**solvency

**some cards from the islamophobia header apply to CVE as well

cve aff
CVE prevents cooperation and precludes analysis of bigger terror threats
Southers, 2015 [Director of Homegrown Violent Extremism Studies at USC, adjunt prof at
USC]
(Erroll, 7/16, "Rethinking Countering Violent Extremism Programs,"
securitydebrief.com/2015/07/16/rethinking-countering-violent-extremismprograms/#axzz3h2ec63r0)
In 2003, in an effort to reduce the risk of al Qaeda-inspired recruitment, radicalization and related terrorist incidents, the United
Kingdom launched the Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy (Prevent). It was considered one of the best in the world when it was
first implemented. At its core, Prevent focused on radicalization and recruitment prevention (rather than simply HVE detection) and
acknowledged the importance of enlisting the community in the fight against terrorism. In the words of Charles Farr, the head of the
U.K.s Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Prevent was the Governments recognition that as a nation, we cannot arrest our
way out of the terrorist threat we face nor can we protect ourselves physically to the point where the threat is mitigated entirely.
That is sage wisdom for Americas challenges with terrorism, but we

need to also look at the results of the

British program. The Prevent strategy was criticized (and ultimately failed in its initial form) for four primary problems:
The strategys concept of radicalization: There was a lack of consensus or conceptual clarity on
the definition of radicalization. A narrow focus on Muslims: The original program
looked exclusively at the Muslim community, essentially labeling all Muslims as
potentially at risk while ignoring other groups engaged in extremist activities.
The implementation methodology: The program funded efforts in Muslim communities based on the size of the Muslim population
in a given area. Inasmuch as the additional risk factors were ignored (particularly other sources of extremism), the community
perceived that the program was intended to spy on Muslims. Negative program consequences :

In considering the
Muslim population (irrespective of behavior), the program inadvertently created a
relationship of mistrust. This compromised the goal of community engagement
and support and potentially helped create an environment ripe for extremist
recruitment based on the resentment of the British government. One major error with
Prevent was a failure to engage stakeholders before implementation so as to determine challenges unique to the communities it was
meant to help. What is more, evaluation of Prevent occurred only after widespread criticism of the strategys shortcomings. At that
point, the challenge became not just creating an effective strategy but also rebuilding the community trust that is central to
addressing HVE. Looking to the United States, it would seem we

are heading down a similar (and

ultimately futile) path. The much-debated CVE Pilot Programs in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston have
engendered widespread backlash in those cities because the perception is that CVE is focused exclusively on
Muslim populations. Yet, in Britain, we saw how approaching communities based
on religion or country of origin neutralizes an effort before it gets out of the gate.
To be sure, Muslim-identity extremism is a threat, but it is not the only nor even the
greatest threat. Consider two recent studies assessing the threat from HVE: In 2014, a
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Centers report found that law enforcement
views the anti-government Sovereign Citizen movement as the top terrorist threat, followed by Muslim extremists and
militia/patriot group members. In

2015, the New America Foundation reported that since

September 11, 2001, nearly twice as many victims have been killed by antigovernment adherents, white supremacists and other non-Muslim extremists
than by radical Muslims: 48 were killed by non-Muslim extremists, compared with 26 self-proclaimed jihadists. As
explained in my book, Homegrown Violent Extremism, terrorism is the product of an alienated individual, a legitimizing ideology
and an enabling environment. The environment (i.e., the community) is most susceptible to positive influence to reduce the risk of
HVE. The issue of an enabling environment must be addressed in terms of enhancing social morality, responsibility and community
integrity, with the intended outcome of facilitating community-based efforts to identify and explore solutions to continuing
challenges. If

CVE becomes synonymous with countering violent Muslim extremism, we are

doomed to fail and will not even address the greatest terrorist threats in this country.

The United States can enhance its security posture by implementing strategies that work with communities. It begins with those
residents having a seat at the table to contribute to policy development, implementation and evaluation that will ultimately affect
them. The community holds the key to the success of any program intended to counter violent extremism. Lets get this right.

fails broadly allows government to crush all dissent or inevitably targets

only Muslims
Saylor, 2015, [directs the department to monitor and combat Islamophobia at the Council on
American-Islamic Relations]
(Corey, July 15, "Is countering violent extremism ready for a $40 million investment?" The Hill
thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/247908-is-countering-violent-extremism-readyfor-a-40-million)
House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Mike McCauls (R-Texas) proposed new Office for Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) in the Department of Homeland Security would redirect 40 million taxpayer dollars over four years into a dubious expansion
of government programming. We all want to prevent violent extremism. But currently, CVE

programming fails to
provide meaningful solutions that would substantively interdict barbaric acts . A 2014
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) document titled Countering Violent Extremism serves as food for thought. Its expert
authors say CVEs ends are not easy to quantify. This means return-on-investment
metrics will be elusive . The report authors then offer risk factors to help public service providers identify at-risk youth
such as Parent-Child Bonding, Empathic Connection, Presence of Emotional or Verbal Conflict in Family and Parent
Involvement in Childs Education. As these factors encompass issues with which most American families have struggled at some
point, their use in identifying at-risk individuals is nearly non-existent. On this subject, McCauls proposal assigns the office to the
task of identifying

risk factors that contribute to violent extremism . But such efforts at classification
have already been attempted. In 2008, the UKs counter-intelligence and security agency, M15, concluded that it is not
possible to draw up a typical profile of the British terrorist as most are demographically unremarkable." Similarly, in its 2010
report titled Preventing Violent Extremism, Britains House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee said,
Regarding the Governments analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism, we conclude that

there has been a pre-occupation with the theological basis of radicalisation, when the evidence
seems to indicate that politics, policy and socio-economics may be more important factors in the process.
This pre-occupation with religion raises another problem with expanding the scope of DHS programming. While the security fields
current focus is on Daesh (ISIS), this has not and will not always be the case, and we join other security and civil liberties
organizations in our concern that the programs scope may be expanded at-will in ways not envisioned by its current advocates. In
February, 2009 the Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC), a DHS fusion center, issued a report labeling common
ideologies or affiliations as warning signs of being a right-wing extremist or member of a domestic paramilitary group. According
to the MIAC report, any U.S. citizen could potentially be a domestic terrorist if they are in favor of strong state rights, hold antiabortionist or anti-Immigration views, are in strong opposition to the collection of federal income taxes or the Federal Reserve
Banks, or support third-party presidential candidates like Ron Paul. The report also noted that "It is not uncommon for militia
members to display Constitutional Party, Campaign for Liberty or Libertarian material" or the Gadsden Flag. Setting the enormous

broad -swath
categorizations of what might constitute subversive behavior risk criminalizing
anyone who holds views with which the government disagrees , a chilling prospect.

costs of monitoring everyone who dislikes paying their taxes or votes for Ron Paul aside, such

Finally, it is worth noting what has already happened on the ground in those areas in which CVE programming has been proposed;
after all, CVE can only work if it is widely accepted as effective by the communities in which it would profess to build ties.

Last

year, former U.S. Attorney General Holder announced a CVE initiative, designating Los Angeles, Boston, and
Minneapolis as pilot cities. While the program was supposed to target all forms of violent extremism, in
practice only Muslims were actually examined. In all three cities, local Muslim community leaders,
who have longstanding records of supporting efforts to make our nation more secure, engaged in the U.S. attorney-led
meetings aimed at shaping local CVE frameworks. In time, however, they distanced
themselves from the project as they formed a deeper understanding of CVEs problematic
realities . In Los Angeles, both the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, an umbrella organization of mosques and
Muslim organizations serving the Muslims of Southern California, and the Muslim Student Association of the West Coast (MSA
West) voted to oppose the narrow scope of the federal government's CVE program. In Minnesota, nearly 50 Muslim

organizations joined together to urge law enforcement to consider our grave concerns and
discontinue this stigmatizing , divisive, and ineffective initiative. A top leader of Bostons Muslim

community opted against the local framework because it targeted only American Muslims and was

founded on the
premise that your faith determines your propensity towards violence . Given that one of the goals of
violent extremists is to transform our nation into their vision of an authoritarian state, Americans must be vigilant that the measures
we fund to stop them do not ultimately themselves fulfill these aims. CVE, with its call for teachers, guidance counselors, public
health workers, and police officers to assess a persons thoughts, rather than actions, to identify violent extremists, does not
represent an effective solution for these very real threats.

focus on Muslim terrorism falls victim to media hype and ignores real
threats
Kurzman and Schanzer 6/16/15, [Professor of Sociology at University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill who specializes in Middle East and Islamic studies; Associate Professor of the
Practice in the Sanford School of Public Policy ]
(Charles and David, "The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat"
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/the-other-terror-threat.html)

