SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000]

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.

NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas
the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages and P10,000.00
for attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. Petitioner claims absence of factual and legal basis for
the award of damages.
*

The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas
resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by
the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where
the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on
a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital
on condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be
divided equally between her and Nestor. Jksm
Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased
husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of
conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing!
x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio.
Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."
[1]

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives of the
Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were
able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo
against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence. Florence
denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a
relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his
accusation and threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter
learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. Chief

As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent
that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with
him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas
spouses declined as they could no longer cope with their commitments to their clients and
customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors fidelity resulting in
frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her
husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and
payment of damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas
spouses filed a civil suit against him for damages.
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being
Florence's lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the
Concepcion family which was why he sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence's son
Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter. Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain
aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then only casually asked the
latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the
following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private
respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is basis to review the facts which are of
weight and influence but which were overlooked and misapplied by the respondent appellate
court. Esm
Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was
without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses
does not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve prying into the privacy of
anothers residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another.
Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly
overlooked, misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if considered, would
change the verdict. Impugning the credibility of the witnesses for private respondents and the
manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by the trial court,
petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge
who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses
of respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision
rendered was flawed. Esmsc
[2]

[3]

The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the
assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. The reason behind this is that the
Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Thus it
accords the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented before it. Esmmis
[4]

[5]

The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of
witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its
factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears
that the trial court erred. In this respect, the Court is not generally inclined to review the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative,
conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled
by the trial court of origin. This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where
the judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the case, because not having heard
the testimonies himself; the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts to
make such determination.
[6]

[7]

[8]

However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not
the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render
his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest
opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses speak nor observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not find any misapprehension
of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of
public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and
evaluated by the judge himself.
Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual
findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record
convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by
different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant evidence consistent with their
claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise,
everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the service, the case cannot
be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable. Esmso
According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and
persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous observation,
for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory
incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in
the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation being repeated in
the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict
with the allegation in the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous
significance since an allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be
proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls,
not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the credibility of the
witnesses. But not in the instant case. Msesm
It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons
they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel
who was not named as a possible witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that
Villaruels testimony is not credible and should never have been accorded any weight at all,
petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruels residence and that of
private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the formers number being No. 223 M.

Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so,
petitioner concludes, Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo
and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruels testimony that at the time of the incident
complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent to that of the
Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated. What is definite
and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.
There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private
respondents but these are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower
court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with on minor details
and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.
[9]

[10]

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the
Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioners posture that no legal provision
supports such award, the incident complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the
Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less
than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no
uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every
system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the
statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human
personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights
of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind. Exsm
[11]

It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated
in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal
provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other
similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a persons dignity,
such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217 of the
Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
[12]

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive,
scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he
made an appointment to see Nestor through a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could
talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said
that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florences
husband). How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he
would protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not
say. Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about
[13]

the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not
let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront
Nestor, even in public, to the latter's humiliation. Kyle
Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent,
had never seen him before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his
subsequent declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack of knowledge about the
business venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how the business was going, what
were the collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that the name
of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name
Florence and Allem, the name of Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the
rumor between him and Florence which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared
Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who were the source of his information. Nestor
went with him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor. Kycalr
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and
why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to
confront Nestor face to face, invade the latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the
presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him - a married man - of
having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private respondent much
shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without
feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before
there was none. This is why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner
demanding public apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored. Calrky
If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then
there would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer,
immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from petitioner, file an action for
damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek redress bespeaks of the
validity of their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at great
length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why
the Nicolas spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past,
would sue him for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by
private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas
spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise her name would be
messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for her to
decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding
Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit, is AFFIRMED. Mesm
SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Decision penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores, RTC-Br. 167, Pasig City.

