[CA-G.R. CV No. 56601. October 23, 2000.

]
MAURICIO, NORMA, BONIFACIO, TERESITA all surnamed ALIPIO and the
HEIRS OF ROBERT ALIPIO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FERNANDO SELECCION,
defendant-appellant.
DECISION
SALAZAR-FERNANDO, J :
p

This is an appeal from the decision 1 dated December 4, 1996 of the

Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela in
Civil Case No. Br. 20 795, entitled "Mauricio Alipio, et al., Plaintiffs vs.
Fernando Seleccion, Defendant" for Recovery of Possession, Collection of
Rentals, Irrigation Fees and Damages, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and

against the defendant Fernando Seleccion ordering said defendant to vacate
the land in question and deliver the peaceful possession of the same to the
plaintiffs. No cost.
SO ORDERED."
The pertinent facts are:
Spouses Cornelio Alipio and Concepcion Mercado were the registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 198,576 square meters situated in San
Manuel, San Mateo, Isabela and covered by OCT No. I-3513 2. The said parcel of
land was acquired under the homestead provisions of the Public Land Law on
January 14, 1936.
On December 8, 1983 and September 10, 1986, Concepcion Mercado and
Cornelio Alipio died, respectively. They were survived by herein plaintiffsappellees, who were their children and forced heirs. 3
Thereafter, plaintiffs-appellees, intending to work and farm the parcel of land
themselves, demanded from defendant-appellant, who was then occupying a
portion of the land with an area of 18,554 square meters, to surrender said
portion, which the latter refused. 4 It appears that the latter succeeded the right of
his parents as tenant over the said portion of land.
Upon defendant-appellant's refusal to surrender the possession of the said
portion of land, plaintiffs-appellees availed of the intervention of the Barangay

Agrarian Reform Council and likewise, the Lupon Tagapamayapa, but to no avail.
5

Consequently, on December 7, 1994, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint 6

for "Recovery of Possession, Collection of Rentals, Irrigation Fees and
Damages" against defendant-appellant, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cauayan, Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 20-795.
On February 23, 1995, defendant-appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss,
alleging among others that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case
considering that it involves agrarian reform matters, which are beyond the trial
court's competence to resolve.
On February 27, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees, filed their Opposition 7 to the
defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs-appellees alleged that
homestead lands are not covered by P.D. 27 and R.A. 6657, citing the cases of
Simon vs. Eduarte, Vinsons-Magana vs. Estrella, and Alita vs. CA.
On March 3, 1995, the trial court, finding nothing to support defendant's
contention that the case is agrarian in nature, denied the Motion To Dismiss for
lack of merit. 8
Forthwith, defendant-appellant filed his Answer 9, formally denying the
material allegations in the complaint and alleging among others that the doctrine
laid down in Alita vs. CA did not cloth the homesteader with the authority to oust
the tenant from the subject land but instead merely prevented the tenant from
becoming an owner thereof.
After due proceeding, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellees, the dispositive portion of which has been earlier quoted.
Hence, this appeal.
Defendant-appellant ascribed to the trial court the following errors:

"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND THAT THE
INSTANT CASE IS ONE OF ACCION PUBLICIANA RATHER THAN ONE
THAT IS AGRARIAN IN NATURE AND IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTAPPELLANT VACATE AND DELIVER THE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING THE ALITA DOCTRINE IN THE
INSTANT CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT." 10

The primary issue here is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over
the instant case. The other matter becomes relevant only after the issue on
jurisdiction has been settled.
It is the contention of defendant-appellant that the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering
that the instant case involves agrarian matters. We find merit in this contention.
Apparently, at the tine of the filing of the instant case, there was an
agricultural tenancy relationship existing between the parties. This fact is very
clear from the complaint itself, where plaintiffs-appellees stated that defendantappellant was a lessee of a portion of the subject land and that they availed the
intervention of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council after defendant-appellant
refused to surrender his landholdings 11, which necessarily implies that
defendant-appellant was an agricultural lessee. For if really there was no
agricultural tenancy relationship, the plaintiffs-appellees would not have referred
the same to the said Council. Said fact is further corroborated by the decision 12
dated May 23, 1989 of the Department of Agrarian Reform in ADM. ORDER NO.
005-069-89 declaring that the subject land is exempt from R.A. 6657 and that the
leasehold system shall govern the relation of the vendees (herein plaintiffsappellees) and tenants, which includes the father of herein defendant-appellant.
The foregoing, including the fact that the subject land is a rice land 13 is a
sufficient basis to dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction.
In Quismundo vs. Court of Appeals 14, the Supreme Court, speaking through then
Justice Regalado, declared that:

"Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by
Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of
Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as
follows:
'SECTION 17.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA). . . .'
"The above quoted provision should be deemed to have repeated Section 12
(a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of
agrarian relations with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions

involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances

promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect
on August 29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the
Official Gazette, the regional trial courts were divested of their general
jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested
in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic Act No.
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15,
1988. The said law contains provisions which evince and support the intention
of the legislature to vest in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive
jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters.
"Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates Section 17 of Executive Order
No. 229 vesting in the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, to
wit:
'SECTION 50.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).'
xxx
xxx
xxx
"It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the
Department of Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of private
respondents since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being
the administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is
not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that
agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just,
expeditious and inexpensive action or proceedings."

Evidently, in the light of the foregoing discussion by the Supreme Court, the
trial court is bereft of jurisdiction over the instant case since the same involves an
agricultural tenancy, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.
Furthermore, the presence of the said facts evincing the existence of
agricultural tenancy relationship should have alerted the trial court that the case
should first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for certification
whether or not the same is a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge
or other officer of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. 316 15 and
Sec. 2 of P.D. 1038 16. Corollary, it was held in Valat vs. Judge Ramos, AM MTJ
91-57, December 6, 1996, that:

"In civil action for illegal detainer with damages pending before [the court],
where the complaint contained an allegation of landlord-tenant relationship,
this information could have cautioned the judge from taking cognizance of the
case at once. Prudence dictates that the proper thing to do under the
circumstances is to refer first the case to the DAR for certification to determine
the existence of the agricultural tenancy relationship in accordance with
existing agrarian laws. . . ."
In either way, the trial court clearly cannot immediately act on the instant
case, as the same must first be brought to the DAR.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no other recourse but to set aside
the decision of the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated December 4, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela in
Civil Case No. Br. 20 795 is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant case
DISMISSED, without prejudice, however, to the re-filing of the same with the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Jr. and Valdez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.

Penned by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte; Original Record, pp. 65-66.

2.

Annex "A": Original Record, p. 5.

3.

Complaint, p. 1; Original Record, p. 1.

4.

Complaint, p. 2; Original Record, p. 2.

5.

Complaint, p. 2, Original Record, p. 2.

6.

Original record. pp. 1-3.

7.

Original Record, pp. 20-21.

8.

Resolution dated March 3, 1995; Original Record, p. 22.

9.

original Record, pp. 26-27.

10.

Appellant's Brief, p. 2; Rollo, p 14.

11.

Complaint, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp, 1-2.

12.
Penned by Asst. Regional Director Pedro L. Ceso III and affirmed by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform; Original Record, pp. 45-49.
13.

Declaration of Real Property, Exhibit "B"; Original Record, p. 6.

14.

201 SCRA 609.

15.
SECTION 2.
Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a
proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent
jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First Instance,
municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any
ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn, and if any such cases are filed,
these cases shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized
representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between
the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds that the case is a
proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer to hear, he shall so certify and
such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or
controversy. (P.D. 316, October 22, 1973).
16.
SECTION 2.
No judge of the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first
instance, city or municipal courts or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of
any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn, unless certified by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court of judge or other
officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any such case is filed, the case shall first be
referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the
locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending
parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in the
locality finds that the case is a proper case for the court or judge or other hearing officer
to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.
The preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding
upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified as a proper case

for trial. Said court judge or hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm, reverse or
modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial merits of the
case may warrant. (P.D. 1038, October 21, 1976).