CHAVEZ VS NHA

FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising
constitutional issues on the JVA entered by
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino
issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this
time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many
Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility
studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost
housing
project,
thus,
Smokey
Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP),
came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer
Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in
government
projects.
Thereafter,
Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP,
among others. The same MO also established
EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and
evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be
assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs
venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc.
(RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President
Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of
Smokey Mountain for eventual development into
a
low
cost
housing
complex
and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to
fully finance the development of Smokey
Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at
the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the
commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain
will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If
the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual
agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project
plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be
agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I
and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing,
levelling-off
the
dumpsite,
and
construction of temporary housing units for the
current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a
fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal
of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR

after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and
restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design
changes and additional work to be done to
successfully implement the project. The original
3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased
to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling
component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The
revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as
an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by
the legislature which made the establishment of
an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On
August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be
later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No.
33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties
agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that
34 temporary housing structures and 21
permanent housing structures had been turned
over by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been
granted the power and authority to reclaim lands
of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given
the power and authority by DENR to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands considered as
alienable and outside the commerce of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed
lands when there was no declaration that said
lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of
reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI
was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is
barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of
public domain
Whether respondents can be compelled
disclose all information related to the SMDRP

to

Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the

instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and
on behalf of the National Government. This does

not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The

requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project
are approval by the President (which were
provided
for
by
MOs),
favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a
part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and
undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract
of PEA or by the National Government Agency
(NHA is a government agency whose authority to
reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is
derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission,
the DENR is deemed to have granted the
authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the
DENR which are exercises of its power of
supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was
the President via the abovementioned MOs that
originally authorized the reclamation. It must be
noted that the reclamation of lands of public
domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and
disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino
and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President
Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the
lands have been deemed to be no longer needed
for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39
that these are to be disposed to qualified
beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have
already been necessarily reclassified as alienable
and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the
NHA can acquire property rights and interests and
encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may
deem appropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted
a public bidding of the right to become its joint
venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project.
It was noted that notices were published in
national newspapers. The bidding proper was
done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May
18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states
that a contractor can be paid a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino
equity can acquire the same. In addition, when
the lands were transferred to the NHA, these
were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by
which it has the power to sell the same to any
qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the
Filipino people to information on matters of public
concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and
Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had

already been terminated by virtue of MOA
between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights
in question after the passage of around 10 years
from the start of the projects implementation
cannot be disturbed or questioned.
The
petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time
SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to
question the said project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.

GMMSWM VS. JANCOM

The present petition for review on
certiorari
challenges
the
[1]
Decision dated December
19,
2003 and
Resolution[2] dated May 11, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 78752 which
denied the petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioners Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid
Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) and their Motion for Reconsideration,
respectively.
In 1994, Presidential Memorandum Order
No. 202 was issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos creating an Executive Committee to
oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for
the waste disposal sites in San Mateo, Rizal and
Carmona, Cavite under the Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) scheme.
Respondent Jancom International
Development
Projects
Pty.
Limited
of Australia (Jancom International) was one of the
bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site. It
subsequently entered into a partnership with
Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name JANCOM
Environmental Corporation (JANCOM), its corespondent.
On February 12, 1997, the above-said
Executive
Committee
approved
the
recommendation of the Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee to declare JANCOM as the sole
complying bidder for the San Mateo Waste
Disposal Site.
On December 19, 1997, a Contract for the
BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste
Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal
Waste Disposal Site[4] (the contract) was entered
into by the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Presidential Task Force on
Solid
Waste
Management
through
then
Department
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Secretary Victor Ramos, then Cabinet
Office for Regional Development-National Capital
Region Chairman Dionisio dela Serna, and then
MMDA Chairman ProsperoOreta on one hand, and
JANCOM represented by its Chief Executive
Officer Jorge Mora Aisa and its Chairman
Jay Alparslan, on the other.

On March 5, 1998, the contract was

submitted for approval to President Ramos who
subsequently endorsed it to then incoming
President Joseph E. Estrada.
Owing to the clamor of the residents of
Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the
closure
of
the San
Mateo landfill. Petitioner
GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not
to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as
reasons therefor the passage of Republic Act
8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of
1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site,
and costly tipping fees.[5]
The Board of Directors of Jancom
International thereafter adopted on January 4,
2000 a Resolution[6] authorizing Atty. Manuel
Molina to act as legal counsel for respondents
and determine and file such legal action as
deemed necessary before the Philippine courts in
any manner he may deem appropriate against
petitioners.
The Board of Directors of JANCOM also
adopted
a
Resolution[7] on February
7,
2000 granting Atty. Molina similar authorization to
file legal action as may be necessary to protect
its interest with respect to the contract.
On March 14, 2000, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari[8] with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City where it was docketed
as Special Civil Action No. 1955, to declare the
GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of the MMDA
calling for bids for and authorizing the forging
of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste
management as illegal, unconstitutional and void
and to enjoin petitioners from implementing the
Resolution and making another award in lieu
thereof.
By Decision[9] of May 29, 2000, Branch 68
of the Pasig City RTC found in favor of
respondents.[10]
Petitioners thereupon assailed the RTC
Decision via petition for certiorari [11] with prayer
for a temporary restraining order with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59021.
By Decision[12] of November 13, 2000, the
CA denied the petition for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the May
29,
2000 RTC
Decision. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, prompting them to file a petition for
review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
147465.
By Decision[13] of January 30, 2002 and
Resolution[14] of April 10, 2002, this Court affirmed
the November 13, 2001 CA Decision and declared
the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective

