Aristotle on the Human Good by Richard Kraut

Review by: Pamela M. Huby

The Classical Review, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1991), pp. 103-104
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
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THE CLASSICAL

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excludePlotinus,who wrote a majortreatiseOn Numbers,on the groundsthat his

thoughtis too weightyfor an investigationof this kind (p. 538).
In herdiscussionof Iamblichusshe attemptsto reconcilethe differentordersgiven
in differentworks for the kinds and componentsof mathematics,showingthat he
anticipatesProclus. She also deals with the notion of mathematicsas a mesotes
betweensensibleandintelligible,in the strictsense,linkedwithdianoia,a themewhich
may be found not only in Proclusbut also in the later Aristoteliancommentators,
who saw soul strictusensufromthe samepoint of view. Iamblichus'link with earlier
philosophymay be seenin his conceptof each groupof mathematicalentitieshaving
its own arkhai,a matterwhichhad alreadybroughtAristotle'swell-knowncriticism
of Speusippusfor makingBeingepisodiclike bad tragedy(Metaph.N 1090b19-20).
An importantdifferenceis that Iamblichus'numbersare no longerprimarybut only
secondaryBeing.
Thisreviewhasconcentratedon certainlatePlatonisttopics,but the book amounts
to a historyof a crucialpart of Platonism,takingin shadowyfigureslike Moderatus
as well as Speusippus,Xenocrates,Albinus/Alcinous,Plutarch,Nicomachusand the
laterPlatonists.Sincethecommonestmodernreactionto Aristotle'scomplaintabout
the Platonists'use of numbersand other mathematicalconceptsis to ignore them,
V.'s book is a salutaryreminderof that fundamentalimportanceof mathematicsin
Platonismwhichis all too often forgotten.
H. J. BLU MENTHA L

Universityof Liverpool

ARISTOTLE

ON THE HUMAN

GOOD

RICHARD KRAUT' Aristotle on the Human Good. Pp. xi+379.

Princeton University Press, 1989. $37.50.
Thereare at least threepossibleways of writingabout Aristotle,to concentrateon
problemsof textandchronology,to interprethimin the lightof modernphilosophical
developments,and to approachhim on his own terms.This book is a particularly
pureexampleof the last approach.If Aristotlehad knownEnglish,thereis hardlya
sentencehere that he would not have understoodat first sight. Whetherhe would
have agreedwith it is anothermatter.Kraut'sthesisis that the NicomacheanEthics
is a unity.Good methodology,he says, requiresus to startwith the assumptionthat
it is internallyconsistent.He appliesthis principlechieflyto the relationshipbetween
the treatmentsof happinessin Book I and Book X, but makesconsiderableuse of the
treatmentof friendshipin Books VIII and IX, and he also, commendably,bringsin
sectionsof the Politicsoften neglectedin studiesof the Ethics.
But one may ask whetherhis initialmethodologicalassumptionis justifiedin this
particularcase. Not only do we know that Aristotle'sesotericworksare not unities
in the sensethattheywerecomposedas unities,but in the case of the Ethicsthereare
the graveproblemsof havingtwo treatmentsof pleasurein the NicomacheanEthics,
and of the complicatedrelationshipand developmentbetweenthe two Ethics,none
of which is even mentioned.It remainsa respectableenterpriseto defendthe thesis
thatthe matterbegunin Book I is completedharmoniouslyin Book X, but it involves
K. in attributingto Aristotleviews that the latterfails to express,and he is driven
himself at one point (p. 250) to cry 'Surely Aristotle might have spelled out his
meaningmorefully.'Thisis in connectionwithwhatseemsto be a passingdistinction

104

THE CLASSICAL

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between perfect and most perfect happiness, but which K.

develops into the
important view that Aristotle held that there were two kinds of happiness,
perfect,
that of a life of contemplation, and secondary, a life lived
virtuously, but without
(much) contemplation, preferably as a politician. The two kinds of life could not be
combined.
Therefollows a host of developments which also are not
precisely there in Aristotle.
Some readers will find his conclusions unconvincing: how
many can accept this:
'Priam, having lost his family and city, could not regularly engage in ethically
virtuous action during the final period of his
political activity was of course out
of the question. And the diminished level of life;
activity caused by this loss of external
goods and suffering constituted his lack of happiness'?
0 Homer! O Vergil! But he
doesdraw one's attention to many things Aristotle says which are
queer and perhaps
glossedover by one who reads him with set ideas. At first sight K.'s 'So, if one
polis
hasa much larger citizen population than another, and both
require equal sharing of
offices,a citizen of the less populous city is better off, since he can rule for
longer
periodsof time' seems artificial, but in Pol. 7.3 Aristotle does consider a rather
similar
case.We might suppose, however, that Aristotle is not
primarily concerned with
plausibilityand consistency, but with exploring the field and perhaps
responding to
questionsraised by his auditors. K. ignores, for example, the fact that
frequently
Aristotlesays 'it is believed that' and the like in such a way that it is not
clear that
heis endorsing such views. Again, is it
truethat Aristotle is simplifying in Books VIII
andIX because of his desire to postpone to Book X the question whether
it is better
tolead a practical or a theoretical life? And the account of Book
VI is ingenious, but
isit valid?
Hespends much time responding to the views of Ackrill,
Cooper, Irwin and
Nussbaum,and has an adequate coverage of other relevant works, though Austin's
nameis absent. There is a hint of Utilitarianism in the kind of
questions he asks, like
theamount of time one should spend on various activities, and he
distinguishes three
kindsof egoism before concluding that Aristotle was
notan egoist of any kind. One
misseswhat might be called a Rylean approach. Ryle believed that Aristotle
was right
philosophically,and that the complications of his arguments reflect the complications
ofthought involved in abstract notions. Aristotle had an excellent
philosophical
'nose',but lacked some important techniques. There is none of that here, and K.
focuseson the simple question whether Aristotle has an inclusive view of
happiness
ornot. He treats pleasure as just another good, whereas Aristotle
went to much
trouble
to show that it is a good of a peculiar kind, with a special
place in an account
ofhappiness. Old confusions survive today: in a recent panel
game, contestants had
tochoose between Wealth, Fame, and Happiness. None
replied that these were not
strict
alternatives. Aristotle knew people like that, and they appear at the
beginning
ofhis quest. He was searching both for an account of
happiness in the form of a
and for that which will ensure happiness for an individual, and these are
definition,
not
the same.
In
spite of these criticisms, the book
canbe recommended as a thoughtful one from
which
everyone will learn a great deal, being forced to return to the text again and
and frequently seeing it in a new light.
again,
University of Liverpool

PAMELA M. HUBY