Author: Samantha Tan

Piansay v David (1964)

Petition: Appeal from an order of CFI Manila
Petitioners: SALVADOR PIANSAY and CLAUDIA V. VDA. DE UY
KIM
Respondents: CONRADO S. DAVID and MARCOS MANGUBAT
Ponencia: Concepcion
DOCTRINE: Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a
chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said
contract, the same cannot and doesnt bind third persons who
arent parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies.
FACTS:
1. Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at
12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda. de Uy Kim. For this loan,
David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at
1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila.
2. The mortgaged house was sold at public auction and was sold
to Uy Kim in the said foreclosure proceedings. Uy Kim then
sold the said house to Marcos Mangubat.
3. Mangubat filed a complaint (Civil Case #29078) against David
in the CFI Manila, for the collection of the loan of P2,000 and
the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed by Uy
Kim in favor of Salvador Piansay. (Note: It seems Uy Kim sold
the mortgaged house to two people, Mangubat and Piansay)
a. Decision was rendered ordering David to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P2,000 and dismissing the
complaint to annul the sale, declaring the Piansay as
rightful owner of the house.
b. CA reversed this decision saying David is the rightful
owner of the house.
4. Thus petitioners instituted another civil case (Civil Case
#47664) against David and Mangubat in CFI Manila wherein
they claim Piansay is the lawful owner of the house.
ISSUE:

1. WoN the chattel mortgage and the sale between Uy Kim and
Piansay were valid.
PROVISIONS: Art 416 of the Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:
1. No.
Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel
mortgage constituted in her favor, because it was in reality a
mere contract of an unsecured loan.
o Even if the chattel mortgage was registered, since
what was conveyed was in the nature of real property,
the registration of the document in the registry of
chattels is merely a futile act and produces no effect.
She could not, in the same token, have sold it validly to
Salvador Piansay.
Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel
mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said
contract, the same cannot and doesnt bind third persons who
arent parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies.
o As a consequence, the sale of the house in question
in the proceedings for the sale of the house in the
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said
chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as
Mangubat is concerned and didnt confer upon Kim
as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to
said house.
DISPOSITION: Appealed cases are affirmed with costs against
petitioners.

Author: Danielle Marie C. Tan

SIBAL V VALDEZ (1927)

Petitioner:Leon Sibal
Respondent:Emiliano J. Valdez, Et. Al.
Ponencia: Johnson, J.
DOCTRINE:
A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no
sense forms part of the immovable.
Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other
words, the phrase personal property should be understood to
include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in
the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual
cultivation, no part of the realty
FACTS:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff
of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff
and his tenants on seven parcels of land.
Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the
latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he
may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest
corresponding thereto.
However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar
cane to the plaintiff.
Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal
property hence not subject to redemption.
ISSUES:
WoN the sugar cane is to be considered as Personal Property

RULING + RATIO:
Yes, Sugar cane in the case at bar is to be considered as personal
property. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of
the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him,
whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment
creditors.
Ungathered products have the nature of personal property. In other
words, the phrase personal property should be understood to
include ungathered products. Crops, whether growing or standing in
the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual
cultivation, no part of the realty
Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the
Tribunal Supremo de Espana as that growing crops may be
considered as personal property
Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as
"ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code,
which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants, and ungathered
products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part
of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in
recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa,
which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be
considered as personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol.
97, Civil Jurisprudence of Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities,
pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred
as personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of
ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was
entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year
because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to
the lessee. And further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as
amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits
and products existing thereon, unless the contract expressly provides
otherwise
Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal
property
Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing

Author: Danielle Marie C. Tan

crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All
personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the
provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof
shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If
growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement
stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for
and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508
were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal
property.
Personal property includes ungathered products; Paragraph 2,
Article 334 of the Civil Code modified by Act 190 and 1508
Paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by
section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense
that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil
Code have the nature of personal property; or that in the sense that,
for the purposes of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of
the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of
personal property. In other words, the phrase "personal property"
should be understood to include "ungathered products." In the case at
bar, the sugar cane in question was personal property and was not
subject to redemption.
DISPOSITION:
Judgement appealed is MODIFIED. The plaintiff and his sureties
Cenon de la Cruz, Juan Sangalang and Marcos Sibal are hereby
ordered to pay to the defendant jointly and severally the sum of
P8,900.80, instead of P9,439.08 allowed by the lower court.

