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AC
The standard is embracing rhizomatic multiplicity, defined as a continuous
engagement with flows of desire unhindered by structure or hierarchy. Desires should
reflect a process without a pre-defined center or end. 3 warrants.
First, desiring-production
Desire is socially conditioned and social structures rely on our continued investment of
desire into them. This challenges the psychoanalytic view of desire that it is the
expression of a fixed subject who lacks an object.
Deleuze and Guattari 83 writes1
In point of fact, if desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity
depends upon an "essence of lack" that produces the fantasized object.
Desire thus conceived of as production, though merely the production of fantasies, has been explained
perfectly by psychoanalysis. On the very lowest level of interpretation, this means that the real object that desire lacks is related to an

extrinsic natural or social production, whereas desire intrinsically produces an imaginary object that functions as a double of reality, as though there were a "dreamed-of object
behind every real object," or a mental production asbehind all real productions. This conception does not necessarily compel psychoanalysis to engage in a study of gadgets and
markets, in the form of an utterly dreary and dull psychoanalysis of the object: psychoanalytic studies of packages of noodles, cars, or "thingumajigs." But even when the fantasy
is interpreted in depth, not simply as an object, but as a specific machine that brings desire itself front and center, this machine is merely theatrical, and the complementarity of
what it sets apart still remains: it is now need that is defined in terms of a relative lack and determined by its own object, whereas desire is regarded as what produces the fantasy
and produces itself by detaching itself from the object, though at the same time it intensifies the lack by making it absolute: an "incurable insufficiency of being," an "inability-tobe that is life itself." Hence the presentation of desire as something supported by needs, while these needs, and their relationship to the object as something that is lacking or

when the theoretician

reduces desiring-production to a production of fantasy, he is content to exploit to
the fullest the idealist principle that defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production , of
missing, continue to be the basis of the productivity of desire (theory of an underlying support). In a word,

"industrial" production. Clement Rosset puts it very well: every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, "the world
acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not
contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that contains the key to
desire (missing in this world)."29If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is
the set of passive synthes es that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive

Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its

object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is
no fixed subject unless there is repression . Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine
syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious.

of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it. Hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of
producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum. The objective being of desire is
the Real in and of itself.* There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled "psychic reality." As Marx notes, what exists in fact is not lack, but passion, as a "natural and
sensuous object." Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire produces. Lack is a
countereffect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective
existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them. For that reason it so often becomes the desire to die, whereas need is a measure
of the withdrawal of a subject that has lost its desire at the same time that it loses the passive syntheses of these conditions. This is precisely the significance of need as a search
in a void: hunting about, trying to capture or become a parasite of passive syntheses in whatever vague world they may happen to exist in. It is no use saying: We are not green
plants; we have long since been unable to synthesize chlorophyll, so it's necessary to eat. . . . Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted
that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire "needs" very few
thingsnot those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from themand that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack
of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real.
The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather,

molar organization deprives desire of its objective being. Revolutionaries ,

are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life
in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has
few needs. And never mind those who believe that this is very easy to say, or that it is the sort of idea to be found in books. "From the little reading I had done I
had observed that the men who were most in life, who were moulding life, who were life
itself, ate little, slept little, owned little or nothing. They had no illusions about duty, or the perpetuation of their kith and kin,
the

artists, and seers

or the preservation of the State. . . . The phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move
forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain."30 The true visionary is a Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary. We know very well where lackand its

Lack (manque)* is created, planned, and organized in and through social production.
It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction;the latter falls back on (serab at sur) the
subjective correlativecome from.

forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). It is lack that infiltrates
itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production.f The deliberate creation of
lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (manque) amid an abundance of production; making

1 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press. 1983.
http://1000littlehammers.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/anti-oedipus-fixed.pdf

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all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to
desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. There is no such thing as the social
production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other. The only connections that could be established between these two productions
would be secondary ones of introjection and projection, as though all social practices had their precise counterpart in introjected or internal mental practices, or as though
mental practices were projected upon social systems, without either of the two sets of practices ever having any real or concrete effect upon the other. As long as we are content
to establish a perfect parallel between money, gold, capital, and the capitalist triangle on the one hand, and the libido, the anus, the phallus, and the family triangle on the other,
we are engaging in an enjoyable pastime, but the mechanisms of money remain totally unaffected by the anal projections of those who manipulate money. The Marx-Freud
parallelism between the two remains utterly sterile and insignificant as long as it is expressed in terms that make them introjections or projections of each other without ceasing
to be utterly alien to each other, as in the famous equation money = shit. The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under
determinate conditions. We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of

There is
only desire and the social, and nothing else. Even the most repressive and the
most deadly forms of social reproduction are produced by desire within the organization that is
the consequence of such production under various conditions that we must analyze. That is why the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely
the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: "Why do men fight for their servitude as
stubbornly as though it were their salvation?" How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less
any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production.

bread!"? As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal
as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved,
to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? Reich is at his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept
ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in
terms of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point,

under a certain set of conditions, they

wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.
Rejecting the psychoanalytic view of desire would entail an ethics that seeks to remove
obstacles to creative expression
Spangenberg 9 writes2
Intensity and intensification will be capable of delivering us from morality based on representation, only after they have freed themselves from subjectivity and from all objectal
coordinates or ensembles. In this regard, Deleuzes understanding of desire is informative. In contrast to the psychoanalytical concept of desire as belonging to a subject and
being directed at an object, Deleuze conceives of desire as a process. Instead of setting up a lack as its mode (and then seeking an object to fill this lack), desire unrolls a plane
of consistency or a field of immanence. To put this differently,

