I.

Executive Summary
Background

The use of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) dates back at

least to the American Civil War when unmanned balloons were loaded
with explosives in a basket and ignited using a timed fuse. Due to the
unpredictability of wind currents and weather, these primitive UCAVs
were not effective. Other ineffective models were developed over the
years until Nazi Germany developed the V-1, an unmanned flying bomb,
and inflicted thousands of casualties across Great Britain. From WWII
until present day the use of UCAVs has accompanied militaries all over
the world (1).
Military equipment around the world is developed and produced
primarily by private corporations. These manufacturers must make crucial
decisions to determine how to invest time and money. When considering
investment in Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles the following aspects will
demonstrate UCAV superiority: combat ability, cost of operation, and
ethical impact. A clear understanding will direct the wise investor toward
UCAV technology as the next step in future aerial combat.

Research
Objective

Demonstrate the superiority of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles to

provide potential investors confidence to invest in UCAV technology.

Criteria

identified as points of interest when considering interest in UCAV

systems.
1. Combat Ability
a. Are UCAVs an improvement to current systems?
b. What role will they play in combat?
2. Cost of Operation
a. What are production costs?
b. How do UCAVs compare with current systems?
3. Ethical Impact
a. Are UCAV systems acceptable ethically?
IfThen
Statement

If UCAV systems demonstrate feasibility in combat and cost and

do not have a negative ethical affect then they should be seriously
considered for further investment.

Purpose and
Scope

The purpose of this report is to demonstrate the capability of

UCAV systems in reference to the current aerial combat standards.
Comparisons will be drawn with the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-22
Raptor specifically. Factors influencing interest in UCAV technology
military budget cuts, sensitivity to soldier death, and continual foreign
warcreate an opportunity for investment. This paper will not directly
address the issues of why to invest now but will focus on why to invest at

The following
categories

all. Each point of interest will be examined and recommendations for

investment will be made.

have been

Conclusion

expensive fighter jets; allowing room for smaller, more agile and cheaper
UCAVs to take a leading role. To fill this role, UCAV technology is
producing fighters that have significant combat advantages over typical
manned jets. These UCAVs can penetrate enemy air space, destroy targets
and out maneuver human pilots (2).
In addition to combat advantage, UCAVs can be produced cheaper
and faster than conventional jets. Smaller in size, UCAVs will soon be
produced at a fraction of the price of the F-22 (2). With increasing budget
obligations, military cuts will generate interest in greater UCAV
production. Those producers ready to manufacture competent UCAVs
will benefit the most.
Monetary savings is not the only driving factor when considering
UCAV technology. The worth of human life is immeasurable. Unmanned
crafts allow combat situations in which human pilots are not at risk. In an
increasingly dangerous world, preserving soldiers lives becomes more
difficult. Fully implementing UCAVs will drastically reduce pilot
casualties.
Ethical warfare has evolved as mankind has evolved and will
continue to develop into the future as war and weapons change. As a tool,
UCAVs should not be the focus of a debate on ethics, instead, focus
Curren

should be directed at those in control (3). Tactical and cost

t aerial
warfare is
dominated by
bulky and

Overall Conclusion

within the decade. Militaries around the globe will be looking for
producers and those prepared now will have the most to profit.

advantages
will shortly
yield UCAVs
that are ready
for combat
and the ethics
surrounding
will adapt as
well.
UCAV
systems will
be
implemented
more fully
4

characteristic of an aerial combat vehicle is its ability to maneuver through

the air. Vehicle maneuverability often will determine the success or failure
of a mission. Typically a craft with a higher degree of maneuverability is
more valuable in the fleet. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles exceed the
maneuverability of manned fighter jets in the following regards.
Smaller in
Size

The current powerhouse in the United States Air Force is the F-22
Raptor. The Raptor leads the world in warfare ability and, without an
equal, allows the United States aerial dominance. The dominance of the
Raptor is proportional to its size; with a 44-foot wingspan and 62-foot
length the F-22 weighs in at 43,340 pounds (4). By comparison the
Pegasus X-47A (designed by Northrop Grumman) has a 28-foot wingspan
and 28-foot length, while weighing 3, 835 pounds (5). Visual comparisons
are given below in Figure 1. Size reduction opens new possibilities, as
these smaller UCAVs are stealthier, harder to hit and have better
maneuverability.