THIS month, the headlines were about a Muslim man in Boston who was accused of threatening
police officers with a knife. Last month, two Muslims attacked an anti-Islamic conference in
Garland, Tex. The month before, a Muslim man was charged with plotting to drive a truck bomb
onto a military installation in Kansas. If you keep up with the news, you know that a small but
steady stream of American Muslims, radicalized by overseas extremists, are engaging in violence
here in the United States. But headlines can mislead. The main terrorist threat in the
United States is not from violent Muslim extremists, but from right-wing
extremists . Just ask the police. In a survey we conducted with the Police Executive
Research Forum last year of 382 law enforcement agencies, 74 percent reported antigovernment extremism as one of the top three terrorist threats in their jurisdiction; 39 percent
listed extremism connected with Al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist organizations. And only 3
percent identified the threat from Muslim extremists as severe, compared with 7 percent for
anti-government and other forms of extremism. The self-proclaimed Islamic States efforts to
radicalize American Muslims, which began just after the survey ended, may have increased
threat perceptions somewhat, but not by much, as we found in follow-up interviews over the
past year with counterterrorism specialists at 19 law enforcement agencies. These officers,
selected from urban and rural areas around the country, said that radicalization from the
Middle East was a concern, but not as dangerous as radicalization among rightwing extremists. An officer from a large metropolitan area said that militias, neoNazis and sovereign citizens are the biggest threat we face in regard to
extremism. One officer explained that he ranked the right-wing threat higher because it is an
emerging threat that we dont have as good of a grip on, even with our intelligence
unit, as we do with the Al Shabab/Al Qaeda issue, which we have been dealing with
for some time. An officer on the West Coast explained that the sovereign citizen antigovernment threat has really taken off, whereas terrorism by American Muslim
is something we just havent experienced yet. Last year, for example, a man who
identified with the sovereign citizen movement which claims not to recognize the authority of
federal or local government attacked a courthouse in Forsyth County, Ga., firing an assault
rifle at police officers and trying to cover his approach with tear gas and smoke grenades. The
suspect was killed by the police, who returned fire. In Nevada, anti-government militants

reportedly walked up to andshot two police officers at a restaurant, then placed a Dont tread
on me flag on their bodies. An anti-government extremist in Pennsylvania was arrested on
suspicion of shooting two state troopers, killing one of them, before leading authorities on a 48day manhunt. A right-wing militant in Texas declared a revolution and was arrested on
suspicion of attempting to rob an armored car in order to buy weapons and explosives and
attack law enforcement. These individuals on the fringes of right-wing politics increasingly
worry law enforcement officials. Law enforcement agencies around the country are training
their officers to recognize signs of anti-government extremism and to exercise caution during
routine traffic stops, criminal investigations and other interactions with potential extremists.
The threat is real, says the handout from one training program sponsored by the
Department of Justice. Since 2000, the handout notes, 25 law enforcement officers have been
killed by right-wing extremists, who share a fear that government will confiscate firearms and
a belief in the approaching collapse of government and the economy. Despite public
anxiety about extremists inspired by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, the number of violent
plots by such individuals has remained very low. Since 9/11, an average of nine American
Muslims per year have been involved in an average of six terrorism-related plots against targets
in the United States. Most were disrupted, but the 20 plots that were carried out accounted for
50 fatalities over the past 13 and a half years. In contrast, right-wing extremists averaged 337
attacks per year in the decade after 9/11, causing a total of 254 fatalities, according to a study by
Arie Perliger, a professor at the United States Military AcademysCombating Terrorism Center.
The toll has increased since the study was released in 2012. Other data sets, using different
definitions of political violence, tell comparable stories. The Global Terrorism Database
maintained by theStart Center at the University of Maryland includes 65 attacks in the United
States associated with right-wing ideologies and 24 by Muslim extremists since 9/11. The
International Security Program at the New America Foundation identifies 39 fatalities from
non-jihadist homegrown extremists and 26 fatalities from jihadist extremists. Meanwhile,
terrorism of all forms has accounted for a tiny proportion of violence in America. There have
been more than 215,000 murders in the United States since 9/11. For every person killed by
Muslim extremists, there have been 4,300 homicides from other threats. Public debates on
terrorism focus intensely on Muslims. But this focus does not square with the low
number of plots in the United States by Muslims, and it does a disservice to a
minority group that suffers from increasingly hostile public opinion. As state and
local police agencies remind us, right-wing, anti-government extremism is the
leading source of ideological violence in America.

ex kurtzman different media angles, inherent biases all cover up real violence turns
case and reinscribes muslim stereotypes
Shane, 6/24/15, [Washington reporter at New York Times]
(Scott, "Homegrown Extremists Tied to Deadlier Toll than Jihadists in US Since 9/11,
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/tally-of-attacks-in-us-challenges-perceptions-of-top-terrorthreat.html)
WASHINGTON In the 14 years since Al Qaeda carried out attacks on New York and the Pentagon, extremists have regularly
executed smaller lethal assaults in the United States, explaining their motives in online manifestoes or social media rants. But the
breakdown of extremist ideologies behind those attacks may come as a surprise. Since

Sept. 11, 2001, nearly twice as

many people have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment fanatics and other non-

Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims: 48 have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim, including the
recent mass killing in Charleston, S.C., compared with 26 by self-proclaimed jihadists, according to a count by New America, a
Washington research center. The

slaying of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church last week, with

white supremacist charged with their murders, was a particularly savage case. But it is
only the latest in a string of lethal attacks by people espousing racial hatred, hostility to
government and theories such as those of the sovereign citizen movement, which denies the
an avowed

legitimacy of most statutory law. The assaults have taken the lives of police officers, members of racial or religious minorities and
random civilians. Non-Muslim extremists have carried out 19 such attacks since Sept. 11 , according to the
latest count, compiled by David Sterman, a New America program associate, and overseen by Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert. By
comparison, seven

lethal attacks by Islamic militants have taken place i n the same period. If such numbers are

new to the public, they are familiar to police officers. A survey to be published this week asked 382 police and sheriffs

departments nationwide to rank the three biggest threats from violent extremism in their
jurisdiction. About 74 percent listed antigovernment violence , while 39 percent listed Al Qaeda-inspired
violence, according to the researchers, Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina and David Schanzer of Duke University.
Homegrown Terrorism In the United States since Sept. 11, terrorist attacks by antigovernment, racist and other nonjihadist
extremists have killed nearly twice as many people as those by Islamic jihadists. A photo from a white supremacist website showing
Dylann Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting.Federal Hate Crime Charges Likely in South Carolina Church
ShootingJUNE 24, 2015 An honor guard carried the coffin of State Senator Clementa C. Pinckney, a shooting victim, in Columbia,
S.C., on Wednesday.Charleston Families Hope Words Endure Past ShootingJUNE 24, 2015 State flags line the Capitol subway tracks
in Washington.Calls to Cut Ties to Symbols of the SouthJUNE 23, 2015 The Council of Conservative Citizens was most visibly active
in South Carolina during a fierce debate in 2000 over flying the Confederate battle flag on the grounds of the State House in
Columbia, picketing in support of continuing to display the emblem.Council of Conservative Citizens Promotes White Primacy, and
G.O.P. TiesJUNE 22, 2015 Earl Holt III, president of the Council of Conservative Citizens, in a 2013 image taken from the council's
website.White Supremacist Who Influenced Charleston Suspect Donated to 2016 G.O.P. CampaignsJUNE 22, 2015 A photo from a
white supremacist website showing Dylann Roof, the suspect in the Charleston, S.C., church shooting.Dylann Roof Photos and a
Manifesto Are Posted on WebsiteJUNE 20, 2015 A scene from a vigil at Morris Brown African Methodist Episcopal Church in
Charleston, S.C., for the victims.Many Ask, Why Not Call Church Shooting Terrorism?JUNE 18, 2015 Law enforcement agencies
around the country have told us the threat from Muslim extremists is not as great as the threat from right-wing extremists, said Dr.
Kurzman, whose study is to be published by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the Police Executive

mismatch
between public perceptions and actual cases had become steadily more obvious to
scholars. Theres an acceptance now of the idea that the threat from jihadi terrorism in the United
States has been overblown, Dr. Horgan said. And theres a belief that the threat of right-wing, antigovernment
Research Forum. John G. Horgan, who studies terrorism at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell, said the