desire in the Deleuzian sense, doesnt belong to a subject and it is not directed

toward an object . On the contrary, desire is only attained at the point where someone is no
longer searching for or grasping an object any more than he grasps himself as a
subject (Boundas 2006). What needs to be reduced, in other words, is the self on its way to
becoming-imperceptible. This is the kind of becoming that carries with it its own pre-personal and pre-subjective intensities the affects, that
is, intensities, modifications and expressions of our power to be the vis existendi of Spinozas conatus and Deleuzes desire (Boundas 2006: 15). Once this
reduction is done, desire will be able to assert itself as the creative and original energeia
of life . Desire, in Deleuzes work, is not a source of phantasms; it does not originate, once again, from an image based on objectification and representation. Rather,
Deleuzian desire is virtual and indistinguishable from its object. Whereas virtual or creative desire is immediately productive of its object and thus lacks nothing, desire [in the
psychoanalytical sense] is castrated when it is configured as desire for an object and of a subject. At the same time that desire is detached from its object, its subject becomes

In so far as Deleuzian desire is not defined by the intentionality of

a subject wanting to have the subject of such a lack - it is capable of producing connections and
relations that are real and that are regenerating in their rhizomatic multiplicity. Following
the subject of this lack (Hallward 2006: 67 & 68).

Spinoza, Deleuze conceives of desire as an act that is enhanced by joy and that facilitates the formation of adequate ideas. Desire, in this sense, is the striving towards more and
better encounters (Boundas 2006). In his distinction between good and bad encounters, Deleuze stays clear of the measuring rod of transcendent norms and values. Rather,
encounters are being evaluated in terms of their ability to invigorate the power to be. There are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life
(Gilles Deleuze in Boundas 2006: 16). The intensification of life and the tenor of existence are, however, capable of grounding an ethics of joy or desire only in so far as they

It is in the light of this that we need to reach a better understanding of Deleuzes

claim that ethics must be an ethics of the event - that is, an ethics of the virtual . Events,
are calibrated according to their alliance with the virtual.

for Deleuze, are not reducible to actual bodies or states of affairs. For this reason, we need to insert between events and states of affairs, a process of counter-actualisation; it
is this process that reveals the true meaning of becoming worthy of the event the spinal cord of Deleuzes ethics (Boundas 2006: 17). It is the counter-actualisation of the
actual that empowers the inherent virtual or pure event to be thought and willed. And to become worthy of the event, then, means to discover ways of aligning ourselves with
the creative processes that work through us. Or to put this differently, in order

to affirm the unlimited creative power of

the virtual, we need to dissolve whatever might restrict its flow and
expression . For Deleuze, the most serious and persistent obstacle to creation is posed by the reactive fiction of a thinking self or subject.
Personality, identity, subjectivity, consciousness, signification: these are our primary obstacles. An
2 Yolanda Spangenberg (Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria). Thought without an Image: Deleuzian philosophy as
an ethics of the event. Phronimon, Volume 10. 2009.

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Ethics, in this sense, is a
question of willing the event in such a manner or to such an extent that the quality of
the will itself is transformed and becomes affirmation. As far as actual thinkers are concerned, then,
adequate vehicle for creation must therefore become: impersonal or anonymous; unconscious, or asignificant (Hallward 2006: 91).

absolute or unconditional affirmation is again always a matter of being-affirmed or being-infused. To think is to allow thought to work through us (Hallward 2006: 137). This
transmutation in the quality of the will is achieved by means of the concept and it is in this sense, that the creation of concepts is redemptive, liberating and ultimately
transformative. Philosophy, for Deleuze, is the discipline through which creative events can be expressed in pure thought. Conceptual creatings are always independent of the
actual configuration of situations and the work of philosophy is precisely to extract a concept from the circumstances of its actualisation. [P]hilosophy posits a new, still virtual
world as the counter-actualised correlate of creation itself. A redemptive philosophy will therefore seek to demonstrate, after Leibniz, that everything has a concept!, or in
other words, that only the singular individual exists and it is by virtue of the power of the concept: monad or soul. (Hallward 2006: 142).

Second, metaphysics
Static conceptions of metaphysics are flawedthe best understanding of reality is one
where we creatively engage it
Lundy 14 writes3
[20] Drawing on Spinoza, Deleuze also argues that the ethical life is one in which we seek to operate
through active forces rather than reactive forces. [7] Reactive forces do not allow us to realize
our potential, since one remains dominated by external forces , or dominated by purely
reactive forces working against our own power and potential. Active forces dominate rather than submit to domination, freeing us to
explore the very limits of what we can do. [8] Here the creative, affirmative, productive power
of will and desire is unfettered. Just as you can never predict how a stroll will turn out, what the good life looks like cannot be prescribed in
advance. One could only say that the good life is a life capable of sustaining an active experimentation conducted with the desiring machines that are ourselves, and an
exploration of the limits, in every direction, of our will. [21] For Deleuze, reactive forces negate difference, where the affirmative, active forces would celebrate and enjoy

traditional metaphysics has prioritized

being. Therefore, even if one agreed with the thesis that difference is to be affirmed,
the agreement with Deleuze would be trivial , provided one is still operating
within the standard metaphysical paradigm of being. What prioritizing being means, insofar as difference is
difference. This is far more radical than it sounds. According to Deleuze,

concerned, is that difference is understood as a measure of relative sameness. For example, we might talk about different beer. [9] This one is dark and bitter, that one is light
and crisp, and another is copper and a bit sweet. But, we can talk about these differences because they all belong to a group of things that have a fundamental sameness: they are
all beer, a beverage made from water and fermented grain. For Deleuze, reactive forces negate difference, where the affirmative, active forces would celebrate and enjoy
difference. This is far more radical than it sounds. According to Deleuze, traditional metaphysics has prioritized being. Therefore, even if one agreed with the thesis that

within the standard metaphysical

paradigm of being. What prioritizing being means, insofar as difference is concerned, is that difference is understood
as a measure of relative sameness. For example, we might talk about different beer. [9] This one is dark and bitter, that one is light and crisp, and
difference is to be affirmed, the agreement with Deleuze would be trivial, provided one is still operating

another is copper and a bit sweet. But, we can talk about these differences because they all belong to a group of things that have a fundamental sameness: they are all beer, a
beverage made from water and fermented grain. [22] If we want, we can even compare beer with very different things like octopi, planets, courage, or justice, because all these