II. Combat Advantage

A
defining
5

Figure 1: Size Comparison

The F-22 Raptor (left) is larger
in every dimension than the
Northrop Grumman Pegasus X47A (right) (2).

Stealth Ability

To strike without warning and without retaliation characterizes the

objectives of stealth warfare. Covert and stealth attacks originated during
primitive conflict and followed clashes into the sky. The benefits of
attacking without being seen are obvious and require no explanation here.
In a satellite world, todays surveillance relies little on visual observations
and predominately on radar and thermal detection. Radar transmitters
emit radio waves that are reflected back to the receiver when they
encounter objectslarger objects reflect larger amounts of radio waves and
are more easily seen while smaller objects can remain hidden. The smaller
UCAVs have the advantage just from their size. Due in part to their
smaller size, UCAVs can fly closer to the ground, also decreasing
likelihood of detection (6).

size, structural design of UCAVs also decreases the ability to be detected.

Smaller size allows designers to develop better geometry because they do
not have as many restrictions in maintaining a larger vessel in flight (7).
The geometry of the body can reflect radar differently to decrease its
appearance on radar. One strategy involves reflecting the radio waves
away from the receiver so the disruptions in the waves are not observed
and the aircraft remains undetected (7). This stealth advantage allows
UCAVs to penetrate enemy airspace and destroy targets or disable targets
No Onboard
Pilot

while remaining virtually invisible.

Size is only one factor is the superior maneuverability of
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. Human pilots provide a variety of
weaknesses while in the cockpit. Examining these aspects clearly
demonstates the benefits of UCAV systems over human pilots.
G-force is a measurement of non-gravitational forces acting on an
object as it moves. G-force experienced during flight is determined by
maneuvers performed by the aircraft. As seen in Figure 2, NASA trains
pilots to withstand G-force by subjecting them to changes in airplane
flight path.

Apart
from smaller
Figure 2: NASAs Reduced Gravity Program

Astronauts are trained by creating zero G environments by

maneuvering the aircraft. As seen the Gs felt are determined
by the flight path (http://jsc-aircraft-

On December 10, 1954, John

Stapp withstood 25

Gs for 1.1

seconds
with a
maximum
of 46.2 Gs. While impressive,

this feat

ruptured almost every capillary in Stapps eyeballs, leaving him sightless

for the rest of the day (8). While alive, Stapp was incapacitated for hours;
any pilot experiencing this would likewise be effectively useless. Human
G-force tolerance depends on magnitude and direction of the force and
length of time applied. Most aerial maneuvers subject pilots to vertical Gforce, which pushes blood away from or into the brain. Most modern
pilots can withstand 9 Gs with the help of training and G-suits before
losing consciousness (9). This human threshold cripples the ability of
manned craft.

that compose the UCAV. Untethered by human frailties UCAVs could

make 20 G turns and quickly assume superior position in a dog fight
with any manned fighter (2). Additionally, UCAV systems can fly upside
down for extended time periods and accomplish missions human pilots
could not enduredue to length or required stress levels (10). Moreover,
a computer pilot does not feel fear and will proceed despite any dangers
associated with the mission. There will be no hesitation when orders are
Weapons

issued, even in conditions where the pilot would be incapacitated (2).

Advantages in maneuverability will not yield victory in combat
alone; to finish the job competent weapons are required. Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicles leave little disappointment in the area of weapon
capabilitycomparatively keeping pace with the larger jetsand future
advances will continue to generate improvements. The UCAV advantage
involves holding larger weapon payloads and maximizing jamming
capabilities.
As previously discussed UCAVs operate without an onboard pilot,
allowing the removal of all cockpit and life-support equipment. The
removal of the cockpit decreases the total weight of the craft, thus

UCAV
thresholds are

permitting a greater weapon payload without compromising the integrity

of the UCAV (7). Greater weapon payload allows for UCAV to

determined by
the strength of
the materials
9

combat or strike missions in a single flight. A multiple mission flight

could entail reconnaissance, target strike, and continued monitoring of the
area by the same UCAV (still armed). By 2030, Pentagon planners
calculate UCAVs will be fitted to carry twice the payload as the F-16
Electronic
Attack

Fighting Falcon (2).