Author: Arcellana

Rubiso and Gelito v Rivera

Petition: appeal by bill of exceptions
Plaintiffs and appellees: Fausto Rubiso and Bonifacio Gelito
Defendant and Appellant: Florentino Rivera
Ponencia: Torres, J

DOCTRINE:
The requisite of registration in the registry of the purchase of a vessel
is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser's rights are
maintained against a claim by third persons.

FACTS:
1. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs were the owners of
a pilot boat Valentina stranded in Tingloy in Bauan, Batangas and
Rivera took charge of the boat, claiming to be the owner, and plaintiffs
thus unable to derive profit from it.
2. The boat is owned by "Gelito and Co" with co-partners Gelito for 2/3
share and Sy Qui for 1/3 share. Afterwards Gelito sold his share to Sy
Qui.
3. Sy Qui then sold the boat to Rivera for 2500 pesos on Jan 4, 1915
and had it registered in the Bureau of Customs on March 17,
1915.
4. Then to enforce a payment of a certain sum of money, the boat was
bought by Rubiso in a public auction on January 23, 1915 and had it
registered in the Collector of Customs on January 27, 1915.
5. The complaint asks the defendant for indemnification and the
delivery of the boat.
ISSUE:
1. WoN Rubiso has a better right to the boat Valentina.
PROVISIONS:
Article 573 of the Code of Commerce: Merchant vessels constitute
property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the
means recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel must
appear in a written instrument, which shall not produce any effect
with respect to third persons if not inscribed in the registry of
vessels.

RULING + RATIO:
1. YES.
Even though Rivera was the first one who bought the boat,
it was Rubiso who registered the vessel first in the office of
the Collector of Customs. Rivera only registered the vessel
on March 17, 1915 while Rubiso had it registered on
January 27, 1915 in the same month of the purchase.
With respect to the rights of the two purchasers, whichever
of them who registered the vessel first is the one entitled
by the protection of the law, which considers him the
absolute owner of the boat and free from encumbrances
and claims.
Rivera is now considered a third person who was directly
affected by the registration. Ships and vessels, whether
moved by steam or sail, partake the nature of real property
on account of their value in the world of commerce.

DISPOSITION: Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Author: Carlo Africa

Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jarque
Petition: Appeal from judgement
Petitioner: Philippine Refining Co.
Respondent: Francisco Jarque
Ponencia: Malcom, J.
Doctrine: Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law
(Code of Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are
personal property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. Failure to conform to the requirements of the said law makes the chattel
mortgage unenforceable against third persons.
FACTS:
1. Philippine Refining Co. and Franciso Jarque executed 3 mortgages
on the motor vessels named Pandan and Zaragoza. These were
recoreded as chattel mortgages but the first two mortgages did not
append an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage did but it was
not registered in the customs house within the 30 day period prior to
the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque on
May 17.
2. A fourth mortgage was executed between Jarque and Aboitiz on
Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry also
within the 30 day period before the commencement of insolvency
proceedings on May 12.
3. The insolvency proceedings began on June 2 where Jarque was
declared as an insolvent debtor which resulted in the execution of all
the properties for Jose Carominas.
4. The judge declined to order the foreclosue of the mortgages.
ISSUES:
W/N the vessels are personal property which makes them subject to the
chattel mortgage law
W/N the mortgages on the boats are valid and therefore can be foreclosed.

RULING + RATIO:
1) Yes they are personal property making them subject to the Chattel
Mortgage law.
Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law (Code of
Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are personal
property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
2) No, the mortgages on the boats are not valid as the lack
requirements provided by law and therefore they cannot be foreclosed.
The Chattel Mortgage law requires a sufficient chattel mortgage to include an
affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The
absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and
subsequent encumbrancers. Therefore this chattel mortgage in
unenforceable against third persons.

Author: Ramirez

US v Carlos (1911)
Petition: Appeal from a judgment of CFI
Petitioners: United States
Respondents: Ignacio Carlos
Ponencia: Per Curiam

DOCTRINE:
The true test of what may be stolen (or what can be considered a
personal property) is not whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but
whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner, may
appropriate the same.

