1

Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 , G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND,respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration
of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the
same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for
the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning
the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several
occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or
seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a
citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right
against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs.
Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular caseis purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant
by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount
to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.

2
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted,
the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union of Lawyers and
Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection
of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
II.

THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?
III.

THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as
a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted,
the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable
limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

FIRST DIVISION
185 SCRA 665
G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amador E. Mostajo and Presbiterio Velasco, Jr. for accused -appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR POLICE CHECKPOINT, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE
EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a
warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles
are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If
vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief
of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have
been instruments in the commission of an offense. However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to
do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before
Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE WAIVED, AS IN THIS CASE. Their
submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when
arrested, not only casts serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms their acquiescence to the search.
Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In one case We held ". . . When
one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT OF DISPATCHING IN TRANSIT OR
TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO
WARRANT; AN INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR. (A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery
of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was
committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in
transit or transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CASE AT
BAR. Factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to
affect the result. There is none in this case on appeal.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE
COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT
THE EVIDENCE. We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of
Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was conducted prior to the
arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in the proceedings below.
Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless

5
search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of
the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit evidence.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 4,
ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the owner of the
prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN ORDINARY CHECKPOINT IS ILLEGAL FOR LACK
OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS ENVISIONED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order,
any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without warrant on the chance that
it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights. In the
case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The search is made as a matter
of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is actually
being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being
searched or arrested is the culprit . . . I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the seized marijuana
as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we cannot
retroactively validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a checkpoint after being stopped for routine inspection is
put to test in this appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City finding inter alia accusedappellant Restituto B. Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan
was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other
prohibited items. With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc. Ricardo Galang, a
member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the occupants if there were firearms inside. They
answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He noticed
a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long with its sides bulging. He asked what it
contained. There was deadening silence. Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime
P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened. He found
what he excitedly described as "marijuana, marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!" At this juncture, the three (3)
remained motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They were brought to the police station that same
night for further investigation. 2
After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2) kilos of Indian hemp otherwise known
as marijuana. 3
Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P. Fernandez were accordingly charged for violation of Sec.
4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment. A fine of P25,000.00 was also
imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Exala did not.
Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us assailing his conviction; hence, We deal
only with him in this appeal.
Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while on
the way to Cavite City, he and Fernandez offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted the offer and requested Bocalan to make
a detour to Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They agreed and Exala got the bag
which he kept beside him all the time until their apprehension at the checkpoint. 6
Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained
through a warrantless search.

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The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that the conduct of Bocalan was not
only unusual but also contrary to normal human experience. 8 He alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had no
personal association with him; 9 yet, on that eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to detour to Salitran which
was some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers out of his way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who owned the
bag containing the marijuana is hardly credible.
On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of the bag as it was already in the
jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was either Bocalan or Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore that
Bocalan and Fernandez offered him P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame alone, but he refused. 10
Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. 11
Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he
can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law simply provides thus
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the victim of the offense
is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly involved in the unlawful dispatch in
transit or transport of marijuana. The evidence of the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo Galang
and Pat. Rosauro de Guzman, belies the defense of Bocalan and establishes beyond cavil that he was caught in
flagrante delicto of transporting the prohibited drug; that he was the driver of the jeep owned by his father that carried
the stuff; and, that he was in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan picked up Fernandez and
Exala one after the other to accompany him to the place where the bag of marijuana was taken and to help him bring
the marijuana to Cavite City. 12 Regardless of the degree of participation of Fernandez and Exala, Bocalan is correctly
punished for his direct involvement in the crime.
Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and are
generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to
affect the result. 13 There is none in this case on appeal.
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention that
it was seized without a valid search warrant. Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it
was not incident to a lawful arrest.
This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on
the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his
objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. 14 In view
of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence. 15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver,
still appellant's contention deserves scant consideration.
There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.
16 An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. 17 Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through
these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the
commission of an offense. 18 However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the
general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his
residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an
incident to or an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal" the main object of which was to
search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing through
it. 20 When the jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants
were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were
bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor
of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc.
Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more