In this perspective, everything exhibits a

fundamental preexisting sameness, called being. This view is certainly intuitive. We normally use difference merely as a relational
things belong to one huge all- encompassing universal grouping called "being."

term. We might say "Dolphins are different than fish because they are mammals," or "Dolphins are different from galaxies because they are smaller," etc. Often, the relationality
is only implied. If I simply say, "Larry is different," I mean he is different than most other people. If I say, "My pencil is different," it naturally invites the question, "Different
from what?" It is just as if I said "My pencil is ten feet away," which invites the question, "Ten feet away from what?" With respect to the last question, it would certainly seem
nonsensical if I were to reply, "It's not that the pencil is ten feet away from anything, it's simply that it possesses the inherent property of ten-feet-away-ness." But that is exactly
the sort of radical shift Deleuze wants to make with respect to difference. In order to understand or experience the difference of my pencil we do not need to contrast it with

Deleuze's thinking is a philosophy of pure difference, which

Instead of a fundamental
underlying being there is only becomingthe unique development of diverse singularities. [10] Realizing and affirming
uniquenessthe primary character of reality as difference and becomingrequires freeing our senses from established tendencies. I believe this would
mean orienting ourselves to the world, as much as possible in a stroll-like fashion, wherein we strive to free ourselves from
some other fundamentally similar thing.

stresses the fundamental and irreducible uniqueness and particularity of every aspect of reality.

organizing schemes , extricate ourselves from purposive/rational teleology, slow ourselves down, and allow ourselves to
experience the particularity of things and events. [23] Imagine you walk past a certain building every day on the way to work. The building is
nothing to you; it is simply that unremarkable building you walk by every day. Or rather it is something very specific; its the signal that you are two thirds of the way there. Now
imagine that one day you happen to stroll past that building. For the first time you encounter the building outside the context of your daily routine. Since it's no longer a point on
a route, you are now in a state of greater receptivity to the difference of the building. It might strike you that this familiar building is particularly beautiful or particularly ugly, or

break
out of habitual tendencies, and see things in new ways and see new connections between

that it reminds you of a building that you worked in before, etc. That is why, for me at least, my camera helps me move into the strolling spirit. It helps force me to
my senses

3 John Lundy. The Stroll: Reflections on Deleuzian Ethics. Rhizomes. 2014. http://www.rhizomes.net/issue26/lundy.html

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things. This relates to what Deleuze calls rhizomatics, the idea that

there are always multiple entries to the world .

[11] An object or a thought can be approached in multiple ways and be connected in multiple ways with others.

And third, objectivity

Views of morality which seek out transcendental representations of the world are based
on a flawed objectivity
Spangenberg 9 writes4
What, precisely, is an ethics of the event? In order to give this question an appropriate consideration, we need to, first of all, establish what ethics is not. Deleuze draws a very
clear distinction between ethics and morality. Morality, as we know, implies that we judge ourselves and others on the basis of what we pre-suppose we are and should be. In

morality is problematic in so far as it

is rooted in an objectifying, representational or dogmatic image of thought. Distinct images of thought may
contrast to this, Deleuzian ethics implies that we do not yet know what we might become. In short,

be defined by reference to the presuppositions which define the nature of thought and which, in this way, provide the plane of theoretical consistency for how life is perceived,
experienced and understood. Deleuze criticises thought defined in terms of identity in recognition and representation by showing what that definition is falsely ignoring or
excluding. According to Deleuze, such definitions are always already objectifying and presupposing what they seek to exclude. In chapter three of Difference and Repetition,
Deleuze (2004) describes and criticises the representational image by showing how the presuppositions of such an image inevitably make us miss the essence of difference.

Deleuze severely criticises is the assumption that there are certain, common sense facts that everybody knows. This element
consists of the presupposition that there is a natural capacity for thought
endowed with a talent for truth or an affinity with the true, under the double aspect of a good will on the part of the thinker and an
upright nature on the part of thought (Gilles Deleuze in Williams 2005:115). This presupposition is moral in so far as it is assumed that it is
how thinkers and thought, in principle, ought to be, regardless of how they are. The point of Deleuzes
criticism here is that the representational or dogmatic image of thought perpetuates the common sense
illusion that there are moral laws, while in fact, there are only morally
established habits. A possible response to Deleuzes critique regarding presuppositions could very well be that philosophy, explicitly and out of
One of the presuppositions

necessity, ought to adopt these presuppositions or else it will fall into quietist despair. From a moralistic standpoint, the destruction of all presuppositions does not take
account of social, political and moral values and this seems to be undeniably bad. Deleuze, although he is very much aware of this response to his critique, still insists on the
dangerous and possibly immoral path of uncovering and destroying all presuppositions. A further response to Deleuzes critique is: can presuppositions ever really be done
away with? Should the proper and superior role of philosophy not be to select the right presuppositions, instead of seeking to do away with all of them? If presuppositions are
really inevitable, Deleuze has merely missed the fact that he has implicitly adopted pessimistic ones (Williams 2005). Deleuzes response to all of these critical points turns on