FACTS:
1. Ignacio Carlos was accused of the crime of theft for stealing 2,273
kilowatts of electric current worth P 909.20, the property of Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company.
2. The court issued a warrant of arrest. He demurred and refused to
enter a plea. He claims that what he did does not constitute and
offense.
3. His counsel asserts that larceny applies only to corporeal property.
The subjects of larceny are tangibles, movables, chattels,
something that can be taken away, and some that had intrinsic
value. Electricity is said to be an unknown force.
4. He was guilty and was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months and 21
days presidio correccional. From this, Carlos appeals.
ISSUE:
1. WoN electrical energy may be stolen
PROVISIONS:
Art 416(3): Forces of nature which are brought under control by science.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES.
In US v Genato, the defendant used a jumper to steal
electricity. It was ruled that even without ordinances, the
right of ownership of electric current is secured.
Electricity is no longer regarded as fluid, but its
manifestations and effects, like those of gas, can be seen
and felt.

True test of what is the proper subject of larceny is not

whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is
capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
It is settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of
larceny. Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property,
and is capable of appropriation by another.
DISPOSITION: No error in holding that electricity is a subject of
larceny.

Author: Carlo Africa

United States v. Tambuntin
Petition: Appeal from judgement
Petitioner: United States
Respondent: Manuel Tambunting
Ponencia: Malcom, J.
Doctrine: There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating
purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried
away. It s a valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other
personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger
quantity and of being transported from place to place.
FACTS:
1. Accused and his wife were occupants of the upper floor of a house
where the Manila Gas Corporation installed apparatus for the
delivery of gas.
2. Occupants who asked to install this vacated the same house and this
the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter.
3. However the company visited the house later on and found that gas
was being used without the knowledge and consent of the gas
company. It was being used by the accused and his wife for around 2
months as an iron pipe was inserted in the gap where the gas meter
was formerly placed.
ISSUES:
W/N the gas can be the subject of larceny.
RULING + RATIO:
1) Yes gas can be the subject of larceny.
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which
renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It s a
valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other personal property,
susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place.

Involuntary Insolvency of Paul Strochecker

vs. Ildefonso Ramirez
Paul Strochecker - Appellee
Ildelfonso Ramirez - Creditor and Appellant
William Edmonds - Assignee
Doctrine: Half-interest over a business is a movable property.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not Ramirez claim to the mortgage should be given
preference over Fidelity and
Co on the grounds of :
A.) That the first mortgage of Strochecker with
Fidelity & Surety Co. is not valid because the property
which is the subject matter thereof is not capable of
being mortgaged

Facts:
1.) On March 10, 1919, Strochecker executed a mortgage in
favor of the Fidelity & Surety Co. and registed in due time in the
registry of property.
2.) On September 22, 1919 another mortgage was
executed in favor of Ramirez and the mortgage was also
registered in the registry.
3.) Ramirez claims preference on the mortgage on the following
grounds:
A.) That the first mortgage of Strochecker with Fidelity &
Surety Co. is not valid because the property which is the
subject matter thereof is not capable of being mortgaged
B.) That the amount due the appellant is a purchase price,
citing art 1922 of the Civil
Code as support of his claims
C.) That his mortgage is but a modification of the security
given by the debtor on February 15, 1919, that is prior to
the mortgage exccuted in favor of Fidelity and Surety Co.

Held+Ratio:
1.) No. As to the first ground, the thing that was mortgaged to the
corporation was described as a drug business known as Antigua
Botica Ramirez. With regard to the nature of the property thus
mortgaged, which is one-half interest in the business described,
such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and
not included in the enumeration of real properties in article
335 of the Civil code and may be the subject of mortgage.
All personal property may be mortgaged.

Author: Mae Bulang

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (2002)

Petitioner: Francisco Chavez
Respondent: Public Estate Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation
Ponencia: Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE:
The mere reclamation of foreshore or submerged areas by the PEA
doesnt convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973 the government signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also
included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA
tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands
and later issued PD No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP
x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also
required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
On November 29, 1996, Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother
of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
7
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the

conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer
to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended
JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
ISSUES:
WON the physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas make the land inalienable and disposable lands of public domain.
PROVISION: Sec.3 Art. 12 of the Constitution, Title I and III of CA No. 141
RULING + RATIO:
NO. Foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they
are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does
not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain.
Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public
domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands
of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The PEA and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL
and VOID ab initio.

