522189

research-article2014

JOS0010.1177/1440783314522189Journal of SociologyLesiska

Article

The European backlash

against immigration and
multiculturalism

Journal of Sociology
2014, Vol. 50(1) 3750
The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/1440783314522189
jos.sagepub.com

Magdalena Lesiska
University of Warsaw, Poland

Abstract
Europe forms an interesting laboratory for studying political reactions to mass immigration and
integration of ethnic minorities during times of political turbulence and economic crisis. Political
leaders of mainstream parties, under pressure from critics of intensified immigration and now
from the social effects of the Great Recession, act reactively and defensively. They respond to
a political backlash against immigration and to concerns about unemployment and job security
by criticizing (mainly illegal) immigrants for welfare parasitism, reluctance to integrate and even
criminality. Such criticism generates a climate of suspicion and hostility towards immigrants and
legitimizes policies that restrict immigration and immigrant rights. The leaders also describe
multiculturalism portrayed as uncritical acceptance of cultural diversity as a failure, and
suggest more realistic (read: less tolerant, more assimilationist) policy strategies.

Keywords
backlash politics, ethnicity, EU, immigration, multiculturalism

As noted by many analysts and observers, the European Union (EU) its political leaders
and the general population has been undergoing a significant shift in attitudes towards
immigrants and ethnic minorities (e.g. Berezin, 2009). The widespread acceptance of
immigrants, including crisis immigrants, and a tolerant attitude towards ethnic minorities, including ethno-racial and ethno-religious minorities, is giving way to calls for
stricter control of immigration and assimilative integration of minorities. These calls, formerly monopolized by the political fringe, now come from mainstream political forces
and their leaders, and they are followed by policy measures that limit immigration and
propose more restrictive, less tolerant management of ethnicity. It is important to stress,
though, that (1) the criticisms of open door immigration policies coming from
Corresponding author:
Magdalena Lesiska, University of Warsaw, Centre of Migration Research, Banacha street 2B, 02-097
Warsaw, Poland.
Email: m.lesinska@uw.edu.pl
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Journal of Sociology 50(1)

mainstream political leaders, while very influential, are also more moderate and nuanced
than those coming from the leaders of fringe movements; (2) the principal targets of criticism are uncontrolled immigrants: illegals, refugees and asylum seekers; (3) the
restrictive measures proposed and implemented by the leaders of the mainstream parties,
while less tolerant than in the past, do not violate key liberal principles, such as racial and
religious tolerance and freedom of movement; and (4) both the immigration rhetoric and
the policies evolve constantly, usually in response to changing economic circumstances.
Thus it is not all immigrants, but rather the problematic categories of immigrants that are
the targets of critical concerns, though these concerns are easily generalized to all immigrants. The labour market immigrants, especially those from within the EU, are regarded
as less problematic. If they attract criticism, it comes mainly from union leaders who are
worried about cheaper and less demanding foreign competitors. Similarly, there seems to
be a widespread sympathy for genuine refugees from violence and persecution in crisisafflicted regions, while illegals and economic refugees attract less sympathy.
The restrictive measures introduced over the last decade have curtailed immigration
and reduced welfare entitlements for the newcomers. They have also shifted the cultural
climate and public opinion from celebration of cultural diversity as an asset to widespread concern about its socially fragmenting impact. This shift of public attitudes and
government policies should not be exaggerated as an anti-liberal backlash. It is rather
a cultural and policy adjustment that follows quite radical right-populist anti-immigration mobilizations. What often escapes the attention of political observers is the fact that
such adjustments are relatively minor and defensive in nature. They coincide with
widespread political backlash against the mainstream parties. But they do not reverse an
overall liberal direction of EU reform strategies, especially the liberalization of the
labour market.
As usual, behind these defensive reactions and the accompanying critical discourses
there are some facts, ranging from widely publicized social pathologies caused by malintegration of some immigrant categories: petty crime, welfare abuses, as well as rare but
highly publicized gangsterism and terrorism. These pathologies form a new thematic
thread in the statements of political leaders linking immigration with the post-9/11 terrorist campaigns and security scares, the liberalization of labour markets, ethno-racial
conflicts, and the economic slow-down with its attendant fiscal and employment problems. Thus the changing attitudes and policies towards immigrants should be seen as
parts of political responses to a path dependent social process that starts with the revival
of the right-authoritarian movements and parties in the 1990s, followed by the post9/11 security scares. Both revived concerns about foreigners, especially those of different culture, skin colour and religion. Political successes of these xenophobic movements
and parties have, in turn, provoked defensive reactions from the leaders of the political
mainstream, thus creating a gradual shift in the views of the elite, in public sentiments
and, eventually, in immigration policies.
The shift has been facilitated by the deteriorating (after 2008) economic circumstances. At the time of the Great Recession, accompanied by increasing unemployment
and social upheavals, anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments are quickly spreading
through the general population. In most cases, however, public sentiments follow cues
as well as arguments coming from above, that is, from political leaders, especially

