Remedial Law; Motion to Dismiss; Appeal; An order denying a motion to dismiss is

not reviewable by the appellate courts except when it is clear in the records that the
trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint.A preliminary matter to
be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to
file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general
rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that
the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National
Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216
SCRA 114 [1992]). In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to
require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
Public International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; Non-suability; Courts and Practices;
A state or international agency requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that it is entitled to immunity.In Public International Law,
when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
Same; Same; Same; In the Philippines, the practice is for the government sovereign or
the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity.In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement
of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing
the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972),
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v.
Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United
States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a suggestion to respondent Judge.
The Solicitor General embodied the suggestion in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus curiae.
Same; Same; Same.In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through
the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side
of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in
support of petitioners claim of sovereign immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Statehood; In 1929, through the Lateran Treaty, Italy recognized
the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican
City.In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy

recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the
Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats,
to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to
International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and
Private 81 [1948]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the
Vatican City.The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City for
the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations
(OConnell, I International Law 311 [1965]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an
independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman
Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions,
and the demands of its mission in the world.The Vatican City fits into none of the
established categories of states, and the attribution to it of sovereignty must be
made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick,
International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a
community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for
political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and
object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope,
who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in
conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed,
the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a
sense an international state (Fenwick, supra. 125; Kelsen, Principles of International
Law 160 [1956]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the Holy See that is the international person.
Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions
as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the
Popes own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
Same; Same; Same; The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957.The Republic
of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The
Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This
appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
Same; Same; Same; The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The

right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,

necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on
November 15, 1965.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted
to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.The decision to transfer the
property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a
governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely
wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that
squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly
refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
(Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
Same; Same; Same; The issue of Petitioners non-suability can be determined by the
trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the
admission of the private respondent.The issue of petitioners non-suability can be
determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings,
particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign
immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the
conduct of the Philippines foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV,
Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case
and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited
diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction
and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm
of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International
Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the
courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting the countrys foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in
World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Same; Same; Same; Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.Private respondent is
not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of

a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through
diplomatic channels.
Same; Same; Same; Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through
the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See.Private respondent
can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up
with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first
make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the
Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. [Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA
524(1994)]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse
and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183.

The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the
complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied
the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order.
Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality
of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name
of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a
dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing
the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
I
On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels
of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the
Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of
petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the
price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the
condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that
the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3)
Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned
his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said

assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the
sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr.
Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots,
proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the
earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that
if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots
should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos
returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it
seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8)
private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered
that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent,
sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title
over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9)
Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself
at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the
rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and
(11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to
sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in
view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between
petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the
reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell
between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the
complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit,
and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed
by private respondent.
On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's
motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21).
On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30,
1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing
Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to
facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed
that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said
defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the
motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to
file its answer (Rollo, p. 22).
Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the
privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of
the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by
reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they
refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p.
87).
Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In
compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of
Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.
II
A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to
question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an
order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the
remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before
the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is
very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the
complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v.
Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer
waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial.
The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal
interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the
Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of
the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to
immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If

the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks
the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is
entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign
Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion"
(O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign
Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondentemployer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent
the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S.
Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to
make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the
"suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The
Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's
claim of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75
Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948];
United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In
cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into
the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved.
III
The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over
petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand,
private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute
and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it
entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the
Philippines.
A. The Holy See

Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status
as a sovereign state is in order.
Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch
and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss
of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of
108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial
(Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]).
In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the
Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats,
to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to
International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and
Private 81 [1948]).
The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of
assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it
indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I
International Law 311 [1965]).

Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions
as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the
Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had
diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87).
This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
B. Sovereign Immunity
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation,
such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the
land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations
(United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the
statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even
suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy See and
Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts
or acts jure gestionis
(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and DefensorSantiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the
attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which
it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz,
International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City
represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and
international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent
government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic
Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of
the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick,
supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial
determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial
activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of
the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian
Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts.
The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct
or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial
character."

One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant
implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different
from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The
Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International
Law 308 [1952]).

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems

involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal
treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have
difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party
is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.

The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely
commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental
functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took
control of nationalized business activities and international trading.
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment
buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the
conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status
of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign
state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the
recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a
coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to
American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo,
182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark
Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering
into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary
function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be
considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out
with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade,
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii,
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):
There is no question that the United States of America, like any
other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of
a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private
respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary
for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred
in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the
civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating
to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this
immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should
immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy
See.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters
living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the
donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and
that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private
respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).
The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without
going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private
respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently
established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign
Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign
relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of
Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the
Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157).
The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality
is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is
conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja,

190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign
relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in
International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we
abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to
conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of
said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous
(Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25,
1994).
IV
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to
espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the
relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of
Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the
International Court of Justice:
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1
Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil
Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; The civil status of
an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities.There was a
blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioners entry into the country
and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to pe rmanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation. Never was the
marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitors visa and for permanent residency. The civil status
of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could
influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who
claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman (Cf. Shiu Shun Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is generally as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This
right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their
admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur.
2d. 72).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to
Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency,
in the Philippines.The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed
to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to
protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d. 489). There is no
law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much
less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse
her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended
stay here as an alien.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw
her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and
exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed.
317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S.
Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino

husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from
her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as
an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to
Filipino citizens.Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitors visa. Once
admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section
13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status
and may be admitted as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to
apply for permanent residency is the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to
Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The right to deport an alien who enters the
Philippines by means of false and misleading statements (Sec. 37[a], Immigration Act
of 1940) prescribes after five (5) years from the time the cause for deportation arises.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry
or at any place other than at a designated port of entry is subject to deportation. The
deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period
and shall not be effected x x x unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five years after the cause for deportation arises (Immigration Act of
1940, Sec. 37[b]). Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of
alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152
[1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period for deportation is counted from the
time the fact of illegal entry is brought to the attention of the immigration authorities.
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed. Petitioner was
admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of
false and misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting
documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first
complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was
admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 7778). After the
EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980
letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78). Tolling the prescriptive period from November
19,1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner
into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of
her deportation on September 27, 1990.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Arrests and Seizures; The arrest contemplated by Sec.
37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying

out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the
right of the alien to stay in the country.In their Comment, public respondents urged
that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that
what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of
Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102), The
arrest contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying
out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the
right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents revoked the
permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien. [Djumantan vs. Domingo, 240 SCRA 746(1995)]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 27,
1990 of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the
deportation of petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract
worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in
January 1979.

On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.

On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old
Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The
latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was
merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with
the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the
said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. She later released
pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash
bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to
depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline
ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of
the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen
(Rollo, pp. 11-12).

When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his "guests," stating inter
alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2
years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who
are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family
for the hospitality they have accorded me during the few years that I
have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment
thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their
behavior while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their
support and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of
the authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors
under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of
merit.

In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public respondents,
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously
granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in their Resolution
dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public respondents to cease and
desist from executing or implementing the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and
the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August
14, 1994 and that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting
of a permanent resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article 27 of P.D. No.
1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of polyandry by Muslim males.
From that premise, she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the
husband and wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She

claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple to live separately
(Rollo, pp. 5-7).

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be

admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.

When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took the position that
the CID could not order petitioner's deportation because its power to do so had
prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).

The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation
of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950];
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912];
Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to
depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien
(Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).

III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the
CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage
to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on petitioner's
immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. Upon a finding
that she was not lawfully admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to deport her has
prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into
the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to
permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration
authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa and for permanent
residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter
that could influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration
authorities. The immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a
woman who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is
married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this
right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their
admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur.
2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to
reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it
(United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).

Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to
admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed
to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a
permanent resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent
residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec.
13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a
matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the right of public
respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing Section 37(b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be
effected if the court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien,
shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the
alien be not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of

Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as

charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designating port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in
the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
his entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the
law governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of
prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after
entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
subsequent to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted a nonimmigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves
in or is opposed to organized government, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials
because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the
unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or
affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching
such doctrines, or who on any manner whatsoever lends assistance,
financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections

forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action
which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an
alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both
imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire
period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported:
Provided, however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department
Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as
the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head,
and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head (as
amended by R.A. No. 144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall
have been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three,
otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941
(now Republic Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall
have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of
the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing, independent of any criminal action which may be
brought against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine
citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating
properties, to prevent them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection
and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any
place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive
period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is
made within five years after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of
1940, Sec. 37[b]).

Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the
country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932];
Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), we held that
under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the deportation of an alien may
be barred after the lapse of five years after the cause of deportation arises. Justice
Feliciano, in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as
follows:
Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five
(5) year limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to
be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is
applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may
be effected "at any time after entry."
Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2,
7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses
2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that she had gained
entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making use of the name of a Chinese
resident-merchant other than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held
that she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years
had elapsed from the date of her admission."
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on
the basis of false and misleading statements in her application and in the other
supporting documents submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez
first complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was
admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the
EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980
letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez
informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five
years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September
27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b)
is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the
deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the
visa previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of
carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to
determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public respondents
revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her
arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining order issued
on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the
issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated
January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Francisco, JJ., took no part.

Political Law; International Law; Extradition; Extradition is an intrusion into the

territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the
State within its own territory.A paramount principle of the law of extradition
provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any offense not included in
a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a
derogation of sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of
the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own
territory.
Same; Same; Same; An act of extradition does not impose an obligation to extradite
on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity
of the requesting States demand, in accordance with the requested States own
interests.As it is an act of surrender of an individual found in a sovereign State to
another State which demands his surrender, an act of extradition, even with a treaty
rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not impose an
obligation to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own
determination of the validity of the requesting States demand, in accordance with the
requested States own interests.
Same; Same; Same; The principles of international law recognize no right of
extradition apart from that arising from treaty.The principles of international law
recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from treaty. Pursuant to these
principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of
bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under conventions
recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within
their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective
municipal laws.
Same; Same; Same; Trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioners
extradition.Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited,
which are relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order,
reveals that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioners extradition.
Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the
petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia
were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have
been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial
court correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are
Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/ perjury, respectively.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase wanted for prosecution merely requires a warrant
for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be
extradited.The petitioners contention that a person sought to be extradited should
have a criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which
can legally pass judgment of acquittal or conviction stretches the meaning of the
phrase wanted for prosecution beyond that intended by the treaty provisions

because the relevant provisions merely require a warrant for the arrest or a copy of
the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited. Furthermore, the
Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets attest to the fact that petitioner is not only
wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal
prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy
thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal
complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase
wanted for prosecution to persons charged with an information or a criminal
complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose
of evading arrest and prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Absolutely nothing in the provision of Article 18 relates to, much
less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.We fail to see how the
petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this provision.
The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treatys date of effectivity; the second
para-graph pertains to its termination. Absolutely nothing in the said provision
relates to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
Same; Same; Same; The offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are
clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty.Thus, the offenses for which
petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the
Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed,
and, irrespective of the time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the
Extradition Treatys provisions, specifically, Article 2, paragraph 4, quoted above.
Same; Same; Same; Treatys retroactive application with respect to offenses
committed prior to the Treatys coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.As conceived under our
Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime
when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating
new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribe greater
punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of
evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. Applying the
constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to
criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so,
there is absolutely no merit in petitioners contention that the ruling of the lower
court sustaining the Treatys retroactive application with respect to offenses
committed prior to the Treatys coming into force and effect, violates the
Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. [Wright vs. Court of Appeals, 235
SCRA 341(1994)]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC,
BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not
surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition. This
principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of sovereignty.
Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a
delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own territory. 1 The act of
extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person accused or convicted of a
crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it
was committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice." 2 As it
is an act of "surrender" of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State
which demands his surrender 3, an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered
executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an
obligation to extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own
determination of the validity of the requesting State's demand, in accordance with the
requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that
arising from treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of
extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit
of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to
surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of

enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is

dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them
to the State where their offenses were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives
and subsequent enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by
agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government
of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a
Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a
Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty
(30) days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective
requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for
broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and (which)
embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year. Additionally,
the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of
effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State
at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the
Requesting State for an extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if
the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a
warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where
appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable
under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least
one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty." 10 For the purpose of the definition, the
Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the
laws of the Contracting States place the offense within the same
category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person
whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in
determining the constituent elements of the offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable
crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation of petitioner.

Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this
Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner
contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition
treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that
the evidence adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for
prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner
before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the
government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 12 are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the
Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of
Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from
the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through
Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said Diplomatic Note was a formal
request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who is
wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by
Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining
Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by
Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of
1958; and one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian
Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in the
following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by
Deception contrary to Section 81 (1) of the
Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and co-offender, Herbert Lance Orr's,
dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy,
Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R),
secured by a mortgage on the property in
Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees
Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney and
a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the
relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage
had been signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell.

The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by

Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the
Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and co-offender Mr. John Carson
Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in
commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd.,
depending on the volume of business written, by
submitting two hundred fifteen (215) life
insurance proposals, and paying premiums
thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and
payment of commissions) to the Australian
Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the
Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of which
respondent is an insurance agent, out of which
life proposals none are in existence and
approximately 200 of which are alleged to have
been false, in one or more of the following ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because
they were told the policies were free (usually for 2
years) and no payments were required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash
inducements ($50 or $100) to sign and had to
supply a bank account no longer used (at which a
direct debit request for payment of premiums
would apply). These policy-holders were also told
no payments by them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through
the "Daily Personnel Agency", and again were
told the policies were free for 2 years as long as
an unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property
by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the
Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the
payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank
account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by
submitting one proposal for Life Insurance to the
AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not

exist with the end in view of paying the premiums

thereon to insure acceptance of the policy and
commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314
of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr.
Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and swearing
before a Solicitor holding a current practicing
certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession
Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration
attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent
Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and
containing three (3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition
Treaty concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and
Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were
initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department
of Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the
petitioner to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his
answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge
ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the
petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and
summons signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the
information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at
Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI
detention cell where petitioner, to date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless,
married to a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child;
that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice
and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he
arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990 returned to
Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11,
1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and
returned to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia
on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to the
Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the

Philippines; and that his tourist visa has been extended but he
could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has
neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary
working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition
requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted
by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article 7 of the Treaty of
Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country
are extraditable offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover,
held that under the provisions of the same Article, extradition could be granted
irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was committed,
provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time
the acts or omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of
Appeals assigning the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO
THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO
BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME
THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE
EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST
FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED
IN ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW
THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN
AUSTRALIA.

IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED

HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER
AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND
EVADE PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT
SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC
CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN
AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating
substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order
issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty.
Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be
valid, the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending
before a competent court" in that country "which can legally pass judgement or
acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are
relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals that the
trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition. Conformably
with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the petitioner was
charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were
undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been
committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court
correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are
Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false
testimony/perjury, respectively. 15

signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of
the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the
Government of the Requesting State," 18 and "certified by a diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requesting State accredited to the Requested State." 19 The last
requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular
Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a
"criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State which can
legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the meaning of the
phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because
the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the
warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be extradited." 21 Furthermore, the
'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only
wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal
prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty is required only when
appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy
thereof is not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal
complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase
"wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a criminal
complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose
of evading arrest and prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in
the Court of Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for
prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the fact that the
offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed
prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement
cannot be given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for
extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The warrant for the
arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and every offense and a
statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect
of each offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under
the said article. All of these documentary requirements were dully submitted to the
trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of
Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement
of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. 16 In conformity with the
provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on
which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing
that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this
Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in
writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the one
hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.

We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive
enforcement from this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the
Treaty's date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination.
Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits retroactive
enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty
irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is
requested was committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts
or omissions constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in
the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the
request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws
in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly
extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State
at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the time they were committed,
they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article
2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all
laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. 23 However, Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was limited only to
penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws
are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an
offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate
the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a
crime already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional principle,
the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely no
merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the
Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a
piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for

the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which

offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was
ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is
within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia
regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either country.
The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated
September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987
Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after the requirements for entry into
force were complied with by both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations; Asian

Development Bank; The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as
falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel
slander cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity.After a
careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors Motions
for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28,
2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the
criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What
we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act
performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioners utterances
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations: Words and
Phrases; International Organization, Defined.The term international
organizationsis generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement
between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such
organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such
that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are
organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which
the member states have an interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; International Public Officials, Defined.International
public officials have been defined as: x x x persons who, on the basis of an
international treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed
by this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to
exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular international
community, and who are subject to a particular personal status.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Specialized Agencies, Defined.Specialized agencies
are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts,
telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation,
meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and
refugees.
Same; Same; Same; The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the
recipient is.A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international
conventions and agreements will show that the nature and degree of immunities vary
depending on who the recipient is.
Same; Same: Same; Diplomatic Immunities and International Immunities,
Distinguished.There are three major differences between diplomatic and
international immunities. Firstly, one of the recognized limitations of diplomatic

immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of a mission may be appointed from
among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express consent of that State;
apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and
immunities as may be granted by the receiving State. International immunities may
be specially important in relation to the State of which the official is a national.
Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving
State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of
international immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the
jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in waiver of
immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the
effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of
reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international
immunities enjoy no similar protection.
Same; Same; Same; Methods of Granting Privileges and Immunities to Personnel of
International Organizations.Positive international law has devised three methods of
granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of international organizations.
The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the
government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry
out its functions, recognizes the international character of the organization and
grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better assure the
successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty
obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case
with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International
Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this
third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an
international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and
general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are
determined by an accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is
located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice,
and the United Nations. The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under
this third category.
Same; Same; Same; The legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to
which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the
international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his
functionsthe privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international
officials rest upon different legal foundations.There is a connection between
diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international officials.
The connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively
well-established body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international
functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both types of officials find the basis
of their special status in the necessity of retaining functional independence and
freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship

between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different

from the relationship between the international official and those states upon whose
territory he might carry out his functions. The privileges and immunities of diplomats
and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. Whereas
those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based
on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on
treaty or conventional law. Customary international law places no obligation on a
state to recognize a special status of an international official or to grant him
jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific treaty
provisions.
Same; Same; Same; The present tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of
personnel of international organizations to a minimum.Looking back over 150 years
of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international organizations,
it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their
functionsThe Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which
provided all the rights of neutrality to persons employed in regulating navigation in
the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European
Commission of the Danube complete independence of territorial authorities in the
exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted diplomatic
immunities and privileges. Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of
protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of
personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be
considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem
on the privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the
problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international
functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of
agents in that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of function.
The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity
and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive
immunity for its officials. While the current direction of the law seems to be to narrow
the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is true
with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal
entities. Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and
immunities to organizations than they have to the personnel of these organizations.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to
immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike
international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.On the other hand,
international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of
the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Convention on
Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The Charter of the ADB
provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity

except when the Bank waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters
Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and staff of the bank. There can
be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect to
acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which
enjoy absolute immunity.
Same; Same; Same; The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant
jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.
Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of
the specified categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their
private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the
necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international
officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered
immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic
prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper
functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its
officials. Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that states grant
jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives. This
much is explicit from the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which
contain substantially similar provisions to that of the General Convention.
Same; Same; Same; The inclination is to place the competence to determine the
nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned.It appears
that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as
private or official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems
to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is official
or private does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United
Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement
of disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30
of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or
private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to
review in the international level if questioned by the United Nations.
Same; Same; Same; Asian Development Bank; Officials of international organizations
enjoy functional immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of their
functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes; Officials and
employees of the Asian Development Bank are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune
from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official,
and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may
commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of
international organizations enjoy functional immunities, that is, only those
necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its
purposes. This is the reason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement
explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers and employees only with

respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to
the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence
of a waiver of immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immunity of the Asian Development Bank is absolute
whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts.
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of immunity from every form of
legal process accorded to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of
ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only
to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which
seeks to narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities
granted to personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to
increase the prerogatives of international organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or
even the Asian Development Bank for that matter, to certify that the Banks officials
and employees are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official
capacity.Considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity
only for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the
Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are
entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated
otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the
executive departments foreign relations, nor the ADB, as the international
organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private
acts of bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place.
If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify. [Liang vs. People, 355 SCRA
125(2001)]
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. March 26, 2001]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January
28, 2000, denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:

1) THE DFAS DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO

BE MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS
CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK (ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE
DFA PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF
FACT ON THE MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH
PREJUDGED PETITIONERS CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
(MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations i[1] for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28
and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V.
Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of
Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the
criminal Informations against him. On a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set aside
the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. ii[2]
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000,
we rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in
essence, that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it
is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the
immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation
in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also
granted the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter,
the parties were directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic
immunity of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the
Philippines, as well as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made
clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even
remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements
allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official
functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a)

of the Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development
Bank, to wit:
Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
(a)
Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not.
What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an
act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioners
utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.

After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors

Motions for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of
January 28, 2000. As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch,
cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB
officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging

Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., Pls. See concurring opinion.

iiFIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter
Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant
of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was
held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding
effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice
to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as

much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.[1] At any rate, it has
been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.[2]
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is
therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have
been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting
evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.[3] The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot
be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.[4] It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support
the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear
that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.[9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/22/00 9:47 A M

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it; Exceptions.As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper
unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it.
This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3)
in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already
been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the
present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
there are special and important reasons therefor.

International Law; Extradition; Treaties; A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect
to its intent.The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069
is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, understanding
certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
Same; Same; Postulates of Extradition; Extradition is a major instrument for the suppression of crime.Extradition treaties
are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one
state to the other. With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one
country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives
to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.
Same; Same; Same; The requesting State will accord due process to the accused.An extradition treaty presupposes that both
parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More pointedly,
our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full
faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly
attacked for its unconstitutionally.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceedings are sui generis.As pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in
extradition which is sui generisin a class by itselfthey are not. An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are
only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.Given the foregoing, it is
evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be
extradited. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting
authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable.
Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; We are bound by pacta sunt seruanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Extradition Treaty.Our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest. Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure
would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it
to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should
it be found proper.
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.Persons to be extradited are presumed to be
flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their

extradition to the requesting state.