7
extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was
no sign of any protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even after their arrest.
Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part
when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on their professed innocence 21 but also confirms their acquiescence to
the search. 22 Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. 23 In one case 24
We held
". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly" (emphasis supplied).
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their
possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the
situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a
warrantless arrest may be made. 25 The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting
marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc. Galang and Pat. de Guzman was explained in their
separate testimonies and, in any event, has been resolved by the trial court as a factual issue. We find no reason to
reverse its findings.
Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have been assigned different levels of liability, suffice it to
say that whether a principal, co-principal or conspirator, accused-appellant would have been meted out the same
penalty imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant RESTITUTO B.
BOCALAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the same is AFFIRMED, with costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinions in Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665/178 SCRA 211,
and People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, and the following additional observations.
I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing criminality in general. I do not agree that in
the interest of peace and order, any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched
without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is not the probable cause
envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The search is made as a
matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is
actually being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the
person being searched or arrested is the culprit.
I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at "constructive borders" near the boundary
for the purpose of preventing violations of immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory, the
requirements of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible exemption is where a crime
like a bank robbery has just been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to seal off all
possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.
I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the of the seized marijuana as evidence against the
petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal
search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would
rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in
the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a conviction based on a
violation of the rights of the accused.

GUANZON v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 80508
30 January 1990

PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

PARTIES:
1.
PETITIONERS: EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA SEVILLA, QUERUBIN
BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO,
ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA
COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,
BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO,
ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA
SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO
SESPENE, ROSA MARTIN and JAIME BONGAT
2.
RESPONDENTS: MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA
NATURE: Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Original Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
The forty one (41) petitioners, claiming to represent the citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before th[e] Court, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting Aerial Target Zonings or Saturation Drives in
Metro Manila. In their petition, they claim that the saturation drive or aerial target zoning that were conducted in
Tondo, Manila were unconstitutional. To support such claim, they specifically alleged that there is no specific target
house to be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their
civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded

9
like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The petitioners
claim that in all these drives, the following acts were committed:
1.

Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police and military
units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards.
2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their homes,
shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within to
come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are ordered to strip down to
their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders, some of the members of
the raiding team force their way into each and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed to
conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their homes, tossing about the
residents belongings without total regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are
damaged in the raiders illegal effort to fish for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that their money and
valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and
hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are interrogated and verified.
These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions
that will authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period wherein they can be legally
detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some arrested persons are released without charge
after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents during these illegal
operations.
10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spot beatings, maulings and maltreatment.
11. Those who are detained for further verification by the raiders are subjected to mental and physical torture to
extract confessions and tactical information. (Rollo, pp. 2 -4)
In their defense, the respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, alleged that the accusations of the petitioners
were total lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out
subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media
joined the operation to witness and record such event.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the saturation drives performed by respondents involved acts which violated human rights.
2.
Whether or not the original action for prohibition is the proper remedy.
ANSWER:
1.
Yes.
2.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON SATURATION DRIVES AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
When saturation drives may be conducted without having to secure search warrants and without
violating the Bill of Rights Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go out
in force to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the
mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
Duty of the court to stop the transgression and encroachment upon the rights of the individual Where a
violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the
individual. It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the
petitioners do not complain they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged
victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police saturation drives, as long as the Court is
convinced that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so inspite of the alleged
pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal
verification. We cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the
respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses.

10
However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing
wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent
demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the
rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit
all police actions to one-on-one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific
individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
2. ON VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND REMEDY
The present petition is an improper remedy The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through
a taxpayers suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially
for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well-meaning citizens with
only second-hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the
military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of
constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be
followed. If our policy-makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are
essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior
of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human
rights abuses and identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference should bring together the
heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and
institutions to devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.
No permanent relief can be given Under the circumstances of this taxpayers suit, there is no erring soldier or
policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no
permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners charges and a hard look by
administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be
committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of
doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences
even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court remanded the petition to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the
petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and
prosecuted.
The Supreme Court likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
National Defense, and the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary Integrated National Police for the
drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances,
flush out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court enjoined the acts violative of human rights alleged by petitioners as committed
during the police actions until such time as permanent rules to govern such rules are promulgated.

