SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
*
G.R.No.133743.February6,2007.
EDGARSANLUIS,petitioner,vs.FELICIDADSANLUIS,
respondent.
*
G.R.No.134029.February6,2007.
295
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
295
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtainsavaliddivorceabroadagainsttheFilipinospouse,asinthis
case.
296
296
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
shemaybeconsideredasacoownerunderArticle144oftheCivil
Code.Thisprovisiongovernsthepropertyrelationsbetweenparties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
thatthepropertyacquiredbyeitherorbothofthemthroughtheir
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
therulesoncoownership.Inacoownership,itisnotnecessarythat
the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumedtohavebeenobtainedthrough
297
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
297
PETITIONSforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionand
resolutionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Manuel O. Chan, Jr.forpetitionerEdgarSanLuis.
Ariel VistaforpetitionerRodolfoSanLuis.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
respondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
Beforeusareconsolidatedpetitionsforreviewassailingthe
1
February4,1998Decision oftheCourtofAppealsinCA
G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and3 set aside the
2
September12,1995 andJanuary31,1996 Resolutionsof
theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,Branch134inSP.
4
Proc.No.M3708;anditsMay15,1998Resolution denying
petitionersmotionforreconsideration.
Theinstantcaseinvolvesthesettlementoftheestateof
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
werebornsixchildren,namely:Rodolfo,Mila,Edgar,Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceasedFelicisimo.
_______________
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743,
298
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
Fiveyearslater,onMay1,1968,FelicisimomarriedMerry
LeeCorwin,withwhomhehadason,Tobias.However,on
October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a
5
ComplaintforDivorce beforetheFamilyCourtoftheFirst
Circuit,StateofHawaii,UnitedStatesofAmerica(U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and
6
AwardingChildCustodyonDecember14,1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
FelicidadSanLuis,thensurnamedSagalongos,beforeRev.
Fr.WilliamMeyer,MinisteroftheUnitedPresbyterianat
7
WilshireBoulevard,LosAngeles,California,U.S.A. Hehad
nochildrenwithrespondentbutlivedwithherfor18years
fromthetimeoftheirmarriageuptohisdeathonDecember
18,1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17,
1993, she filed a
8
petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M
3708whichwasraffledtoBranch146thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that,atthetimeofhisdeath,thedecedentwasresidingat
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage,andsonbyhissecondmarriage;thatthedecedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
299
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
299
_______________
9Id.,atpp.1024.
10Id.,atpp.3035.
11Id.,atp.38.
12Id.,atpp.39138.
13
validlycelebratedandadivorceisthereaftervalidlyobtainedabroadby
thealienspousecapacitatinghimorhertoremarry,theFilipinospouse
shallhavecapacitytoremarryunderPhilippinelaw.
14G.R.No.L68470,October8,1985,139SCRA139.
300
300
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
Thereafter,Linda,RodolfoandhereinpetitionerEdgarSan
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the
15
Orderdenyingtheirmotionstodismiss. Theyassertedthat
paragraph2,Article26oftheFamilyCodecannotbegiven
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriagewithFelicisimobecausethiswouldimpairvested
16
rightsinderogationofArticle256 oftheFamilyCode.
OnApril21,1994,Mila,anotherdaughterofFelicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
PresidingJudgeAnthonyE.Santosfromhearingthecase. 17
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid.Meanwhile,themotionfordisqualificationwasdeemed
18
mootandacademic because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pendingtheresolutionofsaidmotion.
19
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge
TensuanonNovember16,1994.Onevendate,Edgaralso
20
filedamotionforreconsideration fromtheOrderdenying
their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not
statethefactsandlawonwhichitwasbased.
21
OnNovember25,1994,JudgeTensuanissuedanOrder
granting the motion for inhibition. The case was reraffled
toBranch134presidedbyJudgePaulT.Arcangel.
_______________
15SeeRecords,pp.155158,160170and181192.
16
301
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
301
_______________
22Id.,atp.301.
23Id.,atpp.302303.
24Id.,atpp.306311.
25Id.,atpp.318320.
26Id.,atpp.339349.
27Id.,atpp.350354.
