THE ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS

OF
PROCESS THEOLOGY
By
Dr. Stanley Sfekas
Professor of Philosophy
University of Indianapolis/Athens Campus

One of the invaluable consequences of the death of God debate

has been the philosophical resolve to search for alternative categories of
reflection. Belief in God as omnipotent has three problems: (1) it is at
odds with the disorderliness in nature; (2) it yields the acutest form of the
theodicy problem; and (3) it conflicts with the notion from Plato's
Sophist, that being is dynamic power (dynamis). Whitehead, building on
Bergson, has formulated an event ontology to replace the metaphysics
of substance of classical theism and thus avoid these difficulties. This
makes it possible for process philosophy to serve as a metaphysic of a
novel theology whose ontological commitments are consistent with
evolution, emergentism, and quantum theory.
Indeed, the challenge to this theology of process comes not from
scientific materialism but from the other side, traditional theism, as
constituting too meager a foundation for a religious philosophy of life. In
a universe devoid of pre-established meaning, moral purpose, and
certainty, can process theism be a world-view that is optimistic, ethical
and life-affirming? Process theism replies that its vision of reality is its
affirmation of the ultimate reality of the temporal process of creative
advance and, more importantly, that this metaphysical optimism is not
based on dogma. Indeed, process theism is a genuinely philosophical
theology in the sense that it is not grounded in claims of special insight or
revealed truth but in philosophical reflection. The metaphysical
underpinning of process theism is process philosophy as presented in
Whitehead's magnum opus, Process and Reality. Specifically, process
theism is a product of theorizing that takes the categories of becoming,
change, and time as foundational for metaphysics.
The task of metaphysics is, after all, to provide a cogent and
plausible account of the nature of reality at the broadest, most synoptic
and most comprehensive level. And it is to this mission of enabling us to
characterize, describe, clarify and explain the most general features of
reality that process philosophy addresses itself in its own characteristic
way. The key idea in its approach is that natural existence consists in and
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is best understood in terms of processes rather than things of modes of

change rather than fixed stabilities. Change of every sortphysical,
organic, psychologicalis the pervasive and predominant feature of
reality.
This view is as old as Heraclitus who had said anta ,
everything flows and who is universally considered the father of event
ontology. Bertrand Russell notes in his History of Western Philosophy
that Heraclitus event ontology is consistent with the worldview of
contemporary physics. Process philosophy diametrically opposes the
view as old as Parmenides and Zeno and the Atomists of Pre-Socratic
Greece that denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being
or of understanding by subordinating them to substantial things. From the
time of Aristotle, Western metaphysics has had a marked bias in favor of
things or substances, an object ontology.
Process philosophy is a well-defined and influential tendency of
thought that can be traced back throughout the history of philosophy. Its
leading exponents after Heraclitus were Leibniz, Bergson, Peirce, and
William James and it ultimately moved on to include Whitehead and
his school (Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss), but also other 20th Century
philosophers such as Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, Andrew Paul
Ushenko, and the novelist, Nikos Kazantzakis.
When it comes to the God question Whitehead says that he is not
offering proofs. Indeed, Whitehead says: There is merely the
confrontation of the theoretic system with a certain rendering of the
facts. Having established to his satisfaction an alternative to scientific
materialismthat is, the philosophy of organismhe asks whether his
philosophy's categories require reference to God. Ford suggests that
Whitehead was in point of fact surprised to find that they do, for he began
his reflections on the philosophy of nature as an agnostic. In keeping with
his sensitivity to the history of philosophy, Whitehead characterizes his
discussion as adding another speaker to David Hume's Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. If Whitehead has an argument for the
existence of God it is implicit in the dual attempt (1) to show the
reasonableness of process metaphysics and (2) to show the conceptual
necessity of God for its overall coherence. Rudolf Carnap says that it is
one thing to ask what one's metaphysics commit one to, and it is
something else to ask what commits one to one's metaphysics. Whitehead
asks both questions.
That which is best described, in process theism, as the ultimate
reality, is God. For Whitehead and Hartshorne, God should not be treated