violence has been underestimated. Counting terrorism cases is a subjective enterprise, relying on shifting definitions and judgment
calls. If terrorism is defined as ideological violence, for instance, should an attacker who has merely ranted about religion, politics or
race be considered a terrorist? A man in Chapel Hill, N.C., who was charged with fatally shooting three young Muslim neighbors had
posted angry critiques of religion, but he also had a history of outbursts over parking issues. (New America does not include this
attack in its count.) Likewise, what about mass killings in which no ideological motive is evident, such as those at a Colorado movie
theater and a Connecticut elementary school in 2012? The criteria used by New America and most other research groups exclude
such attacks, which have cost more lives than those clearly tied to ideology. Some killings by non-Muslims that most experts would
categorize as terrorism have drawn only fleeting news media coverage, never jelling in the public memory. But to revisit some of the
episodes is to wonder why. In 2012, a neo-Nazi named Wade Michael Page entered a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and opened fire,
killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Mr. Page, who died at the scene, was a member of a white supremacist group
called the Northern Hammerskins. In another case, in June 2014, Jerad and Amanda Miller, a married couple with radical
antigovernment views, entered a Las Vegas pizza restaurant and fatally shot two police officers who were eating lunch. On the
bodies, they left a swastika, a flag inscribed with the slogan Dont tread on me and a note saying, This is the start of the
revolution. Then they killed a third person in a nearby Walmart. And, as in the case of jihadist plots, there have been sobering close
calls. In November 2014 in Austin, Tex., a man named Larry McQuilliams

fired more than 100 rounds at

government buildings that included the Police Headquarters and the Mexican
Consulate. Remarkably, his shooting spree hit no one, and he was killed by an officer before he could try to detonate propane
cylinders he drove to the scene. Some Muslim advocates complain that when the perpetrator of an attack is not Muslim, news media
commentators quickly focus on the question of mental illness. With

non-Muslims, the media bends over

backward to identify some psychological traits that may have pushed them over
the edge, said Abdul Cader Asmal, a retired physician and a longtime spokesman for Muslims in Boston. Whereas if its a
Muslim, the assumption is that they must have done it because of their religion . On
several occasions since President Obama took office, efforts by government agencies to conduct research on right-wing
extremism have run into resistance from Republicans, who suspected an attempt to smear conservatives. A

2009 report by the Department of Homeland Security, which warned that an ailing economy and the election of the first black
president might prompt a violent reaction from white supremacists, was withdrawn in the face of conservative criticism. Its main
author, Daryl Johnson, later accused the department of gutting its staffing for such research. William Braniff, the executive
director of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, said the
outsize fear of jihadist violence reflected memories of Sept. 11, the daunting scale of sectarian conflict overseas and wariness of a
strain of Islam that seems alien to many Americans. We

understand white supremacists, he said. We dont

really feel like we understand Al Qaeda, which seems too complex and foreign to grasp . The
contentious question of biased perceptions of terrorist threats dates back at least two decades, to the truck bombing that tore apart
the federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. Some early news media speculation about the attack assumed that it had been
carried out by Muslim militants. The arrest of Timothy J. McVeigh, an antigovernment extremist, quickly put an end to such
theories. The bombing, which killed 168 people, including 19 children, remains the second-deadliest terrorist attack in American
history, though its toll was dwarfed by the roughly 3,000 killed on Sept 11. If theres one lesson we seem to have forgotten 20 years
after Oklahoma City, its that extremist

violence comes in all shapes and sizes, said Dr. Horgan, the University of
from someplace youre least suspecting.

Massachusetts scholar. And very often, it comes

A version of this article appears in print on June 25, 2015, on page A1 of the New York edition
with the headline: Most U.S. Attacks Are Homegrown and Not Jihadist. Order Reprints| Today's
Paper|Subscribe

islamophobia aff
vague policy focus papers over entrenched inequality Britain proves
Joppke, 2009, [German political sociologist, Professor and chair in General Sociology at the
University of Bern, Switzerland]
(Christian, Feb 16, "Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and her Muslims" Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies: Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453-472 Taylor and Francis)
-vs islamophobia w/o CVE mechanism proves their approach is symbolic/token gesture

This essay examines a paradox: while the British state has done more than other European states to accommodate the claims of
Muslim minorities, recent polls have shown British Muslims to be more disaffected and alienated than other Muslims in Europe.
This raises the question of the limits of integration policy, which is obvious but rarely posed. I argue that, more than reflecting an
adverse reality, the neologism

Islamophobia has functioned as a symbolic device of the British

state to recognise the Muslim minority. However, the policy focus on Islamophobia had two
negative consequences: first, it deflected from the real causes of disadvantage ; secondly,
it fuelled the quest for respect and recognition that stands to be disappointed in a liberal state. I
take the latter to be the main limit of integration policy as revealed by the British case. Keywords: Immigrant Integration;
Multiculturalism; Muslims in Britain and Europe; Discrimination; Liberalism A recent survey of how Westerners and Muslims view
each other in thirteen Western and non-Western countries (Pew 2006) contains a striking puzzle: while there is the good news that
European Muslims have more positive opinions about Europe than Muslims in traditionally Muslim countries ,

Britain stands
out as the Western country whose Muslim minority is the most negatively disposed toward the
non-Muslim majority. Conversely, and a surprise if one considers that the notion of Islamophobia is of British vintage
(Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997), British non-Muslims espouse rather favourable views of British Muslims.
Germany is at the opposite end, with a hostile majority but a docile Muslim minority. And, surprising for all who followed the
French headscarf troubles and banlieue unrest, the best of all (European) worlds seems to be France, where Muslims and nonMuslims hold relatively benign views of one another. Further underlining the BritishFrench Christian Joppke is Professor of Political
Science at The American University of Paris. Correspondence to: Prof. C. Joppke, The American University of Paris, 6 rue du Colonel
Combes, 75007 Paris, France. E-mail: cjoppke@aup.fr. ISSN 1369-183X print/ISSN 1469-9451 online/09/030453-20 # 2009 Taylor
& Francis DOI: 10.1080/13691830802704616 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453472
Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 contrast, almost half of British Muslims (47 per cent) found that there is a conflict between
being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, whereas close to three-quarters of French Muslims (72 per cent) deny that
there is any such conflict (Pew 2006: 3). The BritishFrench contrast is paradoxical if one considers the British mantra that our
diversity is our strength and the smug response by British officials to the French anti-headscarf law of 2004, billed by Londons leftwing mayor, Ken Livingstone, as the most reactionary proposal to be considered by any parliament in Europe since the Second
World War (Guardian, 13 July 2004: 4). In her informative study of the European Muslim elite, Jytte Klausen comes to similar
results. She describes Europes political Muslim elite as pragmatic, integration-minded and optimistic, with little time for left-wing
ideas about global citizenship and transnational identities (Klausen 2005: 19). But again there is one exception: Britain, whose
Muslim leaders were found to be exceptionally unhappy with current policies (Klausen 2005: 63). Moreover, within her typology of
approaches to the integration of Islam, her British Muslim interviewees came out as staunchly neo-orthodox, defined by a clear
No to the questions as to whether Islam is compatible with Western values and whether Islam should be mainstreamed for a
better fit with its European host societies (Klausen 2005: 87). In line with this, 70 per cent of her interviewed British Muslim leaders
came out in favour of legal dualism, that is, of applying religious Sharia rules in private law, such as marriage and divorce*a stance
that was rejected by even larger majorities of Muslim leaders in most other Western European countries (Klausen 2005: 192).
Finally, British Muslims integration deficits stand out in a recent survey by the UK think-tank Policy Exchange, which found that 31
per cent of surveyed British Muslims feel more in common with Muslims in other countries than with fellow citizens (Policy
Exchange 2007: 38), and that a considerable 13 per cent in the younger age bracket (1624) admire organisations like Al Qaeda that
are prepared to fight against the West (Policy Exchange 2007: 62).1 Attitudes were found to be particularly extreme among the
young, which suggests that the rift between Muslims and the majority society is growing. Accordingly, only 19
per cent of the interviewed Muslims over 55 years think that apostasy should be punishable by death, while almost twice as many
(36 per cent) of the 1624-year-olds think so; a mere 18 per cent of Muslims over 55 advocate polygamy for Muslim men, compared to
52 per cent in the 1624 age bracket; and, while not a few older Muslims think that homosexuality is wrong and should be illegal (50
per cent), even more of the very young think that way (71 per cent). Indeed, as a Financial Times columnist summarised the Policy

rift between Muslims and

non-Muslims is deepening, not disappearing (Caldwell 2007). Since home-grown Islamic terrorism has struck
Exchange findings, (t)his is the clearest report we yet have from any European country that the