28Id.,atpp.391393.
302
302
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
WHEREFORE,theOrdersdatedSeptember12,1995andJanuary
31,1996areherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE;theOrdersdated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
29
proceedings.
TheappellantecourtruledthatunderSection1,Rule73of
the Rules of Court, the term place of residence of the
decedent,forpurposesoffixingthevenueofthesettlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation,oractualresidenceorplaceofabodeofaperson
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa.Thus,thepetitionforlettersofadministration
wasproperlyfiledinMakatiCity.
TheCourtofAppealsalsoheldthatFelicisimohadlegal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article26oftheFamilyCodeandtherulingsinVan
Dorn v.
30
31
Romillo, Jr. andPilapil v. IbaySomera. Itfoundthatthe
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolvedbyvirtueofthedecreeofabsolutedivorceissued
bytheFamilyCourtoftheFirstCircuit,StateofHawaii.As
a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent.Thus
With the wellknown ruleexpress mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in
Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
enactmentofE.O.No.227,thereisnojusticiablereasontosustain
303
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
303
_______________
32
from a mistaken finding of fact because the records clearly show that
thedivorcewasobtainedonDecember14,1973(notDecember14,1992)
andthatthemarriageofGov.SanLuiswithrespondentwascelebrated
on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of
theFamilyCodeonAugust3,1988.
33RolloofG.R.No.133743,p.65.
34SeeCARollo,pp.309322,335340,and362369.
35RolloofG.R.No.133743,pp.842.
36Id.,atp.75.
3752Phil.645(1928).
38G.R.No.104960,September14,1993,226SCRA408.
304
304
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
distinguishedfromlegalresidenceordomicile.Thistermresides,
like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be
interpretedinthelightoftheobjectorpurposeofthestatuteor rule
inwhichitisemployed.Intheapplicationofvenuestatutesand
_______________
39 SECTION 1. Where
305
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
305
306
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
provided he
resides therein with continuity and
43
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have
hisresidenceinoneplaceanddomicileinanother.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
FelicisimowasdomiciledinSta.Cruz,Laguna,respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
44
Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchasedtheaforesaidproperty.Shealsopresentedbilling
45
statements fromthePhilippineHeartCenterandChinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented
proofofmembershipofthedeceasedintheAyalaAlabang
46
47
VillageAssociation
andAyalaCountryClub,Inc.,
letter
48
envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
childrentohimathisAlabangaddress,andthedeceaseds
49
callingcards statingthathishome/cityaddressisat100
SanJuanico,AyalaAlabangVillage,Muntinlupawhilehis
office/provincialaddressisinProvincialCapitol,Sta.Cruz,
Laguna.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
residentofAlabang,Muntinlupaforpurposesoffixingthe
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subjectpetitionforlettersofadministrationwasvalidlyfiled
intheRegional
_______________
43 See Boleyley
307
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
307
jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis estate
exceededP200,000.00asprovidedforunderB.P.Blg129,Section19(4).
51 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in
part:
PursuanttotheprovisionsofSection18ofB.P.Blg.129,andSection4ofthe
ExecutiveOrderissuedbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonJanuary17,1983,
declaringthereorganizationoftheJudiciary,theterritorialjurisdictionofthe
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby
definedasfollows:
xxxx
5.BranchesCXXXIItoCL,inclusive,withseatsatMakatioverthemunicipalitiesofLas
Pias,Makati,MuntinlupaandParaaque.xxx
308
308
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
52
inthecasebelowaspetitionershusbandentitledtoexercisecontrol
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
53
allegedconjugalproperty.
_______________
52Supranote14.
53Id.,atpp.139,143144.
309
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
309
This principle
was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
55
IbaySomera wheretheCourtrecognizedthevalidityofa
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
thealienspouseisnotaproperpartyinfilingtheadultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other,hencetheactuationsof
56
onewouldnotaffectorcastobloquyontheother.
57
Likewise,inQuita v. Court of Appeals, theCourtstated
thatwhereaFilipinoisdivorcedbyhisnaturalizedforeign
58
spouse,therulinginVan Dornapplies. Althoughdecided
on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtainedin1954whentheCivilCodeprovisionswerestill
ineffect.