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the leaders of mainstream political groups. Uncontrolled immigrants, as well as the visible minorities, are portrayed by such leaders as competitors for scarce jobs and welfare,
as a source of imported social problems and as potential security threats.
While the leaders of various extreme movements and groups have been attacking
immigration and multiculturalism for decades, the defensive reaction by mainstream
leaders is relatively new. It started at about the same time as the post-2008 economic
downturn. Within a few months in 201011, at the peak of the European Great Recession,
political leaders in many European countries started to claim that immigrants abuse welfare, pose additional burden to heavily indebted governments, pose threats to social and
political order, and that multiculturalism a tolerant acceptance of cultural diversity
had failed. Moreover, these critical statements have entered mainstream political discourse, spread to the general public, foreshadowed the introduction of more restrictive
immigration policies and legitimized their prompt implementation. They have also proliferated internationally. Particularly influential in that respect were the statements made
by prestigious and popular European leaders Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and
David Cameron subsequently publicized by the mainstream mass media. From there
they easily spill over often in less moderate forms to popular political discourses, thus
facilitating further shifts in policies. Some see it as an emulation of the Dutch model
(such strategies were first articulated and implemented in the Netherlands following the
terrorist-perpetrated assassinations of 2002 and 2004), some as a conservative political
and cultural backlash, and some as a secular shift to post-multiculturalism.
In spite of these diverse interpretive frameworks, the overall direction of change is
seldom disputed. What is less clear and is therefore a focus of this article is the social
and political mechanism of this change: the key actors, the central causalities and political outcomes. It can be argued that the shift was path dependent, reinforced by particular circumstances (a coincidence of socio-economic and socio-political crises), and in the
last decade shaped from above by mainstream political leaders. The last point needs to
be highlighted. While anti-migration and anti-multicultural sentiments have always been
present in public attitudes and the populist rhetoric at the political extremes (especially
the far right), it was the permissive signal from mainstream leaders that started the shift
in attitudes and political strategies of the main EU countries. In line with this proposed
causal model, the article:
(1) outlines the key elements of the new mainstream political discourses on immigration and multiculturalism by major European political leaders, and places
these discourses within the broader political and economic framework of backlash politics;
(2) identifies the key policy strategies foreshadowed by these elite discourses, especially the legal provisions and policy measures introduced during the last decade
in most European countries; and
(3) charts the main directions of the shift, and highlights the differences between the
main European countries. The differences in national migration and integration
policies seem to reflect the severity of the crisis, ethno-national differentiation,
levels of market liberalization, and the widening competition for skilled immigrants in each country.

