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Ting vs. Velez-Ting, G.R. No.

166562,

March 31, 2009

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the


English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this
legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand
by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the
English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th
century, it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to
its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were
plainly unreasonable; (2) where courts of equal authority developed
conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or
reasoning used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by
the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules
and precedents are necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the
courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison disagree
about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge
to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas reveal a deep internal
conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the
flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that
the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof.
Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in
the United States. Two strains of stare decisishave been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof.

Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed
as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a
policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not
one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of
horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional
litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we
have said about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains:
after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a
meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted
by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for Congress'
role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it
cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to
follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The
most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as

constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public


transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that
separate . . . is inherently unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the
shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored
Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this
Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in
order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of
the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries
will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered
before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the
voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood
v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine
whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts
have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification. [53]

De Castro vs. JBC, April 20, 2010

We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being
thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of
March 17, 2010.

Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of
clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is
controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela.[1]
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It
simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of
imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and
in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in
question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions
relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the
decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason
are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. [2]
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
[3]
In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind
the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The
one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to
rule according to its best lights.[4]
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not
controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not
obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after reexamination, to call for a rectification.[5] The adherence to precedents is strict and
rigid in a common-law setting like theUnited Kingdom, where judges make law as
binding as an Act of Parliament.[6] But ours is not a common-law system; hence,
judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial
pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the
court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to
the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and
stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or


abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court
in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to
conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of
the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in
any decision rendered en banc or in division.

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