Translation: " Nestor, you are Bings paramour! So she gave you P100,000.00 which you, together with your wife,
brought to Baguio and you came back leaving your wife behind so that you and Bing could spend all the time
together for your immoral purposes."
[2]
Art. 26. - Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; (2) Meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing or humiliating another on account of
his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
[3]
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel,
slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to
disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering in a funeral); (10) Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 x x x x
[4]
Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, G.R. No. 126363, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 385;
Sarmiento v. CA, G.R. No. 110871, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 656.
[5]
People v. Aquino, G. R. No. 125906, 16, January 1998, 284 SCRA 369.
[6]
People v. Lagao, G. R. No. 120279, 27 February 1998, 286 SCRA 610.
[7]
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 96412, 24 August 1998, 294 SCRA 512.
[8]
People v. Gecomo, G.R. Nos. 115035-36, 21 February 1996, 254 SCRA 82.
[9]
People v. Obello, G. R. No. 108772, 14 January 1998, 284 SCRA 79.
[10]
People v. Ebrada, G. R. No. 122774, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 353.
[11]
Report of the Civil Code Commission, p. 32.
[12]
Caguioa, Eduaro, P., Comments and Cases on Civil Law, Vol. I, 1959 Ed., p.41.
[13]
TSN, 4 March 1988, p. 14.
*

[1]

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M No. P-04-1925. December 16, 2004]

COURT PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT OF

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-San Carlos City, complainants,
vs. OSCAR LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the
very nature of their duties and responsibilities, government employees must faithfully
adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public
office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.
[1]

The Case
This case originated from a Complaint lodged by the court employees of the Office
of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, against Oscar T. Llamas, cash clerk II of the same Office, charging
respondent with discourteous, disrespectful and unbecoming conduct.
The Complaint had initially been referred for investigation, report and
recommendation to Dagupan City RTC Judge Luis M. Fontanilla, who prayed for and
was granted inhibition from hearing the case on the ground that two of the signatories
of the Complaint were close to him. The case was thereafter referred to Vice-Executive
Judge Silverio Q. Castillo of the same RTC, who likewise prayed for and was granted,
on justifiable grounds, inhibition therefrom. The case was finally referred to Judge
Crispin C. Laron of the Dagupan RTC, Branch 43.
[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

The Facts
In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. dated January 25, 2000,
herein complainants, all of whom are employed in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
[6]

RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, labeled respondent as a troublesome and

arrogant court employee.
Respondent Oscar Llamas is a brother of Judge Victor T. Llamas, who used to
preside over Branch 56 of the San Carlos RTC. Animosity between Judge Llamas and
the OCC personnel started when the latter, headed by Atty. Omega L. Moises, testified
in an immorality case filed against the former. Respondent sympathized with his brother
and showed hostility towards his co-employees.
During the hearing of the instant administrative Complaint, Gemma F. Adriano -- one
of the complainants -- testified that while inside the office, respondent showed signs of
belligerence towards the other employees by slamming his drawer, the window
jalousies, as well as the stapler and the puncher. There were occasions when he would
look at them with a hostile expression that would cause anxiety to three female
employees who happened to be in the office at the time.
According to Adriano, respondent also became disrespectful to Atty. Moises by
acting belligerently even in the latters presence. He would also frequently leave the
office without permission, only to be seen drinking wine with his brother-judge during
office hours. With the rising tension in the office, complainants finally decided to file a
Complaint against respondent. From then on, he refused to talk to them.
Myrna de la Cruz, a utility worker, testified that sometime in May of 1998, she had
looked for Oscar Llamas within the court premises, because a person was asking for
him in connection with some cadastral cases. While going down the stairs of the Hall of
Justice, Cruz sprained her foot. She finally found him drinking liquor at Annies
Canteen, where he allegedly had the habit of drinking with other court personnel and
with litigants. She thus felt relieved when he was transferred to the Dagupan RTC.
Manuel de Guzman corroborated the testimony of his-co-complainants. He said
that on January 15, 2000 (a Saturday), while on duty, respondent challenged the brother
of Atty. Moises to a fistfight. On the same occasion, respondent called her (Atty.
Moises) a traitor for causing the withholding of his Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
allowance for the last quarter of 1999. Apparently, she had indicated his frequent
absences in his Daily Time Report (DTR), thereby preventing him from receiving the
allowance.
Atty. Moises added that respondent had been the cash clerk of the Office of the
Clerk of Court from 1997 to 2001 until his transfer to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(Branch 1) of Dagupan in May 2001. She corroborated the testimony of the other
complainants by saying that his attitude was probably due to the fact that some of her
friends at the RTC (Branch 57) had filed charges against his brother, Judge Victor T.
Llamas, for immorality and grave misconduct.
Atty. Moises repeatedly warned respondent about his unprofessional attitude in no
less than three Memoranda. The first Memorandum called his attention to his drinking
sessions during office hours and his highly hostile attitude. She would always request a
member of her staff to call him whenever he was drinking outside the Justice Hall.