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The first section presents an analysis of the elite discourse on immigration and integration in the broader context of EU integration. The second contains an examination of
the recent revisions made in law and policy related to immigration and integration in
European countries, and points out a specific convergence of integration approaches
across Europe. The third shifts the focus to national differences between member states
of the EU community, and the concluding section offers a reflection on the political sustainability of the new European strategies concerning migration and multiculturalism.
The political discourse on immigration and its socio-political context. Like America and Australia, Europe has been shaped by periods of intense migration, though, unlike in America and Australia, these migrations in Europe seem to follow a cyclical pattern. Western
European countries have been experiencing waves of mass immigration since the end of
the Second World War, whereas southern and eastern states have cycled from net emigration to net immigration in later decades (e.g. Kaczmarczyk et al., 2012; Livi-Bacci, 2012;
Oklski, 2012).
There have been several waves of mass migration across Europe in the last two generations: population displacements caused by the Second World War, labour migrations
in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, mass importations of foreign workers in the 1970s
and 1980s, and then the massive EastWest movements of people that followed the collapse of communism. Each wave ended with backlash restrictions. For example, the
oil crisis of the 1970s coincided with a Europe-wide anti-immigration backlash and
tightening of immigration laws. Since then, cross-border migrations have been handled
carefully by political elites, and slogans such as control the borders and zero immigration could be regularly heard from representatives of all political parties, left, right and
centre. The current cycle began in the last decades of the 20th century, with the inflow to
Europe of refugees from destabilized and impoverished regions of Africa, the Middle
East and South-East Asia. This inflow triggered a backlash, and anti-immigration movements achieved unexpected electoral success across Europe (Mudde, 1999, 2012).
Political support for these movements was boosted by two developments: the security
concerns awakened by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent terrorist actions, and then the
sudden and sharp economic crisis which developed into the Great Recession. The security scares implicated immigrants and political refugees not only from the Middle East
but from all politically destabilized regions of Asia and Africa. Particularly distressing
and widely publicized were the Islamist assassinations of Pim Fortuyn (2002) and
Theo van Gogh (2004) in the Netherlands, and the bombings in Spain (2004) and London
(2005). These reinforced the political backlash, initially among the populist right, but
then also in the political mainstream. These fears were deepened by the financial crisis,
which soon became a prolonged and deep Great Recession. It proved particularly painful
in the southern and western belt of Europe stretching from Greece to Ireland, with disastrous debt explosions, the bursting of housing bubbles and double-digit unemployment. At the end of the first decade of this century, these social circumstances shaped
themselves into a political perfect storm; as consecutive tidal waves of crisis immigration from Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and South Asia hit Europe, terrorism
generated a climate of fear and suspicion of all extra-European immigrants; the Great
Recession exacerbated these emotions throughout Europe.

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It was, in many senses, also a world-wide storm one with its epicentre in southern
Europe. Immigration has been implicated in all phases of this storm and in all parts of the
world. It sparked intense debates in Asia (especially Vietnam, Bangladesh and Burma),
the USA and Australia. In spite of significant differences in circumstances especially
the severity of recession the anti-immigration sentiments, accompanied by anti-immigration discourses, spread everywhere, and moved from the political fringes to the mainstream. Like the Great Recession, the spread of anti-immigrant sentiments hit Europe
hard. European critics highlighted the economic costs of immigration (job competition,
welfare burdens), worsened social pathologies (ethno-specific crime), security concerns
and, last but not least, the threat to national culture and identity.1
This last theme deserves special attention because it was mobilized in Europe in a
particularly virulent form, and with particularly disastrous consequences. Over the last
few years, the critical discourse in Europe has extended to cover issues of community
cohesion and national culture (e.g. Kymlicka, 2010). Obviously, this reflects a wider
context of debates about integration and national sovereignty within the EU. The Great
Recession seems to have reinforced these older themes by adding further concerns
about national debt, jobs, welfare costs and fiscal burdens. But because the economic
crisis hit selectively affecting mainly the southern and western MediterraneanAtlantic
belt, the critical discourse also diversified in line with the complex geographies of flows
and crises. By 2010, though, the central themes of the re-ignited immigration debate
started to appear in the discourses of popular, mainstream political leaders.
Within a period of a few months, certain top European leaders made very straightforward proclamations criticizing multiculturalism (multiculti, as Angela Merkel called
it) directly fuelling arguments against immigration in Europe (see Box 1). They declared
(in one way or another) that mass migrations are problematic, liberal tolerance has failed
and persisting ethnic diversity generates strain. At the same time, they revived calls from
the right to reduce and control immigration, and to implement more assimilative policies.
This coincided with a wave of popular publications criticizing diversity and multiculturalism, of which Thilo Sarrazins (2010) Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab (translated as
Germany Does Away with Itself), Byron Roths (2010) The Perils of Diversity and the
more recent The Diversity Illusion (2013) by Ed West are prime examples. Suddenly,
immigration has ceased to be desirable, and multiculturalism (multiculti) acquired
negative connotations.
Box 1.
At the beginning of the 60s our country called the foreign workers to come to
Germany and now they live in our country. We kidded ourselves a while, we said:
They wont stay, sometime they will be gone, but this isnt reality. And of course,
[this] approach [to building] a multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to
enjoy each other has failed, utterly failed. (German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
October 2010)2
Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we have encouraged different cultures to live
separate lives, apart from each other, and apart from the mainstream. We fail to provide a

