one and the dissolution of the other. Shortly after the coup Amin announced the suspensions of the chairmen of the state-owned
National Trading Corporation and Coffee Marketing
Board and the appointments of separate commissions of
inquiry to investigate these two bodies and corruption
generally. The commissions will not begin work until
later this year, and until they do the promised 'clean up' is
unlikely to materialise. In the meantime Amin has expanded the definition of corruption to include slacking:
were the commissions to take a similar view, Uganda's
public service-like those of most other countries-

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would be decimated,
More serious is the current uncertainty within the
East African Community. Far from rectifying the alleged
isolationist tendencies of the Obote regime, of which
the soldiers' proclamation complained, Amin has completed Uganda's isolation from one EAC partner state by
closing the Uganda-Tanzania border.
But its effect has been to slow development not only in
Uganda, but in the East African region as a whole.
The restoration of fundamental freedoms to Ugandans
has not been a problem to Amin's regime in the same
sense as the army, Buganda or the economy and all its
ramifications. Yet the government has done more in this
area than in almost any other in its first six months of
power. Only in one respect has it failed to live up to its
original intentions, and that is in the matter of detention
without trial.
The soldiers listed three sources of popular complaint:
the continuation of the State of Emergency; lack of freedom of expression and association; and 'the unwarranted
detention without trial and for long periods of a large
number of people, many of whom are totally innocent of
any charges.' The State of Emergency was lifted four
weeks after the coup, the majority of political detainees
having been released much earlier.
The regulations for treating new detainees have not
been fulfilled within three months of the legislation
coming into force. Questioned on this point, Amin's
reply was not reassuring. Military detainees would
shortly be courtmartialled 'in the field' some way away

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TRANSITION 40

from Kampala, he said. He did not say what charges

would be brought against them or what would happen to
non-military detainees. And he could give no assurance
that the proceedings would be open to the press. Shortly
afterwards, a new detention decree was published, permitting the government to hold military detainees for a
further three months without the Minister of Internal
Affairs being required to issue formal detention orders
against them as he would otherwise have been compelled
to do by the May legislation. Officials said the short
duration of the new law's effectiveness was an indication
that some of the military detainees might soon be released.
Sceptics saw it as a means of preventing the Detention
Review Committee, which cannot begin work until
detention orders have been issued, from gaining access
to the military detainees.
With this one exception, however, Amin's regime has
shown itself uniquely tolerant of criticism and dissent.
Amin himself has even gone so far as to say that a government without opposition is a weak government. He has
travelled widely, encouraging those with whom he has
come into contact to air their grievances frankly, and
making frequent use of elders' conferences to ascertain
the problems of particular tribes and districts. The same
technique was used in an attempt to iron out religious
differenceswithin the Moslem and Anglican communities
and inter-religious divisions between Uganda's several
faiths: it was not completely successful, but at least a
start was made. Tribal differences, notably the serf-lord
dispute between the Bwamba/Bakonjo and Batoro peoples have been given the same treatment. The argument
throughout has been that it is better to provide a safetyvalve for discontent than to stifle it. It was for the lack of
a safety-valve, the government maintained, that Obote's
regime fell so easily; it does not want to go the same way.
Part of the government's difficulty has been to find a
suitable means of institutionalising the ventilation of
grievances. With political activities suspended, parliament and district councils dissolved, there are few forums
available for the discussion of local or national issues.
Elders' conferences were found not to be entirely satisfactory because the participants were drawn from too
narrow a social stratum.
As this is written, moves are under way to establish
throughout Uganda village, sub-county, county, and

district committees whose membership will be selected

from all age-groups, religions, tribes and former political
affiliations. Their function will be to identify and discuss
local problems and presumably (although this has not yet
been made clear) to forward them together with suggestions for their solution to some higher authority, yet
to be announced. The result should be the non-partisan
non-political equivalent of the apparatus of a national
political party. Similar moves were to have been made to
democratise the means of airing grievances within the
army with the creation of a so-called military junta,
consisting of ten soldiers of ranks ranging from private
to senior officer drawn from each army unit. This body
was to have had sweeping powers to advise the defence
council and also the cabinet. Evidently this proposal was
considered too radical, however, for six weeks after the
junta was said to have been formed it was announced that
it had not been formed at all, that its name was a
misnomer and that what was in fact happening was that
military committees were being formed in each district.
These would advise the defence council on problems
relating to their areas, and would also have limited
advisory powers in regardto the cabinet.
Amin has also been encouraging freer debate in the
Uganda press, but so far with little success. A combination of timorousness on the part of reporters and pusillanimity on the part of those who occupy the editorial
chairs has resulted in depressingly little criticism, constructive or otherwise, appearing in Ugandan newspapers.
To some extent it is understandablethat this should be so.
The Obote regime so frowned on independent opinion
that most Ugandan journalists now find its exercise difficult, even unnatural. But it is nonetheless regrettable.
With the best will in the world, no government is going
to continue inviting criticism indefinitely. Accounting the
merits and demerits of governments is an invidious task,
even by such a simple criterion as 'to save a bad situation
from getting worse'. The foregoing has been an attempt
to identify some of the areas in which Amin's regime has
succeeded and others in which it has failed, and to
delineate the main problems it now faces-the army and
the economy, mutually interlocking yet at odds-and
the main era of potential concern-Buganda. A more
conclusive evaluation will have to await the completion
l
of the second and more difficult six months.

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