The second Memorandum, dated December 2000, called the attention of

respondent to his tardiness and frequent absences. Atty. Moises introduced in evidence
several documents showing that due to his absences and tardiness, he did not receive
his productivity bonus for two years, from 1997 to 1999; his JDF allowance for the last
quarter of 1999; and his salary for February 2000. He was also required to refund the
sum of P5,000 for the month of March 2000. The payroll showed that, for the separate
periods July 1 to 15 and November 1 to 15, the sums of P3,845.92 and P801.03,
respectively, were deducted from his salary.
Atty. Moises testified further that on November 22, 1999, respondent altered his
leave form by making it appear that he had applied for a leave from November 22 to
December 2, 1999; actually, his application was only for November 23 and 24, 1999.
Upon discovering the alteration, she issued forthwith the third Memorandum dated
December 8, 1999.
Respondent did not appear during the hearing, but submitted his Counter-Affidavit
with Position Paper, basically denying the allegations leveled against him. He asserted
that he was a quiet, humble, hardworking and cooperative employee, who performed
any task assigned to him. He explained his absences by saying that he had to drive his
brother, Judge Llamas, to Manila where the hearing of the immorality case was being
conducted.
[7]

Respondent denied ever drinking alcohol during office hours, alleging that the
charges against him were bereft of evidence and had no basis whatsoever. He also
attached an Affidavit executed by Jose P. Cabugao, one of the complainants. Cabugao
said therein that he had been deceived into signing the Letter-Complaint against
respondent. Allegedly, complainants had been convincing other court employees to join
them in their effort to destroy the reputation of Judge Llamas.
Respondent also attached his letter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. dated
November 18, 1999, requesting that the former be detailed to Dagupan City because of
the hostile acts of some of herein complainants -- Atty. Moises, Emmanuel Lacandola,
Manuel Marquez and Angelito Dispo. Such acts allegedly included repeatedly spitting
on the desk of respondent, placing his chair on top of his desk upside down, carrying
firearms inside the office, making threatening remarks against him, staring
provocatively, and slamming doors or desk drawers when he was around.
Respondent pointed out that the prayer for his detail or transfer had become moot in
view of his transfer to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Dagupan City and his subsequent
resignation from the judiciary. He added, Granting, without necessarily admitting that
[he] is guilty of misconduct, the maximum penalty imposable would be dismissal from
service [which] would not be possible for the reason that respondent had already
resigned from his position.
[8]