Alvero vs Dizon Case Digest

AURELIO S. ALVERO vs ARSENIO P. DIZON, et al.,
G.R. No. L-342
May 4, 1946
FACTS:
The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as
part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas in the petitioners house. The Petitioner further contends that the seized documents
should be returned as it obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion, those are not his personal
papers but part of the files of the New Leaders Association, which was proven to be an organization created for the
purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to
compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the seized documents are legal?
Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the trial court?

11
HELD.
No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.
RATIONALE:
The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief
of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily
given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.
EXCEPTION:
Important exception to the necessity for a Search Warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to
search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things
arrested with the crime as its fruits as the means by which it was committed.
The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized documents, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at
the hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of
the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated
and established by a motion.
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION
Not violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Thus, the petitioner
is estopped from questioning their admission.
PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searched and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative and judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

G.R. No. L-342

May 4, 1946
AURELIO S. ALVERO, petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL., respondent.
Albert and Albert for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor General Alvendia for respondents.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with injunction originally filed in this court.
In the petition it is alleged that petitioner Aurelio S. Alvero has been accused of treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the
People's Court; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain
documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino guerrillas,
in the petitioner's house; that petitioner immediately objected to the presentation of said documents, and called the
attention of the respondent judges to the fact that he had filed a petition, in which he protested against the procedure
of the government in the seizure of said documents, and asked for their return to the petitioner; that the respondents
permitted the prosecution to present said documents as evidence, which were considered, upon the termination of the

12
presentation of the evidence for both parties, in denying said petition for bail; that the petition filed on December 1,
1945, for the return of the documents allegedly seized illegally in petitioner's house, was not considered by the
respondents, before the commencement of the trial of petitioner's case, on the merits, due perhaps to an involuntary
oversight; that at the commencement of the trial of said criminal case No. 3, and during its course, the prosecution
again presented, as evidence, against the petitioner said documents which had been taken from his house, and
petitioner renewed his objection thereto, and asked for their return to him, alleging that their seizure was illegal and
that their presentation would be tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his
constitutional rights; that in deciding the question so raised, the respondent judges, in open court, stated that the
prosecution might in the meanwhile continue presenting said documents, without prejudice to the final resolution of
said petition, when the prosecution should finish presenting its evidence; that in concluding the presentation of its
evidence and resting the case, after offering said documents as part of its evidence, the petitioner again raised the
question of the admissibility of said documents, and the respondent judges then ordered the substantiation of said
allegations of petitioner, and set for hearing his petition for the return of said documents; that said petition was heard
on February 16, 1946, and at said hearing, the petitioner and his wife testified, without any contradiction that, on
February 12, 1945, on the occasion of the arrest of the petitioner by soldiers of the United States Army, the latter
searched the house of the petitioner and seized, among other things, the documents which he had in his house; that
when said petition for the return of said documents was submitted for the consideration and decision of the
respondent judges, the latter, on February 26, 1946, issued an order denying said petition, and admitted as competent
evidence the documents presented by the prosecution, marked as Exhibits A, C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1, R-2, U, Z, CC, DD,
FF, HH; that on the same date that said order was issued, denying the petition for the return of said documents,
petitioner asked for the reconsideration of said order, which was also denied. (Petition, pars. 1-12.)
And herein petitioner now claims that the respondent judges, in denying the petition for the return of said documents,
acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their discretion, alleging that even the
seizure of documents by means of a search warrant legally issued, constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed in
paragraphs 3 and 18 of section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, and, consequently, when their seizure cannot be
justified by the corresponding search warrant, the court should order their immediate return; that the petitioner has no
other speedy and adequate remedy for the protection of his rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than this
petition for certiorari, as the right of appeal granted by law to a person accused of a crime, is costly and highly
prejudicial to the petitioner, as it presupposes that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused by means
of legal and competent evidence, as alleged in the last three (3) paragraphs of the petition.
Consequently, herein petitioner asks for the annulment of the order issued by the respondent judges, on February 26,
1946, in said criminal case No. 3, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio S. Alvero, the return to him of the
documents presented by the prosecution, mentioned above, and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. .In
their answer filed on March 21, 1946, herein respondents have substantially admitted the allegations made and
contained in the first twelve (12) paragraphs of the petition, except the portions alleging that the documents in
question had been obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion; and that certain soldiers of the
American Army took certain personal properties of herein petitioner, at the time the search was made; and that the
acquisition of said documents was manifestly a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights and that their admission,
as evidence for the prosecution, would be tantamount to compelling petitioner, as accused, to testify against himself
all of which portions have been expressly denied by the respondents.
Respondents have also expressly denied the allegations contained in the remaining three (3) paragraphs of the
petition.
And as defenses, respondents allege (1) that petitioner himself has admitted the legality of the seizure of the
documents in question in his motion for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946; (2) that petitioner has not proven
that said documents had been illegally seized for him; (3) that the seizure of the documents in question took place, on
February 12, 1945, in Pasay, Rizal, which was then still a combat zone, and that the seizure of certain papers in the
house of the petitioner was made by soldiers of the United States Army of Liberation or its instrumentalities; (4) that
said seizure was effected lawfully under the terms of the proclamation of the Commander in Chief of the United States
Liberation Forces, dated December 29, 1944, in which he declared his purpose to remove alleged collaborators, when
apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for
the duration of the war; (5) that the documents in question had been properly admitted as evidence for the
prosecution in criminal case No. 3, as herein petitioner, as accused in said case, had expressly waived his right to
object to their admissibility, particularly Exhibits A, FF, HH and P; (6) that petitioner's evidence of alleged ownership,
relative to Exhibits C, G, H, K, I, P, R, R-1 and R-2, is altogether insufficient, and petitioner himself has expressly
admitted that said documents are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders' Association, which
was proven to be an organization created, for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy; (7) and that none of the
exhibits referred to in the petition has been satisfactorily identified by the petitioner as included among the papers
allegedly wrongfully seized from his house and belonging to him.
Considering the allegations made by the parties in their respective pleadings, and their supporting papers, as well as
the admissions made therein, the following facts appear to have been sufficiently established:

13
(1) That on February 12, 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied
by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed herein petitioner under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration with
the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal;
(2) That on or about October 4, 1945, petitioner was accused of treason, in criminal case No. 3 of the People's Court;
after which, on December 1, 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized and taken
from his house;
(3) That petitioner also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution presented certain papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition was denied;
(4) That at the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits, as described in the petition for certiorari, filed in this
court;
(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission of said papers and documents at the hearing
on said petition for bail, and at the trial of the case on the merits, in not having insisted that the question of the
legality of the search and seizure of the papers and documents taken from his house should have been litigated and
finally decided first, and thus practically waived his objection to their admissibility, as evidence for the prosecution;
(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken from his house, held after they had been
admitted as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on the petition for bail and at the trial of the case
on the merits, herein petitioner had failed to identify satisfactorily the documents now in question, and his ownership
thereof; and
(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946, admitted the legality the
legality of the seizure of the documents taken from his house, and at the hearing on his petition for bail, he himself
called for some of the documents in question.
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to
seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the
provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession of prisoners of war (Wilson,
International Law, 3d ed., 1939, p.524); and also under the proclamation, dated December 29, 1944, issued by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain
citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance due
the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war.
(41 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 148, 149.) As a matter of fact, petitioner himself, in his motion for reconsideration, dated
February 26, 1946, expressly admitted the legality of the seizure of his personal papers and documents at the time of
his arrest.
The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to
a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right
to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed. (Agnello vs. United States,
269 U. S., 20.)
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his control may be seized and
used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by
the officer upon reasonable grounds to have committed a felony. (Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S., 132.).
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which is also guaranteed
by state constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional
search and seizure. (People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.)
It is true that on December 1, 1945, herein petitioner filed a petition, demanding the return of certain papers and
documents allegedly seized and taken from his house at the time of his arrest; but when he consented to their
presentation, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing on his petition for bail and at the trial of the
case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said
papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion, made before the trial, for
their return, he was and should be deemed to have waived his objection to their admissibility as part of the evidence
for the prosecution; since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be waived. (Weeks vs. United States,