and unimplementable pending approval by the

President.
JANCOM and the MMDA later purportedly
entered into negotiations to modify certain
provisions of the contract which were embodied
in a draft Amended Agreement[15]dated June
2002. The draft Amended Agreement bore no
signature of the parties.
Respondents,
through
Atty.
Molina,
subsequently filed before Branch 68 of the Pasig
City RTC an Omnibus Motion[16] dated July 29,
2002 praying that: (1) an alias writ of execution
be issued prohibiting and enjoining petitioners
and their representatives from calling for,
accepting, evaluating, approving, awarding,
negotiating or implementing all bids, awards and
contracts involving other Metro Manila waste
management projects intended to be pursued or
which are already being pursued; (2) the MMDA,
through its Chairman Bayani F. Fernando, be
directed to immediately forward and recommend
the approval of the Amended Agreement to
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo; (3) Chairman
Fernando be ordered to personally appear before
the court and explain his acts and public
pronouncements which are in direct violation and
gross defiance of the final and executory May 29,
2000 RTC Decision; (4) the Executive Secretary
and the Cabinet Secretaries of the departmentsmembers
of
the
National
Solid
Waste
Management Commission be directed to submit
the contract within 30 days from notice to the
President for signature and approval and if the
latter chooses not to sign or approve the
contract, the Executive Secretary be made to
show cause therefor; and (5) petitioners be
directed to comply with and submit their written
compliance with their obligations specifically
directed under the provisions of Article 18,
paragraphs 18.1, 18.1.1 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the
contract within 30 days from notice.[17]
To the Omnibus Motion petitioners filed
their
Opposition[18] which
merited
JANCOMs
[19]
Reply
filed on August 19, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, Atty. Simeon M.
Magdamit, on behalf of Jancom International, filed
before the RTC an Entry of Special Appearance
and Manifestation with Motion to Reject the
Pending Omnibus Motion[20] alleging that: (1) the
Omnibus Motion was never approved by Jancom
International; (2) the Omnibus Motion was
initiated by lawyers whose services had already
been terminated, hence, were unauthorized to
represent it; and (3) the agreed judicial venue for
dispute resolution relative to the implementation
of the contract is the International Court of
Arbitration in the United Kingdom pursuant to
Article 16.1[21] of said contract.

In the meantime, on November 3, 2002,

the MMDA forwarded the contract to the Office of
the President for appropriate action,[22] together
with MMDA Resolution No. 02-18[23] dated June 26,
2002, Recommending to her Excellency the
President of the Republic of the Philippines to
Disapprove the Contract Entered Into by the
Executive Committee of the Presidential Task
Force on Waste Management with Jancom
Environmental Corporation and for Other
Purposes.
By Order[24] of November 18, 2002, the RTC
noted the above-stated Entry of Special
Appearance of Atty. Magdamit for Jancom
International and denied the Motion to Reject
Pending Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Jancom
International filed on December 9, 2002 a Motion
for Reconsideration[25] which was denied for lack
of merit by Order[26] of January 8, 2003.
Petitioners and respondents then filed
their Memoranda[27] on May 23, 2003 and May 26,
2003, respectively.
By Order[28] of June 11, 2003, the RTC
granted respondents Omnibus Motion in part. The
dispositive
portion
of
the
Order
reads,
quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, let an Alias Writ of
Execution immediately issue and
the Clerk of Court and ExOficio Sheriff or any o[f] her
Deputies is directed to implement
the same within sixty (60) days
from receipt thereof.
Thus, any and all such bids
or contracts entered into by
respondent
MMDA
with
third
parties covering the waste disposal
and management within the Metro
Manila after August 14, 2000 are
hereby
declared
NULL
and
VOID. Respondents are henceforth
enjoined and prohibited, with a
stern warning, from entering into
any such contract with any third
party whether directly or indirectly,
in violation of the contractual
rights of petitioner JANCOM under
the BOT Contract Award, consistent
with the Supreme Courts Decision
of January 30, 2002.
Respondent
MMDA
is
hereby directed to SUBMIT the
Amended Agreement concluded by
petitioners with the previous MMDA
officials, or in its discretion if it
finds [it] more advantageous to the
government, to require petitioners

to make adjustments in the

Contract
in
accordance
with
existing environmental laws and
other relevant concerns, and
thereafter forward the Amended
Agreement for signature and
approval by the President of the
Philippines. The
concerned
respondents are hereby further
directed to comply fully and in
good faith with its institutional
obligations or undertakings as
provided in Article 18 of the BOT
Contract.
Let a copy of this Order be
furnished the Office of the Clerk of
Court and the Commission on Audit
for its information and guidance.

[29]

SO
ORDERED.
(Emphasis in the original)

On June 23, 2003 the RTC issued an Alias

Writ of Execution[30] reading:
WHEREAS,
on May
29,
2000, a Decision was rendered by
this Court in the above-entitled
case, the pertinent portions of
which is [sic] hereunder quoted as
follows:
WHEREFORE
, in view of the
foregoing, the Court
hereby
renders
judgment in favor of
petitioners
JANCOM
ENVIRONMENTAL
CORP and JANCOM
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS
PTY.,
LIMITED
OF
AUSTRALIAS
[sic],
and
against
respondents
GREATER
METROPOLITAN
MANILA
SOLID
WASTE
MANAGEMENT
COMM., and HON.
ROBERTO
N.
AVENTAJADO, in his
capacity as Chairman
of
the
said
Committee, METRO
MANILA
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY and HON.
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, in

his
capacity
as
Chairman
of
said
Authority, declaring
the
Resolution
of
respondent Greater
Metropolitan Manila
Solid
Waste
Management
Committee
disregarding
petitioners
BOT
Award Contract and
calling for bids for
and authorizing a
new contract for the
Metro Manila waste
management ILLEG
AL an[d] VOID.
Moreover,
respondents
and
their
agents
are
hereby PROHIBITED
and ENJOINED from
implementing
the
aforesaid Resolution
and
disregarding
petitioners
BOT
Award Contract and
from making another
award in its place.
Let
it
be
emphasized that this
Court
is
not
preventing
or
stopping
the
government
from
implementing
infrastructure
projects as it is aware
of the proscription
under PD 1818. On
the
contrary,
the
Court is paving the
way
for
the
necessary
and
modern solution to
the
perennial
garbage
problem
that has been the
major headache of
the government and
in the process would
serve to attract more
investors
in
the
country.
SO
ORDERED.
WHEREAS, on August 7,
2000, petitioners through counsel
filed
a Motion
for