Europe, there has been much debate about a general failure of European societies to successfully integrate their postwar immigrants,
especially those of Muslim origin. Unfailingly, this debate is conducted in terms of a presumed failure of states to integrate

immigrants, with the 454 C. Joppke Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 reverse hope that, by means of revamped integration
policies, states will eventually resolve the problem. Rarely is the question of the limits of state policy posed. But one should at least
consider that one of the most successful immigrant societies in the world, the United States, has integrated her immigrants, at least
in the past halfcentury, without any explicit state policy, relying instead on flexible markets and the fabled assimilatory powers of
American mass culture. Even if one brushes this aside as American exceptionalism, putting

high hopes on the state is

still strangely countertide. For example, consider the retreat of the state on so many policy fronts, from economic to
welfare policy; and, not even to mention the state-as-diminished-byglobalisation mantra, consider the polycentric nature of
functionally differentiated societies, which have neither peak nor centre (Luhmann 1986: 16782), so that the entire idea of state-led
integration appears misguided from the start. The question of the limits of integration policy is obvious but rarely posed. Britain is a
particularly interesting case in this respect. This is because the British

case shows a puzzling disjunction between

an apparently ill-adapted and dissatisfied Muslim minority and a rather accommodative
state policy , which has rarely been far from what organised Muslims want the state to do. Formulated as a counter-factual, if
you look for a place in Europe where you would not expect Muslim integration to pose a particular problem, you would expect this
place to be Britain. Of all European societies, Britain

has perhaps gone the furthest in accommodating her

ethnic minorities by means of explicit state policy, Muslims included. Britain was the first European
country to devise remedial race relations policies for her immigrants, whose logic of combating not just personal insult and injury
but structural exclusions in key societal sectors became the European mainstream only 40 years later. This first and paradigmsetting anti-discrimination policy in Europe was framed within a consensual view of Britain as a multicultural society, where
diversity was extolled as a virtue long before this happened elsewhere.

discourse of islamophobia is totalizing and stigmatizing ignores alt causes

Joppke, 2009, [German political sociologist, Professor and chair in General Sociology at the
University of Bern, Switzerland]
(Christian, Feb 16, "Limits of Integration Policy: Britain and her Muslims" Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies: Vol. 35, No. 3, March 2009, pp. 453-472 Taylor and Francis)
The Runnymede report defines Islamophobia as certain closed views of Islam, which are distinguished from open views in terms
of eight binary oppositions, such as monolithic/diverse, separate/interacting, or inferior/different (the first adjective always
marking a closed, the second an open view). This makes for an elastic definition of Islamophobia, with little that could not be
packed into it. Consider the eighth binary opposition, Criticism of West rejected/considered. If criticisms made by Islam of The
West (are) rejected out of hand, there is an instance of Islamophobia, the non-biased attitude being that criticisms of the West
and other cultures are considered and debated. Is it reasonable to assume that people enter debate by putting their point of view to
disposition? Under such demanding standards, only an advocate of Habermasian communicative rationality would go free of the
charge of Islamophobia.

However, the real problem is to leave unquestioned the exit position,

criticism of the West. In being sweeping and undifferentiated, such a stance seems to be no less
phobic than the incriminated opposite. If the point of the Runnymede report is to counter Islamophobic assumptions
that Islam is a single 456 C. Joppke Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 monolithic system, it seems inconsistent to take for

There is a double
standard here, in that the West is asked to swallow what on the other side would qualify as
phobia. Moreover, if in terms of the lead binary opposition, monolithic versus diverse, a
closed and thus Islamophobic view of the Islam is to consider the Islam as a single
monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities, one has to retort that this is precisely the view of
granted a similarly monolithic criticism of the West, which the West is asked to consider and debate.

Islam that Jytte Klausen (2005) found dominant among the British Muslim elite. In her study, 71.4 per cent of her interviewees
espoused a neoorthodox view of integration, according to which the basic tenets of Islam are not for modification and Islam is

the very
notion of Islamophobia suggests, the trouble with the idea is that it confuses hatred of, and
discrimination against Muslims on the one hand with criticism of Islam on the other (Malik 2005).
what it is, so that the idea of a Westernised, British or European Islam is rejected out of hand (Klausen 2005: 100). As

Tellingly, the first six of Runnymedes Islamophobia-defining stances denote wrong attitudes toward Islam as belief system, while
only the last two address discrimination against people. Accordingly, the

notion has been attacked for stifling free

speech and end(ing) up defending the nastiest and most right-wing part of the Muslim
community (Hari 2006). In the wake of the Danish Cartoon Affair, where such risks were promptly apparent, a group of 12
prominent writers*mostly liberal Muslim intellectuals, including Salman Rushdie* consequently declared that Islamophobia
is a wretched concept that confuses criticism of Islam as a religion and stigmatisation of

those who believe in it. Unsurprisingly, on the basis of a vaguely and contestably defined Islamophobia, the Runnymede
report drew a dark picture of British society as permeated by anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiment, expressed in
misrepresentations in the media and in everyday life no less than in hate crimes and discrimination in employment and schooling.
Once the concept was there, there had to be a reality described by it. Of course, the purported causality is the reverse: (A)nti-Muslim
prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be
identified and acted against (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997: 1). In fact, the true success of the report was
to introduce the word Islamophobia into the public vocabulary, and even outside Britain it has become a popular summary
explanation for the difficulties that Muslims face (Klausen 2005: 58). Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Britain was
Islamophobic when the concept was launched in the mid-1990s, what has been the development since? A good measure is the
follow-up report by the Runnymedes Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and
Action (2004). The report comes to optimistic conclusions, at least with respect to measures that fall within the ambit of state policy.
If one considers only non-EU domestic measures, a new question on religion was included in the 2001 census after much lobbying
by Muslim organisations (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 2004: 75). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
457 Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 This allows for monitoring by religion analogous to already existing ethnic monitoring.
Secondly, a 2001 amendment to the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act created the new legal term of religiously aggravated offence, thus
adding religious to already existing protection from racially motivated offences. This was complemented, two years after the
publication of Runnymedes 2004 progress report, by the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, which extended the 1986 Public
Order Act to create a new offence of incitement to religious hatred. Whereas the 2001 amendment of the Crime and Disorder Act had
outlawed direct acts of offending or harassing Muslims, the new law added to this the incitement of others to do so. There was,
again, logic to this extension, because Jews and Sikhs were already protected via race. However, the 2006 Racial and Religious
Hatred Act became widely criticised, especially by writers, intellectuals and entertainers, as injurious to free speech. The government
pointed out that the law was about protecting people, not faiths, and that this was not a new blasphemy law.2 As in the entire
campaign against Islamophobia, the line distinguishing between people and their beliefs is nevertheless unclear. Moreover, as one
critic pointed out, the analogy between race and religion does not really work: There is no possible rational objection to blackness.
There are many possible rational objections to religion ... and some of the greatest thinkers in modern history have held them
(Garton Ash 2005). Multiply withdrawn and re-introduced, and eventually realised only in a watered-down version,3 the 2006 Act
was the Labour governments attempt to reconcile the unison opposition by British Muslims to the war on Iraq, by trying to deliver
an agenda that has shown consideration and respect for Muslims.4 Taking effect not long after the so-called Danish Cartoon Affair
of Autumn 2005, the Act could not be tested for its claimed irrelevance for free speech: in an astounding act of self-censorship, all
major British newspapers refused to reprint the incriminated cartoons. For Tariq Modood (2006: 3) this restraint in the uses of
freedom directed against religious people epitomised some progress (in Britain) since the Satanic Verses affair. Not even including
this latest legislative advance, the Runnymedes 2004 review of progress, much of it achieved at the presumed height of
Islamophobia after 9/11, is impressive. While the Muslim Council of Britain lamented that the government has done little to ...
protect its Muslim citizens and residents from discrimination, vilification, harassment and deprivation (Commission on British
Muslims and Islamophobia 2004: 3), in reality perhaps no European government has gone further than the British in protecting
Muslims from these vices. And Muslims have clout in Britain. For instance, the domestic incorporation of the EU Employment
Directive in December 2003 went along with a stunning victory of the Muslim lobby over gay rights, no small feat in the land of
Virginia Wolf and Oscar Wilde. At the behest of the Muslim lobby, the 2003 UK Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation)
regulations, which implement the sex-related part of the EU Employment Directive, contain a clause that allows religious
organisations to refuse employment to a known homosexual, if such refusal is in line with religious script. As the Times 458 C.
Joppke Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 commented, Gay rights campaigners have been snubbed by the government for fear
of upsetting Muslim voters who are regarded as more important to Labours election campaign (quoted in Klausen 2005: 74). The
Causes of Disadvantage The notion of Islamophobia cannot be meaningfully decoupled from an actors intent to harm or
discriminate. A phobia, after all, is an irrational fear: this can only be the disposition of an actor. Islamophobia inherits this
limitation from its closest historical progenitor, anti-Semitism. However, in

its subject-centredness Islamophobia

falls short of the model that it aspires to emulate, racism, which has increasingly come to
denote an objective fact built into the anonymous workings of institutions . This weakness might well
have been strength, because there are good reasons to be sceptical of the construct of institutional racism in which racism is an
objective outcome separate from actors intentions. Unfortunately, the advocates

of the concept of Islamophobia are

generally not fond of conceptual subtleties, applying the latter, like racism, to generic
discrimination that afflicts Muslims qua Muslims. Accordingly, the Commission on British
Muslims and Islamophobia suggested the existence of institutional Islamophobia,
analogous to the notion of institutional racism, defining the former as those established laws,
customs and practices which systematically reflect and produce inequalities in society between
Muslims and nonMuslims (2004: 14). However, considering only the key sector of employment, it is difficult to
argue that Muslims are systematically discriminated against and disadvantaged because
they are Muslims. One study found that only 26 per cent of Pakistanis and 23 per cent of Bangladeshis had full-time work
in 1994,5 which are the lowest rates of all ethnic groups in Britain (Brown 2000). However, at the same time, 41 per cent of Indian
Muslims had full-time work. Factoring in similarly good showings by Middle-Eastern Muslims, one must conclude that being
Muslim cannot be the cause of the disadvantage that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis face. Instead, it

