Socratic and Non-Socratic Philosophy: A Note on Xenophon's "Memorabilia", 1.1.

13 and 14
Author(s): Laurence Berns
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Sep., 1974), pp. 85-88
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126584
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SOCRATIC AND NON-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY:

A NOTE ON XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA,
1.1.13 AND 14
LAURENCE
BERNS

he wondered
it was not evident to them that it is not
whether
for
human
to
these things
discover
possible
beings
[sc. divine
things,
r? Sai/i?na].
of themselves
Since even those who thought most
for their
speaking about these things do not hold the same opinions with one another,
but are disposed
towards one another
like madmen.
And

II

For of the madmen,

1) some do not
fear terrible things, 2) others even
fear things not frightening;
3) and
some do not hold ?Sok lv] it shameful
[ai<rxp??>] to say or to do anything
in a crowd, 4) while others
whatever
hold that it is not right even to go
out
human
[oi}h'l%iTii)T?ov~] among
some
not
and
honor
do
5)
beings;
any holy thing [or temple,
Upbv],
or altar, nor any other of the divine
others
venerate
6) while
things,
chance wood
and
stones,
things,

And of those who worry about the

nature
of all things
[j?v w?vTwv]*

1) some hold that the being [r? 8j>]

is one only, 2) and others that they

are infinite in multitude
; 3) and for
some everything
is always moved,
could ever
4) and for others nothing
be moved;
5) and for some every
comes
both
to be and
is
thing
for others noth
destroyed,
6) while
ing could ever come to be nor be
destroyed.

beasts.

We
what
was

is said
said

ments

about

each

three pairs in each. Within

subject

in a later

behavior

concerning

both lists

what
pair, depends
in
earlier
Of the state
corresponding
subjects
pairs.
the first pair is concerned
madmen
with
extreme
atti
the
second
extreme
with
about
fear,
judgments
shame,
upon

about

about

tudes
the

have two lists with

about
third

extreme

with

piety.

The

subject

of

the third pair, piety, is derived from or dependent upon the first two,
fear and
pendent

as in the second

shame,
upon

number

and motion.

are de
list generation
and destruction
seems
The suggestion
to be that

to be ashamed is to fear disgrace, while piety depends upon a fear of

being in disgrace before divinities or divinity :Correspondingly, move
ment presupposes limited plurality, mover, moved, and that from
which and to which the moving thing moves ;coming to be and passing
away

presupposes

the movement

of a plurality

of elementary

beings

into and out of different combinations.

The parallel structure of both lists invites coordination.

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Do

LAURENCE BERNS

86

each of the attitudes,

or are

they

appropriate

the same number

seems

most

For those for whom everything

destroyed

(II, 5), nothing

ever

come

to be

or be

is eternal,

(I, 5).

down

under

non

the

end

are no

there

(II,

of

both comes to be and is

nothing

immortals,

For those for whom nothing

destroyed

disposition,

from

evident,

the lists.
worthy

set

of these major

to each

corresponding

begin

of divine honors

(I) correspond to,

the whole

of

Is there a characteristic

in (II)?

positions?
from what

will

listed under

view

the

to,

of madness,

kind
peculiar
or pre-Socratic
We

or dispositions,

is eternal,

everything

6)

could
and

any chance thing they happen upon could be thought to be divine

(I, 6). For those who hold that the being is one only (II, 1), every
thing is one with itself, there is no other to harm one; hence they
do not even fear terrible things (I, 1). For those for whom the
(II, 2), there are
beings are infinite, unlimited (aireipa) in multitude
to what
sources
is other
from one
of danger,
to possible
concerned
sources
of fear (I, 2).
(I), 3 and 4 were
self, to possible
to koXov
to aivxpov.
is the noble,
Its opposite
the shameful,
with
we
difficult:
is most
The
fourth
may
If,
correspondence
(1.1.16).
no bounds

the

conjecture,
therefore

origins,

the

was
everything
or changed
(Kivr?dr?vai) (II, 4),
as
a
violator
shameful
exposed

moved

being
for whom
remains

are noble,
and
ever be
could

of everything
and nothing

"parents,"
once noble,

one

in danger
of
is always
For those
of the noble
(I, 4).

then

is always
changed
(II,
everything
is
there
and
therefore
nothing
such,

noble

3), nothing
ever to be

ever
of

ashamed

(I, 3).
to Xenophon
according
of "those
claiming
fearlessness
between
the mean

and

sought
lessness

and

or moderation,

sobriety,
well

bashfulness,

as a moral

between

wisdom

the mad-like
sober

means

between

that

at 1.2.19 is the first

in the Memorabilia.

to be

seemed
"He

for Socrates:

are,

and

superstition

aoxppoavvrj,

Xenophon

Plato,

to

(croata) and moderation

extremes,

theoretical

1This,
"philosophy"

principle

avoided

always
He
philosophize."1
between
and timidity,

Socrates,
extremes
these

did not

. .

indicates

is, the beings

occurrence

impiety.
a

are

But
as

theoretical
a boundary

draw

By

."(3.9.4).
what,

always
shame

exposing
the

for Socrates,
limited

of any word

in multi

cognate

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with

SOCRATIC AND NON-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

some

tude,

things

some

and

change

do not,

and

87
some

come

things

into being and perish and others do not.