Execution which
Court GRANTED in its
dated August 14, 2000;

the
Order

WHEREAS,
as
a
consequence thereof, a Writ of
Execution was issued on August
14, 2000 and was duly served
upon respondents as per Sheriffs
Return dated August 27, 2000;
WHEREAS, ON July 29,
2002, petitioners through counsel
filed an Omnibus Motion, praying,
among others, for the issuance of
an Alias Writ of Execution which the
CourtGRANTED in
its Order dated June 11, 2003,
the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, let an Alias Writ of
Execution immediately issue and
the Clerk of Court and ExOficio Sheriff or any of her Deputies
is directed to implement the same
within sixty (60) days from receipt
thereof.
Thus, any and all such bids
or contracts entered into by
respondent MMDA [with] third
parties covering the waste disposal
and management within the Metro
Manila after August 14, 2000 are
hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Respond
ents are henceforth enjoined and
prohibited, with a stern warning,
from entering into any such
contract with any third party
whether directly or indirectly, in
violation of the contractual rights of
petitioner Jancom under the BOT
Contract Award, consistent with the
Supreme
Courts
Decision
of January 30, 2002.
Respondent MMDA is hereby
directed to SUBMIT the Amended
Agreement
concluded
by
petitioners with the previous MMDA
officials, or in its discretion if it
finds [it] more advantageous to the
government, to require petitioners
to make adjustments in the
Contract
in
accordance
with
existing environmental laws and
other relevant
concerns,
and
thereafter forward the Amended
Agreement for signature
and
approval by the President of the
Philippines. The
concerned

respondents are hereby further

directed to comply fully and in
good faith with its institutional
obligations or undertakings as
provided in Article 18 of the BOT
Contract.
Let a copy of this Order be
furnished the Office of the Clerk of
Court and the Commission on Audit
for its information and guidance.
SO
ORDERED.
x x x x (Emphasis
the original)

in

By letter[31] of August 15, 2003, Chairman

Fernando
advised
Sheriff
Alejandro
Q. Loquinario of the Office of the Clerk of Court
and Ex-Oficio Sheriff, Pasig City RTC that:
1.

MMDA has not entered into a

new contract for solid waste
management
in
lieu
of JANCOMs Contract.

2.

JANCOMs Contract has been

referred to the Office of the
President
for
appropriate
action.

3.

Without
the
Presidents
approval, JANCOMs Contract
cannot be implemented.[32]

Petitioners later challenged the RTC June

11, 2003 Order via petition for certiorari[33] with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the CA. They subsequently filed
an Amended Petition[34] on September 26, 2003.
To the Amended Petition JANCOM filed
on October 8, 2003 its Comment[35] after which
petitioners filed their Reply[36] on November 24,
2003.
By the challenged Decision of December
19, 2003, the CA denied the petition and affirmed
the June 11, 2003 RTC Order in this wise:
The Supreme Court ruled
that the Jancom contract has the
force of law and the parties must
abide in good faith by their
respective
contractual
commitments. It is precisely this
pronouncement that the alias writ
of execution issued by respondent
judge seeks to enforce. x x x
xxxx

The fact that the Jancom

contract
has
been
declared
unimplementable
without
the
Presidents signature, would not
excuse
petitioners
failure
to
comply with their undertakings
under Article 18 of the contract.
xxx
xxxx
Petitioners complain that
respondent judge focused only on
requiring them to perform their
supposed obligations under Article
18 of the contract when private
respondents
are
also
required thereunder to
post
a
Performance Security acceptable
to the Republic in the amount
allowed in the BOT Law. Petitioners
complaint is not justified. x x x
xxxx
It cannot x x x be said that
respondent judge had been unfair or onesided in directing only petitioners to fulfill
their own obligations under Article 18 of
the Jancom contract.Compliance with
private respondents obligations under the
contract had not yet become due.
xxxx
There is no debate that the trial
courts Decision has attained finality. Once
a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed
as a matter of right and the granting of
execution becomes a mandatory or
ministerial duty of the court. After a
judgment
has
become
final
and
executory, vested rights are acquired by
the winning party. Just as the losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning
party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
It is true that the ministerial duty
of the court to order the execution of a
final and executory judgment admits of
exceptions as (a) where it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice
to direct the suspension of its execution;
or (b) whenever it is necessary to
accomplish the aims of justice; or (c)
when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment became
final which could render the execution of
the judgment unjust. Petitioners have not
shown that any of these exceptions exists

to prevent the mandatory execution of the

trial courtsDecision.[37] (Italics in the
original)

Petitioners
Motion
for
Reconsideration[38] having been denied by the CA
by Resolution of May 11, 2004, the present
petition for review[39] was filed on July 12,
2004positing that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER
COURT AND IN DISREGARDING THE
FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS:
I
THE
SUBJECT
CONTRACT
IS INEFFECTIVE
AND
UNIMPLEMENTABLE UNTIL AND
UNLESS IT IS APPROVED BY THE
PRESIDENT.

Petitioners go on to argue that since the

contract covers only 3,000 tons of garbage per
day while Metro Manila generates at least 6,000
tons of solid waste a day, MMDA may properly bid
out the other 3,000 tons of solid waste to other
interested groups or entities.
Petitioners moreover argue that the
alleged
Amended
Agreement
concluded
supposedly between JANCOM and former MMDA
Chairman Benjamin Abalos is a mere scrap of
paper, a mere draft or proposal submitted by
JANCOM to the MMDA, no agreement on which
was reached by the parties; and at all events,
express authority ought to have first been
accorded the MMDA to conclude such an
amended agreement with JANCOM, the original
contract having been concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM.
Finally, petitioners argue that respondents
should also be required to perform their
commitments pursuant to Article 18[46] of the
contract.

II
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT ONLY
COVERS THE DISPOSITION OF
3,000 TONS OF SOLID WASTE A
DAY.
III
THE
ALLEGED AMENDED
AGREEMENT IS ONLY A DRAFT OR
PROPOSAL
SUBMITTED
BY
RESPONDENTS.
IV
RESPONDENTS MUST ALSO BE
MADE TO COMPLY WITH THEIR
CONTRACTUAL
COMMITMENTS.
[40]
(Underscoring supplied)
JANCOM filed on September 20, 2004 its
Comment[41] on the petition to which petitioners
filed their Reply[42] on January 28, 2005.
On May 4, 2005, Jancom International filed
its Comment,[43] reiterating its position that it did
not authorize the filing before the RTC by Atty.
Molina of the July 29, 2002Omnibus Motion
that impleaded it as party-movant.
On July 7, 2005, petitioners filed their
Reply[44] to Jancom Internationals Comment.
Petitioners argue that since the contract
remains unsigned by the President, it cannot yet
be
executed. Ergo,
they
conclude,
the
proceedings which resulted in the issuance of an
alias writ of execution ran afoul of the [January
30, 2002] decision of [the Supreme] Court in G.R.
No. 147465.[45]

The petition is impressed with merit in

light of the following considerations.
Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 1. Execution upon
judgments
or
final
orders.
Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment
or order that disposes of the action
or proceeding upon the expiration
of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly
perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied
for in the court of origin, on motion
of
the
judgment
obligee,
submitting therewith certified true
copies
of
the
judgment
or
judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the
entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.

Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic

that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of
right to a writ of execution the issuance of which
is the trial courts ministerial duty, compellable by
mandamus.[47]

There are instances, however, when an

error may be committed in the course of
execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of
a party. These instances call for correction by a
superior court, as where:
1)
2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

the writ of execution varies the

judgment;
there has been a change in the
situation of the parties making
execution inequitable or unjust;
execution is sought to be enforced
against
property
exempt
from
execution;
it appears that the controversy has
never been submitted to the judgment
of the court;
the terms of the judgment are not
clear enough and there remains room
for interpretation thereof; or
it appears that the writ of execution
has been improvidently issued, or
that it is defective in substance, or
is issued against the wrong party, or
that the judgment debt has been paid
or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was
issued without authority.[48] (Emphasis
and Underscoring supplied)

That a writ of execution must conform to

the judgment which is to be executed,
substantially to every essential particular thereof,
[49]
it is settled. It may not thus vary the terms of
the judgment it seeks to enforce,[50] nor go
beyond its terms. Where the execution is not in
harmony with the judgment which gives it life and
exceeds it, it has no validity.[51]
This Courts January 30, 2002 Decision
in G.R. No. 147465 held:
We, therefore, hold that the
Court of Appeals did not err when
it declared the existence of a valid
and perfected contract between
the Republic of the Philippines and
JANCOM. There being a perfected
contract, MMDA cannot revoke or
renounce the same without the
consent of the other. From the
moment of perfection, the parties
are bound not only to the
fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all
the
consequences
which,
according to their nature, may be
in keeping with good faith, usage,
and law (Article 1315, Civil
Code). The contract has the force
of law between the parties and
they are expected to abide in good
faith
by
their
respective
contractual
commitments,
not

weasel out of them. Just as nobody

can be forced to enter into a
contract, in the same manner,
once a contract is entered into, no
party can renounce it unilaterally
or without the consent of the
other. It is a general principle of
law that no one may be permitted
to change his mind or disavow and
go back upon his own acts, or to
proceed contrary thereto, to the
prejudice
of
the
other
party. Nonetheless, it has to be
repeated
that although
the
contract is a perfected one, it
is
still
ineffective
or unimplementable until and
unless it is approved by the
President.[52] (Emphasis
and
Underscoring supplied)

This Courts April 10, 2002 Resolution also

in G.R. No. 147465 moreover held:
x x x The
only
question
before the Court is whether or not
there is a valid and perfected
contract between the parties. As to
the necessity, expediency, and
wisdom of the contract, these are
outside the realm of judicial
adjudication. These considerations
are primarily and exclusively a
matter for the President to
decide. While the Court recognizes
that the garbage problem is a
matter of grave public concern, it
can only declare that the contract
in question is a valid and perfected
one between the parties, but the
same
is still
ineffective
or unimplementable until and
unless it is approved by the
President, the contract itself
providing that such approval
by the President is necessary
for
its effectivity.[53] (Emphasis
and Underscoring supplied)

Article 19 of the contract provides:

Article
19. Effectivity. This
Contract shall become effective
upon approval by the President of
the
Republic
of
[the] Philippines pursuant
to
existing Laws subject to condition
precedent
in
Article
18. This
Contract shall remain in full force
and effect for twenty five (25)
years subject to renewal for
another twenty five (25) years from

the
date
of Effectivity. Such
renewal will be subject to mutual
agreement of the parties and
approval by the [P]resident of the
Republic
of
[the] Philippines.
(Emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)
In issuing the alias writ of execution, the
trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of
the contract despite this Courts unequivocal
pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected,
the contract shall become effective only upon
approval by the President.
Indubitably, the alias writ of execution
varied the tenor of this Courts judgment, went
against essential portions and exceeded the
terms thereof.
xxxa
lower
court
is
without supervisory jurisdiction to
interpret
or
to
reverse
the
judgment of the higher court
x x x. A judge of a lower court
cannot enforce different decrees
than those rendered by the
superior court. x x x
The inferior court is bound by the
decree as the law of the case, and
must carry it into execution
according to the mandate. They
cannot vary it, or examine it for
any other purpose than execution,
or give any other or further relief,
or review it upon any matter
decided on appeal for error
apparent, or intermeddle with it,
further than to settle so much as
has been remanded. x xx[54]

The execution directed by the trial court

being out of harmony with the judgment, legal
implications cannot save it from being found to
be fatally defective.[55]
Notably, while the trial court ratiocinated
that it issued on June 23, 2003 the alias writ to
set into motion the legal mechanism for
Presidential approval and signature,[56] it failed to
take due consideration of the fact that during
the pendency of the Omnibus Motion, the
contract had earlier been forwarded for
appropriate action on November 3, 2002 by
Chairman Fernando to the Office of the President,
with recommendation for its disapproval, which
fact the trial court had been duly informed of
through pleadings and open court manifestations.
[57]

Additionally, it bears noting that the June

11, 2003 Order of the trial court is likewise
indisputably defective in substance for having

directed the submission of the draft Amended

Agreement to the President.
The appellate court, in affirming the June
11, 2003 Order of the trial court, overlooked the
fact
that
the
Amended
Agreement
was unsigned by the parties and it instead
speculated and rationalized that the submission
thereof to the President would at all events solve
the mounting garbage problem in Metro Manila:
We find that the submission
of the Amended Agreement to the
President will break the impasse
now existing between the parties
which has effectively halted the
governments efforts to address
Metro Manilas mounting garbage
problem. x x x
As long as petitioners refuse
to deal with private respondents,
the Metro Manila garbage problem
will only continue to worsen. x x x
That
the
Amended
Agreement could have well been
negotiated,
if
not
concluded
between private respondents and
the former MMDA administration, is
not far-fetched. Petitioners do not
dispute that the President had
referred the Jancom contract to
then MMDA Chairman Benjamin
Abalos
for
recommendation. Petitioners also
do not dispute that private
respondents negotiated with the
MMDA for the amendment of the
contract.
Besides,
the
Amended
Agreement does not veer away
from the original Jancom contract.
x x x[58]