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vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these
segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.
(British Prime Minister David Cameron, February 2011, in Howarth and Andreouli, n.d.)
Multiculturalism is a failure. The truth is that in our democracies, we cared too much about
the identity of the migrant and not sufficiently about the identity of the country that welcomed him. (French President Nicholas Sarkozy, February 2011)3

It should be noted, in addition, that none of the countries whose leaders criticized
multiculturalism has ever embraced genuine multiculturalism a programme of stateaided integration without an expectation of cultural assimilation, originally forged in
Canada and Australia as an alternative to assimilation (as well as the American melting
pot strategy). Germany, France and Spain, in particular, had always been assimilationist in their national approach. Ethno-cultural diversity was tolerated, but within a
restricted band and as cultural ornament, rather than as an integral feature. The UK, a
country with a long tradition of multi-nationalism in the form of the British Commonwealth
and the popular concept of the community of communities has been closer to a true
multicultural model than the continental countries. However, liberal tolerance for multiethnic immigration and cultural diversity in Britain was not backed by any attempts to
aid the integration of immigrants.
The rhetoric of failed integration was followed by a policy shift towards tighter
control and obligatory cultural assimilation. Pre-departure tests to select immigrants
were introduced, as well as assimilative measures in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany,
France, Austria and Belgian Flanders. These were aimed at selecting immigrants who
were willing to integrate and assimilate: to learn the language, upgrade their skills, find
employment, plug into local communities, adopt core cultural values, norms and lifestyle
of the host country.
These measures do not prove that the discourse was free from opportunism. Both
words and deeds played a key role in attracting the political support of the mainstream
parties all of which were losing supporters and capturing some electorates from the
far right (Hainsworth, 2000; Liang, 2007). The growing support for the far right, especially for the anti-immigration movements and parties that had profited from the fear of
terrorism, has worried the political leadership of the mainstream parties, and has influenced the programmes of virtually all European parties.4 The mainstream leaders were
framing the issues differently, though. They avoided the inflammatory rhetoric of the far
right, reduced the degree of emotional appeal (through rational discourse) and avoided
stigmatization. While the rhetoric was different virulent and stigmatizing at the fringe
the themes became very similar. The far right parties have always blamed the immigrants for social ills and have cultivated a climate of fear and hostility towards foreigners. Their leaders talk about foreign invasion, takeover of the country, welfare
parasitism and conspiracies by liberal elites. As always, they scare, blame and inflame.
The mainstream leaders talk about problems of integration, illegal arrivals, failures
to adapt, but they abstain from apportioning blame or attaching a stigma to criminal
minorities, especially avoiding arguments that carry racial overtones. But the agenda of