14
232 U. S., 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States, 251 U. S., 385; Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298;
People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil., 626, 630, 631.)
At the hearing on his petition for bail, petitioner himself requested the production of the document marked as Exhibit
A, which was a letter sent by him to Dr. Jose P. Laurel; the document marked as Exhibit HH, which was a memorandum
to Col. Suzuki, dated December 30, 1944; and the document marked as Exhibit P, which was a memorandum on
Nippongo classes. And he is now, therefore, estopped from questioning their admission.
Furthermore, petitioner could not properly identify many of said documents, such as Exhibit FF, nor satisfactorily
establish his ownership thereof; while the prosecution has sufficiently established the fact that some of the papers now
in question, such as Exhibit C, had been received at the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in the City of
Manila, since February 11, 1945, that is, one day prior to the seizure of certain papers and documents in the house of
the petitioner. And with reference to Exhibits C, G, H, K, L, P, R, R-1 and R-2, petitioner himself admitted that they are
not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leader's Association. And it is well established rule in this
jurisdiction that in a petition for the production of papers and documents, they must be sufficiently described and
identified, otherwise the petition cannot prosper. (Liebenow vs. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., 39 Phil., 60, 67, 69; Rule
21, section 1, Rules of Court.)
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. (Adams vs. New York,
192 U. S., 585.) But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by
a private person or under authority of state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256
U. S., 465.)
As the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and documents from the residence of
herein petitioner, on February 12, 1945, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came in the possession of the authorities of
the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of the United States Army in Manila, the use and
presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence for the prosecution against herein petitioner, at the trial of his
case for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable
searches and seizures, or on any other constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in
similar cases. (Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United States, 275 U. S., 310.)
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the petition for certiorari with injunction, filed in this case, is absolutely
without merit, and it is, therefore, hereby denied and dismissed with costs. So ordered.
Jaranilla, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., and Buenaventura, Santos, Santiago and T. Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
We concur in the decision, but we wish to make of record our express disagreement with the doctrine as stated in the following
paragraphs of said decision:
The majority of the states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which is also guaranteed by state
constitutional provisions is not violated by the use in evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure.
(People vs. Defore, 242 N. Y., 13; 150 N. E., 585.).
But it does not prohibit the Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or
under authority of state law. (Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Burdeau vs. McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)
We also disagree with the following pronouncement in the other concurring opinion:.
La traicion implica renuncia y privacion de la garantia contra irrazonables registros y secuestros, diligencias previas a la
conviccion o absolucion, actuaciones estas finales del proceso.
The theory is erroneous and retrogressive. It violates the spirit and the letter of the Constitution. There is no reason, either legal or
moral, for depriving an accused of treason of the benefits of constitutional guarantees. Even those convicted of the most heinous
crimes remain under the pale of the Constitution, and cannot be punished, including those sentenced to death, except in accordance
with the due process clause of our fundamental law.

15

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:p

16
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX)
convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2
(e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and
the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich,
Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one
by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before
the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of
the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the
shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer,
went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane
wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that
the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly
stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the
Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to
the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

17
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED
OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS
RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON
HOW THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,
Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the
1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which
are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the
illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over
up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache &
Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14,
1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by
the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and

18
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private
individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence,
his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain
from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life . . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d
621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a
motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available
to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing
appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not
be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence
later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument
stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and
a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to

19
the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain
sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part
of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed.
1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of
the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of
the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986;
Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by
police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be
emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of
either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven
v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The
modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an
individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private
individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal
complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

20
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the
undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave
statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the
records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as
testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his
constitutional right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As
borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession
while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is
there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the
finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of
the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met
in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the
packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the
country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to
human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could
not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial
court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand,
would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete
stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant
failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237
[1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously
convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that
the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse
and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66;
Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances
(People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA
651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if
indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of

21
shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper
thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine and inspect the packages. She
refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the
box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of
search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant,
abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state
authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing
appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not
be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure
of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof

22
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom,
protection against the STATE.

