AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, vs.

Spouses
HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON

December 6, 1975 was thus binding upon the

parties thereto.

Facts:

A contract of sale is consensual. It is

perfected by mere consent,[10] upon a meeting
of the minds[11] on the offer and the acceptance
thereof based on subject matter, price and
terms of payment.[12] At this stage, the sellers
ownership of the thing sold is not an element in
the perfection of the contract of sale.

Respondents alleged that they are the owners

of a parcel of land described as: No. 4786 of
the Cadastral Survey of San Manuel situated in
the Municipality of San Manuel, Bounded on the
NW., by Lot No. 4785; and on the SE., by Lot
Nos. 11094 & 11096; containing an area of Four
Thousand Two Hundred Twelve (4,212) sq. m.,
more or less. Covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 22134 of the Land Records of
Pangasinan.
which Hermoso de Leon inherited from his
father Marcelino de Leon by virtue of a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition. Sometime in the early
1960s, respondents engaged the services of
the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the
documents of the properties of his
parents. Atty. Juan let them sign voluminous
documents. After the death of Atty. Juan, some
documents surfaced and most revealed that
their properties had been conveyed by sale or
quitclaim to Hermosos brothers and sisters, to
Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in
fact, no such conveyances were ever intended
by them. His signature in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of
Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered
that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de
Leon to Aurora Alcantara. They demanded
annulment of the document and reconveyance
but defendants refused
Aurora Alcantara-Daus that she bought the land
in question in good faith and for value. [She]
has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open
possession over the same and has been
appropriating the produce thereof without
objection from anyone.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale \
executed by Rodolfo de Leon over the land in
question in favor of petitioner was perfected
and binding upon the parties therein?
Ruling:
Petition has no merit.
Petitioner argues that, having been
perfected, the Contract of Sale executed on

The contract, however, creates an

obligation on the part of the seller to transfer
ownership and to deliver the subject matter of
the contract.[13] It is during the delivery that the
law requires the seller to have the right to
transfer ownership of the thing sold.[14] In
general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be
challenged on the ground of the sellers nonownership of the thing sold at the time of the
perfection of the contract.[15]
Further, even after the contract of sale has
been perfected between the parties, its
consummation by delivery is yet another
matter. It is through tradition or delivery that the
buyer acquires the real right of ownership over
the thing sold.[16]
Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the
sale, Rodolfo de Leon was not the owner of the
land he delivered to petitioner. Thus, the
consummation of the contract and the
consequent transfer of ownership would
depend on whether he subsequently acquired
ownership of the land in accordance with Article
1434 of the Civil Code.[17] Therefore, we need to
resolve the issue of the authenticity and the due
execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and
Quitclaim in his favor.

2. Sampaguita Pictures vs Jalwindor

Manufacturers
Facts:
Sampaguita is the owner of Sampaguita
Pictures Building. The roof deck and all existing
improvements were leased to Capitol 300. It
was agreed that:

Said premises shal be used by

said club for social purposes.

All imoprovements made by

lessee shall belong to lessor
without any reimbursement
Improvements shall be
considered part of the monthly
rental fee

Capitol purchased on credit from

Jalwindor glass and wooden jalousies.
The parties submitted to the trial court a
Compromise Agreement wherein Capitol
acknowledged its indebtedness to Jalwindor in
the amount of P9,531.09, payable in monthly
installments of at least P300.00 a month.

Capitol was not able to pay rentals to

Sampaguita. Capitol was ejected from the
building. Capitol failed to comply with the terms
of the compromise agreement. Sheriff made
levy on the glass and wooden jalousies.
Sampaguita filed a third party claim alleging
that its the owner of said materials and not
capitol.

On the other hand, Capitol likewise failed to

comply with the terms of the Compromise
Agreement, and on July 31, 1965, the Sheriff of
Quezon City made levy on the glass and
wooden jalousies in question. Sampaguita filed
a third party claim alleging that it is the owner of
said materials and not Capitol, Jalwindor
however, filed an indemnity bond in favor of the
Sheriff and the items were sold public auction
on August 30, 1965 with Jalwindor as the
highest bidder for P6,000.00.

