Formation[edit]

The JUI follows the Sunni Deobandi school. In Pakistan, Deobandis have a presence
in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North West Frontier Province), and Balochistan. The
JUI traces its roots to Politically active Deobandi who formed the Jamaat Ulema Hind (JUH), in
1919 in British India. The JUH was against colonialism and for a united India, opposing the
formation of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. A faction supporting the creation of
Pakistan parted ways in 1945 to support the All Indian Muslim League. This faction came to be
known as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).[5]

United JUI[edit]
JUI' s first president, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, broke away from the party in 1947 to form the
Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (MJUI), which played a key role in the passage of the Objectives
Resolution of 1949 that laid down the "Islamic" foundations of future constitutions in Pakistan.
[6]

The JUI became more politically active under Maulana Mufti Mahmood (1919-1980) who

assumed its leadership in 1962. Under Mahmood during the 1960s the party "developed a strong
presence" and base of support among the "intensely conservative countryside"
of Balochistan and the Northwestern Frontier Province (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)).
[7]

Mahmood led the JUI against Ayub Khans modernization policies.

The JUI also participated in the 1970 elections with the conservative Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami
Pakistan party and the Barelvi Sunni religious party Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP). It won
seven seats in the National Assembly and nine in the provincial assemblies and became a
partner in the NWFP and Balochistan provincial governments.[6] Mufti Mahmood was sworn in as
NWFP chief minister. Under him the provincial government established a board to bring all laws
in conformity with Islam. He resigned in 1973 over Bhuttos dismissal of the Balochistan
provincial government.

Split into JUI-F and JUI-S[edit]

During the 1980s, the JUI supported some of General Zia ul Haq's policies, including his antiSoviet Jihad in Afghanistan. Additionally, official patronage and financial support
for madrassas during the Zia years allowed the JUI to build thousands of madrassas, especially
in the NWFP, which were instrumental in the formation of the Taliban. At the same time the JUI
was distrustful of Zia's close ties with theJamaat-e-Islami and joined the anti-Zia and PPP-led
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).[6]
This dual relationship with Zias regime eventually led to a split in the party which came to be
divided into the JUI-F, headed by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman and the JUI-S headed by Samiul
Haq, who supported Zia and was a member in his parliament, the Majlis-e-Shura.

Madrassas[edit]
Over the years the JUI-S has maintained that it is more committed to enforcing Sharia in the
country than the JUI-F faction. JUI-S influence is largely restricted to a few districts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) whereas the JUI-F is predominant in the Pashtun areas of Balochistanand

KPK. Both factions of the JUI have a large network of madrassas and mosques that provide the
main basis of its religious activism and politics. The two JUIs run over 65 per cent of all
madrassas in Pakistan.[8] About 30,000 Afghan refugee students from JUI-controlled madrassas
(both JUI-F and JUI-S) in Pakistan joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. [3] JUI party
workers and leaders are products of the madrassa system. Both JUI factions have backed other
India-oriented Deobandi militant groups, particularly the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and its offshoot,
the Jaish-e-Mohammad, with JUI madrassas providing recruits for them. They are closely
associated with theTaliban in Afghanistan and its faction in Pakistan. The Taliban movement
reportedly originated in JUI seminaries. Samiul Haq (of the JUI-S) is the leader of the Darul
Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akora Khattak, from where many of the top leaders of Taliban
commanders and leaders, including its supreme leader the Mullah Omar, graduated.[9]

Peace deals[edit]
The JUI-F has also played a role in brokering peace deals between the military and militants in
Pakistans tribal belt. For instance, in 2004, two JUI-F national parliamentarians from South
Waziristan arranged a deal (known as the Shakai agreement) with the Pakistani
Taliban leadership and in September 2006 the JUI-F helped broker a similar deal inNorth
Waziristan. These deals have been criticized for legitimizing the status of the local militants as
power-brokers. JUI-F leader Fazlur Rahman is also reportedly involved in negotiating
agreements between the Pakistani Taliban and military and the Afghan Taliban and the U.S. On
the political front the JUI-F has been more successful than the JUI-S. Fazlur Rahman, leader of
the JUI-F, was appointed as Chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs in the
second government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto(199396).It is well known for its
compromize policy with every and any government.

History since 2002[edit]

The JUI-F was also the largest party in the MMA, winning 41 seats in the National Assembly and
29 of the MMA's 48 seats in NWFP in the 2002 elections. Subsequently, Fazlur Rahman became
the Leader of the Opposition in 2004 and retained the post till 2007. The JUI-F was also part of
the current ruling PPP coalition but left the government amidst charges of corruption against one
of its members, an information technology minister of the federal cabinet. In return for JUI-F
support, the PPP-led government appointed Maulana Sherani, a JUI-F senator without any
formal academic training in Islamic jurisprudence, as chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology
in 2010. Sherani has frequently spoken out against the governments legislative efforts,
particularly those related to women. He opposed a proposed bill on domestic violence stating
that domestic violence was not a major issue in Pakistan until womens rights groups appeared
and created it and that any such legislation hinders the creation of a true Islamic society.
Currently, even though the JUI-F is no longer a coalition partner, Fazlur Rahman chairs the
Kashmir committee and another JUI-F senator, Talha Mahmood Aryan, chairs the standing
interior committee of the senate.

Both factions of the JUI have frequently come together on a common platform to oppose
American drone strikes in Pakistans tribal areas, viewing it as a violation of Pakistans
sovereignty. For example, following the 2 May 2011 U.S. raid in Abbottabad that led to Osama
Bin Ladens killing, the JUI-F and the JUI-S participated in a multi-party conference in Peshawar,
condemning the drone strikes and calling on the government to end logistical support
to NATO troops in Afghanistan. On the domestic front, members of the JUI-F have been vocal
critics of changes in the blasphemy laws. Fazlur Rahman remained silent until his party left the
ruling coalition in December 2010, after which he criticized proposals to amend the blasphemy
law. The JUI-F has also opposed the passage of a bill aimed at preventing domestic violence
with its members vowing to fight it tooth and nail as, according to them, its passage would
promote Western culture in the Islamic state.
In 2008, a further (minor) split of JUI-F resulted in the formation of a third faction, known as JUIN ("N" for Nazryati "Ideological").