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the fringe and the mainstream started to converge with the security scares and the deepening economic crisis. Since the beginning of the new century both the mainstream and
the fringe have been targeting audiences vulnerable to anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural sentiments. It was the initial success of the far right that when combined with the
electoral bleedingby the mainstream parties that forced the mainstream leaders into
this game (Norris, 2005).
While the discourse of mainstream political leaders remains moderate resembling a
dog-whistle rather than an open call to arms the discourse among the off-centre
leaders openly utilizes two anti-immigration narrative frames. The first is connected to
public fears of disintegration of the national community and national identity. Mass
immigration, especially from distant cultures, combined with multiculturalism (an elite
social engineering project), is seen as the key threat to national integration and identity.
The second frame employs the fear of crime and terrorism. It is relatively new, and it
targets the actual or presumed enemies of the Christian West, mainly Muslims and
those stereotyped as Muslims (such as Christian Arabs). The two often converge.
Muslims are accused of a lack of effort towards integration, of self-segregation in closed
neighbourhoods, and of placing religious law (Sharia) above the law of the state. They
are also stereotyped as hostile immigrants, harbouring certain anti-western resentments. Interestingly, a growing affinity between these frames can be detected, an affinity
typical of the leaders of the political fringe, and the themes embraced always in the
dog-whistle way by mainstream leaders. In spite of the differences in their vocabularies, arguments and rhetoric, both the mainstream leaders and the leaders of non-mainstream groups have joined in the exploitation of widespread anxiety, uncertainty and
fear. This contributes to a rapid politicization of issues related to immigration and
migrant adaptation, to a competition of political forces in harnessing public fears and
concerns, and as argued in the next section to a shift away from liberal policies sympathetic to immigration and tolerant of wide cultural diversity.
The new immigration and integration strategies. The anti-immigration discourse generated
and amplified by political leaders over recent years is a harbinger of a directional shift
towards much stricter control of immigration, tighter regulation of the selection and
entry processes, and importantly towards more integrative-assimilative settlement
policies. The latter clearly implies the abandoning of multiculturalism, blamed as it is for
mal-integration and its accompanying social pathologies. This is a part of a broader
revival of ethno-nationalism stressing the importance of national culture and identity
(Joppke and Morawska, 2003).
If actions speak louder than words, the amendments recently made to national laws
(summarized in Table 1) are the most compelling evidence of the shift discussed here.
The fact that these modifications all with a similar anti-liberal slant have been introduced more recently, following changes in elite discourses, strongly suggests the directionality of causation: in general, from political leaders and elites, through mass
electorates to legal-administrative regulations. In that sense elite discourses laid the
groundwork, preparing the public for policies and, at the same time, fortifying political
support by playing to popular fears and concerns (often mobilized first by leaders of the
non-mainstream parties and movements).

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Table 1. Provisions of integration law and practices implemented in European states.

Country and year of implementation

Provisions of integration law and

practice

Denmark (2007), France (2007), Germany (2007),

Lichtenstein (2003), the Netherlands (2006)

Language knowledge compulsory

as a requirement for admission
to the country under family
reunification scheme
Obligatory integration courses for
newcomers

Belgium (Flanders, 2004), Denmark (2002), the

Netherlands (1998), Finland (2006) and Sweden (only for
social benefit applicants) (2010)
Austria (2006), Belgium (Flanders, 2004), Denmark
(2006) France (2006), Switzerland (2007)
Austria (2003), Belgium (Flanders, 2004), Czech Republic
(2009), Denmark (2003), Estonia (1993), Finland
(1991), France (2007), Germany (2005), Greece (2005),
Lichtenstein (2009), Lithuania (2003), Luxembourg
(2008), Italy (2011), the Netherlands (2007), Norway
(2005), the United Kingdom (2007)
Austria (1998), Bulgaria (1998), Czech Republic (1993),
Croatia (2012), Denmark (2002), Estonia (1995), Finland
(1991), France (1993), Germany (2000), Greece (2004),
Hungary (1993), Latvia (1994), Lichtenstein (2008),
Lithuania (2003), Luxembourg (2001), the Netherlands
(2003), Norway (2005), Poland (2012), Portugal (2006),
Romania (1991), Slovak Republic (2007), Slovenia (2008),
Switzerland (some cantons), the United Kingdom (2005)

Individual integration contract

Language and/or integration
course and test compulsory for
long-term residence permit

Citizenship test and/or language

test as prerequisite/s for
nationality acquisition

Source: Based on Extramiana and van Avermaet (2011); EUDO Citizenship Observatory (http://eudo-citizenship.eu); European Website on Integration (http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/); Jacobs and Rea (2007); Reichel
(2011); Sartori (2011); Van Oers et al. (2010).