[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,
MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE
LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and
JOHN DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A.
Ramirez and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to declare null and void Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from enforcing
the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax
assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said documents,
papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did not
issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:cha
1es
virtual
1aw
library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of
Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly
Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to
make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: respondent Veras
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon;
an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished
but still unsigned by respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge
was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read
to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leons application for search warrant and respondent Logronios deposition,
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.

23
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners
at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded
with
their
search
which
yielded
six
boxes
of
documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant
be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the
search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners, jointly and severally,
damages and attorneys fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the
petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order dismissing the
petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following reasons:chanrob
irtual
1aw
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

library

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:jg
hanrobles.com.ph
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of
Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the judge himself
and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision, was introduced by
Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following discussion
in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757)
is
enlightening:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating in our
constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he must be
under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that
he
may
produce
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the
judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses
he
may
produce
.
.
."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of
facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent
De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainants application for search warrant
and the witness printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask
either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there
was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to
the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At this juncture it may be well

24
to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition)
taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V.
Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that
stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case.
After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De
Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judges chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the
depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy
Clerk
Gonzales
testified
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them, requested
Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and without legal basis, he can
be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms the facts contained in his
deposition
and
the
affidavit
executed
before
Mr.
Rodolfo
de
Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."
tua1aw
library
Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission
of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the
Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It
was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the
issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the
proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up
questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were
important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to
all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question is: Was the said search
warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?
To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above. Thus
we find the following:ch
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Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information required
under the Tax Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article subject to a
specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct of illicit distilling,
rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .," and provides that in the case
of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee who caused the violation shall be
responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output removed, or to pay
the
tax
due
thereon.

25
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the
violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the
violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of
business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business
or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six abovementioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax);
while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable,
because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one code, i.e., the
National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the
Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this
Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding
the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus
we
said
in
Stonehill:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this
Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes
and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and
check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970."cr
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The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said:jgc
:chanrobles.com.ph
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:ch
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Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance
sheets
and
related
profit
and
loss
statements.
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending
to
defeat
its
major
objective:
the
elimination
of
general
warrants."cralaw
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While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the
language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if
seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the
requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
wit:jg
c:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant
to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."c

26
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The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem.,
dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not
conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense;
and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event,
the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts,
persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of
foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judges order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first place, when the questions raised
before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the court below, the filing
of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in this Court is no longer a prerequisite.
(Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied
without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the
essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
against petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of
petitioners fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with
irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a
violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as
holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal
entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ." (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed.
652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied to a
corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation
against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful
way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:jg
c:charobles.com.ph
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein
may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity . . ."cra
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In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were
searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong,
and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands
on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