Issue: Who owns the glass and wooden

jalousie windows?
Samapaguita.
When the glass and wooden jalousies in
question were delivered and installed in the
leased premises, Capitol became the owner
thereof. Ownership is not transferred by
perfection of the contract but by delivery, either
actual or constructive. This is true even if the
purchase has been made on credit, as in the
case at bar. Payment of the purchase price is
not essential to the transfer of ownership as
long as the property sold has been delivered.

Ownership is acquired from the moment the

thing sold was delivered to vendee, as when it
is placed in his control and possession. (Arts.
1477, 1496 and 1497, Civil Code of the Phil.)
Capitol entered into a lease Contract with
Sampaguita in 1964, and the latter became the
owner of the items in question by virtue of the
agreement in said contract "that all permanent
improvements made by lessee shall belong to
the lessor and that said improvements have
been considered as part of the monthly rentals."
When levy or said items was made on July 31,
1965, Capitol, the judgment debtor, was no
longer the owner thereof.
The action taken by Sampaguita to protect its
interest is sanctioned by Section 17, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 17, Proceedings where
property claimed by third person.
... The officer is not liable for
damages for the taking or
keeping of the property to any
third-party claimant unless a
claim is made by the latter and
unless an action for damages is
brought by him against the
officer within one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of the
filing of the bond. But nothing
herein contained shall prevent
claimant from vindicating his
claim to the property by any
action.
It is, likewise, recignized in the case of Bayer
Phil., Inc. vs. Agana, et al., 63 SCRA 358,
wherein the Court declared, "that the rights of
third party claimants over certain properties
levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the
judgment, may not be taken up in the case
where such claims are presented but in a
separate and independent action instituted by
claimants. ... and should a third-party appear to
claim is denied, the remedy contemplated by
the rules in the filing by said party of a
reinvicatiry action against the execution creditor
or the purchaser of the property after the sale is
completed or that a complaint for damages to
be charged against the bond filed by the
creditor in favor of the sheriff. ... Thus, when a
property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to a
writ of execution is claimed by a third person in

a sworn statement of ownership thereof, as

prescribed by the rules, an entirely different
matter calling for a new adjudication arises."
The items in question were illegally levied upon
since they do not belong to the judgemnt
debtor. The power of the Court in execution of
judgment extends only to properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment
debtor. The fact that Capitol failed to pay
Jalwindor the purchase price of the items levied
upon did not prevent the transfer of ownership
to Capitol. The complaint of Sampaguita to
nullify the Sheriff's sale well-founded, and
should prosper. Execution sales affect the rights
of judgment debtor only, and the purchaser in
the auction sale acquires only the right as the
debtor has at the time of sale. Since the items
already belong to Sampaguita and not to
Capitol, the judgment debtor, the levy and
auction sale are, accordingly, null and void. It is
well-settled in this jurisdiction that the sheriff is
not authorized to attach property not belonging
to the judgment debtor. (Arabay, Inc. vs.
Salvador, et al., 3 PHILAJUR, 413 [1978],
Herald Publishing vs. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94, 100).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is

hereby reversed, and plaintiff-appellant
Sampaguita is declared the lawful owner of the
disputed glass and wooden jalousies.
Defendant-appellee Jalwindor is permanently
enjoined from detaching said items from the
roofdeck of the Sampaguita Pictures Building,
and is also ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the
sum of P1,000.00 for and as attorney's fees,
and costs.

PNB v. Lo
Villamor, J.
Parties:
Philippine National Bank, plaintiff-appellee,
Severo Eugenio Lo, et al. defendants
Severio Eugenio Lo, Ng Khey Ling and Yep
Seng, appellants
Facts:
1916 Severo Eugenio Lo and Ng Khey
Ling together with J.A. Say Lian Ping,
Ko Tiao Hun, On Yem Ke Lam and Co
Sieng Peng formed a commercial
partnership under the name of Tai Sing
Co., with a capital of P40,000
contributed by said partners.
Articles of Copartnership states that:

Partnership was to last for 5

years from after the date of its
organization
o Purpose: to do business in the
City of Iloilo or in any other part
of the Philippines the partners
might desire; purchase and sale
of merchandise, goods, and
native, as well as Chinese and
Japanese products
o J.A. Say Lian Ping was
appointed general manager
A. Say Lian Ping executed a power of
attorney in favor of A. Y. Kelam,
authorizing him to act in his stead as
manager and administrator of Tai Sing
& Co. and to obtain a loan of P8,000 in
current account from PNB.
Kelam mortgaged certain personal
property of the partnership.
The credit was renewed several times
and Kelam, as attorney-in-fact of Tai
Sing & Co., executed a chattel mortgage
in favor of PNB as security as security
for a loan P20,000.
This mortgage was again renewed and
Kelam as attorney-in-fact of Tai Sing &
Co. executed another chattel mortgage
for the said sum of P20,000.
1920 Yap Seng, Severo Lo, Kelam
and Ng Khey Ling, the latter
represented by M. Pineda Tayenko,
executed a power of attorney in favor of
Sy Tit.
By virtue of the power of attorney, Sy Tit
representing Tai Sing & Co. obtained a
credit of P20,000 from PNB in 1921 and
executed a chattel mortgage on certain
personal property belonging to the
partnership.
Defendants had been using this
commercial credit in a current account
with the plaintiff bank from 1918 1922
and as of December 31, 1924 the debit
balance of this account P 20, 239.
PNB claims in the complaint this amount
and an interest of P16, 518.74.
Eugenio Los defense:
o Tai Sing & Co. was not a
general partnership.
o Commercial credit in current
account which Tai Sing & Co.
obtained from PNB had not been
authorized by the board nor was
the person who subscribed said
contract authorized under the
articles of copartnership
Trial Court: in favor of PNB
o

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tai Sing & Co. is a general

partnership in that the appellants can be
held liable to pay PNB
HELD: Yes. Tai Sing & Co. is a general
partnership
RATIO:
Appellants admit and it appears from the
articles of copartnership that Tai Sing &
Co. is a general partnership and it was
registered in the mercantile register of
Iloilo.
The fact that the partners opt to use Tai
Sing & Co. as the firm name does not
affect the liability of the general partners
to third parties under Article127 of the
Code of Commerce. Jurisprudence
states that:
o

o
o

The object of article 126 of the

Code of Commerce in requiring
a general partnership to transact
business under the name of all
its members, of several of them,
or of one only, is to protect the
public from imposition and fraud
It is for the protection of the
creditors rather than of the
partners themselves.
The law must be unlawful and
unenforceable only as between
the partners and at the instance
of the violating party, but not in
the sense of depriving innocent
parties of their rights who may
have dealt with the offenders in
ignorance of the latter having
violated the law.
Contracts entered into by
commercial
associations
defectively organized are valid
when voluntarily executed by the
parties, and the only question is
whether or not they complied
with the agreement. Therefore,
the defendants cannot invoke in
their defense the anomaly in the
firm
name
which
they
themselves adopted.

As to the alleged death of the manager,

Say Lian Ping before Kelam executed
the contracts of mortgage with PNB, this
would not affect the liability of the
partnership
o Kelam was a partner who
contracted in the name of the
partnership and the other
partners did not object
o Lo, Khey Ling, and Yap Seng
appointed Sy Tit as manager,
and he obtained from PNB the
credit in current account

Trial Court correctly held defendants to

be jointly and severally liable to PNB

This is in accordance with Article 127 of

the Code of Commerce all the
members of a general partnership, be
they managing partners thereof or not,
shall be personally and solidarily liable
with all their property, for the results of
the transactions made in the name and
for the account of the partnership, under
the signature of the latter, and by a
person authorized to use it.

Norkis Distributor vs. CA

G.R. No. 91029, February 7,1991; 193
SCRA 694
FACTS:
Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the
distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in
Negros Occidental. On September 20,
1979, private respondent Alberto
Nepales bought from the Norkis Bacolod
branch
a
brand
new
Yamaha
Wonderbike motorcycle Model YL2DX.
The price of P7,500.00 was payable by
means of a Letter of Guaranty from the
DBP, which Norkis agreed to accept.
Credit was extended to Nepales for the
price of the motorcycle payable by DBP
upon release of his motorcycle loan. As
security for the loan, Nepales would
execute a chattel mortgage on the
motorcycle in favor of DBP. Petitioner
issued a sales invoice which Nepales
signed in conformity with the terms of
the sale. In the meantime, however, the
motorcycle
remained
in
Norkis
possession. On January 22, 1980, the
motorcycle was delivered to a certain
Julian Nepales, allegedly the agent of
Alberto Nepales. The motorcycle met an
accident on February 3, 1980 at
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. An
investigation conducted by the DBP
revealed that the unit was being driven
by a certain Zacarias Payba at the time
of the accident. The unit was a total
wreck was returned.