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Treaty, uses the word immediate to qualify the
arrest of the accused, a qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant
arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate.It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties,
receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase if it appears, the law fur ther conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage.By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impressiona prima facie findingsufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A judge gravely abuses his discretion when he sets for hearing
the application for the issuance of an arrest warrant in an extradition proceeding after having already determined from the
petition itself and its supporting documents that a prima facie finding exists.We stress that the prima facie existence of
probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself
and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the Extradition Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.Moreover, the
law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving
the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from the
provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also
bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in
the entire proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition Proceedings. Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise
to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in
spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by the use of the word conviction in Art. III, Section 13 of the
Constitution, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal lawsit does not apply to extradition proceedings
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right
to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the

constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings.The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The detention of a potential extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due processwhile the essence of due process is the opportunity to
be heard, it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar
doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstancessuch as those present in an extradition case
call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provisionin the Constitution, the law or the treatyexpressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step
towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.Too, we cannot allow
our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions,
choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provisionin the Constitution, the law or the treatyexpressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest
court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.The rule, we repeat, is that bail is
not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion
and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe
that the right to due process is broad enough to induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due
process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application. Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in extradition proceedings has no express or specific statutory
basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.Since this exception has no express or
specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes
that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the
vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need

to fulfill international obligations.

Same; Same; Congress; The constituents of a potential extraditee who elected him to Congress while a foreign country was
requesting his extradition were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the casehis election to public office is not, by itself, a
compelling reason to grant him bail.While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of
the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000
residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument
when it ruled thus: When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office. x x x It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should
have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending
the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that
his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings, although as
a matter of policy it may only be granted under exceptional circumstances.The Government maintains that an extradition
court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law conferring such power; and that the 1987 Constitution, as well
as the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested and detained for violation of Philippine Laws, but not to
extradition proceedings in which courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. The argument is as ingenious as it
is fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may
only be granted under exceptional circumstances. This, quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of
American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel, 190 US 40 (1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti v. United
States, 112 F.3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al, 106 F.3d 855 (1996); which
are also discussed extensively by Mr. Justice Puno.
Same; Same; Same; There is neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal cases,
or that class of cases where courts must render judgments of conviction or acquittalbail as a remedy is available where
there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial.Significantly, both the extradition treaty between the United States and
the Philippines, and the Philippine Extradition Law (PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding from the courts the
power to grant bail. Had the intention of the parties to the treaty been to totally nullify the pre-existing power of the
extradition court on the matter of bail, they could have easily provided for it in the treaty. But since they had not done so, it
would be reasonable to presume that they had not so intended. Indeed, the treaty fails to even remotely suggest such judicial
limitation insisted upon by the Government. Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that bail should
only be allowed in criminal cases, or that class of cases where courts must render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Bail
as a remedy is available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Co
Siaco, akin to the situation confronting us but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential deportee
to post bail although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in
deportation cases.
Same; Same; Same; We cannot curtail a citizens right to freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable
mechanisms appropriate to address themthe risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail.We cannot
curtail a citizens right to freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable mechanisms appropriate to address
them. To my mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail. Trial judges must henceforth weigh
carefully and judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused during the proceedings and right after, when he
ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or passports cancelled and hold-departure orders issued or
border patrols heightened, in order that the extraditee may not flee from our jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree that it
is the extraditees burden to prove the least likelihood of flight, the extradition court is also entitled to presume that the
executive branch has done all it can to forestall his sudden disappearance. The executive branch cannot plead its helplessness
and inutility to defeat the grant of bail to the extraditee.

Same; Same; Same; To unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an individual by reason of an unfounded fear of being unable to
fulfill treaty obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the dignity of the human person, thereby destroying
something of what is noble in our ways of life.
In our societyand even in the United States, I am surefreedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the
civil liberties protected by the Constitution. To unduly sacrifice the civil liberties of an individual by reason of an unfounded
fear of being unable to fulfill treaty obligations, would be to render impotent the ideals of the dignity of the human person,
thereby destroying something of what is noble in our way of life. Certainly, if civil liberties may be safely respected without
imminently or actually impairing faithful compliance with treaty obligations, as in this case, then there is no valid reason for
disregarding them.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Due Process; While the Supreme Court is obliged to accord due respect to the states interests
to comply with its treaty obligations, it cannot also shirk from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizensa full
and careful weighing of these warring interests is imperative; It is my humble submission that the majority failed to allocate
the proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the private respondent to life, liberty and to due process.There can be
no disagreement that P.D. No. 1069 deserves an interpretation that would blend with the purpose of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, i.e., the minimization of flight risk and the facilitation of an extraditees surrender to the requesting state. But this
stance should not be taken to mean that this Court can cast a blind eye to the private respondents constitutional rights to life,
liberty and to due process. While this Court is obliged to accord due respect to the states interests to comply with its treaty
obligations, it cannot also shirk from its duty to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens. Thus, a full and careful
weighing of these warring interests is imperative as we did in its predecessor case Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion. With due
respect, it is my humble submission that the majority failed to allocate the proper weight due to the constitutional rights of
the private respondent to life, liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded in the civilized world as universal in
character and it was never the intent of the RP-US Extradition Treaty to trivialize their significance.
Same; Same; Same; Where the extradition process has moved away from the stage of evaluation to the stage where a formal
petition for extradition has been filed in court, the competing interests of our government and of the potential extraditee have
developed new dimensions and they need to be rebalanced.The extradition process against the private respondent has,
however, moved away from the stage of evaluation of documents by the executive officials of the Philippine government. A
formal petition for the extradition of the private respondent has now been filed with our court of justice. With this
development, the competing interests of our government and of the private respondent have developed new dimensions and
they need to be rebalanced.
Satne; Same; Same; It is my humble submission that from the moment the petition for extradition is filed before the
extradition court, a potential extraditee has the right to demand that he be furnished a copy of the petition.It is my humble
submission that from the moment the petition for extradition is filed before the extradition court, a potential extraditee has
the right to demand that he be furnished a copy of the petition. This right inheres from the duty imposed by P.D. No. 1069 to
the extradition judge to summon a potential extraditee to appear and answer the petition as soon as practicable. It is a
mandatory duty that should be carried out by the extradition judge; the law does not give him any discretion. This submission
is in accord with our ruling in Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, where we held that: P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RPUS Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as
the supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the extradition in the extradition court.
Same; Same; Same; I submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest
should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.I submit that the decision whether to send notice to an
extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is
crystal clear from section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 which provides: x x x He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will serve the ends of justice. (Italics supplied) Under this provision, the issuance of
a warrant of arrest is dependent on a big if, or to an all important conditionif it will serve the ends of justice. The
determination of whether a warrant of arrest against an extraditee will serve the ends of justice is certainly not a cut and dried
duty. It involves the appreciation of highly contentious facts, both objective and subjective in nature. Their appreciation
requires a judicial mind honed in the law of evidence. The history of extradition will reveal that, initially, the task of
determining whether an extraditee should be immediately arrested was given to the executive authorities of the extraditing
state. The matter, in other words, was treated purely as an executive function but unfortunately, the practice was given to

abuses. Recognizing that certain human rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether a
potential extraditee should be immediately arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to judges. The office
of the judge was called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee.
The extraditing judge is not to act as a stamp pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant.
Same; Same; Same; The view that the extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to notify and hear a potential
extraditee before ordering his arrest cuts too much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge.Under our law on
extradition, P.D. No. 1069, section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on whether to order the arrest of the extraditee is
guided by the following considerationwhether the arrest will serve the ends of justice. The grant of this judicial discretion
will be rendered naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to unnecessary fetters. With due respect, the view
that the extraditing judge has no discretion to determine whether to notify and hear a potential extraditee before ordering his
arrest cuts too much on the freedom of action of the extraditing judge. I submit that we should give the extraditing judge
more discretion on the matter. If the extraditing judge feels that the notice and hearing will allow an extraditee to flee, I have
no doubt, he will immediately order his arrest. If, however, he believes that notice and hearing will not pose such danger and
that he needs to hear the parties to make a better determination on whether the immediate arrest of an extraditee will serve
the ends of justice, let us not deny him the discretion to do so. The essence of discretion is freedom of action and we negate
that essence when we impose needless limits on the judges freedom of action.
Same; Same; Same; We should not lay down the doctrine that speed should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds
recklessness and we cannot be reckless with our right to life and liberty.Prescinding from these premises, I cannot also
subscribe to the submission of the majority that the phrase if it appears in section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 conveys the message
that accuracy is not as important as speed in issuing a warrant of arrest against a potential extraditee. We are concerned here
with the priceless right to life and liberty, with the right to due process before ones liberty is taken away. We are not dealing
with chattels. We should not lay down the doctrine that speed should be preferred to accuracy for speed breeds recklessness
and we cannot be reckless with our right to life and liberty.
Same; Same; Same; The petition for extradition may be in due form but it does not establish sufficient factual basis to justify
the immediate issuance of warrant of arrest against the potential extraditee.Even a cursory reading of these documents will
not sustain the thesis of the majority that it is evident that the respondent could have already gotten an impression from
these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of justice. The documents are evidence tending to prove the guilt of
the private respondent in regard to the cases filed against him in the United States. They are not evidence, however, to prove
that the private respondent will flee the Philippine jurisdiction while his extradition petition is being heard. In other words,
the petition for extradition may be in due form but it does not establish sufficient factual basis to justify the immediate
issuance of warrant of arrest against the private respondent. The probability of his flight from our jurisdiction is central to the
question of whether he should be arrested. In the absence of evidence establishing that private respondent will flee, I cannot
join the majority in holding that the respondent extraditing judge gravely abused his discretion in calling for a hearing so that
the parties can adduce evidence on the issue.
Same; Same; Same; The matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest is addressed to the
discretion of the extraditing judge.Once more, I beg to disagree from the reading of our law on extradition by the majority.
The law, it is true, did not provide that the extraditing judge must hold a hearing before he issues a warrant of arrest. The call
for a hearing is not mandatory but neither is it prohibited. Ergo, the matter of whether there ought to be a hearing before
issuance of warrant of arrest is addressed to the discretion of the extraditing judge. The exercise of this discretion depends on
the configuration of the facts of each case.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; The mere silence of our extradition treaty with the United States and our
extradition law does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee; While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant
depends on presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee will not frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing
from our jurisdiction.I respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his right to bail in our Constitution. The
mere silence of our extradition treaty with the United States and our extradition law (P.D. No. 1069) does not negate the right
to bail of a potential extraditee. Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs and practices support an extraditees right to bail. But
while an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and convincing evidence that the extraditee
will not frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; The right to bail inheres from the rights to life, liberty and to due process.The right to bail inheres from
the rights to life, liberty and to due process. Our Constitution jealously guards every persons right to life and liberty against
unwarranted state intrusion; indeed, no state action is permitted to invade this forbidden zone except upon observance of due
process of law. Like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail gives flesh to the guarantee to liberty, without
which, the right to liberty can prove meaningless, and due process will only be an empty slogan. However, unlike the privilege
of habeas corpus which is principally a remedy against illegal restraint on liberty, the right to bail is available even when the
reason for the detention is lawful. The purpose of bail is to relieve a person the rigors of prolonged imprisonment until the
main case against him is resolved, and at the same time, insure his attendance when required by the authorities. It is the
prospect of prolonged detention, not the detention itself, which offends the constitutional right to due process.
Same; Same; Same; The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be treated in light of our other treaty obligations,
especially those concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should
be treated in light of our other treaty obligations, especially those concerning the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the Philippines is a party, a treaty shall be interpreted in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose, taking into account the relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties. As members of the family of nations, the Philippines and the United States have the
responsibility to uphold fundamental human rights, and the dignity and worth of the human person. They are mandated to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law can be maintained. Being signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both countries are committed to protect and promote the right of every person to
liberty and to due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can take proceedings before a court, in order that such
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention, and order his release if the detention, is not lawful.
Although the right to liberty is a relative right and may be suspended or derogated in exceptional circumstances, it is a
generally accepted principle in international law that the presumption lies in favor of the existence of the right, and the
burden lies with the authorities to justify the lawfulness of the arrest or detention. This presumption creates an obligation on
state authorities to make effective remedies available to every person under detention for the enjoyment of his fundamental
right to liberty.
Same; Same; Same; There is no customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in extradition cases.There is no
customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in extradition cases. At present, there is no customary norm prohibiting
bail in extradition cases. On the contrary, most countries, including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa and
Pakistan, among others, allow a potential extraditee to be released on bail. Members of the European Union have recently
ratified the European Convention on Extradition, which also provides a procedure for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Even the United States grants bail to an extra-ditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances.Even the
United States grants bail to an extraditee, albeit in exceptional circumstances. In the United States, the ruling case law
upholds the right of a potential extraditee to apply for bail. The US Supreme Court in the landmark case of Wright vs.
Henckel, recognized the authority of the circuit courts to receive application for and grant bail in certain exceptional case,
thus: We are unwilling to hold that the circuit court possess no power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically
vested by statutes, or that, while bail should not be ordinarily granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not in
any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief.
Same; Same; Same; While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate
the ends of justice.While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is discretionary depending on whether it will frustrate
the ends of justice. In extradition cases, the extradition court does not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Neither does the court measure the injury caused to the community, as the offense was not committed within its jurisdiction.
The court, therefore, cannot base its decision to grant or deny bail on the gravity of the offense, as it could in criminal cases.
Rather, it should base its decision on whether it will frustrate the ends of justice. The risk of flight of an extraditee is an
important factor to consider, in determining whether his bail will frustrate justice. Whether or not a potential extraditee is a
flight risk is determined by two factors: (1) capacity to flee; and (2) intent to flee. The combination of these two factors
determines the degree of risk that the trial court must assess and weigh. While there is no mathematical formula to guide the
court in gauging the precise risk posed by a particular combination of these two factors, it is commonsensical to assume that
one without the other would not result to any risk at all. For while one has the capacity to flee, if he does not intend to flee,
the fear of flight would be for naught, and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof to justify the arrest and detention of the potential extraditee initially rests on the
petitioning executive authorities.The burden of proof to justify the arrest and detention of the potential extraditee initially