The common themes and political vectors of the policies are quite clear and do not
need explanatory comment; so are the policy intentions (Jacobs and Rea, 2007).
While Table 1 does not require detailed commentary, some specific examples may help
to reveal the direction of the policy shift. The Netherlands is a good choice, because its
elites pioneered many of the measures summarized in Table 1. The Netherlands, a country
known in Europe since the 1980s for its tolerance, warm embrace of multiculturalism,
generous welfare and open-arms policies towards refugees has suddenly changed its policies doubtless in response to the shocks of political assassinations (2002 and 2004) by
Islamist extremists, the growing welfare burden caused by refugees and, most importantly, to political backlash on the far right and in the liberal centre. The Dutch have
formed the first openly anti-immigrant mainstream political party (PW), and have adopted
one of the strictest selection and control policies on the continent.5 Moreover, the Dutch
model has been followed directly (or in part) by many other European countries in recent
years. It includes language tests and introductory courses obligatory for family members
who plan to join relatives in the Netherlands. The costs fall largely on the applicants themselves. Language and integration courses are compulsory for newly arriving non-EU

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citizens, though most of them are subsidized by the national budget. The courses and tests
(now obligatory and widely emulated in other European countries) serve as instruments of
selection. Only those who pass the pre-entry tests gain permission to enter. Participation
in the civic integration courses and passing the exams also became compulsory to qualify
for social benefits and to obtain (or prolong) residence permits. Most of these measures
were introduced following the anti-immigration mobilizations at the turn of the century
triggered by the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and of Theo van Gogh in 2004 (by
a Dutch environmentalist and an Islamist respectively). Both events, and the political
backlash that followed, came as a shock to Dutch society.
The Dutch model has been emulated widely. The Council of Europe reported the
results of surveys conducted in EU countries on language requirements for immigrants
(Extramiana and van Avermaet, 2011). These tests have proliferated and now extend to:
admissions to the country, obtaining permanent residence, and the granting of citizenship. Almost half of the surveyed countries introduced serious changes in their integration policies between 2008 and 2010. Today, the majority of European countries require
language proficiency to obtain a long term residence permit. In most cases language
classes in these countries are financed (or co-financed) by the state, and linguistic instruction is combined with courses designed to build knowledge of the host country. Such
regulations are common also in central and eastern Europe, where the concept of citizenship is more strongly bound to ethnicity, culture and ancestry than in western Europe.
Official justifications of the shift vary widely. In some countries (Austria, Denmark,
France and the Netherlands) the explicitly stated reason was the countrys desire to control and contain immigration (Van Oers et al., 2010: 312), although there is no evidence
of a link between the effectiveness of integration, and the assimilative and compulsory
nature of the newly implemented strategies. After all, the former (more liberal) strategies
and policies, including the original integrative multiculturalism, were aimed at and
achieved considerable success in integrating the previous waves of immigrants. The
irony is that the widely publicized cases of immigrant mal-integration, including the
increased rate of ethno-specific crime, afflict mostly those countries that embraced
assimilationist policies. This issue is returned to in the conclusion.

The logic of the single market

The EU as a revolutionary project for the creation of a truly supranational social, political and economic space is based on liberal principles: freedom of movement of ideas,
goods, services and people. The Schengen system has been implemented progressively
since the mid-1990s and it has greatly facilitated internal mobility within the EU territory. The promotion of a culture of mobility also includes common recognition of
degrees and professional credentials within the EU, common standards in the treatment
of EU citizens and non-citizen long-term residents (Recchi, 2008). This is an essential
part of the project aimed at building a supranational European economy. Although the
founding fathers of the EU also stressed the key role of the common European culture
(besides the economy and common institutions), the progress of the EU integration was
most rapid after the elimination of borders and other legal obstacles to free trade and
movement of persons. The price of this quantum leap in freedom of movement was, first,