even the most obvious, unequivocal and seemingly universal moral values
have, in the past, turned out to be restrictive, erroneous and divisive. Instead of presupposing
and affirming any obvious or given values, the superior role of the philosopher is to
criticise all emergent obvious values or doxa. Deleuze knows that both Descartes and Kant are well aware of this since they claim
that the presupposition of the good and shareable nature of thought is only by right or in principle, and not in fact. For Descartes, as for Kant the good
and shareable nature of thought is only formal; it does not concern specific empirical content. According to
Deleuze, however, this line of thought still misses the way in which the supposedly empty form of
thought continues to establish obvious values and a doxa with an exclusive
empirical content. In broad outline Deleuze argues that, if thought is, as it is claimed, good and shareable in principle, it should be able to create unity,
the very familiar argument that

not only within each individual thinker but also between different thinkers. This has the implication that different faculties must in principle, be treatable in the same way, and
that different selves should be able to judge or know when thought is correct. So how, Deleuze asks, are the different faculties united by the single faculty of thought? And,
furthermore, how are we able to judge different thoughts? According to Kant (Deleuze 2004) we are able to reflect on the various faculties, and we are able to actively think and
talk about the object of each faculty, because we are able to recognise those objects. The identification of the proper object of each faculty depends on the transcendent faculty
of recognition which is supposedly shared and has access to all the other faculties. But if the faculty of recognition is purely formal and empty of content why, then, does
Deleuze still have a problem with it? Neither Descartes nor Kant (Deleuze 2004) is making any suppositions as to the specific content of recognition when they say that, in
order to use the different faculties, we must be able to recognise their objects. In so far as recognition is a condition for anything to be registered as existing, how could it
possibly be exclusive? According to Deleuze, a general category of things is necessarily still excluded due to the particular form of recognition. In other words, due to the fact
that recognition proceeds by objectifying and comparing the new with what is already known or what has already been experienced. To put this differently, recognition operates
by objectifying and referring difference back to that which has already been recognised and experienced. It discounts the new and virtual qualities of pure difference. For
Deleuze, the problem with recognition lies in the fact that recognition necessarily depends on representation. To be able to recognize the object of a faculty, we have to consider
the object in terms of an identity that we can conceive of, an analogy that we can judge, an opposition that we can imagine and a similarity that we can perceive (Williams
2005).

A philosophical method geared toward creativity challenges representational visions of

morality
Spangenberg 9 writes5
4 Yolanda Spangenberg (Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria). Thought without an Image: Deleuzian philosophy as
an ethics of the event. Phronimon, Volume 10. 2009.

5 Yolanda Spangenberg (Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria). Thought without an Image: Deleuzian philosophy as
an ethics of the event. Phronimon, Volume 10. 2009.

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Deleuzes account of the transcendental conditions
of thought demand a radically different conception of philosophy away
The interconnections among Ideas, problems and events in

from representation . In What is Philosophy? Deleuze (1994), in collaboration with Guattari, describes
philosophy as the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts. Like works of art (and
unlike scientific theories), philosophical concepts do not refer to objects or states of affairs outside
themselves. Rather, they are autopoetic, self-organising entities; they are defined not by their
referential relations to things or states of affairs but by the relations between their elements as well as their relations to other concepts. Concepts
participate in a multiplicity of virtual relations with other concepts that
constitute their becomings. In this context, the term becomings refers to the particular paths along which a concept might be
transformed into something else (Patten 1996). For Deleuze, the philosophers superior task is to create concepts that express and thereby bring into consciousness significant or

The greatness of a philosophy is

measured by the nature of the events to which its concepts summon us or that it enables
us to release in concepts (Gilles Deleuze in Patton 1996: 13 & 14). Of primary importance in Deleuzes theory of difference is the
question of our stance towards the events that befall us. Philosophy, as the
art of creating concepts, is therefore serving an ethical rather than an epistemological
purpose. I shall conclude this paper with a few remarks on the ethical implications of Deleuzes philosophy of difference.
important events. Every concept shapes and reshapes the event in its own way.

Thus, I advocate that the right to be forgotten from Internet searches ought to be a civil
right.
Contention 1 is Normalization
The Internet has ushered in the new era of normalizationit is increasingly relevant for
how people are controlled
Buchanan 7 writes6
There can be no doubt that the Internet has transformed practically every aspect of
contemporary life , especially the way we think about the body and its relation to identity
and to place, once the twin cornerstones of social existence: in social life you are
always someone from somewhere, the son or daughter of so-and-so from such-and-such town. These details of
our existence, which are essentially historical , although they may sometimes take a form biologists think belongs to
their domain (i.e., gender, race, body shape), segment us in different ways , slicing and dicing us this way and that so that we
adhere to the conventions and demands of the socius itself. We are segmented in a binary fashion, following
the great major dualist oppositions: social classes, but also men-women, adults-children, and so on. We are segmented in a circular fashion, in ever larger circles, ever wider
disks or coronas, like Joyce's 'letter': my affairs, my neighbourhood's affairs, my city's, my country's, the world's . We are segmented in a linear fashion, along a straight line or
a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents an episode or 'proceeding': as soon as we finish one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or

These segmentations penetrate our being, they appear and

even feel bodily, especially the apparently natural attributes of gender and race, but they are not for all that
visceral. Deleuze and Guattari are very specific about this. They describe these socially orchestrated captures of the body - gender, race, class, work, family, and so on
- as 'incorporeal transformations'. If, today, as Deleuze foresaw with typical acuity in his short paper on what he labelled 'the society of control', our credit
card and social security numbers are more significant identity and place markers
than the colour of our skin or where we went to school, that isn't because the 'meat' of our bodies has lately been superseded in its cultural significance by our
bloodless digital 'profile'. Rather what has happened is that one incorporeal 'apparatus of
capture' has been succeeded by another - the segmentations of gender, race and class
have been supplanted by the segmentations of debt and credit. "A man is no longer a man confined
but a man in debt."3 In effect, our body has been replaced as the principal site of power by
procedured, in the family, in the school, in the army, on the job.2

6 Ian Buchanan. Deleuze and the internet.

article=2411&context=artspapers

University of Wollongong. 2007. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

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our profile.