rests on the petitioning executive authorities. Under our extradition treaty and law, a potential extraditee may be arrested
and detained under any of the following circumstances: (a) upon the receipt of the request for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and even before the filing of the request for extradition; (b) upon the filing of the petition for extradition before the
extradition court; or (c) during the hearing of the petition for extradition. In all the above circumstances, the issuance of a
warrant of arrest depends on a showing that it will serve the ends of justice. Initially, it is the burden of the petitioning
executive authorities to prove that the warrant against the extraditee will serve the ends of justice.
Same; Same; Same; After the warrant of arrest is issued, the burden of proof on the right to be admitted to bail shifts on the
potential extraditee; The presumption of innocence, from which the ordinary presumption in favor of granting bail emanates,
is inoperative in extradition cases.After the warrant of arrest is issued, the burden of proof on the right to be admitted to
bail shifts on the potential extraditee. In criminal cases, the presumption lies in favor of granting bail. This is so because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence, which is not overturned by the finding of probable cause upon which the
warrant of arrest against the accused was issued. However, the presumption of innocence, from which the ordinary
presumption in favor of granting bail emanates, is inoperative in extradition cases. The issuance of the warrant of arrest in
extradition cases is not based on the finding that the accused is probably guilty of the offense for which he was charged in the
requesting State. The warrant is predicated on the finding that it will serve the ends of justice. Once issued, it raises a
presumption of the continuing presence of the circumstances upon which the issuance of the warrant was based. More often
than not, this circumstance is the probability that the extraditee will flee from the jurisdiction of the extraditing court. The
burden of proving admittance to bail is thus shifted to the extraditee.
Same; Same; Same; In fairness to both parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so that the proper
procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be complied with.I respectfully submit that in fairness to both
parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so that the proper procedure and standard to determine the
right to bail can be complied with. I put no blame on the extradition court nor to the parties in this regard for we are still
developing our jurisprudence on extradition.
Same; Same; Same; The Court should fashion out a higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee.With
humility, I submit that the Court should fashion out a higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a possible extraditee. The
higher standard is demanded by the fact that our extradition treaty obligates us to assure that an extraditee will not abscond
from our jurisdiction. Failure to comply with this obligation will expose our country to international embarrassment. It will
defeat the purpose of extradition treaties, i.e., the suppression of crimes, especially transnational crimes to which the
Philippines is very vulnerable. The standard, I propose, is the standard of clear and convincing evidence which is higher than
mere preponderance of evidence but lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If this new and stricter standard would be
adopted, it ought to follow that the parties should be given a chance to offer evidence to meet the same. Contrary the claim of
the majority, the voluminous pleadings already filed by the parties are insufficient to resolve the issue of whether the private
respondent is entitled to bail. These pleadings proffer legal arguments but not proof of facts. The remand of the case at bar is
therefore not a cop-out but is proper and it will not delay the proceedings. The extradition court can be ordered to finish the
hearing on the limited issue of bail within one (1) week. After all, extradition proceedings are summary in nature.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; The edict in the Bill of Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the
fundamental right to bail, is clearno statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its language and its intent.Treaty laws,
particularly those which are self-executing, have equal stature as national statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are
subject to the parameters set forth in the Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and a circumscription of
government authority by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its limitation upon which an act
of government is justly measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the government and any act in
opposition thereto can only be struck down as being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter gives a mandate, the
government can do no less than to accept it; its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill of Rights granting to
all persons, without distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its
language and its intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for the grant of bail
it recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by simply disallowing excessive bail.The draft ponencia would rely
heavily on foreign jurisprudence, notably American cases, to belabor the point that the right to bail is extraneous to
extradition proceedings. The citation, particularly of the jurisprudence obtaining in the United States, could be predicated on
the Eighth Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This amendment however, recognizes merely by implication the right

to bail by simply disallowing excessive bail; it does not expressly provide for the grant of bail. Individual states have
incorporated into their own state constitutions various versionssome give it as a matter of right and some do nota fact
which partially explains the lack of uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where some states provide for a
constitutional right to bail, the same is almost invariably viewed as affording a greater right than that provided in the federal
charter.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictionsthe absoluteness
of the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution precludes any need for further standards than
those explicitly expressed by it.But Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions.
The absoluteness of the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution precludes any need for further
standards than those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial discretion is confined to the issue of whether or not the offense
charged is a capital crime and a determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be too
simplistic but it is the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable in developing a special circumstances
standard on the basis of mere pro hac vice pronouncements from elsewhere. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, this
Court has expressed unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of restraint against unwarranted judicial
adventurism that can otherwise easily get out of hand.
CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:
International Law; Extradition; Bail; Supreme Court; The constitutional duty and power of the Supreme Court to protect and
enforce the fundamental rights of all persons in the country, should include, to the extent that the Court can grant under its
power, the right of extraditees to avail of the same or similar remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners have
accorded to their own extraditees.I concur with the well-written ponencia of Justice Panganiban. I write this concurring
opinion to afford extraditees in this country the right to bail, in carefully limited exceptions, under the equity and rule making
power of the Court. It is the constitutional duty and power of the Court to protect and enforce the fundamental rights of all
persons in this country. This should include, to the extent that the Court can grant under its power, the right of extraditees in
this country to avail of the same or similar remedies that courts in the countries of our treaty partners have accorded to their
own extraditees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Following the emerging trend in the United States, and guided by our own experience in
combating transnational crimes including international terrorism, the Supreme Court should rule that our extradition courts
may, after the arrest of the extraditee, grant the extraditee bail if he establishes that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger
to the community, and there is no other special circumstance that would warrant denial of bail.Thus, following the
emerging trend in the United States, and guided by our own experience in combating transnational crimes including
international terrorism, the Court should rule that our extradition courts may, after the arrest of the extraditee, grant the
extraditee bail if he establishes that he does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community, and there is no other special
circumstance that would warrant denial of bail. The burden of proving he is entitled to bail rests on the extraditee because by
resisting the extradition to face a fair trial abroad, the extraditee is presumed to be a flight risk. This is why courts have
consistently held that the presumption is against bail in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Same; State Witnesses; Witness Protection Program; Under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act,
the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the accused and his utilization as a state witness.For the same
reason, Jimenezs claim that he is a state witness in the plunder case against ex-President Joseph Estrada, and that his flight
would strip him of (the) immunity he is entitled to, cannot be given credence. Under the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefits Act, the Certificate of Admission is essential to the discharge of the accused and his utilization as a state witness.
Without the Certificate of Admission, Jimenez is not entitled to immunity under the Program. The Department of Justice will
issue the Certificate of Admission only if it is satisfied with the proposed testimony of the witness as disclosed in his sworn
statement. Since until now the Department of Justice has not issued a Certificate of Admission to Jimenez, it could mean that
the Department is either not satisfied with what Jimenez is bargaining to testify against ex-President Joseph Estrada, or that
Jimenez may not be the least guilty. Unless Jimenez presents to the extradition court the Certificate of Admission, and this he
has not done, Jimenezs claim of beings state witness against ex-President Estrada is baseless and self-serving. [Government
of the United States of America vs. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623(2002)]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK
B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May
23, 2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.[3] The first assailed Order set
for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to
Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly
let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into
legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809
and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as
the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition
for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR
No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within
which to file a comment and supporting evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.[9] By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This

Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire
fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001
and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate
arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10]
which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In
that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned
July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash.[11] After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6
of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.

4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a
matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of
special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he
will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The
Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail,
had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before
a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in
this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive
issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the
issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders
are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of
sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of
law.[16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is
lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would
still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent
that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case[17] ruled on the issue by disallowing
bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the
same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals,
which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of
the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties.[18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions:
(1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.[19] As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari
is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve

pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and
which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy
justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the
proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where
special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to
take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no
local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended
as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another
for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.

Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument
of international co-operation in the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.[31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent
that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the
locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of
crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct
encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of
persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend
towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized
countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances
of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
others legal system and judicial process.[34] More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition
treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited.[35] That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the
requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty
would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they
are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
x x xx x xx x x
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where
judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual

extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice
whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations
foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited.[37] Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged
with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of
the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.[38] The ultimate purpose of
extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch
ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity[40]with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.[42] This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth
in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law
require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is
under obligation to make the surrender.[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience[44] of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction
of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country.[45] Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return
and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state,
as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to
avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.