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a sudden intensification of work-related mobility and, second, a backlash against this

intensified flow of immigrant workers.
One of the major political problems within the EU today is that it opened its internal
borders and extended its external borders (with recent enlargements) without creating a
common immigration and integration policy. This has had similar political effects to the
creation of a common currency without a set of common fiscal policies. The result is a
widening discrepancy of interests between the member states due to their different levels
of attractiveness to immigrants and immigration profiles. In spite of this, by concentration on socio-economic aspects and avoidance of the most challenging ones, the EUs
political elites were able (with some success) to develop a normative base of common
immigration policy. Since the Tampere summit in 1999, the European Commission (EC)
has been moving towards common immigration and adaptation strategies. At the Tampere
summit, immigration was recognized as a labour market and welfare issue. The leaders
also discussed the role of immigration in compensating for lower fertility rates, especially in rapidly ageing societies (European Commission, 2000). The embryo of the common immigration policy has already been accepted. However its implementation awaits
harmonization, in this case through resolution of issues around the treatment of longterm residents, control of external borders, fighting against illegal migration and the drug
trade, and asylum policy.
Although considerable progress in the development of a common approach was
achieved, the measures are, as yet, non-binding, compliance is voluntary, and policing
takes the form of a limp promotion of good practices by the EU. This soft approach
aims to minimize compulsion, but its result is long delays. The more recent Common
Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU (a part of the common programme for integration agreed in the Hague in 2004), stresses the principles of equal
treatment, secure residence and access to employment and education. These are the provisions intended to ensure immigrants smoothly adaptat to, and participate in, the host
society. The list includes 11 agreed-upon principles concerning employment, education,
open access to institutions, housing and other aspects of welfare. However, due to pressures from the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, clauses that legitimized the use of
integration provisions as an instrument of selection were also included in the proposed
new law, thus resulting in a shift towards more control, more restrictions and a more
assimilative approach.6 The new provisions allow member states to require immigrants
to prove their language fluency and cultural competence in order to be granted admission
and residence.
In 2006 Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French Minister of the Interior, was supported by
the interior ministries of the six largest EU member states in proposing an integration
contract as an obligatory measure throughout the EU. This integration-cum-assimilation
contract (Contrat dacceuilet de lintegration) was implemented in France in 2006. By
signing the contract, immigrants agree to participate in a language and cultural integration course. A successful completion entitles the immigrant to a 10-year residence permit. In case of failure s/he receives only a one-year residence permit. There was also an
attempt to introduce similar provisions (towards obligatory programmes of cultural integration) at the EU level. This measure was proposed by the French government and
included a compulsory EU integration programme based on language ability, commitment

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to the values of the receiving country, and access to employment. The proposal was
eventually rejected by the EU, but these cases illustrate the fact of ongoing governmental
pressures to develop more forceful policies on integration, defined not only at the national
level, as in the past, but also at the level of the EU (Schain, 2009).