as the exception to metaphysical principles; otherwise, there can be no

reasoned discourse about the divine (that is to say, no theology). Ideally,
God is to be the chief exemplification of metaphysical principles, and it is
this ideal that Whitehead and Hartshorne strive to realize. In process
theism, the divine or eminent form of creativity provides the basis for
cosmic order and achieved value. In Whitehead's words, God is the poet
of the world, leading it with tender patience by the divine vision of truth,
beauty, and goodness
From the days of the skeptics of antiquity we are told again and again
throughout the history of philosophy that speculative systematization is
inappropriate that such knowledge as we humans can actually obtain is
limited to the realm of everyday life and the discoveries of science.
Repeated in every era, this stricture is also rejected by many within each.
The impetus for a synoptic understanding, for a coherent and panoramic
view of things that puts the variegated bits and pieces together, represents
an irrepressible demand of the human intellect as a possession of "the
rational animal." And process metaphysics affords one of the most
promising and serious options for accommodating this demand precisely
because it is consistent with science in a way that classical theism is
notwith quantum theory, emergentism, and evolutionism.
The demise of classical atomism brought on by the
dematerialization of physical matter in the wake of the quantum theory
did much to bring aid and comfort to a process-oriented metaphysics. For
quantum theory taught that, at the microlevel, what was usually deemed a
physical thing, a stably perduring object, is itself no more than a
statistical pattern a stability wave in a surging sea of process. Those
so-called enduring "things" come about through the emergence of
stabilities in statistical fluctuations. For it regards nature's microprocesses
as components of an overall macroprocess whose course is upwards
rather than downwards, so to speak. Hitching its wagon to the star of a
creative evolutionism, process philosophy sees nature as encompassing
creative innovation, productive dynamism and an emergent development
of richer, more complex and sophisticated forms of natural existence.
Process theism does not privilege claims to special insight or
revealed truth. This is not to say that some theologians have not found
process thought congenial to their interests such as Ogden, Cobb, and
Griffin. Whitehead and Hartshorne did not view themselves as apologists
for a particular faith, but neither did they simply dismiss religious
experiences as uninformative. Whitehead warns against narrowness in the
selection of evidence. He says, Philosophy may not neglect the

multifariousness of the worldthe fairies dance, and Christ is nailed to

the cross They add, however, that the claims that religious people make,
individually (as in the case of mystics) or collectively (as in the case of
organized religions), are subject to human fallibility. Every putative
revelation is sifted through an imperfect human filter. This applies
equally to the metaphysician trying to make sense of religious claims.
Process theists follow Whitehead in eschewing dogmatic finality in
their pronouncements. For process philosophy, philosophy itself is a
process that is ever subject to revision and critical examination. As far as
justifying religious belief is concerned, Whitehead and Hartshorne try to
navigate between appeals to blind faith and knock-down proof. In
metaphysics, says Whitehead, The proper test is not that of finality, but
of progress.
If process theism is not based on revelation, neither is it based on
nave appeals to science, including the social sciences. It is no more
characteristic of process thought to give a scientific argument for the
existence of God than to give a reductionistic account of religious belief
by means of a theory in sociology or psychology. As far as Whitehead
and Hartshorne are concerned, the working assumptions of the sciences
are no more or less secure than the working assumptions of religion.
Process thought teaches a modest skepticism about the competencies of
science that is arguably in the spirit of science itself.
Indeed, the theory of actual entities and their prehensions is Whitehead's
alternative to the metaphysical worldview that developed as a result of
the dramatic successes of early modern scienceWhitehead calls it
scientific materialism. The theory of actual entities is a response to the
idea that the stuff of which the world is made is devoid of mind-like
qualitiesWhitehead refers to this as vacuous actuality. The theory of
prehensions is a response to the idea that bits of matter can exist at
definite places and times without any essential reference to other places
and timesWhitehead refers to this as the fallacy of simple location
and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The fact is that Whitehead
wrote relatively little about God and a great deal about how his
philosophy of organism resolves problems of metaphysics and
epistemology inherited from a prior age.
Process theism is not based on religious doctrine or theology, and it is
not a scientific theory; it is a product of metaphysics, or what Whitehead
calls speculative philosophy. It is, however, metaphysics in a new
key, to borrow a phrase from Susanne Langer. Whitehead says that,
Speculative philosophy is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical,

necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our

experience can be interpreted. Metaphysics, so defined, is an audacious
enterprise, for experience is open-ended and every claim to knowledge is
perspectival and conditioned. If metaphysicians strive for a
comprehensive vision of things, they must continually remind themselves
that there is no standpoint within the world from which to speak
confidently for eternity.
Whitehead and Hartshorne reject the idea that metaphysics proceeds
best by deducing theorems from self-evident axioms. To be sure,
inferences must be made from the categories of one's metaphysics, but it
is the categories themselves that are continually on trial. The court in
which metaphysical proposals are judged is the community of
philosophers, stretching through history and into the future. Whitehead
and Hartshorne, heavily influenced by Plato, practice philosophy as a
dialogue with great minds, past and present. Hartshorne, taking a page
from Karl Popper, says that, Objectivity is not in the individual thinker
but in the process of mutual correction and inspiration.
The ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments are
each one strand of a multiple argument strategywhich Hartshorne calls
a cumulative casein which the various elements are mutually
reinforcing. For Hartshorne, all of the arguments are phases of one
global argument, as he puts it, namely that the properly formulated
theistically religious view of life and reality is the most intelligible, selfconsistent, and satisfactory one that can be conceived.
With Hartshorne, as with Whitehead, what is at stake in theistic
arguments is less a matter of the soundness of a particular piece of
reasoning than the assessment of an entire metaphysical system. The
development and defense of a concept of God that is fully engaged in
temporal processes is perhaps the central pillar and the lasting
achievement of their reasoning. After all, one of the selling points of
process theism over its rivals has been not only its theoretical superiority
in dealing with theological puzzles but its adequacy to everyday religious
sensibilities.
Along with Paul Weiss, Hartshorne should probably be regarded as
preeminent among recent American philosophers who continued to
pursue their work in the grand style of systematic metaphysical
description and construction. For decades, Hartshorne and Weiss have
tenaciously clung to their definite convictions that metaphysics is the
main business of philosophy, despite almost overwhelming opposition

