Energy Liberalisation, Privatisation and Public Ownership: Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)

Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)
www.psiru.org
EnergyLiberalisation,privatisationandpublicownership
September2013
DavidHall,SandravanNiekerk,JennyNguyen,SteveThomas
d.j.hall@gre.ac.uk;sandravn@iafrica.com;t.nguyen@gre.ac.uk;s.thomas@gre.ac.uk
1. LIBERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION TRENDS ..................................................................................... 2

1.1.
LIBERALISATIONANDUNBUNDLING:SLOWINGDOWN....................................................................................................2
1.2.
PRIVATISATION......................................................................................................................................................2
ChartA.
1.3.
ChartB.
2.
PublicprivategenerationinCentralAmerica19902011......................................................................................3
PPPSANDIPPS.....................................................................................................................................................3
PPPinvestmentsinelectricitygenerationbyfuel.................................................................................................4
1.4.
OUTSOURCING......................................................................................................................................................4
PUBLIC SECTOR : RE-MUNICIPALISATION AND RE-NATIONALISATION ......................................... 4
2.1.
REMUNICIPALISATION:GERMANY..............................................................................................................................4
Table1.
2.2.
Newandremunicipalisedstadtwerkeinenergy,Germany,20072012..............................................................5
OTHERRENATIONALISATIONS..................................................................................................................................6
Table2.
Renationalisationsofelectricitycompanies(excludingGermany).......................................................................6
3.
CURRENT CONFLICTS OVER PRIVATISATION .......................................................................................... 7

3.1.
INDONESIA............................................................................................................................................................7
3.2.
KENYA..................................................................................................................................................................7
3.3.
KOREA.................................................................................................................................................................7
3.4.
NIGERIA...............................................................................................................................................................7
3.5.
PAKISTAN.............................................................................................................................................................8
3.6.
PARAGUAY............................................................................................................................................................8
3.7.
PHILIPPINES..........................................................................................................................................................8
3.8.
TUNISIA................................................................................................................................................................8
4. ANNEXE (ENGLISH): LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE.............................................. 9
4.1.
TRENDS:MORENATIONALISATIONTHANPRIVATISATION................................................................................................9
4.2.
ILLEGALITY,CORRUPTIONANDABUSEOFPOWER..........................................................................................................9
4.3.
EFFICIENCY............................................................................................................................................................9
4.4.
PRICESINCREASEDBYPRIVATISATIONANDLIBERALISATION..........................................................................................9
4.5.
PRIVATEDISTRIBUTIONFAILURES.............................................................................................................................10
4.6.
PRIVATEGENERATORS:FAILINGTOINVEST.................................................................................................................10
4.7.
UNBUNDLINGANDLIBERALISATION..........................................................................................................................11
4.7.1.
notworkinginhighincomecountries....................................................................................................11
4.7.2.
Problematicindevelopingcountries......................................................................................................12
4.8.
ALUMINIUMCOMPANIES:HUGECONSUMPTION,SECRETSUBSIDIES................................................................................12
4.9.
CASUALIZATION...................................................................................................................................................12
5. ANNEXE (ESPAGNOL) LECCIONES DE LA EXPERIENCIA INTERNACIONAL .................................. 12
5.1.
TENDENCIAS:MSNACIONALIZACINQUEPRIVATIZACIN...........................................................................................12
5.2.
LAILEGALIDAD,LACORRUPCINYELABUSODEPODER................................................................................................13
5.3.
EFICACIA.............................................................................................................................................................13
5.4.
LOSPRECIOSINCREMENTADOSPORLAPRIVATIZACINYLALIBERALIZACIN..................................................................13
5.5.
LOSFALLOSDELADISTRIBUCINPRIVADA.................................................................................................................14
5.6.
LOSGENERADORESPRIVADOS:ELFRACASOALAHORADEINVERTIR................................................................................14
5.7.
LASEGMENTACINYLALIBERALIZACIN...................................................................................................................15
5.7.1.
Nooperanenpasesderentasaltas.......................................................................................................15
Table4.
ProblemascomunesenlossistemaselctricosliberalizadosdelospasesdelaOCDE......................................15
5.7.2.
Problemticaenlospasesendesarrollo...............................................................................................16
5.8.
LASEMPRESASDELSECTORDELALUMINIO:ELENORMECONSUMO,LASSUBVENCIONESSECRETAS........................................16
5.9.
LAPRECARIZACINDELEMPLEO..............................................................................................................................16
PSIRU,BusinessSchool,UniversityofGreenwich,ParkRow,LondonSE109LS,U.K.
Website:www.psiru.orgEmail:psiru@psiru.orgTel:+44(0)2083319933Fax:+44(0)2083318665
Prof.StephenThomas,DavidHall(Director),JaneLethbridge,EmanueleLobina,VladimirPopov,VioletaCorral,SandravanNiekerk
PSIRU University of Greenwich
www.psiru.org
Introduction
Thispaperreviewsthetrendsinprivatisationandliberalisationintheenergysector,andthedevelopmentof
remunicipalisationandrenationalisationinGermanyandelsewhere.
1.
1.1.
Liberalisationandprivatisationtrends
Liberalisationandunbundling:slowingdown
ThepressuresfromIFIstounbundleandliberaliseelectricitysystemshavefacedstrongresistanceeverywhere.
OutsideOECDcountries,veryfewcountrieshaveimplementedthemodelinfull.ThosethatdidsuchasChileand
Argentinanowfacegreatproblemswhichrequireareturntoamuchstrongerroleforthepublicsector;thosewhich
didsopartially,suchasBrazil,arealsoreassertingtheroleofcentralplanning.
InAfrica,theprocessofunbundlinghassometimesresultedinasplitbetweengenerationontheonehand,and
transmissionanddistributionontheother,ashappenedinKenya;sometimesinasplitbetweengenerationand
transmissionononehand,anddistributionontheother,ashappenedinNamibia;sometimesallthreeareseparated,
asinNigeria;andinTanzania,Tanescoremainsaverticallyintegratedstateutility..
TheWorldBanknowtakestheviewthatmanydevelopingcountriesmayretainintermediatestructuresforthe
foreseeablefuture,ratherthancontinuetofullliberalisation.Onereasonforthisisthatithasfailedtobeuseful:a
WorldBankpaperin2013quotesanacademicstudywhichconcludedthatitisdifficulttofindconclusiveevidenceof
theconsistentlybeneficialeffectsofthereformsactuallyimplementedinmanycountries.Asurveyoftransmission
gridoperatorsin178countriesfoundthattwothirdswerestillrunbyverticallyintegratedutilities.1
InEurope,theliberalisedenergymarketsarenowcomingundergreatpressurebecausetheyareseenasincompatible
withtheneedtodeveloprenewableenergy.Thisisleadingtostrongerrolesforgovernments,lessrespectforthe
markets,ande.g.inGermanytosomeremunicipalisation.Seetheseparatepaperonrenewablesformoredetails.
Therearestillpressurestocreatemarketsforprivatecompanies,however.InVietnam,theWorldBankisstrongly
promotingfurtherunbundlingofthepublicsectorutilityEVN:PSIRUhassubmittedacritiqueoftheseproposals,
whichhasbeenpublishedinthecountrysleadingacademicjournal.InAfrica,theWorldBankisstronglypromoting
regionalpowerpools,asawayofenablingtradinginelectricity(seetheseparatepaperonIFIsformoredetails).2
1.2.
Privatisation
Thepressuresforprivatisationarenolongerasglobalorasconstantasinthe1990sand2000s.Moreover,there
weremanysuccesfulcampaignsagainstelectricityprivatisationandliberalisation,inallregions,andincountrieswith
allincomelevels.Asaresult,thepublicsectorcontinuestohaveastrongandcentralroleinmostdeveloping
countriese.g.EskominSouthAfrica,EletrobrasinBrazil,EVNinVietnam.Theyalsoremaintheprincipalsourceof
investmentfinanceinAfrica,forexample,theprivatesectorhascontributedonly11%oftheactualinvestmentin
electricitysystems(seeseparatepaperonIFIsformoredetail).
AccordingtoWorldBankfigures,theprivatesectoroperatedbetween29%and48%ofdistributioncompaniesin
developingcountries,butthecurrentproportioniscertainlymuchlower.Manydistributorswereprivatisedinsome
LatinAmericancountriesinthe1990s,butsomehavebeenrenationalised,andtherewerenevermanysuch
privatisationselsewhere:inAfrica,forexample,thereisoneprivatiseddistributor,UmemeinUganda,andelsewhere
onlyoneortwomanagementcontracts.Thereareveryfewprivatisedtransmissionsystemsanywhere.
Ineffectthereforethegreatmajorityofprivatesectorpresenceisingeneration,throughIndependentPower
ProducersIPPs.AsthepatternofelectricitygenerationinCentralAmericashows,theprivatesectorsharegrew
rapidlyfromthemid1990s,butreacheditspeaklevelby2005andnotgrownmuchsincethen.Thetrendissimilar
elsewhere,buttheactualshareislower.
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ChartA. PublicprivategenerationinCentralAmerica19902011
Privateshareinelectricitygeneration,
CentralAmerica,19902011
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Source:Centroamrica:estadsticasdeproduccindelsubsectorElctrico,2011.CEPAL/ECLAC
http://www.eclac.org/mexico/publicaciones/xml/6/46906/2012014Estad.subs.elect.2011L.1061alta_res..pdf
Privatisationrmeainsaconstantthreathowever,eitherasawayforgovernmentstoraisemoney,orbecausepublic
utilitiescomeunderfinancialpressureasaresultofhavingtopayexcessiveamountstoIPPs,ascanbeseeninthree
currentexamplesfromLatinAmerica:
Colombiaissellingits57.6%shareholdinginIsagen,the3rdlargestelectricitygeneratingcompany,toraise
money.PotentialbuyersincludeAES,DukeEnergyandGdFSuez.3
Panamaispassingabillenablingthesaleoffurthersharesincompanieswhicharealreadypartlyorlargely
privatised,suchasAESPanama,EnelFortuna,andElektraNoreste.4
HondurasisplanningtoprivatisestreetlightingandelectricitydistributionthroughPPPs,becauseofthe
deficitsithasrunupasaresultofpowerpurchaseagreements:Thecontractssignedwiththermalpower
firmsareENEE'smainfinancialburdenastheytake90%ofitstotalrevenues.AlthoughElcosa,Emce,Luffusa
andEnersageneratedlessthan58%ofthecountry'senergyin2011,theytook82%ofENEE'srevenues.The
firmalsohasasubstantialpayrollasitemploys4,000workers.Tomakematterworse,ENEEalsofaces
considerabletechnicallosses.5
1.3.
