Jacob v.

Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162206
November 17, 2010
Leonardo-De Castro, J. (1st Div)
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on April 10, 2000. Four days later, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with
the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Sandiganbayan accordingly ordered the prosecution to reassess
their evidence and take appropriate action within 60 days thereafter. After the allotted time period
however, the Ombudsman failed to submit its report on its findings on the reinvestigation it conducted,
and continued to submit no reports nor take any action on the case for an entire year. Meanwhile, the
accused were arraigned on schedule.
On March 20, 2001, after almost a year without any development on the trial, the accused filed a Motion
to Resolve with the Office of the Ombudsman, praying that the cases against them be dropped, on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman however still took no action, and even asked the
Sandiganbayan that they be granted more time to prepare their case. Meanwhile, the accused verbally and
consistently asserted their right to a speedy trial in all the hearings conducted.
It was not until August 20, 2001, after having the trial delayed for so many times, that the Sandiganbayan,
through Justice Nario, issued a verbal order dismissing the cases against the accused. This decision of the
court was appealed by the prosecution, and was granted by the Sandiganbayan, on the ground that the
delay incurred against the accused was not vexatious, capricious and oppressive to them, and thus their
right to a speedy trial was not violated.
Petitioners now allege that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that their right to a speedy trial was not
violated. Furthermore, they argue that setting aside the verbal decision of Justice Nario amounted to
putting the accused in double jeopardy
Issues:
Whether or not the right to speedy trial and the right against double jeopardy of the petitioners were
violated.
Ruling:
Neither right was violated. The key to determining whether there has been a violation of the right to a
speedy trial is determining whether it has been free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the first, third and fourth elements
were definitely present, and in favor of the petitioners: the trial had been prolonged for over a year, the
defendants had consistently asserted their right, and there were real and actual prejudice to the petitioners,
which includes but is not limited to anxiety and financial draining.
As for the second element, however, the Court ruled that although they acknowledged the existence of the
delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by the accused, the weighing of
interests militate against a finding that petitioners right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases
involving them would have justified the dismissal of the same. In balancing the societal interests of the
state and the rights of the accused, the dismissal of the criminal cases is too drastic a remedy to be

accorded to the petitioners. The State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the
criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Before
resorting to the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by dismissing the
cases, the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of
contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his report on his reinvestigation.
On the issue of double jeopardy, since the Court agrees that Justice Narios verbal decision was void from
the beginning for not having a valid ground and for not being in the improper form, no jeopardy has
attached in that case, and there being no first jeopardy, there can be no second that will constitute the
double jeopardy.

Lejano v People
G.R. no. 176389
December 14, 2010
Abad, J. (en banc)
Facts:
Hubert Webb, one of the accused in the infamous Vizconde case had filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals for the decision of the trial court in convicting him of the crime Rape with Homicide. The
Appellate Court however sustained the decision of the trial court, and even subsequently denied his
motion for reconsideration. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Webb filed an additional request to submit
for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the deceased victim, which specimen was then believed
to still have been under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of
the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they
might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer had custody of the specimen, the same having
been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted accused
Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital
evidence resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not Webb should be acquitted on the ground of denial of the right to due process as a result of
the failure of the government to produce evidence that could prove his innocence.
Ruling:
Webb is not entitled to an acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen. US
jurisprudence, which is applicable here because our rules on DNA evidence are largely based on theirs,
has held in the case of Arizona v Youngblood that due process does not require the State to preserve the
semen specimen, although it might be useful to the accused, unless the latter is able to show bad faith on
the part of the prosecution or the police.
Furthermore, Webb first raised the DNA issue in the trial court at a time when DNA testing had not yet
been recognized as admissible evidence in the country. It was a foreseeable consequence therefore that the
issue of keeping the specimen for possible future testing did not even come up. Neither did Webb nor the
other accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.
Finally, the Court appreciated the lack of interest of Webbs party in having the test done, given that he
had not raised the same issue at the other avenues before coming to the Court. Considering all the
aforementioned, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce
the semen specimen at some future time.