from the powerful camps of American logical positivism, linguistic

analysis, and their allies. Accordingly, Hartshornes efforts to combine
logical rigor with metaphysical description have been an encouraging
example to many younger philosophers who have surmised that dogmatic
exclusion of all metaphysical issues would eventually afflict philosophy
with a fatal case of "analysis Paralysis." Since the anti-metaphysical ban
has now been partially lifted by many philosophers, they are regarding
Hartshornes positions with increasing seriousness.
Furthermore, in gratifying his metaphysical passion, Hartshorne has
demonstrated that the deepest levels of metaphysics inevitably involve
the question of God. This achievement alone is pregnant with enormous
meaning and interest for philosophy and theology; and, in this regard, we
must view Hartshorne as standing in the same tradition with Aristotle,
Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, and Whitehead. Accordingly, philosophical
thinkers everywhere may thank Hartshorne for his notable contributions
in preserving and recovering a sense of the wholeness and grandeur of
philosophy as the pursuit of that light and wisdom which alone can
sustain civilized human life during a time when civilization seems
gravely threatened.
Hartshornes dependence upon Whitehead finds clearest expression
in his enthusiastic adoption of Whiteheads view of the universe as
essentially one of perpetual change and becoming. This view, which
Hartshorne affirms without reservation, holds that everything, including
God, is ceaselessly changing in a dynamic process of creative advance
that will never end. Accordingly, the Whiteheadian-Hartshornian
conception of the universe-in-process is squarely in opposition to the
dominant views of traditional Western philosophy and theology. The
traditional or classical vision of the universe has held that the basic
realities of both God and the universe endure permanently without
essential change. Hartshorne follows Whitehead in insisting that the only
permanence anywhere occurs within and not above the ever-changing
process. Both thinkers feel that one misconceives the nature of the entire
universe as long as he fails to understand that becoming, dynamic,
changing categories are more fundamental than being, static, and
permanent categories.
Furthermore, Hartshorne fully shares Whiteheads idea that the ultimate
components which constitute the universe are droplets of experience or
feeling. These droplets are often called "actual entities" or "actual
occasions," and they are not permanent things such as atoms but rather
fleeting, transient events, occurrences, or happenings. Hartshorne claims

that nature, man, and God are all composed of countless billions of these
droplets of experience that occur and then pass away only to be
succeeded by other similar events. Each such event is a type of
experience that strives toward the realization of some value. In this
manner, therefore, Hartshorne also adopts Whiteheads contention that
the world is not a conglomeration of dead, material atoms but a vast
congeries of fleeting aesthetic sensitivities or feelings. In other words,
Whiteheadian-Hartshornian process philosophy maintains that every facet
of the universe is alive, thus repudiating metaphysical materialism in all
its forms.
Most strikingly, Hartshornes philosophy radically reconceives the
nature of God in order to obviate some notorious logical and moral
difficulties in the traditional Western conception of God. His
panentheistic doctrine of God suggests that it is impossible to conceive of
God apart from the world or the world apart from God. Hence, he
discards the classical Christian doctrine of Gods creation of the world ex
nihilo and affirms instead that the world, just as God, never had a real
beginning and will never have a final end.
Indeed, the tradition of Western classical theism does not fare
quite so well under his critical scrutiny. It is only slight exaggeration to
state that he feels the traditional Western religious and philosophical
understanding of God to be such a mass of errors and inconsistencies as
to require removal in toto from the body of metaphysical thought. In fact,
he regards the traditional doctrine of God as so rationally untenable that,
if it were the only conceivable notion of God, he would himself be driven
to adopt atheistic humanism in spite of its shortcomings.
What Hartshorne finds so repugnant to both sound logic and true
religion in the classical Western doctrine of God is the idea that God is an
Absolute Being of Changeless Perfection. He maintains that this notion
was the bastard child which resulted from the marriage of Greek
metaphysics with the highest religious truth of the Bible. Among the chief
officiators at this unfortunate (according to Hartshorne) union were such
giant philosophical or theological minds as Philo, Augustine, Anselm,
Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant.16 In Hartshornes judgment, the doctrine
that God is "a being in all respects absolutely perfect or unsurpassable"17
is the source of the trouble. Moreover, with logical rigor and religious
zeal, he proceeds to demonstrate that this doctrine involves traditional
theism in a whole raft of paradoxes and inner contradictions, in the hope
that he might encourage its entire abandonment by thoughtful people.