is more likely that

their relative disadvantage is due to a combination of demographic and social-

structural factors , such as the relative youth of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, their concentration in
economically depressed regions and sectors, and the low skill level and traditionalist profiles of the first immigrant generation
(Policy Exchange 2007: 68). Finally, if one considers the particularly low employment level of Muslim women, religion may very
well be involved in this*however, as a factor of choice, not of discrimination. 2005 Labour Force Survey figures show that only 23
per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women aged 1634 actually want to work. Conversely, Muslim women who want to work are
relatively successful and thus do not seem to suffer inordinately from discrimination: 25 per cent of Muslim women in employment
are working in managerial or professional jobs, which is a higher proportion than Christian women at 21 per cent (Policy Exchange
2007: 69). Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 459 Downloaded by [] at 14:15 26 July 2015 When seeking to explain why British
Muslims fare worse in socio-economic terms than other ethnic groups, a conspiracy of silence prevents honest discussion of
internal cultural factors that may be responsible for this (Lewis 2002: 134). Take the example of Bradford, which has the thirdlargest Muslim community in Britain after London and Birmingham, and which was one of the sites of the 2001 race riots that led to
a massive questioning of British multiculturalism. One authoritative review found Bradford in a very worrying drift towards selfsegregation, with communities ... fragmenting along racial, cultural and faith lines, but where political etiquette and a discourse of
victimisation prevented talking openly and honestly about problems, lest one risked being labelled racist (Ouseley 2001). In one
description in the Yorkshire Post of 22 November 2002, Bradford is an Asian city*or, more precisely, a Kashmiri city. Four decades
after the first immigrants came here, their families still read newspapers published in Urdu, the conversation around the breakfast
table is conducted in Punjabi, the Shalvar kameez is preferred to the suit, purdah is practiced in the majority of homes and the
faithful are summoned up to worship...by the cry of the muezzin. In this Asian city, South Asian Muslims further self-segregate
around a handful of inner-city wards, which provide all of the citys 13 Muslim councillors (in 2001) and whose schools are up to 90
per cent frequented by Muslim students (Lewis 2002).

**terror da links
must analyze religious ties to violence before effective policymaking
avoiding discussion wields the reins to radicals
Rubin, 2015 [resident scholar @ AEI, former Pentagon official whose major research areas are
the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy]
(Michael, Feb 12, "Countering violent extremism? 'It's the theology, stupid"
https://www.aei.org/publication/countering-violent-extremism-its-the-theology-stupid/)
Unfortunately, Obamas efforts will fail before they begin, sacrificed upon the altar of political correctness and a diplomatic desire
not to offend. Obama seems more concerned with protecting the sensitivities of Islamists than he does the lives of their victims. He
walks on eggshells to avoid singling out Islam, and so uses the euphemism violent extremism. That condemns any resulting policy
to failure: To discuss violent extremism but refuse to define what it means is the equivalent of hosting a conference to cure cancer,
but barring any mention of cancer or discussion of tumors or metatheses. The

sacrifice of precision and

reality to wordplay and diplomacy has long undercut the international fight
against terrorism . In 1988, Western countries used more than 100 different
definitions of terrorism; a quarter-century later, they used 250 different
definitions. Obama, for his part, has simply sidestepped the issue. His 2011 National
Strategy for Counterterrorism avoids defining terrorism, even as it defined other terms
such as affiliates and adherents. In 1988, Western countries used more than 100
different definitions of terrorism; a quarter-century later, they used 250 different
definitions. That wont stop other countries from condemning terrorism. That part is easy, but most states take an la carte
approach: All terrorism is bad unless it happens to be for a cause with which they agree. Hence, Turkey considers the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) a terrorist group, yet sees no irony in supporting Hamas, even as that group launches rockets indiscriminately
at Israeli towns and bombs civilian buses in pursuit of a genocidal platform outlined in its charter. Likewise, the Islamic Republic of
Iran condemns as a terrorist group the Mujahedin al-Khalq, a cult blending Islamic and Marxist influences which has many
followers in Europe and America, yet blesses Hezbollah as a resistance organization. Even with regard to al Qaeda, whose defeat
the 2011 Counterterrorism Strategy declared its main goal, however, political correctness and a desire to avoid offense have tied
Americas hands. There

can be no groups that more represent violent extremism than

al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Yet the White House consistently refuses to acknowledge the
theological basis of the actions of either. Instead, it insists (without evidence) that al Qaedas ideology has been
rejected repeatedly and unequivocally by peoples of all faiths around the world. Likewise, on September 10, 2014, Obama declared,
ISIL [The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] is not Islamic, and added, No religion condones the killing of innocents, and the
vast majority of ISILs victims have been Muslim. The

mantra that terrorism has nothing to do with

Islam, or at least legitimate Islam, might reassure the sensitivities of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, but
it is a counterfactual refrain. Woven into the Islamic States videos are Koranic recitations and theological
incantations. Two verses of the Koran bless beheading, and the Islamic State justified the burning alive of Jordanian pilot Moath alKasasbeh with a citation from Ibn Taymiyyah, the early 14th-century scholar from whose exegesis most Sunni Islamic radicalism
springs today. In Obamas latest National Security Strategy, unveiled on February 6, 2015, the White House declared, We reject the
lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam. That is, of course, a straw man argument: beyond the propaganda of al Qaeda
and the Islamic State themselves, no one accused the United States of waging war against Islam. In the conflicts in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, the United States worked directly in concert with multiple majority-Muslim states: Qatar hosted US Central Commands
forward operating base; Bahrain is home to the US Fifth Fleet; Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan, a logistics base and transit hub used in
the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns; and Oman allowed US forces to launch airstrikes from its territory. Meanwhile, Jordan helped
train the new Iraqi army, and other majority-Muslim countries like Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Kazakhstan also participated in
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates both sent contingents to Afghanistan. Multiple Arab allies
participated in air strikes against the Islamic State. If that represents a war against Islam, someone forgot to tell Muslims. Beyond
the propaganda of al Qaeda and the Islamic State themselves, no one accused the United States of waging war against Islam.

Subordinating the Islamic basis for violent extremism to diplomatic sensitivity

leads not to solutions but rather to the ridiculous. Take the Taliban: In 1997, John Holzman, then the
number two American diplomat in Pakistan, sent a secret cable to Washington suggesting that the best way to moderate the Taliban
would be to encourage dialogue between the Taliban and Saudi Arabia, never mind that Saudi Arabia was one of the prime enablers
of al Qaeda; the State Department rewarded him with an ambassadorship. Art therapy in Saudi Arabia this decades magic

solution is about as wise and effective. Back to the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism: By

performing
intellectual somersaults to deny the theological basis and justification of Islamist
terrorism today, and by ignoring the need to engage in a battle of interpretation
within Islam, at best, the White House initiative will be ineffective. At worst, it will
provide cover for extremism . There is precedent: In 2012, Obama formed a Global Counter Terrorism Forum
but then acquiesced to Arab and Turkish demands that he exclude Israel. Just as Mary Robinson, then the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, transformed her World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related
Intolerance into a platform celebrating racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, and terrorism, so too did Obama transform a
counterterrorism forum into a celebration of those states most responsible for Islamist terror. Turkey, as mentioned, openly
supports Hamas, and has covertly aided the most extreme elements in Syria. The

Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, for its part, has focused its energy more on efforts to ban discussion of extremist
Islam than it has on addressing the cancer of radicalism and the battle of interpretation within Islam.
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states continue to teach Ibn Taymiyyah in secondary school curriculums. While it is
true that extremism exists outside of Islam, the world is not confronted by Jewish
and Christian radicals beheading journalists, immolating prisoners on camera,
kidnapping hundreds of school girls, or enslaving religious minorities . Even if
there are exceptions to the rule, these do not provide reason to sidestep discussion
of theology. Should the United States join in efforts to counter violent extremism? Absolutely. But l eadership
means not swapping substantive if difficult discussions for political correctness
and photo ops. Countering extremism is vitally important and growing more so every month. The
explosion of radicalism and violence should be evidence enough that providing
diplomatic cover for radicalisms enablers rather than addressing controversial
topics head-on not only fails but sets the fight back further . It is a lesson Obama would do well to
learn.