PPPsandIPPs
Privatisationisalsobeingpursuedthroughthepromotionofpublicprivatepartnerships(PPPs)ininfrastructureand
becausethegreatmajorityofPPPsinelectricityareinelectricitygeneration,thesePPPstaketheformofindependent
powerproducers(IPPs).Theseprivatepowerstationshavelongtermcontractsunderwhichthegovernmentand/or
apublicsectorutilityguaranteestopurchaseoutputataguaranteedprice,knownaspowerpurchaseagreements
(PPAs).Thismeansthatthepublicsectorcarriestherisk,whiletheprivatecompaniesareguaranteedtheirprofits.
TherearemanyproblemswithIPPs.Firstly,thePPAsoftenmeanthatpublicutilitiespayfarmoreforpowerfromIPPs
thantheychargeconsumers,sotheutilitiesbecomeincreasinglyindebted.Secondly,thereisahugeincentivefor
corruption,withcompaniespreparedtopaylargebribestogetsuchlongtermguaranteedprofits.Thirdly,companies
maystillnotmaketheinvestmentsiftheydonotfittheirstrategies,socountriescannotrelyontheextracapacity.
Fourthly,thegreatmajorityofIPPsusefossilfuelssuchasgas,coaloroil,andsoarecontrarytothedrivefor
reductioninCO2emissions.
TheIFIsandotherglobalinstitutions,suchastheG20,areactivelypromotingPPPsforallformsofinfrastructure,
includingwater,airports,portsandroads,aswellasenergy.TheG20andothers,includingtheWorldEconomic
Forum,areencouragingaglobalnetworkofnationalpublicprivatepartnership(PPP)unitsbasedinsidegovernments,
withaGlobalInfrastructureFacilitymanagedbytheWorldBanksprivatesectorlendingarm,theInternational
FinanceCorporationIFCtoprovidepublicfinanceforPPPs,andencouraginggovernmentstoprovidefurther
subsidiestomakePPPsprofitable.6
TheG20sapproachhasbeenstronglycriticisedbycivilsocietyorganisationsatthe2013meetingsinMoscow,who
calledfortheG20to:7
relinquishitsbiasinfavourofPPPsinordertoweighthisapproachwithalternatives
encouragegovernmentstoexpandpublicinvestmentininfrastructure.largeinfrastructureprojectsare
oftendrivenbygovernments(andstateownedenterprises(SOEs))ofemergingmarketcountries
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ensurethatgovernmentssecurethenecessaryinstitutionalcapacityto:negotiateequitablefinancial
arrangements;provideregulation,especiallyinthesectorswherenaturalmonopoliesexist;deliverpublic
goods;andpreventcorruption
supportdemocraticallycontrolledinfrastructureinvestment,basedonabottomupapproachformulated
bylocallyandnationallyownedstrategies.
Takefullaccountofthetransactioncostsoftenderingandmonitoring
AWorldBankreviewinMarch2013foundthatPPPsinvestmainlyincoal,gasandoilfiredgeneration,including
diesel,ratherthanrenewables.Nevertheless,theIFIsaretryingtohelpprivatecompaniesisbycapturingfunds
intendedforclimatechangesothattheycanbeusedonPPPs.8
ChartB. PPPinvestmentsinelectricitygenerationbyfuel
Source:WorldBankMarch2013RevisitingPublicPrivatePartnershipsinthePowerSectorhttp://go.worldbank.org/69VJOM9P90
1.4.
Outsourcing
Anotherformofprivatisationisoutsourcingofworktocontractors,whichresultsinthereplacementofpermanent
workerswithcasualisedlabour.Thisisusedbybothprivateandpubliccompanies.Forexample,therewas
widespreaduseofcontractorsbysomeofthemultinationalswhichtookoverelectricitycompaniesinLatinAmerica,
especiallyArgentina;andEuropeanenergycompaniesalsotriedtooutsourceworkinthe1990sand2000s.
OnecurrentbattleoveroutsourcingisinKenya,wheretherehasbeenamajordisputebetweenKenyaPowerand
Lightandtheunion,KETAWU,overattemptstodismisspermanentworkersandemploycasuallabourthrough
contractors.KETAWUhasbeensuccessfulinblockingdismissalsandconvertingthecasualisedandoutsourced
workersintopermanentstatus.
2.
2.1.
Publicsector:remunicipalisationandrenationalisation
Remunicipalisation:Germany
InGermany,therehasbeenamajorshifttowardsdirectmunicipalprovisionofenergyservices,especiallyelectricity,
sincethemid2000s.Between2007andmid2012,over60newlocalpublicutilities(stadtwerke)havebeensetup
andmorethan190concessionsforenergydistributionnetworksthegreatmajoritybeingelectricitydistribution
networkshavereturnedtopublichands.
Thisprocessisexpectedtocontinueandaccelerate.Almostallexistingconcessionsintheenergysectorareupfor
renewalintheperiodupto2016,andabouttwothirdsofallGermancommunesareconsideringbuyingbackboth
electricitygeneratorsandthedistributionnetworks,includingprivateshareholdingsinsomeofthe850Stadtwerke.
Thenewandremunicipalisedstadtwerkeareabletooperateassupplycompanies,eitherbuyingorgeneratingthe
mixofelectricitytheywant.
TherearecampaignsandreferendainitiativesformunicipalisedelectricityinmajorcitieslikeHamburg,Stuttgart,
Bielefeld,Bremen,FrankfurtandBerlin.ThesearegainingstrongsupportfromaGermanpublicwhichisverycritical
ofelectricityprivatisation,especiallybecauseofpricerises:thispublicsupportisalsovisibleintheparallelstreamof
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referendawhichhavestronglyrejectedproposalsforprivatisationofelectricityandotherlocalutilities,andapublic
opinionpollof2008whichshowedthatmostcitizenstrustpublicenterprisesmorethanprivateones.(Rber2009)
Inaddition,somemunicipalandregionalauthorities(lnder)haveboughtlargeelectricitycompaniesfromthemajor
groups.GermanenergycompanieshavewantedtosellsomeoftheiroperationspartlybecauseGermanandEU
regulatorshaveinsistedonit,partlybecausetheywanttoreducedebts,andpartlybecauseofproblemswith
profitability,especiallyaftertheGermangovernmentdecisiontophaseoutnuclearpower.TheCDUgovernmentof
BadenWuerttembergboughtback45%ofEnBWfor4.7billionEurosfromtheFrenchmultinationalEDF;E.onsold
Thga,aholdingforsharesinmanystadwerke,for2.9billion;sixcommunesinNorthRhineWestphaliaboughtthe
fifthbiggestGermanelectricitygeneratingcompany,EvonikSteag,for649million.9
Table 1.
New and re-municipalised stadtwerke in energy, Germany, 2007-2012
Note:themajorityoftheseareelectricityutilities;someelectricityandgas;asmallnumberaregasonly.