Leviste v CA
G.R. no. 189122
March 17, 2010
Corona, J (3rd Div)
Facts:
Leviste was convicted of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and one
day prision mayor to 12 years and one day reclusion temporal. He appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, and while pending appeal, he filed for application for admission to bail, citing his advanced age
and health conditions as ground, as well as claiming absence any risk of flight on his part. The Court of
Appeals denied his application for bail, however, invoking the principle of exercising grant of bail with
grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Petitioner contends that he should have been granted bail, considering that none of the conditions
justifying denial of bail under Section 5.3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. He contends that
when the penalty imposed is more that 6 years but less than 20 years, and the circumstances mentioned in
the rules are absent, bail must be granted pending appeal.
Issue:
Should bail be automatically granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
No, bail is not automatically granted under such circumstances. Bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In this case, the courts do not exercise any discretion in granting bail, as it is a
matter of right, under the right to due process.
On the other hand, bail becomes a matter of discretion when it is an application for bail pending appeal,
provided that the punishment for the crime the accused is convicted of is not death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment. In the case, the court may exercise either sound or stringent discretion in granting bail.
Stringent discretion is used by the courts in determining whether any of the circumstances in paragraph 3
Section 5, Rule 114 is present:
1. That he (accused) is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
3. That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
5. That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal
Should any of these circumstances be present, the same warrants an automatic denial of the application
for bail pending appeal. If none are present, then the courts may use sound discretion in granting the bail
considering all other relevant circumstances other than those aforementioned, including the demands of

equity and justice. This merely means that despite there being none of the circumstances in Section 5.3,
Rule 114, the courts may still decide to deny the application of bail pending appeal, as it still has the
ultimate discretion in granting such. In this case, the appellate court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner the bail sought after.
Rather, it was merely acting in compliance with the Rules of Court, as well as keeping with the trend
towards a strict attitude against the allowance of bail pending appeal, grounded on the principle that
judicial discretion should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.

Leviste v Alameda
G.R. no. 182677
August 3, 2010
Carpio Morales J. (3rd Div)
Facts:
Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas, and was ordered to be committed
to custody by RTC Judge Alameda, prompting Leviste to post a cash bond for his release from detention.
The private respondents, the heirs of De las Alas, with conformity of the public prosecutor, filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion with the court for the deferment of the proceedings to allow to public prosecutor
to re-examine the evidence on record or to perform a reinvestigation of the case to determine the proper
offense. Despite objection from the petitioner, respondent Judge granted the Omnibus Motion and ordered
the prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Subsequently, the same judge issued an order admitting the
Amended Information for murder instead of homicide, and issuing a warrant of arrest for the petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge erred in granting the motion for reinvestigation as requested
by the heirs of De las Alas. He posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the
trial court an investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends
that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused. Furthermore, petitioner faults
the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause,
considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the reinvestigation before it
issued the warrant of arrest.
Issues:
Whether or not the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused in cases of arrests
without a warrant.
Whether or not court erred in not conducting a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause before
issuing the warrant of arrest.
Ruling:
The Court denied the petition, ruling in favor of the respondents.
On the remedy of preliminary investigation: The Court cited Sec. 6 Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability
of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with
the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and
the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused
may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.

Generally, preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard
to fine. If there was no preliminary investigation conducted prior to the filing, the accused has the remedy
of asking for a preliminary investigation after the complaint or information has been filed, provided he
does so within 5 days of learning of the complaint. However, the rules admit of cases wherein the
preliminary investigation is no longer necessary: in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant, so long as
an inquest, where available, has been conducted.
In this case, it was the private complainants [now private respondents] who filed a motion for
reinvestigation, admittedly with conformity of the public prosecutor, and not the accused; such being the
subject of the petitioners main contention that the private respondents were not entitled to the remedy,
and therefore, the ensuing amended information and warrant of arrest ordered against him were both
invalid.
The Court holds, however, that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in
light of the ensuing disquisition. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal
case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of
the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor
who has the control of the prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is
allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the
private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation. Furthermore, the reason for filing for a reinvestigation, that is to determine the proper
offense and to amend the offense alleged in the information was a substantial amendment, which makes it
not only the right but also the duty of the prosecutor to ask for a preliminary investigation.
On the issue of judicial determination of probable cause: The Rules do not require a hearing to be
conducted in order to make a judicial determination of probable cause. What the law requires is that the
judge make a personal evaluation of the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecution regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, make a personal
determination of the existence of the same before issuing the warrant. Should he be not satisfied, he may
disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion.