What are some of the inherent inconsistencies of traditional theism? First,

if Gods absoluteness is total and "perfect," then he cannot be related to
or relative to the world and man. But this means that God is completely
unmoved and untouched by any good or evil which man may do and that
man can make absolutely no difference to God. Yet, when judged by
biblical and religious insight, such consequences seem patently false or
absurd. They are especially repellent to Hartshorne, who feels that one of
the highest religious motivations is the desire which man may have of
doing some action in order to bring joy to the heart of God. Moreover, he
also suggests that, when a man such as Beethoven creates new forms of
beauty in the universe, his creativity makes a difference even to God by
adding new values to his experience.
Or again, in regard to omnipotence, simple analysis reveals at once
that God cannot literally have "all" power if there are any other beings in
the universe whatever. If there are any beings other than God, then they
must have at least some minute amount of power. Otherwise, they would
not be beings at all; for what is a being with absolutely no power at all?
Hartshorne readily allows that God may be supremely powerful; but, in a
world of creatures, it does seem plain that he cannot be literally "allpowerful"
As far as Christians are concerned, Hartshornes logic is probably most
telling in regard to Gods love. If God truly loves man, then it seems plain
that he has some desires or "passions" and that he cannot be absolutely
independent and immutable. What sense would it make to speak of Gods
love at all if it did not mean that he wants mans well-being and responds
to both mans obedience and his waywardness?
Hartshornes objections are directed to the kind of theological thought
that glories in alleged "insuperable paradoxes" about God without
recognizing that some "paradoxes" are actually impossible contradictions
and others are excuses for slovenly thinking. In one of his more sarcastic
moods, Hartshorne defines a "theological paradox" as "what a
contradiction becomes when it is about God rather than something
else"!
As one would expect, Hartshorne lays special stress on Gods life
as one of continual change and becoming instead of an unchanging life of
eternal and static being. Hartshorne also abandons the notion of Gods
absolute and unchanging perfection and relates Gods life and love
crucially and decisively to the deeds of men and the events of the world.
Moreover, Hartshorne contends that there is literally no end to Gods

everlastingly changing in response to perpetual changes in the cosmic

process. Therefore, since God may always surpass himself and his
previous perfections with every new experience, Hartshorne asserts that
absolute perfection will never be attained even by God. An especially
impressive facet of Hartshornes vision of God is his relentless insistence
that, in the midst of all Gods joy and bliss, God also suffers most
poignantly and excruciatingly as he witnesses the misery and tragedy of
the creatures. By this means, Hartshorne has paved the way for excitingly
new possibilities for contemporary theological grappling with the age-old
problem of evil. Furthermore, the notion of the suffering of God raises to
a metaphysical level the suffering of Jesus.
In contrast to the views of the Barthian and biblical theologians,
Hartshorne holds that the existence of God can be known and proved by
means of human reason. He thus emphasizes that philosophy is
indispensable for theology, tending to place much more stress upon sound
philosophical reasoning than upon faithful acceptance of revelation.
Consequently, process theologians in general regard philosophy as an
essential ally in doing theology in a way that is incomprehensible to many
theologians in conservative and neo-orthodox camps. Hartshornes wide
influence among theologians is odd when it is considered that he is not a
theologian and does not rely on sacred scripture or religious authority for
his insights. Another oddity is the fact that Hartshorne's influence among
theologians is due to the defense he offers of the rationality of belief in
what he calls a neoclassical God, as opposed to the God of classical
theism.
Another characteristic aspect that process theology derives from
Hartshorne is its decisive rejection of humanism as a satisfactory option
for modern man. Hartshorne grounds all of reality and all meaningful
human existence directly upon God. It is because of this feature that
process theology constitutes a vigorous challenge and a viable alternative
to the paradoxical views of the "God-is-dead" theologians. The "God-isdead" theology has suggested that all talk about God should be
abandoned because it is meaningless to modern man. However, virtually
the entire platform of the death-of-God theology has been effectively
rejected by process theology, primarily because Whitehead and
Hartshorne have marked out a path that enables the process theologians to
understand how it still might be possible and necessary for man to speak
meaningfully about God. This stance of process theology in opposition to
theological humanism might well prove to be its historically most
significant feature.

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