Evaluation and Recommendation of the

Office of the Court Administrator

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the acts attributed to respondent
supported by substantial evidence. It opined that [a] cash clerk, being a judicial
employee, is expected to act with prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Deviation
from these salutary norms undeniably constitutes misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The OCA asked the Court to adopt the recommendation of
Investigating Judge Crispin C. Laron that respondent be dismissed from service.
[9]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OCA, but modify the penalty.
Administrative Liability
The acts described in the Complaint, the testimony of complainants, and the OCAs
findings of fact can be lumped into the following categories: 1) discourtesy and
disrespect to superiors and co-employees, 2) alcohol drinking, during office hours, 3)
tardiness, 4) absenteeism and 5) falsification of the leave form.
The Court notes that respondent never successfully disputed any of the foregoing
charges against him. His Answer contained mere blanket denials and countercharges
against complainants. While he dismissed the Complaint by alleging that it was only a
malicious plot to discredit him, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the strong evidence
they have piled up against him.
In her December 2, 1999 Memorandum addressed to respondent, Atty. Moises
called his attention to the number of absences he had incurred since January 1999,
totaling 48 as well as to 20 instances of his tardiness. In another Memorandum dated
May 26, 1998, she reminded him that drinking liquor during office hours was considered
an offense under the Civil Service Law; thus, she directed him to observe working hours
and official time.
[10]

[11]

As regards the charge of drunkenness during official time, its veracity is difficult to
determine under the circumstances. Respondent attached to his Answer the Affidavits
of denial executed by the canteen-owners in whose stores he allegedly had his
drinking sprees.
[12]

Nonetheless, he could not explain away the deductions in his salary or his failure to
receive his JDF and productivity pay, which had allegedly been caused by his frequent
absences and tardiness. As a result of these and of his loitering around the premises of
the Hall of Justice even during office hours, his co-workers had to take over and perform
his designated tasks. His explanation that he incurred his absences while driving for his
brother-judge deserves short shrift. As a public servant, the former owes his loyalty, not
to his brother or to any other family member; but, rather, to the institution of which
respondent is a part and, ultimately, to the public he is sworn to serve.

In the third Memorandum dated December 9, 1999, Atty. Moises further called the
attention of respondent to the unauthorized alterations or erasures in his leave form.
He was never able to refute the foregoing charges. However, his allegation that he
applied for a leave during the dates specified, when in truth and in fact he did not, does
not amount to seriousdishonesty. He made the alterations to reflect the number of
absences he had actually incurred, albeit without the approval of his immediate
supervisor. Nevertheless, such act constitutes misconduct.
[13]

[14]

Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the
very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold
sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public
trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
[15]

Neither did respondent deny his brash behavior bordering on discourtesy and
disrespect for Atty. Moises. By banging doors and windows, slamming office supplies,
and staring at everyone with belligerence, he displayed conduct unbecoming a court
employee; it degraded the dignity of the judiciary and undermined the peoples faith and
confidence in it. At all times, employees of the judiciary are expected to accord respect
to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Government
service is people-oriented; high-strung and belligerent behavior has no place therein.
[16]

Rude and hostile behavior often translates a personal conflict into a potent pollutant
of an otherwise peaceful work environment; ultimately, it affects the quality of service
that the office renders to the public. Letting personal hatred affect public performance is
a violation of the principle enshrined in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, a principle that demands that public interest be upheld
over personal ones.
[17]

Improper behavior especially during office hours exhibits not only a paucity of
professionalism at the workplace, but also great disrespect for the court itself. Such
demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and
employee. Thus, the Court looks with great disfavor upon any display of animosity by
any court employee and exhorts every court personnel to act with strict propriety and
proper decorum to earn public trust for the judiciary. Colleagues in the judiciary,
including those occupying the lowliest position, are entitled to basic courtesy and
respect.
[18]

[19]

[20]

In discharging its constitutional duty of supervising lower courts and their personnel,
this Court cannot ignore the fact that the judiciary is composed essentially of human
beings who have differing personalities, outlooks and attitudes; and who are naturally
vulnerable to human weaknesses. Nevertheless, the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates
that court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from any
impropriety -- with respect not only to their duties in the judicial branch, but also to their
behavior anywhere else.
[21]

[22]

Sufficiently proven were the following charges: 1) frequent unauthorized absences,

loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours and 2)
gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. Under Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, the first carries with it, upon its first commission, the minimum penalty of
suspension for six months and one day; the second, the minimum penalty of
suspension for one month and one day.
[23]