The
Amended
Agreement
was,
as
petitioners correctly allege, merely a draft
document containing the proposals of JANCOM,
subject to the approval of the MMDA. As earlier
stated, it was not signed by the parties.[59]
The original contract itself provides in
Article 17.6 that it may not be amended except
by a written [c]ontract signed by the parties.[60]
It is elementary that, being consensual, a
contract is perfected by mere consent. [61] The
essence of consent is the conformity of the
parties to the terms of the contract, the
acceptance by one of the offer made by the
other;[62] it is the concurrence of the minds of the
parties on the object and the cause which shall
constitute the contract.[63] Where there is merely

an offer by one party without acceptance by the

other, there is no consent and the contract does
not come into existence.[64]
As distinguished from the original contract
in which this Court held in G.R. No. 147465:

The pertinent portions of the letter read:

Attention:
PEREZ
Secretary
Subject:

x x x the
signing
and
execution of the contract by the
parties clearly show that, as
between the parties, there was
concurrence
of
offer
and
acceptance with respect to the
material details of the contract,
thereby
giving
rise
to
the
perfection of the contract. The
execution and signing of the
contract is not disputed by the
parties x x x,[65]

the parties did not, with respect to the Amended

Agreement, get past the negotiation stage. No
meeting of minds was established. While there
was an initial offer made, there was no
acceptance.
Even
JANCOM
President
Alfonso
G. Tuzon conceded,
by
letter[66] of June
17,
2002 to Chairman Fernando, that the Amended
Agreement was a mere proposal:
Apropos to all these, we are
seeking an urgent EXECUTIVE
SESSION on your best time and
venue. We can thresh up major
points to establish a common
perspective based on data and
merit.
We are optimistic you shall
then consider with confidence the
proposed Amended Contract which
incorporates the adjustments we
committed to as stated and earlier
submitted to your Office during the
incumbency of your predecessor,
for evaluation and appropriate
action by NEDA in compliance with
the BOT Law and Article 18.1.1 of
our contract.[67]

HON.

HERNANDO

B.

Request for Opinion

Regarding
the
Compromise
Offer
of Jancom Environmental
Corporation
for
the
Municipal Solid Waste
Management
of
Metro Manila

Dear Secretary Perez:

This
is
to
respectfully
request for an opinion from your
Honorable Office regarding the
Compromise Proposal offered by
JANCOM Environmental Corporation
(JANCOM) in relation to its Contract
for the BOT Implementation of the
Waste Management Project for the
San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal
Site dated 19 December 1997
(hereinafter referred to as the BOT
Contract for brevity) with the
Republic of the Philippines.
xxxx
x x x this representation is
requesting your Honorable Office
to render a legal opinion on the
following:
Does the offer of JANCOM to
temporarily set aside the waste-toenergy plant and implement only
the other two major components of
the BOT Contract amount to
a novation of the BOT Contract,
and therefore necessitating a rebidding? If the same does not
amount to a novation, by what
authority may Jancom set aside
temporarily a major component of
the BOT Contract?
x x x x[69]

While
respondents
aver
that
an
acceptance was made, they have not proffered
any proof. While indeed the MMDA, by a
letter[68] issued by then MMDA General Manager
Jaime Paz, requested then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez for his legal opinion on the
draft Amended Agreement, nowhere in the letter
is there any statement indicating that the MMDA,
or the Republic of the Philippines for that matter,
had approved respondents proposals embodied in
the said draft agreement.

Only
an
absolute
or
unqualified
acceptance of a definite offer manifests the
consent necessary to perfect a contract.[70] If at
all, the MMDA letter only shows that the parties
had not gone beyond the preparation stage,
which is the period from the start of the
negotiations until the moment just before the
agreement of the parties.[71] Obviously, other
material considerations still remained before the
Amended Agreement could be perfected. At any

time prior to the perfection of a contract,

unaccepted offers and proposals remain as such
and
cannot
be
considered
as
binding
commitments.[72]
Respecting petitioners argument that
respondents should be directed to comply with
their commitments under Article 18 of the
contract, this Court is not convinced.
Article 18.2.1 of the contract provides:
18.2.1 The BOT COMPANY hereby
undertakes
to
provide
the
following within 2 months from
execution of this Contract as an
effective document:
a)

sufficient proof of the actual

equity contributions from the
proposed shareholders of the
BOT COMPANY in a total
amount not less than PHP
500,000,000
in
accordance
with the BOT Law and the
implementing
rules
and
regulations;

b)

sufficient proof of financial

commitment from a lending
institution sufficient to cover
total project cost in accordance
with the BOT Law and the
implementing
rules
and
regulations;
c)
to support its obligation
under this Contract, the BOT
COMPANY
shall
submit
a
security bond to the CLIENT in
accordance with the form and
amount required under the BOT
Law. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court held in G.R. No.

147465:
As clearly stated in Article
18, JANCOM undertook to comply
with the stated conditions within 2
months from execution of the
Contract
as
an
effective
document. Since the President of
the Philippines has not yet affixed
his signature on the contract, the
same has not yet become an
effective document. Thus, the twomonth period within which JANCOM
should comply with the conditions
has
not
yet
started
to
run. x x x[73] (Underscoring
supplied)

A final point. The argument raised against

the authority of Atty. Molina to file respondents
Omnibus Motion before the RTC does not lie.
Representation continues until the court
dispenses with the services of counsel in
accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.[74] No substitution of counsel of record is
allowed unless the following essential requisites
concur: (1) there must be a written request for
substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written
consent of the client; (3) it must be with the
written consent of the attorney to be substituted;
and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at
least a proof of notice that the motion for
substitution was served on him in the manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court.[75]
In the case at bar, there is no showing that
there was a valid substitution of counsel at the
time Atty. Molina filed the Omnibus Motion on July
29, 2002 before the RTC, nor that he
had priorly filed a Withdrawal of Appearance. He
thus continued to enjoy the presumption of
authority granted to him by respondents.
While clients undoubtedly have the right
to terminate their relations with their counsel and
effect a substitution or change at any stage of the
proceedings, the exercise of such right is subject
to
compliance
with
the
prescribed
requirements. Otherwise, no substitution can be
effective and the counsel who last appeared in
the case before the substitution became effective
shall still be responsible for the conduct of the
case.[76] The rule is intended to ensure the orderly
disposition of cases.[77]
In the absence then of compliance with
the essential requirements for valid substitution
of the counsel of record, Atty. Molina enjoys the
presumption of authority granted to him by
respondents.
In light of the foregoing disquisition, a
discussion of the other matters raised by
petitioners has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated December 19, 2003 and
Resolution dated May 11, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78752 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The June 11, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68 in SCA
No. 1955 is declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