On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of
that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition,
the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be
served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties,[46] receiving facts and arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time
to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The
law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and
swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon
the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good
first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H,
the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of
the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness [excerpts]
Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J
Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit
L Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in two
volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends
of justice. He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded
from these supporting documents that probable cause did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein
respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the
extraditee.[50]

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided.
It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary[52]in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law
and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little
step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore,
the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to
the less reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor
the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing
just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that
the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty
of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause.
They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses.[57] In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused
and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed
to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,

what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a
prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary
nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the
opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission
of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding[58] is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including
those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4[59] of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.[60] It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.[61] Hence, the second
sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti[62] in arguing that, constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x
liberty x x x without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard[63]
but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.[65]
In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his
being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to
apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.[66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences
of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty
obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest
or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14[67] of the Treaty,
since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of
the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic
and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.[70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there
exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest
court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance
amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power
should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also
recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In
People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that
he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly
confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
[from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of

nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has
to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[73]
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared
for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution
of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to
public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him
during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional
rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him
the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request
in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for
his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that
is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition
court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in
this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties
-- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this
Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only
petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required
by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately
filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the
great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the
potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and
Counter-Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.
Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding
the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the
learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus,
a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary
and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition.
We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision
has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported
by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in
bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may
proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of
the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights
to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped
detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at
scheduled hearings on the petition.

5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding,
they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call
for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available
during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience
of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the
other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave
abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our
inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate
and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID,
while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail
bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition
proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United
States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Where the petition involves pure questions of law, the same may be exempted from the
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998).On October 7, 1997, we resolved to give due course to the
petition (Rollo, p. 217). Petitioners filed their memorandum on December 1, 1997. The petition involves pure questions of
law; thus, we except this case from the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 [1998]. Rather than refer
the case to the Court of Appeals, whose decision would be appealable to the Supreme Court, our ruling would finally put an
end to the litigation.
Manila Hotel Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Conflict of Laws; Forum Non Conveniens; Not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried in the Philippines.The NLRC
was a seriously inconvenient forum. We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the

case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a
Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel, and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract.Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through
correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the
intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.
Same; Same; Requisites before a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over a conflict of laws case.Under the
rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so
provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Labor Law; The Supreme Court cannot see how the NLRC is a convenient forum where all the incidents of the
casefrom the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines, an inconvenience is
compounded by the fact that the proper defendants are not nationals of the Philippines.We fail to see how the NLRC is a
convenient forum given that all the incidents of the casefrom the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred
outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and
MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they doing business in the Philippines. Likewise, the main
witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

Same; Same; Same; An intelligent decision cannot be made as to the law governing the employment contract where the same
was perfected in foreign soil.Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract
as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract was made). The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos
signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in
the Peoples Republic of China.
Same; Same; Same; The NLRC cannot determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal where all acts complained
of took place in a foreign country.Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all
acts complained of took place in Beijing, Peoples Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether
the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos
retrenchment.

Same; Same; Same: Principle of Effectiveness; Jurisdiction; Even if a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, the
same would not have any binding effect against the foreign employer, an incorporated under the laws of a foreign state which
was not even served with summons.Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not
have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; The fact that a corporation owns fifty percent (50%) of the capital
stock of another corporation is not enough to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between the two corporations.Even if we
assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos retrenchment,
still MHC, as a separate and distinct juridical entity, cannot be held liable. True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns
fifty percent (50%) of its capital stock. However, this is not enough to pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and
MHC. Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is resorted to when the corporate fiction is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime. It is done only when a corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person or another corporation.
Same; Same; Tests in determining whether the corporate veil may be pierced.The tests in determining whether the
corporate veil may be pierced are: First, the defendant must have control or complete domination of the other corporations
finances, policy and business practices with regard to the transaction attacked. There must be proof that the other
corporation had no separate mind, will or existence with respect the act complained of. Second, control must be used by the

defendant to commit fraud or wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or breach of duty must be the proximate cause of the injury
or loss complained of. The absence of any of the elements prevents the piercing of the corporate veil.
Same; Same; Evidence; Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.It is basic that a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to
which it may be related. Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. In this case, we find no
evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one and the same entity.
Evidence; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; When one notes a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval, as a
party would the person so noting has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a
judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.When one notes a contract, one is not expressing his
agreement or approval, as a party would. In Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the Court recognized that
the term noted means that the person so noting has merely taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration,
without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter.
Same; Same; Same; The witnessing part of the document is that which, in a deed or other formal instrument is that part
which comes after the recitals, or where there are no recitals, after the parties.Mr. Cergueda merely signed the witnessing
part of the document. The witnessing part of the document is that which, in a deed or other formal instrument is that part
which comes after the recitals, or where there are no recitals, after the parties (emphasis ours). As opposed to a party to a
contract, a witness is simply one who, being present, personally sees or perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator, or
eyewitness. One who notes something just makes a brief written statement a memorandum or observation.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationships; Elements.More importantly, there was no existing employer-employee
relationship between Santos and MHICL. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following
elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to
dismiss; and (4) the power to control employees conduct.
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; The fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel
Group is not enough to pierce the corporate veil.Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and MHICL
are one and the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel Group is not enough to pierce
the corporate veil between MHICL and the Palace Hotel. [Manila Hotel Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 343
SCRA 1(2000)]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120077

October 13, 2000

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G.
SANTOS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for certiorari 1 to annul the following orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "NLRC") for having been issued without or with excess jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion:2
(1) Order of May 31, 1993.3 Reversing and setting aside its earlier resolution of August 28, 1992. 4 The questioned
order declared that the NLRC, not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter referred to as
"POEA"), had jurisdiction over private respondent's complaint;

(2) Decision of December 15, 1994.5 Directing petitioners to jointly and severally pay private respondent twelve
thousand and six hundred dollars (US$ 12,600.00) representing salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract;
three thousand six hundred dollars (US$3,600.00) as extra four months salary for the two (2) year period of his
contract, three thousand six hundred dollars (US$3,600.00) as "14th month pay" or a total of nineteen thousand
and eight hundred dollars (US$19,800.00) or its peso equivalent and attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%)
of the total award; and
(3) Order of March 30, 1995.6 Denying the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.
In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo Santos (hereinafter referred to as "Santos") was an overseas worker employed as a
printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently, in June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace
Hotel, Beijing, People's Republic of China and later terminated due to retrenchment.
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "MHC") and the Manila Hotel International
Company, Limited (hereinafter referred to as "MHICL").
When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines.
MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. 7 MHC is an "incorporator" of MHICL,
owning 50% of its capital stock.8
By virtue of a "management agreement"9 with the Palace Hotel (Wang Fu Company Limited), MHICL10 trained the personnel
and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
Now the facts.
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the Sultanate of Oman, respondent Santos received a letter dated
May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager, Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent
Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend of his.
Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position as printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits.
The position was slated to open on October 1, 1988. 11
On May 8, 1988, respondent Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and signified his acceptance of the offer.
On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk mailed a ready to sign employment contract to respondent
Santos. Mr. Henk advised respondent Santos that if the contract was acceptable, to return the same to Mr. Henk in Manila,
together with his passport and two additional pictures for his visa to China.
On May 30, 1988, respondent Santos resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press, effective June 30, 1988, under the pretext
that he was needed at home to help with the family's piggery and poultry business.
On June 4, 1988, respondent Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged Mr. Henk's letter. Respondent Santos
enclosed four (4) signed copies of the employment contract (dated June 4, 1988) and notified them that he was going to
arrive in Manila during the first week of July 1988.
The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his employment would commence September 1, 1988 for a period of two
years.12 It provided for a monthly salary of nine hundred dollars (US$900.00) net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a
year.13
On June 30, 1988, respondent Santos was deemed resigned from the Mazoon Printing Press.

On July 1, 1988, respondent Santos arrived in Manila.

On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos left for Beijing, China. He started to work at the Palace Hotel. 14
Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended "employment agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effective November 5,
1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of
petitioner MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment agreement under the word "noted".
From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent Santos was in the Philippines on vacation leave. He returned to China and reassumed
his post on July 17, 1989.
On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt's Executive Secretary, a certain Joanna suggested in a handwritten note that respondent Santos
be given one (1) month notice of his release from employment.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the
Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. 15 We
quote the letter:16
"After the unfortunate happenings in China and especially Beijing (referring to Tiannamen Square incidents), our
business has been severely affected. To reduce expenses, we will not open/operate printshop for the time being.
"We sincerely regret that a decision like this has to be made, but rest assured this does in no way reflect your past
performance which we found up to our expectations."
"Should a turnaround in the business happen, we will contact you directly and give you priority on future
assignment."
On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the employment of respondent Santos and paid all benefits due him,
including his plane fare back to the Philippines.
On October 3, 1989, respondent Santos was repatriated to the Philippines.
On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos, through his lawyer, Atty. Ednave wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full compensation
pursuant to the employment agreement.
On November 11, 1989, Mr. Shmidt replied, to wit: 17
His service with the Palace Hotel, Beijing was not abruptly terminated but we followed the one-month notice clause
and Mr. Santos received all benefits due him.
"For your information the Print Shop at the Palace Hotel is still not operational and with a low business outlook,
retrenchment in various departments of the hotel is going on which is a normal management practice to control
costs.
"When going through the latest performance ratings, please also be advised that his performance was below average
and a Chinese National who is doing his job now shows a better approach.
"In closing, when Mr. Santos received the letter of notice, he hardly showed up for work but still enjoyed free
accommodation/laundry/meals up to the day of his departure."
On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He prayed for an award of nineteen thousand nine hundred and
twenty three dollars (US$19,923.00) as actual damages, forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) as exemplary damages and

attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the damages prayed for. The complaint named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr.
Shmidt as respondents.
The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before the
Labor Arbiter.18
On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, decided the case against petitioners, thus: 19
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. directing all the respondents to pay complainant jointly and severally;
"a) $20,820 US dollars or its equivalent in Philippine currency as unearned salaries;
"b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
"c) P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
"d) Ten (10) percent of the total award as attorney's fees.
"SO ORDERED."
On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case.
On August 28, 1992, the NLRC promulgated a resolution, stating: 20
"WHEREFORE, let the appealed Decision be, as it is hereby, declared null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Complainant is hereby enjoined to file his complaint with the POEA.
"SO ORDERED."
On September 18, 1992, respondent Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He argued that the case
was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an "overseas contract worker." 21
On May 31, 1993, the NLRC granted the motion and reversed itself. The NLRC directed Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon to
hear the case on the question of whether private respondent was retrenched or dismissed. 22
On January 13, 1994, Labor Arbiter Tumanon completed the proceedings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented to and heard by him.23
Subsequently, Labor Arbiter Tumanon was re-assigned as trial Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Arbitration Branch,
and the case was transferred to Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera. 24
On November 25, 1994, Labor Arbiter de Vera submitted his report. 25 He found that respondent Santos was illegally
dismissed from employment and recommended that he be paid actual damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract.26
On December 15, 1994, the NLRC ruled in favor of private respondent, to wit: 27
"WHEREFORE, finding that the report and recommendations of Arbiter de Vera are supported by substantial
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered, directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay complainant the
following computed contractual benefits: (1) US$12,600.00 as salaries for the unexpired portion of the parties'
contract; (2) US$3,600.00 as extra four (4) months salary for the two (2) years period (sic) of the parties' contract;