On March 20, 1980, DBP released the

proceeds of private respondents
motorcycle loan to Norkis in the total
sum of P7,500. As the price of the
motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in
March, 1980, Nepales paid the
difference of P328 and demanded the

delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis

could not deliver, he filed an action for
specific performance with damages
against Norkis in the RTC of Negros
Occidental. He alleged that Norkis failed
to deliver the motorcycle which he
purchased,
thereby
causing
him
damages. Norkis answered that the
motorcycle had already been delivered
to private respondent before the
accident, hence, the risk of loss or
damage had to be borne by him as
owner of the unit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a
transfer of ownership of the motorcycle
to Alberto Nepales.

HELD:
No.The issuance of a sales invoice does
not prove transfer of ownership of the
thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is
nothing more than a detailed statement
of the nature, quantity and cost of the
thing sold and has been considered not
a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is
necessary that the act of delivery
whether constructive or actual, be
coupled with the intention of delivering
the thing. The act, without the intention,
is insufficient. When the motorcycle was
registered by Norkis in the name of
private respondent, Norkis did not intend
yet to transfer the title or ownership to
Nepales, but only to facilitate the
execution of a chattel mortgage in favor
of the DBP for the release of the buyers
motorcycle loan.

Article 1496 of the Civil Code which

provides that in the absence of an
express assumption of risk by the buyer,
the things sold remain at sellers risk
until the ownership thereof is transferred
to the buyer, is applicable to this case,
for there was neither an actual nor
constructive delivery of the thing sold,
hence, the risk of loss should be borne
by the seller, Norkis, which was still the
owner and possessor of the motorcycle
when it was wrecked. This is in
accordance with the well known
doctrine of res perit domino.

Philippine Suburban Dev. Corp. vs The

Auditor General
Facts

The President of the Philippines and the

Cabinet had a meeting about the relocation
of the squatters of Manila and suburbs.
o They then eventually approved in
principle the acquisition by the Peoples
Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) of the unoaccupied portion of
the Sapang Palay Estate in Sta. Maria
Bulacan for relocating the squatters
who desire to settle north of Manila,
and of another area either in Las Pinas
or Paranaque, Rizal, or Bacoor for
those who desire to settle south of
Manila
o The project was to be financed through
the flotation of bonds under the charter
of the PHHC in the amount of Php 4.5
million, the same to be absorbed by the
GSIS
o PHHC was informed abut this approval
o PHHC Board of Directors then passed
a Resolution authorizing the purchase
of the unoccupied portion of the
Sapang Palay Estate at Php 0.45 per
square meter subject to the following
conditions precedent:
President
shall
confirm
the
purchase price
Portion of the estate to be
acquired shall first be defined
The President shall first provide
the PHHC with the necessary
funds to effect the purchase and
development of this property
That the contract of sale shall first
be approved by the Auditor
General
That the vendor shall agree to the
dismissal with prejudice of a
pending Civil Case
o The President subsequently authorized
the floating of bonds to be absorbed by
the GSIS, in order to finance the
acquisition by the PHHC of the entire
Sapang Palay Estate at a price not to
exceed Php 0.45 per square meter.
o PHHC then acquired possession of the
property, with the consent of Phil.
Suburban, to enable PHHC to proceed
immediately with the construction of
roads in the new settlement and to
resettle the squatters and flood victims
in Manila who were rendered homeless
by the floods or ejected from the lots
which they were occupying.
o Philippine
Suburban
Development
Corporation (owner of the unoccupied
portion of Sapang Palay) and PHHC