Region(land)
Newstadtwerke
Remunicipalised
distribution
concessions
Otherre
municipalisation
BadenWrttemberg
19
47
15
Bayern
7
8
3
Berlin
1
Brandenburg
1
21
2
Bremen
1
Hamburg
1
Hessen
1
18
4
MecklenburgVorpommern
2
2
Niedersachsen
11
14
9
NordrheinWestfalen
12
13
19
RheinlandPfalz
1
4
Sachsen
1
18
1
SachsenAnhalt
4
1
SchleswigHolstein
6
27
1
Thringen
1
16
TOTAL
63
192
57
Source:pressreports,VKU
Germanlegislatorsandregulatorshavefacilitatedthisremunicipalisation.Theenergyframeworklawwascriticised
inparliamentaryhearingsforcreatingbarrierstoremunicipalisationandpublicownershipofenergygrids,especially
aroundthelackoflegalclarityforthereturnofpropertybythepreviousconcessionaire,requirementstomake
availablenecessaryinformationfornewtenders,andthepriceofbuybacksofnetworks(Krischer2011).Alawinthe
stateofNorthRhineWestphaliainDecember2010facilitatedremunicipalisationofpreviouslyprivatisedutilities,and
alsoprovidesforthecommercialexpansionofcommunalStadtwerke.Onekeymotivewastobreakuptheexisting
oligopolyintheelectricitymarket,whichsinceliberalizationin1999hasbeendominatedbyfourcorporations(E.ON,
RWE,VattenfallandEnBW),asnotedbythereportsoftheGermanmonopolycommissionwhichin2009gavethe
bluntanalysis:thereisstillnoworkablecompetition.10
Asaresult,themajorityofelectricitydistributioninGermanyisnowmunicipal,ratherthanprivate.Asof2011,
stadtwerkealreadyhold57%ofelectricityconsumption(andthesamedominanceisvisibleingasnetworks,where
themunicipalitieshold52%,anddistrictheating,ofwhichtheyhold50%).Despitebeingthehomeoftwoofthe
largestprivateenergycompaniesinEurope,electricitydistributioninGermanyisnowpredominantlypublic.There
municipalisationofthedistributionnetworksdoesnotinitselfgivemunicipalitiesdirectcontroloverthelevelof
renewableelectricityused.UndertheliberalisedmarketrequiredbyEUlaw,distributorshavetotransmitwhatever
electricityisbeingsoldbysupplycompaniestothefinalconsumers.Thenewandremunicipalisedstadtwerke,
however,areabletooperateassupplycompanies,eitherbuyingorgeneratingthemixofelectricitytheywant.In
generation,however,thelevelismuchlower,withmunicipalitiesowningabout10%oftotalinstalledgenerating
capacity.Over80%ofelectricitygenerationinGermanyremainsinthehandsofthe4largestcompanies,although
thisisexpectedtofallasthecompaniesphaseouttheirnuclearpowerplantsasrequiredbynewnationalpolicy
followingtheJapaneseearthquakeandtsunami.11
Informationaboutremunicipalisationhasbeendisseminatedbyastrongnationalassociationofstadtwerke,theVKU
(VerbandkommunalerUnternehmentheAssociationofLocalUtilities),withover1400members,whichactively
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promotesremunicipalisationandactsasavehicleofpolicydiffusion.Itemphasisesthedistinctivefeatureof
stadtwerkeaspursuingpublicinterestobjectives:theydonotprimarilypursueprivatecommercialobjectivesbutare
guidedbypublicwelfareobligations.Inourdemocraticsystem,theyoperateunderlocalselfadministrationtoserve
"citizenvalue",i.e.tomeettheneedsofthelocalcommunity.Thetypeofcapitaltheyformandsecureisa
communityorientedasset[eingemeinschaftlichorientiertesVermgen]."InMay2012theVKUlaunchedapublic
campaigntopromotethesuperiorityofmunicipalenterprises.12
Thereisalsoanewcollaborationtostrengthentheroleofmunicipalitiesinbuyingelectricityandexpandingtheirrole
asgenerators.Trianelisajointventureofover80stadtwerke,formedin1999tofacilitateenergytradingbyGerman
municipalcompaniesintheliberalisedelectricityandgasmarkets.Ithassinceextendeditsfunctions,building
pumpedstoragepowerstations,gasandcoalfiredpowerstations,andwindenergyfarms,includinganinvestmentof
800millioninthefirstmunicipaloffshorewindfarmintheNorthSea.In2010ithadsalesover2.5billion.Ithas
extendeditsmembershipinternationally,sothatitnowincludesmunicipalutilitiesinSwitzerland,Austria,andthe
Netherlands.Italsopromotestheroleofmunicipalenergycompanies,andjoinedtheVKUcampaigninMay2012,
withastatementthat:"Municipalcompanieshavedevelopedahistoricallysustainablebusinessmodel,withahigh
levelofpublicsupport,incontrasttotheprivatepowercompanies.13
AkeypartofthebackgroundistheambitiousrenewableenergypolicyobjectivesoftheEnergytransformation
[energiewende],becausetheprivatecompaniesareseenasfailingtodeliverrenewables.Thisisdescribedinthe
separatepaperonRenewableEnergy.
2.2.
Table 2.
Otherrenationalisations
Re-nationalisations of electricity companies (excluding Germany)
Country
Argentina
Argentina
Belize
Date
20092013
Jul2013
2009
Bolivia
2010
2013
May2007
2003
Brazil
Dominican
Republic
Egypt
Finland
Japan
Lithuania
2005
2011
2012
2011
distributioncompaniesEdecat,Edelar14
Metrogas,gasdistributioncompany15
2electricitydistributioncompanies,BelizeTelemediaLtd(BTL)
andBelizeElectricityLtd(BEL)16
2electricitydistributioncompanies,transmissioncompany,and
generatingcompanies
ReturntomajoritypublicownershipofdistributorLight
distributioncompaniesEdeNorteandEdeSur
PampaEnergia
BritishGas
3IPPs
BoughtouttransmissioncompanyFinngrid
NationalisationofnuclearcompanyTepco
Renationalisationandintegrationofelectricitycompanies
privatisedin2000s
distributorEdC,generationcompanies
EdF
Iberdrola,GDFSuez,
Rurelec,RedElectrica
AES
UnionFenosa
Venezuela
2007
AES,CMS
Japan:In2012JapanfinallynationalisedTepco,thenuclearpowercompanywhichhadbeenhitbyleaksofradioactive
materialasaresultofthe2010earthquakeandtsunami.
Lithuania:Attheendof2011Lithuaniacompletedtherenationalisationofitsenergysystem,reversingthe
privatisationintroducedintheearly2000s.
InArgentina,thestatehastakenanincreasingroleinthesectorsincetheeconomiccrisisof2000.
Thegovernmentintervenedintheelectricitysectorbetween2002and2007bymakingpublicinvestmentsin
additionalgeneratingcapacity,andendingmarketbasedpricing.Anacademicstudyfoundthatthiswasvery
effective:Publicinvestmentandinvestmentthroughpublicprivateparticipation(PPP)inthesectornotonly
relievedthecapacityconstraints,butalsoallowedgovernmenttokeeppricesundercontrol.Onaverage,
priceswouldhavebeen75%higher,hadtheArgentinegovernmentnottakenpriceandinvestmentrelated
measures17
thegasdistributorMetrogaswaseffectivelyrenationalisedinMay2013whenYPF(theoilandgascompany
whichwasitselfrenationalisedin2012)boughttheshareswhichwerestillownedbyBritishGas(BG)inGas
ArgentinoSA(GASA),thecontrollerof70%ofcapitalinMetrogas.YPFwillhavetoresolvecashflow
problemsthathavelaidMetrogasverylowoflatewithtariffslongsincefrozenandcostsrising.18
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TheelectricitydistributioncompaniesEdecatandEdelarwererenationalisedbyprovincialgovernmentsin
2009and2013,followingproblemsofunderinvestment,labourdisputes,andlowprices.19
Boliviahassystematicallynationalisedelectricitygeneration,distributionandtransmissioncompaniessince2010.All
ofthesehadbeenprivatisedinthe1990s,aspartoftheunbundlingandliberalisationprogrammesoftheWorldBank.
InJanuary2013BolivianationalisedthetwomajorelectricitydistributorsElectropaz,whichsuppliesmore
than470,000customersintheareaofLaPaz,andElfeo(morethan80,000customersintheOruroregion),
andtheassociatedservicecompaniesCompaaAdministradoradeEmpresasBolivianaandEmpresade
ServiciosEdeser,allofwhichwereownedbyIberdrola.InMay2012,thetransmissioncompany
TransportadoradeElectricidad(TDE)wasnationalised,whichhadbeenownedbytheSpanishelectrical
transmissioncompanyREE.
In2010,fourpowergenerationcompanieswereexpropriated,includingtwosubsidiariesofGDFSUEZand
Rurelec(UK).Nationalisationsinthepowersectorsarebasedonarticles20and378oftheBolivian
constitution(energyproductionchaininthestagesofgeneration,transmissionanddistributionmaynotbe
restrictedsolelytoprivateinterests).20
Boliviastillplansfurthernationalisationsinthesector,toestablish100%stateownershipofEmpresa
ElectricaValleHermoso,EmpresaGuaracachi,TransportadoradeElectricidad(TDE)andEmpresade
DistribucionLarecajaSAM21
Belize:DeanBarrow'sadministrationnationalisedBelizeTelecomsLimited(BTL)andBelizeElectricityLimited(BEL)in
2009.LegalcasesregardingthenationalisationsofBTLandBELremainongoing.22
TheDominicanRepublicnationaliseditsdistributioncompaniesin2003,fiveyearsafterprivatisation,becauseof
increasingpublicunrestoverprices.
Brazil:thedistributioncompaniesownedbytheRedegroupweretakenoverbytheregulatorybodyAneelin2012
becausethedangerofbankruptcythreatenedthepowersupplyin5states.In2013acourtagreedthecompany
wouldbetakenoverbyanotherBrazilianprivategroup,Energisa.23
3.
3.1.
Currentconflictsoverprivatisation
Indonesia
IndonesiahasbeenattemptingtounbundleandprivatiseitspublicsectorutilityPLNsincetheearly2000s.Thereare
alsoanumberofIPPs,manysetupinthe1990swithcorruptagreementswhichforcePLNtobuypoweratexcessive
prices.Theunionhasfoughtalongbattle,includingavictoryintheconstitutionalcourtagainsta2003law,butanew
lawenablesvariousformsofprivatisation,includingoutsourcing.
3.2.
Kenya
TheKenyanelectricitysectorhasalreadybeensubjectedtounbundling,andpartialprivatisationthroughIPPs,mostof
whichhavebeencorruptandexpensive,andthepartialprivatisationofKenyaPowerandLight.Therearecontinuing
attemptsatprivatisationinvariousforms,includingoutsourcing,andthepossibleuseofprivatecompaniestotake
oversomedistribution.TheunionKETAWUhasthreatenedstrikeactionoverthedismissalofworkersandtheir
replacementbycontractorsusingcasualstaff,andalsocampaignedonformalisingtheemploymentstatusofcasual
daylabourersemployedbythepowercompany.24
3.3.
Korea
Threenuclearreactorshavebeenshutdownasaresultofsafetyconcerns,aftersafetyequipmentwasfoundtobe
inadequateasaresultofbribespaidbythenuclearpowerindustry.Thegovernmenthasstarteddiscussingfurther
liberalisationasawayofdealingwiththecrisis,despitethefactthatthisoptionwasdropped8yearsagoafterstrong
campaignsbyunionsandothers.
3.4.
Nigeria
Nigeriahasgreatproblemswithitselectricitysystem.Only40%ortheurbanpopulationand10%oftherural
populationconnected,therearefrequentblackouts,andlackoffinance.Theelectricitysystemwasunbundledin2005
withthesupportoftheWorldBank,andthegovernmentdecidedin2010toprivatiseallpartsdofthesystem,andto
increaseelectricitypricestomakethebusinessmoreprofitable.Thisprovokedmassivepubliprotests,andtheprice
riseswerereviewed,buttheprivatisationcontinued,andmostofthesuccessfulbiddersincludecompanieswithclose
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connectionstothegovernment.TheNigerianunionhaswarnedinvestorsthattherearemanyunresolvedlabour
disputes.
3.5.