(3) US$3,600.00 as "14th month pay" for the aforesaid two (2) years contract stipulated by the parties or a total of
US$19,800.00 or its peso equivalent, plus (4) attorney's fees of 10% of complainant's total award.
"SO ORDERED."
On February 2, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Labor Arbiter de Vera's recommendation had
no basis in law and in fact.28
On March 30, 1995, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. 29
Hence, this petition.30
On October 9, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction and a motion for the annulment of the entry of judgment of the NLRC dated July 31,
1995.31
On November 20, 1995, the Court denied petitioner's urgent motion. The Court required respondents to file their respective
comments, without giving due course to the petition.32
On March 8, 1996, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that after going over the petition and its annexes, they
can not defend and sustain the position taken by the NLRC in its assailed decision and orders. The Solicitor General prayed
that he be excused from filing a comment on behalf of the NLRC 33
On April 30,1996, private respondent Santos filed his comment. 34
On June 26, 1996, the Court granted the manifestation of the Solicitor General and required the NLRC to file its own
comment to the petition.35
On January 7, 1997, the NLRC filed its comment.
The petition is meritorious.
I. Forum Non-Conveniens
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign
elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel
and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through
correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the
intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government. 36
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to
do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine
court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. 37 The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time
of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact
that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they "doing
business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the
employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). 38
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter
while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all
acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether
the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos'
retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the
NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers.
Neither are we saying that we do not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were
an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him.39 He is not an
"overseas contract worker" a fact which he admits with conviction. 40
Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the merits, the NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos'
retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate and distinct juridical entity cannot be held liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent (50%) of its capital stock. However, this is not enough to
pierce the veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is resorted to when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime. 41 It is done only when a corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person or another corporation.
In Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals,42 we held that "the mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the
fiction of separate corporate personalities."
The tests in determining whether the corporate veil may be pierced are: First, the defendant must have control or complete
domination of the other corporation's finances, policy and business practices with regard to the transaction attacked. There
must be proof that the other corporation had no separate mind, will or existence with respect the act complained of. Second,
control must be used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or breach of duty must be the
proximate cause of the injury or loss complained of. The absence of any of the elements prevents the piercing of the corporate
veil.43
It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those composing it as well as from that of any other
legal entity to which it may be related.44 Clear and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. 45 In
this case, we find no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one and the same entity.
III. MHICL not Liable
Respondent Santos predicates MHICL's liability on the fact that MHICL "signed" his employment contract with the Palace
Hotel. This fact fails to persuade us.

First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and Development) of MHICL, Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment
contract as a mere witness. He merely signed under the word "noted".
When one "notes" a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval, as a party would. 46 In Sichangco v. Board of
Commissioners of Immigration,47 the Court recognized that the term "noted" means that the person so noting has merely
taken cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision
on the matter.
Mr. Cergueda merely signed the "witnessing part" of the document. The "witnessing part" of the document is that which, "in a
deed or other formal instrument is that part which comes after the recitals, or where there are no recitals, after the parties
(emphasis ours)."48 As opposed to a party to a contract, a witness is simply one who, "being present, personally sees or
perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator, or eyewitness." 49 One who "notes" something just makes a "brief written
statement"50 a memorandum or observation.
Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-employee relationship between Santos and MHICL. In
determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: 51
"(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
"(2) the payment of wages;
"(3) the power to dismiss; and
"(4) the power to control employee's conduct."
MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the aforementioned powers. It did not select respondent Santos as an
employee for the Palace Hotel. He was referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage
respondent Santos to work. The terms of employment were negotiated and finalized through correspondence between
respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk, who were officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL.
Neither did respondent Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the power to control his conduct. Finally, it was the Palace
Hotel, through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated respondent Santos' services.
Neither is there evidence to suggest that MHICL was a "labor-only contractor." 52 There is no proof that MHICL "supplied"
respondent Santos or even referred him for employment to the Palace Hotel.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and MHICL are one and the same entity. The fact that the Palace
Hotel is a member of the "Manila Hotel Group" is not enough to pierce the corporate veil between MHICL and the Palace
Hotel.
IV. Grave Abuse of Discretion
Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and considering further that no employer-employee relationship
existed between MHICL, MHC and respondent Santos, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana clearly had no jurisdiction over
respondent's claim in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90.
Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original jurisdiction only over the following: 53
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
"2. Termination disputes;
"3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

"4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;
"5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and
"6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement."
In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requirement.
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreements.54
"To determine which body has jurisdiction over the present controversy, we rely on the sound judicial principle that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein." 55
The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was obvious from the allegations of the complaint. His failure to dismiss the case
amounts to grave abuse of discretion. 56
V. The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders and resolutions of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated May 31, 1993, December 15, 1994 and March 30, 1995 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91
(NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.

ANNOTATION
IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
By
ATTY. SEVERIANO S. TABIOS
___________________
I. Introduction
One of the causes of the dismissal of a case against a party is the valid claim of the party being sued that under the law it is
actually immune from suits. While such a claim is generally available to a sovereign State under the doctrine that a State
cannot be sued without its consent, it may in some cases be also be interposed by agents of a State under certain conditions.
For this purpose, a diplomatic agent who is being held liable in a case for acts committed in his official capacity may invoke
the immunity granted under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It is indeed internationally
accepted that diplomatic agents enjoy immunity from the criminal, civil as well as administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
State except in cases where their actions relate to any professional or commercial activity exercised by them in the receiving
State outside of their official functions.

The reason for this grant of immunity is obvious. The public service would be hindered and the public safety endangered, if
the supreme authority in the case of the State or its duly authorized agents performing public functions were subjected to
suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.1 As explained by Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, a sover1 See Malong, et. al. vs. Philippine National Railways, et. al., 138 SCRA 63 citing The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129.
eign is exempt from suits, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.2 For this purpose, the
Philippine Constitution provides that the State may not be sued without its consent.3
It appears therefore that the only instance when a party clothed with immunity as in the case of a State can be sued is when it
consents to the suit. This consent may normally be embodied in a legislation, because the State, by virtue of its sovereignty,
may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature.4 It may also waive its immunity by
taking the initiative of filing a suit against a private party.5
With respect to the agents of the State, on the other hand, their immunity depends on the grant of the law and should
therefore strictly depend on what the law says. Thus, in the case of agencies of the government, the immunity given to the
State cannot extend to them for acts performed in a private or nongovernmental capacity, because suits against State agencies
pertaining to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or non-government capacity as well as suits against
corporations created by the State to engage in ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental character are not
regarded as suits against the State.6 Similarly, in the case of a diplomatic agent who represents a sovereign State within the
jurisdiction of the receiving State, the immunity granted under the Vienna Convention attaches only to the performance by
the diplomatic agent of its official functions. Immunity from suit does not extend to activities performed by the agent outside
of its official function.7
2 Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. ed. 834.
3 Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution.
4 Director of Commerce vs. Concepcion, 43 Phil. 384.
5 Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil. 344; Froila vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et. al., 95 Phil. 95.
6 Malong vs. Philippine National Railways, et. al., 138 SCRA 63, 67.
7 Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. 97765, Sept. 24, 1992.
Immunity from Suits
II. Parties Clothed with Immunity from Suits
A State as Party to the Suit
The State like the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. Its 1987 Constitution
provides in Article XVI, Section 3 thereof that the State may not be sued without its consent. However, its immunity from
suit does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. As a party plaintiff, it may avail itself of the
different forms of actions open to private litigants. Moreover, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the
State surrenders its privileged position and comes to the level of the defendant. In the process, the latter automatically
acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the State.8
The same rules apply even if the States action is a mere complaint in intervention. In this regard, the Supreme Court has
declared that where the State takes the initiative in an action against a private party by filing a complaint in intervention, it
thereby surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of a defendant.9

It should be remembered, however, that where the State initiates an action against a private party, the complaint or petition
should be signed by the Solicitor General. According to the Supreme Court, only the Solicitor General can bring or defend
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.10 Henceforth, all actions filed in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, will be summarily dismissed.11
Where the complaint in a case was brought by the Republic of the Philippines not as a nominal party but in the exercise of its
sovereign functions to protect the interests of the State over a public property, the rule on the prescription of actions does not
apply. In this regard, the Supreme Court cited the provisions of
8 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., 95 Phil. 95.
9 Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil. 344.
10 Republic vs. Partisala, et. al., 118 SCRA 370, 373.
11 Republic vs. Partisala, et. al., 118 SCRA 370, 373.
the New Civil Code to the effect that both acquisitive and extinctive prescriptions do not run against the State and its
subdivisions.12 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations does not run against the right of
action of the Government of the Philippines.13
B. Agencies of the Government as Party Litigants
In the case of Malong, et. al. vs. Philippine National Railways, et. al.,14 the Supreme Court declared that the correct rule is
that not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.15 Thus, the fact that a non-corporate
government entity performs a proprietary function does not necessarily result in its being subject to suit, because if said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental functions, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government agency.16
In a case involving the Bureau of Customs, the Supreme Court ruled that as the Bureau of Customs is a part of the
Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government, its arrastre service which
is a necessary incident of its governmental function of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles does
not necessarily render the Bureau of Customs liable to suit, although said arrastre service may be deemed proprietary,
otherwise it could not perform its governmental functions without necessarily exposing itself to suits. In other words, a mere
incidental proprietary function does not overcome the immunity from suit granted to a government agency performing
governmental function.17
12 Art. 1108, New Civil Code.
13 Republic vs. Infante, et. al., 120 SCRA 154, 157; Government vs. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 738.
14 138 SCRA 63.
15 National Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro, et. al., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 286; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs.
U.S.A., 104 Phil. 593.
16 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 120.
On the other hand, where the government agency being sued had assumed to act in a private or non-governmental capacity,
or if it were a corporation created for public purpose but engaged in ordinary business, the Supreme Court has declared that
suits against said government entities are not regarded as suits against the State.18 In this regard, the point that the Supreme
Court wanted to emphasize is that when the government enters into a commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other party corporation.19 For this purpose, by engaging in a particular business

through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.20
In relation to the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court in deciding the issue of whether or not the State acted in a
sovereign capacity in organizing the Philippine National Railways for the purpose of engaging in transportation declared that
the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the Philippine National Railways which is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. As the Philippine National Railways is not performing a governmental
function, it is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in a private enterprise like any private common carrier.21 It is
similar to the National Development Company which is not immune from suit, because it does not exercise sovereign
functions, it being an agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business functions.22 Other government
agencies cited by the Supreme Court as not immune from suit are the Social Security System and the Philippine National
Bank.23
17 Ibid.
18 Malong vs. Philippine National Railways, 138 SCRA 63.
19 Manila Hotel Employees Assn vs. Manila Hotel Co., et. al., 73 Phil. 374, 388.
20 Ibid.
21 Malong vs. Philippine National Railways, 138 SCRA 63.
22 National Development Co. vs. Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705; National Development Co. vs. NDC Employees and Workers
Union, 66 SCRA 181, 184.
C. Public Officials as Party Litigants
The non-suability of the State in the performance of its governmental functions extends to actions of public officials in the
performance of said governmental functions. In this regard, in actions filed against public officials, the Supreme Court
declared that where a litigation may have adverse consequence on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds
or loss of property, the public official proceeded against, who may not be liable in his personal capacity, can appropriately
invoke the doctrine of immunity from suits.24
On the other hand, if a public official is sued in his private capacity, then he cannot hide behind the mantle of immunity from
suit. In this regard, the Supreme Court citing pertinent authorities25 declared in the case of Shauf vs. Court of Appeals,26
that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-known principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.27
23 Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 707; Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, 121 SCRA 26.
24 Begosa vs. Chairman, 32 SCRA 466.
25 Director of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, 33 SCRA 368; Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1; Animos vs. Phil. Veterans Affairs
Office, 174 SCRA 214.
26 191 SCRA 713, 728.
27 Dumlao vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., 114 SCRA 247.