Lozano v. People
G.R. No. 165582
July 9, 2010
Mendoza, J. (2nd Div)
Facts:
Paz Gonzales reported several items stolen from her, including her tires, the total amount of which
amounting to P27,000.00 The barangay tanod received a tip that the stolen tires were being kept in
Callangas house, and as Barangay Tanod Lazaro was watching the place, they saw petitioner and Tubis
carrying out 2 tires which they placed in the baggage compartment of their car. When they accused left,
the other barangay tanods proceeded to arrest the two, and they were subsequently convicted of theft,
mainly on the basis of the testimonies of Lazaro and Gonzales.
Lozano contends that since both witnesses had no personal knowledge that the said tires were recovered
in the possession of the accused, their testimonies are purely hearsay, hence without any probative value.
They did not see first hand that the tires in question were recovered from the vehicle the accused were
riding; Gonzales only knew of this after being told by the barangay tanods; Tanod Lazaro, whilst being
part of the team who captured the accused, was not one of the tanods who actually physically arrested
them and recovered the tires from the car.
Accused Lozano further averred that since the penalty in the crime of theft is based on the value of the
thing stolen, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce proof of its value. In the case at bar, no proof
was adduced as to the value of the alleged lost properties, save for the bare testimony of Paz Gonzales
that it was more or less P27,000.00.
Issues:
Whether or not the testimonial evidence was hearsay and had no probative value.
Whether or not the court properly assigned the value of P27, 000.00 for the value of the items stolen.
Ruling:
On the rule against hearsay: A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, is not barred by the rule
against hearsay. The rationale for the present sense impression exception is that (1) There is no
substantial danger that defects in the declarants memory will affect the value of the statement; (2) the
declarant would not have had much time to fabricate before making the statement; and (3) in many cases,
the person to whom the statement was addressed would have been in a position to check its accuracy;
hence, the declarant could speak with care. Although Lazaro was not part of the team which intercepted
the vehicle and arrested the accused, he personally saw the appellant and his co-accused load the tires
onto their vehicle. Thereafter, the other barangay tanod intercepted the accused and arrested them, and
immediately after that, the barangay tanod reported the arrest and recovery to Lazaro. He obviously did
not have the opportunity to fabricate his statement as he instantly transmitted the information to Lazaro,
who in turn was able to verify the correctness and truthfulness of such account.
On the value of the stolen items: It is a standing doctrine that the opinion of the witness is admissible in
evidence on ordinary matters known to all men of common perception, such as the value of ordinary
household articles. This is to be qualified, however, to apply only to the two tires which were actually
recovered from the possession of the accused, and not to all the other items reported by Gonzales to have

been stolen from her car. The fact that the accused were in possession of the stolen tires does not
necessarily mean that the accused are also the ones responsible for the loss of the other items. Absent
proof of the stolen property, no presumption of guilt can arise. Instead, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should prevail in favor of the accused.

Magdalo v Comelec
G.R. No. 190793
June 19, 2012
Sereno, J. (en banc)
Facts:
Magdalao Para sa Pagbabago (Magdalo) filed its Petition for Registration with Comelec, seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR)
for participation in the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. It duly complied with the substantial
and procedural requirements thereto, but was denied by Comelec on the ground that the partys organizer
and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the Oakwook Mutiny
on July 27, 2003. Comelec declared that this and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time
clearly showed their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in
the process defying the laws of organized societies, and as such assessed them as advocates of the use of
force, thus disqualifying them to become a duly registered political party.
However, Magdalo maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess
whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record. At the time Comelec rendered its
decision, the criminal case against Trillanes and the members who participated in the Oakwood Mutiny
was still pending, and therefore, Comelecs act was a prejudgment of the aforementioned criminal case,
contrary to the right of the accused to a presumption of innocence.
Issue:
Whether or not Comelec violated the right of the accused to a presumption of innocence in basing its
decision of a prejudgment of the criminal case against the members of Magdalo.
Ruling:
The Court rules in favor of Comelec. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution
and Section 61 of BP 881 in the Comelec to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups
to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, Comelec
only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals
by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Thus, the
quantum of proof required for administrative cases is different from that for criminal cases; in the former,
only the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies; while in the latter, the highest quantum of proof,
which is proof beyond reasonable doubt, is required.
In the case at bar, Comelec only had to assess whether the acts committed by the members of Magdalo
during the Oakwood mutiny was telling of their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means
to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. Their findings did not preempt any decision that would have been rendered by the trial court in the criminal proceedings against the
same, and as such, there was no violation of the right of the accused to a presumption of innocence.
Comelec therefore correctly considered all evidence and ruled on Magdalos registration.