If

or moderation

sobriety

is

the

of

characteristic

Socratic

philosophizing, and if it is the Socratic element that is common to

the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, that characteristic might
be traced to the Socratic thinkers' insistence on doing justice to the
cognitive
understand

of

significance
to include

ordinary
(which we
experience,
is said about
the things
experienced).2

common,

what

A few illustrations may

suffice.

in the Theaetetus

Socrates,

(180d),

the attitude
of adherents
of universal
flux speaks
ironically
adapting
some
of cobblers
are at rest
that
of
the
"foolishly
supposing
beings
and others
in motion."
The
trouble with
of old,"
"the famous men

the Stranger from Elea says on the following day (Sophist, 243a-bl),
is that "looking
the many,
they

far beyond
slighted

us

[yictpihbvTes, overlooking
; for not caring whether

or despising]
us,
we follow along

with them when they speak or are left behind, each of them does his
own thing to the limit." He comes back to the discussion of motion
and

rest

later,

arguing
that
sayings

the

accept
every

way

about

all

but

moving,

that
"the

"in

rather

motionless

things

the philosopher
all" is at rest

and

accord

being

being and the all are both [motionless

The

(249c-d).

with

moved,

the

as

it seems,

"the

is in
being"
children's
prayer

he must

say

and being moved]

becomes

schematized

Socrates

says

not

that

the

together"

in Aristotle's

Physics,
where
he concludes
that "from these
3, 253a22ff.,
(254al)
such arguments
it is impossible
for anyone
to believe
are in motion
or that all things
are always
all things
at

?, chapter
and other
either

discussion

must,
or that

that

rest."3

In 3.9.6

Xenophon's

that madness

is the

opposite
"but to be
Ignorance,
however,
of oneself
and to opine
one knows
and
ignorant
one does not know,
what
to be very
he reckoned
close to madness."
seem
would
to be a more
This
of those
characterization
precise
of wisdom,

mad-like

is not madness,
to suppose
that

ao(pia.4

thinkers

who

worry

about

the

nature

of

all

things.

If

they thought that by the study of the cosmos they would be able
to make

and

control

natural

phenomena

whenever

they

wanted

2Cf.
Plato, Phaedo 96ff.
3Cf.
253bl, 29. Cf. also Plato, Sophist 251c-252e.
4
In 1.1.16 it is the opposite of <ru(ppo<ybvr?.

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to,

LAURENCE BERNS

88

they would be mad. But they are not mad, if "they expect nothing
of this sort and it is sufficient for them just to know by what cause
of

each

continual
that

he

sort

this

inquiry
too was

(yv?vat,
know,"
"look beyond
[or

comes
to be"
But
Socrates'
thing
(1.1.15).
not unreasonably,
to lead many
to suppose,
seemed
one of those
to
for whom
it was
satisfactory
"just
was
of making
his associates
accused
?jl?vov). He
of

to despise,
laws"
above,
vwepopav^] the established
not
this
He
does
refute
directly
charge.
Xenophon
never
made
that Socrates
his followers
it by arguing
violent,

(1.2.9).
counters

so that they might

but trained them in prudence

reforms
who

those

by means
are very

of
The
definition
cited
persuasion.
above,
are ignorant
who
both
about
close to madness,
as readily
to
about what
they do not know,
applies

and

themselves
the many

as

altogether

surprised

beyond
addition,

their

accomplish

to

of

their

speculative
to read at

we
Therefore
despisers.
1.3.4 that Socrates
"himself

U7rpe?pa] all human

[or above,
from the gods."5
"to counsel
Socrates'

Xenophon's
mean
between

the

way
of

ways

but

things,"

then

be

might
the mad-like

with

are

not

looked
a crucial

characterized

as

and of the
speculators
subvert
the way
of life of

who

those
speculators
fail to learn what
learn
of the polis, and who
they might
Socrates
nevertheless
about
the talk of the many,
thinking
Unlike

many.

the many,
from

joins them in looking beyond all human

His

beyond,
however,
human
the
through

looking

looking
himself.

His

"looking

the many's

subvert

things

beyond"

same

direction

they

care?

straight
the things

...

beyond

of the

they first
to be able to
above

For

[ra

gods.
set man

look

out
just

alone

and

"do

the many

you

among

before

virepdev]

as to
a way
as little as
noble

in such

by looking with

to the

For

from

is carried

understanding

This he accomplishes

possible.

things to their principles.

on a prior or contemporaneous
in order to understand
them and

is based

[wpoop?v~]
. . ."
(1.4.11).

not
the
and

believe

in the
that

animals
up
to see better

St. John's College, Annapolis

with

5Or "he looked down on

[despised]
counsel from the gods."

all human

things

in comparison

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