LILIA P.

LABADAN
VS
FOREST HILLS ACADEMY
575 SCRA 262 (2008)
While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.
Lilian L. Labadan (Labadan) was hired by Forest Hills Mission Academy (Forest Hills)
as an elementary school teacher in 1989. After one year of employment, she was
maderegistrar and secondary school teacher. In 2003, Labadan filed a complaint
againstForest Hills for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday
pay, allowances, 13th month pay, service incentive leave, illegal deductions, and
damages. She alleged that she was allowed to go on leave, and albeit she had exceeded
her approved leave period, its extension was impliedly approved by the school principal
because Labadan received no warning or reprimand, and was in fact retained in the
payroll. Labadan further alleged that since 1990, tithes to the Seventh Day Adventist
church, of which she was a member, have been illegally deducted from her salary; and
she was not paid overtime pay for overtime service, 13th month pay, five days service
incentive leave pay, and holiday pay; and that her SSS contributions have not been
remitted.
Forest Hills claims that Labadan was permitted to go on leave for two weeks but did not
return for work after the expiration of the period granted. Because of Labadans failure
to report to work despite promises to do so, Forest Hills hired a temporary employee to
accomplish the needed reports. When Labadan did return for work, classes for
theschool year were already underway. With regard to the charge for illegal
deduction,Forest Hills claimed that the Seventh Day Adventist church requires its
members to pay tithes equivalent to 10% of their salaries, and that Labadan never
questioned the deduction of the tithe from her salary. As regards the non-payment of
overtime pay, holiday pay, and allowances, Forest Hills noted that petitioner proffered
no evidence to support the same.

The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Labadan, and found that she was illegally
dismissed, and dismissed her claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, allowances, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters decision with regard to the finding of illegal
dismissal. Labadan then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
was dismissed by the same. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Labadan was illegally dismissed by Forest Hills
HELD:
While in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal.
The records do not show that petitioner was dismissed from the service. They in fact
show that despite petitioners absence from July 2001 to March 2002 which, by her
ownadmission, exceeded her approved leave, she was still considered a member of
the Forest Hills faculty which retained her in its payroll.
Labadan argues, however, that she was constructively dismissed when Forest
Hillsmerged her class with another so much that when she reported back to work, she
has no more claims to hold and no more work to do.
Labadan, however, failed to refute Forest Hills claim that when she expressed her
intention to resume teaching, classes were already ongoing for School Year 2002-2003.
It bears noting that petitioner simultaneously held the positions
of secondary schoolteacher and registrar and, as the NLRC noted, she could have
resumed her work asregistrar had she really wanted to continue working with Forest
Hills.
Labadans affidavit and those of her former colleagues, which she attached to her
Position Paper, merely attested that she was dismissed from her job without valid cause,
but gave no particulars on when and how she was dismissed.
People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis
GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990

FACTS:
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales
and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a
license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment
agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging
employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia"
to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be charged for
illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be
illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee.
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated
June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that
to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings
with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues
that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement
consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private
respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more
prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the
act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419
July 10, 2007
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc.
(respondent) for about five (5) years. He signed a new contract of employment with
the duration of 9 months on Feb 3 1998 and he was to be deployed 10 days after.
This contract was approved by POEA. A week before the date of departure, the

respondent received a phone call from petitioners wife and some unknown callers
asking not to send the latter off because if allowed, he will jump ship in Canada.
Because of the said information, petitioner was told that he would not be leaving for
Canada anymore. This prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the respondent. The LA held the latter responsible. On appeal, the NLRC ruled that
there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent,
hence, the claims should be dismissed. The CA agreed with the NLRCs finding that
since petitioner had not departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee
relationship between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the socalled employer could have no leg to stand on.
ISSUE: When does the employer-employee relationship involving seafarers
commence?
RULING:
A distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and
the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the
contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred
when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the
rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employeremployee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner
been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the
employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of
which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the
reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as
agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.
Respondents act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and
boarding "MSV Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on
its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual
damages he suffered.