religions influence on squo terrorism makes it UNIQUELY dangerous

Kheiriddin, 2015 [political analyst and president at TJK communications]
(Tasha, Feb 23, "We can't fight terrorism by ignoring religion",ipolitics.ca/2015/02/23/wecant-fight-islamist-terrorism-by-ignoring-the-role-of-religion/
They preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man and predict its eventual domination of all
peoples on the Earth. They are the focus of evil in the modern world. I urge you to beware the temptation of pride, the temptation
of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive
impulses of an evil empire, to simply call (this conflict) a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle
between right and wrong and good and evil. That was the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan speaking in Florida on March 8, 1983.
Reagan was talking about the arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, but his argument could apply just
as well to the conflict between the West and Islamist terrorists, twenty-two years later. Today, organizations

like ISIS,
Boko Haram and the Taliban preach the supremacy of the religious state over the
secular. The most extreme among them daydream about dominating the planet with a worldwide caliphate . Just as in Reagans day, naysayers downplay the conflict between the West
and these groups. They blame Westerners for provoking the terrorists attacks by
fighting their incursions or by publishing blasphemous cartoons. And just as in Reagans day, those naysayers including
President Barack Obama are missing the point. In their zeal to be honest brokers, they
refuse to admit that Islamist terrorism is Islamist that the religion plays a role
in inspiring this violence, just as political ideology inspired the aspirations of the former
USSR and the assorted terror groups it inspired and funded. Without communism, there would have
been no Shining Path, no Red Brigades, no Khmer Rouge, no Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and assorted satellite republics. And without Islam, there would be no al Qaida, no AlShabab, no countries ruled by the brutality of Sharia law . Yes, Harpers response to this threat
the Conservatives anti-terror bill C-51 is overbroad. Yes, the Tories are using terrorism as a political prop. But the reality is that

Canada has been attacked by Islamist fanatics twice, and likely will be attacked again. In some respects, the terrorism

perpetrated by Islamist fanatics is even more deadly than the violence perpetrated or
bankrolled by the former communist superpower and its allies. Islamist terrorists are
engaged in a hot war, not a cold one. They base their appeal in faith an even more potent
opiate than ideology, because it holds up the promise of an afterlife. And they are
not confined to a specific territory: their operatives live, work and plot in the West itself. This makes
them more difficult to combat because theyre here, not over there. So when Prime Minister Stephen Harper
speaks of the threat of jihadis or radicals in mosques, he is not, as NDP Leader Tom Mulcair claims, fomenting Islamophobia. He
is acknowledging that the West, Canada included, faces a real and specific problem and that we

need to
acknowledge the role played by religion in inspiring that problem, whether the
faith in question has been perverted or not. If religious fanatics were plotting in synagogues or
churches, the PM would have a responsibility to call that out, too. In the past few decades, Christian fundamentalists
have committed attacks, chiefly in the United States. They have mostly killed those they felt
acted contrary to their faith, such as abortion providers. But they have not invaded entire
countries, flown planes into skyscrapers, raped thousands of women and girls,
beheaded hostages and burned them alive. Islamist terrorism is on an entirely different
level.

**cp working
nb = terror (or politics I guess, increasing counterterror measures are popular)
as a pic maybe itd work - lessen muslim profiling but increase strategic terror research vs the
broad 1ac people read without defending CVE?

CP text - The United States Federal Government should increase funding to forge a
comprehensive plan for research, development, and deployment of technologies to detect, cure,
or prevent a biological attack as per our Myhrvold evidence

! to the terror da when reading this cp

terrorists attack and cause extinction allies and deterrence dont check
timeframe is now
Myhrvold, 2013, [formerly Chief Technology Officer at Microsoft, co-founder of Intellectual
Ventures]
(Nathan P, July, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action"
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)
Would They Do It? Would terrorists really try to kill millions, or will they stick to convincing their own youth to blow themselves up
in small-scale suicide bombings? Several lines of reasoning suggest that

stateless terror groups will

acquire and use weapons having high-M impact. Table 2 shows the possible M impact of terrorist
weapons. Stateless groups have the same level of ambition as nation-states and ought to be
treated as operating on the same footing. Was it rational to worry that the Soviet Union would launch a nuclear war to further their
communist hegemony or simply to destroy the United Statesor out of fear that we would attack them in this way first? Dealing
with those questions consumed $1 trillion of defense spending and shaped the Cold War. When

compared to the
Soviets, the risk that al-Qaeda or some future group will use high M-impact
weapons seems higher on every level. Their geopolitical goals are more ambitious.
The ideology is more extreme. The vulnerability to counterattack or reprisal is
low. Terrorists have demonstrated a shocking degree of ruthlessness. Under any
rational theory of risk, these foes must be considered likely to act. Plus, it is no secret that
the United States aims to exterminate al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groupsand rightly so. With revenge and selfpreservation on their minds, our primary adversaries are not likely to show us
unnecessary mercy . Additionally, terrorism survives by making a big impact;
when the world gets desensitized to car bombs, mass shootings, and beheadings,
the temptation to one-up the last attack increases. The belief that terror groups will not
use terrible weapons if they get them seems foolish in the extreme. To borrow a phrase from A Streetcar
Named Desire, to hold this belief is, in effect, to rely on the kindness of terrorists. Any
rational analysis must assign a substantial amount of the terror risk to large-scale,
highmagnitude events . Yet that is not how our defenses are organized and not how we are spending our resources.
Instead, we focus most of our counterterrorism efforts on thwarting small-scale attacks. Tactical vs. Strategic Counterterrorism The
enormous range of possible terrorist actions mirrors a situation encountered in modern warfare. Military commanders must
confront war at many levels, from hand-tohand combat to global thermonuclear war. That broad range is difficult to cover with a
single organization. The military answer is to split the problem into pieces by both scale and approach. The division by scale is
usually phrased as the difference between strategic and tactical. Tactical terrorism is important to fight. We want to keep hijackers
off airplanes and suicide bombers out of shopping malls. Referring to such problems as tactical does not suggest they are
unimportant. Rather, it highlights the need to make even greater efforts to thwart strategic terrorism. Strategic counterterrorism is

another matter altogether. The security forces inside the United States are ill prepared for the threat from terrorists intent on using
contagious biological agents or nuclear weapons. By the time such terrorists have arrived at the airport or harbor, they have all but
won. Are U.S. authorities doing enough to combat terrorism at the strategic level? The indirect evidence indicates that the answer is
most certainly no. Aside from a few inadequate efforts to screen a fraction of ships and aircraft overseas before they depart for
American shores, the problem is simply not being managed. By the time such terrorists have arrived at the airport or harbor, they
have all but won. Are U.S. authorities doing enough to combat terrorism at the strategic level? The indirect evidence indicates that
the answer is most certainly no. Aside from a few inadequate efforts to screen a fraction of ships and aircraft overseas before they
depart for American shores, the problem is simply not being managed. Effective Threat Management A basic principle of
management accountability is to ask the following question: Who is the most senior person in the organization whose full-time job is
dedicated to function X? So ask, Who is the most senior government official whose full-time job is defending the United States
against strategic terrorism? In the worst possible case, no single leader is focused solely on this problem. Instead, the people who
are focused exclusively on terrorism are relatively low-level government workers employed in different departments and agencies
with conflicting missions. Contrast this with our efforts to prevent strategic nuclear war, for which an elaborate and well-defined
chain of command exists. We have a comprehensive set of early-warning systems and contingency plans that cover every foreseeable
eventuality. An extremely welldefined set of people have full-time jobs preparing for and responding to a strategic nuclear attack.
Where are our early warning systems for strategic terrorism? Who is in charge of building them? What is the remedy if an attack
takes place? When it comes to devising a response to biological terrorism, who is in charge? Is this an issue for the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention? Or should it be handled by the uniformed Public Health Service? Or is the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) supposed to be organizing hospitals? Currently, token and understaffed efforts are fragmented across
dozens of government agencies. The Sleeping Dogs of War To understand the government agencies responsible for defending us
against terrorism, we must consider the handful of men that influenced the building of American intelligence and defense
institutionsmen like Hitler, Tj, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. MYHRVOLD 48 | FEATURES PRISM 4, NO. 4 Prior to World
War II, the United States turned inward and steadfastly ignored the threats from Germany and Japan. The assault on Pearl Harbor
(coupled with dogged scheming by Franklin Delano Roosevelt egged on by Winston Churchill) persuaded America to confront the
threat from Japan and Germany. In a very real sense, Tj and Hitler were, in effect, the fathers of the modern American defense
establishment. Stalin took over where Hitler and Tj left off and launched us into the Cold War. This was a long and tiring struggle.
If at any point American interest or determination flagged, Khrushchev was there to bang his shoe on the table to get our attention.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, no adversary has so dominated our attention. Inertia and the absence of a
compelling threat have kept the large bureaucracies in the defense establishment doing largely what they had done before. The 9/11
attacks and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought some changes. But the vast

machinery of

the Cold War, built up over five decades, has yet to retool. If our future threats were the same as those of the
past, we could stay this course. Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe that the most significant
dangers we will face will be completely new. The precautions we take must be novel as well. The steps
necessary to prevent nuclear and biological terrorism are qualitatively different from those
needed to plug the holes that allowed 9/11 to happen. Yet our military forces and government agencies seem not
to recognize this difference. Nearly all personnel and resources are focused on the immediate problems posed by tactical issues in
Afghanistan and by low-level terrorism directed at the United States. The Long View, Backward and Forward Your car has a very
large windshield, through which you can see the road ahead, but only a few small mirrors to view what is coming up behind. Thats
because the threat is largely from the front, the direction in which you are moving. A bureaucracy (particularly one that exists within

