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Rogelio C.

Lascoa Jr
Wills and Succession-1st Bacth Midterms
1. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA
A. MAGNO, respondents.

Phil. Com. and Ind. Bank v. Escolin (no fideicommissary)

L-27860, 27936-37, and L-27896

Mar. 29, 1974

Doctrine: Where under the will the whole estate is bequeathed to X to be owned and enjoyed by him as
universal and sole heir with the absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that
while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof during his lifetime(inter vivos) to
anyone, he cannot do so after his death(mortis causa).
FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain
both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made her husband, Mr. Hodges, her only heir. She
likewise stated in the will that upon her husbands demise, the undisposed properties from her estate
would be given equally among her own brothers and sisters. Some fi ve years later, Mr. Hodges, also a
citizen of Texas, died. The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB, claims that the designation
of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges was an attempted substitution, but cannot be given effect
because it is not a simple nor a vulgar nor a fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law,
the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total conjugal estate.
Is the designation of Mrs. Hodges brothers andsisters valid?
If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her
The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple
or vulgar substitution because the will does not say that said relatives would inherit if Mr. Hodges
would predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary
substitution for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to preserve and transmit said properties to the relatives
of Mrs. Hodges). But this does not mean that no effect should be given to their designation, for the
truth is that they were also instituted to said remaining properties.
The institution of Mr. Hodges partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a resolutory term,
because Mr. Hodges would surely die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the inherited properties
would end at his death (that is, while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the properties inter vivos,
he was not free to do so mortis causa). The institution of Mrs. Hodges brothers and sisters is on the
other hand an institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is really a suspensive term), their
inheritance having become vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges death, but only operative upon the
death of Mr. Hodges. With respect to the second issue, the allegation of the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges
estate is 1/4 of the total mass is a judicial admission of a fact (the existence of the foreign law being
a fact), and by the principle of estoppel, would prevent the PCIB from alleging that Mrs. Hodges
estate is less than 1/4.

G. de Perez v. Garchitorena (fideicommissary)

54 Phil. 431

Doctrine: Provision in the will that the whole estate shasll pass unimpaired to the children of heiress in
the event heiress should die after the testatrix, was held a fideicommissary substitution. It implied an
obligation to preserve and to transmit. Necessary consequence derived from the nature of fideicommissary
is that second heir does not inherit from fiduciary but from testator.
FACTS: Ana instituted Carmen as her heir with the following stipulations in her will:
(a) Should Carmen die, the whole estate should pass unimpaired to Carmens children.
(b) The estate should never pass out of the hands of Carmen and her children as long as this was
legally possible.
(c) Should Carmen die after Ana while Carmens children are still minors, the estate would be
administered by the executrix.
It should be noted that in the will, no express mention was made of a fideicommissary substitution. Neither
was there any statement as to whether Carmen was to die before or after Ana. It was thus alleged that
no fideicommissary substitution was made, and so, after Carmens death, the property

belonged to her estate and not to the children as substitutes, and therefore, creditors could
attach the same.
HELD: The properties belonged to the children, and not to Carmens estate. This is because all the
requirements of a fideicommissary substitution are present here, and consequently, the creditors cannot
go against the property. The requisites for a fideicommissary substitution are present because the
first and second heirs exist, in the proper relationship, and were both alive at the testatrixs
death. The phrase shall pass unimpaired and the phrase should never pass out of the
hands, show an obligation to preserve and transmit. Finally, the phrase should Carmen die
after Ana anticipates a situation where a first heir, Carmen, will later die after having enjoyed
the inheritance.

Administratrix, petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA.DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,

oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors-appellants.
Ramirez vs Ramirez (no fideicommissary)
Doctrine: No fideicommissary because two persons not related to the original heir is instituted.
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow
as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nudapropriedad.
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining
two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants
violates testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda

a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose no
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]
-the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the
free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testators express will.
The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate enpleno dominio as her legitime and which
is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To
give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his
disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept
inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not
related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that
such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is
no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee
agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits
the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land
of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation
of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to
the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace

4.Crisologo vs Singson
Doctrine: Only Simple substitution because it merely provides that upon the granddaughters death,
whether it happens before or after that of testator, her property shall belong to the brothers of the testator.
Substitution becomes effective only upon such death.
Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death deathwhether this happens
before or after that of Donya Leona's deathConsolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya
Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.
No, it is not fideicommissary substitution, only a Simple Substition.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs
provided for therein is not expressly made of the o fideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear
statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the
property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's deathwhether this happens before or after that of
the testatrixher share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.
Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.It is of the essence of a fideicommissary
substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another

the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular
The last will of the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitution vulgar, the substitution
Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of
the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