That respondent considers himself resigned from the service is of no consequence

to the charges against him. The jurisdiction of the Court was acquired at the time of the
filing of the Complaint; it was not lost by the resignation of respondent from his office
during the pendency of the case. In our Resolution dated July 14, 2003, we held thus:
[24]

Considering the Court Administrators Memorandum dated June 18, 2003, on the
letter of respondent stating that he had already resigned as Cash Clerk II in the Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Pangasinan (detailed in
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Dagupan City, Branch I) effective September 30,
2002 and inquiring among others, whether the instant administrative case should still
be investigated, reporting as follows:
Section 1, Rule XII of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel
Actions (CSC M.C. No. 40, s. 1998) provides:
An officer or employee under investigation may be allowed to resign pending
decision of his case without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings until
finally terminated.
Finally, while indeed respondent tendered his resignation on September 30, 2002,
verification from the Administrative Service, Office of the Court Administrator,
indicates that the resignation of Mr. Llamas has not been accepted or acted upon.
Since respondent has not been reporting for work and considers himself resigned
from the service, the penalty of suspension is no longer viable. Thus, in lieu of
suspension, the penalty of fine equivalent to his salary for a period of six months may
be imposed. This ruling is in line with Section 19 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, which provides:
[25]

The penalty of transfer, or demotion, or fine may be imposed instead of suspension

from one month and one day to one year except in case of fine which shall not exceed
six months.
WHEREFORE, Oscar T. Llamas is found GUILTY of frequent unauthorized
absences, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty during regular office
hours, and gross discourtesy in the performance of official duties, for which he is
hereby ORDERED to PAY a fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months. This sum

may be taken from whatever sums may be due him as retirement, leaves or other
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

[1]

Mirano v. Saavedra, 225 SCRA 77, August 4, 1993.

[2]

See Judge Fontanillas Letter to DCA Perez dated March 5, 2002.

[3]

Third Division Resolution dated September 11, 2002.

[4]

In his letter to Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez dated August 12, 2002, Hon. Silverio Q.
Castillo stated that one of herein complainants -- Jose P. Cabugao -- was his godson, whose wife
was a court interpreter in his court.

[5]

Third Division Resolution dated October 16, 2002.

[6]

The signatories to the Letter-Complaint were Manuel D.G. Marquez (process server), Angelito Dixon C.
Dispo (Clerk III), Jose P. Cabugao, Jr. (Social Welfare Officer II), Myrna P. de la Cruz (utility
worker) and Gemma F. Adriano (Clerk IV).

[7]

Respondents Counter-Affidavit with Position Paper and Discussion of Defenses, dated August 8, 2003;
it was submitted before the RTC, Dagupan City, Branch 44.

[8]

Counter-Affidavit with Position Paper and Discussion of Defenses of Oscar T. Llamas, dated August 8,
2003.

[9]

August 4, 2004, OCA Memorandum, p. 10.

[10]

Exhibit B.

[11]

Exhibit C.

[12]

Affidavits of Helen de la Cruz, dated February 1, 2000; and of Francisco V. Malicdem, dated February
21, 2000.

[13]

Exhibit E.

[14]

Mirano v. Saavedra, supra.

[15]

Supra.

[16]

Macalua v. Tiu Jr., 275 SCRA 320, July 11, 1997.

[17]

2 of RA 6713.

[18]

Zipagan v. Tattao, 418 Phil. 82, September 24, 2001.

[19]

Mirano v. Saavedra, supra, per curiam.

[20]

Amane v. Mendoza-Arce, 318 SCRA 465, November 19, 1999.

[21]

Re: Initial Reports on the Grenade Incident that Occurred at about 6:40 A.M. on December 6, 1999
Submitted by DCAs Zenaida Elepao and Reynaldo Suarez, 419 Phil. 267, October 10, 2001.

[22]

Supra.

[23]

See grave and less grave offenses enumerated in 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

[24]

Office of the Court Administrator v. Diaz, 362 SCRA 580, February 18, 1999.

[25]

See Sevilla v. Gocon, GR No. 148455, February 16, 2004.