entered into a contract embodied in a

public instrument entitled Deed of
Absolute Sale whereby the former
conveyed unto the latter the two
parcels of land.
The document was not registered
in the Office of the Register of
Deeds until March 14, 1961, due
to the fact, as petitioner claims,
that the PHHC could not at once
advance the money needed for
registration expenses.
o On the other hand, the Auditor General
expressed objections and requested a
reexamination of the contract in view of
the fact that the value of the hacienda
greatly increased. This objection was
communicated to the President.
o The President, however, still approved
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan requested
PHHC to withhold a specific amount from
the purchase price to be paid by it to the
Philippine
Suburban.
Said
amount
represented the realty tax due on the
property involved.
o PHHC paid under protest. It then
requested the Secretary of Finance to
order a refund of the amount on the
argument that it ceased to be the
owner of the land in question upon the
execution of the Deed of Aboslute Sale
and that the possession of the property
was actually delivered to the vendee
prior to the sale. Secretary of Finance
denied the request.
Respondent argues, on the other hand, that:
o Art. 1498 does not apply because of
the requirement in the contrct that the
sale shall first be approved by the
Auditor General
o that the petitioner should register the
deed and secure a new title in the
name of the vendee before the
government can be compelled to pay
the balance of the purchase price
o that according to the Land Registration
Act, until the deed of sale has been
actually registered, the vendor remains
as the owner of the said property, and
therefore, liable for the payment of real
property tax
Issues:
1. WON the approval of the Auditor General is
still needed No
2. WON there was delivery of the property to
the vendee Yes
3. WON the payment of the real estate tax shall
be paid by the purchaser - Yes

Ratio
1. The approval of the sale by the Auditor
General is no longer needed in the case at bar
since the contract has been entered into for a
special purpose and that it was entered into to
implement the Presidential directive.

The approval required by Administrative

Order 290 only refers to contracts in
general,
ordinarily
etered
into
by
government offices and GOCCs
2. There is delivery of the property

General rule: there is symbolic delivery of

the property subject of the sale by the
execution of the public instrument, unless
from the express terms of the instrument, or
by clear inference therefrom, this was not
the intention of the parties
o Exmples when symbolic delivery is not
intended
When a certain date is fixed for the
purchaser to take possession of
the property subject of the
conveyance
In case of sale by installments, it is
stipulated that until the last
installment is made, it is stipulated
that until the last installment is
made, the title to the property
should remain with the vendor
When the vendor reserves the
right to use and enjoy the property
until the gathering of the pending
crops, or where the vendor has no
control over the thing sold at the
moment of the sale
In the case at bar, the vendor had actually
placed the vendee in possession and
control over the thing sold, even before the
date of the sale. The condition that
petitioner should first register the deed of
sale is not necessary for the validity of the
sale.
3. After delivery of possession, purchaser shall
be liale for the taxes

Since the delivery of possession, coupled

with the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale had consummated the sale and
transferred the title to the purchaser, the
payment of the real estate tax after such
transfer is the responsibility of the
purchaser.

However, in the case at bar, the purchaser

PHHC is a government entity not subject to real
property ta

Addison vs. Felix

Facts:
By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914,
Addison sold to Marciana Felix four parcels of
land. Felix paid, at the time of the execution of
the deed, P3,000 and bound herself to pay the
remainder in installments. In January 1915,
plaintiff filed a suit to compel the defendant to
make payment of the final installment. The
defendant contends that the plaintiff had
absolutely failed to deliver to the former the
lands that were the subject matter of the sale,

November 10, 1903, (Civ. Rep., vol. 96, p. 560)

that this article "merely declares that when the
sale is made through the means of a public
instrument, the execution of this latter is
equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold:
which does not and cannot mean that this
fictitious tradition necessarily implies the real
tradition of the thing sold, for it is
incontrovertible that, while its ownership still
pertains to the vendor (and with greater reason
if it does not), a third person may be in
possession of the same thing; wherefore,
though, as a general rule, he who purchases by
means of a public instrument should be
deemed . . . to be the possessor in fact, yet this
presumption gives way before proof to the
contrary."

notwithstanding the demands made upon him.

Also, the plaintiff was only able to designate
only 2 of the 4 parcels and more than 2/3 of
these two were found to be in possession of
one Juan Villafuerte. The trial court rendered
judgment holding the contract of sale to be
rescinded. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands were delivered.
Held:
No. The records show that the plaintiff did not
deliver the thing sold. It is true that the
execution of a public instrument is equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is
necessary that the vendor shall have had such
control over the thing sold, that at the moment
of the sale, its material delivery could have
been made. It is not enough to confer upon the
purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. The thing sold must be placed in
his control.
The supreme court of Spain, interpreting article
1462 of the Civil Code, held in its decision of