But this does not mean that the age of the body has been succeeded by the age of the body without organs as many of the Internet-inclined have

argued because the disciplined or segmented body was just as much a body without organs as is the ghostly profile government agencies and banks make of us and store in their
databases for referral whenever we want a loan, a driver's license, or to leave the country for a vacation. It will no doubt come as a surprise to many that the clearest
confirmation of this point, that the disciplined body is already a body without organs, is to be found in Foucault's Discipline and Punish, which is often read as a history of the
body.4 Referring to Kantorowitz's influential thesis that the King effectively has two bodies, one that lives and dies and another that is immortal, Foucault writes: If the surplus
power possessed by the king gives rise to the duplication of his body, has not the power exercised on the subjected body of the condemned man given rise to another type of
duplication? That of a 'non-corporal', a 'soul', as Maby called it. This history of this 'micro-physics' of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a
genealogy of the modern 'soul'. Rather than seeing this soul as the as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology
of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently
around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over
madmen, children at home and at school, the Australian Humanities Review: Deleuze and the Internet by Ian Buchanan Page 2 of 19
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-December-2007/Buchanan.... 30/08/2012colonised, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the
rest of their lives.5

Search engines in particular are normalizing through the process by which they store
personal info. The question is how we can degooglize ourselves to ensure our freedom
through privacy
Jansma 10 writes7
Nowadays a lot of people are in some form represented on the internet. These virtual forms can include profiles on social network sites like Facebook and Twitter, but also as
writings on a personal websites and blogs. They have been labeled many names, including data double (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000), a databased self (Simon, 2005) and the one I

Deleuze tells us in his Postscript on the Societies of Control, we have become

dividuals, and masses, samples, data, markets or banks (p:5), meaning we are separated from our body and
turned in a digital self, making a whole new way of control possible . But what exactly is
like most: the dividual (Deleuze, 1992). As

the impact of this control on our privacy and is this feeling rightly? According to Deleuze and Foucault, control puts us in the role of subject. In Foucaults disciplinary society
control exists in the form of discipline and bodily monitoring, where in Deleuzes control society this control is mainly focused on the dividual and exists in the form of
modularity and codes (password etc.) (Deleuze, 1999, p:5). This control is being done by continuous communication between computers, monitoring our every digital move and

An article in Dutch newspaper De pers brought

forth the question of the possibility of a degooglization; a way to alter or make your
digital self disappear from the internet and its powerful search engines. (De Pers, 2009) This question arose from the
growing presence of our dividuals and the way we dealt with the information it was made of. Because we are not just being monitored by institutions
only, but also by everyone with access to the internet , it becomes more and more important to control this information. Nominal
freedom of action is canceled by the ubiquitous look of the other (Mark Poster, 1990, p:90-91). By
putting yourself on the web, you make yourself instantly searchable by search sites like
fed by data assemblage and shared surveillance (Simon, 2005). Thats where the internet comes in.

Google or Bing, which can have both advantages and disadvantages. For example, it is sometimes said that, if you are not on the internet, you dont exist. Self-exposion on the
web, e.g. photos on Flickr, resumes on Linked-in and profiles on Facebook, can result in an acceptance of other people and in a commodification of the self (Haggerty & Ericson,

too much personal information can result in a need of privacy: harmful

This combined
with the influence other people can have on its appearance and data , e.g. by tagging you in a
picture or placing photos and movies in comments, can make a dividual somewhat anarchistic and dangerous. All in all a paradox in
2000). On the other hand,

information can end up at places you dont want them to end up, for instance at your future boss, current enemies or commercial companies.

privacy is at hand. Do we have to focus on privacy by not putting any information of ourselves on the internet, hereby avoiding a dangerous dividual but becoming nonexistent to some, or should we focus less on privacy and become visible (but controllable) to the public, but make possible the disclosure of sensitive information?

Online storage of personal information undermines biological processes of memory

which are key to the creative formation of identity--studies prove
Murata and Orito 10 write8
[Ellipses in original] Does the externalisation of human memory have any negative effect on human ability based on biological memory? Recently, it has been believed
that the externalisation of human memory enables to facilitate the efficiency of human information processing and retrieval. For example, Thompson (2007) says Ive almost
given up making an effort to remember anything, because I can instantly retrieve the information online. [...] by offloading data onto silicon, we free our own gray matter for
more germanely human tasks like brainstorming and daydreaming. What's more, the perfect recall of silicon memory can be an enormous boon to thinking. In other words,
storing information in biological memory is waste of time and energy and the utilisation of e-memory is far more effective than of biological memory in terms of human

many people to allege that computer

databases provide an effective and even superior substitute for human biological
memory, Carr (2010b) disagrees with such allegation based on the latest findings of
intellectual activities. Is this at all true? While acknowledging it is not particularly surprising for

7 Sander Jansma. The Privacy Paradox in a control society. Masters of Media. September 24

th

, 2010.

http://mastersofmedia.hum.uva.nl/2010/09/24/the-privacy-paradox-in-a-control-society/

8 Kiyoshi Murata (Centre for Business Information Ethics, School of Commerce, Meiji University, Japan) and Yohko Orito (Faculty
of Law and Letters, Ehime University, Japan). The right to forget/be forgotten. 2010. http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~ethicj/The
%20right%20to%20forget%20(extended%20abstract).pdf