Electronic attack systems are playing an increasingly important
role in modern war and UCAVs are the ideal platform for battle. Battle
ready UCAVs are capable of operating closer to targets than manned craft
and thereby require less power to operate electronic-attack and jamming
systems (11). Less power requirements lead to smaller equipment or
better equipment-weight ratios. UCAVs then become the premiere
platform for jamming technologycloser penetration and better
equipment being driving components for immediate implementation.
Presently, the United States Air Force has had great success by equipping
the US Hunter joint tactical unmanned aerial system with electronic attack
equipment, including communications and radar jamming (12).

Future
Projections

Figure 3 depicts protections for future weapon technology installed

on UCAV systems. Short-Term describes the state of UCAV weaponry
in 2008, Medium-Term describes the development in the next one-two
years, while Long-Term describes the projections in the next decade. It
is important to note that an important opportunity for UCAV systems to

accomplish
multiple

grow will be within the upcoming years, as technology will advance to

allow UCAVs to play a more dominate role in air defense (11).
10

nticipated projections for implementation. The Figure 3: UCAV Weapon Projections

t reconnaissance UAVs that are being equipped
rm, large, UCAVs aimed at obtaining and
ing air supremacy. (11)

UCAV Weapon Projections

11

Automation

Different control styles of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles provide

operators with needed flexibility to accomplish missions with greater
efficiency than manned craft. Full Automated Control, Full Manual
Control, and Mixed or Hybrid Control allow UCAVs to be used in a
variety of settings.
Full Automated Control permits the UCAV to fly autonomously
without human interference. The UCAV uses onboard sensors to monitor
activities thereby restricting the operator from interfering (13). This style
automation emphasizes the computers precision and calculation abilities
but removes the human flexibility. Full Manual Control is the counter to
Full Automated Control and allows an operator to have complete control
of the craft at all times. In this environment the potential for a human
operator to be overwhelmed is problematic. Additionally, communication
disruption between the operator and UCAVeven temporarilycould
result in failure in the craft (13). Mixed or Hybrid Control was developed
to balance advantages and disadvantages of human and computer control.
The recommended procedure includes developing systems that allow
human override ability of the UCAV while allowing the UCAV to manage
aspects relating to staying airborne (13).

12

III. Cost of
Operation
The availability of funds determines, in part, the strength of a
modern military. The ability to produce equipment that better
accomplishes a task at a lower cost describes the goal of investment.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles satisfies both parties in providing lower
cost weapons that possess significant operational advantages. The
advantages associated with pilot-free operation include no loss of pilot
life, no need for pilot training, and no cost associated with cockpit
manufacturing.
All aerial maneuvers possess some inherit risks, and flying in a
No Loss of
Pilot

combat zone furthers the possibility for disaster. Removing the pilot from
the onboard cockpit eliminates the potential for a human casualty in the
result of mission failure (13). There will be no need to reclaim down
soldiers, no cost to fly a body home, no one to bury, and no family to
grieve. The American public has become increasingly sensitive to their
sons and daughters dying in combat and UCAVs are the first step to
reduce these fatalities (2). When counting cost how much is a human life
worth? While difficult to answer other aspects of UCAV cost benefits
have more quantitative comparisons.

Pilot Training

The United States Air Force audit found that $1.5B could be saved
over the next six years if unmanned vehicles were controlled by
specialized airmen instead of trained pilots (14). Additionally the USAF
spends more than $20M a year on just two of the many basic pilot training
13

platforms (15). These funds are easily recovered with the implementation
of UCAV systems. Considering recent economic challenges, militaries
around the globe will be searching for opportunities to reduce spending.
UCAVs piloting controls operate based on programming and do not
require training (2). When a UCAV is destroyed there is no need to retrain
and replace a pilot, simply program the new craft. Eliminating training
costs allows militaries to allocate funds to other needed programs.
UCAVs completely eliminate the cost associated with cockpit
production and maintenance. The flagship of the United States Air Force is
Cockpit
Production

the unmatched F-22 Raptor. The Raptor potential for air superiority is
uncontested and yet the actual impact of the F-22 has been largely unfelt.
After the first 158 Raptors were delivered they were grounded due to
problems with the life support systems inside the cockpit; causing the
$65B investment to collect dust on the tarmac (16). UCAV systems do not
require life support, control systems, flight sensors and gauges, and
ejection seats like modern manned jetsthereby allowing cheaper
production and no risk of failing life support (2).
By nature of the size, UCAVs require fewer materials to construct.
Considering material, fuel, maintenance costs the Pentagon projects
UCAVs will cost 1/3 of the price of the F-16. F-16 unit production is

14

$18.8M per unit and F-22 unit production is $150M per unit (15). By
2030, Pentagon projections of 1/3 unit cost will result in UCAVs being
produced for $6M per unit. Figure 4 illustrates the $144M savings per
unit when UCAVs are invested in as opposed to the overpowered F-22.