It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the

mere execution of the instrument was not a
fulfillment of the vendors' obligation to deliver
the thing sold, and that from such nonfulfillment arises the purchaser's right to
demand, as she has demanded, the rescission
of the sale and the return of the price. (Civ.
Code, arts. 1506 and 1124.)
Of course if the sale had been made under the
express agreement of imposing upon the
purchaser the obligation to take the necessary
steps to obtain the material possession of the
thing sold, and it were proven that she knew
that the thing was in the possession of a third
person claiming to have property rights therein,
such agreement would be perfectly valid. But
there is nothing in the instrument which would
indicate, even implicitly, that such was the
agreement. It is true, as the appellant argues,
that the obligation was incumbent upon the
defendant Marciana Felix to apply for and
obtain the registration of the land in the new
registry of property; but from this it cannot be
concluded that she had to await the final
decision of the Court of Land Registration, in
order to be able to enjoy the property sold. On
the contrary, it was expressly stipulated in the
contract that the purchaser should deliver to the
vendor one-fourth "of the products ... of the
aforesaid four parcels from the moment when
she takes possession of them until the Torrens
certificate of title be issued in her favor." This
obviously shows that it was not forseen that the
purchaser might be deprived of her possession
during the course of the registration
proceedings, but that the transaction rested on
the assumption that she was to have, during

said period, the material possession and

enjoyment of the four parcels of land.
Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue of
the provisions of law and not by contractual
agreement, it is not the conventional but the
legal interest that is demandable.
It is therefore held that the contract of purchase
and sale entered into by and between the
plaintiff and the defendant on June 11, 1914, is
rescinded, and the plaintiff is ordered to make
restitution of the sum of P3,000 received by him
on account of the price of the sale, together
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per
annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint until payment, with the costs of both
instances against the appellant. So ordered.

TEN FORTY REALTY V. CRUZ|

PanganibanG.R. No. 151212 | September
10, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an ejectment complaint against
Marina Cruz(respondent) before the MTC.
Petitioner alleges that the land indispute was
purchased from Barbara Galino on December
1996, andthat said land was again sold to
respondent on April 1998;
On the other hand, respondent answer with
counterclaim that never was there an occasion
when petitioner occupied a portion of the
premises. In addition, respondent alleges that
said land was a public land (respondent filed a
miscellaneous sales application with the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office) and the action for ejectment
cannot succeed where it appears that
respondent had been in possession of the
property prior to the petitioner;
On October 2000, MTC ordered respondent to
vacate the land and surrender to petitioner
possession thereof. On appeal, the RTC
reversed the decision. CA sustained the trial
courts decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner should be declared
the rightful owner of the property.
HELD:

No. Respondent is the true owner of the land.1)

The action filed by the petitioner, which was an
action for unlawful detainer, is improper. As
the bare allegation of petitioners tolerance of
respondents occupation of the premises has
not been proven, the possession should be
deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the
CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case
should have been for forcible entry. However,
the action had already prescribed because the
complaint was filed on May 12, 1999 a month
after the last day forfiling;2) The subject
property had not been delivered to petitioner;
hence, it did not acquire possession either
materially or symbolically. As between the two
buyers, therefore, respondent was first in actual
possession of the property.
As regards the question of whether there was
good faith in the second buyer. Petitioner has
not proven that respondent was aware that her
mode of acquiring the property was defective at
the time she acquired it from Galino. At the
time, the property which was public land
had not been registered in the name of Galino;
thus, respondent relied on the tax declarations
thereon. As shown, the formers name
appeared on the tax declarations for the
property until its sale to the latter in 1998.
Galino was in fact occupying the realty when
respondent took over possession. Thus, there
was no circumstance that could have placed
the latter upon inquiry or required her to further
investigate petitioners right of ownership.
DOCTRINE/S:
Execution of Deed of Sale; Not sufficient as
delivery. Ownership is transferred not by
contract but by tradition or delivery. Nowhere in
the Civil Code is it provided that the execution
of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption
of delivery of possession of a piece of real
estate. The execution of a public instrument
gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when
the delivery is not effected, because of a legal
impediment. Such constructive or symbolic
delivery, being merely presumptive, was
deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to
take actual possession of the land sold.
Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable
Public Land.
Private corporations are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain, as
provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the

Constitution. While corporations cannot acquire

land of the public domain, they can however
acquire private land. However, petitioner has
not presented proof that, at the time it
purchased the property from Galino, the
property had ceased to be of the public domain
and was already private land. The established
rule is that alienable and disposable land of the
public domain held and occupied by a
possessor personally or through
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously,

and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure

converted to private property by the mere lapse
of time.
RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.