C
MADRIGAL TRANSPORT V. LAPANDAY
HOLDINGS CORP., G.R. NO. 156067, AUGUST 11,
2004 MATA
The special civil action for certiorari and appeal
are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive;
they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is
available,certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed
remedy of appeal.
Facts:
On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal
Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 49. Later, on February 21, 1998,
petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
Respondents
Lapanday
Holdings
Corporation
(Lapanday),
Macondray
and
Company,
Inc.
(Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 36.
In the latter action, Madrigal alleged that it had
entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday
for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service
the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines, Inc
however, despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo
had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del Monte
charter hire contracts.
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court
(RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent.On March
30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday,
Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions
to Dismiss on the complaint for damages filed by the
Petitioner.
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the
Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of
action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency
Law, the trial court opined that upon the filing by
Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the
latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for
Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to
prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed
assignee.
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration(MR), but was denied by the said
court July 26, 1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998(the one
which granted the MD of the Complaint for damages)
and the July 26, 1999( the one which denied the MR)
Orders of the trial court.On January 10, 2000, the
appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the
instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be
treated as one for review as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal
was available. This was later on challenged by the
Respondents via their MRs. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Madrigals Petition for Certiorari. The CA
opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was
final and thus the proper subject of an appeal,
not certiorari. It averred that even if the Petition could
be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be
XI.F
TOPACIO V. ONG, G.R. NO.
DECEMBER 18, 2008 CABUENAS CLEA
179895,
Principle:
The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by a quo warranto proceedings, and it cannot
be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a
motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista
Party v. De Vera, the Court ruled that prohibition does
not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of
a public officer.
FACTS: Petitioner via the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeks to prevent Justice Ong from
further
exercising
the
powers,
duties
and
responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
In Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, the Court enjoined
Ong from accepting an appointment to the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming
position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all
necessary steps, through appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and
citizenship.
Ong immediately filed with the RTC a Petition for the
amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation
of an entry in his Certificate of Birth. The RTC granted
his petition and recognized him as a natural-born
citizen.
Petitioner implored respondent OSG to initiate posthaste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the
latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan because Ong failed to meet the
citizenship requirement form the time of his
appointment.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
Yes.
While denominated as a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, the petition partakes of the
nature of a quo warranto proceeding with
respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to
declare null and void his appointment as an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for
being unconstitutional. While the petition
professes to be one for certiorari and
prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo
warranto" aspect of the petition.
Being a collateral attack on a public officer's
title, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition must be dismissed.
The title to a public office may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings; and it cannot be assailed
collaterally, even through mandamus or a
motion to annul or set aside order. In
Nacionalista Party v. de Vera, the Court ruled
that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the
validity of the appointment of a public officer.
. . . [T]he writ of prohibition, even when
directed against persons acting as judges or
other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a
substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully
called upon to perform any of the functions of
the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de
facto , the title to the office and the right to act
cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an
intruder takes possession of a judicial office,
the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief
through a writ of prohibition commanding the
alleged intruder to cease from performing
judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition
is an improper remedy by which to determine
the title to an office.
1.
2.
HELD:
1. No.
The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion,
much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG
in deferring action on the filing of a quo
warranto case until after the RTC case has been
terminated with finality. A decision is not
Jurisdiction
Exercise
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the
authority to hear
and determine a
cause
Where
there
is
jurisdiction of the
person and subject
matter, as we have
said before, the
decision
of
all
other
questions
arising in the case
is but an exercise
of that jurisdiction.
of
QUICK DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner Morabe filed the original petitionin
the CFI of Manila praying that the respondent be
ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his
reinstatement. The latter was dismissed by the
respondent on the ground that he was one of the
complainants in an investigation conducted by the
petitionerof charges against the respondent that the
latter paid his employees beyond the time fixed in
Republic Act No. 602.
The CFI rendered judgment finding that the
dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is
unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage
Law. The court, however, refused to grant an order for
the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the
ground that this remedy, which it considers as an
injunction, is available only against acts about to be
committed or actually being committed, and not
against past acts.
ISSUE:WON the CFI erred in not ordering the
respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service.
HELD: YES.
The authority to
decide a cause at
all, and not the
decision rendered
therein, is what
makes
up
jurisdiction.
Facts:
The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari
by the petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly
acting without jurisdiction on the case involving the
cockpit license permit of Constancio Joaquin which the
petitioner, in his capacity of the Caloocan Municipal
President revoked to operate. Respondent judge
apparently issued a provisional license upon the filing
of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction without notice to
the petitioner. The petitioner now files a motion for
certiorari before the higher court against the
respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for
issuing the mandatory injunction of provisional license.
Its not a PROVREM 2015 5
2.
Long Digest
Facts:
The Province of Tarlac instituted action for the
condemnation of certain parcels of land for the
construction of the Capas-Murcia Diversion road
against herein petitioners Abad. A compromise
agreement was entered into between said province
and the petitioners for the payment to the latter of the
agreed value of their lands. The respondent judge
approved the compromise in a partial decision
rendered by himand ordered the parties to comply with
the conditions therein set forth.
Subsequently, the provincial fiscal, in behalf of
the Province of Tarlac, moved for the reconsideration of
the decision on the ground that in giving his assent to
the compromise, he acted under the mistaken belief
that the prices fixed therein had been approved by the
appraisal committee of the provincial government, and
that the Province of Tarlac, at the time of the
compromise, had no longer any authority to
expropriate the lands, because by virtue of Executive
Order No. 71, the Capas-Murcia Diversion road was
declared a national highway under the authority of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.