R5 Aff
neurosciences and physiological researches . He suggests that a human brain is so malleable that it can be evolved
through interacting with its external environment. In contrast to computer memory which can only store digital information, the
human brain is able to continually conduct prolonged information processing during which the systems of biological memory are
flexibly reorganised responding to the changing environmental context . Through
this update process, old memory stored in the human brain is maintained to be meaningful in the present context. Thus, consciously or unconsciously, human
biological memory is living memory and is not just a storehouse of info rmation
like computer memory. In addition, based on the recent studies, he points out that biological memory of the brain is substantially infinite, and the intellectual activity of

outsourcing of human memory to external

digital memory devices would result in reduced human ability to appropriately organise
and integrate information, which deeply relates to knowledge creation and
recollection is itself helpful to create ideas and to enhance human learning ability. Hence,

learning. Then the Internet environment in which people can enjoy opportunities to access a huge amount of information may overwhelm the functioning of human working
memory to integrate things stored in short-term memory into long-term memory. Utilisation of the Web is not necessarily useful to raise human ability in information
processing. In this regard, Carr (2010b) describes that those who celebrate the outsourcing of memory to the Web have been misled by a metaphor. They overlook the
fundamentally organic nature of biological memory (191), and that we dont constrain our mental powers when we store new long-term memories. We strengthen them. With
each expansion of our memory comes an enlargement of our intelligence. The Web provides a convenient and compelling supplement to personal memory, but when we start
using the Web as a substitute for personal memory, bypassing the inner processes of consolidation, we risk emptying our minds of their riches (192). The dependence on the
Web technology entails danger to reduce human ability in information processing and intellectual power. Carr (2010a) also points out that

our most

creative and conceptual thinking often emerged from the complexity of the connections
among the memories stored in our mind . Biological memory is the seat of
the unique self

as well as the foundation of a rich culture. If we outsource our memory to external databases, we begin to destroy that foundation.

His

comment suggests the social significance of the right to forget/be forgotten .

Contention 2 is Solvency
RTBF is key to creative formation of identityit reclaims our biological capacity for
forgetting that has been undermined by digital storage
Murata and Orito 10 write9
In a certain sense, memory and forgetting are two sides of the same coin. Heidegger (1927: 339) insists that remembering is possible only
on the basis of forgetting. Ricoeur (2000) emphasises the close ties between memory and forgetting, and describes that forgetting is one of the
conditions for memory. Human beings selectively perceive components of their environment based on schemata they have developed (Neisser, 1976; Anzai, 1985), and in order

it is important for a person

to make his/her own personal story through selectively remembering/forgetting things
which he/she has experienced and constructing a well-organised structure of memory of
them in his/her mind. In this study, forgetting is defined as an intellectual/mental state of a person where he/she doesnt recall a fact that (has) happened in the past or
to develop sound personal identity, build successful human relationships and enjoy normal intellectual activities,

information that he/she knew in the past and/or images, feelings and sensations related to the fact or the knowledge. Glorifying a past event or having erroneous human
memories, which doesnt necessarily imply failure of decoupling (Klein et al., 2004), is a kind of forgetting. As Ricoeur (2000)s categorisation of forgetting into forgetting
through the erasing of traces and forgetting kept in reserve suggests, there is variety in the degree of forgetting. Anyone experiences a momentary lapse of memory and shortterm or mild forgetting. In human brains long-term memory which dynamically maintains a well-organised structure (Rumelhart, 1977), there are a lot of things which one

Forgetting is quite natural mentation for human

beings. Whereas many people suffer morbid forgetting due to aging or disease, anyone experiences wholesome forgetting more or less. This relates to
maintenance of peace of mind and creation of spiritually affluent lives through surmounting fault, shame and PTSD, for example; sound
mental growth including self-transcendence; positive human relationship-building based on, for example, forgiveness (although it can be a far deeper and richer
phenomenon than forgetting as Enright (2001) and Konstan (2010) suggest); and establishment of personal identity. However, as
a result of the development of an advanced information and telecommunication society, the
wholesome functioning of forgetting has substantially become underestimated. We dont
never recalls even when relevant or trigger information to them is provided to him/her.

need to have an obsession with photographic memory, although many people seem to believe that human memory should be precise and the total recall is undoubtedly good.
The vagueness of biological memory based on forgetting characterises humanity and the total recall based on e-memory would make people less human. Hence,

if

9 Kiyoshi Murata (Centre for Business Information Ethics, School of Commerce, Meiji University, Japan) and Yohko Orito (Faculty
of Law and Letters, Ehime University, Japan). The right to forget/be forgotten. 2010. http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~ethicj/The
%20right%20to%20forget%20(extended%20abstract).pdf

R5 Aff
people are in the technological environment in which forgetting is harmfully
restricted regardless of whether they like it or not, an attempt to protect this natural human
mentation through conceptualising the right to forget/be forgotten would be socially justifiable as well
as significant. Coerced Remembrance by Total Recall Technology People, at least in the industrialised countries, are now living in the environment where ICT has become
prevalent in all areas of their lives and economy. They enjoy tremendous benefit provided by ICT-based information systems various organisations set up and operate. On the
other hand, however, as the consequence of the widespread or ubiquitous availability of ICT, people seem to be forced to remember, for example, their past attitudes, behaviour
and experiences and, in addition, even their lineage and genetic characteristics which they would forget if they didnt live in the current ICT-dependent society. In the business
administrative context, Simon (1976) pointed out that human memory may be either natural or artificial, and for any kind of memory to be useful there must be mechanisms
that permit the memory to be drawn upon when needed. Actually, organisational databases and the World Wide Web (WWW) are now considered to substitute a large part of
human memory in a very precise, rapid and efficient fashion, over which memory subjects can hardly exert control. There are some Net users who wish to externalise their
personal memory using online services provided by, say, My Yahoo! and iGoogle. Lifelogging technology (Allen, 2007) would promote the externalisation of human memory in a
through and infallible manner. Thanks to the permeation of ICT centred on database and network technology throughout society, the artificialisation or externalisation of

every time people access some online data related to

them involuntarily or by chance or receive unexpected personalised services based on their
personal information stored in organisational databases, they may be coerced into refreshing their memory
which may contains what they wish to forget. If this is the case, the wholesome functioning of forgetting is seriously impeded. People lose the
human memory has progressed at rapid speed. However,

ownership of their own memory.