Pakistan
Therehavebeenattemptstoprivatisethenationalelectricityutility,WAPDA,forover15years.Forsomeyearsitwas
takenoverbythemilitary.Thecampaignagainstitsprivatisationremainsstrong,ledbytheunion.WAPDAisunder
greatfinancialpressurebecausetheintroductionofprivatepowergenerators(IPPs)inthe1990sforcedWAPDAto
paymuchhigherpricestothenewprivatecompanies,whilebeingunabletoraisethepriceschargedtocitizens.
TheKarachielectricityutility,KESC,wasprivatisedin2005toaSaudicompany,whichhassincesoldittotheAbraaj
group,aprivateequitycompany,whichgets24%ofitsfinancefromDFIsandIFIs.Thisprivatisationisstillregarded
asadisasterbyworkers,consumers,andKarachiCityCouncil,allofwhomhaverepeatedlydemandedits
renationalisation,andcontinuetodosoinlate2013.25
3.6.
Paraguay
ThegovernmentofParaguayhasannouncedplanstoprivatisethestateenergycompany,ANDE.Theprobablebuyer
istheminingmultinationalRioTinto,whichrecentlyannouncedplanstobuildanaluminiumsmelterinthecountry.
Theunion,SITRANDE,haslaunchedacampaignagainstthis.(seeAnnexeforfurtherinformation)
3.7.
Philippines
ThegovernmentandtheprivatisedNationalPowerGridCompanyhavetriedtoforcetheprovinvceofAlbaytoagree
totheprivatisationofitselectricitycooperative,AlbayElectricCooperative(ALECO),whichisindebt.Themember
consumersinALECOledbyitslaborunionshavealreadyproposedaviablesolutionbasedoncontinuedpubliccontrol,
butthegovernmentrejectthis.
OnJuly30th,2013,theNationalPowerGridCorporationshutoffpowerto1.2millionpeopleinthe
PhilippineprovinceofAlbay,citingmillionsinunpaidbills.160,000householdshadnopower,andhospitals
andotheremergencyfacilitiesusedgeneratorstooperateandmaintaincriticalservices..Localcitizens
groupandtheemployeeunionofALECOarguedthatthepoweroutagewasblackmailtoforceAlbaycitizens
toacceptprivatizationofthelocalpowercooperative.26
ThePhilippineunionshavebeenfightingprivatisationanditsconsequencesformanyyears.Theyrecentlywonalong
runningcourtcasetoclaimbackpayorreinstatementforover5,000workerswhowereillegallydismissedwhenthe
nationalutility,Napocor,wasprivatisedin2003.TheSupremeCourthasruledinfavouroftheworkers,thattheyare
entitledtobackpayworthUSD$1.3billiondollars,thoughthishasstillnotbeenpaid.27
3.8.
Tunisia
Tunisiahasastrongpublicsectorelectricitycompany,butprivatecompaniesfromEuropeandtheMiddleEastwant
toprofitfromthepossiblesolarenergyfromtheSaharadesert,aswellasotherformsofprivatisation.Theprivate
consortiumpromotingtheDesertecprojecthasnowcollapsed,butarecentvisitbyFrenchbusinesses,GdFSueztold
theTunisiangovernmentthattheywanttoseePPPscreated.28
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4.
www.psiru.org
Annexe(English):Lessonsfrominternationalexperience
Note:ThissummaryoftheargumentsagainstelectricityprivatisationwaspreparedfortheParaguayanunion
SITRANDEinAugust2013
4.1.
Trends:morenationalisationthanprivatisation
Nationalisationofelectricitycompaniesisnowmorecommonthanprivatisation,inlargepartbecauseprivateowners
haveincreasedpricesbutnotinvested.
InLatinAmerica,privatiseddistributionorgeneratingcompanieshavebeenwhollyorpartlyrenationalisedin
Argentina,Belize,Bolivia,Brazil,theDominicanRepublic,andVenezuelainthelast10years,whiletherehave
beennonewprivatisations.
InBolivia,theelectricitysystemwasprivatisedinthe1990sandearly2000s,andsoldtomultinationalssuch
asIberdrolaandREE(Spain),GdF(France)andRurelec(UK).ConnectionchargeswerethehighestinLatin
America,only78%ofthepopulationwasconnectedin2009,andtherewasverylittleinvestmentinnew
transmissionanddistributionlines.Thegovernmenthasnowrenationalisedmostgenerating,distribution
andtransmissioncompaniesinthelast3years,andhascutelectricitypricesby60%.29
InEurope,thepublicsectorisbecomingmoreimportanttoo,becausetheprivateenergycompanieshavenot
deliveredrenewableenergy.InGermany,over200electricityutilitieshavebeenbroughtintothepublic
sector,and60newpublicsectorutilitieshavebeencreated,since2007.Thepublicsectornowownsover
80%ofthenetworks,andagrowingproportionofelectricitygeneration.30
4.2.
Illegality,corruptionandabuseofpower
Insomecountries,courtshaveruledthatelectricityprivatisationisunconstitutionalorillegal.
InMexico,proposalstounbundleandliberalisethesystemwererejectedasunconstitutionalbytheSupreme
Courtin2002,rulingthatitcontravenedtherequirementforstateownershipofthesystem.31
InEcuador,theConstitutionalCourtruledthataproposedprivatisationofdistributioncompanieswas
illegal32
InThailand,inMarch2006,theSupremeAdministrativeCourtdeclaredthattheprivatisationprocessstarted
bythenprimeminister,ThaksinShinawatra,wasillegalonavarietyofgrounds.Itruledthat:The
governmenthasabuseditspowerinprivatizingthestateenterprise.33
IPPsdependonlongtermpowerpurchaseagreements(PPAs),lastingfor2030years,underwhichthegovernmentor
astateagencyguaranteestobuytheoutputatanagreedprice.Thepotentialprofitsfromsuchcontractscreate
incentiveforcorruption,andtherehavebeenprosecutionsofcompaniesforcorruptionoverIPPsinmanycountries,
includingIndonesia,Pakistan,andNigeria.34
4.3.
Efficiency
Privateelectricitycompaniesarenotmoreefficientthanpublicsectorcompanies.Aglobalstudyin1995,which
compareddozensofpublicandprivateelectricityoperatorsallovertheworld,andfoundnosignificantsystematic
differencebetweenpublicandprivateintermsofefficiency.35StudiesoftheUKprivatisationsconcludedthatthereis
littleevidencethatprivatisationhascausedasignificantimprovementinperformance.Generallythegreat
expectationsforprivatisationevidentinministerialspeecheshavenotbeenborneout"36.
ThereisnoevidencethatANDEisinefficient,butithassufferedfromlackofinvestment.AreportonParaguaybyaUK
academicin2010saidofANDEthat:itsinternalmanagementandtechnicalcapacityareregardedasbetterthan
thoseatotherstateownedenterprises,andthatinterruptionsofsupplywerecausedbyyearsofunderinvestment
innewgeneratingandtransmissioncapacity.37
4.4.
Pricesincreasedbyprivatisationandliberalisation
Privatisationandliberalisationdonotdecreasethepriceofelectricitytheyincreaseit.Thecostofattemptingto
createcompetitionishigherthanthecostofmaintainingatraditionalmonopolysystem,becauseofthecombined
costofcapital,costofmarketing,costofcustomerswitching,costofinstallation(Thomas,2006).
InLatinAmerica,andintherestoftheworld,privatisation,unbundlingandmarketisationarelinkedwithhigher
electricitypricesforhouseholds.38AstudyofcountriesinLatinAmericaandeasternEuropefoundthattheresultof
unbundlingandcreatingwholesalemarketsinelectricitywasnottoreduceprices,buttoincreasethem.39Anew
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studyhasshownthatinnearlyallcountrieswhichhaveprivatisedandliberalisedtosomeextent,thenonfuelcostsof
electricitytohouseholdsandtoindustryhasrisensharplyinthe20yearsupto2007.
Source:Erdogdu201340
4.5.
Privatedistributionfailures
Theprivatisationofdistributioncompanieshascreatedmanyproblems,withprivatecompaniestryingtoforceup
prices,producinggreatpublicresistance.
BoththeDominicanrepublicandBelizerenationaliseddistributioncompanies,asaresultofcontinuingpublic
oppositionandcompanydemandsforstatesubsidies.41
InArgentina,thestatehasrefusedtoallowfurtherpricerises,buthasprovidedgrowingsubsidiestoenable
theprivatecompaniestomakeaprofit.
InGuatemala,theprivatiseddistributioncompanieshaveprovokedpublicangerbyexcessivepriceincreases
andpoorservice.InOctober2012,soldierskilled6peopledemonstratingagainstpricerisesbythe
companies,whicharenowownedbyaUKcompany,Actis.42Actisalsoownstheprivatiseddistribution
companyinUganda,calledUmeme,whichdefraudedthegovernmentofUgandatothetuneofUSD$197
millionbyoverdeclaringlosses,wassuedby2,000consumersforovercharging,andwasratedasoneof
themostcorruptinstitutionsinthecountrybyaTransparencyInternationalsurvey;andtheregulatorhas
saidthatUmemescontractwouldhavebeenterminatedalongtimeago,butthereisapunitive
compensationclauseinthecontract.43
AWorldBankreportconcludedthatexperienceshowsthatacentralisedpublicsectorutilitydeliversmuchbetter
resultsinruralelectrificationthanfragmentedorprivatisedapproaches:
countriesthathavetakenacentralizedapproachtoelectrification,withthenationalutilityresponsibleforextending
thegrid,havebeenmoresuccessfulthanthosethatfolloweddecentralizedapproaches,wherearuralelectrification
agencyattemptedtorecruitmultipleutilitiesorprivatecompaniesintotheelectrificationcampaign.44
4.6.