27
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely as claimed by petitioners at least
partly as in effect admitted by respondents based on the documents seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months after the search and seizure
on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis for the assessments.
Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is
declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents,
papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from enforcing the assessments mentioned in
Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on the documents, papers and effects seized
under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in any criminal or other
proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es
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I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question violates the specific injunction of Section 3, Rule 126 that
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." There is no question in my mind that, as very
clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Villamor, the phrase "for violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209" refers to more
than one specific offense, considering that the violation of Section 53 which refers to withholding of income taxes at
the sources, Section 208 which punishes pursuit of business or occupation without payment of the corresponding
specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209 which penalizes failure to make a return of receipts sales, business or gross
value output actually removed or to pay the taxes thereon in connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on Business
and Occupation can hardly be absorbed in a charge of alleged violation of Section 46(a), which merely requires the
filing of income tax returns by corporations, so as to constitute with it a single offense. I perceive here the danger that
the result of the search applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of violating Section 46(a) but also and
separately of Section 53, 208 and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73, also mentioned in the
application, are really directly related to Section 46(a) because Section 72 provides for surcharges for failure to render,
returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns and Section 73 refers to the penalty for failure to file returns or
to pay the corresponding tax. Taken together, they constitute one single offense penalized under Section 73. I am not
and cannot be in favor of any scheme which amounts to an indirect means of achieving that which not allowed to be
done directly. By merely saying that a party is being charged with violation of one section of the code in relation to a
number of other sections thereof which in truth have no clear or direct bearing with the first is to me condemnable
because it is no less than a shotgun device which trenches on the basic liberties intended to be protected by the
unequivocal limitations imposed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to secure a search warrant
with the aggravating circumstance of being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom the application
for
its
issuance
is
presented.
I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my vehement disapproval of the action taken by respondent
internal revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured during the search, the legality of which was
pending resolution by the court, as basis of an assessment, no matter how highly motivated such action might have
been. This smacks of lack of respect, if not contempt for the court and is certainly intolerable. At the very least, it
appears as an attempt to render the court proceedings moot and academic, and dealing as this case does with
constitutionally protected rights which are part and parcel of the basic concepts of individual liberty and democracy,
the government agents should have been the first ones to refrain from trying to make a farce of these court
proceedings. Indeed, it is to be regretted that the government agents and the court have acted irregularly, for it is
highly doubtful if it would be consistent with the sacredness of the rights herein found to have been violated to permit
the filing of another application which complies with the constitutional requirements above discussed and the making
of another search upon the return of the papers and documents now in their illegal possession. This could be an
instance wherein taxes properly due the State will probably remain unassessed and unpaid only because the ones in
charge of the execution of the laws did not know how to respect basic constitutional rights and liberties.

28
Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz
et
al
Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge
On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of
a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the
application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI
Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed
his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was
informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be
false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant
and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search WarrantUnregistered and private
books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for
payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and
coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of
bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.The description
does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a
probable cause.
2.

The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.The search warrant in question was issued
for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the
irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3.

The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

G.R. No. L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court
of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of
First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.

29
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, 3 a total of
42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences,
and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold
therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to
nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional
rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose

30
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with
reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . .
(A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or
not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things
may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As
a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

31
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule,
that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory
that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching
officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution
of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of
an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

After

20

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved
to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it
used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom
from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to
the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that
as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne
Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused

32
had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied
in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer
who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police
officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks
the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which
the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight
of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by
the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners
allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436,
Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession
and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or
amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In
other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the
contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently
established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of
the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are
null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

33
It is so ordered.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations
of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and
are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently
illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared,
abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void
the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal
standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the
three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as
null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered
5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants
served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the
authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down
the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without
exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the
petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things
and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the
searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution
that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness
or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the
petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and
effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by
federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and
effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of
documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive
of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the
sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person,"
gives "standing."

34
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the
petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other
search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and
were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of
corporation of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized
from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir.
1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or
his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in
his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over
the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we
say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have
standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the
premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or
indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC);
had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored
(Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of
the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore
independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the
searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly
technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it
is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving
the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has
led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act,
1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as
those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be

35
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in
order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for
their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents
seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled
to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search
and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of
the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461
(1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the
shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones
vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the
apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well.
The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on
premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against
him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like
in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the
corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's
search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade
premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers
seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of
either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee
had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel andVillano considered also the
fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at
682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files.
The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the
possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as
not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural
device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States,
232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C.
S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn,
was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at
his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and

36
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were
seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S.,supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively
against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search
warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned:
"United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the
rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not
whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58,
187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches
were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were
suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners
all personaland private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences
or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their,
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices
and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful
searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they
were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed
(actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void
search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the
determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things arepersonal/private of the petitioners
or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to
move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the
great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
Stonehill v. Diokno Digest
Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the
corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank

37
Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results,
search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and
the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the
deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's
residence.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises
RULING:
No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The
petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct
from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in
the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object
belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the
premises).