Even a complete stranger to memory subjects can stake a claim to their memory. Is this the inevitable

fate of them or a price they have to pay in return for enjoying the benefit provided by ICT-based information systems? Why cant they require others (including both
organisations and individuals) not to reminder them of what they forget on its own or wish to forget? Isnt it reasonable for them to expect that they can forget something about
themselves and be forgotten by others appropriately? In the circumstances where, amongst the four modalities of regulation of human behaviour (Lessig, 1999), markets and
technological architecture function so that people are not allowed to, even appropriately, forget the past of them and the existing social norms dont hinder such function,

the right to forget/be forgotten may have to be established as a legal right , although forgetting is quite
natural mentation for human beings.

RTBF is key to creative self-inventionit challenges electronic surveillance and targeted

advertising
Murata and Orito 10 write10
Behind the study objectives is the authors concern about negative impacts of the externalisation of human memory on intellectual activities and growth, personal identity
development, happiness and dignity of each and every human being. The permeation of information and communication technology (ICT) centred on database and network
technology throughout society has brought about the progress of artificialisation or externalisation of 193 human memory. Organisational databases and the Web are now

technology-driven social
change from Foucauldian disciplinary society to Deleuzian environmental
considered to substitute a large part of human memory. This, with the global spread of market-economy principles, caused a

control society (Azuma and Ohsawa, 2003; Foucault, 1975; Deleuze, 1990) which has resulted in the socio-economic and
technological environment where eternal , unambiguous human memory outside human brains ,
which is continually updated by 24/7 electronic surveillance systems, is relentlessly
used for providing personalised services by business organisations and for public security
and safety and peoples reliable livelihoods by public organisations. In this environment, however, people are
forced to refresh their memory or prohibited to forget the past of them through being provided the
personalised, paternalistic services based on digital records stored in the external human memory. Such
services seem to presuppose that the future of people is an extension of the past of
them. Of course, this is not necessarily true. People can get over their past and may desire to settle
and forget the unfortunate past of them. Actually, human beings have an ability to forget (or store memory) selectively. We have to look at the bright side of forgetting. In the
current technological circumstances where the dream of the total recall will likely come true, if we fail to establish the right to appropriate forgetting/being forgotten, it would
become difficult for us to construct our own identity and personal story at our discretion.

The role of the ballot is to embrace rhizomatic multiplicity. The role of the judge is
to be a facilitator of rhizomatic multiplicity. This is a prerequisite to challenging
oppressive social structures, thats Deleuze and Guattari 83. The role of the ballot
defines the role of the judge since the purpose of a judge is to sign their ballot.

10 Kiyoshi Murata (Centre for Business Information Ethics, School of Commerce, Meiji University, Japan) and Yohko Orito
(Faculty of Law and Letters, Ehime University, Japan). The right to forget/be forgotten. 2010.
http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~ethicj/The%20right%20to%20forget%20(extended%20abstract).pdf

R5 Aff
1AR
Identity bad
Voisset-Veysseyere 11 writes11
In the Deleuzo-Guattarian text, gender is territory: mark, signature. A Thousand Plateaus makes no difference between gender
and sex, according to the socius of any society from which the subject is territorialized as a preformed or fix well-constructed or defined identity: Sex with their own ghetto

Gender belongs to code as a hierarchical category

territorialities.23
or as a classifying tool by which we can
indeed imagine real transexualities.24 But even in the margins of the code, deterritorialization (transcoding)25 is only differentiation and reterritorialization. Regarding
especially to the birth of instituted philosophy in the City, gender is the value for the male friends and rivals who are subjected to the identity injunction of a school; more

people are segmented, not in such a way as to disturb or disperse, but on the contrary to ensure and
control the identity of each agency, including personal identity.26 Unity delineates the territory of a State encoding of flow by law
and empowering of desire in the guise of its alienation in repression: State apparatuses of identity.27 Because there is no identity
without fabric of subjection [assujettissement] or without law the legislator and the subject28 and because law is the structure by
which psychoanalysis lays claim to the role of Cogitatio universalis as the thought of the Law29 at the same time it is signifying the subject, schizoanalysis
liquefies all identity and explodes strata. Out of the regime of
subjectification30 or subjection and against the stratification of desire flow within a site of individuation, each of us
has then to semiotize oneself: Learning to undo things, and to undo oneself, is proper to the war
machine: the not-doing of the warrior, the undoing of the subject.31 No more self (ego) with its secrets (depth) could be a motto of thinking, at least a way of
generally,

experimentation: Where psychoanalysis says, Stop, find your self again, we should say instead, Lets go further still, [], we havent sufficiently dismantled our self.32

The image of subject (unity, identity, sameness versus otherness) is broken: The self is only a threshold, a door, a
becoming between two multiplicities.33 Escaping is then proliferating, following a line instead of identifying or obeying; for we are
not only made by segments: Individual or group, we are traversed by lines34 Among different sorts of lines bastard line, orphan line of thinkers (Massumi, p. ix-x)
and so on, there are lines of flight or of deterritorialization: That is what multiplicity is.35 Multiplicity becoming: Becoming and multiplicity are the same thing36 takes
place in a non predictable universe; a subject cannot be attributed (subjugated) under the one, the object disappears with it: A multiplicity has neither subject nor object,37
no beginning nor end. The multiple must be made38 means then that we must go beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple,39 engages in a line by a gobetween or a passing-through. Becoming and gender appear but opposite in regard to a schizoanalysis which is the theory of an opening subjectivity while psychoanalysis is the
theory of a linear proceeding of subjectivity,40 of a determinate one. Psychoanalytical theory views desire as lack and identity as the mark of this lack in the name of Phallus,
desire as conservative and not as revolutionary; on the contrary of the linguistic and psychoanalytic model, schizoanalytical philosophy theorizes the sense as creation, as
becoming; we can imagine like this: On the road to the asignifying and asubjective.41 On the line as on a surface, we move beyond the signification and its segments.