Privategenerators:failingtoinvest
TheIEAsaysthatinmostdevelopingcountriesupfrontpublicinvestmentindevelopingnationalandlocalcapacityis
themostimportantingredientforattractinganyprivateinvestmentatallandeventhenitwillonlytakeplace
whereacommercialreturncanbereliablyearnedontheinvestment.45Asaresult,privateelectricitygenerators
invariablyrequirelongtermgovernmentguarantees,usuallyintheformofpowerpurchaseagreements(PPAs)which
guaranteetopayforthepotentialoutputofapowerstationforupto25or30years,regardlessofdemandsothe
statestillcarriestherisks.EveryIPPprojectinMexico,forexample,hasexplicitgovernmentguarantees.46
Brazilintroducedprivatisationandliberalisationinthe1990s,relyingonprivatecompaniestodevelopnew
powerstations.In2001therewasacrisisduetoashortageofgeneratingcapacityresultingfromthefailure
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ofthenewmarkettostimulateinvestmentinnewgeneration.Brazilthensuspendedtheprivatisationand
liberalisationprogramme,andlaterreestablishedastrongcentralstateownedEnergyPlanningCompany
(EPE,EmpresadePesquisaEnergtica),whichnowemploysabout250people.Itforecastsdemand20years
ahead,plansrequiredinfrastructureandgeneration,andcommissionsspecifiedprojects.47
Chileprivatisedandliberaliseditssysteminthe1980s,underthemilitarydictatorship.Butthenewsytem
effectivelyencouragedpowerfirmstopostponeoravoidaltogethertheinstallationofadditionalgeneration
capacity,whichledseriousenergycrisesin199899,andagainin20072009,whenthegovernmenthadto
spendover$US1billiontosubsidisefuelandelectricityprices,andmakeheavyuseofexpensivediesel
generators..48Thecrisishighlightedproblemswiththecoordinationandtransparencyoftheprivate
generatingcompaniesandtherelativeweaknessofpublicbodiesindealingwithshorttermprofitoriented
privatefirms,andthelackofalongtermenergystrategy.49
PrivateIPPsnearlyalwaysusegasgeneration,whichisnotascheaporcleanashydroplants,andso:incountrieslike
GhanatariffsincreasedsteeplyaftertheintroductionofthermalgenerationwithIPPs.(Dagdeviren2009)AWorld
Bankstudyalsodescribesthemasrelativelycostlybecauseoftechnologychoices,procurementproblems,and
currencydevaluations,andsaysthattheyrepresentasmallfractionoftotalgenerationcapacityandhavemostly
complementedincumbentstateownedutilities.50
4.7.
Unbundlingandliberalisation
4.7.1.
not working in high income countries
AglobalreviewofliberalisationandderegulationintheUSA,EUandotherOECDcountries,publishedintheElectricity
Journalin2009,identifiedanumberofcommonfeaturesinthisexperience.Itfoundaconsistentpatternof
problems,includingconsumeropposition,lackofcompetition,higherprices,gaming,oligopoly,lackofinvestmentor
innovation.51ThereportwaswrittenbythedirectoroftheElectricityConsumersResourceCouncil(ELCON),which
representsindustrialconsumersofelectricityintheUSA,whowereexpectedtobenefitfromderegulation.ELCON
nowbelievesthatthestructureoftodaysorganizedmarketsisneithercompetitivenorsustainable.
Table3. CommonproblemsinliberalisedelectricitysystemsinOECDcountries
1
Consumersbothlargeandsmallstronglyopposerestructuring.
2
Restructuringhasnotresultedinrealortruecompetition.
3
Restructuringhasbroughthigherelectricityprices.
4
Technologicalinnovationhasnotbeenrealized.
5
Highconcentrationofgenerationownership,andjointownershipofgenerationandtransmission,
throughouttherestructuredworld.
6
Singleprice,bidbasedauctionsareeasytogameanddifficulttopolice.
7
Itisverydifficulttonegotiatereasonablelongtermcontracts.
8
Adisincentivetoinvest...failuretobuildnecessaryinfrastructureleadstoconcernsoverreliability
9
Inadequatetransparencyandcooperation
10 Regulatorshavenotprotectedconsumersfromtheproblemsofrestructuring.
11 Developingrenewableenergyresourcesrequiresamoveawayfromliberalisedmarkets.
Source:110Andersen200952;11UKClimateChangeCommitteeReport53
IntheUSA,duringthe1990s,newlegislationencouragedderegulation,unbundling,andthecreationofwholesale
andretailmarkets.ButmanystatesstoppedunbundlingtheirpowersystemsaftertheenergycrisisinCaliforniain
2000,whenacartelofprivatecompaniesincreasedthepriceofelectricityby800%andthestatesufferedaseriesof
blackoutsexceptinthecityofLosAngeles,whosepubliclyownedverticallyintegratedpowercompanycontinuedto
workandproduceelectricityatnormalprices.54
InEurope,allcountrieshavebeenrequiredbytheEUtounbundleandliberalisewholesaleandretailmarketssince
1998.Buttheoveralleffecthasbeentoincreasepricesanddecreaseconsumersatisfaction.AnEUwideanalysis
foundthatbothprivatisationandunbundlinghadadamagingeffect:publicownershiptendstodecreaseprices[and]
verticaldisintegrationtendstoincreaseprices55
MajorblackoutsinItalyandelsewherein2003wereattributabletolargeamountsofcommercialtradingofelectricity
overtransmissionlines,accordingtoanofficialreport,theunderlyingcausesweretheunresolvedconflictbetween
thetradinginterestsoftheinvolvedcountriesandoperatorsandthetechnicalandlegalrequirementsforsafeand
reliableoperationofthenetworks.AsimilardiagnosishasbeenmadeoftheUSAblackouts(UCTE2003,Rigby2003,
ThomasandHall2003).
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4.7.2.
www.psiru.org
Problematic in developing countries
Abouthalfthecountriesintheworldhavetriedsomeformofunbundling,butmostdevelopingeconomiesinthe
worldhaverejected,frozenorreversedliberalisationandunbundling.Manycountriescontinuetoruntheirelectricity
systemsthroughverticallyintegratedutilitiesmanaginggeneration,transmissionanddistribution,likeAnde,including
halfthecountriesinLatinAmerica,andcountriessuchasSouthAfrica,China,andIndonesia.56
Globalreviewsofexperiencehaverepeatedlyconcludedthatprivatisationofelectricityindevelopingcountriesisa
dangerouspolicy:
AsurveybyanUNCTADofficialin2004concludedthat:inalongrundevelopmentperspective,fullscale
privatisationofgasandpowersectorsindevelopingcountriesentailssignificantrisks,andthereforeaflexible
policyapproachispreferabletoarigidcommitmenttoextensiveliberalization57
Anacademicreviewofexperiencein42countriesin2009questionedthesuperiorityoftheprivatemodel
fordevelopingcountries..Increasingly,thepublicsectorisinvolvedinprivateprojectstoundertakeorshare
therisksthattheprivatesectorisunwillingtotakeon.58
4.8.
Aluminiumcompanies:hugeconsumption,secretsubsidies
TheinvolvementofRioTintointheproposedprivatisationinParaguayisalarming.Aluminiumcompaniesneedhuge
amountsofelectricityfortheirsmelters,andusesecretagreementstogetpricesfarlowerthanordinarycustomers.
InSouthAfrica,forexample,themultinationalaluminiumcompanyBHPBillitonhasbeenconsuming9%ofallthe
electricityproducedinthecountry,atlessthanonefifthofthetariffpaidbyotherconsumers.InAustralia,theAlcoa
companywasgivena30yearguaranteeofcheapelectricity,whichcostthegovernmentoverUS$1billion,and
consumedabout9%ofallelectricityinthestateofVictoria.Aluminiumcompaniesalreadyconsumemorethan10%of
theentireelectricityproductionofBrazil.59
4.9.
Casualization
Outsourcingbyprivatisedelectricitycompanieshasoftenfragmentedtheworkforceandcasualisedworkers.
InArgentina,privatizedcompaniesusedoutsourcingtodrivedownworkingconditions,intheareasofsystem
maintenance,personnel,invoicing,collections,etc.Inordernottobelaidoff,workersagreedtoaccept
voluntaryseverance,thenacceptedacontractwiththecompanytodothesametasksbutasaselfemployed
person.Theworkerslostthesecurityoftheemployeremployeerelationshipandhadtoprovideforhisor
herownfuturepension.60
InPanama,UnionFenosadeliberatelyusedoutsourcingasawayofcuttingjobs:theoutsourcingprocess,
whichisexpectedtobecompletedin2005,willcuttherequiredlaborforcebyover230employees.61
InColombia,EndesaintroducedsystematicoutsourcingintheprivatizeddistributioncompanyCodensa:by
2002about7000workerswereonthesecontracts,withworseworkingconditions,casualisationandtheloss
ofunionorganization.62
5.
Annexe(espagnol)leccionesdelaexperienciainternacional
Note:ThissummaryoftheargumentsagainstelectricityprivatisationwaspreparedfortheParaguayanunion
SITRANDEinAugust2013
5.1.
Tendencias:msnacionalizacinqueprivatizacin
La nacionalizacin de las empresas del sector de la electricidad es actualmente ms corriente que la privatizacin,
debido,engranmedida,aquelospropietariosprivadoshanincrementadolospreciosperonolasinversiones.
EnAmricaLatina,lasempresasdedistribucinogeneradorasprivatizadassehanvueltoanacionalizartotal
o parcialmente en Argentina, Belice, Bolivia, Brasil, la Repblica Dominicana yVenezuela en los ltimos 10
aos,mientrasquenosehanproducidonuevasprivatizaciones.
En Bolivia, el sistema elctrico fue privatizado en los aos 90 y principios del 2000, y vendido a
multinacionales tales como Iberdrola y REE (Espaa), GdF (Francia) y Rurelec (Reino Unido). Los gastos de
conexineranlosmsaltosdeAmricaLatina,solamenteel78%delapoblacinestabaconectadoen2009y
lainversinennuevaslneasdetransmisinydistribucineramuyescasa.Ahora,enlosltimostresaos,el
gobiernohavueltoanacionalizarlamayoradelasempresasdedistribucinytransmisin,yhareducidoel
preciodelaelectricidadenun60%.63
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5.2.
www.psiru.org
EnEuropa,elsectorpblicotambinestcobrandoimportancia,porquelasempresasenergticasprivadas
nohansuministradoenergarenovable.EnAlemania,desde2007sehanincorporadomsde200compaas
elctricas al sector pblico y se han creado 60 nuevos servicios de distribucin pblicos. El sector pblico
poseeahoramsdel80%delasredesyunacrecienteproporcindelageneracindeelectricidad.64
Lailegalidad,lacorrupcinyelabusodepoder
Enalgunospases,lostribunaleshandictaminadoquelaprivatizacindelaelectricidadesinconstitucionaloilegal.