HENARES VS LTFRB

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of

mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public
utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing
statistics
from
the
Metro
Manila
Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of
1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the National Capital Region, 2 a study of
the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila
Observatory4 and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high
growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in
the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles,
two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their
concomitant
emission
of
air
pollutants,
petitioners attempt to present a compelling case
for judicial action against the bane of air pollution
and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters
(PM) complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine
combustions have caused detrimental effects
on health, productivity, infrastructure and the
overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite
the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine
combustion when these react to other pollutants.
For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons,
oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur
dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form
nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions
also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in
plants. According to petitioner, another emission,
carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely
burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then
inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in
blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the
nervous system and can be lethal to people with
weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new
power generated in the country will use natural
gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel
stations are being phased-out, still with the
projected doubling of power generation over the
next 10 years, and with the continuing high
demand for motor vehicles, the energy and
transport sectors are likely to remain the major
sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us
to the study of the Philippine Environment
Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the
country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu
and Baguio, the exposure to PM 10, a finer PM
which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing
serious health problems, is estimated at over
US$430 million.8 The study also reports that the
emissions of PMs have caused the following:

Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This

loss is valued at about US$140 million.
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic
bronchitis, which is valued at about
US$120 million.
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory
symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging
twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five
to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio),
costs about US$170 million. This is a 70
percent increase, over a decade, when
compared with the findings of a similar
study done in 1992 for Metro Manila,
which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the
Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing
that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have
resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive
pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary
tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers;
and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of
respiratory symptoms among school children and
15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The
studies also revealed that the children in Metro
Manila showed more compromised pulmonary
function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners
infer that these are mostly due to the emissions
of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental
effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners
propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners,
CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of
methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless
and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil
fuel because it produces much less pollutants
than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90
percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel
fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and
cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60
percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur
dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the
only drawback of CNG is that it produces more
methane, one of the gases blamed for global
warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners
contend that the bases for their petition for a writ
of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs
to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section
16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the
Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the
Department
of
Transportation
and
Communications
(DOTC)
as
additional
respondent.

In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC,

the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since
the writ may be issued only to command a
tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act
that is required to be done, when he or it
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the
Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a
discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a
mandamus is, is one in which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in
Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke,
prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners
of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the
Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not
even mention the existence of CNG as alternative
fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to
provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG
as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR
that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749
and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he
says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under
Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required
to set the specifications for all types of fuel and
fuel-related
products
to
improve
fuel
compositions for improved efficiency and reduced
emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the
cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards for motor
vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot
alter, change or modify the emission standards.
The Solicitor General opines that the Court should
declare the instant petition for mandamus
without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the
respondents possess the administrative and
regulatory powers to implement measures in
accordance with the policies and principles
mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically
Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that
under these laws and with all the available
information provided by the DOE on the benefits
of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence
of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and
compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while
air pollution brought about by the emissions of

gasoline and diesel endanger the environment

and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the
performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ
applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be
issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor
General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the
issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS
HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE
ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW

PRESENT

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS

THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT
THE
SUGGESTED
ALTERNATIVE
OF
REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO
USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC
UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do
petitioners have legal personality to bring this
petition before us? Second, Should mandamus
issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use
CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16, 21 Article II of
the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that
bestows on the people the right to breathe clean
air in a healthy environment. This policy is
enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of
this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749.
These, according to petitioners, are the bases for
their standing to file the instant petition. They
aver that when there is an omission by the
government to safeguard a right, in this case
their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge
this omission by the government. This, they say,
is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the
DOTC that are the government agencies clothed
with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same
agencies' awareness and knowledge that the
PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants,
then, the responsibility to see that these are
curbed falls under respondents' functions and a
writ of mandamus should issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his

position that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a
position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains
that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in
Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as
far as setting the maximum limit for the emission
of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as
alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General
avers that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that
would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve
issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners
challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous,
speedy and unchartered course in an issue that
Chief
Justice
Hilario
G.
Davide,
Jr.
in
his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as
"inter-generational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no
dispute that petitioners have standing to bring
their case before this Court. Even respondents do
not question their standing. This petition focuses
on one fundamental legal right of petitioners,
their right to clean air. Moreover, as held
previously, a party's standing before this Court is
a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in
view of the importance of the issue raised. We
brush aside this issue of technicality under the
principle of the transcendental importance to the
public, especially so if these cases demand that
they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an
issue of paramount importance to petitioners for
it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences
of the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of a neglected environment due to
emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect
the
well-being
of
petitioners.
On
these
considerations, the legal standing of the
petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of
mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ
could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
mandamus lies under any of the following cases:
(1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation,

board or person unlawfully excludes another from

the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is legally entitled; and there is
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,25 we said,
It is settled that mandamus is
employed
to
compel
the
performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require
anyone
to
fulfill
contractual
obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review
the exercise of discretion. On the
part of the petitioner, it is essential
to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a
clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. It
never issues in doubtful cases.
While it may not be necessary that
the duty be absolutely expressed,
it must however, be clear. The writ
will not issue to compel an official
to do anything which is not his duty
to do or which is his duty not to do,
or give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law.The
writ neither confers powers nor
imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power
already possessed and to perform
a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to
be recognized and enforced hinges on a
constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act
No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.
Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically
provides that when PUVs are concerned, the
responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. a) The
DOTC shall
implement
the
emission standards for motor vehicles set
pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To
further improve the emission standards,
the Department [DENR] shall review,
revise and publish the standards every
two (2) years, or as the need arises. It
shall consider the maximum limits for all
major pollutants to ensure substantial
improvement in air quality for the health,
safety and welfare of the general public.

Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration
with
the DOTC, DTI
and
LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the
control and management of air
pollution
from
motor
vehicles consistent with the Integrated
Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it
is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission
standards for fuel use and the task of developing
an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are
concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the
line agency whose mandate is to oversee that
motor vehicles prepare an action plan and
implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
We also said, it is clearly the duty of the
responsible government agencies to advance the
said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the
Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer
for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an
alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use
of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG,
there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles.
Executive Order No. 290, entitledImplementing
the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public
Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24,
2004. The program recognized, among others,
natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for
vehicle which has the potential to produce
substantially
lower
pollutants;
and
the
Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing
the beginning of the natural gas industry of the
Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No.
290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG
as a clean alternative fuel for transport.
Furthermore, one of the components of the
program is the development of CNG refueling
stations and all related facilities in strategic
locations in the country to serve the needs of
CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290,
consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002,
designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in
developing the natural gas industry of the
country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b)
in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most
significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC,
working with the DOE, to develop an
implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG
fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs
[natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon

through the issuance of directives/orders

providing preferential franchises in present day
major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in
newly opened routes" A thorough reading of the
executive order assures us that implementation
for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To
a certain extent, the instant petition had been
mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and
adequate
remedy
herein
sought
by
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding
the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel
the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as
a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners
of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB
has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or
franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for
the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.27 The need for future changes in both
legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm.
Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that we give sufficient time and
leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in
this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the
fundamental right to a balanced and healthful
ecology with the twin concepts of "intergenerational
responsibility"
and
"intergenerational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld
the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize,
in this petition, the right of petitioners and the
future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said
that if the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution
even if the right is "assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers [of the
Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to
come. . ."29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case,
it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have

placed on the protection of the environment in

the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as
the statistics are on air pollution, with the present
fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to
the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants
emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in
particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint
the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public
utility vehicles. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental
problems bared
by
herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
AZUCENA O. SALALIMA, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION
and SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM, respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April
12, 2000 as well as its Resolution dated
December 6, 2000, which affirmed the
Employees Compensation Commissions denial
of petitioners claim for compensation benefits
resulting from the death of her husband, Juancho
Salalima, under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended.
Petitioners husband, Juancho S. Salalima, was
employed for twenty-nine years as a route helper
and subsequently as route salesman for the
Meycauayan Plant of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils.,
Incorporated. In 1989, during an annual company
medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed
with minimal pulmonary tuberculosis.2 His illness
remained stationary until October 1994 when
Juancho was confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital to undergo section biopsy. His biopsy
revealed that he had "Adenocarcinoma, poorly
differentiated, metastatic".3 Consequently, he
underwent chemotherapy at the Makati Medical
Center. On February 1, 1995, he was found to be
suffering from pneumonia.4On February 14, 1995,
he was confined at the Makati Medical Center. He
died two days later on February 16, 1995 due to
"Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs with widespread
metastasis to Neck, Brain, Peritoneal Cavity,
Paracaval Lymph Nodes, Abscen; Acute Renal
Failure;
Septicemia;
Upper
Gastrointestinal
5
Bleeding".

A claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626

as amended was filed by his surviving wife,
Azucena, petitioner herein, with the Social
Security System (SSS). In a report dated
November 12, 1998, SSS Branch Manager Elnora
Montenegro and Senior Physicians Corazon
Bondoc and Annabelle Bonifacio recommended
the denial of petitioners claim on the ground that
Adenocarcinoma of the Lungs (Cancer of the
Lungs) had no causal relationship with Juanchos
job as a route salesman.6 Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioner
brought
the
case
to
the
Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed
the decision of the SSS. In its Decision 7 dated
October 7, 1999, the ECC relied upon the Quality
Assurance Medical Report prepared by Dr. Ma.
Victoria M. Abesamis for the SSS stating that
Juanchos exposure to smog and dust is not
associated with the development of lung cancer.8
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals arguing that Juanchos route as a
salesman exposed him to all kinds of pollutants,
not to mention the daily hazards and fatigue that
came with his tasks. She pointed out that the SSS
and the ECC disregarded Juanchos medical
history and the fact that the risk of contracting
Juanchos ailment was increased by the nature of
his work.9 In its Comment, ECC averred that the
presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation prevalent under the Workmens
Compensation Act have been abandoned. Under
the implementing rules of P.D. 626, as amended,
for the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex A of the Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions. The ECC
argued that neither condition is present in
Juanchos case since lung cancer is not an
occupational disease nor is the risk of contracting
lung cancer increased by Juanchos working
conditions.10The SSS joined the arguments of the
ECC and added that petitioner was not able to
present substantial evidence to overcome the
conclusion reached by the SSS that Juanchos
cause of death was not work-connected.11
In her Reply, petitioner cited the raison dtre for
the passage of Republic Act No. 8749, otherwise
known as the Clean Air Act. Petitioner stated that
the Act provides for a comprehensive pollution
control policy that mainly concentrates on the
prohibition of leaded gasoline due to its
scientifically proven deleterious effect on the
health
of
individuals.12 Petitioner
likewise
attached a clipping from the newspaper Manila
Standard13 containing a report stating that if the
present level of diesel exhaust continues, the
pollution could be expected to cause more than
125,000 cases of lung cancer in 70 years.

On April 12, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the decision of the ECC, stating that the factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
ECC, if supported by substantial evidence, are
entitled to great respect in view of their expertise
in their respective fields.14 Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration15 was denied for lack of merit.16
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari,
raising the lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DENYING
PETITIONERS CLAIM UNDER P.D. 626, AS
AMENDED, IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES
ON EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION AND EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
Petitioner claims that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals was premised upon a misapprehension
of the relevant facts of the case at bar. She
anchors her petition on the fact that while the
cause of her husband Juanchos death was
Adenocarcinoma of the lungs, he nonetheless
suffered from two listed occupational diseases,
namely pulmonary tuberculosis and pneumonia,
prior to his untimely demise, which she insists
justifies her claim for death benefits.
We find merit in the petition.
P.D. No. 62617 amended Title II of Book IV on the
ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code.
Under the provisions of the law as amended, for
the sickness and resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the claimant must prove that:
(a) the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
the Rules on Employees Compensation, or (b)
the risk of contracting the disease was increased
by the claimants working conditions.18 This
means that if the illness or disease that caused
the death of the member is not included in the
said Annex "A," then his heirs are entitled to
compensation only if it can be proven that the
risk of contracting the illness or disease was
increased by the members working conditions.
Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the
lungs (cancer of the lungs) which was the
immediate cause of Juanchos death as stated in
his death certificate, while listed as an
occupational disease, is compensable only among
vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. 19 This,
however, would not automatically bar petitioners
claim for as long as she could prove that
Juanchos risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the latters working conditions.20
In the case at bar, there are two conflicting
medical reports on the correlation between
Juanchos work as a route salesman and the
illness he suffered which was the immediate
cause of his demise. Dr. Pablo S. Santos, Coca-