ThesignificanceoftheVan Dorncasetothedevelopment
oflimitedrecognitionofdivorceinthePhilippinescannotbe
_______________
54Id.,atp.144.
55Supranote31.
56Id.,atp.664.
57G.R.No.124862,December22,1998,300SCRA406.
58 Id., at p. 414; See also Republic
October5,2005,472SCRA114,121.
310
310
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
311
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
311
Assuch,theVan Dorncaseissufficientbasisinresolvinga
situationwhereadivorceisvalidlyobtainedabroadbythe
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph2,Article26thereof,ourlawmakerscodifiedthe
lawalreadyestablishedthroughjudicialprecedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
andproductiveofnopossiblegoodtothecommunity,relief
64
in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairswherethealienspouse
_______________
63Id.,atpp.119121.
64Goitia
v. Campos Rueda,35Phil.252,254255(1916).
312
312
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
obtainsavaliddivorceabroadagainsttheFilipinospouse,
asinthiscase.
65
66
PetitionersciteArticles15 and17 oftheCivilCodein
statingthatthedivorceisvoidunderPhilippinelawinsofar
asFilipinosareconcerned.However,inlightofthisCourts
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his
own country if
67
the ends of justice are to68 be served. In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, theCourtstated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results;
andlikewise,wemayadd,byitspurposes.Itisacardinalrulethat,
in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably,thelawshouldneverbeinterpretedinsuchaway
astocauseinjusticeasthisisneverwithinthelegislativeintent.An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motivesofthelegislature,istorender justice.
Thus,weinterpretandapplythelawnotindependentlyofbutin
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
status,conditionandlegalcapacityofpersonsarebindinguponcitizens
ofthePhilippines,eventhoughlivingabroad.
66 ART. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
uponinaforeigncountry.
67Supranote14atp.144.
68G.R.No.L72873,May28,1987,150SCRA259.
313
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
313
Applyingtheabovedoctrineintheinstantcase,thedivorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowedFelicisimotoremarry,wouldhavevestedFelicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as
314
314
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
xxapersondiesintestate,administrationshallbegranted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
survivinghusbandorwife,ornextofkin,requeststohaveappointed,if
competentandwillingtoserve;xxx.
315
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
315
Aninterestedpersonhasbeendefinedasonewhowould
bebenefitedbytheestate,suchasanheir,oronewhohasa
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest
must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or
75
contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interestedpersonwhohasadirectinterestintheestateof
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validityofthedivorceandFelicisimoscapacitytoremarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then
she may be
76
considered as a coowner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code.Thisprovisiongovernsthepropertyrelationsbetween
partieswholivetogetherashusbandandwifewithoutthe
(1962).
76
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full: When a man and a
womanlivetogetherashusbandandwife,buttheyarenotmarried,or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
andsalariesshallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.
316
316
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
San Luis vs. San Luis
thecoownersshallbepresumedequal,unlessthecontrary
77
isproven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
boththedivorceandthemarriage,theapplicableprovision
wouldbeArticle148oftheFamilyCodewhichhasfilledthe
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulatingthepropertyrelationsofcoupleslivingtogether
78
as husband and wife but are79incapacitated to marry. In
Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred80before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The
Courtdescribedthepropertyregimeunderthisprovisionas
follows:
The regime of limited coownership of property governing the
union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
appliestopropertiesacquiredduringsaidcohabitationinproportion
totheirrespectivecontributions.Coownershipwillonlybeuptothe
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry.Absentproofoftheextentthereof,theircontributionsand
correspondingsharesshallbepresumedtobeequal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by
thepartiestoabigamousmarriageandanadulterousrelationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisitionofthepropertyisessential.xxx
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competentevidenceandreliancemustbehadonthestrengthofthe
partysown
_______________
77 Valdes
v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297; 260
SCRA221,228(1996).
78 Francisco
No.151967,February16,2005,451SCRA494,506.
79G.R.No.150611,June10,2003,403SCRA678.
80Id.,atp.686.
317
VOL.514,FEBRUARY6,2007
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318