En Mxico, las propuestas de segmentar y liberalizar el sistema fueron rechazadas al ser consideradas
inconstitucionales por parte del Tribunal Supremo en 2002, que dictamin que infringan el requisito de
propiedadestataldelsistema.65
En Ecuador, el Tribunal Constitucional dictamin que la propuesta de privatizacin de las empresas de
distribucinerailegal.66
EnTailandia,enmarzode2006,elTribunalAdministrativoSupremodeclarqueelprocesodeprivatizacin
iniciado por el entonces primer ministro, Thaksin, era ilegal por diversos motivos. Dictamin que: El
gobiernohaabusadodesupoderalprivatizarlaempresaestatal.67
Losoperadoresprivados,conocidoscomoProductoresdeEnergaIndependientes(PEI),dependendelosAcuerdosde
AdquisicindeEnergaElctrica(AAE)alargoplazo,quedurande20a30aos,envirtuddeloscualeselgobiernoo
unaagenciaestatalgarantizacomprarlaproduccinaunprecioacordado.Losbeneficiospotencialesdeestetipode
contratoscreanincentivosparalacorrupcinyhahabidoprocesoscontraempresasporcorrupcinsobrelosPEIen
muchospases,entreellosIndonesia,PakistnyNigeria.68
5.3.
Eficacia
Lasempresaselctricasprivadasnosonmseficacesquelasempresasdelsectorpblico.Unestudiomundialde1995
compar docenas de operadores elctricos pblicos y privados de todo el mundo y no encontr diferencias
sistemticas significativas entre el sector pblico y el privado en trminos de eficacia.69 Los estudios de las
privatizacionesdelReinoUnidoconcluyeronqueexistenpocaspruebasdequelaprivatizacinhayaproducidouna
mejorasignificativaenelrendimiento.Generalmente,lasgrandesexpectativasdelaprivatizacinmanifestadasenlos
discursosministerialesnosehanmaterializado.70
No existen pruebas de que Ande sea ineficaz, pero ha sufrido una falta de inversin. Un informe sobre Paraguay
realizadoporununiversitariodelReinoUnidoen2010dijodeAndeque:sugestininternaysucapacidadtcnica
son consideradas como mejores que las de otras empresas propiedad del estado, y que las interrupciones en el
suministroestabancausadasporaosdeinversininsuficienteennuevascapacidadesdegeneracinytransmisin.
71
5.4.
Lospreciosincrementadosporlaprivatizacinylaliberalizacin
Laprivatizacinylaliberalizacinnodisminuyenelpreciodelaelectricidadloaumentan.Elcostedeintentarcrear
competenciaesmayorqueelcostedemantenerunsistemademonopoliotradicional,debidoalacombinacindel
costedelcapital,elcostedelacomercializacin,elcostedelastransferenciasdeclientes,elcostedelainstalacin.
(Thomas,2006)
EnAmricaLatina,yenelrestodelmundo,laprivatizacin,lasegmentacinylamercadizacinestnvinculadascon
precios de la electricidad ms elevados para los hogares.72 Un estudio sobre pases de Amrica Latina y de Europa
orientaldescubriqueelresultadodelasegmentacinylacreacindemercadosmayoristasdeelectricidadnoera
bajar los precios, sino aumentarlos.73 Un nuevo estudio ha mostrado que en casi todos los pases en los que se ha
privatizado y liberalizado en alguna medida, los costes de la electricidad que no son de combustible aumentaron
considerablementeparaloshogaresylaindustriadurante20aoshasta2007.
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Fuente: Erdogdu 2013 74

5.5.
Losfallosdeladistribucinprivada
Laprivatizacindelasempresasdedistribucinhacreadomuchosproblemas,conempresasprivadasqueintentan
incrementarlosprecios,loquehadadocomoresultadounaresistenciapblicasignificativa.
LaRepblicaDominicanayBelicevolvieronanacionalizarlasempresasdedistribucinaconsecuenciadela
continuaoposicinpblicaydelaspeticionesdesubsidiosestatalesporpartedelasempresas.75
En Argentina, el estado se ha negado a permitir nuevas subidas de precios, pero ha proporcionado
subvencionescadavezmayoresparapermitirquelasempresasprivadasobtuvieranbeneficios.
En Guatemala, las empresas de distribucin privatizadas han provocado el descontento de la poblacin
debido al excesivo incremento de los precios y al servicio deficiente. En octubre de 2012, unos soldados
mataron a seis personas que se estaban manifestando contra el aumento de los precios por parte de las
empresas, las cuales en la actualidad pertenecen a una compaa del Reino Unido, Actis.76 Actis posee
tambinlaempresadedistribucinprivatizadadeUganda,denominadaUmeme,quedefraudalgobierno
de Uganda alrededor de 197 millones de US$ declarando prdidas excesivas, fue demandada por 2.000
consumidoresporsobrefacturacinyfueclasificadacomounadelasinstitucionesmscorruptasdelpaspor
un estudio de Transparencia Internacional; y el regulador ha dicho que el contrato de Umeme se habra
concluido hace mucho tiempo, si no hubiera existido una clusula de indemnizacin punitiva en el
contrato.77
Un informe del Banco Mundial concluy que la experiencia muestra que un servicio pblico de distribucin
centralizadodamuchosmejoresresultadosenlaelectrificacinruralquelosenfoquesfragmentadosoprivatizados:
los pases que han adoptado un enfoquecentralizado de la electrificacin,con un servicio pblico de distribucin
nacional responsable de extender la red, han tenido ms xito que aquellos que han seguido enfoques
descentralizados,enloscualesunaagenciadeelectrificacinruralintentreunirmltiplesdeserviciosdedistribucin
oempresasprivadasenlacampaadeelectrificacin.78
5.6.
Losgeneradoresprivados:elfracasoalahoradeinvertir
LaAIEdicequeenlamayoradelospasesendesarrollolainversinpblicainicialeneldesarrollodelacapacidad
nacional y local es el ingrediente ms importante para atraer cualquier inversin privada e incluso entonces
solamente tendr lugar si se puede obtener de manera fiable una rentabilidad comercial sobre la inversin.79 En
consecuencia,losgeneradoresdeelectricidadprivadosrequierensistemticamentegarantasestatalesalargoplazo,
generalmente en forma de Acuerdos de Adquisicin de Energa Elctrica (AAE), que garantizan el pago de la
produccinpotencialdeunacentralelctricaporunos2530aos,independientementedelademandademanera
que los riesgos siguen recayendo en el estado. En Mxico, por ejemplo, cada proyecto de un PEI, cuenta con unas
garantasgubernamentalesexplcitas.80
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Brasil introdujo la privatizacin y la liberalizacin en los aos 90, confiando en que las compaasprivadas
desarrollarannuevascentraleselctricas.En2001tuvolugarunacrisisdebidoalaescasezdecapacidadde
generacin resultante del fracaso de los nuevos agentes del mercado a la hora de invertir en nuevas
instalacionesdegeneracin.Enconsecuencia,Brasilsuspendielprogramadeprivatizacinyliberalizacin,y
posteriormente volvi a establecer una slida Empresa de Pesquisa Energtica (EPE) estatal central, que
emplea actualmente a unas 250 personas. Prev la demanda en los prximos 20 aos, planifica las
infraestructurasylageneracinqueserequierenyencargaproyectosespecficos.81
Chileprivatizyliberalizsusistemaenlosaos1980,duranteladictaduramilitar.Perofueelnuevosistema
el que en la prctica alent a las empresas elctricas a aplazar o evitar totalmente la instalacin de una
capacidaddegeneracinadicional,locualdiolugaraunagravecrisisenergticaen199899,ymstardeen
200709,cuandoelgobiernotuvoquegastarmsdemilmillonesdeUS$parasubvencionarelcombustibley
lospreciosdelaelectricidad,yutilizardeformaintensivaloscostososgeneradoresdiesel.82Lacrisispusoen
evidencia los problemas vinculados con la coordinacin y la transparencia de las empresas privadas
generadorasdeelectricidadylarelativadebilidaddelosorganismospblicosalahoradeenfrentarsealas
compaasprivadasorientadasalosbeneficiosacortoplazo,ylafaltadeunaestrategiaenergticaalargo
plazo.83
Los PEI privados casi siempre utilizan generadores con gas, que no es tan barato o limpio como las plantas
hidroelctricas,yporello:enpasescomoGhana,lastarifasseincrementarondrsticamentetraslaintroduccinde
generadores trmicos con los PEI. (Dagdeviren 2009) Un estudio del Banco Mundial tambin los describe como
relativamentecostososdebidoalasopcionestecnolgicas,losproblemasdeabastecimientoylasdevaluacionesde
lamonedaydicequerepresentanunapequeaproporcindelacapacidaddegeneracintotalyprincipalmente
hancomplementadolosserviciosdedistribucindepropiedadeincumbenciaestatal.84
5.7.
Lasegmentacinylaliberalizacin
5.7.1.
Nooperanenpasesderentasaltas
UnestudiosobrelaliberalizacinyladesregulacinenEstadosUnidos,EuropayotrospasesdelaOCDE,publicado
en el Electricity Journal en 2009, identific una serie de caractersticas comunes en esta experiencia. Encontr un
modeloconstantedeproblemas,entreelloslaoposicindelosconsumidores,lafaltadecompetencia,preciosaltos,
el juego con el sistema, el oligopolio, la ausencia de inversin o innovacin.85 El informe fue elaborado por el
director del Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON), que representa a los consumidores industriales de
energa elctrica en Estados Unidos, los cuales esperaban beneficiarse de la desregulacin. ELCON considera ahora
quelaestructuradelosmercadosorganizadosactualesnoesnicompetitivanisostenible.