5. Morente v. De la Santa
9 Phil. 387
FACTS: In her will, a wife provided as follows:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la
2. That my said husband shall not leave my sisters after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone;
should my husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me,
except the one-third part thereof and the two-thirds remaining shall be and remain for my brother Vicente
or his children should he have any;
3. After my death, I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one
of the properties belonging to me.
(a) If the husband marries again, will he forfeit the devise?
(b) If the husband leaves the sisters of the wife, will he forfeit the devise?
(c) If the husband does not live in the camarin, will he forfeit the devise?
(d) if the husband has children by anyone, will he forfeit a part of the devise?
(a), (b), and (c) No. Reason: The happening of these events should not be considered as the
fulfillment of conditions which would annul or revoke the devise. They were mere orders and there
was no condition or statement that if he should not comply with the wishes of the testatrix he would
lose the devise given him. The condition should have been expressly provided. It was not.
In this case, he would lose two-thirds of the devise. Reason: There was a statement that should he
have children by anyone, the forfeiture would take place. Here the condition was expressly
6. Broce vs Marcellana
CA L-10896-R, June 21, 1954
(Remember that it only applies to the free portion of the estate of wife not to the legitime)
Doctrine: The condition is for the surviving spouse, should he remarry, to choose a relative of the
deceased spouse within the 6th degree.
FACTS: Wife provided in her last will and testament: I want and I direct my husband that I am dead, and
he should want to remarry, he should choose a relative of mine within the 6 th degree, and if he disregard
this wish of mine, my brothers and sisters will have the right to claim or recover my properties as if they
were only the heirs.
Husband however, one month prior to his death, married another woman who was not within the 6 th
degree of the deceased spouse, notwithstanding the fact that there were 3 of them available.
ISSUE: Is the condition imposed in the will for the husband to marry one of the relatives of his late wife
within the 6th degree against good morals?
HELD: Article 793 (now Article 874) of the old Civil Code which was in force that time provides: An
absolute conidition of not contracting a first or subsequent marriage shall be disregarded unless such
condition has been imposed on the widower or widow by the deceased spouse, or by the ascendants or
descendants of the latter.
Thus, the condition is valid. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the lawmakers was to preserve the property of
the testator in favor of her nearest of kin in case of non compliance with the condition. In the instant case,
the heirs of the husband are not entitled to any of the properties which he inherited from his late wife
because her heirs are entitled to recover all the properties which the husband received because of his
failure to marry any of her relatives within the 6th degree.

7. Miciano v. Brimo
50 Phil. 867

FACTS: Joseph G. Brimos will provided that even if he was a Turk, still he wanted his estate disposed of in
accordance with Philippine laws; and that should any of his legatees oppose this intention of his, his or her
legacy would be cancelled. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, did not want this disposition
in accordance with Philippine laws, and so he opposed practically every move that would divide the estate
in accordance with Philippine laws.
ISSUE: Does Andre Brimo lose his legacy?
HELD: No, Andre Brimo does not lose his legacy, because the condition, namely, the disposal of the
testators estate in accordance
with Philippine law, is against our laws which provide that intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law (Turkish law) of the person whose
succession is under consideration whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (2nd paragraph, Art. 16). The condition being disregarded,
the legacy becomes unconditional, and therefore Andre Brimo is entitled to his legacy.
8. Leonor Villafl or Vda. de Villanueva v. Delfi n N. Juico, etc.
L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962
FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor gave, among other things, a legacy to his wife by virtue of which she was
given the use and possession of a certain piece of property on condition that she would never remarry,
OTHERWISE, the legacy would go to a grandniece. The widow NEVER remarried. Upon the widows death,
the grandniece claimed full ownership over the property, but it was contended by the heirs of the widow,
that they (the heirs) should own the property because the widow never remarried.
HELD: The grandniece gets the property, for although the widow never remarried, still she was never
given the full ownership of the property (she had been given merely its use and possession). If the testator
had intended otherwise, why did he have to specify use and possession.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO,
G.R. No. L-15737

February 28, 1962.

FACTS: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will
in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in[[-5 favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor. Clause 6th , contained the institution of heirs. The 12th clause of the will provided,
however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child
with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child
with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special
Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate
and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child
with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the
lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by
Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow
Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became
vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is
that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on
account of the fact that she never remarried.
ISSUE: How should the will of the Testator be interpreted.
RULING: The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed
law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it
clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered,
and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. In this case the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor
clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while

alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will,
the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if
the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they
had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de
VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the
will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this
decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
9. Santos vs. Buenaventura
18 SCRA 47
Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of no contest and forfeiture will
must not be penalized.
Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.
Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in
accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima was
secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.
After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but before the
latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is withdrawing her opposition to the
probate of the will.
The will provides a NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE clause.
Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?
No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith because
grounded on strong doubts appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee in the latters petition
for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Such act of
withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy probate of will.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22797
September 22, 1966
FACTS: On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos
Vda. de Blas. 1The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees or more
accurately, devisees mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to
the deceased. Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia opposed to the probate of said will on grounds
that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon
the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through
fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.The
will likewise contained a "no contest and forfeiture" clause .
(1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "nocontest and forfeiture" clause of the will; and
(2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid?
(1)NO. after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith because
grounded on strong doubts she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition
for the probate of the will. She must not be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the

testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short
period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected.
(2) Fourteenth.I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after each other, love and help one
another and accept with thanks what I have bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and cherish the same.
Any one of them who contests or opposes the probate of my will or the carrying out of its provisions shall
lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit under my will, and their inheritance or share shall
pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. This is the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will.
However due to the non-violation of this clause,th court did not bother to discuss the same.