The
structures and mandates of bureaucracies are based on what has already happened, not what
will happen. They cite history to justify their operations. Actions based on a view into the future are speculative and open to
a democracy) has the opposite arrangement: an enormous rearview mirror and just a tiny peephole facing forward.

criticism, especially when the problems of the present loom large. The only force with a proven ability to shake the complacency
inherent in bureaucracies is a determined adversary that persistently and openly fights or antagonizes us. For much of the last
decade, both we and al-Qaeda have been distracted by Iraq and Afghanistan. For al-Qaeda, attacks in Afghanistan are cheaper and
easier to mount than direct operations against the United States. Attacking the U.S. mainland now would only antagonize the
American public and recommit us to the war on terrorism. Eventually this strategic calculus will change. Whether it changes
tomorrow or in 2033,

it is hard to believe that another major attack wont occur within a

generation . If the next major incident is only a 9/11-scale (M3.5 attack) it will be traumatic, but our society will survive
largely intact. The problem is that we are not apt to be that lucky. The clear pattern of al-Qaedafrom Somalia, to Khobar
Towers, to the African embassy bombings, to the U.S.S. Cole, to the STRATEGIC TERRORISM PRISM 4, NO. 4 FEATURES | 49
World Trade Center and the Pentagon is

one of infrequent attacks which escalate in severity . The next

one could be an M5.0 or M6.0 nuclear or biological event. Waiting until it occurs to begin our
preparations is utterly irresponsible, but that is just what were doing. Meanwhile, we are only beginning
to look beyond al-Qaeda to the groups that will succeed this faltering foe. This is alarming when one considers that 20 years ago,
neither alQaeda nor any other radical Islamic organization were on anybodys list of major threats to U.S. security. Twenty years
from now, new terrorist groups and causes will exist. Radical Islam is likely to remain a concern in 2033, but it wont be the only
one. Some of todays players will leave the international arena, and new ones will enter. But strategic terrorism is here to stay. It is
crucial that we realize that the fundamental problem is not limited to a specific organization like al-Qaeda or to a specific ideology
like radical Islam. Bin Laden is dead and gone, yet this general threat persists. Just as managing nuclear weapons became a

permanent part of the world order after World War II, combating strategic terrorism must become a permanent part of ensuring
global security today. This challenge demands dramatic shifts in American defense and foreign policy. It isnt a temporary crisis. It
requires a fundamental and long-lasting adjustment to the new state of affairs. The investment needed is similar in scale to that
spent during the Cold Warhundreds of billions of dollars. This doesnt mean a Cold War revival. The Cold War was about building
a deterrent implementing the strategy of mutually assured destruction for any party foolish enough to initiate nuclear hostilities. It
was relatively straightforward: create a defensive deterrent by building ever more terrible offensive weapons in multiple redundant
systems. The war on terror is fundamentally different.

We cannot win by developing more powerful offensive

weapons than our adversaries. Deterrence of the old sort simply does not work.

scientists and tech are ready cp resolves governmental indifference to

countering strategic terror
Myhrvold, 2013, [formerly Chief Technology Officer at Microsoft, co-founder of Intellectual
Ventures]
(Nathan P, July, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action"
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)
The Research Challenge In most wars, scientific research is a secondary activity rather than a frontline
effort. This approach is emphatically not appropriate in the struggle against strategic terrorism,
a primarily technological and scientific battle. For more than two decades, we have allowed an unprecedented
explosion of work in molecular biology to occur without providing substantial STRATEGIC TERRORISM PRISM 4, NO. 4
FEATURES | 51 funding for understanding and preventing the misuse of this knowledge. Scientists routinely publish results that
either implicitly or, in many cases, explicitly contain recipes for mayhem. Yet, no funding agency has devoted substantial resources
to understanding these threats in detail or to developing countermeasures against them. Ironically, this sort of research is precisely
the kind at which our society excels. But developing

solutions will be impossible if we dont identify the

problems and do the work. As it stands, we do neither. The reason is simple enough little , if any,
funding is available for countermeasures research . The National Institutes of Health (NIH), the
National Science Foundation, and other government grant-making agencies provide research funding in biology and medicine to
combat natural scourges, but not bioterrorism. Why? Because plenty of here-and-now diseases, such as cancer, diabetes, and AIDS,
are vying for their attention. Spending money to fight speculative future threats is far more risky and, hence, is rarely done.

The

only way to change this situation is to forge a comprehensive plan for research,
development, and deployment of technologies to detect, cure, or prevent a biological
attack . In addition to creating counterterrorism strategies, a well-funded research initiative to develop
bioterrorism defenses would give an enormous boost to biomedical research in some areas
that may ultimately prove just as useful. At the moment, all of humanity is susceptible to natural
infections that are very similar in some ways to those that might be unleashed during an act of
bioterrorism: a novel strain of pandemic influenza or an emergent pathogen such as the one that causes SARS.
Counter-bioterrorism research could lead to broad-spectrum antiviral drugs and vaccines or to
monitoring systems for detecting outbreaks early. We could expect enormous dividends from this research in
areas well outside of bioterrorism defense itself. Scientists will rise to this challenge if given
adequate resourcesindeed the United States excels at such scientific and technological
research. Still, considerable patience will be required: countering strategic terrorism isnt a single, isolated problem. Instead, it
is hundreds of disparate problems. However, the situation is not hopeless. The R&D capabilities of the United States are still
unmatched in the world. A full description of the research agenda is beyond the scope of this treatment, but it could be put together
in short order. The Intelligence Challenge Preventing nuclear war and fighting common crime are similar in some ways. Both efforts
typically exploit the principle of deterrence by inflicting punishment after the fact. This approach works well when the deterrence is
realwhen it is clear that the probability of punishment or retaliation is high. With

strategic terrorism, we
already know we cannot retaliate effectively. Besides deterrence, the other main approach to security is
guarding: preventing crime by having forces on the scene that stop criminals or attackers in their tracks. Guarding is used quite a bit
in counterterrorismair marshals on flights, security screeners in airports, and bomb-sniffing dogs at large events. Unfortunately,

guarding does not prevent strategic terrorism. If the goal of a terrorist is to spread
an infectious disease in the United States, it is simple to put a few infected
volunteers on a plane headed into our country. It MYHRVOLD 52 | FEATURES PRISM 4, no. 4 would

be difficult for security to notice anything amiss.

The terrorists wouldnt be obviously sick or carrying

suspicious items. Even if a way existed to detect such attackers, by the time someone found
them in the United States, it would already be too late. Even with nuclear, chemical, or noncontagious bio
warfare, guarding the country is of limited use. Intercepting a nuclear bomb in a shipping container works only if you stop it in a
place you dont mind losing if the weapon detonates. Having a nuclear bomb explode in a Port Authority facility in New Jersey may
be marginally better than having it explode in midtown Manhattan, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory. The need to battle strategic

intelligence services: they must provide information

of sufficient quality and timeliness to enable policy makers to decide whether or not to
act. The intelligence community needs a complete bottom-up review to determine
whether its structure and methodologies match present and future needs . The new
terrorists preemptively sets the bar for 21st-century

approach will require large and unpopular budget increases. Existing program budgets will need to be redistributed. Congress will
vigorously defend current projects affecting their constituents and contractors will howl. Action is nevertheless imperative. The
Military Challenge Gathering intelligence is only the first step . The second is what to do with it when it
indicates a threat. What is the threshold for action? What sort of team do you send in? What are CBP officer with his explosive
detection dog clears vehicles entering the Super Bowl area. Gerald Nino STRATEGIC TERRORISM PRISM 4, NO. 4 FEATURES | 53
terrorism are treated as criminal activities and are left to local SWAT teams or the FBI. It is unrealistic to expect such forces to have
the training and expertise to deal with strategic threats. Instead, we