Conclusions
Europe has always been open to migrations, and it has always been multicultural in the
sense that it has always contained diverse cultures and promoted tolerance of ethnic diversity. This tradition of openness and tolerance, though, does not make Europe immune to
anti-immigration sentiments and assimilationist policies. Such policies arise in specific
circumstances, at specific junctures of socio-economic and socio-political crises, and they
are imposed from above, rather than pushed up from below. Over the last decade or so,
Europe has been experiencing such a crisis juncture combined with defensive words and
actions by mainstream party leaders. Together, they produced a shift in opinion and policy
against immigrants and ethno-religious minorities. This shift has to be seen in its historical context; it was foreshadowed by security scares, accelerated by the economic downturn and its disastrous social impact, and it shaped the pronouncements of key European
leaders who declared immigration to be problematic and condemned multiculturalism as
a failure. The pronouncements of the leaders were accompanied and politically reinforced by policy measures imposing stricter controls over immigration and more assimilative strategies of migrant integration. All these measures have been introduced in a
climate of anxiety and uncertainty caused by security concerns and the deepening economic crisis. In such a climate the issues of immigration and migrant adaptation have not
only been politicized, economized and securitized, but also Europeanized in the
sense of having been widely disseminated throughout the EU.
The shift, while significant, should not be exaggerated or demonized; it cannot be
compared to the racist or fascist campaigns of the 1920s or 1930s. While extremist rhetoric and violent reactions do appear at the fringe of European politics, all mainstream
European leaders keep a moderate and liberal stance that includes commitment to the
free movements of people. This commitment, though, is increasingly qualified, regulated and restricted. Immigration from outside the EU is curtailed, and free movement
of labour is subjected to constraints. Similarly, the criticism of multiculturalism is not
identical to the call for compulsory cultural assimilation. Rather, it resembles a return to
a traditional integrative assimilationism that has always dominated in continental Europe
(especially in Germany and France), but which was undermined by left-libertarian celebration of diversity in the last decades of the 20th century.
Is this a permanent shift? A look back at the history of migration may incline us to
scepticism. Europe has been going through cycles of liberalization and restrictive regulation of immigration, accompanied both by pro- and anti-multicultural sentiments, and
coinciding both with economic cycles and political upheavals. The current shift, it seems,
reflects some very specific circumstances and an equally specific political trajectory,
both conducive to an anti-immigration backlash. Moreover, the recent shift looks more
like a series of opportunistic knee-jerk responses than a consistent and well-considered
strategy. Further liberalization of the European labour market is likely to clash with the

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Journal of Sociology 50(1)

restrictive immigration controls adopted as a result of concerns since 2008. Therefore it

is tempting to believe that the current shift is temporary one of the cyclical politicalideological shifts that reverses itself or simply passes when circumstances change.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

Notes
1. According to the European Social Survey (2003), half of the respondents expressed resistance to immigration by people belonging to different races or ethnic groups from the majority
population. In a Eurobarometer survey (no. 60/2004) respondents ranked the importance of
immigration as higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, defence and foreign affairs.
2. See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 18 October 2013).
3. See: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/28/the_dis_integration_of_europe (accessed
17 October 2013).
4. The most electorally successful far right anti-immigration parties in Europe are: the Austria
Freedom Party (FP) in Austria; National Front (FNb) and Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium;
Danish Peoples Party (DFP) in Denmark; National Front (FN) in France; Northern League
(NL) in Italy; Party for Freedom (PW) in the Netherlands; Swiss People Party (SVP) in
Switzerland. Three of these won over 15% of the vote in national elections: the Austrian FP
26.9% in 1999, the Dutch PW 15.5% in 2010 and the Swiss SVP 28.9% in 2007. Moreover,
though only in Austria (20025) and Italy (20015, 200811), these parties have been a part
of the national government (Mudde, 2012). It should be underlined that strong and charismatic leadership (e.g. Jrg Haider in Austria, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France or Geert Wilders
and the assassinated Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands) is also a key factor in the success of
these parties.
5. The preamble of the Modern Migration Policy Act, which came into force on 1 June 2013,
says openly that present Dutch policy is based on an economic and selectivity approach:
This Act will render the Netherlands more appealing to much needed migrants for the
reinforcement of our economy, culture and science. Selectivity is the point of departure
of the Modern Migration Policy. This means that the policy is inviting to migrants for
whom there is an economic need and that it is restrictive against others. It will make
the Netherlands a more attractive country for international companies and knowledge
migrants and this may contribute to a reinforcement of the Dutch economy. (Government
of the Netherlands, 2013)
6. See Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 2003 on the right to family reunification and the
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 2008. See also Groenendijk (2010: 1011).
Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, in
accordance with national law (Article 7.2. of Directive 2003/86/EC):
The European Commission agrees [] d) to regulate family migration more effectively
by inviting each Member State, in compliance with the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to take into consideration in
its national legislation, except for certain specific categories, its own reception capacities

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Lesiska

and families capacity to integrate, as evaluated by their resources and accommodation in

the country of destination and, for example, their knowledge of that countrys language.
(European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 2008)

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Author biography
Magdalena Lesiska is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director in Centre of Migration Research at
University of Warsaw (CMR UW). Her present research area includes migration policy at national
and EU level, citizenship policy, political and public participation of immigrants.

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