Digest Author: Leiron Martija

Republic v Court of Appeals (1997)

Petitioner: DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SOLICITOR GENERAL
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, Mrs Morato et al.
Ponencia: PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to CA 141, lands granted by the government through homestead
patents are not to be brought under an encumbrance until the 5-year period
has lapsed. Any contravention to this rule leads to the cancellation of the
patent.
FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Morato files for a registration for a free patent of
land with the Government. The same grant her a Homestead Patent
over a piece of land that partially covers the Calauag Bay.
2. Under CA 141, it is mandated that lands granted under the
Homestead Act are not to be placed under any encumbrance for a
period of 5 years. It also states the powers of the government to take
back the land should this moratorium be unobserved.
3. Despite this, private respondent mortgaged a part of her newly
granted land to Co and Quilata for Php 10,000.00 The couple built a
new house on their share. A part of the granted land was also leased
to Advincula for php 100.00 a month. He built a warehouse with the
agreement that the same would become property of Morato after the
lease.
4. The Director of Lands sends investigators upon reports that the land
was being subjected to encumbrances. They find the allegations to
be valid, and subsequently revoke the Homestead Patent.
5. Private Respondent avers that the Director of Lands no longer has
authority to revoke the patent because the land is no longer within
the public domain. The Government hitches its defense on CA 141.
6. RTC finds for Respondent, CA for government.
ISSUES:
Is the land still public domain?
Can the government revoke the patent?

RULING + RATIO:
1) NO
It is no longer public domain because it has already been granted to
Morato under the Homestead Patent, which is as indefeasible as a
Torrens title.
o BUT!
CA 141 is the law which governs land registration.
o The government grants Homestead Patents to private
individuals in the hopes that it would promote the
maintenance and growth of agricultural lands.
o The same law outlines conditions for keeping the lands, and
the governments power to take back the patents if the public
purpose is not met.
In a philosophical sense, it does not exactly become private land
(jura regalia) because the private citizen is not free to use it fully
(moratorium on encumbrances)
o Within those 5 years, Morato had merely an inchoate right to
the land. She could not yet dispose of it as she wished.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED.

Author: Joss P.

Lanzar v. Director of Lands (1977)

Petition: Petition to Review on Certiorari CA Decision
Petitioner: RAMON LANZAR,
Respondent: DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO,.
Ponencia: FERNANDEZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
Law of Waters:
'Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no
longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof

FACTS:
1.) Ramon Lanzar filed a petition for registration of a title of a
parcel of land arguing that he is the owner thereof in fee
simple
2.) Director of Lands argued that the land is a foreshore which
meant that it forms part of public domain
3.) RTC ruled in favor of Lanzar explaining that the property has
been in the latters possession for more than 30 years
4.) CA reversed, explaining that the land being an accretion
formed by the action of the sea is public domain thereby not
being subject to appropriation
ISSUES:
1. WoN the title may be registered on the ground of 30 years of
adverse possession by Lanzar
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. The shores and land reclaimed from the sea while they

continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant

whatsoever has been made of any portion of them to private

persons, remain part of the public domain and are of public
uses.
2. Until they are converted to patrimonial property by the State,
they are not susceptible of prescription as they are not within
the commerce of men.
DISPOSITION:

Digest Author: Alexi Calda

IGNACIO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1960)

Petitioner: FAUSTINO IGNACIO
Respondent: DIRECTOR OD LANDS AND LAUREANO
VALERIANO
Ponencia: MONTEMAYOR
DOCTRINE: Land formed by the action of the sea is property of
the state. Until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the
Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer
needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special
industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation of ownership.

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits

caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof.
RULING + RATIO: YES.
Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or
for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation of ownership.
DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.

FACTS:
1. Ignacio filed an application to registers his land (mangrove)
with an area of 37,877 sq m located in Navotas, Rizal.
2. He amended his application by stating that he owned the
parcel of land through accretion.
3. Dir. Of Lands, Valeriano and Gutierrez opposed the
application. Gutierrez withdrew his opposition.
4. The land actually adjoins a parcel of land acquired by Ignacio
through the government and a part which was formed by
accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of Manila
Bay.
5. The Dir of Land on the other sought that the parcel of land is a
foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide, thus
forming part of the public domain.
ISSUE: WoN the land forms part of the public domain
PROVISION: Art 4 of Law of Waters of 1866

Villarico vs. Court of Appeals

Petition: Petition for Certiorari
Petitioner: Spouses Teofilo C. Villarico and Maxima A Faustino
Respondent: Honorable Court of Appeals, Rep. of the Philippines, and
Marcos Camargo
Ponencia: Purisima, J
DOCTRINE:

Appeals, there has been no showing that a declassification has

been made by the Director of Forestry declaring the land in
question as disposable or alienable.
2. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons.
Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into
registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title
refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public
domain.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession

thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into registrable title.
FACTS:
1. On May 31, 1977, an application for confirmation of title was filed by
the spouses, Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico over a 1,834 square
meter parcel of land in Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
2. They alleged to be the absolute owners of the property, having bought
it from Teofilos father and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for more than
30 years. They allege that the land involved is not within the forest zone
or government reservation.
3. The application for land registration was opposed by Marcos Camargo,
who claims to be the real owner thereof.
4. The Government interposed its opposition, averring that the land in
question is part of the public domain, within the unclassified area in
Meycauayan, Bulacan per LC Map No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 of the
Bureau of Forest Management, and not available for private
appropriation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land is part of the public domain.
PROVISION:
1. Art. 420 of the Civil Code
RATIO/HELD:
1. Yes. The land in question is within the unclassified forest zone
incapable of private appropriation. As stated by the Court of

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied and the Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22608 AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncements as to costs.

Digest Author: Anjo A. Alvaiz

VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA, Jr. (1987)

Petitioner: FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG,
FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO.

Respondent: HON. MARIANO CASTAEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of

First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge,
Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga

space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to the
municipal government.
5. After an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney,
respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as OIC of the office of the
mayor of San Fernando, issued a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the
stalls in the subject place. The reaction of the petitioners was to file
a petition for prohibition.

Ponencia: CRUZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the
subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.
FACTS:
1. In the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado
Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands
a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is
commonly known as a talipapa is the subject of the petition.
2. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct
business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted
to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this
and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on
public property.
3. The dispute goes back to 1961, when the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24
members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the abovementioned place. A case was filed and the CFI of Pampanga
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. While this case was
pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality,
thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four
years later, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case
and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in
nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could
not be the subject of private occupancy.
4. The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners
were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to them they
and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or

ISSUES:
WON the petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
PROVISION:
Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets,
the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. (not
mentioned in the case)
RULING + RATIO:
None.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be
the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is
elementary.
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had
no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and
cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their
alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted
this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was
decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted
Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking
place and public plaza of the municipality.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution
could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that
the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through
the medium of a contract.
DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

Digest Author: Falgui

Dacanay v. Asistio Jr (1992)

Petitioner: FRANCISCO U. DACANAY
Respondent: MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO
SARNE, JR. of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA PASTRANA AND/OR
RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND REPRESENTING COSTALLHOLDERS
Ponencia: GRIO-AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE: Streets are for Public Use
A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of
man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or other contract.
FACTS:
1. On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and
municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets.
Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea
markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96"
where the petitioner lives.
2. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City,
caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96, V.
Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear
the city streets, stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the
City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or
their deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921) in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 122, praying the court to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the
demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action.
3. The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on December 20,
1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction which it had earlier issued. The trial court observed that
the Heroes del '96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales street, being
of public dominion must, therefore, be outside of the commerce of
man.
4. However, shortly after the decision came out, the city administration
in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as
successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of
clearing and cleaning up the city streets.

5. Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-12921,

Francisco U. Dacanay, a concerned citizen, taxpayer and registered
voter of Barangay 74, Zone 7, District II of Caloocan City, who
resides on Heroes del '96 Street, one of the affected streets, wrote a
letter dated March 7, 1988 to Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his attention
to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street and asked
for their demolition.
6. As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street,
through the tolerance of the public respondents, and in clear violation
of the decision it Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present
petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that the public
respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case
No. C-12921 which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the
demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del
'96 Streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.
.
ISSUES:
WoN public streets may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue
of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
PROVISION: Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:
NO.
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as
found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been
leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets
may not be bargained away through contract.
The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not
infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose
they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted

Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles

Petitioner: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.
Respondent: Judge Pascual Bercilles
Ponencia: Concepcion, Jr., J.
Digest Author: Gullas, J.
DOCTRINE: Patrimonial Property
Property of public dominion becomes patrimonial property of the state when
no longer intended for public use or public service. The city council is the
competent authority to determine whether or not a certain property is still
necessary for public use.
FACTS:
1. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through
Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the
terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the City
Development Plan. Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City
Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting
City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.

PROVISION:
Civil Code
Article 422: Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State
Cebu City Charter
Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to
the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following
legislative powers:
(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or
square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.
RULING + RATIO:
I.