need a nationally trained and

nationally funded force, even more developed than the FBIs WMD Directorate and Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG). Strategic terrorism spans a wide range of possibilities from a criminal act by one or a small number of people to an all-out
invasion. Our military must be prepared to handle the full range of possibilities, domestically and internationally. The DomesticPolicy Challenge American jurisprudence is firmly grounded in the sentiment expressed by Sir William Blackstone, an 18th-century
jurist: it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer. Thus, there will be a seemingly insurmountable clash
between the American tradition of liberal freedoms for its citizens and the extreme circumstances of strategic terrorism. There is
substantial logic to the idea that trampling the rights of millions of citizens is, in aggregate, worse than letting a small number of
criminals escape justice. The implicit calculus of harm is that whatever havoc a guilty party may wreak is less odious to society than
the damage that may be caused by prosecuting the innocent or abridging their rights through unreasonable search and seizure or
other police behavior. When the Founding Fathers established the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, constraining the power of the
state was a radical, untested, and unprecedented experiment. Liberal protection of human rights, pioneered on a large scale first in
the United States and the risks of collateral damage? What if were wrong? The primary military challenge is to develop enough
depth and breadth of new forms of special operations to give decisionmakers an appropriate set of options. Taking out a terrorist
camp that is building a nuclear weapon or brewing up smallpox is a very specific challenge. What if that camp is in a city? What if it
is in an American city? First, we need to develop new weapons. For example, our military lacks practical weapons that can destroy a
bioweapons facility in a way that guarantees the contents are sterilized. The so-called surgical air strikes of the past have improved
greatly but a tremendous amount of collateral damage still occurs . Weapon systems must be
rethought and optimized for a wide range of special operations, from small-scale covert action to large-scale efforts such as the
current one in Afghanistan. The U.S. military also needs to retool its organization. Troops involved in special operationsRangers,
Green Berets, Delta Force members, and so forthhave been treated as adjuncts to the real forces. This is a World War II mindset
and is unlikely to be useful. Instead, attacks will often use special-operations units without involving conventional forces. The years
since 9/11 have seen an increase in the size and importance of special operations, but this increase appears to be a small down
payment on the capabilities the future will demand. It may even make sense to unify all special operations under a separate branch
of the armed services, one more on par with the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force than todays Special Operations Command
(SOCOM). The reach of military operations inside the United States must also change. Most acts of MYHRVOLD 54 | FEATURES
PRISM 4, NO. 4 then exported to Europe and other developed nations, has been a great success. Indeed, the project has expanded
substantially. The actions of the U.S. Congress in writing new laws, of the courts in interpreting the Constitution, and of advocacy
groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and a very active criminal-defense bar have expanded the civil rights of
Americans. Indeed, the number of rights and privileges enjoyed by Americans has steadily increased over time. This entire endeavor
is, however, called into question by the nature of strategic terrorism, whose potential for harm is enormous enough to demand a
reexamination of the quantitative bargain. We need to ask, Is

the cost to society in lives really worth

more than the cost of constraints on civil liberties ? Sir Blackstones trade-off implicitly assumes that
the harm done by causing one innocent man to suffer is worse than whatever harm the ten guilty men may do with their freedom. Is
he still correct if one of those ten guilty men is a strategic terrorist who could kill millions of innocent Americans?

at aff answers
squo doesnt solve
Myhrvold, 2013, [formerly Chief Technology Officer at Microsoft, co-founder of Intellectual
Ventures]
(Nathan P, July, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action"
cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic_Terrorism_corrected_II.pdf)
The 9/11 attacks and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought some
changes. But the vast machinery of the Cold War, built up over five decades, has yet to retool. If
our future threats were the same as those of the past, we could stay this course. Unfortunately,
there is every reason to believe that the most significant dangers we will face will be
completely new . The precautions we take must be novel as well. The steps necessary to
prevent nuclear and biological terrorism are qualitatively different from those needed to plug
the holes that allowed 9/11 to happen. Yet our military forces and government agencies seem not
to recognize this difference. Nearly all personnel and resources are focused on the
immediate problems posed by tactical issues in Afghanistan and by low-level terrorism
directed at the United States. The Long View, Backward and Forward Your car has a very large
windshield, through which you can see the road ahead, but only a few small mirrors to view
what is coming up behind. Thats because the threat is largely from the front, the direction in
which you are moving. A bureaucracy (particularly one that exists within a democracy) has the
opposite arrangement: an enormous rearview mirror and just a tiny peephole facing forward.
The structures and mandates of bureaucracies are based on what has already happened, not
what will happen. They cite history to justify their operations. Actions based on a view into the
future are speculative and open to criticism, especially when the problems of the present loom
large. The only force with a proven ability to shake the complacency inherent in bureaucracies is
a determined adversary that persistently and openly fights or antagonizes us.

at not qualled:
myhrvold was reviewed by a security expert AND tons of experts agreewe
dont hear about them because they have no significant role in the gov the
cp changes that
Harris, 2013, [senior staff writer at Foreign Policy, covering intelligence and cyber security ]
(Shane, Sept 18, "Meet the Microsoft Billionaire Who's Trying to Reboot US Counterterrorism",
foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/18/meet-the-microsoft-billionaire-whos-trying-to-reboot-u-scounterterrorism/
Add to Nathan Myhrvolds already eclectic rsum which includes ex-chief technology officer
of Microsoft, co-founder of one of the worlds largest patent-holding firms, and author of a $625
cookbook a new credit: terrorism expert. Myhrvold, a famous autodidact, recently published a
33-page paper that he rousingly calls, "Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action." The core of his
argument is easy enough to understand, and probably true: The United States is more focused
on stopping a guy who blows up an airplane and kills 300 people than on a guy who
intentionally spreads smallpox and kills 300,000. "In my estimation, the U.S. government,

although well-meaning, is unable to protect us from the greatest threats we face," Myhrvold
writes. "[M]odern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality
than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that
are as destructive as or possibly even more destructive than those held by any nation-state."
Myhrvold to Washington: National security youre doin it wrong. The paper is accessible to a
layman, which is what Myhrvold was when he started thinking about the strategic aspects of
terrorism not long after the 9/11 attacks. He wrote the piece in his spare time apparently he
does have some and it was mostly finished in 2006. Myhrvold had no intention of publishing
it until recently, when he met Benjamin Wittes, the editor of the influential national
security and legal site Lawfare . Wittes thought that parts of the paper accurately described
the threat posed by small actors with big weapons, and he decided that Myhrvolds analysis
deserved a wider audience. Lawfare published the paper in July. Since then, the document has
made the rounds. It has been discussed in military and intelligence circles. Law professors are
reading it and talking about it at symposia. Members of Congress and their staffs have reviewed
Myhrvolds findings. Chances are that if you ask a national security expert, he either has read the
paper or will tell you he plans to right away. As these kinds of things go in wonkland, Myhrvolds
paper has buzz. And last week, Myhrvold started making the rounds too. He was in Washington
meeting with senior officials in the intelligence agencies and committee members and staff on
Capitol Hill. He was hesitant to tell Foreign Policy, when we sat down for a chat, precisely whom
he has been talking to. But he was clear that it was a large number. And they werent all
meetings that Myhrvold had set up. A lot of people in government were calling him,
asking if hed stop by to talk about the paper and how he thinks the United States could
improve its security policy . This is all profoundly strange. Not strange that Myhrvold
who is probably best known for talking about pistachio ice cream on The Colbert Report and for
an unflattering profile of his company that aired on This American Life would be chatting up
spooks and congressional committee chiefs about his views. Washington is full of rich and
important guys pushing their passion projects, and Myhrvold is a very rich and important guy.
Whats strange is that so many in the national security establishment are apparently surprised,
even unnerved, by Myhrvolds findings. As Myhrvold will be the first to tell you, the paper
contains few new insights or warnings about how terrorists could use a biological weapon to kill
millions of people. And its central "call to action," for the United States to shore up its woefully
weak defenses against such an attack, have echoed around Washington in the 12 years since the
9/11 attacks. A lot of people with more official expertise on terrorism have already written these
warnings. They show up repeatedly in the 9/11 Commission report. There are books on the
subject. The Homeland Security Department was established in part to defend against this stuff.
The enthusiastic reception that Myhrvold is getting in Washington is a measure of how much
this town seems to have forgotten about potentially catastrophic terrorism and specifically
about what security experts call "low-probability, high-impact" events like turning a virus into a
weapon or detonating a small nuclear bomb. "Big things actually matter a ridiculous amount,
even if theyre not probable," Myhrvold told Foreign Policy. He points out that a bioterrorist
attack is at least as likely as, and probably more likely than, a nuclear weapons strike was by the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States devoted enormous resources and
manpower to managing that threat and it still does and there is nothing comparable to
preventing bioterrorism. Myhrvold says that not everyone he talks to is surprised by what he
wrote. (And it should be said that the paper is well written, concise, and thoughtful, which helps
explain why its catching on.) But when he does find out that an agency or department has a
resident expert on bioterrorism or portable nukes, that expert is not working in the front office.

Hes not part of the strategic discussion. Myhrvolds broad complaint is that theres no one
person in charge of thinking about those unlikely but potentially awful doomsday scenarios. Its
perhaps discouraging but not that surprising that it takes a relatively famous outsider to focus
the mind on what countless white papers and task force reports have been saying for more than
a decade.