Table4. ProblemascomunesenlossistemaselctricosliberalizadosdelospasesdelaOCDE
Losconsumidorestantograndescomopequeos seoponenfirmementealareestructuracin
Lareestructuracinnohadadolugaraunaverdaderaoautnticacompetencia
Lareestructuracinhatradoconsigopreciosmselevadosdelaelectricidad
Lainnovacintecnolgicanoseharealizado
Altaconcentracindelapropiedaddelageneracinypropiedadconjuntadelageneracinylatransmisina
travsdelmundoreestructurado
6
Lassubastasdeprecionico,laslicitaciones,sonfcilesdejugarydifcilesdecontrolar/regular
7
Esmuydifcilnegociarcontratosrazonablesalargoplazo
8
Undesincentivoparainvertirelfracasoalahoradeconstruirlasinfraestructurasnecesariassuscitadudas
respectoalafiabilidad
9
Transparenciaycooperacininadecuadas
10 Losreguladoresnohanprotegidoalosconsumidoresdelosproblemasrelativosalareestructuracin
11 Eldesarrollodefuentesdeenergarenovablerequiereundistanciamientodelosmercadosliberalizados
Fuente:110Andersen200986;11UKClimateChangeCommitteeReport87
EnEstadosUnidos,enlosaos90,unanuevalegislacinfomentladesregulacin,lasegmentacinylacreacinde
mercadosmayoristasyminoristas.Peromuchosestadosdejarondesegmentarsussistemasdeenergaelctricatras
la crisis energtica de California en 2000, cuando un consorcio de empresas privadas increment el precio de la
electricidad en un 800% y el estado sufri una serie de apagones excepto en la ciudad de Los ngeles, cuya
compaaelctricapblicaintegradaverticalmentesiguitrabajandoyproduciendoelectricidadaunprecionormal.88
1
2
3
4
5
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En Europa, la UE ha solicitado a todos los pases que segmente y liberalicen los mercados mayoristas y minoristas
desde1998.Peroelresultadoglobalhasidounincrementodelospreciosyunadisminucindelasatisfaccindelos
consumidores. Un anlisis a escala de la UE encontr que tanto la privatizacin como la segmentacin tenan un
efecto perjudicial: la propiedad pblica tiende a disminuir los precios [y] la desintegracin vertical tiende a
incrementarlosprecios.89
LosprincipalesapagonesenItaliayenotroslugaresen2003seatribuyeronalagrancantidaddeactividadcomercial
elctrica sobre las lneas de transmisin, segn un informe oficial, siendo las causas subyacentes los conflictos sin
resolver entre los intereses comerciales de los pases y los operadores afectados, ylos requisitos tcnicos y legales
paraunfuncionamientoseguroyfiabledelasredes.SerealizundiagnsticosimilarsobrelosapagonesdeEstados
Unidos(UCTE2003,Rigby2003,ThomasandHall2003).
5.7.2.
Problemticaenlospasesendesarrollo
Cerca de la mitad de los pases del mundo han intentado alguna forma de segmentacin, pero la mayora de las
economas en desarrollo en el mundo han rechazado, congelado o invertido la liberalizacin y la segmentacin.
Muchospases,entrelosqueseincluyenlamitaddelospasesdeAmricaLatinaypasestalescomoSudfrica,China
e Indonesia, siguen dirigiendo sus sistemas elctricos mediante servicios pblicos de distribucin integrados
verticalmentequegestionanlageneracin,latransmisinyladistribucin,comoAnde.90
Losanlisismundialesdelaexperienciahanllegadoalaconclusinenrepetidasocasionesdequelaprivatizacinde
laelectricidadenlospasesendesarrolloesunapolticapeligrosa:
Un estudio realizado por un funcionario de la UNCTAD en 2004 concluy que: en una perspectiva de
desarrolloalargoplazo,laprivatizacinagranescaladelossectoresdelgasylaelectricidadenlospasesen
desarrollo supone un riesgo considerable, por lo que es preferible un planteamiento poltico flexible a un
compromisorgidodeamplialiberalizacin.91
Unanlisisacadmicodelaexperienciaen42pasesen2009cuestionlasuperioridaddelmodeloprivado
paralospasesendesarrollo.Cadavezms,elsectorpblicoestimplicadoenlosproyectosprivadospara
emprenderocompartirlosriesgosqueelsectorprivadonoestdispuestoaasumir.92
5.8.
Lasempresasdelsectordelaluminio:elenormeconsumo,lassubvencionessecretas
La implicacin de Rio Tinto en la privatizacin propuesta en Paraguay es alarmante. Las empresas del aluminio
necesitanenormescantidadesdeelectricidadparasusfundicionesyutilizanacuerdossecretosparaobtenerprecios
muchomsbajosquelosclientesnormales.EnSudfrica,porejemplo,lacompaamultinacionaldelaluminioBHP
Billitonhaestadoconsumiendoel9%detodalaelectricidadproducidaenelpaspormenosdeunaquintapartedela
tarifa pagada por los dems clientes. En Australia, la compaa Alcoa recibi una garanta de treinta aos de
electricidad barata, que cuesta ms de mil millones de US$ al gobierno, y consumi cerca del 9% de toda la
electricidad en el estado de Victoria. Las compaas del aluminio ya consumen ms del 10% de la totalidad de la
produccindeelectricidaddeBrasil.93
5.9.
Laprecarizacindelempleo
Lasubcontratacinporpartedelascompaaselctricashafragmentadoamenudolamanodeobrayprecarizadoa
lostrabajadores.
EnArgentina,lasempresasprivatizadasutilizaronlasubcontratacinparareducirlascondicionesdetrabajo
enlasreasdemantenimientodelsistema,personal,facturacin,cobros,etc.Conelfindenoserechados,
lostrabajadoresacordaronaceptarundespidovoluntarioyposteriormenteuncontratoconlaempresapara
hacerlasmismastareasperocomotrabajadoresporcuentapropia.Lostrabajadoresperdieronlaseguridad
delarelacinempleadorempleadoytuvieronqueproveersufuturapensin.94
EnPanam,UninFenosautilizdeliberadamentelasubcontratacincomounaformaderecortarempleos:
el proceso de subcontratacin, que se espera completar en 2005, reducir la mano de obra requerida en
msde230empleados.95
En Colombia, Endesa introdujo la subcontratacin sistemtica en la compaa de distribucin privatizada
Codensa: en 2002 haba unos 7.000 trabajadores contratados de este modo, con peores condiciones de
trabajo,empleosespordicosysinafiliacinsindical.96
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GlobalTrendsinElectricityTransmissionSystemOperation:Wheredoesthefuturelie?MallikaChawlaandMichaelG.Pollitt;PSIRU2012
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3
LaRepublica(Colombia)July31,2013Colombia:Celsia,AES,DukeandGDFSuezarepotentialcandidatesforIsagen
4
Panama:BillallowingsharesalespassesseconddebateLaPrensadePanama,July31,2013
5
LaPrensa(Honduras)July30,2013TuesdayHonduras:ENEEwilloutsourcevariousservicesviaPPPs
6
G202013LongTermFinancingofGrowthandDevelopmenthttp://www.g20.org/news/20130228/781245645.html;WEF2013Strategic
Infrastructure;StepstoPrepareandAcceleratePublicPrivatePartnershipshttp://www.weforum.org/reports/strategicinfrastructuresteps
prioritizeanddeliverinfrastructureeffectivelyandefficie
7
ResponsibleInvestmentinInfrastructure:recommendationsfortheG20http://www.g20civil.com/documents/196/1546/
8
WorldBankMarch2013RevisitingPublicPrivatePartnershipsinthePowerSectorhttp://go.worldbank.org/69VJOM9P90
9
VKU2011TheLocalPublicUtilitySectorInfrastructurepartnerforacapableEuropehttp://www.vku.de/en/presse/publikationen/position
paperofthegermanassociationoflocalutilitiesvkufortheeulegislativeperiod20092014.html;EPSUNovember2011Germany:Trendtoward
remunicipalisationofenergysectorhttp://www.epsu.org/a/8107
10
Stadtwerke:UmkehrungdesZeitgeistesDerFreitag2011;http://www.vku.de/energie/veroeffentlichungengutachten/gutachtender
monopolkommission/gutachtendermonopolkommission.html
11
VKUhttp://www.vku.de/energie/energieerzeugung/kommunalekraftwerkskapazitaeten/kommunalekraftwerkskapazitaeten.html;
Monopolkomission2012Energie2011:WettbewerbsentwicklungmitLichtundSchatten
http://www.monopolkommission.de/aktuell_sg59.html
12
VKUWhowearehttp://www.vku.de/en/ueberuns.html;forthecampaign,seehttp://www.meinestadtwerke.de/
13
GlobalPowerReportSeptember8,2011GermanmuniTrianelstartsconstructionof200MWoffshorewindfarminNorthSea;11.05.2012
TrianelbeteiligtsichanbundesweiterStadtwerkekampagneStadtwerkegestaltendie
Energiewendewww.trianel.com/de/pressemeldungen/details/article//stadtwerkegestaltendieenerg.html
14
LaNacion(Argentina)September2,2009WednesdayArgentina:Catamarcanationalisesenergycompany;DiariodeCuyoJuly29,2013Monday
Argentina:Edelarisnationalised
15
SeeNewsLatinAmericaJune5,2013Wednesday6:43PMEESTArgentineregulatorstopsmonitoringMetrogas
16
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Dagdeviren,Hulya.2011.Crisis,SustainabilityofElectricityPricesandStateInterventionsinArgentina.IndustrialandCorporateChange(August
3):dtr044.doi:10.1093/icc/dtr044.http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2011/08/03/icc.dtr044
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ElCronistaMay7,2013TuesdayArgentina:YPFgetsitshandsonallofMetrogasatlast
19
DiariodeCuyo,July29,2013MondayArgentina:Edelarisnationalised
20
Enerdata03January2013BolivianationalisesIberdrola'spowerdistributionsubsidiarieshttp://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/pressand
publication/energynews001/bolivianationalisesiberdrolaspowerdistributionsubsidiaries_15444.html
21
ElDeberJuly8,2013MondayBolivia:Governmentswantsfullcontrolofeightfirms
22
IHSGlobalInsightJune13,2013GovernmentofBelizeassumescontrolofoffshorecompanyregistries
23
ValorEconomicoSeptember10,2013TuesdayBrazil:CourtapprovesEnergisa'sacquisitionplanforRedeEnergia;ValorEconomicoSeptember3,
2012MondayBrazil:AneeltakesovermanagementofRedeoperators
24
http://library.prospect.org.uk/id/2012/00717;http://www.thestar.co.ke/news/article46087/ketawuissuesstrikenoticeoverhiringcasuals;
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DailyNation(Kenya)September11,2013WednesdayKenyaPowerseeksusersofplanned5,000MW;3 DraftRepublicofKenyaNationalEnergy
PolicyMay11,2012
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PakistanTheNationOctober27,2011KESCnationalisationtoendpoweroutageshttp://www.nation.com.pk/pakistannewsnewspaperdaily
englishonline/national/27Oct2011/KESCnationalisationtoendpoweroutages;http://www.abraaj.com/aboutus/ourinvestors
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TUEDAugust2013MassiveBlackoutinPhilippinestoForcePrivatizationBackfires,sayUnionsandCommunityGroups
http://energydemocracyinitiative.org/massiveblackoutinphilippinestoforceprivatizationbackfiressayunionsandcommunitygroups/
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Leaders20130705Cequeleschefsd'entreprisefranaisdemandentlaTunisie
http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/cequeleschefsdentreprisefrancaisontdemandealatunisie?id=11783&nuid=46646&did=146
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See PSIRU 2013 Electricity sector overview (forthcoming, www.psiru.org ) ; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-20/bolivia-cuts-electricityrates-after-nationalization.html ; http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/press-and-publication/energy-news-001/bolivia-nationalises-iberdrolas-powerdistribution-subsidiaries_15444.html ; Economist Jan 19th 2013Can the government do a better job than the private sector?