Colas Head of Medical Services, stated in his

report that while Juanchos job does not expose
him to any chemical material used within the
plant, consideration must be given to smog and
dust as factors in the development of his lung
cancer.21 On the other hand, Dr. Ma. Victoria M.
Abesamis of the Social Security System declared
in her report that Juanchos exposure to smog
and dust is not associated with the development
of lung cancer.22
According to medical experts, Adenocarcinoma of
the lungs is one of the four major histologic
varieties of bronchogenic carcinoma, the
characterization being based upon the cell types
that compose the carcinoma. Bronchogenic
carcinoma, more commonly known as lung
cancer, is the term used to designate nearly all
types of malignant lung tumors. Medical books
list the etiology of lung cancers as follows:
cigarette smoking, occupational exposure, air
pollution, and other factors such as preexisting
lung damage and genetic influences.23
We agree with petitioner that the respondent
government agencies failed to take into
consideration Juanchos medical history in their
assessment of the claim for benefits filed by
petitioner. For a considerable stretch of Juanchos
stay at Coca-Cola, he was found to be suffering
from pulmonary tuberculosis. Several months
before his demise, he was diagnosed with
Adenocarcinoma of the lungs. A little over two
weeks before his death, Juancho was afflicted
with pneumonia. The obvious deduction is that
Juancho, from the time he acquired pulmonary
tuberculosis until his passing away, was
predisposed to varied lung diseases.
It is worth noting that tuberculosis is most
commonly confused with carcinoma of the lung
because the highest incidence of both diseases is
in the upper lobe of the lungs and in older men.
The symptoms of both diseases include loss of
weight, chronic cough, blood-streaked sputum
and mild fever.24 Likewise, numerous studies
indicate that scars within the lungs and diffuse
pulmonary fibrosis are associated with a slightly
increased incidence of lung cancer. 25 Tuberculosis
is a disease characterized by lesions in the lungs
as well as tuberculous scars.26 Thus, in light of
Juanchos continued exposure to detrimental
work environment and constant fatigue, the
possibility that Juanchos Adenocarcinoma of the
lungs developed from the worsening of his
pulmonary tuberculosis is not remote.
The degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is
merely substantial evidence, which means, "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the

workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical

opinion to the contrary can be disregarded
especially where there is some basis in the facts
for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone.27 In Juanchos case,
we believe that this probability exists. Juanchos
job required long hours on the streets as well as
his carrying of cases of soft drinks during sales
calls. The combination of fatigue and the
pollutants that abound in his work environment
verily contributed to the worsening of his already
weak
respiratory
system.
His
continuous
exposure to these factors may have led to the
development of his cancer of the lungs.
It escapes reason as well as ones sense of equity
that Juanchos heirs should now be denied
compensation (death) benefits for the sole reason
that his illness immediately before he died was
not compensable in his line of work. The picture
becomes more absurd when we consider that had
Juancho died a few years earlier, when the
diagnosis on him revealed only pulmonary
tuberculosis, his heirs would not perhaps be going
through this arduous path to claim their benefits.
Denying petitioners claim is tantamount to
punishing them for Juanchos death of a graver
illness.
P.D. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned
the presumption of compensability and the
theory of aggravation prevalent under the
Workmens Compensation Act. Despite such
abandonment, however, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or
a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law
in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law
to implement the constitutional guarantee of
social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the
compassionate policy towards labor which the
1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
56174 dated April 12, 2000 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Social Security System is ordered to
pay petitioner Azucena Salalimas claim for death
benefits under the Employees Compensation Act.
SO ORDERED.
SJS VS ATIENZA
In
this
original
petition
for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society
(SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio
S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027.2 Respondent
mayor
approved
the
3
ordinance on November 28, 2001. It became
effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the
police power delegated to local government units,
a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the society. 5 This is
evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which
state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound
urban planning and ensuring health, public
safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining
areas, the land use of [those] portions of land
bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south,
Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr.
M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta,
Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are
hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and
other businesses, the operation of which are no
longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the
date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which
to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence,
disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area
described therein from industrial to commercial
and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and
the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the
oil companies in which they agreed that "the
scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the
most viable and practicable option." Under the

MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the

following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives
stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon
signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale
down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include,
among
others,
the
immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY
EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres
and the commencing of works for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the
Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down
program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall establish joint operations and management,
including the operation of common, integrated
and/or
shared
facilities,
consistent
with
international and domestic technical, safety,
environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of
the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals
shall be limited to the common and integrated
areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering
the commercial and operational terms and
conditions of the joint operations, shall be
entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance
of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned
therein, which shall be taken from the properties
of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the
surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other
hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the
City Council this MOU for its appropriate action
with the view of implementing the spirit and
intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall,
consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU,
enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously
operate in compliance with legal requirements,
within the limited area resulting from the joint
operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall
monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the
provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the
national government shall protect the safety
buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts
at preventing future occupation or encroachment
into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution,

the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was

effective only for a period of six months starting
July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution
No.
139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to
April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to
issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called
for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action
for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory
legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or
repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the
mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2)
of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), 13 to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027
has been superseded by the MOU and the
resolutions.14However, he also confusingly argues
that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent
with each other and that the latter has not
amended the former. He insists that the
ordinance remains valid and in full force and
effect and that the MOU did not in any way
prevent him from enforcing and implementing it.
He maintains that the MOU should be considered
as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting
from
an
office,
trust
or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty that is already
imposed on the respondent and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
performance of the act and it must be the clear
and imperative duty of respondent to do the act
required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to
compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt

exists. The principal function of the writ

of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not
to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the
office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought
is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a
clear legal right to the enforcement of the
ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a
political party registered with the Commission on
Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to
have many members who are residents of Manila.
The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are
allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in
previous
cases
that
when
a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right
and its object is to compel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the
laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila,
petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent
never questioned the right of petitioners to
institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code
imposes upon respondent the duty, as city
mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of
these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief

executive of the city, he has the duty to

enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by theSanggunian or
annulled by the courts.21 He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason
for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty
on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the

statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is

obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered
into by respondent with the oil companies and
the
subsequent
resolutions
passed
by
the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear
or uncertain. This is also connected to the second
issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the
MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s.
2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the
terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified
it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until
April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing
that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the
Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001
attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila
from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a
protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of
the City of Manila, is directed to immediately
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.