2. The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder
and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City
Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a
total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of
absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First
instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered.
3. On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property
sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration
by any private individual.
ISSUES:
I.

Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under
Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to
declare a road as abandoned?

II.

Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the

patrimonial property of the City of Cebu, which may be the object of a
common contract?

II.

YES. From the foregoing provision from the Cebu City Charter, it is
undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city
road or street.
a. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is
still necessary for public use.
b. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And
the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
So the fact that some private interests may be served
incidentally will not invalidate the ordinance.
Yes. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it
follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract

DISPOSITION: Ruling of the lower court denying petitioners application is

set aside.

Laurel v. Garcia G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Petitioner,: SALVADOR H. LAUREL
Respondents: RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary
Doctrine: The Roppongi lot is a property of PUBLIC DOMINION. The
Roppongi property itself was specifically designated to house the
Philippine Embassy. There is no doubt that it is of public dominion unless
it is convincingly shown that the property is patrimonial, which
respondents failed to show. Conversion of patrimonial property happens
if the property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment must be a
CERTAIN and POSITIVE ACT based on correct legal premises.

Facts:
Subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine Govt. under the Reparation
Agreement entered with Japan as part of the indemnification to
the Filipino people for the losses in life and property and their
suffering during WWII. Other lots being:
Nampeidai property (site of Philippine
Embassy Chancery)
Kobe Commercial property (warehouse and
parking lot of consulate staff)
Kobe Residential property (vacant residential
lot)
The Reparation Agreement was valued at $550M payable in
20yrs to be fixed by both governments. The Reparation Law
prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization
of reparations and development loans; those which belong to
the govt. and which may be availed of by private entities.
The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for
the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy and as intended
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the later was
transferred to Nampeidai, when the Roppongi building needed
major repairs. Due to the failure of the govt. to provide
necessary funds, Roppongi remained undeveloped.

During the incumbency of President Corazon Aquino, a

proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the Roppongi property to Kajima
Corp., in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in
Roppongi,1 in Nampeidai and the renovation of the Philippine
Embassy in Nampeidai. The President created a committee to
study the disposition or utilization of the govt. of the
properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
The President issued E.O. 296, entitling non-Filipino citizens or
entities to avail of reparation capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties were
mentioned in the Whereas clause. Amidst opposition by
various sectors, the Executive branch has been pushing in its
decision to sell the reparation properties starting with the
Roppongi lot.
2 petitions for prohibition were filed, seeking to enjoin
respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of
the Roppongi lot. A temporary restraining order was granted
by the court.
In G.R. No. 92047, it compelled respondents to fully disclose
the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the
Roppongi property and explain the proceedings which
effectively prevent Filipino citizens and entities from bidding.
Supreme Court resolved to decide in favour of the 2 petitions
and enjoining respondents from proceeding with the sale of
the Roppongi property and made permanent the temporary
restraining order.
Provision:
CHAPTER 3
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS
Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. (338)
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. (339a)
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property. (340a)
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)

Issue:
W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?
Held:
No. The Govt cannot alienate said Roppongi property and others.
Ratio:
1. The Roppongi lot is a property of PUBLIC DOMINION.
The nature of the lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is expressly spelled out by the terms dictated in
the Reparation Agreement which bind both the Philippine and
Japanese govt. that these properties were assigned to the
government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was
specifically designated to house the Philippine Embassy. There
is no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property is patrimonial, which
respondents failed to show.

Under pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, Art. 419 states

that: Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Art. 420 provides: The following things are
property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. Under
art. 421: All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property. Therefore the Roppongi property is correctly
classified under paragraph 2 of art. 420 as property belonging
to the State intended for some public service.
2. Property of public dominion is OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE
OF MAN.
The Roppongi property is outside the commerce of man,
therefore it cannot be alienated by the govt. Its ownership is a
special collective ownership for general use enjoyment and for
the satisfaction of collective needs and reside in a social group.
The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person but
the citizens intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation.
3. Conversion of patrimonial property happens if the
property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment
must be a CERTAIN and POSITIVE ACT based on correct
legal premises.
The property no being used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property and happens only when withdrawn from public use.
It continues to be part of the public dominion until there is a
formal declaration from the govt. to withdraw it from being
such. Abandonment cant be definite under Art. 422. It cannot
be inferred from the non-use alone specially if it was

attributable to a lack of financial support to repair or improve

the property.