Based on the foregoing doctrine, in a case where the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts denial of a motion to dismiss
filed by a diplomatic agent based on a Diplomatic Note belatedly presented stating that he was performing his duties as a
diplomatic agent for the acts on which he was being held liable in a suit, the Supreme Court declared that the Court of
Appeals should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and
whose authenticity has not yet been proved. In this regard, the Supreme Court pointed to its ruling in the case of United
States of America vs. Guinto,28 on what to do in case the record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really
discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. In such a
situation, the Supreme Court required that the needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court and only after it shall
have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will the Supreme Court
determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.29
III. Implied Waiver of Immunity from Suit
A State by appearing in a suit against it may waive its immunity from suit.30 However, where the State, as one of the
defendants, appeared in a suit precisely to resist the claim against it on the ground of its privileged position which exempts it
from a suit, there could be no waiver of its right of nonsuability.31 This is in accord with the principle that waiver of State
immunity from suit is to be construed in strictissimi juris.32
On the other hand, where the State takes the initiative and files an action against a private party, it thereby surrenders its
privileged position and comes down to the level of a defendant.33
_______________
28 182 SCRA 644, 660.
29 Minucher vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. 97765, Sept. 24, 1992.
30 Clark vs. Bernard, 108 U.S. 436, 27 L. ed. 280.
31 Insurance Co., etc. vs. Warner, etc., 21 SCRA 765, 767.
32 Ibid.
33 Lim, etc. vs. Brownell, etc., 107 Phil. 344.
In this regard, the Supreme Court declared that by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State has
surrendered its privileged position thereby giving the defendant the right to set up, within certain limits, whatever claims and
other defense it might have against the State.34
Another instance of implied consent to be sued may take place if the State should take possession of a citizens property
without paying the just compensation to which the citizen is entitled. In this situation, the Supreme Court declared that if the
constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should,
then a suit against the State should not be summarily dismissed, because the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.35
34 Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., 95 Phil. 95.
35 Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, et al., 40 SCRA 464, 470. [Immunity from Suits, 214 SCRA 254(1992)]

International Law; Evidence; Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them.It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Same; Same; A distinction must be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.A distinction is to be
made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is
unwritten, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of
the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Same; Same; Section 25 (now Section 24) interpreted to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove
the existence of a written foreign law.The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
Same; Same; Requisites for a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible.For a copy of a foreign public document
to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a
document in a foreign country.
Same; Same; When a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy
of the statute.With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
Same; Same; Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact x x x
otherwise it will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law.We reiterate that under the rules of private
international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws
of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as
processual presumption.
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the
diligence required of a good father of a family.Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award of damages. There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is
obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the

New Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man
would exercise with regard to his own property.The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which
an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we have found private respondent to have
exercised when the vessel sailed only after the main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries were checked and found to
be in good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessels double bottom tanks
when the vibrations occurred anew.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply.The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply
to the case at bar because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of the
private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for defendants negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. [Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 213(2000)]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119602

October 6, 2000

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision
of the lower court in CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant, versus Philippine
President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent
herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was
ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. 1 He was asked to pilot the said vessel
on February 11, 19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez),
the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port 4 at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. 6
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. 7 The vessel proceeded
on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. 8
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. 9 These occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the
watch officer called the master to the bridge.11

The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel 12 and verified that it was in the centre of the channel.13 He then went
to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. 14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President
Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. 15
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, 16 thus obstructing the ingress and egress of
vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was
unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against
Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages
in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses
of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. 17
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at the time of the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for defendant PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel Malandrinon, whose passage was
obstructed by the vessel Philippine Roxas at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page 2 of the complaint;
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating the channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said
vessel grounded and as a result, obstructed navigation at the channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel;
"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under the command of the pilot Ezzar
Solarzano, assigned by the government thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12 hours to navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the Philippine Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the Steamship Mutual Underwriters Ltd." 18
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses incurred
abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer,
and to pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.

"SO ORDERED."19
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private respondent questioning the
decision on the merits of the case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out with its questioned decision dated June 14, 1994, 20
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the Decision
of the lower court. Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the amount of
Three Hundred Twenty-three Thousand, Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (P323,042.53) as and for attorney's fees
plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."21
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration22 but the same was denied for lack of merit in the resolution dated March 29,
1995.23
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO
FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE
ROXAS" FOR THE GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE
TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS
SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY
OBJECTION FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED BELATEDLY ON
APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS
MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 24
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought
to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of

reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts. 25
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove
the existence of a written foreign law. 26
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,27 it was held that:
" Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, since the year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim
section 322 of the California Civil Code and stated that said section was in force at the time the obligations of defendant to the
plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently established the fact that
the section in question was the law of the State of California on the above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to
prove the existence of a foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact You ask the witness what the law is; he may, from his recollection, or on producing and
referring to books, say what it is.' (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice Denman in a well-known
English case where a witness was called upon to prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he
referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume
4, pages 3148-3152.) x x x."
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela,28 to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)29
and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain
Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight years. 30 As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering
and navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office of the harbour masters. 31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A
photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones
of Venezuela.33 Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written official
acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. 34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by
the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal
of his office.35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to
the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. 36

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was
presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that
a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the
public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to
the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute.37
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its
import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue. 38
A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V
Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In
the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption. 40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the errors assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private respondent that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of
a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
"If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a
good father of a family shall be required."
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with
regard to his own property. This we have found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the
"main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in good running condition; 41 when the master
left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River;
when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew. 42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known
as the Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports
enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these persons are quoted hereunder:
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence
or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize the damage.

"The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule
the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the
vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate
proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
"x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots Association. -- The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot
shall be as follows:
"x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he
leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects
or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a captain of a vessel, to wit:
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:
"x x x
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and leaving ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless
there is a pilot on board discharging his duties. x x x."
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He
remains in control of the ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by law 43 despite the presence of a pilot
who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a
pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits
within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every
vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
"xxx."
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be
knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez
testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, 44 and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12)
years.45 He also had experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River. 46
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The
master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, 47 mayhap, because the latter had
assured him that they were navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. 48 Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on
account of his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that he
does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River. 49

Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting
his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide
the vessel safely.
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a different class from ordinary employees, for they
assume to have a skill and a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters over which their licenses extend superior to that
of the master; pilots are bound to use due diligence and reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in proportion to
the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a knowledge and observance of the usual rules of navigation, acquaintance with the
waters piloted in their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known obstructions. The character of the skill and
knowledge required of a pilot in charge of a vessel on the rivers of a country is very different from that which enables a
navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the rules of navigation, with charts that disclose
the places of hidden rocks, dangerous shores, or other dangers of the way, are the main elements of a pilot's knowledge and
skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor pilot, is selected for the individual's personal knowledge of the topography
through which the vessel is steered."50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked
him what was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and that the vibration was as
(sic) a result of the shallowness of the channel." 51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River
due to his knowledge of the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which are shallow
and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all
probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182
U.S. 406, it was held that:
"x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done by the negligence of the crew employed in the
ship. The same doctrine will apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master or owner, by whose negligence any injury
happens to a third person or his property: as, for example, by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his negligence. And
it will make no difference in the case that the pilot, if any is employed, is required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master
is at liberty to take a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily
required to select from a particular class. On the other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and,
a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will be
liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed properly
the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them, and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not
apply." (Underscoring supplied)
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none, 52 the voyage has been sufficiently planned and monitored as
shown by the following actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF
for information regarding the channel, river traffic,53 soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the buoys. 54 The
officer on watch also monitored the voyage. 55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the cause for the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the circumstances surrounding the injury do not
clearly indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must
be met: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for
defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 56
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot
on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control,
to render the respondent liable, are absent.

As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyds Register of Shipping confirmed the vessels seaworthiness in a Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988
by finding that "the above named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2
and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and +LMC" from 31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about 12/2/88." 57 The same
would not have been issued had not the vessel been built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified thus:
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing at all to the seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class record of the vessel, wherein recommendations were
made on the top side tank, and it was given sufficient time to be repaired, it means that the vessel is fit to travel even with
those defects on the ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third party looking into the condition of the vessel and
as far as their record states, the vessel was class or maintained, and she is fit to travel during that voyage."
"x x x
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the 'class +100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?
"WITNESS
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules and she is capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but
she is particularly capable of carrying Ore Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
"x x x
"COURT
The vessel is classed, meaning?
"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy." 58
It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship must be reasonably fit to perform the services, and
to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy. 59
As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the deposition of pilot Vasquez:
"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not complied with because of the inability of the vessel to do
so?
"A No.

"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?
"A. The vessel was navigating normally." 60
Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an accident report wherein he stated that on February
11, 1988, he checked and prepared the main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and found them all to be in good
running condition and ready for maneuvering. That same day the main engine, bridge and engine telegraph and steering gear
motor were also tested.61 Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for consumption for maneuvering and checked the engine
generators.62
Finally, we find the award of attorneys fee justified.1wphi1
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
"x x x
"(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
"x x x"
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of
attorneys fees was proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Doctrine of State Immunity; A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States Government, and in the absence of any
waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.From the foregoing, it is apparent
that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the
United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the
suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the
United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

Same; International Law; Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally recognized principles of international law that
the Philippines recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land.In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these
universally recognized principles. In inter-national law, immunity is commonly understood as the exemption of the state
and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of
states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet
imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).
Same; As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities (jure imperii), and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).The
doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract
does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between
sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of the
doctrine. Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect
to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and has no value as an imperative authority. As it stands now, the application of
the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle of
state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). [JUSMAG Philippines vs.
NLRC, 239 SCRA 224(1994)]
G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO,
Union President, JPFCEA, respondents.
Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner.
Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAGPhilippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at bench.
JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public
respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and
ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO
(private respondent) against petitioner.
First, the undisputed facts.
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAGPhilippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he
held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. 2 He was also advised that he was
under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave.
On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that
he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement.

JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged
lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. 4
In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint " for want of jurisdiction." 5
Private respondent appealed 6 to the National Labor Relations Commission (public respondent), assailing the ruling that
petitioner is immune from suit for alleged violation of our labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating its immunity
from suit for its non-contractual, governmental and/or public acts.
In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC 8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost
its right not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel that JUSMAG failed to
refute the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to
immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent on December 18, 1969.
The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America, 9 where the "United States Government (was
considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a) contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the local courts."
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue on illegal dismissal.
Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT
AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE
SUED; AND
B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JUSMAG AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT; AND
B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT PROOF TO THE
CONTRARY.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.
JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21, 1947, between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist of
Air, Naval and Army group, and its primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval
matters. 11

Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services required by the Group, including
compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be
borne by the Republic of the Philippines."
This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines,
dated January 23, 1991, the United States Government, thru its Embassy, manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to
cover the salaries of security assistance support personnel" and security guards, the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and
housing, and the cost of utilities. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated April
18, 1991. 13
Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAGPhilippines, thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S. Brigadier General Robert G. Sausser. The Agreement delineated the
terms of the assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991, the relevant parts of which read:
a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards currently contracted
between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and the Security Assistance Support Personnel
(SASP). . . . .
b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty uniformed
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG.
c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore, the
AFP agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no more than 74 personnel to designated positions with
JUSMAG.
d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. The term "Operational
Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring
recommendations; firing recommendations; position classification; discipline; nomination and approval of
incentive awards; and payroll computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of
JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. For the period of time that there is an exceptional funding agreement
between the government of the Philippines and the United States Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay
the total payroll costs for the SASP employees. Payroll costs include only regular salary; approved
overtime, costs of living allowance; medical insurance; regular contributions to the Philippine Social
Security System, PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA); and the thirteenthmonth bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those previously
defined above. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this agreement will be funded and paid by
the AFP.
e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their current rate of
pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of employment thereafter subject to renewal
of their appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). No promotion
or transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their pay and benefits.
f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at established AFP civilian rates.
Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be made available to the Comptroller, JUSMAG, by the
Comptroller, GHQ, AFP. Additionally, any legally mandated changes in salary levels or methods of
computation shall be transmitted within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ to Comptroller,
JUSMAG.
g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief, JUSMAGPhilippines. Any termination of these personnel thought to be necessary because of budgetary restrictions
or manpower ceiling will be subject to consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that JUSMAG's
mission of dedicated support to the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.