Combat Production Costs Per Unit

Figure 4: Cost Comparison

Unit cost ($M) for the F-16, F-22 and Pentagon projected cost
($M) for UCAVs by 2030.

15

IV. Ethical
Impact
The attempt to define clear and universal ethics of warfare has struggled
to keep ground in a world of changing values and changing tactics. As an
example, the once considered unethical guerilla fighting has become the common
place on the battlefield (17). To attack without being seen is the new standard.
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are an extension of the idea of attacking without
being seen.
The counter-argument to UCAV systems has been the unfairness of a
wealthy country equipped with UCAVs attacking a poorer country with no
protection. There is no real protection against this happening. The history of war
is full of powerful countries attacking less powerful ones (3). Introducing or not
introducing UCAVs will have no affect on the strong taking advantage of the
weak. Therefore, the question of ethics does not involve the weapon but how it
will be used (3). It is equally important to understand that one country feeling an
action is unethical does not dictate the affairs of another country (for example,
the United States stopping UCAV development does not mean Russia will stop as
well). The interest in utilizing UCAV technology will create a market for
powerful UCAVs and the common usage will resolve any ethical debatethe
same as every advance in weaponry has done.

16

V. Overall
Conclusion

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles are a dynamic addition to the world air

Final
Conclusion

forceproviding lower cost, stealth weapons capable of competing with larger

manned jets. Potential for investment in the approaching years will grow as
UCAV technology grows and implementation in aerial fleets matures. Therefore,
it is recommended steps be taken now to ensure an investment in UCAV systems.
The future of aerial warfare is changing and Unmanned Combat Air
Vehicles are paving the ground for those changes. UCAVs show dominance in

Discussion

the multifaceted evaluation of combat situations. By nature, the smaller size of

UCAVs permits greater agility, smaller target for enemy attacks, and increased
stealth. These aspects alone merit investment in the future of UCAV systems.
Additionally, the removal of an onboard pilot allows UCAVs to accomplish
objectives impossible to manned fighters. UCAV weapon capability allows for
drones carry more weapons and be especially effective in communication
jamming and electronic-attack. Furthermore, UCAV automation options allows
for optimal control in a variety of combat scenarios. The clear combat benefits of
UCAV systems show the certainty of their place in the future of aerial combat.
The current transition state of UCAV systems (from small armed UAVs to
equipped UCAVs) opens to the door for immediate investment action.
UCAV cost of production and operation is far below that of typical
manned jets. Specifically comparing the F-22 to 20-year projections each UCAV
will save $144M. UCAV systems do not require fighter pilots to operate them
and therefore provide savings in pilot training. Perhaps most importantly,
UCAVs allow militaries to operate in dangerous situations without the risk of
losing a human pilot.

17

responsible for UCAV actions are the ones that should be faced with ethical
questions, not the UCAVs themselves.

Warfare
ethics change as
standards of
acceptable
conduct change.
As UCAVs
become more
common they
will be more
wildly
accepted. The
important point
to remember is
that those
18

2010.
2. S. Douglass, NO PILOT REQUIRED. (cover story), Popular
Science, vol. 258, no. 6, p. 40, Jun. 2001.
3. D. W. Kolff*, Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni
CooperationUsing UCAVs to Kill Alleged Terrorists: A
Professional Approach to the Normative Bases of Military Ethics,
Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 240244, 2003.
4. www.af.mil
5. www.air-attack.com
6. W. In, M. E. Franke, E. J. Stephen, and M. F. Reeder,
Aerodynamic ground effects of tailless chevron and lambdashaped UCAV models, in 45th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting
2007, January 8, 2007 - January 11, 2007, 2007, vol. 12, pp.
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7. W. Jinzhong, W. Guangyao, and G. Songfen, Cost efficiency
analysis of attack UCAV, Journal of Beijing University of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, vol. 6, p. 014, 2009.

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19

Gilson, E. Daskarolis-Kring, J. Kring, and P. Hancock,

Ergonomics of UAV/UCAV Mission Success: Considerations for
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13. M.
Moulo
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20