Curry goes affhe says that abstract and ahistorical morality is bad, but my aff rejects
both Western metaphysics and representational morality. The rejection of both justifies
facilitating rhizomatic multiplicity, thats Spangenberg 9.
1. Perm, do both.
The affs method provides the best account of how modern racism operates
Saldanha and Adams 12 write12
To treat the question of race critically it is necessary , then, to engage the image of thought,
the identities, emplacements and forms of recognition that produce it, as well as those creative
moments of encounter that oblige us to think otherwise, to liveto become. Such a
critical approach to the question of race can be derived from three insights emerging from Deleuzes thought and their implications for thinking about race-habits. First is the
diagnostic of how racism works to be found in Deleuze and Guattaris conceptualization of race, in the chapter Year zero: faciality (1987: 167-91), as the product of faciality
that abstract machine of modernity that produces significance (the white wall) and subjectification (the black hole). The second and third insights emerge from Deleuzes critical
attitude toward habits and partialities and the ethico-political and aesthetic possibilities to be found in his experimentations with empiricist ethics and cinema, respectively. In
each of these experiments, Deleuze points towards the promotion of lines of flight and encounters that interrupt the habitual individualities and moralising tendencies that
impose a limit to life, experience and thought. Faciality and Empiricist Ethics: Reflections on A life... In presenting faciality as a non-dialectical theory of racism, one that is not

Deleuze and Guattari invite an appreciation of modern

racisms propensity to totalise rather than exclude . According to Deleuze and Guattari, modern racism
operates through the erasure of exteriority. The simple formula it presents works by totalising, such that there is no exterior, there are no
predicated on the notion of racial Others,

11 Cecile Voisset-Veysseyere. Toward a post-identity philosophy: along a flight line with Gilles Deleuze? 2011.
http://www.revuetrahir.net/2011-2/trahir-voisset-veysseyre-post-identity.pdf

12 Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams. Deleuze and Race. 2012. http://books.google.com/books?
id=gfQCbrC8IeEC&pg=PA251&lpg=PA251&dq=deleuze+AND+racism&source=bl&ots=evKfapoUei&sig=WfLt_eUZDRd6MGNN6F
MSdUtsQws&hl=en&sa=X&ei=zm1uVMbsIMyqgwSTgoKwBg&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=deleuze%20AND
%20racism&f=false

R5 Aff
people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and
whose crime it is not to be (1987: 178). As a product of faciality, racism operates
on the logic of the same and propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification
have been wiped out (or those who only allow themselves to be identified at a given degree of divergence). Consequently, faciality
and racism do not operate through essentialising opposition marked by binary categories such as
black/white or self/other. Instead, the faciality machine presents racial difference as a range of
deviations from the dominant standardthe Christ, White-Man face. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: Racism operates by the
determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves,
sometimes tolerating them at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (its a Jew, its an Arab,
its a Negro, its a lunatic...)

2. Perm, do both.
A politics of creative experimentation and fluidity is key to challenging racism
Saldanha and Adams 12 write13
In presenting society as a set of institutional inventions, Deleuze provokes us to think about ways of arousing and
maintaining becomings based on the protest against individualist principles. Drawing on Humes crucial discovery that relations are external to
their terms (Deleuze 1991), Deleuze points out that a consideration of the exteriority of relations is not a principle; it is a vital protest against principles (Deleuze and Parnet
1987: 55). Thinking the exteriority of relations presupposes departure from the principles of identification and distribution used to organise the self and the world in racialised

It also privileges experimentation and flux

ways.
, forcing us to think that which runs through life, but is repugnant to
thought (ibid). Being cognizant of the limits to thought arising from the order of being, accompanied by hierarchies, norms and frames characteristic of racial signification and

Deleuze spurs us always to go further. He suggests we make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make
it topple over. He urges readers to create something new. To substitute the AND for IS. A and Ba crucial subtension of
subjectification,

relations that makes relations shoot beyond their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything that could be determined as being. One, or whole (ibid.).

Such interruptions and conjunctions present ways of thinking and experiencing relations that
undermine the stable categories and principles (essentialisms, reifications, reductionisms) that race-habits
seek to maintain. For race operates through fixing and distributing attributes and functions. The
White Man IS. The black man IShis hair, his skin, his nose. As such, the relations that they
enter into are seen as being internal to the names Negro, White Man, Arab or Jew, and serve as the basis for placing
bodies in their proper positions within the grand scale of being . The denigrations and
approbations of these categories are taken as a given and mobilised as basis for mediating estrangement.

3. Perm, do both. Challenging Internet normalization is key. It outweighs race-based

categorization and only my evidence is comparative, thats Buchanan 7.

13 Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams. Deleuze and Race. 2012. http://books.google.com/books?
id=gfQCbrC8IeEC&pg=PA251&lpg=PA251&dq=deleuze+AND+racism&source=bl&ots=evKfapoUei&sig=WfLt_eUZDRd6MGNN6F
MSdUtsQws&hl=en&sa=X&ei=zm1uVMbsIMyqgwSTgoKwBg&ved=0CF0Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=deleuze%20AND
%20racism&f=false