h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP.
(Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current SASP). Any termination of services, other than
voluntary resignations or termination for cause, will result in immediate payments of AFP of all
termination pay to the entitled employee. Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses and
annual leave will be presented to the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later than 14 calendar days prior to
required date of payment.
i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social Security System.
A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(No. 227, dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding agreement for the salaries of SASP and security guards until December
31, 1992.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947.
Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not
impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is
commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is
anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal). 17
Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State, without its consent or
waiver. However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et al., 18 we recognized an exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by a
state, thus:
. . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract, through its officers
or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if
the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against
whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued, even without its
consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has descended to the level of the citizen
and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. . . . . (emphasis ours)
It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of America 19 was decided.
In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States Government for stevedoring
services at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. It then sought to collect from the US government sums of money
arising from the contract. One of the issues posed in the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction over the defendant United States, a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court upheld
the contention of Harry Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be
sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its
consent to be sued under the contract."
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a
contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships
between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of
the doctrine. 20 Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra,
with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority."
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts

( jure gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US vs. Ruiz, supra:
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature of the act. Ergo, since a
governmental function was involved the transaction dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at
Subic Bay it was held that the United States was not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove was employed as a cook in the Main Club
located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, John Hay Air Station. He was dismissed from service after he was found to have
polluted the stock of soup with urine. Genove countered with a complaint for damages. Apparently, the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and available to the general
public, thus, the services are operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Speaking through
Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the Court (En Banc) said:
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to
justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be
established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed
Genove. For the matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason
is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions,
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign state cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. 24 Such is the case at bench. Prescinding from this premise, we need not
determine whether JUSMAG controls the employment conditions of the private respondent.
We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped from denying the
existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent. On the contrary, in its Opposition before the public
respondent, JUSMAG consistently contended that the (74) SASP, including private respondent, working in JUSMAG, are
employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra,
(2) the exchange of notes between our Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the United States, thru the US
Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the Agreement on May 21, 1991, supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
JUSMAG.
We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than twenty (20) years. Considering
his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, can take the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working for JUSMAG, pursuant to
the aforestated Military Assistance Agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the impugned Resolution dated
January 29, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; The only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after
the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.A strict observance of the
Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and
all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to
evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of
Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a
proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasijudicial power.The evaluation process, just like the
extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also
erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a)
to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a
proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; What a quasi-judicial proceeding involve.In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs.
United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the
determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.

Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon,
op. cit., p. 64).
Same; Same; Same; Same; An investigatory body does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating
the facts and making findings in respect thereto; Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.In Ruperto v.
Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the
sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and
making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising
judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence
submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above description in
Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power
is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether
or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys power is limited to an initial finding of
whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding,
the consequences of which are essentially criminal; In essence the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation.Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request
is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently
rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted.
Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary
arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree
No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It
is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible consequences, we conclude
that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a tool for criminal law
enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal.There is also the earlier case of
Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and
where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as
civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is
civil in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due process is comprised of substantive and procedural due process; The basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well.Due process is
comprised of two componentssubstantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993
Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the
proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may
claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and
shelved aside.Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private
respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the

peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on
the other, it results in an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The accused (as Section
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in
court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the
implementing law. The prejudice to the accused is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements
of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to
be heard.The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be heard, presupposing
foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to clear
himself. This right is two-prongedsubstantive and procedural due processfounded, in the first instance, on Constitutional
or statutory provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of procedure. Substantive due process looks into the
extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his life, liberty and property.
Procedural due processthe more litigated of the twofocuses on the rules that are established in order to ensure
meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding
conducted by or under the auspices of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.Like
public concern, the term due process does not admit of any restrictive definition. x x x Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application that makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as
and when there is a possibility that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused. Verily, whenever
there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices
of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored.
KAPUNAN, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; The evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a
preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional
rights of the person sought to be extradited.While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not
exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic
constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his
house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of
happiness are taken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is
entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them.
Same; Same; Same; Any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a persons constitutional rights is matter of
public concern.With respect to petitioners claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to the documents
relating to the request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a
persons constitutional rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said, injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere, so any violation of ones rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is everybodys concern because they, one
way or another, directly or indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole.
Same; Same; Same; Where the liberty of a person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of
due process rights can never be too early.But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly
expressed, if the right to notice and hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when
the deprivation can still be prevented. Like the filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a petition for
extradition causes immediate impairment of the liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a substantial curtailment of
other rights. His arrest may be immediately ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and
public trial. He will be constrained to seek the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye
would be directed at him with all the concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk,
and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.
QUISUMBING, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; The constitutionally mandated duties of our government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state.The
human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of our
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Extradition; Due Process; Definition of Ex-tradition; It does not apply to persons merely suspected of
having committed an offense but against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness
or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment.Extradition is a well-defined concept and is more a problem in international
law. It is the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign
State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an
offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from
custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed
an offense but against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or
enforcing a civil judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Since a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of international law, he is bereft of rights.Given the
harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only with States and that individuals are not its subject.
For its undesirable corollary is the sub-doctrine that an individuals right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in
extradition law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of
international law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a mere object transported from one state to the other
as an exercise of the sovereign will of the two states involved.
Same; Same; Same; Court should consider whether the constitutional rights invoked by the private respondent have truly
been violated and even assuming so, whether he will be denied fundamental fairness; Private respondent has not proved
entitlement to the right he is claiming.The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an irreconcilable conflict
between the RP-US Extradition Treaty and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the other. Rather, it calls for a
harmonization between said treaty and our Constitution. To achieve this desirable objective, the Court should consider
whether the constitutional rights invoked by the private respondent have truly been violated and even assuming so, whether
he will be denied fundamental fairness. It is only when their violation will destroy the respondents right to fundamental
fairness that his constitutional claims should be given primacy. Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission
that considering all the facts and facets of the case, the private respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is
claiming. The majority holds that the Constitution, the RP-US extradition treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not prohibit
respondents claim, hence, it should be allowed. This is too simplistic an approach. Rights do not necessarily arise from a
vacuum. Silence of the law can even mean an implied denial of a right. Also, constitutional litigations do not always involve a
clear cut choice between right and wrong. Sometimes, they involve a difficult choice between right against right. In these
situations, there is need to balance the contending rights and primacy is given to the right that will serve the interest of the
nation at that particular time. In such instances, the less compelling right is subjected to soft restraint but without
smothering its essence. Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that even assuming arguendo
respondents weak claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondents rights to due process and to information is too
slight to warrant the interposition of judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; In an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be
passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition judge.As admitted in the ponencia itself, an extradition
proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where
there is an accused who can claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an
extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our
executive officials nor by the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is
untrue of criminal proceedings. Even the rules of evidence are different in an extradition proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; A request for respondents arrest does not mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest.Respondent
Jimenez stands in danger of provisional arrest, hence, the need for him to be immediately furnished copies of documents

accompanying the request for his extradition. Respondents fear of provisional arrest is not real. It is a self-imagined fear for
the realities on the ground show that the United States authorities have not manifested any desire to request for his arrest.
On the contrary, they filed the extradition request through the regular channel and, even with the pendency of the case at bar,
they have not moved for respondents arrest on the ground of probable delay in the proceedings. To be sure, the issue of
whether respondent Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a request for provisional arrest
must be made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the request for extradition, the US authorities have
implicitly decided not to move for respondents provisional arrest. But more important, a request for respondents arrest does
not mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be arrested. [Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160(2000)]
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465

January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His
only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's
ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for
the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the
executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of
Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522
containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note
Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida,
and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be
charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than
one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that
the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1,
1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United
States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private
respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the
United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents
submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the
Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence.
Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to
preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under
the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by
the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any
objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained
through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure
orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to
Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular
extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized

disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is
the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal
law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional
trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that
he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the
status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for
the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to
file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E.,
TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST
AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT
ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE
EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND
WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent
Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are
hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day
of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective
memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these
issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings:
During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights
of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the
immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process
leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private
respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this
entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's
basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case,
brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the

propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only
on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves
a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall
be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the
Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of
the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and
place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the
offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law
and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the
Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the
request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain
whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the
person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is
requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of
punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as
applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and
committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in
support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign
Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of
the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are
sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The
lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer
that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue
an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special
proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the
provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon
application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor
upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to
the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules
of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the
required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the
dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature
of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3],
Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military
offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign
Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its
accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department,
in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of
Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities.
Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the
same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition
Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the
extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn,
August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right
to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period
of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings
be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a
manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the
extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly
reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could
not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA
Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition
papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are
not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and
Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based
upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known
as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to

exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative
body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction
(Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory
body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the
facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make
a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body
has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee.
Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore,
sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to
determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an
initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1],
Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that
once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is
submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the
temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only
an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment
sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by
petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in
an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.
Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial
stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against selfincrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under
Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed

physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty.
The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license
as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed
under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in
forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature
of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American
jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute
such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in
nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this
true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for
while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person
charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing
of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the
extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not
authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The
characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It
had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public
good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs.
California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with
which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character
which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the
present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both
the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect
and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process
clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise"
(Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz,

Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents
within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted
by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63,
Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or
like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a
person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary
distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the
subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in
the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the
implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as
swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In
order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the
elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that
the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before
some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state,
and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument
charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory
requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to
confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision
requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing
Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the
Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer

having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the
Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and
judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the
provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S.
Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice.
Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made,
that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2
thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures
admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C.
3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the
extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The
court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b)
the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a
"complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the
crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted
that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character
of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the
alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in
factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this
certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting
government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he
deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to
the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the
Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in
the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the
Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case,
perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as
well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be
given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the
possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that
they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for
efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured
not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end
does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective,
requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless,
accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not
always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles
inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the
strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may
not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been
met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to
deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not
forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition
papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly
authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers
in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot
just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that
urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and
deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it
results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the
request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No.
1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The
prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which
reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to
information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is
an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the
guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On
the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which
are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters
requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his
right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the
conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and
may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas,
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official
records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S.
Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of
foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that
the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that
the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done;

hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall
under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the
extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict
between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to
a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules
of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable
in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed.,
p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international
law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op.
cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy
of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two
components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings.
From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the
propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior
thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an
"ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process
rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose
no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request
for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the

same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this
stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at
any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures
on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both
procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional
arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential
Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which
states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when
the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective
extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide
therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions
are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs.
NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor
Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the
Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be
given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree
No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661
[1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under
Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of
the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing
Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and
Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or
dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be

informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum
requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and
to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of
liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable
action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may
be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in
the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the
land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must
ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684
having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.
Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.