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21569707-can-government-do-better-job-private-sector-tap-socket ; Latin American Herald Tribune
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30
Hall D. 2012 Re-municipalising municipal services in Europe PSIRU November 2012) www.psiru.org
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Gabriele, A., 2004. Policy alternatives in reforming energy utilities in developing countries. Energy Policy, 32(11), 1319-1337. Available at:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V2W-48PVDXF-1/2/1d61a59a955f07bafc6fbdceb69f1001 [Accessed November 10, 2009];
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World Markets Analysis April 13, 2004: Energy Minister Replaced in Ecuador
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EGAT Annual Report 2008 http://pr.egat.co.th/AnnualReport/annual2008/annual08_eng/annual2008en_p10.pdf
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Hall D. 2007 Electrifying Africa http://www.psiru.org/reports/2007-01-E-Africa.doc
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Divestiture. Massimo Florio. 2004. MiT. A paper covering some of the results is available at The Missing Shock: The Macroeconomic Impact of
British Privatisation Massimo Florio and Mara Grasseni. Nota di Lavoro 104.2004 July 2004
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European Union. An Econometric Panel Data Model BIONATURE 2011 :
http://www.thinkmind.org/download.php?articleid=bionature_2011_2_40_60145 ; Schober, Dominik (2013) : Static vs. dynamic impacts of
unbundling: Electricity markets in South America, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 13-033 http://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/13033.html
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Nagayama, Hiroaki. 2007. Effects of Regulatory Reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry on Electricity Prices in Developing Countries.
Energy Policy 35 (6) (June): 34403462. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.018. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421506005246 A
study covering 83 countries from 1985-2002 in Latin America, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
40
Erdogdu, Erkan. 2013. Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach. MPRA Paper. May. http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/47139/ ;
41
States News Service, July 16, 2013 International Monetary Fund concludes Article IV consultation with Belize
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Guardian Unlimited October 12, 2012 UK owner of Guatemalan energy firm urged to act after protest deaths
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Africa News October 20, 2009 Uganda; Report Shows How Govt Lost Shs 452 Billion in Umeme Deal The Independent (Kampala); Africa News
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Drag UEDCL, Umeme to Court New Vision (Kampala); Africa News August 2, 2010 Monday Uganda; Country's Most Corrupt The Independent
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45 WEO 2010: Chapter 8 "Energy poverty - How to make modern energy access universal?"
http://www.iea.org/weo/docs/weo2010/weo2010_poverty.pdf
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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V2W-48PVDXF-1/2/1d61a59a955f07bafc6fbdceb69f1001 [Accessed November 10, 2009];
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November 13, 2009].
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Energy Planning in Brazil by Stephen Thomas at http://www.psiru.org/reports/2009-11-E-Brazilplanning.doc
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Galetovic and Fischer, 2001, quoted in Gabriele 2004)
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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V2W-48PVDXF-1/2/1d61a59a955f07bafc6fbdceb69f1001 [Accessed November 10, 2009].
50 World Bank/AFD 2010 Africas Infrastructure 2010 http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/system/files/AIATT_Consolidated_smaller.pdf p.111
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Anderson, J.A., 2009. Electricity Restructuring: A Review of Efforts around the World and the Consumer Response. The Electricity Journal, 22(3),
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70-86. Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VSS-4VY16BV-2/2/c6a2f7d764e06203a8ec658abb98b75d [Accessed
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Committee on Climate Change, 2009. Meeting Carbon Budgets the need for a step change.
Progress report to Parliament, Available at: http://www.theccc.org.uk/reports/progress-reports [Accessed November 14, 2009].
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Joskow, P. & Kahn, E., 2002. A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in Californias Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000:The
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Carlo V. Fiorio and M. Florio 2007 The Electricity Industry Reform Paradigm in the European Union: Testing the Impact on Consumers
http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/upp/uppdoc/D6.2_2.pdf
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Mallika Chawla and Michael Pollitt 2013 Global Trends in Electricity Transmission System Operation: Where does the future lie?
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Draft-Working-Paper-MC.pdf
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Gabriele, A. (2004) Policy alternatives in reforming energy utilities in developing countries Energy Policy Vol 32 Issue 11 July 2004;
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Dagdeviren, Hulya. 2009. LIMITS TO COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN PRIVATIZED ELECTRICITY MARKETS. Annals of Public
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ReutersMarch22,2013EskomCriticisedForSellingPowerToBHPBillitonAtCheaperPriceshttp://www.venturesafrica.com/2013/03/eskom
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APJAE(AsociacindelPersonalJerrquicodelAguaylaEnerga):ThePrivatisationOfEnergyInTheArgentineRepublicLossesAndGains.2000.
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UnionFenosa2004AnnualReportp.154
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Estradalvarez,Jairo.Reestructuracincapitalistaytendenciasderegulacindelasrelacioneslaboralesenelsectorelctricocolombiano.En:
Globalizacin,aperturaeconmicayrelacionesindustrialsenAmricaLatina.FacultaddeCienciasHumanasUN,ColeccinCES.Bogot,1999.
QuotedinRojas.
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Vase Electricity sector overview, PSIRU 2013 (disponible prximamente en www.psiru.org); http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0320/bolivia-cuts-electricity-rates-after-nationalization.html; http://www.enerdata.net/enerdatauk/press-and-publication/energy-news-001/bolivianationalises-iberdrolas-power-distribution-subsidiaries_15444.html; Economist, Jan 19th 2013, Can the government do a better job than the private
sector? http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21569707-can-government-do-better-job-private-sector-tap-socket; Latin American Herald
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Gabriele, A. 2004, Policy alternatives in reforming energy utilities in developing countries. Energy Policy, 32(11), 1319-1337. Disponible en:
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Pollitt, M. (1995), Ownership and Performance in Electric Utilities: the International Evidence on Privatisation and Efficiency, Oxford University
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S. Martin and D. Parker In: The Impact of Privatisation Ownership and Corporate Performance in the UK, Routledge, London (1997); The Great
Divestiture, Massimo Florio, 2004, The MiT Press. Un documento que comprende algunos de los resultados est disponible en The Missing Shock:
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71
Nickson A. 2010, Revising the Past: The Paraguayan Energy Sector in Perspective
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72
Erkan Erdogdu, 2013, Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach, MPRA Paper. May. http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/47139/; Moreno and Lopez 2011, The Impact of Renewable Energies and Electric Market Liberalization on Electrical Prices in the
European Union. An Econometric Panel Data Model, BIONATURE 2011:
http://www.thinkmind.org/download.php?articleid=bionature_2011_2_40_60145; Dominik Schober, 2013: Static vs. dynamic impacts of
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73
Hiroaki Nagayama 2007, Effects of Regulatory Reforms in the Electricity Supply Industry on Electricity Prices in Developing Countries. Energy
Policy 35 (6) (June): 34403462. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.018. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421506005246, estudio
que abarca 83 pases de 1985 a 2002 en Amrica Latina, la ex Unin Sovitica y Europa oriental.
74
Erkan Erdogdu, 2013, Essays on Electricity Market Reforms: A Cross-Country Applied Approach. MPRA Paper. May. http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/47139/
75
States News Service, July 16, 2013: International Monetary Fund concludes Article IV consultation with Belize
76
Guardian Unlimited, October 12, 2012: UK owner of Guatemalan energy firm urged to act after protest deaths
77
Africa News, October 20, 2009, Uganda: Report Shows How Govt Lost Shs 452 Billion in Umeme Deal, The Independent (Kampala); Africa
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1. LIBERALISATION AND PRIVATISATION TRENDS ..................................................................................... 2

CURRENT CONFLICTS OVER PRIVATISATION .......................................................................................... 7

PSIRU University of Greenwich

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New and re-municipalised stadtwerke in energy, Germany, 2007-2012

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not working in high income countries

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Problematic in developing countries

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Fuente: Erdogdu 2013 74

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